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16. Русия - влиянието на пропагандата върху държавите от ЕС (разискване по актуални въпроси)
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  Preşedintele. – Următorul punct de pe ordinea de zi este dezbaterea tematică privind Rusia influența propagandei asupra statelor din UE (2018/2507(RSP)).

Aș dori să vă informez pe toți că în această dezbatere nu se aplică procedura „catch the eye” și nu se acceptă cartonașe albastre.


  Sandra Kalniete (PPE). – Mr President, Commissioner, colleagues, I will not try to describe all the impacts of Russian propaganda on European countries and societies: instead I will focus on what should be our response.

First we have to recognise, and then to raise awareness and share expertise within the Union. I commend the work of the European External Action Service (EEAS) East StratCom Task Force, the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and the Centres of Excellence for Strategic Communication and for Countering Hybrid Threats, but I regret that the EU capacities are under-funded and under-staffed. The Commission and the EEAS have not heard the alarm bells that have been ringing in this House and in the European capitals since the war against Ukraine.

I invite Commission Vice-President and High Representative Mogherini and other EU leaders to balance their meetings with Lavrov and Putin with due attention to the Kremlin’s attempts to weaken and undermine our democracies and alliances.

Secondly, we have to make our societies more resilient. There are many aspects to this but some require swift legislative action by the House. Through the revised Audiovisual Services Directive we have to mandate national media regulators to adopt a zero tolerance policy against hate speech, irrespective of the media platform, and there is a need for significantly increased transparency of media ownership so that citizens know who’s who in the media they use.

Freedom of speech should be defended against those who use it against our fundamental values. Transparency and stricter regulation are the key words for political-party and campaign funding in the Member States. The EPP Group has called for a major review looking into indirect Kremlin funding of European political protagonists, and particularly into shady support for anti-European and anti-democratic forces in our societies. This is closely linked to the need for enhanced investigation and prevention of money laundering by Kremlin-linked entities through European banks and companies.

Thirdly, we have to consider how we credibly deter the Kremlin from cyber meddling and disinformation operations. When told in no uncertain terms that it will face unpleasant consequences and bear significant costs, the Kremlin tends to listen. But any deterrent is credible only if it is based on capacities and the political will to deploy the instruments available, and once again we need adequate resources at European level. The EU Cyber Security Agency is in its infancy and, if we want to be serious about it, its budget should be increased not twofold but tenfold.

One key to our capacity building in the cyber domain is trans-Atlantic cooperation and NATO, and, given the political dynamics in Washington, European states have to take the lead in any collective action vis-à-vis the Kremlin, as well as in setting international rules for cyber space. Europe drives the global agreement on climate change and it should be among the rule makers for cyber space.

Fourthly, there is no substitute for independent and fact-based journalism. The world’s richest and most powerful publisher, Facebook, has replaced editors with algorithms, shifting entire societies away from critical thinking while making billions from our clicks. I am convinced that quality journalism should be supported by governments, and by the EU, because otherwise it would disappear and leave us all at the mercy of Kremlin and other trolls who have learned how to play the social media game.



  Monika Panayotova, Présidente en exercice du Conseil. – Monsieur le Président, honorables membres du Parlement européen, Monsieur le Commissaire, avant de présenter mon discours sur le sujet du débat, comme je prends la parole pour la première fois devant vous, au nom du Conseil, je voudrais tout d’abord vous dire que je suis ravie d’être à votre disposition au cours de la présidence bulgare.

En tant qu’ancienne députée européenne, je sais très bien à quel point il est important de travailler ensemble, en étroite coopération, pour pouvoir répondre aux attentes de nos citoyens et garantir la légitimité démocratique de l’agenda européen et des politiques de l’Union européenne. Comme nous le rappelle la devise de notre présidence en bulgare, l’union fait la force.

Now I will switch to the language of Shakespeare in order to thank you for inviting the Presidency to intervene on behalf of the Council in this topical debate and on this very topical issue. In this Chamber you have indeed discussed the issue of propaganda and fake news several times in recent months.

As regards Russia, in March 2015, the European Council stressed the need to challenge that country’s ongoing disinformation campaigns. It invited the High Representative, in cooperation with Member States and the European Union institutions, to prepare an action plan on strategic communication. It noted at the same time that the establishment of the communication team was the first step in this regard. As a result, the East StratCom Task Force was launched in September 2015. It has been engaged in developing communication products and campaigns, focused on explaining EU policies in the Eastern Partnership region. This includes proactive communication campaigns, as well as analysing disinformation trends, explaining disinformation narratives and myth—busting.

In November last year, EU Foreign Ministers took stock of the current work on EU strategic communications, in particular as regards outreach to the Eastern Partnership region, the southern neighbourhood and the Western Balkans. They agreed to enhance work further and expressed their support for the development of all three task forces. In December 2017, they decided to reinforce cooperation with NATO partners on countering hybrid threats. Member States have also underlined the importance of expressing positive EU messages in the EU neighbourhood, as well as the need to counter disinformation where and when needed. I am sure that today you will discuss the work and the findings of the East StratCom Task Force, as well as the influence of the reported activities in EU countries.

In their joint communication on resilience in the EU’s external action last June, the High Representative and the Commission noted that the European Union, as well as some of its partner countries, was targeted by external disinformation activities that discredit the political and social systems that are central to our identity, security and stability. They underlined the importance of further developing measures to increase citizens’ resilience to disinformation, notably by raising awareness and by supporting greater media plurality and professionalism.

Indeed, the challenges posed by the proliferation – including online and on social media – of new sources of disinformation need to be addressed on many different levels. We must, for instance, not forget the important role of education and the need to develop democratic resilience, media literacy, tolerance and critical thinking. These efforts have become key to fighting off propaganda and manipulation through fake news, which threaten the very foundation of our societies as citizens elect their representatives on the basis of political views shaped by an open and fair debate. These issues were discussed notably during the third annual rule of law dialogue in the General Affairs Council in October last year, when Ministers discuss the topic of media pluralism and rule of law in the digital age.

Finally, I would also like to refer to the High—Level Expert Group on fake news launched by the Commission. Its first meeting was held at the beginning of this week. It will help define the roles and responsibilities of the different stakeholders and formulate recommendations. Its work will be of interest to all of us.

I look forward to your debate which I will follow attentively.


  Julian King, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, thank you for organising this topical debate on a subject which is, as we have already heard, of the highest importance, not only to the EU but also to all our citizens. On behalf of the Commission, I welcome the analysis set out in Parliament’s resolution on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against the Union by third parties.

There seems, frankly, little doubt that the pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign is an orchestrated strategy, delivering the same disinformation stories in as many languages as possible, through as many channels as possible, as often as possible. This conclusion is based on two years’ work by the EU’s East StratCom Task Force, which has gathered more than 3 500 examples of pro-Kremlin disinformation, contradicting publicly available facts, repeated in many languages on many occasions.

Russian authorities are not exactly shy about the goals of this disinformation campaign and disinformation activity. In Russia’s official military doctrine, as well as statements by top Russian generals, they describe the use of false data and destabilising propaganda as legitimate tools, and information as another type of armed force. While EU Member States are obviously in the front line for such Russian disinformation, the Commission’s main role is to try and head off any fragmentation that might arise from differing Member State responses to such activities. That is why we place great emphasis on the role of the East StratCom Task Force under High Representative / Vice-President Mogherini, responsible for countering disinformation in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. Its objectives, as we have already heard, are to ensure more effective communication and promotion of EU policies towards these neighbourhoods and EU Member States, to contribute to a strengthened media environment in these neighbourhoods and Member States, and to improve EU capacity to forecast, address and respond to disinformation activities by external actors.

In terms of positive communication, the Task Force supports and advises EU delegations in the Eastern Partnership, Russia and Central Asia on how to improve their communications. It provides media products to support that activity: for example, the team was responsible for the communications campaign in the run-up to, and during, last November’s Eastern Partnership Summit. The Task Force works closely with the Commission and EU delegations in the eastern neighbourhood in support of independent media.

The Task Force is a permanent member of all the relevant donor committees supporting independent media. It has also launched a Russian-language service from Brussels, providing updates and fact-based background information about the Union for Russian-language journalists. The aim is to increase visibility and more accurate representation of EU policies in the Russian media.

Lastly, the Task Force produces a weekly disinformation review. Its Twitter account ensures that the Task Force’s products reach up to two million people per month, in addition, obviously, to regular background briefings, including to international media, think-tanks and academics. This work is very important. That is why I welcome the proposal that Parliament has advanced to strengthen both our East and South StratCom Task Forces.

We have heard about the importance of cyber security. I have had the occasion to address this House on cyber security previously, and I am afraid time does not allow me today to go into details but, from the Commission side, as set out in the proposals last September, we strongly support measures to build our cyber resilience and our cyber deterrence.

Rightly, there has been a focus on the wider phenomenon of fake news. It is one of the Commission’s priorities for the coming year. As we have heard, in November last year we established a high-level expert group, which has now started its work to advise the Commission on scoping the phenomenon, grasping its international dimension, defining the roles and responsibilities of relevant stakeholders and presenting recommendations. The group will contribute to the preparation of a strategy addressing the challenge of fake news, which we will issue in spring this year.

The Commission has also launched a public consultation on fake news, which is open until 23 February. There are two questionnaires available – one for our citizens and one targeted at legal entities and journalists to draw on their professional experience. We will see what those consultations highlight, but we believe that strong media literacy and promoting quality media are important elements of meeting the challenge of fake news, because media freedom and pluralism are pillars of our of our democracy. They are fundamental rights and they are crucial guarantees for open and free democratic debate.

It is primarily for Member States to guarantee media freedom and pluralism. That said, the Commission is aware of existing challenges and is taking a number of measures, within our competence, to strengthen media freedom and pluralism across the Union, including, further to an initiative of this Parliament, funding the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom in Leipzig to address violations of media freedom.

We have to remain vigilant. The purpose of a disinformation campaign is to get people to believe that the disinformation is fact, is credible. If we look at opinion polls measuring how many people accept obvious disinformation planted in pro-Kremlin media, then unfortunately we have to conclude that Russian disinformation can be extremely successful. That is why we need to redouble our efforts to debunk this propaganda and why we welcome the debate today.


  President. – You are right, because if we do not pay proper attention it means that fake news becomes truth and then truth becomes fake news. With your permission, I would draw your attention to an article which has been published in the latest issue of the Atlantic which deals with the subject.


  Esteban González Pons, en nombre del Grupo PPE. – Señor presidente, los nacional-populistas del mundo ven nuestra democracia representativa y nuestro sistema de vida europeo como su peor rival ideológico, y piensan que la desinformación es útil, que la desinformación es su continuación de la guerra contra nosotros en internet. Por eso los enemigos de Europa practican la desinformación, para desequilibrarnos y demoler aquellos principios democráticos que la Unión Europea representa. Si la Unión Europea no fuera un faro de democracia, la Unión Europea jamás sería atacada con fake news. Es porque somos demócratas por lo que nos atacan, no por ser europeos.

