Menetlus : 2016/0363(COD)
Menetluse etapid istungitel
Dokumendi valik : A8-0302/2017

Esitatud tekstid :


Arutelud :

PV 30/11/2017 - 2
CRE 30/11/2017 - 2

Hääletused :

PV 30/11/2017 - 8.19

Vastuvõetud tekstid :


Neljapäev, 30. november 2017 - Brüssel Uuendatud versioon

2. Tagamata võlainstrumentide rahuldamisjärgud maksejõuetusmenetluse hierarhias (arutelu)
Sõnavõttude video

  President. – The next item is the report by Gunnar Hökmark, on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, on ranking of unsecured debt instruments in insolvency hierarchy (COM(2016)0853 – C8-0479/2016 – 2016/0363(COD)) (A8-0302/2017).


  Gunnar Hökmark, rapporteur. – Mr President, thank you very much. And I would like to thank the shadows because this has been a very rapid process, a fast-track, in order to ensure that we can very quickly have legal certainty in place on what to do when a bank is in deep problems.

I think an important point of departure is the fact that in the European Union investments are far too low. Investments are at a pre-crisis level. I think it is important to understand and to see that this in itself means a systemic risk and a risk of financial instability. Because, if investments are too low, competitiveness lags behind and jobs are lost, but we are also lacking the growth we need in order to ensure stability in the economic system and the financial system. And that is why it is important to ensure that banks can be stable and at the same time have the strength and opportunity to finance investments.

In the European Union, banks are crucial for this. We have more banks that are crucial for investments than in other economies. Our capital markets are of that kind. That is why it is important that banks can make investments, create markets, can in all ways ensure that we have the investments and the growth that is needed.

This legislation, that we are to adopt today, is about ensuring that when a bank is in deep problems, there will be no discussion that governments or taxpayers shall finance the problems of others. And this is in itself an extremely important signal to markets. First of all, it is a way of ensuring that when you are in trouble, you know what to do. That is why we have this ranking. And that is why we have the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD), because that is how we tell the market that we are going to bail in or do something else with the banks, but not lean on governments.

But a second thing with the BRRD which is, for me, extremely important is telling the market – those who invest in a bank, those who own a bank – do not get into the belief that someone else will save you. This in itself is creating a market discipline that is crucial. My aim with the banking package we are now dealing with is to ensure that we introduce total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC). This will mean even higher security and certainty on what to do when resolving a bank but no higher capital burdens beyond that. Because if we go down that route, it will mean less investment and less opportunities for growth. But the legal clarity we achieve with this hierarchy will safeguard depositors, safeguard taxpayers and will make it known among everyone in the market that you take the same risk when you invest in a bank as when you invest in another company. That is how simple it is.

I would once again like to thank colleagues for the very rapid process, because it is important that we have this cornerstone in the banking union in place. Now we have some other things to do in order to complete the banking union, the financial market and the banking legislation.


  Jyrki Katainen, Vice-President of the Commission. – Mr President, I would like to thank the House very much for its efforts to solve this issue.

As Mr Hökmark already said, the basic idea in this legislation is to make the market economy more healthy, to show where the risks lie and also to create a more solid rule base for the problems which may arise, as happens every once in a while in the market economy. But this piece of legislation does not overshoot the regulation. It just clarifies who is responsible, and for what.

This will enable banks to build up buffers that can absorb losses when the bank fails, without jeopardising financial stability, and without burdening taxpayers. Banks will issue debt under the new statutory category available in all EU Member States. The debt will be ranked just below the most senior debt and other senior liabilities, for the purposes of resolution. It will remain part of the senior debt category, but as an unpreferred tier senior debt.

Clear, harmonised rules on the position of bondholders in the bank creditors’ hierarchy in insolvency resolution will facilitate the bail-in being supplied, by providing greater legal certainty and reducing the risk of legal challenges. This measure will give banks clarity so that they can build up buffers to absorb losses and protect taxpayers. It is also a key, and most cost-effective, way to comply with the global standard on total loss absorbing capacity, which requires global systemically important banks to build up a minimum level of buffers to be used in resolution.

Our ambition is to allow banks and investors to take full advantage of the opportunities of our single market to issue and buy debt, through harmonised solutions.

