Пълен протокол на разискванията

Вторник, 17 април 2018 г. - Страсбург

20. Изпълнение на инструментите на ЕС за външно финансиране: междинен преглед за 2017 г. и бъдеща структура за периода след 2020 г. (разискване)

  La Présidente. – L’ordre du jour appelle le débat sur le rapport de Marietje Schaake, au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, sur la mise en œuvre des instruments de financement extérieur de l’Union: examen à mi-parcours en 2017 et future architecture après 2020 (2017/2280(INI)) (A8-0112/2018).

  Marietje Schaake, rapporteur. – Madam President, in less than two weeks the Commission will publish its proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework, and a lot of attention will go to the EU budget after Brexit. But we should not forget about the future of the EU’s foreign policy spending, with almost EUR 100 million budgeted for external relations already, a lot is at stake, and we must use this upcoming budget as an opportunity to reflect and reform in order to make the EU a stronger global player.

It is undeniable that the current foreign policy spending structure needs improvement. Evaluations, independent ones, have found that a strategic and overarching vision is lacking, while management by different services within both the Commission and the European External Action Service are inefficient and incoherent. Information sharing with us here in Parliament has been anything but forthcoming and, similarly, legal barriers have prevented the EU from swiftly responding to new and emerging challenges.

We cannot make opaque trust funds the new model for foreign policy spending and certainly not with the main goal of managing migration, and that is exactly what risks happening. The European External Action Service is rumoured to seek the creation of one single instrument for EU External Action with ‘a strong focus on migration’. You heard it right: the goal is to pool all the money together, and as we understand, Commissioner Hahn is trying to ensure the funding intended for candidate Member States and the European neighbourhood remain separate.

What’s most concerning to me and many of my colleagues is not that there is an appetite for ambitious reforms – in fact that should be embraced – but that no governance model has been set up for such a single instrument. So how can we in the European Parliament be asked to agree with the new vehicle if we do not know how it is going to be steered?

I am afraid that the lack of clarity here uncovers a bigger problem. During a recent Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing and during the many foreign instruments working groups that I have chaired, it has become clear that Members of the European Parliament are not in the mood to give the External Action Service or the Commission carte blanche. They feel sidelined already as strategic dialogues are often neither strategic nor dialogues. Information is shared reluctantly and late.

Parliament is keen to ensure it can do its job and steer policies, spending and apply the necessary and required parliamentary scrutiny. MEPs also want to build in more flexibility to ensure adequate responses to new crises, as well as the preservation of European values. We do, as Europe faces unprecedented challenges at the moment: bloodshed continues in Yemen and Syria, and Presidents Erdoğan and el-Sisi have further consolidated their authoritarian grip on power in Turkey and Egypt. At the same time, governments in Russia, China and Iran are at odds with the values and interests we hold dear in Europe.

In practice, the values-based goals and objectives of EU foreign policy have too often become subordinate to short-term and national interests such as migration management or countering terrorism. The deal concluded with President Erdoğan to stop Syrian refugees from reaching us in Europe is a case in point.

The future of the EU’s foreign policy budget can benefit from reforms, but cannot only be designed to deal with today’s crises. Who knows what could be at the top of the agenda in 2025? And in the absence of an altogether more flexible budget, which is what we should be focusing on with the MFF, we need at least to build in flexibility while we have multiannual spending plans. But certainly the instrumentalising of all foreign policy funds and managing migration as the key goal is not the right direction.

So before the European External Action Service and the Commission propose a new architecture, they should think about governance and, where needed, be reminded that we in Parliament play an equal role here. I therefore encourage colleagues in this House to focus on the principles of parliamentary scrutiny, oversight, policy-steered spending, evaluations and accountability. Let us not get bogged down in long lists of our favourite instruments to save from the reforms.

  Neven Mimica, on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Madam President, honourable Members, let me thank the Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr McAllister, and the rapporteur, Ms Schaake, for this important report and good collaboration over the past months. Let me first share a few reflections on the mid-term review and the instruments covered by the report.