En el caso de Rusia debo decir que no hablamos de un enemigo, aunque a veces Rusia nos trate como si lo fuéramos. El Kremlin dispone de 1 000 millones de euros al año en medios públicos, una red de televisiones en cien países y treinta y tres idiomas y un ejército de cuentas fantasmas listas para expandir fake news. Y las utilizan en el terreno de la Unión Europea. La Unión Europea, para defenderse, cuenta, sin embargo, solo con un millón de euros de presupuesto y la Task Force, que son diecisiete personas. Diecisiete personas frente a 1 000 millones de euros al año en medios públicos. Estamos realmente bastante indefensos.

Cada vez que la Unión Europea tiene un problema, aparecen fake news, aparecen los ataques informáticos, se roban correos electrónicos y entran en acción los medios de comunicación rusos. Debemos empezar a reaccionar más en serio. En los últimos sucesos en Cataluña, por ejemplo, se han detectado actuando a favor de la ruptura de España más de 4 800 robots que difundían de forma constante información falsa o manipulada en internet. Algunas televisiones rusas llegaron a abrir sus informativos en España con imágenes de carros de combate, de tanques dirigiéndose a Barcelona, que solo existían en la imaginación del editor.

Por lo tanto, termino con dos ideas. Primero, las campañas de desinformación y de propaganda son una amenaza para la democracia, y como tal debemos tratarlas. Y, segundo, los europeos no queremos imponer nuestro estilo de vida a nadie, pero debemos saber defenderlo, incluso en internet. Estamos orgullosos de nuestra democracia, de la separación de poderes, de la libertad de expresión, del Estado de Derecho y de la prensa libre, pero esa debe ser una fortaleza, y jamás una debilidad. Europa es una inteligencia incómoda para los enemigos de la verdad, y posverdad solo es otro nombre de mentira.


  Liisa Jaakonsaari, S&D-ryhmän puolesta. – Arvoisa puhemies, on fakta, että Venäjän strateginen viestintä Euroopassa on laajaa, ja aggressiivinen käyttäytyminen verkoissa on kasvanut. Puhutaan informaatiosodasta. Tosi on tietenkin, että informaatiosotaa on aina ollut sekä rauhan että sodan aikana.

Euroopan unionin ja Venäjän välit ovat huonot ja tulehtuneet. Tässä yhteydessä oikeastaan vetoaisinkin arvoisiin puhemiehiin, että Te tekisitte kaikkenne, että olisi mahdollisuus duuman ja Euroopan parlamentin vuoropuheluun. Tällä hetkellä sitä ei ole.

Mutta tähän asiaan. Mitä nyt tehdä disinformaation ja valeuutisten torjumiseksi? Aivan kuten täällä on käynyt ilmi, niin ilman muuta Euroopan unionin strategista viestintää pitää vahvistaa ja sille pitää antaa enemmän resursseja. Mutta myös media, sosiaalinen media, tutkiva journalismi, ajatushautomot ja kansalaisjärjestöt, kaikilla on oma tehtävänsä auttaa ihmisiä erottamaan faktat ja valheet. Ja kuten täällä on todettu, medialukutaito on nyt erittäin tärkeä.

Euroopan unioni ei yksin pysty, myös jäsenvaltioitten täytyy olla tässä mukana. Mainio uutinen olikin, että Ruotsin pääministeri Stefan Löfven ilmoitti viime viikolla Sälenin turvallisuuskonferenssissa, että Ruotsiin perustetaan psykologisen puolustuksen yksikkö. Kun Euroopan unionissa nyt vahvistetaan omaa puolustusta, meidänkin pitää perustaa psykologisen puolustuksen yksikkö – psychological defense – olkoon se avainsana.


  Roberts Zīle, ECR grupas vārdā. – Priekšsēdētāj! Atceros, kā pirms gadiem četriem — vēl pirms krievu Krimas okupācijas — runāju ar savu kolēģi no Rietumeiropas šeit pat, Parlamentā, par to, ka “Sputņiks” tiek reģistrēts viņu valstī, ka viņš sāk raidīt ļoti daudzās valodās, un viņa atbilde bija: “Mēs vienmēr esam par vārda brīvību, mēs par to neuztraucamies”.

Es domāju, ka šis ir piemērs tam, kā daudzas Rietumu demokrātijas nenovērtēja to, ko dara Kremļa administrācija, Putinam nonākot pie varas, tehnoloģiju jomā un IT iespēju jomā — sākot no kiberuzbrukumiem, no noplūžu radītājiem par Rietumu demokrātiem, kuri pēc tam slēpjas Krievijā vai tai draudzīgās valstīs, līdz pat pavisam attīstīta līmeņa propogandai. Un daudziem rietumvalstīs, manuprāt, likās, ka tā ir Baltijas valstu vai bijušā Austrumu bloka valstu problēma, ka Krievijas pasaules koncepts sāk strādāt kā propagandas elements.

Diemžēl mēs redzam, ka Krievija ir spējīga iejaukties ar propogandas un daudziem citiem ieročiem informatīvajā karā, kā tas nupat bija ASV, nemaz nerunājot par vairākām Eiropas Savienības valstīm — viņu politiskajos procesos. Būtiskākais, ka te netika novērtēts tas, ka var jaukt melus ar patiesību dažādās proporcijās — līdz pat simts procentiem melu un nullei procentu patiesības. Un to dara pat Kremļa vadītājs, kurš mierīgi var pastāstīt, ka mūsu “jautrie lāči” un citi, teiksim, hakeri un tie cilvēki, kas strādā ar informatīvajām programmām, to dara kā brīvmākslinieki, par to nesaņemot atalgojumu.

Un tas, kas tika minēts par robotiem vai datoriem, kas īstenībā rada šo sociālo informāciju propagandas karā, tad šeit mums jāatceras, ka, runājot par vārda brīvību, robotiem un datoriem nav tiesību uz vārda brīvību. Uz vārda brīvību tiesības ir cilvēkiem. Un tā ir būtiska lieta, kas mums jāņem vērā saprotot to, ar kādu pretinieku mēs pašlaik sastopamies.

Tāpēc, manuprāt, ir ārkārtīgi svarīgi saprast, ka mūsu zālēm pret Krievijas propagandu jābūt ļoti netradicionālām un diezgan ātrām. Pretējā gadījumā mēs to neuzvarēsim.


  Johannes Cornelis van Baalen, on behalf of the ALDE Group. – Mr President, fake news is, of course, an issue affecting all ages. It has always been there. It comes from many states, as well as from private actors. But today in the internet age, people are very unclear as to where it comes from and who has sent this news. Indeed, as the Commissioner said, in order to have media literacy, it should be clear who has written these messages.

What is interesting is that those who were at Maidan Square to support the democratic revolution against – let me say – the cronies of Mr Putin, find ourselves back on internet. I have seen myself at Maidan Square with big guns in my hands, but the guns were so big that they were bigger than my hands themselves. Normally, you would say that it’s nonsense, but people believe it. Why were you at Maidan Square with a gun? Well, again, I was not there. That is why I am sympathetic to the idea of President Macron of France that there must be transparency, on the platforms too, as to where the news comes from.

This is not intended to have a negative impact on news; there should be freedom of news, but there should be transparency as to where it comes from. You also have to see who sponsors it, because if you read something on the internet, you should know if it is supported by the state or by a private agency. Therefore, there must be transparency, and that is the most important thing concerning this. Once again, the best thing is that we provide not counter propaganda, but facts, facts and more facts, so that not only the Russians, but also the Chinese people and others, can have access to sources that they don’t normally have access to. Again, let us try to be active and not selective. It is not only Russia, but also China and others.


  Barbara Spinelli, a nome del gruppo GUE/NGL. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, espressioni quali fake news vanno maneggiate con grande cautela, perché sono ambigue e rischiano di essere usate a fini di propaganda e censura.

Non intendo con questo difendere il regime russo, sono però scettica verso la tendenza ad attribuirgli interferenze nelle elezioni in USA ed Europa. Non esistono prove di tali interferenze ma solo smentite venute dal Winsconsin, dalla California, dall'Agenzia francese per la cibersicurezza e dal Digital Society Institute di Berlino.

Le fake news non nascono poi solo in Internet. Nella guerra in Iraq fu la stampa mainstream a diffondere menzogne devastanti sulle armi di distruzione di massa. Non possiamo nasconderci che chi con più veemenza denuncia oggi le notizie false e vuole censurare Internet è a sua volta divulgatore di fake news che ricominciano una pericolosa guerra fredda con la Russia.


  Rebecca Harms, im Namen der Verts/ALE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident, sehr geehrte Kollegen! Wir wissen seit langer Zeit, dass nicht nur die Propagandamedien Russlands, sondern auch Teile der Politik Russlands darauf angelegt sind, Spaltungen und Polarisierung in der Europäischen Union voranzutreiben, demokratische Debatten zu unterminieren und die Europaskepsis zu stärken. Dabei sind Fake News in den sozialen Medien ein ganz besonders beliebtes Mittel geworden. Aber interessant ist auch, dass der Kreml systematisch anti-europäische Parteien, rechtsextreme Populisten wie zum Beispiel auch Fünf Sterne, aber auch linksnationalistische Parteien unterstützt und in diese Propaganda Aktivitäten gegen die Europäische Union einbaut. Wir haben das wahrgenommen in der Brexit-Auseinandersetzung, wir haben Belege dafür, Frau Spinelli, aus Frankreich. Und in den deutschen Wahlen gab es eine extrem interessante Zusammenarbeit zwischen Bots aus Nischni Nowgorod und der amerikanischen Alt-Right-Bewegung zur Stärkung der Alternative für Deutschland.

Wie gehen wir mit so etwas um? Die Auseinandersetzung, die wir darum führen, dient nicht dazu, den Kreml irgendwie zu schlagen, sondern die Auseinandersetzung, die wir führen, dient dazu, unsere Gesellschaften in ihrer demokratischen Verfasstheit zu stärken. Deswegen glaube ich, dass es richtig ist, dass wir die DG StratCom haben. Die ist aber zu klein, und die Vernetzung mit der nationalen Ebene ist nicht gut genug.

Über dieses Aufspüren von Propaganda und von Lügen in der Propaganda hinaus glaube ich, dass die Europäische Union dringend den Journalismus stärken muss. Darüber müssen wir eine Debatte führen, denn der Journalismus ist in den letzten Jahren geschwächt worden. Dabei haben wir zugeguckt.

Und eine letzte Sache möchte ich noch sagen, um den Kommissar zu stärken: Wenn soziale Medien anfangen, Nachrichten zu machen, wie Facebook oder Twitter oder Google das tun, dann müssen sie ähnlichen Regeln gehorchen wie auch Medienunternehmen und die Presse. Das ist eine Aufgabe, der wir uns stellen müssen.


  Jörg Meuthen, im Namen der EFDD-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Wir reden heute erstens über Fake News, den Kampfbegriff, mit dem die Etablierten alle unerwünschten Fakten und Meinungen zu diskreditieren versuchen. Zweitens über Russland, das dieselben Etablierten zum Sündenbock für alles Schlechte in der Welt auserkoren haben. Die heutige Debatte über angebliche Wahlbeeinflussung durch russische Fake News ist für die Etablierten daher wie Ostern und Weihnachten an einem Tag. Ich werde Sie eh nicht davon abhalten können, sich in Tiraden über Rechtspopulisten, Russen und die angeblich nötige Regulierung von Meinungen zu ergehen – wir haben es gerade von Frau Harms gehört.