Once again I would like to thank Parliament, especially Mr Roberto Gualtieri and, of course, Mr Hökmark, as rapporteur, and all the shadow rapporteurs for this file. This was one important piece of the entire banking package. We still have a lot of work to do to finalise the whole banking package and we have to keep working together in a fast and comprehensive way.


  Pedro Silva Pereira, em nome do Grupo S&D. – Senhor Presidente, Senhor Comissário, Caros Colegas, não é todos os dias que se legisla depressa e bem na União Europeia. Por isso, não devemos deixar de assinalar este facto quando temos essa oportunidade.

A verdade é que esta proposta legislativa, que revê a hierarquia dos credores em caso de resolução, conseguiu esse quase milagre: não só foi adotada em procedimento acelerado como conseguiu reunir um amplo consenso, quer neste Parlamento, quer no diálogo que estabelecemos com o Conselho e com a Comissão.

Quero agradecer ao relator, o meu colega Gunnar Hökmark, mas também aos relatores—sombra dos outros grupos políticos, pelo excelente trabalho que tivemos a oportunidade de fazer em conjunto.

Esta proposta legislativa é importante e necessária. Pretende melhorar as regras do chamado bail-in, o resgate interno dos bancos em risco de falência, que foram criadas para proteger o dinheiro dos contribuintes. É necessário que essas regras sejam claras.

Alterámos a hierarquia de credores para criar uma nova categoria de dívida sénior não privilegiada, o que aumenta a capacidade dos bancos de absorverem perdas e de alcançarem a necessária recapitalização.

Devo dizer que o grupo socialista está particularmente satisfeito com o facto de a maturidade contratual da nova classe de dívida sénior não privilegiada ter sido fixada em pelo menos um ano, com o facto de ter ficado estabelecido o grandfathering, ou seja, os novos critérios de elegibilidade podem aplicar-se aos instrumentos de dívida anteriormente emitidos. Ficou também claro que a dívida emitida pelos bancos no quadro da legislação nacional anterior, mas que cumpra os requisitos agora fixados, poderá ocupar na hierarquia de credores a mesma posição da nova categoria de dívida agora criada. Finalmente, e muito importante, ficou clarificado que nada nesta diretiva afeta a possibilidade de os Estados-Membros darem uma proteção acrescida aos depósitos.

Penso, portanto, que temos aqui uma boa solução e esperamos que ela possa ser continuada na revisão da Diretiva DRRB.


  Brian Hayes, on behalf of the PPE Group. – Mr President, I would like to firstly congratulate Gunnar Hökmark for this negotiation, which was brought about in the informal trilogue process but also as part of the banking package. I think it is important that the agreement that has been obtained across the House sends a strong message in terms of how we are going to deal with it, were a crisis to emerge again. It is absolutely clear, when one looks back on the financial crisis 2008-2009-2010 that we did not have the architecture, we did not have the rules, we did not have the instruments as a European Union to respond to that particular crisis.

Coming from a country that went through an appalling banking crisis, where the Irish taxpayers had to bail out the Irish banking system to such a huge level, for us it is crucially important that we moved to a bail-in process. What I very much welcome about this particular instrument is that there is now clarity on the question on non-preferred debt but also on the categorisation of that debt and how that is to work. Had we had that clarity at the time, as part of a bail-in regime, we would not have found the difficulties that were there for our economy – but other economies as well – going through that crisis.

I think it is crucially important that this instrument is now in place, that there is agreement from the Commission, the Council and Parliament on this matter. It is part of the banking package which now seeks to intensify further banking union, which has to be at the heart of all that we are trying to achieve as a modern economic bloc within the world and having these rules with such clarity allows us to do that.

So my congratulations to my colleague, and to other colleagues who worked with Mr Hökmark and indeed the Commission on this very important matter.


  Stanisław Ożóg, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Panie Przewodniczący! Delegacja polska w grupie ECR popiera przedłożoną propozycję zmiany art. 108 dyrektywy o naprawie oraz restrukturyzacji i uporządkowanej likwidacji banków. Dotychczasowe przepisy nie regulują bowiem kwestii podporządkowania niezabezpieczonego długu uprzywilejowanego względem roszczeń wynikających z innych form niezabezpieczonego długu. Takie uregulowanie jest natomiast konieczne, jeśli chcemy, by banki globalne w roku 2019 wdrożyły standard całkowitej zdolności do pokrywania strat. Nowa regulacja ułatwi tym samym stosowanie unijnych przepisów o umarzaniu lub konwersji długu szczególnie w sytuacjach transgranicznych, a na jednolitym rynku unijnym da międzynarodowym inwestorom i bankom globalnym rzecz najbardziej przez nich pożądaną, czyli pewność prawa.