I fully concur with the report’s findings that our instruments are generally fit for purpose, but have been stretched to their limits in the past years. In particular, the European Neighbourhood Instrument has been a pivotal tool to force reforms in our neighbourhood. At the same time, as the report notes, the challenges that we have faced in the neighbourhood have shown the need for greater financial resources and more flexibility.

The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance is unique in addressing the objective of preparing candidate countries and potential candidates for EU membership. The next instrument for pre-accession should be clearly positioned in the context of the new Western Balkan strategy.

The mid-term review concluded that our Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace was relevant, effective, and efficient and had a unique added value, and we fully agree.

The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights promotes some of our core values in a challenging global context. We have witnessed increased pressure on human rights defenders and closing spaces for civil society in many countries. We intend to enhance our support to human rights defenders even more in the coming years and continue our work on EU election observations.

Finally, the Partnership Instrument is a young instrument that has helped us invest in the European Union’s soft power, where and when we needed it the most. In the next three years we want to focus it on some priorities, such as economic diplomacy, climate, health, peace and security, and digital issues including cybersecurity.

Let me come to the future architecture. I would like to reflect on the lessons from the mid-term review that guide our thinking for the proposal we will soon publish. First, the volume of external action funding needs to match our political ambitions. To deliver on our ambitions we need adequate financial resources.

Second, too often we have had to adapt our policies to our instruments. It is time that we adapt our instruments to our political priorities. This is why we have proposed merging our development and foreign policy instruments into one broad instrument covering neighbourhood as well as development and international cooperation.

Third, one broad instrument does not mean one single policy. It does not mean less funding for certain regions or themes. There will be clear funding dedicated to each policy area in order to reflect our political priorities.

Fourth, we need more flexibility and more responsiveness. Our aim is also to set aside a significant share of unallocated funds. This will allow us to react to changing circumstances without diverting funds from other policies.

We want – and we agree with the report on this – to make the EU budget more accountable, more transparent and understandable to the public. That includes, as announced yesterday, bringing the European Development Fund inside the budget, as this would significantly enhance parliamentary scrutiny.

Finally, it should be easier to work for the security of our citizens and partners. For this reason, the High Representative has proposed setting up a European peace facility to finance missions and capacity building as an off-budget funding mechanism.

Let me conclude by saying that our debates on budgets should finally focus on our citizens’ priorities, instead of focusing simply on instruments. We would like our conversation to be driven by the great issues of our times, from migration to the situation in Syria, from security to Africa’s development.

  Antonio López-Istúriz White, en nombre del Grupo PPE. – Señora presidenta, como ponente alternativo del Grupo PPE tuve la oportunidad de coordinar la visión de mi grupo en un dosier vital para la política exterior de la Unión Europea. Me gustaría agradecer y reconocer el trabajo realizado por mi compañera Marietje Schaake que mucho ayudó, sin duda, a conseguir el texto que votamos mañana en esta casa.

La efectividad de los instrumentos de financiación exterior de la Unión Europea es fundamental para que podamos asegurarnos de que la Unión Europea tenga las herramientas necesarias para implementar su política global, de vecindad y de ampliación.

Lo que discutimos hoy no es solo la revisión intermedia de estos instrumentos, sino también la recomendación para la nueva arquitectura a partir de 2020: qué hay que cambiar u optimizar en esos instrumentos para que sigan haciendo el importante trabajo que hacen en nuestra política exterior. En este sentido, me gustaría destacar tres puntos.

El presupuesto actual de las relaciones exteriores es solo del 6 % del marco financiero plurianual. Sin embargo, con esa cantidad la Unión Europea ha logrado éxitos considerables en nuestras relaciones exteriores, desde un exitoso acuerdo con Turquía para frenar los flujos migratorios a los acuerdos de Minsk para lograr la estabilidad y la paz en Ucrania.