Das ist pure Heuchelei, denn dieses Parlament wird bei der Europawahl 2019 einen Wahlkampf im Eigeninteresse führen. Eigene Slogans mit EU-Beamten als Wahlkämpfern, die dann eigene Wahrheiten produzieren, nach der Devise: „quality news should be supported by the government“. Das ist Propaganda vom Allerfeinsten! Wer so etwas macht, hat gar kein Recht, sich über angebliche Wahlbeeinflussung durch Russland zu beklagen. Wenn Frau Kalniete hier mit Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung pocht, dann schauen Sie sich exemplarisch mal das Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz in Deutschland an – warum in die Ferne schweifen, wenn das Böse liegt so nah. Sie sitzen hier im Glashaus, werfen Sie deshalb lieber nicht mit Steinen.


  Mario Borghezio, a nome del gruppo ENF. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, l'interlocutore naturale di questa nostra discussione, a cui potremmo rivolgere i dubbi, tutti i dubbi, che sono stati espressi, è la Duma ed è veramente sconcertante che questo Parlamento non dialoghi con quello che è l'interlocutore naturale del più grande paese che, tra l'altro, fa parte dell'Europa, non dell'Unione europea ma chiaramente dell'Europa, molto più della Turchia.

Fake news: ci continuate a parlare di questo problema che, di per sé, sarebbe grave. Recentissimamente è stato detto che ci sarebbero delle fortissime influenze della Russia nei confronti dell'elettorato italiano. I servizi di sicurezza italiani l'hanno smentito immediatamente, non esiste nulla di tutto questo, allora bisogna andarci molto cauti.

Si dice che c'è stata un'influenza sul voto della Brexit, sull'esplosione democratica della volontà del popolo catalano. Ma allora mi dovete spiegare: siete così lontani dal sentire dei popoli da pensare che quando votano, votano perché c'è un'influenza di Mosca? No, c'è la voce dei popoli che si esprime col voto, fino a prova contraria.


  Janusz Korwin-Mikke (NI). – Słucham tego wszystkiego, zwłaszcza pierwszych przemówień, i czuję się, jakbym był na obradach Komitetu Centralnego Komunistycznej Partii Związku Sowieckiego: dokładnie ta sama frazeologia, że trzeba wzmocnić naszych dziennikarzy, prawda, że nie można dopuścić, żeby każdy mówił, co chce, tylko my tu musimy sterować tym wszystkim, że wróg grozi naszej demokracji socjalistycznej. To samo mówiono w Związku Sowieckim, ja to pamiętam, ja mam 75 lat, ja to pamiętam, jak to było. Mówicie dokładnie tak samo jak oni.

Propaganda rosyjska opiera się częściowo na sowieckich wzorach, i dlatego jest na szczęście jeszcze trochę niezgrabna, ale europejska opiera się na wzorach doktora Goebbelsa: kłamie się i kłamie nieustannie. Wszystkie dzienniki mówią to samo w całej Europie. Tutaj pan van Baalen mówił o strzałach na Majdanie. Kto, przepraszam bardzo, powiedział o tym, że to strzelali nasi ludzie? Pan Paet, Pana kolega (tam siedzi pan Paet), powiedział w telefonie do pani baronowej Ashton, że to od nas ludzie strzelali na Majdanie. Tu są kłamstwa podstawowe i skończmy z kłamstwami. To jest pierwsza sprawa.


  David McAllister (PPE). – Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, as previous speakers have already pointed out, Russian disinformation campaigns are intended to undermine objective or ethical journalism while casting all information as biased or as an instrument of political power. I agree we have to tackle these challenges; it is high time to build up the resilience of our Union.

In my opinion this should include four points. Firstly, to thoroughly investigate Russian interferences in election campaigns. Secondly, to impose targeted sanctions against hacking and falsified publication of sensitive data. Thirdly to turn the East StratCom task force into a permanent EU structure with adequate funding and increased personnel. And, fourthly, to develop an effective, well-targeted and tailor-made strategy on how to communicate and promote our European policies and values.

In all our actions we ought to keep in mind that the European Union’s main strength when facing hostile influence from Russia is information rather than criminalisation. And, Mr President, a final remark. As a European Parliament we could perhaps improve things in our own House too.

I observed in 2017 a few of our Members using the technical infrastructure of this Parliament to broadcast discussions and interviews on Kremlin-backed news channels such as Russia Today. I’m not quite sure if you can really, on the one hand, criticise disinformation campaigns backed and facilitated by Russian media outlets and, on the other hand, allow active support to them with our very own parliamentary infrastructure. This is inconsistent, this should stop.



  Eugen Freund (S&D). – Herr Präsident! Wir wissen seit einiger Zeit – genau seit fast einem Jahr –, dass die Verbreitung von Lügen und Fake News auch vom Weißen Haus aus möglich ist. Dennoch ist es ein Unterschied, ob ein egozentrischer Politiker glaubt, damit sein eigenes standing zu verbessern, oder ob ausländische Medienunternehmen gezielt falsche Informationen verbreiten, um Länder zu destabilisieren.

Als Schattenberichterstatter meiner Fraktion für den Bericht des Europäischen Parlaments über gegen die EU gerichtete Propaganda habe ich mich intensiv mit dieser Propaganda und den gezielten Falschinformationen auseinandergesetzt. Dabei war klar, dass einige Unternehmen wie Sputnik oder Russia Today dabei wesentlich zur Verbreitung von Falschinformationen beitragen. Dass der Kreml dieser Verbreitung von Propaganda nicht abgeneigt ist, vor allem wenn er Sender wie Russia Today finanziert, bleibt freilich unbestritten.

Europa benötigt daher eine schlagkräftige Strategie. Das ist besonders wichtig, um sich gegen Einflussnahme von außen zu schützen und der Verunsicherung und der Radikalisierung von europäischen Bürgerinnen und Bürgern entgegenzuwirken.


  Anna Elżbieta Fotyga (ECR). – Mr President, the best way to deter Russian propaganda is to remain consistent. Every time we feel the temptation for a rapprochement with Russia, we have to know that there are necessary prices to be paid, usually by the weakest among us.

Eight years ago, the Smolensk catastrophe happened. The Russian propaganda in the first quarter of an hour afterwards was extremely successful all over the world, including in our countries. Listen to the sound of silence whenever I even mention this thing nowadays. We have to know that next time we wish to go into deeper dialogue over the heads of others, there will be victims. This time, they will probably be among Ukrainian children.


  Morten Løkkegaard (ALDE). – Hr. formand! Kolleger! Fake news blev jo ikke opfundet i Rusland, og debatten om fake news er meget bredere end Rusland. Der er ingen tvivl om, at Rusland har været med til at indlede den seneste og vigtigste runde af debatten, og at Rusland også bliver det sted, hvor denne debat ender et eller andet sted. Men i Den Liberale Gruppe har vi gjort os nogle anstrengelser for at komme frem til en bredspektret plan med en masse forslag til, hvordan man rent faktisk kan gøre noget ved det. En flerstrenget plan. Vi skal sætte ind over for databeskyttelse og gennemsigtighed, herunder begrænsning af misbrug af personlige data - et utroligt vigtigt område! Vi skal have fokus på en langt bedre uddannelse af de unge mennesker, så de bliver i stand til at færdes på nettet på en ordentlig måde. Vi skal have indført et online-medieansvar. Vi skal sørge for, at de aktører, der er på markedet, indfører en form for selvregulering. Vi skal sørge for, at der findes støttemekanismer for ordentlig journalistik, for grænseoverskridende journalistik.

Endelig skal vi selvfølgelig sørge for at sætte ind - som flere kolleger har været inde på - over for deciderede fake news fra blandt andre Rusland. Det kan vi gøre ved også at støtte - som flere kolleger peger på - denne East Stratcom taskforce, som vi allerede har oprettet i Unionen. Den er vi også tilhængere af at styrke. Med disse punkter skulle vi kunne adressere dette problem på en fornuftig måde.


  Javier Couso Permuy (GUE/NGL). – Señor presidente, decía Einstein: «Dos cosas son infinitas: la estupidez humana y el universo; y no estoy seguro de lo segundo.». La patética obsesión de los medios de la derecha europea contra la supuesta injerencia rusa está alcanzando grados de estupidez que sonrojarían al propio científico.

El pasado noviembre el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores español denunció ante la Unión Europea la injerencia rusa y venezolana en el debate sobre Cataluña, y afirmó poseer datos. Estamos esperando todavía esos datos. Porque no los hay. Los medios de comunicación interesados en repetir este mantra tienen ejemplos sonrojantes: cuentas de Twitter radicadas en San Petersburgo, noticias falsas. Pero, si nos vamos a los hechos, veamos, si ustedes tienen interés.

El pasado noviembre el Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, a través de su jefe de ciberseguridad, afirmaba que el CNI no había detectado ningún ciberataque del Gobierno ruso. Tampoco los organismos alemanes encontraron una actividad significativa rusa, ni la autoridad cibernética francesa. Es decir, detrás de esta patética paranoia se esconde una estrategia política clara, es decir, impedir la buena vecindad con Rusia.

¡Dejen las paranoias, señores!


  Bronis Ropė (Verts/ALE). – Net ir tie, kas nėra girdėję žymiosios nacių propagandos ministro Gebelso frazės, jog milijoną kartų pakartotas melas tampa tiesa, jos teisingumu gali įsitikinti pažiūrėję dabartinio Kremliaus režimo valdomas televizijas. Padėtis verčia susirūpinti. Net ir nukentėjusi nuo naftos kainų smukimo ir kur kas mažiau nuo Europos Sąjungos sankcijų, Rusija kasmet už dešimtis milijonų eurų išleidžia tūkstančius melagingų ir neapykantą kurstančių žinučių. Beje, Putino režimo įkaite tapusi Rusija nėra vienintelis tokios grėsmės šaltinis. Radikalių religinių judėjimų keliama informacinė grėsmė pastaruoju laikotarpiu sumažėjo, bet tai nereiškia, kad ji išnyko. Džiugina kol kas tik tiek, kad čia, Europos Sąjungos institucijose, jau suvoktas priešiškos propagandos keliamas pavojus. Dar prieš porą metų apie tokias informacines grėsmes kalbėjo tik atskiros pavienės valstybės narės. Esu įsitikinęs, kad stiprindami strateginę komunikaciją, einame teisingu keliu. Kartu norėčiau atkreipti dėmesį į tai, kad Europos atsparumą propagandai turime pradėti stiprinti nuo paties pagrindo – nuo piliečių sąmoningumo didinimo.


  Gerard Batten (EFDD). – Mr President, thank you very much. Now just so there’s no misunderstanding about my position on Russia, I’ll repeat what I’ve said many times before. Mr Putin is a gangster that runs a gangster state. The old Soviet Union used to spend millions on infiltrating and undermining Western governments and societies, and it has to be said they were very successful at it.