Jednocześnie chcę zwrócić uwagę na konieczność monitorowania implementowanych przepisów, czy aby nie przynoszą nadmiernych obciążeń dla instytucji finansowych.


  Miguel Viegas, em nome do Grupo GUE/NGL. – Senhor Presidente, a presente diretiva harmoniza a posição dos créditos não garantidos no quadro de um processo normal de insolvência. Esta questão tornou-se necessária no quadro da União Bancária e do Sistema Único de Resolução que prevê que todas as instituições financeiras, ditas sistémicas, possam apresentar um nível suficiente de capacidade total de absorção de perdas.

Esta proposta tem o mérito de ser coerente com os princípios e objetivos da União Bancária de substituir a lógica do bail-out pela lógica alternativa do bail-in, ou seja, para assegurar uma resolução sem recursos a fundos públicos é necessário salvaguardar que cada instituição possa apresentar no seu balanço um conjunto de ativos de elevada qualidade que garantam a cobertura dos prejuízos e mantenham o banco a funcionar, pelo menos nas suas funções básicas vitais.

O problema é que a criação e o funcionamento da União Bancária não só não evitaram o recurso a mais fundos públicos como têm promovido a concentração do setor, aumentando o peso das instituições chamadas de demasiado grandes para falir. Não é por acaso que está na agenda a discussão de um mecanismo de backstop para dar solidez a todo o sistema. Ou seja, tudo ao contrário dos objetivos proclamados.

Pela nossa parte, continuamos a acreditar que só um controlo público do sistema financeiro poderá colocar a banca ao serviço da economia e não o contrário.


  Ernest Urtasun, en nombre del Grupo Verts/ALE. – Señor presidente, para mi grupo parlamentario el desarrollo, aplicación y mejora de la Directiva DRRB es imprescindible. Debemos reforzar ese marco para evitar, como ha dicho el ponente, que el dinero de los contribuyentes vuelva a ser usado para rescatar masivamente a la banca. No quiero recordar los datos, por ejemplo, que en mi país el Banco de España ha dado recientemente: que el rescate bancario español le costó al Tesoro español 60 000 millones de euros, que es prácticamente el 6 % del PIB.

Nosotros estamos preocupados, sin embargo, porque este marco en estos momentos tiene dificultades de aplicación, y no solo por lo que ha pasado recientemente con los bancos venecianos, que, al final, como no se quiso ir a la resolución y se fue a la liquidación mediante ley nacional, le han acabado costando al contribuyente italiano 5 000 millones de euros.

O también está el caso del Banco Popular. Como vimos, en estos momentos los agujeros de la aplicación de la DRRB son muy grandes: la señora Koenig nos reconoció, por ejemplo, que en el caso del Banco Popular, cuando ella pidió la lista de fondos y activos disponibles para operar el bail-in, pues esa lista no estaba, no existía, no estaba disponible. Y eso es un problema.

Por lo tanto, hay que avanzar en reforzar la DRRB, en que este Parlamento esté unido en la defensa de su respeto y, evidentemente, lo que decidimos con el paquete de hoy es un paso adelante, porque va a permitir a los bancos mejorar su capacidad de absorción de pérdidas sin recurrir al dinero público.

La única cosa que tengo que lamentar es que nos hubiera gustado que el nuevo producto senior non-preferred que creamos hubiera sido catalogado como producto complejo con arreglo a los criterios de MiFID para proteger a los pequeños inversores. Es una cosa sobre la cual volveremos próximamente porque tenemos el segundo paquete de la BRRD y esa enmienda la vamos a volver a presentar. Pero, a pesar de ello, quiero agradecerle al ponente el trabajo y mi Grupo va a dar su visto bueno a este paquete legislativo.


  David Coburn, on behalf of the EFDD Group. – Mr President, the aim of this directive is to ensure that the global, systematically important banks have the loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity necessary to help ensure that the critical functions can be continued without public finances or financial stability being put at risk, and it is a very good idea. Simply speaking, this report is advocating bail-ins as opposed to bailouts.