En segundo lugar, debemos señalar la importancia de contar con instrumentos específicos para aspectos específicos de nuestra agenda internacional. La financiación específica para los instrumentos de nuestra política de vecindad tiene que estar asegurada. El Instrumento Europeo de Vecindad es la manera más efectiva de influir en la emigración, la seguridad, el desarrollo económico y una mejor gobernanza de nuestros socios estratégicos que, geográficamente, están más cerca de nosotros.

No me queda tiempo.

  Andi Cristea, on behalf of the S&D Group. – Madam President, many thanks to the rapporteur and to colleagues for the solid text we have before us today. It is clear that we need to enhance the effectiveness of our external financing instruments. We need an architecture that is able to match the unprecedented challenges we are confronted with.

In the context of the preparation of the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF, the Commission and the European External Action Service are discussing the structure of the external financing instruments to simplify the architecture and enhance flexibility. We must ensure that appropriate safeguards in terms of parliamentary scrutiny are put in place. A simplified architecture of the instruments achieved through their consolidation would have to be accompanied by a new oversight model of governance and parliamentary scrutiny, ensuring full accountability. In addition, a consolidation of instruments would have very political implications, even more so in the context of Brexit and budget pressure. Current priorities this House has fought hard for – human rights, development, enlargement and neighbourhood policy, to name just a few – must remain at the heart of our external action.

  Anders Primdahl Vistisen, for ECR-Gruppen. – Fru formand! Først og fremmest vil jeg gerne takke ordføreren for det arbejde, der er lagt i betænkningen. Det er utroligt væsentligt, at vi får set på, hvordan vi får brugt vores midler på den rigtige måde og på den mest fleksible måde. Derfor er ECR-Gruppen også glad for, at vi får øget fleksibilitet med de forslag, der ligger her i betænkningen. Når vi så alligevel ikke kan stemme for det samlede resultat, skyldes det først og fremmest, at vi ikke mener, at vi kan foreslå forøgelser for EU’s budgetområder, før vi har adresseret finansieringen. Da vi ikke mener, at EU-budgettet som følge af brexit nødvendigvis skal være højere, så mener vi også, at vi har et ansvar for at adressere, hvordan midlerne skal fremskaffes, før vi foreslår at anvende dem.

Den anden ting, som piner os i ECR-Gruppen, er, at man har gentaget den ensidige kritik, der har været i forbindelse med ødelæggelserne i Gaza og på Vestbredden, om at kræve EU-midler til bygninger tilbage fra israelerne uden at tænke på, at palæstinenserne i meget høj grad selv har lagt op til de ødelæggelser, der er sket, bl.a. ved bevidst at bruge bløde civile mål som affyringsramper og gemmested for terrorangreb mod Israel.

Noget, vi derimod er glade for, der er kommet med i betænkningen, er en kritik af de kandidatlandsmidler, der er gået til Tyrkiet. Det er fuldstændigt klart for ECR-Gruppen, at vi er nødt til at tage et opgør med den ret ukritiske tilgang, der har været hvad angår midler til Tyrkiet i de foregående år.

  Jordi Solé, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group. – Madam President, I welcome Ms Schaake’s report, especially when it comes to reviewing the current external financing instruments, underlining the need to align them with the Sustainable Development Goals and proposing some improvements.

When it comes to making proposals on the post—2020 architecture, we are not so enthusiastic. We know – and we have just heard once again – that Ms Mogherini and the Commission are working on a major overhaul of this architecture, merging the existing financing instruments, including the Development Cooperation Instrument, the Human Rights and Democracy Instrument and the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace into a unified single instrument.

Until today, we have not heard – beyond the rather empty argument of simplification – of any good reason why all these important thematic tools of the Union should disappear and be merged. On the contrary, the recent mid—term review conducted by the Commission has just confirmed that these instruments are fit for purpose and, in the case of the Instrument for Stability and Peace, ‘a key tool for the EU to underpin its diplomacy and tailor—made projects’.