So there’s nothing new going on, but you are seeking to create a scapegoat for your own unpopularity with the peoples of Europe. Now, don’t blame the Russians for your own mistakes.

To give you two examples, you’re unpopular because of economic stagnation on austerity due to the eurozone and mass uncontrolled immigration and the Islamisation of our societies due to that immigration. Now you seek a distraction and you found it in Russian propaganda. You give Mr Putin too much credit. He is not the author of your unpopularity, you are the authors of your own unpopularity.


  Auke Zijlstra (ENF). – Dank u wel, Voorzitter. Dit debat is gebaseerd op valse aannames, nepnieuws. De verantwoordelijke Nederlandse minister, mevrouw Ollongren, kon in de Tweede Kamer geen enkel serieus voorbeeld noemen van Russische beïnvloeding van de mening van de Nederlandse burger. Beïnvloeding vindt wel plaats door de Europese Commissie. Dat is niet toegestaan maar gebeurt stelselmatig: bij verkiezingen in Italië en Spanje en bij het brexit-referendum. Want zoals de heer Juncker verklaarde: een democratische stem tegen de Unie is niet mogelijk.

Brussel heeft schrikbarend weinig vertrouwen in de kiezer en ziet dus niet zoveel in democratie. Alleen maar lastig, die wisselende voorkeuren. Daarom zijn we op weg naar Europese censuurwetten. Doodeng. Dit gaat niet goed aflopen. Niet voor de media, niet voor de burger en niet voor de vrijheid van meningsuiting.

Voorzitter, we moeten kiezen: deze Europese Unie of onze vrijheid. Ik heb al gekozen. Dank u wel.


  Udo Voigt (NI). – Herr Präsident, werte Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Ich fühle mich wieder erneut zurückversetzt in die Achtzigerjahre: Die kalten Krieger sind aufgewacht, die Transatlantiker sind wieder da. Herr King, wenn Sie schon davon sprechen, dass die russischen Medien falsche Zahlen und Fakten liefern, ja dann sagen Sie doch mal, wann die Russen falsche Zahlen geliefert haben. Wann haben sie falsche Fakten geliefert? Ich habe die Ereignisse und die Kriege in Libyen, in Afghanistan, in Serbien, im Irak und in Syrien verfolgt, und in all diesen Dingen habe ich also gesehen, dass unsere transatlantischen Lügenmedien falsch berichten, nicht aber die russischen Nachrichten wie Sputnik oder RT. Ich konnte mich selber bei zwei Besuchen in Syrien davon überzeugen, wer die Wahrheit berichtet. Warum sind Sie nicht mutig genug, um auf Russland zuzugehen, den Dialog zu suchen, statt einen Propagandakrieg auszulösen? Die Zukunft Europas – eines Europas der Vaterländer – liegt in der Gemeinschaft mit Russland und nicht mit der raumfremden Macht USA.


  Cristian Dan Preda (PPE). – Domnule președinte, propaganda lui Putin conține un discurs anti-occidental, caută să influențeze alegeri și cultivă o imagine pozitivă a autocrației din Rusia. Înainte de anul nou a fost inaugurat un nou sediu pentru trolii lui Putin de pe internet, un mediu propice pentru propagandă.

În România, munca acestor troli este ușurată de numeroase figuri publice, oameni politici sau pretinși jurnaliști. Fostul deputat european Adrian Severin, de pildă, publică texte pe site-urile propagandei rusești Sputnik și Russia Today, care preiau in extenso și pozițiile lui Sorin Roșca Stănescu, fost senator PNL, și ale lui Adrian Năstase, fost prim-ministru socialist. Punctul lor comun: contestarea condamnărilor pentru fapte de corupție. Propaganda pro-rusă a devenit în context românesc o unealtă a luptei împotriva instituțiilor de justiție, a legislației anticorupție, a influenței Uniunii Europene și a Statelor Unite.

Relația specială dintre socialiști și propaganda rusă este confirmată și de politicieni în funcție, precum deputatul PSD de București Liviu Pleșoianu, care se luptă și el cu justiția românească și difuzează discursuri ultranaționaliste. Lumea jurnalismului nu e, nici ea, iertată de păcatul flirtului cu dezinformarea de origine rusă. Informațiile de la Kremlin sunt uneori prezentate ca veridice, fără niciun fel de spirit critic. Există și aici, în Parlamentul European, colegi de-ai mei din grupul S&D care susțin exact aceleași puncte de vedere ca și propaganda rusă. O văd, de pildă, pe doamna Grapini, chiar aici alături de noi.


  President. – You cannot combat fake news with other fake news.


  Jeppe Kofod (S&D). – Mr President, next year the citizens of Europe will elect a new European Parliament. This raises an uncomfortable question: how many seats will Russia get? Let us not kid ourselves; Russian meddling in democratic elections is no longer the exception – it is becoming the norm.

From the US Presidential election to Brexit, the hands of Kremlin have been busily dancing along keyboards, churning out disinformation – the real fake news and propaganda – the full extent of which is yet to be uncovered and the consequences yet to be fully understood. In the EU alone, we know for a fact that Russia has conducted propaganda and misinformation campaigns in several countries: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the UK, France, Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy and so on. All of these EU member states have been – and continue to be – the target of Russian misinformation and propaganda campaigns.

Our best defence is to stand firm on European values, principles and ideals: Democracy, freedom of the press, speaking the truth to power. The EEAS and this East StratCom team is doing a tremendous job, as several have noted. They are the front line, defending democracy and the free press, but they are caught in an uneven fight and that is why I am calling for a marked strengthening of East StratCom and an EU action plan for countering Russian meddling in the 2019 European election.

And so I return to my original question: “How many seats will Russia win in the European Parliament?” Let’s make sure they win no seats.


  Ангел Джамбазки (ECR). – Г-н Председател, г-жо Министър, уважаеми колеги, социалните мрежи са новите медии и такава е реалността, независимо дали ни харесва или не. Живеем във време, в което всяка публикация може да достигне до всяка точка на света, до стотици хиляди, до милиони потребители за броени секунди. Колкото е по-скандална, по-невероятна и по-измислена една фалшива новина, толкова по-бързо се разпространява тя. От това се възползват както вражеските пропаганди, така и агресивни малочислени общности, които се смятат за носители на последна истина от последна инстанция.

И в този законодателен дом има последователи на един съвременен културен марксизъм, които се опитват да налагат цензура и да стигматизират носителите на различни от тях мнения. Да, фалшиви новини има, но отговорът им не е в това да се налага цензура или да се пишат норми за това какво може да се пише или да не се пише в социалните мрежи и защо това е невъзможно. Не е и в насилственото променяне на културни модели и традиции. Отговорът на фалшивите новини е това да се казва истината, колкото се може по-бързо, по-организирано, по-спокойно и подкрепено с факти. Това трябва да прави всеки един от нас.


  Petras Auštrevičius (ALDE). – Mr President, Mr Commissioner, colleagues, a massive wave of Kremlin-produced propaganda flooded the continent, from Vladivostok to Lisbon. It finally ended up across the Atlantic, just to find Washington DC equally unprepared. This was also the case with the political waters in London, Paris, Madrid and Barcelona.

I particularly appreciate the title of today’s debate on Russia. It is precise concerning the Russian propaganda which aims to influence EU countries, meaning us! The EU’s response to this hybrid warfare will not be policing the media. Our response must be an effective EU media policy set up to defend our liberal European democracy, basic values and way of life.

Lastly, in shaping the EU’s media policy, we must certainly not be limited only to election periods as Putin’s foreign services, troll factories and bots are on duty 24/7.


  Benedek Jávor (Verts/ALE). – Elnök Úr! Az orosz propaganda befolyása egyre aggasztóbb méreteket ölt. Az EU propagandaellenes kampányainak megerősítése rendkívül fontos és jó irány, azonban mit sem ér azokban az országokban, ahol maguk a kormányok az orosz propaganda legfőbb fogyasztói és egyben terjesztői is. Magyarország kormánya az elmúlt években folyamatosan Oroszország mellett állt ki, nemcsak gazdasági és politikai szövetségben Vlagyimir Putyin Oroszországával, hanem jelentős szerepet vállalat az orosz hamis hírek és propaganda terjesztésében Magyarországon és azon kívül. Az orosz, hamis híreket terjesztő csatornák – a Szputnyik, a Russia Today – nem csak a hivatalos csatornákon működnek, hanem természetesen az online felületeken is. Trollok ezrei segítik a hamis híreknek, a propagandának a terjesztését.

Magyarországon és néhány más tagállamban jelentős támogatást kapnak az állami és a közszolgálati médiától, amelyeknek a politikailag független, elfogulatlan, valós hírek fórumának kéne lenniük. Ezért az Európai Unió nem mehet el a továbbiakban szó nélkül azok mellett az országok mellett, ahol maga az állami közszolgálati média és maga a kormány a legfőbb fogyasztója és terjesztője ezeknek a hamis híreknek. Ehhez pedig arra van szükség, hogy az EU felismerje azt, hogy elkerülhetetlen a független, szabad, elfogulatlan média támogatása jogszabályokkal és pénzügyileg is.


  David Coburn (EFDD). – Mr President, we are again discussing the influence of so-called Russian propaganda in EU countries. What about the millions, the millions in EU propaganda to pervert the democratic decisions of the Irish, the Dutch and the French on the Lisbon Treaty? And you spent millions on EU propaganda to prevent Brexit, aided and abetted of course by the BBC, the Brussels Broadcasting Corporation, which also receives largesse I believe from the EU. This destroys any impartiality or credibility that they might have had. Fortunately the British public saw through that one.

But the EU is still trying to do this by setting up the Orwellian propaganda machine to push the EU project and subvert national democracies, in your own words: “challenging Euroscepticism”. Well, it is pure Pravda as the old Soviet Union called it, pure Pravda.

I am more concerned with EU propaganda than the clunky Russian version, and I assure you so are most other people. Mr McAllister talked about Russia Today, well Russia Today gave UKIP a voice in the days when we could not get it on the BBC. So perhaps they are defending freedom and a freedom you lot want to close down. So thank God for them.


  President. – Mr Coburn, you practically managed to transform a blue card into a speech at the end of your intervention. That is not allowed. We have to respect the time limit because otherwise other colleagues would not be able to exercise their democratic right to speak.


  Marcus Pretzell (ENF). – Herr Präsident, meine Damen und Herren! Dass Regierungen Propaganda verbreiten – und zwar so ziemlich überall auf der Welt – ist nichts besonders Neues, und dass auch Russland sich daran beteiligt, ist nicht besonders überraschend. Allerdings muss man feststellen, dass vermutlich über 90 % der europäischen Bevölkerung mit dieser Propaganda noch nie in Berührung gekommen sind. Denn diese Form von Propaganda, die es gibt, ist doch eher eine Randerscheinung – gerade wenn wir auf Sputnik oder Russia Today rekurrieren.