As a libertarian, I am in favour of a bailing-in system. Ordinary taxpayers should not bear the burden of a financial crisis caused by banks which are too big to fail and too politically connected to fail. This is still the case in many European countries. In Italy, for example, some of the smaller banks were saved only a few months ago by using taxpayers’ money. It seems that not many lessons from the banking crisis were learned. As a Euro—sceptic, I do not believe in supranational policymaking in general, although Brexit will enable Britain to make our own laws to help keep the financial system in the United Kingdom stable. Nevertheless, I hope EU countries ...

(The President cut off the speaker)


  President. – Mr Coburn, thank you. May I say that the cough does you good because your voice was even louder than usual.


  Marco Zanni, a nome del gruppo ENF. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, con questo provvedimento, ancora una volta, a mio avviso, si è persa un'occasione per correggere, quanto meno in maniera importante, alcune distorsioni della regolamentazione precedente, quindi della BRRD e del bail-in, e per correggere soprattutto, secondo me, uno dei più grandi errori della BRRD e del bail-in, cioè la sua retroattività.

Avrei preferito che il nuovo strumento, che si chiama in questo caso senior non-preferred bond, fosse uno strumento di nuova emissione per tutte le banche, di modo da creare un buffer di capitale per assorbire le perdite, abbastanza grande da, di fatto, escludere dal bail-in, in maniera importante, tutta la mole di debito senior emesso prima dell'entrata in vigore della BRRD e che purtroppo è finito in mano a risparmiatori che in alcuni casi hanno dovuto subire ingenti perdite.

È stato deciso di seguire un altro approccio che, secondo me, porterà a risultati negativi nel futuro. Chiamare senior un prodotto che senior di fatto non è rischia di creare delle distorsioni nella vendita di questi prodotti ai risparmiatori o nell'impacchettamento di questi prodotti in strumenti finanziari che finiscono nelle mani di persone che non riescono adeguatamente a considerare il rischio. Quello che viene fatto con la normativa del bail-in e della BRRD, purtroppo, non va a proteggere i risparmiatori e non va a proteggere neanche i contribuenti.


  Paul Tang (S&D). – Mr President, this is an important piece of the puzzle. We are trying to establish, or what we are trying to work on, is the principle that if you take risk, you cannot shift the cost somewhere else. Bankers take risk; they cannot just catch a return but they need also to carry the cost. That does indeed mean that we aim for a bail-in and not for a bailout, most certainly not by taxpayers. That is a principle, that is clear, but that requires work and I am very pleased to see this proposal and the good work. I would like to thank Mr Gunnar Hökmark and the shadow rapporteurs for their work because what we need is a very clear debt hierarchy. This requires amending the legislation.

I am pleased to see that we have taken a step forward; further steps need to be taken forward. This is also important because we need protection for investors. There should be no misunderstanding about which is senior, which is non—senior, and we have seen this in several countries. We need to take further steps, no doubt, because I am still convinced that we should not bet on one horse, not just on the bail-in, but also look at own capital, at the leverage ratio of our countries, including the Netherlands where the leverage ratio is still very low, and you could say a pre-crisis ratio. So, once again, this is a step forward and we need to take further steps.


  Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner (ECR). – Arvoisa puhemies, käsittelyssä oleva mietintö on välttämätön osa prosessia, jolla pyritään finanssimarkkinoiden normalisointiin kriisin jälkeen. Järjestelemättömät luotot ja järjestelmän kannalta merkittävät pankit uhkaavat edelleen rahoitusmarkkinoiden vakautta ja elpymisen kestävyyttä.

Kolmikantaneuvotteluissa sovittu teksti on osa pankkiunionin rakentamisen osana laadittua pankkipakettia. En kannata uusia yhteisvastuuta lisääviä lainoja, eikä jäsenvaltioiden luoma uusi velkatyyppi sitä tee. Uusi velkatyyppi on tarpeen, jotta voidaan täyttää maailmanlaajuisesti sovitut velkahierarkiavaatimukset kattamaan tappiot selvitystilanteissa ennen muita suurimpien pankkien kokonaistappion kattamiskyvyn ulkopuolelle jätettyjä velkasitoumuksia, kuten johdannaisia, vakuudellisia talletuksia tai verovelkoja. Mietintö on pieni, mutta tärkeä askel kohti veronmaksajien taakan helpottamista tulevissa pankkikriiseissä.