This mid—term review also stresses in its conclusions that this capacity ‘must be further strengthened in any future architecture’. We acknowledge that the new structure should be more rational and more flexible. We even acknowledge that there is room for merging some external-action and some development-cooperation instruments, but we stress the importance of maintaining separate instruments for enlargement, neighbourhood policy, development, human rights and democracy, civilian conflict prevention and civilian crisis response.

  Sabine Lösing, im Namen der GUE/NGL-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! Die Einbindung des Parlaments in Form des sogenannten strategischen Dialogs zwischen Parlament, EAD und Kommission war bisher nichts als Beschäftigungstherapie für Abgeordnete, bei der sich EAD und Kommission mit Allgemeinplätzen durch 90-Minuten-Treffen geschleppt haben. Mit Informationen oder gar Zusammenarbeit oder parlamentarischer Kontrolle hatte das nichts zu tun.

Die nun angedachte Zusammenlegung aller Finanzinstrumente zu einem einzigen wird diesen Zustand der parlamentarischen Nichtpartizipation verschlimmern. Das lehnen wir ab. Und dies auch noch vor dem Hintergrund der zunehmenden Zweckentfremdung der Finanzmittel der jeweiligen Instrumente. Einst gedacht als zivile Instrumente zur Verbesserung der sozioökonomischen Entwicklung und der Friedensschaffung, werden sie nun Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsinteressen der EU untergeordnet. Der Türkei-EU-Deal zur Flüchtlingsabwehr wurde vom Heranführungsinstrument kofinanziert. Das Instrument für Stabilität und Frieden, konzipiert als rein ziviles Instrument zur Entwicklung, Entwaffnung, Reintegration, zur Konfliktverhütung, zur friedlichen Konfliktlösung, kann seit letzten Herbst auch für Ausbildung, Unterhalt und Ausrüstung von Armeen in Drittstaaten genutzt werden. Dies ist die komplette Unterordnung von zivilen und entwicklungspolitischen Politiken unter Militär- und Sicherheitspolitik.

Entwicklungshilfe für Militärisches zu verwenden ist eine friedenspolitische Bankrotterklärung. Deswegen enthalten wir uns bei dem Bericht, unterstützen aber alle Vorschläge in Richtung demokratischer Partizipation.

  David Coburn, on behalf of the EFDD Group. – Madam President, it seems strange to me that the European Union should have these so-called ‘financial instruments’ which are designed to support foreign and domestic policy objectives in the neighbourhood – North Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, etc. – and to support candidate member countries to meet the standards of the acquis and join the EU, whether their populations want to or not. In relation to Brexit, it calls for the ratio of spending to be increased. How is the EU going to be able to fund if one of its most important contributors, the UK, is leaving? Where is the money coming from?

The purpose of this money seems to be to increase EU interference and disrupt neighbouring states. I would hate to think that this money will be used in the future to interfere and destabilise an independent Britain by subsidising disruptive remainer groups. We do not want the domestic and economic (inaudible) potentially booming UK economy undermined by our own money through these (inaudible) external financial instruments which seem more like some sort of Machiavellian slush fund.

(The President cut off the speaker)

  Diane James (NI). – Madam President, let’s just go back to some basics, please, which is that essentially the EU external financing programme is designed to buy friends and buy influence. It is actually a classic display of what is called ‘soft power’. The report all but admits that it has been a failure in its purpose to promote EU values, and let me quote from the report: ‘[The EFI is] inconsistent [with] implementation of EU values and partnership principles’, ‘[... the absence of] evaluation mechanisms’; ‘the lack of flexibility’. The report is concerned that the EU and its instruments face significant challenges, including political trade-offs between the promotion of values and rights and short-term security interests, numerous violent global conflicts and a decline in transatlantic consensus. Hardly a glowing report.

If the report recognises and cites this sort of shortcomings, what level of confidence can MEPs have in its continuation? Finally, may I finish by reminding the Chamber of the EUR 50 billion cost of these instruments?