Es war heute auch schon zu hören, es sei russische Militärdoktrin, Falschinformationen zu verbreiten, und ich erinnere ganz gerne nochmal an den Irakkrieg, an dem sich übrigens neben den USA und Großbritannien auch Spanien und Italien und einige andere Staaten beteiligt haben. Vielleicht erinnern Sie sich an die Fake News, die zu Beginn dieses Krieges standen. Wenn Sie politisch über Wahrheit oder Lüge entscheiden wollen und es eben nicht mehr zum politischen Kampf gehört, zu entscheiden, was Wahrheit oder Lüge ist, dann verlassen Sie den demokratischen Konsens. So funktioniert es in demokratischen Gesellschaften üblicherweise nicht.


  Elmar Brok (PPE). – Herr Präsident, Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Russland ist ein autoritäres Regime, in dem wirklich freie Wahlen unter den Chancen der Gleichberechtigung nicht stattfinden. Ich sehe, dass hier Kollegen wie Meuthen und Pretzell und Coburn und Couso Permuy und all diese Leute dieses Russland in diesem System verteidigen, weil dieses auch ihrer eigenen Ideologie, die nicht freier, liberaler Demokratie entspricht, entspricht. Und das dekouvriert sie als wirkliche Gegner von Freiheit.

Zweitens müssen wir deutlich machen, dass wir nicht mit derselben Methode zurückschlagen können, wie Russland und deren Freunde in Europa das tun, sondern dass wir eine freie Gesellschaft mit freien Medien sind und nicht mit staatlichen Instrumenten darauf antworten können. Aus diesem Grund ist es der beste Weg, den westlichen freien Medien, aber auch den dort eventuell noch existierenden, Möglichkeiten in solchen Ländern zu geben, und zwar auch den neuen Medien. Wir selbst müssen gegenüber unserer eigenen Bevölkerung deutlich machen, wie Lügen gemacht werden. Und es muss klar sein, dass wir Wege finden müssen zu erklären, wenn Lügen Lügen sind. Das ist das Entscheidende. Es kann nicht sein, dass Wahrheit und Lüge gleichwertig nebeneinander stehen und dies dann von Herrn Pretzell als demokratischer Diskurs dargestellt wird. Das ist das Gegenteil davon.


  Tanja Fajon (S&D). – Spoštovani, jeseni 2016 smo v Evropskem parlamentu izglasovali resolucijo za boj proti ruski propagandi. Sama sem bila takrat zadržana in še danes razmišljam enako. Strinjam se, da je spremljanje medijskega vplivanja držav na politiko in družbo potrebno, pri čemer je treba prepoznati tudi prepletenost medijev s političnimi strankami in gospodarskimi družbami, zato imam nekaj kritičnih opozoril.

Prvič, zakaj se ukvarjamo zgolj z rusko propagando? Kakšen odnos imamo do novic ameriškega FOX Newsa? Nas motijo kapitalski vložki ameriških medijskih korporacij v evropske medijske postaje? Čigava stališča nam sporočajo kanali Al Jazeere? In če ostanemo v Evropi, kaj menimo o nacionalnih medijih, ki so v lasti neke stranke, njenih funkcionarjev in z njimi povezanih oseb? V Sloveniji tak medij imamo. So njihova politična sporočila propaganda?

In druga pripomba, nemara bi v sporočanju Sputnika in RT, čemur rečemo ruska propaganda, bolj kot doslej morali prepoznati uspeli poskus Rusije, da si po dolgih letih zahodne medijske dominacije s posnemanjem obstoječih vzorcev poišče svoj položaj v medijskem svetu.

Upam, da bo ustanovitev dragega oddelka za boj proti ruski propagandi prinesla rezultate, a če naj naš plenum ohrani verodostojnost, moramo vsako medijsko propagando, posebej lažno propagando, obravnavati enako.


  Zbigniew Kuźmiuk (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Zabierając głos w tej debacie, chcę zwrócić uwagę na trzy kwestie. Po pierwsze, na wagę sprawozdania przyjętego przez Parlament w listopadzie 2016 r., przygotowanego przez polską posłankę Annę Fotygę, które właśnie było w dużej mierze poświęcone rosyjskiej propagandzie, i na jego konkluzje, które z pewnymi oporami, ale jednak są wprowadzane w życie.

Po drugie, na powołanie instytucji StratComu zajmującej się badaniem technik dywersji, przeciwdziałaniem dezinformacji, prowadzeniem akcji edukacyjnych, przy czym wydaje się, że ta instytucja powinna być raczej wyłączona z unijnej służby zagranicznej. Powinna być po prostu samodzielną instytucją, samodzielną unijną agencją.

I wreszcie po trzecie, chciałbym pochwalić zwiększenie środków na walkę z rosyjską propagandą o milion euro, ale jednocześnie przypomnieć, że Rosja na jedną swoją telewizję, Russia Today, przeznacza tysiąc razy więcej rocznie.


  Yana Toom (ALDE). – Mr President, I’m listening to this debate with a strong feeling of déjà vu. I was born in the Soviet Union and when I was a child I heard about anti-Soviet propaganda each and every day. If there were no meat or coffee, books or cars, we always knew who was guilty: Western capitalism and, personally, Ronald Reagan.

Today when the European Union is facing challenges, crisis in Catalonia, problems with democratic institutions in a Member State or a low level of trust in Europe as such, some of my colleagues know exactly who is guilty: anti-European propaganda and, personally, Vladimir Putin.

As a former journalist, I cannot agree with such a black and white approach. And the main solution I see in terms of counter-propaganda is an honest, open and professional media. A media which is free from censorship and which is not regulated or directed by politicians. We should not make the mistakes of Soviet leaders but today, sorry, I have a strong feeling that we’re dangerously close to that. And of course I fully agree with Mr van Baalen, the media have to be transparent.

But it also concerns Statcom, where you will find not a single name of these guys who are writing this information review.


  Steeve Briois (ENF). – Monsieur le Président, lutter contre la désinformation par la désinformation, voilà un beau sujet de philosophie qui résume un peu l’état de l’Union européenne.

Je suis particulièrement stupéfait par ce que j’ai pu entendre de la part de la Commission. Je trouve scandaleux que vous puissiez stigmatiser ainsi la Russie. Les fake news ont toujours existé, y compris chez nous. Si l’Union européenne souhaite faire la chasse aux fake news, eh bien, qu’elle commence déjà par le faire chez elle, qu’elle balaie devant sa porte, qu’elle le fasse avec certains médias qui, eux, sont gavés d’argent public et qui, bien souvent, diffusent de fausses informations par lesquelles, évidemment, ils influencent les élections dans les États membres.

L’Union européenne accuse le Kremlin de financer une campagne de désinformation contre l’Europe. S’attaquer à la Russie, c’est bien, c’est dans l’air du temps. Vous n’aurez pas beaucoup d’ennemis, au moins, avec cela. La Russie est vraiment le bon bouc émissaire pour vous car en réalité, ce que ne vous ne supportez pas, c’est que quelqu’un puisse avoir une voix dissidente par rapport à ce que vous dites. Plutôt que de faire la chasse à la Russie, commencez à le faire avec la propagande islamiste.


  Esther de Lange (PPE). – Dit debat gaat helemaal niet over Rusland alleen. Het gaat veel dieper dan dat. In de publieke ruimte vinden we het normaal dat we weten met wie wij te maken hebben. Op het internet en sociale media, daarentegen, kun je anoniem allerlei onwaarheden verkondigen, of zoals de ontmaskerde Nederlandse trol die actief was tijdens het Oekraïne-referendum zei: “Natuurlijk lieg ik over de Oekraïne”.

Werkgevers, bedrijven en onderwijzers zullen de handen ineen moeten slaan om mensen de tools te geven om meningen van feiten en echt van nep te onderscheiden. De Commissie zou ik willen vragen hoe we anonimiteit op internet kunnen aanpakken en wat daarbij de juiste balans is tussen privacy en transparantie. Als Twitter met een blauw vinkje kan aangeven wie de échte Beyoncé is tussen alle nepaccounts, waarom kunnen we dan niet aangeven van wie de identiteit bekend is, van wie niet, en wie overduidelijk gewoon een computer is?

Deze uitdaging raakt volgens mij het hart van onze democratie.

Let me underline this, especially for our colleagues in the ENF Group, with a short quote from Hannah Arendt: ‘The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not a convinced nazi or a dedicated communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction, true or false, no longer exists’.


  President. – I am afraid that technology today has eliminated our privacy, that is my belief.


  Brando Benifei (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, il lavoro fatto in questi mesi dall'Unione per contrastare i fenomeni di interferenza esterna si sta intensificando. La creazione delle task force sulle fake news da parte della commissaria Mariya Gabriel è certamente un fatto positivo, accanto al lavoro già avviato dall'Alto rappresentante Federica Mogherini in seno al Servizio di azione esterna con la East StratCom per migliorare la comunicazione europea nei paesi del vicinato orientale e individuare le operazioni di disinformazione.

Allo stesso tempo, tuttavia, dobbiamo fare attenzione a non focalizzarci sulla sola Russia, con la quale deve essere mantenuto un dialogo politico proprio per non aiutare involontariamente la presa autoritaria di Putin e la sua narrazione nazionalista. Il fenomeno della controinformazione per destabilizzare l'Europa, infatti, è un tema certamente grave e provato, ma di portata globale, non ascrivibile a un solo paese, e che ci interroga sulla necessità di far sì che l'Unione europea faccia un salto di qualità istituzionale verso una vera federazione, che sappia contrastare questi fenomeni con più efficacia.


  Monica Macovei (ECR). – Domnule președinte, discutăm de mult timp despre propaganda falsă rusească și facem asta pentru că da, este reală, este adevărat, și este o amenințare. Chiar acum o săptămână, senatorii americani au detaliat într-un raport de peste 200 de pagini practicile Kremlinului de influențare a alegerilor în state din mai multe continente. Încă o dată, se reconfirmă că Moscova nu are niciun fel de ezitare să controleze alegerile și să intervină chiar și în democrații consolidate.

La Kremlin, manipularea, dezinformarea și minciuna sunt politică de stat pentru a controla deciziile de politică internă și externă în cât mai multe state ale lumii, dacă se poate, în toate. Iar la noi, Serviciul de Acțiune Externă are doar 14 angajați în East StratCom, care ar trebui să combată mii și mii de troli ai propagandei false rusești. Evident, este o glumă și este total insuficient.

Și, ca să-i răspund unui coleg de mai devreme care spunea că speră ca la alegeri să nu fie agenți ai Federației Ruse în Parlamentul European, vreau să vă spun că avem și astăzi agenți ai Federației Ruse în Parlamentul European și am avut și în mandatul trecut.

Ca să închei, oamenii au murit pentru democrație și pentru alegeri libere. Deci, trebuie să le respectăm această dorință, vrem să trăim în democrație și politicienii care colaborează cu Rusia pentru diverse interese ne trădează.


  Marietje Schaake (ALDE). – Mr President, propaganda is nothing new, but with the Kremlin, and certainly other governments and non-state actors also actively seeking to influence European audiences and undermine democratic values, we should not be naive. What is new is the exponential spread through social media, the lack of transparency of political advertisements online, and the selection of the order in which information is presented by unaccountable companies’ algorithms. This impacts people’s access to information and thus democratic resilience. But in the quest for solutions, the worst thing we can do is to erode the very freedoms we need to defend.