  Bernard Monot (ENF). – Monsieur le Président, l’Union bancaire vise à couper la possibilité de soutien réciproque entre les banques commerciales et l’État membre d’où elles sont originaires. Cet approfondissement fédéraliste vient après la rupture du lien politique et économique entre les nations européennes et leurs banques centrales, qui remonte au traité de Maastricht, et interdit toute possibilité de soutien direct d’un État par sa banque centrale.

Il s’agit bien là, dans les deux cas, de supprimer tout recours financier et soutien économique qu’un État pourrait recevoir, afin d’accroître la pression des marchés financiers. La discipline de marché doit, dans l’esprit allemand, obliger les États à adopter des politiques budgétaires d’austérité. Réciproquement, depuis la BRRD, il est définitivement interdit aux États de soutenir leurs banques en cas de difficultés financières.

Nous estimons qu’il est crucial de revenir en arrière. L’Union européenne ne parviendra jamais à mettre en place une union bancaire en mesure de fonctionner. Il est donc dans l’intérêt des citoyens et des États de défaire l’union bancaire le plus rapidement possible. Réarranger l’ordre juridique interne des États afin d’harmoniser la hiérarchie des créditeurs bancaires ne va donc pas dans la bonne direction. Voter contre ce texte est pour nous un vote de cohérence pour la défense des épargnants contre le bail-in.


  Neena Gill (S&D). – Mr President, the directive we will vote upon later today is critical. It will ensure that taxpayers will not be hit by the possible insolvency and the resolution of a bank. When a bank is failing or insolvent, the new rules will create a creditor hierarchy, a new category of unsecured debt, as well as a harmonised approach towards bondholders. Many people in the EU, and in particular in the UK, have been victims of mis-selling of financial products, which, in the end, appeared to be bail-inable. These new rules will make sure that clients and investors will be better protected by clear mention of the risks and the inclusions in the prospectus.

I am concerned by some supervisors trying to overstretch their powers, as we have seen with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the last couple of weeks, and sometimes with the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). Therefore, it is key that we, as a legislator, make level 1 legislation as clear as possible, and I believe this legislation meets this criterion. Therefore, I would like to congratulate the rapporteur and the negotiating team. I hope this directive is a first step towards an ambitious EU banking reform, ensuring that the banks become more resilient, less risky and supportive of the sustainable economy.


  Νότης Μαριάς (ECR). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, η πρόσφατη χρηματοπιστωτική κρίση αντιμετωπίστηκε με το γνωστό σύστημα· οι ίδιοι οι φορολογούμενοι διέσωσαν τις τράπεζες και στην Ελλάδα και στην Ισπανία και στην Ιταλία και σε άλλες χώρες. Αφού, λοιπόν, οι φορολογούμενοι διέσωσαν τις τράπεζες, τώρα οι τράπεζες επιτίθενται κατά των φορολογουμένων, οι οποίοι βεβαίως βρίσκονται σε δύσκολη οικονομική κατάσταση, υπάρχει πληθώρα κόκκινων δανείων και πλέον οι άνθρωποι αυτοί χάνουν τα σπίτια τους. Αυτό είναι το μεγάλο πολιτικό σκάνδαλο που έχουμε δει τα τελευταία δέκα χρόνια.

Στην Ελλάδα, μάλιστα, έχουν δοθεί επιπλέον προνόμια στις τράπεζες. Όταν λαμβάνουν μέρος σε πτωχευτική διαδικασία, οι απαιτήσεις των τραπεζών προηγούνται πλέον σε σχέση με τις απαιτήσεις των εργαζομένων, τις απαιτήσεις των ασφαλιστικών ταμείων και του δημοσίου. Επιπλέον, κύριε Katainen, να σας πω το εξής: τώρα πλέον οι τράπεζες στην Ελλάδα θα χορηγούν δάνειο και θα καλύπτουν το 75% των ακινήτων που βγαίνουν σε πλειστηριασμό. Δηλαδή, τα «κοράκια» θα παίρνουν πλέον 75% δάνειο για να αγοράσουν τα σπίτια των φτωχοποιημένων Ελλήνων και θα έχουμε μια νέα γενιά κόκκινων δανείων.