(The speaker agreed to take a blue—card question under Rule 162(8))

  David Coburn (EFDD), blue-card question. – Ms James, do you agree with me that this money does not seem to be accounted for, and that no one seems to know where it goes or what it is used for? Would you like to elaborate on that? What do you think?

  Diane James (NI), blue-card answer. – Mr Coburn, as a colleague, thank you very much, but we have seen this all too often with other areas of expenditure. It is interesting, isn’t it, that in terms of transparency and scrutiny far too many of the financial expenditure reports this Chamber looks at are equally as critical and equally lacking on the detail that would give us as MEPs confidence to sign off.

  José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra (PPE). – Señora presidenta, creía que tenía un minuto y medio. En todo caso, quiero agradecer a la ponente, la señora Schaake, el trabajo que nos ha presentado sobre un tema que es de una gran importancia. La Unión Europea, como se ha recordado aquí, moviliza 52 000 millones de euros en el ámbito de las perspectivas financieras, una parte muy importante de los cuales la asumen los llamados instrumentos de política exterior.

Comisario, nos acaba de recordar que no se apartan sustancialmente de los ejes fundamentales que constituyen la Agenda 2030, el programa de acción de Adís Abeba, los objetivos de la Conferencia de París, pero es evidente —y la ponente nos lo ha dicho— que estos fondos necesitan ajustes. Aprovecho, señor comisario, su presencia aquí para interesarme por el Instrumento de Cooperación al Desarrollo (ICD), el instrumento que usted gestiona, y los problemas que se presentan para los países ya graduados.

En todo caso, si tuviese que subrayar un elemento fundamental del informe que nos presenta la colega Schaake, me referiría a la flexibilidad. Es evidente que tenemos que estar atentos para tomar en consideración las nuevas amenazas y la nueva configuración de nuestras relaciones y tratar de tener unos instrumentos más ágiles, más flexibles y, sobre todo, más eficaces al servicio de los intereses y de los valores de la Unión Europea.

  Brando Benifei (S&D). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, gli strumenti finanziari per l'azione esterna sono una componente fondamentale della politica estera europea per la promozione dei nostri valori attraverso azioni concrete nel mondo.

Negli anni, tuttavia, il Parlamento ha più volte evidenziato problemi di incoerenza, inefficienze e duplicazioni che ne limitano l'efficacia mentre gli scenari internazionali, in particolare in regioni a noi vicine, sono in continua evoluzione.

In vista del prossimo quadro finanziario pluriennale, è necessario che l'impegno finanziario non sia ridotto bensì rafforzato, nonostante la Brexit e le crescenti reticenze di alcuni Stati membri, mentre gli strumenti devono diventare più flessibili e trasparenti; deve essere garantito un ancora più serio controllo del Parlamento sul loro uso.

Da questo punto di vista il nostro faro deve restare il principio di condizionalità. Le risorse dell'Unione europea non possono sostenere chi fa passi indietro sui diritti umani e sullo Stato di diritto. Quando ciò accade deve diventare pratica consolidata della nostra azione e sostegno diretto alla società civile del paese coinvolto, deviando i fondi a esso destinati, come sta avvenendo per la Turchia, dopo una forte pressione da parte di questo Parlamento.

  Bodil Valero (Verts/ALE). – Fru talman! Genom mina gröna kollegor Alexander Langer och miljöpartiets grundare Per Gahrton var de gröna drivande för att EU skulle satsa på civil konfliktlösning. Det blev också en del av den europeiska utrikespolitiken.

Fredsfrämjande insatser har vi hittills finansierat genom ett särskilt instrument för fred och stabilitet, ett instrument som vi gröna aktivt bidragit till innehållet i. Men nu vill många i det här huset slopa den pengapotten efter 2020.

Under året har pengarna för fredsinstrumentet utökas till att omfatta vissa militära ändamål efter att såväl de konservativa som socialdemokraterna drev igenom att det ska kunna användas för militärt kapacitetsbyggande i tredjeländer. Det är inte bara politiskt oklokt, det är dessutom inte i enlighet med reglerna. Vi vet alla att fördraget inte tillåter att EU-budgeten används till militära utgifter. Vi vet också att den rättsliga grunden för fredsinstrumentet inte tillåter att den används till att finansiera militära projekt.