A few action points: we need transparency rules for political advertisements online. We need algorithmic accountability and the tackling of botnets and trolls. We should actively try to reach Russian-speaking minorities in Europe and populations in the countries around Europe directly in Russian language with pluralist sources and opinions. We should defend and promote democratic values in Europe and abroad and not compromise them.


  Андрей Ковачев (PPE). – Фалшивите новини, особено в последните години, придобиват глобален размер. С напредването на дигиталните технологии и увеличаването на свързаността, една информация стига до всяко кътче на планетата за секунди. Това е мощно оръжие, което лесно и много по-евтино може да печели умове и сърца на милиони хора.

В геополитическата надпревара това оръжие се използва все по-масово за постигане на политически цели. Целите на този пропаганден натиск са изопачаване на истината, провокиране на страх, съмнение и разделение в Европейския съюз. Големият въпрос е какъв е нашият демократичен отговор срещу подобни практики. Отговорът може да бъде само един единствен – истината. На всяка фалшива информация трябва моментално да се отговаря с истината.

Затова призовавам, както европейските институции, така и страните членки да инвестират много повече средства, ресурси и хора в този отговор на пропагандата и на фалшивите новини. Примерите от моята страна са насочени срещу Европейския съюз, НАТО и нейния геополитически избор. Западните Балкани са особено застрашени от пропагандата, чиято цел е да промени обществените нагласи.


  Kati Piri (S&D). – Dank u, Voorzitter. De Russische president Poetin heeft in zijn arsenaal tegen het democratische Westen een nieuw wapen: het bewust verspreiden van desinformatie. Dat gebeurt onder andere via sociale media, maar ook – zoals we vandaag tijdens het debat merkten – via het financieren van politieke partijen in Europa om op die manier democratische processen te verstoren. De grootste dreiging is er voor de buurlanden van Rusland, veelal jonge democratieën. Maar we hebben ook gezien hoe Russische propaganda effectief was bij de brexit en bij de Amerikaanse verkiezingen.

Allereerst moeten we erkennen dat Russische propaganda een serieuze bedreiging is voor onze open democratische samenlevingen. Dat is het geval. We moeten dan ook meer doen om onze burgers hiertegen te beschermen. De Europese Commissie komt in het voorjaar met aanbevelingen. Technologische bedrijven als Facebook zullen meer transparantie moeten geven over adverteerders en over algoritmes die bepalen wat wij überhaupt te zien krijgen. Om de ernst van de zaak te onderstrepen en meer bewustwording te creëren, zouden we in het Europees Parlement jaarlijks een debat moeten organiseren om op basis van informatie (onder andere van StratCom) het debat met elkaar aan te gaan. Dank u wel


  Marek Jurek (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Fundamentem naszego bezpieczeństwa na wschodzie, również fundamentem bezpieczeństwa i niepodległości państw, które tam z nami sąsiadują, jest nasza realna, a nie wirtualna solidarność, przede wszystkim solidarność w polityce bezpieczeństwa. My dzisiaj na tej sali słyszeliśmy przedstawiciela niemieckiej socjaldemokracji, a więc jednej z największych partii politycznych w Europie, jak mówił i przekonywał o tym Radę Europejską, że czas na normalizację stosunków z Rosją. Krym jest okupowany, Rosja nie chce zwrócić samolotu, w którym zginął polski prezydent i który stanowi główny dowód w śledztwie, które w tej sprawie się toczy, a my mówimy o normalizacji? Czym ma być ta norma, o której dzisiaj mówił nasz kolega siedzący w samym centrum tego parlamentu? To ma być kariera kanclerza Schrödera, jego wybitna rola ekspercka, którą ciągle kontynuuje u boku prezydenta Putina?


  Ivo Vajgl (ALDE). – Spoštovani, nisem prepričan o tem, da je potrebno, da se tolikokrat vračamo na to temo v Parlamentu. Mislim, da imamo veliko pomembnejših stvari, o katerih bi se lahko pogovarjali.

Ustvarjanje lažnih zgodb, tendencioznih novic, vključno z zgodbami in dejanji, ki pomenijo poskus vplivanja na demokratične volitve in procese v drugih državah, vse to vodi v zaostrene mednarodne razmere. Verjamem pa, da propaganda iz tujine, iz Rusije ali od koder koli drugje, ne more omajati zaupanja državljanov Evropske unije v Unijo samo in njene vrednote.

Gre za instrumente hladne vojne in hladna vojna je predigra pravih spopadov običajno. Zato sta potrebni dve enako aktivni in motivirani strani. Ko opozarjamo na nesprejemljivo početje drugih, ne smemo sami postati udeleženci v tej nevarni igri, ki postaja spričo novih in prodornih sredstev, ki so na razpolago, čedalje bolj zagrizena in na žalost tudi čedalje bolj učinkovita.


  Gunnar Hökmark (PPE). – Mr President, it is quite interesting that the communists and the extremist nationalists in this Chamber can’t see Russian disinformation. Of course you can’t, but we can see you. We see that you are giving the same message of extremism, conflicts and dislike for democracy as Russian disinformation tries to impose on our societies.

The difference between Russian disinformation and a lot of the other disinformation we see is that Russian disinformation is part of a broader warfare against Europe and European democracies. It cannot be seen as isolated from all the other things that Russia does. It must be defeated and disclosed, and we must tell them that we will win and they will lose.



  Bogusław Liberadzki (S&D). – Panie Przewodniczący! Dziękuję za działania w moim interesie.

Nie ma się co dziwić: propaganda i działalność propagandowa przeciwko obcym, drugim zawsze występowała i występuje. Czy dziwicie się, że Rosja nie jest zadowolona, jeżeli Unia Europejska się umacnia? A jak ma być zadowolona, skoro utraciła Litwę, Łotwę, Estonię, Polskę, Czechy, Węgry i tak dalej? Wiadomo, że będzie działać w tym kierunku, żeby osłabić wewnątrz Unię Europejską. Odnoszę wrażenie, że jeżeli my pokażemy, że umiemy być dumni z Unii Europejskiej jako pięknego projektu, to zwiększy to naszą odporność. Mamy nowy instrument czyli media społeczne, które są rzeczywiście niekontrolowane, bo sami tego chcemy, które są ogólnodostępne, natomiast jeżeli się znajdą zapisy, chociażby z naszej dzisiejszej dyskusji, że Russia Today czy Sputnik informowały lepiej niż BBC, Agence France czy Polska Agencja Prasowa, i jeżeli to przekażemy społeczeństwu, to będzie zachęta – oglądajcie Russia Today. Więc tego nie powinniśmy robić. Jeżeli będą zapisy – tutaj słyszeliśmy kolegów: „Zanim będziecie mówić o Rosji, uporządkujcie swoje sprawy, bo w samej Unii jest niedobrze” – no to sami dajemy paliwo. Ważne, żeby z naszej debaty nie wystąpiła przesłanka niemocy – rozmawiali, ale nic nie mogą. Tutaj powinniśmy wesprzeć starania Komisji. Także w Parlamencie Europejskim czynimy działania, żeby nie być tymi, którzy nie mogą.


  Zdzisław Krasnodębski (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Ja uważam, że sprawa, która się tutaj najczęściej przewija, czyli fake news, to jest tylko jeden z przykładów propagandy rosyjskiej i kanałów propagandy rosyjskiej, wcale nie najważniejszy. Powinniśmy się głębiej zastanowić nad tym problemem, który koledzy poruszali na marginesie: na wpływie Rosji i propagandy rosyjskiej na politykę i polityków europejskich, a też na rolę niektórych polityków europejskich czy w krajach europejskich w szerzeniu propagandy rosyjskiej. Nie chodzi tylko wcale o populistów, nacjonalistów i inne tego rodzaju osoby określane tym mianem. Weźmy przykład wspomniany przez posła Jurka: byłego kanclerza Niemiec Gerharda Schrödera. Czy on jest nacjonalistą, populistą? Nie – jest człowiekiem, który przecież wypowiada się – podobnie jak jego partia – zawsze bardzo pozytywnie na temat Unii Europejskiej. A co sądzić o jego działalności? Otóż uważam, że jest ona o wiele bardziej niebezpieczna niż te wszystkie fake news. Podobnie ci wszyscy politycy, którzy twierdzą, że NordStream jest tylko projektem gospodarczym, szerzą propagandę rosyjską.


  Javier Nart (ALDE). – Señor presidente, hay unos hechos que son determinantes. Uno, existen servidores informáticos con sede en la Federación Rusa que generan, difunden y multiplican mensajes falsos, intoxicando las redes. Dos, estos mensajes tienen como objetivo fracturar las sociedades occidentales. Tres, los servidores requieren altas inversiones en instalaciones y personal. Cuatro, la financiación exigida no es conocida ni se justifica, ya que no tiene publicidad. Cinco, los servicios policiales y de inteligencia de la Federación Rusa son extraordinariamente eficaces. Seis, ciertamente esta situación no beneficia a las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y la Federación Rusa, que entiendo no pueden seguir congeladas. Siete, ¿por qué las autoridades rusas permiten esta actividad?

Y, en conclusión: si el presidente Macron ha tenido el sentido común de establecer una legislación que bloquee estas informaciones ficticias, estas informaciones intoxicantes, ¿qué va a hacer la Unión Europea para realizar una actividad semejante?


  Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE). – Já si dovolím takovou jednu historickou paralelu. Před druhou světovou válkou žili dohromady mnohé národy a Židé. Co se stalo? Co Židé udělali jiného, že mnoho lidí během nástupu nacistů úplně změnili o Židech mínění a pak spolupracovali, bili je, vydávali je nacistům napospas? Prostě uvěřili propagandě a to je i ten důvod, proč tu dnes musíme toto téma otevřít.

Vážení kolegové, stokrát opakovaná lež o EU se stává pravdou, a jestli si toto neuvědomíme, tak EU nemá tady vůbec svoje místo v budoucnosti. A to já si osobně nepřeji. Proto jsem rád za tuto debatu, proto jsem rád za to, že se k tomu můžeme vyjádřit, a proto jsem rád za to, že můžu apelovat na pana komisaře a na paní komisařku, abychom navýšili peníze na organizace a na způsoby boje proti jakékoliv propagandě.


  Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D). – Señor presidente, señor comisario King, una vez Henry Kissinger le dijo a Robert McNamara: «Do you know, Bob? The fact that I’m a paranoid doesn’t mean that I don’t have real enemies».

Podemos discutir si la estrategia es errática, pero no que la amenaza es real. Porque la propaganda como forma de hacer política no se extinguió con los totalitarismos que se enfrentaron en la Segunda Guerra Mundial, sino que continúa amenazando los valores fundacionales de la Unión Europea, en un híbrido de ciberterrorismo, fake news, intoxicación y chantaje. Y es cierto que la amenaza no proviene solamente de Rusia ni afecta solamente a los países de su directa vecindad, pero también que los estudios y los informes del Congreso de los Estados Unidos y de la comisión de investigación puesta en marcha en el Reino Unido y de las agencias de inteligencia europeas señalan a miles de cuentas automatizadas, radicadas en Rusia, que atacan los valores fundacionales de las sociedades democráticas, como se puso de manifiesto recientemente en Cataluña, para sembrar caos y confusión, favoreciendo la causa de la secesión.