  Pervenche Berès (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, lorsque ce Parlement a adopté la directive sur le redressement des banques et la résolution en cas de faillite, notre préoccupation était d’éviter la contagion et l’accès à l’argent des contribuables, en permettant un renflouement interne. En même temps, pour que cela soit viable, les conditions de marché ont été aggravées ou, d’une certaine manière, renforcées avec la montée en puissance à la fois de la législation européenne et des normes internationales, avec la perspective d’entrée en vigueur du TLAC.

Dès lors, il nous fallait organiser la montée en puissance d’un marché permettant aux acteurs d’être prêts afin d’avoir la qualité de dette leur permettant de répondre à ces obligations. De fait, plusieurs États membres avaient lancé leur propre réforme en anticipant la réponse européenne, et le secteur bancaire, depuis l’accord au Conseil de stabilité financière (CSF), fin 2015, était concerné par l’exigence du TLAC. Les marchés, eux-mêmes – comme en témoignent les volumes importants de dettes éligibles au TLAC émis avec succès par les banques –, ont réagi et anticipé les effets de cette réforme.

L’idée est de permettre aux banques de constituer des coussins de dettes subordonnées améliorant leur résolvabilité, sans contraindre de façon indue leur coût de financement. C’est la raison pour laquelle nous pouvons, je crois, nous réjouir que ce Parlement ait contribué à mettre en œuvre ce nouveau type de dette de manière accélérée afin que les acteurs puissent se préparer.

Bien sûr, des questions ont été soulevées en essayant d’utiliser ce véhicule accéléré que nous devrons traiter lorsque nous aborderons la révision de fond de la directive BRRD mais, à ce stade, je crois que l’essentiel est de permettre aux acteurs du marché et au marché lui-même d’anticiper l’entrée en vigueur des nouvelles normes internationales.


Catch-the-eye procedure


  Jean-Paul Denanot (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, effectivement, nous avons vécu des crises bancaires à répétition, auxquelles ont d’ailleurs remédié les contribuables, et il est grand temps, me semble-t-il, que l’Europe légifère pour d’abord protéger les consommateurs et leurs dépôts, ensuite pour permettre aux banques de garantir leur stabilité interne, mais il me paraît encore plus important, par ailleurs, de permettre aux banques de prêter au monde économique afin de relancer l’emploi en Europe.

Ce texte législatif a le mérite d’être équilibré pour répondre à ces trois objectifs. Par la mise en œuvre d’une hiérarchie des créanciers, nous allons stabiliser le réseau bancaire, mais il ne faut pas oublier que nous avons besoin en Europe d’une banque centrale régulatrice ainsi que d’un contrôle parlementaire de tous les mouvements bancaires.


  Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D). – Mr President, I welcome the proposed amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU under opinion as this represents a very much needed effort to implement the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) standard, which was adopted by the G20. I believe that in order to avoid legal uncertainty the TLAC standard requires that liabilities may be eligible for TLAC only if they are subordinated to other liabilities.

As such, I support the proposal for Member States to ensure that ordinary senior debt instruments and other unsecured ordinary senior liabilities have a higher priority ranking in their national insolvency laws than the new non-preferred senior class of debt.

Finally, it is of utmost importance for the Commission to assess whether it is necessary to make further amendments with regard to the ranking of deposits in insolvency, at the latest three years after the date of entry into force of the Directive.


(End of catch-the-eye procedure)


  Jyrki Katainen, Vice-President of the Commission. – Mr President, thank you very much for this discussion. It showed that it was very consensual. We all more or less all support the principles and the text of the legislation.

There are three main points: firstly, it will create legal clarity for bank debt holders; secondly, it will strengthen the internal market and banking sector; and thirdly, it protects taxpayers. Sometimes when discussing these kinds of issues, people feel that it does not make sense that banks take too much risk, and that is why banks are bad and they want to fail. This is not the case. Banks usually do not want to fail on purpose, but we have to understand that banking is just like any business. It may fail, for various reasons, and that is why we have to have an orderly manner to solve these banking problems.