Jag vill därför starkt uppmana parlamentet att i nästa långtidsbudget återställa fredsinstrumentet till det som det är tänkt för: civil konfliktlösning och fredsbyggande.

  Eduard Kukan (PPE). – Madam President, I would first like to pass on my congratulations to Ms Schaake for the good report. External financial instruments are like the muscles of our external policy: they can lift up the positive changes in third countries. To flex the muscles, however, we need a solid backbone – in other words, clear political guidance, direction and strategic vision. Once these are put together, we can talk about the ambition to become a global player.

Although the current instruments seem to be fit for purpose, they lack strategic overreaching vision. In many cases, we experience a lack of flexibility, for example the crisis in Ukraine, the migration crisis or the situation in Syria, Libya or Egypt. In the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), therefore, we need instruments fully in line with the vision and policy priorities. They need to be flexible enough and work in synergy with each other. Reform of the current instruments is required in order to provide more accountability, transparency and oversight. As the rapporteur to the Neighbourhood Instrument, I was often disappointed at the limited insight and role that Parliament had a chance to play after adoption of the instruments. We need more scrutiny, but also general political guidance coming from the European Parliament. The governance of the instrument should be more efficient and responsive to the needs of political priorities.

  Clare Moody (S&D). – Madam President, this is inevitably a technical report but, as the rapporteur has said, there is a fundamental principle at stake. Parliament plays a vital role in the effectiveness of European action. Part of that role is holding the Commission to account.

The Commissioner’s statement said much on needing to be flexible and needing to make the funding more flexible in order to fit evolving priorities, on the face of it a very reasonable proposition. But what was not explained was how, or who, would set those priorities or the means of delivering them. Presuming a mechanism is put in place to determine that prioritising process, then that is when we should discuss in detail the best use of the funding.

However, today it is important to be clear that the Parliament has a red line: parliamentary scrutiny. The Commission must come up with a clear proposal that meets that red line.

  Tunne Kelam (PPE). – Madam President, I would like to thank my colleague, Ms Schaake, for this clear and common—sense approach to the vital topic. We actually call for a policy—driven and principle—based use of the external financial instruments that should operate within, and in harmony with, the EU’s strategic policies.

The central idea for me is to develop a maximum of synergies and coherence between all the instruments in question. At the same time, regarding the idea floated by the Commission and the External Action Service to pool all instruments into one, I remain sceptical and agree with Ms Schaake that we cannot provide a ‘carte blanche’ for this idea. At the same time, I do believe that the EU has to apply stricter conditionality as for the beneficiaries. It would actually be useful to strengthen the ownership of the beneficiaries, having them fully on board from step one. There is also the need to make sure that the EU rules and procedures for funding are fully understood from the beginning. The monitoring and evaluating of the process is a must. In situations of serious political backsliding, funds need to be suspended faster to make the beneficiary comply with the EU rules and principles. Lastly, I think the EU has a task to have maximum visibility for its external instruments and their impact.

  Arne Lietz (S&D). – Frau Präsidentin, sehr geehrter Herr Mimica! Ich danke zunächst der Berichterstatterin für ihren Bericht und möchte noch zwei Dinge ergänzen. Erstens: Für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit geplante Mittel dürfen auch künftig auf keinen Fall für die Finanzierung des Militärs in Partnerländern ausgegeben werden. Das hat das Parlament gegenüber den Mitgliedstaaten und der Kommission bereits im letzten Jahr erfolgreich erstritten, und ich sehe keinen Grund, warum wir jetzt dahinter zurückfallen sollten. Das Instrument für Stabilität und Frieden sollte daher bei der Planung des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens ab 2020 besondere Beachtung bekommen. Wir warten hier auf den Vorschlag der Kommission, der das hoffentlich mit in Betracht zieht.