Es imprescindible que la Unión Europea haga honor a la declaración de Praga de la comisaría Mogherini e invierta y se equipe para hacer frente a esta amenaza, que es absolutamente real.


  Kosma Złotowski (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Cieszy mnie, że dzisiaj większość z nas tu na sali Parlamentu Europejskiego dostrzega coś takiego jak propaganda rosyjska i jej szkodliwość dla Unii Europejskiej, dla demokracji w ogóle, ale rzeczywiście ciężko byłoby wyjść z tej sali i mówić: „No, powiedzieliśmy i nic nie możemy”, tak jak tu wskazywał nam pan poseł Liberadzki. Otóż my musimy coś zrobić. Propaganda rosyjska oczywiście to jest wiele, wiele fortepianów, ale wskazywaliśmy tu wszyscy na jeden z nich, a mianowicie Russia Today. Owszem, oni chcą wpłynąć na opinię publiczną w Unii Europejskiej, czy w ogóle szerzej na świecie, ale my też musimy wpływać na ich opinię publiczną. Europe Today – to powinna być nasza odpowiedź. Mamy doświadczenie, mamy Radio Wolna Europa. Są zresztą takie inicjatywy i Unia Europejska, Komisja Europejska powinny je wesprzeć.


  Urmas Paet (ALDE). – Mr President, tensions between Western societies and Russia have given rise to the flow of fake news that aims to weaken the European Union. Europe must become less naive to be able to defend itself given this surge of false news and propaganda. A few examples. Most European hotels show the TV Russia Today alongside ordinary channels. Some months ago, in this very same European Parliament building an exhibition was opened showcasing Russian views on the events in Syria. Would anyone imagine having the same kind of EU exhibition in the Russian State Duma right now?

Also, European journalists have to be very professional. There is a need to go back to classical journalism rules. All facts must be checked. You must be critical of your sources and no Russian media channel should be considered a trustworthy source. One must be able to distinguish between propaganda channels and real journalists, and it is not that difficult actually. So Europe itself can do a lot to protect its societies from propaganda attacks by using common sense and being less naive.


  Tunne Kelam (PPE). – Mr President, I would like to thank first of all our StratCom team for their excellent efforts which should be taken extremely seriously by our governments and foreign policy leaders. Still, they are too small and need much more funding.

But one field where Russian propaganda has had a lasting effect: it has succeeded to make us believe that the Russian Duma is freely elected, not a Putin selected body and that by fostering personal contacts with Duma members we can exercise some influence on the conduct of Russian rulers.

I think the opposite is true: Duma members are instruments of Putin par excellence. They have a very clear programme and they are ten times better prepared for spreading disinformation among European parliamentarians than we are. We should keep this in mind.


  Ruža Tomašić (ECR). – Gospodine predsjedniče, utjecaj ruske propagande na građane država članica Unije sigurno nije zanemariv, no veliko je pitanje koliko je presudan u njihovom donošenju odluka na izborima i referendumima. Uvjerena sam da nije toliko.

Čini mi se da europski politički mainstream koji ubrzano gubi povjerenje građana, a time i političku moć, želi u Moskvi pronaći svog Pedra, nekoga koga može kriviti za sve. Da, Moskva sigurno želi ostvariti određeni utjecaj u Europi, ali ne – nije glavna odgovorna za razočaranje naših građana.

Danas se ne događa ništa što se nije događalo i ranije. Uvijek su velike sile koristile razne metode kako bi jedna drugu destabilizirale. Danas se samo koriste druga sredstva za iste ciljeve.

Naravno da to ne bismo trebali šutke promatrati i dozvoliti da nas se destabilizira, ali ne mislim ni da je uputno Putinu pripisivati nadljudske osobine kako bi se prikrilo ili ublažilo vlastiti nerad, nekompetenciju i očite pogreške.




  Dubravka Šuica (PPE). – Gospodine predsjedniče, poznati Collins Dictionary je proglasio riječju godine 2017. fake news. U usporedbi s 2016. ovaj je pojam korišten 360 % više. Znači, to nam isto nešto govori o čemu se radi.

Gospođo Caliente, hvala Vam lijepo što ste uspjeli ovu temu podići na današnji dnevni red i slažem se s Vama da želimo nultu toleranciju kada je u pitanju govor mržnje. Isto tako, nikako ne možemo dozvoliti da se podrivaju demokratske europske vrijednosti koje smo postigli, i putem ruske propagande. Želimo se boriti protiv mitova, manipulacija, hibridnih ratova. Iz ovoga svega proizlazi da je cilj destabilizirati Europsku uniju.

Gospodine Gonzales, slažem se s Vama. Nećemo nikome nametati naš način življenja, ali želimo očuvati naš način življenja i želimo se boriti protiv propagande. Istina je da su uvijek velike sile, ne velike nego nedemokratske sile, koristile propagandu za svoj utjecaj. Mi moramo sačuvati naš i drago mi je da Europska unija poduzima sve moguće aktivnosti kako bismo spriječili lažne vijesti i hibridne ratove.


  Laima Liucija Andrikienė (PPE). – Europos Sąjungos atsakas į Rusijos agresijos grėsmę iki šiol buvo silpnas, nes didelė mūsų politinio elito dalis, ypač Europos vakaruose, vis dar nepripažįsta šios grėsmės. Agresyvūs Kremliaus veiksmai yra precedento neturintys po Šaltojo karo. Tai svetimų teritorijų okupacija ir aneksija panaudojant jėgą, nuolatiniai kitų valstybių sienų ir oro erdvės pažeidimai, tai precedento neturintis dezinformacijos naudojimas, priešiškas kišimasis į demokratinius rinkimus ir nuolatiniai kibernetiniai išpuoliai. Faktas, kad, kai Jungtinės Valstijos tyrinėja aiškiai priešišką prasiskverbimą į savo demokratijos tvirtovę, rinkimų procesą, tokie tyrimai Europoje niekur nebuvo pradėti, nors Rusijos įsikišimo atvejai Nyderlanduose, Jungtinėje Karalystėje, Prancūzijoje, Vokietijoje yra akivaizdūs. Todėl privalome įvardinti Rusiją kaip pagrindinį priešiškos dezinformacijos šaltinį ir nedelsiant imtis praktinių veiksmų: 1) pripažinti grėsmę, 2) ištirti ir viešai demaskuoti priešišką Rusijos veiklą, 3) padidinti STRATCOMM pajėgumus iki reikiamo lygio ir 4) skleisti supratimą už specialistų bendruomenės ribų.


  Dariusz Rosati (PPE). – Pani Przewodnicząca! W ciągu ostatnich miesięcy byliśmy świadkami prób manipulowania opinią publiczną i wpływania na wyniki demokratycznych wyborów w Unii Europejskiej i poza nią. Wiele z tych prób było dziełem Federacji Rosyjskiej.

Rosja rozwinęła strategię kłamliwej propagandy, której głównym celem jest osłabienie i rozbicie Unii Europejskiej, między innymi przez wspieranie tendencji antyeuropejskich i wzmacnianie partii nacjonalistycznych i populistycznych w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich i w państwach sąsiadujących. Przykro stwierdzić, ale również i na tej sali znajdują się przedstawiciele partii, którzy bronią tego postępowania Federacji Rosyjskiej.

Przykład Ukrainy jest szczególnie wymowny. Pod wpływem kłamstw rozpowszechnianych przez kontrolowane przez Kreml media, fundacje, internetowe boty i armię trolli wielu obywateli państw unijnych uwierzyło, że to Ukraina ponosi odpowiedzialność za krwawą wojnę prowadzoną na jej terytorium przez Rosję.

Pani Przewodnicząca! W obliczu tej wojny informacyjnej musimy zacząć działać natychmiast i zdecydowanie. Apeluję do Komisji Europejskiej i do przedstawicieli państw członkowskich o podjęcie działań zmierzających do wypracowania skutecznej strategii walki z tym zjawiskiem.


  Michael Gahler (PPE). – Frau Präsidentin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Ich glaube ein wichtiger Punkt ist, dass wir im Rahmen dieser Debatte in unsere Öffentlichkeit das Bewusstsein tragen, dass in diesem Bereich etwas geschieht – dass also überhaupt Russland auf diesem Weg unterwegs ist. Wenn wir es geschehen ließen, dass Herr Putin Erfolg hat in der Form, dass er die Grenze zwischen Wahrheit und Lüge verschiebt, oder, dass wir es akzeptieren, dass, jeder eben seine Wahrheit hat, dann hätte er gewonnen.

Ich bin zuversichtlich, dass wir aus der Kraft unserer Demokratie heraus die Stärke haben, klarzumachen: Wir machen nichts gegen eine russische Politik, wir machen keine Gegenpropaganda, sondern aus meiner Sicht ist das probateste Mittel gegen solche Fake News einfach die schlichte Wahrheit. Wenn wir die rüberbringen, dann haben diejenigen, die die Wahrheit verfälschen wollen, keine Chance.


  Jaromír Štětina (PPE). – S lítostí a roztrpčením sleduji, kolik škody napáchal kremelský trolling na naší půdě, na půdě členských států EU. Tým, který bojuje s vyvracením desinformací na straně EU, působí od roku 2015 a má o něco více než 10 členů. Ano, došlo k rozšíření týmu East StratCom po nesčetných výzvách tohoto Parlamentu o 2 členy.

Paní vysoká představitelka zde – eufemisticky řečeno – podcenila situaci a s její nápravou nezodpovědně nepospíchá. Má země ČR je zaplavena nesmyslnými lživými informacemi o EU. Před druhým kolem prezidentské volby se tak na slušného protikandidáta současného prezidenta Zemana valí smršť prefabrikovaných lží z dílny AC 24, Aeronetu, Sputniku a mnoha dalších. Zamysleme se prosím nad naší taktikou vůči Kremlu.


  Lars Adaktusson (PPE). – Madam President, a number of EU Member States have been subjected to severe disinformation attacks from Russia. Russian deception is aimed at weakening, destabilising and dividing the European Union. In essence, we are talking about an attack on democracy.

When it comes to confronting this, the High Representative has stated that the External Action Service has taken proper action. However, many experts beg to disagree. The EU instantly needs to raise public awareness, to streamline the exchange of intelligence and to allocate necessary resources to institutions like Europol and StratCom. In order to protect and preserve fundamental values we need an effective strategy. We need political courage to counter the forces for whom misrepresentations and lies are the principal political instrument.


  Ramona Nicole Mănescu (PPE). – Madam President, the chief editor of Russia Today said that Russia Today is capable of conducting an information war against the whole western world: to conquer and to grow an audience in order to make use of this audience at critical moments. It seems that the Kremlin decided a long time ago that the EU is an enemy of Russian interests and should be treated accordingly, by any means.

But our lack of action shows that the EU does not perceive Russia as a real threat and we are not doing enough. We must end this dolce farniente and decide more quickly about our position on strategic communication and counter propaganda; such a decision must be followed by actions with an appropriate budget.