The taxpayers’ role is also very critical here. Taxpayers have sold banks, i.e. investors in the banks, shareholders of the banks, who are usually normal European citizens. There are also sometimes other businesses which have invested in the banks so we have to make sure that the European market economy is functioning well and it has a solid rule base, and even if we are talking about the banking sector, it does not mean that taxpayers should have a greater responsibility to savers, owners, investors or creditors of the banks as they have responsibility in other sectors of business. So this piece of legislation creates much-needed clarity and once again I want to thank this House for its good cooperation.


  Gunnar Hökmark, rapporteur. – Mr President, a few points: this is in some ways a complex piece of legislation with a lot of details, but it is not magic. With this legislation we are not avoiding risks, because financial markets and banking are about analysing risks, taking risks and distributing risks: that is the whole idea. But what we are doing with this legislation – and Mr Tang touched upon this – is ensuring that the risk stays with the risk-taker.

That is the main purpose of this and the purpose of the hierarchy, because it describes the different levels of risk. This means that, as Mr Pereira said earlier, depositors will have the least risk, will be the most safeguarded, with the owners in the first hand and then the subordinated debt.

This is not magic, and it is my firm belief that, when we are asked to proceed with the rest of this banking package, we shall underline that all debt is bail-in-able, because that is creating market discipline. But we shall also ensure that we have clarity, which means that banks can be transparent but also secure, so that they can finance the investments we need, which are needed in the next step to secure financial stability. Thank you very much for this debate. I look forward to the decision which we will take later today.


  President. – The debate is closed.

The vote will take place shortly.

(The sitting was suspended at 9.38)

Written statements (Rule 162)


  Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD), per iscritto. – L'attuale sistema europeo di risoluzione bancaria è incentrato sul meccanismo perverso del bail-in e, se prima non viene realizzata la separazione bancaria, unica riforma in grado di introdurre un'alternativa credibile e concreta al bail-out e a un bail-in sui risparmi dei cittadini, noi non sosterremo altre modifiche, che, di fatto, suonerebbero come una legittimazione dello status quo. La revisione in discussione, inoltre presenta aspetti critici. A fronte dell'introduzione di una nuova classe di titoli di debito che saranno coinvolti tra i primi nell'assorbimento delle perdite in caso di bail-in, non viene infatti prevista alcuna garanzia sostanziale e concreta a protezione della clientela retail, né vengono previsti requisiti di trasparenza che indichino in modo chiaro la più elevata rischiosità di questa classe di strumenti.


  Barbara Kappel (ENF), schriftlich. – Die Reform der Finanzdienstleistungen nach der Finanzkrise 2008–2009 umfasste eine Richtlinie zur Festlegung eines Rahmens für die Sanierung und Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten und Wertpapierfirmen (BRRD). Mit diesen Legislativdokumenten wurde ein Rahmen geschaffen, um die Phase der Sanierung und Umstrukturierung von notleidenden Finanzinstituten wirksam zu bewältigen und so deren negative Auswirkungen auf die Finanzstabilität (Ansteckungseffekte) und die öffentlichen Finanzen (von den Steuerzahlern finanzierte Rettungspakete) zu verringern. Dies wird durch den „Bail-in“ erreicht: einen Mechanismus, bei dem entweder Schulden abgeschrieben oder Verbindlichkeiten gemäß einer vordefinierten Hierarchie in Eigenkapital umgewandelt werden. Um sicherzustellen, dass ausreichende finanzielle Ressourcen für Abschreibungen oder Eigenkapitalumwandlungen zur Verfügung stehen, verlangt die BRRD, dass Finanzinstitute eine Mindestanforderung an Eigenmittel und berücksichtigungsfähige Verbindlichkeiten (MREL) festlegen. Die Vorschriften für besicherte vorrangige Schuldtitel und neu ausgegebene Schuldverschreibungen sind jedoch in den einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten sehr unterschiedlich, sodass ungesicherte Debitoren und Kreditoren in der EU unterschiedlich behandelt werden. Mit diesem Vorschlag wird die Insolvenzgläubigerhierarchie teilweise harmonisiert. Dies ändert die Rangfolge der Inhaber von vorrangigen ungesicherten Bankschuldverschreibungen, die zur Einhaltung der BRRD-Vorschriften in Betracht kommen, sodass Debitoren und Kreditoren von Banken in der gesamten EU gleichwertiger behandelt werden.

Õigusteave - Privaatsuspoliitika