Zweitens: Die EU und die meisten Mitgliedstaaten haben ihre Verpflichtungen nicht erfüllt, 0,7 % des Bruttonationaleinkommens für öffentliche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit einzusetzen. Vor diesem Hintergrund muss deren Finanzierung im Rahmen der künftigen Gestaltung der Außenfinanzierungsinstrumente für die Zeit nach 2020 ausgeweitet werden.

  Francisco José Millán Mon (PPE). – Señora presidenta, quiero felicitar, en primer lugar, a la señora Schaake por su completo informe. En este mundo globalizado, complejo e interdependiente, necesitamos una acción exterior robusta por parte de la Unión Europea: no cabe el repliegue, sino que tenemos que proyectarnos fuera de las fronteras de la Unión. Esta proyección exterior requiere financiación.

La Unión debe ser un proveedor de paz, desarrollo, reformas democráticas, estabilidad e integración, en particular en su inmediata vecindad. En la revisión de los reglamentos que comenzará próximamente, es preciso reformar precisamente nuestro Instrumento de Vecindad.

Requerimos una política de vecindad realista y ambiciosa que atienda a las necesidades de nuestros socios y a sus ambiciones sin perjuicio de nuestros principios, valores e intereses. Por eso, celebro la posición de la ponente, favorable al mantenimiento de ese instrumento específico de vecindad en la arquitectura a partir de 2020: debemos dejar claro que seguimos interesados en promover esa política de vecindad que contempla el artículo 8 del Tratado de la Unión.

También apoyo que se mantenga el actual equilibrio en la asignación de fondos entre la vecindad meridional y oriental, como dice el informe que mañana aprobaremos.

Por otra parte, no voy a reiterar la importancia que tiene la dimensión de seguridad y también la cuestión migratoria. En el diálogo y cooperación con nuestros vecinos, estas materias deben ocupar un lugar muy elevado en la agenda.

Termino. La Unión Europea tiene que ser eficiente; tenemos que demostrar que es proveedora también de seguridad y capaz de contribuir eficazmente a la ordenación de los flujos migratorios.

Estamos viviendo estos años, en Europa, el ascenso de fuerzas populistas y euroescépticas: una Unión Europea eficaz les quitará argumentos.

  Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski (PPE). – Koledzy Kelam i Kukan wyręczyli mnie: mogę się podpisać pod tym, co moi koledzy z grupy PPE powiedzieli wcześniej. Natomiast dodam jedynie dwa elementy, które z mojego punktu widzenia są istotne.

Po pierwsze, tak jak powiedział kolega Kukan, rozpraszamy się. Musimy dbać o dyscyplinę, musimy być lepiej zorganizowani i powinniśmy mieć lepiej sformułowane cele strategiczne. Ja do tego dodam, że powinniśmy dbać także o przekazy wewnętrzne tu, w Europie, aby Służby Działań Zewnętrznych pamiętały, że sojusznicy dla określonej polityki to są przede wszystkim obywatele Unii Europejskiej.

I na koniec dodam jeszcze jeden element. Otóż 52 miliardy euro to nie są małe pieniądze. Jeżeli one są podzielone na tak liczne zadania, to zbyt często oddalamy się od przede wszystkim najbliższych sąsiadów, realizujemy rozproszone cele w bardzo odległych terenach geograficznych i w ten sposób tracimy to, co jest najistotniejsze – system wartości celów strategicznych do osiągnięcia.

  Željana Zovko (PPE). – Poštovana predsjedavajuća, poštovana potpredsjednice i poštovani povjereniče Mimica, na početku željela bih čestitati kolegici Marietje Schaakena dobro pripremljenom izvješću koje ima za cilj pridonijeti kreiranju jasne vizije strukture i prioriteta u okviru instrumenata Europske unije za vanjsko financiranje u sljedećem višegodišnjem financijskom razdoblju.