Either we respond on the same scale or we start an open dialogue with Russia based on our interests and priorities. We must understand that this is not about an ideological conflict. The Kremlin’s propaganda is targeting very concrete files, such as the energy file and, using the old, but effective, strategy of divide et impera. It will clearly win this game if we do not take firm action today.



  Julian King, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, on behalf of the Commission, can I just express our appreciation for the work that this Parliament does to address the issues around this phenomenon, this challenge of disinformation. Today’s debate obviously, but not just starting today, going back some time, a number of you have mentioned the resolution that Ms Fotyga was rapporteur for in 2016.

Deliberate disinformation raises the stakes. It raises the stakes both for freedom of expression and for our properly functioning democracies. The challenge for public authorities at all levels is to find ways of tackling disinformation without having an adverse effect on freedom of expression, as a number of you have underlined. It is no good our seeking to counter disinformation or fake news by setting up some kind of 1984-style Ministry of Truth; and we are not going to do that.

As I said earlier, the Commission is looking at what more might be done to address the challenge of hostile propaganda, fake news and online disinformation, always bearing in mind that balance between countering disinformation and respecting our democratic rights including crucially freedom of expression.

So we are reinforcing our StratCom’s efforts. We will continue our support to media freedom of expression. We will come forward with proposals focusing on this challenge of fake news later this spring. We are looking at what more we can do with the big Internet platforms to address these issues and we are pursuing, with you, the measures that need to be taken to reinforce our cybersecurity, our cyber resilience and deterrence. Those are concrete steps that we are taking on these issues.

Honourable Members, this has been a most timely debate.


  Monika Panayotova, Présidente en exercice du Conseil. – Madame la Présidente, je vous remercie.

Madam President, thank you again for inviting me to this debate. I have followed it closely, and it has again illustrated the topical character and the scale of the challenge posed by disinformation and propaganda.

As some Members have mentioned, the tools we already have, such as East StratCom, are proving to be valuable in raising awareness of disinformation, but it is clear that they are only a part of the response to such challenges. Today’s debate also further highlighted the need for EU institutions and Member States to further cooperate. Supporting greater media literacy and media plurality is also essential, and here all Member States have a role to play too. The European Union should further communicate positive narratives and fact-based messages and develop resilience among its citizens towards propaganda and disinformation. In this way people will not feel confused or insecure and will be able to engage in critical thinking, distinguishing facts from propaganda.



  La Présidente. – Le débat est clos.

Je reviens vers vous, Mme Grapini. On m’a déjà prévenue deux fois que vous aviez demandé la parole pour «un fait personnel». Il n’y a pas de souci, je vais vous la donner.

Je vous rappelle juste qu’au titre de l’article 164, vous ne pouvez pas vous exprimer sur le fond du débat, mais simplement, ce qui n’est déjà pas mal, je crois, réfuter soit des propos tenus au cours du débat vous concernant personnellement, soit des opinions qui vous sont prêtées, ou encore, vous pouvez rectifier vos propres déclarations. Vous avez pour ce faire trois minutes maximum.


  Maria Grapini (S&D). – Doamnă președintă, nu am să mă refer la fond, am vrut doar ca, în baza acestui articol pe care dumneavoastră l-ați spus, să mă refer la lucruri mincinoase spuse. A fost pronunțat numele meu. Colegul Cristian Preda, care, de altfel, a plecat din sală, și-a folosit timpul de vorbire în această dezbatere extrem de importantă pe o temă foarte importantă, acuzându-mă că aș fi pro-rus.

Eu sunt un pro-european demonstrat în țară și aici, prin activitatea mea. Și în țară și aici am demonstrat acest lucru și cred că nu putem să dezbatem despre știri false alimentând colegii din Parlament, Comisia, Consiliul cu informații false. Și cred că este neetic, este un om care nu se bucură de nicio popularitate, nu mai face parte dintr-un partid politic, este decredibilizat total și nu cred că este normal să acuze fără argumente. Și cred că ar fi bine să încercăm să găsim o soluție prin care cei care vin aici cu acuzații - ar trebui să beneficiem și noi de prezumția de nevinovăție - să vină și cu dovezi. Eu cred că aceasta ar fi calea etică într-un forum, așa cum este Parlamentul European, și nu este prima dată când domnul Cristian Preda face acest lucru.

Ar trebui totuși să rezumăm și să spunem celor care iau cuvântul să facă referire la subiectul în dezbatere. Este un subiect important și eu cred foarte mult în tot ce a spus și domnul comisar și Consiliul și mulți colegi de aici din cadrul dezbaterilor că noi, Uniunea Europeană, Comisia Europeană, Parlamentul putem să facem mai mult pentru evitarea știrilor false. De altfel, sunt membră a comisiei LIBE și știți - și dumneavoastră sunteți membră - că sunt implicată și am apreciat raportul din proprie inițiativă al Tanjei Fajon, care dorește să găsim împreună o soluție pentru combaterea știrilor false. Vă mulțumesc - intervenția mea a avut legătură doar cu un atac absolut rușinos.


  La Présidente. – Vous avez eu l’occasion de vous exprimer, Madame, effectivement, sur ce sujet.

Déclarations écrites (article 162)


  Javi López (S&D), por escrito. – Este debate sin resolución trata el impacto de la propaganda rusa en la seguridad de los Estados miembros y la interferencia en sus procesos políticos y electorales. Rusia está llevando a cabo y alentando acciones para desestabilizar tanto los gobiernos y las sociedades europeas como a la UE y a la OTAN. Varios Estados miembros han expresado su preocupación por los efectos de esta propaganda y sus potenciales efectos políticos dramáticos, más teniendo en cuenta que Hungría e Italia celebrarán elecciones este año, o los vínculos geográficos e históricos existentes en los países del Este. Este tema tiene una gran relevancia desde la perspectiva de la defensa, ya que la relación con Rusia es uno de los puntos cruciales en la confección de la Unión Europea de la Defensa. La UE ha considerado este tema como clave y se ha establecido una unidad especializada para abordarlo. Además, se firmó en Praga una Declaración que urgía a la alta representante a adoptar medidas al respecto y se ha ido incrementado el presupuesto para luchar contra la injerencia externa y las noticias falsas.


  Artis Pabriks (PPE), rakstiski. – Informācijas telpa ir pārvērtusies par modernu kaujas lauku, tai skaitā Eiropā un Latvijā. Mēs Baltijas valstīs to pamanījām pirmie, tādēļ 2015. gadā Rīgā tapa StratCom. Šodien, lielā mērā pateicoties deputātiem no Baltijas, šis jautājums ir nokļuvis Parlamenta dienas kārtībā. Krievija ir viena no valstīm, kas šo informācijas telpu izmanto aktīvi un iedarbīgi. Kamēr Krievijas varas iestādes neslēpj, ka viltus ziņas un nepatiesa informācija ir militāri rīki, arvien pamatotākas kļūst bažas, ka Krievija ir bijusi iesaistīta gan vēlēšanās ASV, gan Brexit referendumā. Šim informācijas kaujas laukam un nepatiesu ziņu izplatīšanai sociālie tīkli ir kļuvuši par pateicīgu augsni. Krievijas propagandas mašīnā ir ieguldīti astronomiski līdzekļi. ES ir radījusi ES Austrumu StratCom, kas aktīvi un veiksmīgi izplata informāciju par atklātajām Krievijas dezinformācijas kampaņām un viltus ziņām, cenšoties atspēkot Kremļa propagandu. Tādēļ ir nepieciešams palielināt šī centra resursus un kapacitāti. Tāpat mums ir jādomā, kā mazināt šādas informācijas izplatību sociālajos tīklos, kādas privātuma un vārda brīvības robežas šeit pieļaujamas, vai komentāri internetā var būt anonīmi. Mums ir jābūt gataviem mēģinājumiem ietekmēt ne tikai nacionālo, bet arī Eiropas Parlamenta vēlēšanu rezultātus. Vēlos vēl piebilst, ka Krievijas propagandas ietekme jūtama arī Eiropas Parlamentā, jo ir novēroti atkārtoti mēģinājumi Krievijai interesējošus jautājumus iekļaut Parlamenta dienas kārtībā.


  Tibor Szanyi (S&D), írásban. – Fontosnak tartom ezt a vitát, mert 2016. novemberi állásfoglalásunk után azt a felismerést tükrözi, hogy az azóta eltelt időszakban a helyzet csak súlyosbodott, az EU belső kohézióját és atlanti szövetségi rendszerét a nyílt provokációk, burkolt fenyegetések, álhírek és megosztási kísérletek széles eszköztárával bomlasztani törekvő putyini expanziós politika mára az Európai Unió biztonságát fenyegető egyik legveszélyesebb külső kihívássá fajult. Üdvözlöm a Bizottság szándékát, hogy az orosz propaganda ellensúlyozásában az Unió a tagállamokat az eddigit jelentősen meghaladó közösségi forrásokkal, korszerű, konkrét akciótervekkel segíti. Moszkva ugyanis célzott álhíreivel, s a piszkos „hibrid háború” sok más eszközével egész Európa biztonságát, értékeit, demokratikus jogállami berendezkedését támadja: megszállás alatt tartja egy szuverén ország területét, határain harcokat szít, másutt uniós tagállamokat provokál, manipulálni próbálja belső viszonyainkat, sajtónkat.

Tapasztaltuk, hogy Putyin a józan ész és a diplomácia nyelvét nem érti, csak az erőét. Ezért tagállamonként differenciált eszközökkel, de a helyzet súlyosságának megfelelően a demokratikus közösség erejét felmutató együttes EU fellépésre van szükség. Ugyanakkor magyar politikusként sajnálattal látom, hogy ebben az uniós egység leggyengébb láncszeme éppen Magyarország, pontosabban az Orbán-kormány politikája: egy tagállam vezetése személyes politikai számításból kiszolgáltatja hazája és szövetségesei biztonságát, elárulja gazdasági, pénzügyi, energiaellátási érdekeit Putyin céljainak szolgálatában. Magyarország nem válhat Moszkva hídfőállásává az EU-n belül!


  Indrek Tarand (Verts/ALE), in writing. – As we all know, fighting the influences of Russian propaganda, or any disinformation campaign for that matter, is not exactly straightforward. Since we do not want a ministry of truth, we need a more sophisticated approach. I myself am not susceptible to Russian propaganda, having lived half of my life in the Soviet Union I have no trouble discerning facts from fiction, but there are plenty of impressionable people out there, especially on the internet. Some studies indicate that six out of ten people do not even read the articles that they share and repost on social media. The Geier / Tarand report on the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2017 decided to create ‘a Strategic Communication Capacity budget item in line with the European Council conclusions of March 2015 and equip the EEAS with adequate staff and tools to face the challenge of disinformation from third states and non-state actors.’ We might indeed need to provide the EEAS East StratCom Task Force with more financial and human resources, but before we do that I would like to see a thorough impact assessment of their work so far, especially considering the complex nature of combating this problem.

Последно осъвременяване: 15 май 2019 г.Правна информация - Политика за поверителност