Instrumenti Europske unije za vanjsko financiranje za razdoblje nakon 2020. godine moraju u cilju jačanja europskih vrijednosti i interesa Europske unije u svijetu biti učinkovitiji, fleksibilniji i transparentniji, a kako bi se to i ostvarilo, moramo preispitati postojeće stanje unutar trenutačnog višegodišnjeg financijskog okvira.

U skladu s navedenim, potrebno je otkriti nedostatke u njegovoj implementaciji te otkriti preklapanja koja utječu na efekt pomoći u državama primateljicama. Moramo jačati vlasništvo država primateljica u određivanju reformskih prioriteta kako bi u njima potakli želju za što brzom implementacijom potrebnih reformi.

Zahtjevi za implementaciju ključnih gospodarskih reformi, kao i demokratske političke institucionalne konsolidacije u partnerskim državama moraju biti praćeni odgovarajućim financijskim sredstvima u sljedećem financijskom razdoblju. To smatram osobito važnim za instrument za pretpristupnu pomoć IPA II, pogotovo u kontekstu današnjeg ohrabrujućeg Izvješća o proširenju na zapadni Balkan te nedavno objavljene Strategije Europske unije za proširenje, koja pruža podršku državama kandidatkinjama i potencijalnim kandidatkinjama u implementaciji reformi s ciljem postizanja stabilnosti i sigurnosti u neposrednom susjedstvu Europske unije.

  Cristian-Silviu Buşoi (PPE). – Madam President, I congratulate the rapporteur, Ms Schaake, and the team of shadow rapporteurs on the very good report. We have nine financial instruments which are working well, but for the next period, after 2020, we could improve the efficiency of many of these instruments.

In the light of the wars and conflicts and rising tensions outside EU borders, I stress the importance of further strengthening, post-2020, the architecture of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, which could bring massive EU added value, as it cooperates directly with human rights defenders and local civil society organisations around the world, without the need for the approval of national authorities.

The instrument needs clearer and more strategic objectives which are totally independent of other instruments in order to bring more feasible solutions on, critically, human rights violations in countries like Syria and Turkey, which were intensely debated last time in our plenary.

Secondly, I would like to welcome the news that the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace, in addition to the support for security initiatives and peace-building activities, will now provide funds for training measures and equipment supplies to third countries working towards the Sustainable Development Goals. Nevertheless, we need the establishment of solid and transparent monitoring and evaluation systems that are consistent for all instruments.

  Julia Pitera (PPE). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Dostrzegam oczywiście zalety połączenia instrumentów finansowych Unii Europejskiej, między innymi stworzenie bardziej elastycznych i prostych procedur finansowania. Jednocześnie uważam, że European Neighbourhood Instrument powinien pozostać odrębnym instrumentem finansowym. Przypominam: przegląd śródokresowy pokazał, że instrument ten działa świetnie. Dlaczego mielibyśmy w takim razie coś zmieniać?

Pozbawienie polityki sąsiedztwa własnego instrumentu finansowego obniży rangę polityczną Partnerstwa Wschodniego. Stracilibyśmy specjalne podejście do najbliższego sąsiedztwa Unii. Zanikną także pewne cele i cechy, na przykład zróżnicowanie i zasada more for more, a tym samym zachęta do reform strukturalnych.

Polityka sąsiedztwa jest skoncentrowana na zaangażowaniu politycznym zamiast na pomocy rozwojowej, jest to polityka bardziej kompleksowa, bardziej ambitna i w związku z tym wymaga szczególnej uwagi. Ponadto istniałoby ryzyko zmniejszenia finansowania Partnerstwa Wschodniego poprzez łatwiejsze przenoszenie środków między różnymi priorytetami i regionami. Nie zgadzam się na to i dlatego uważam, że polityka sąsiedztwa nie może zostać pozbawiona własnego instrumentu finansowego.

  Ivana Maletić (PPE). – Poštovana predsjedavajuća, pozdravljam povjerenika Mimicu i čestitam izvjestiteljici na izvrsnom izvješću. Ovo izvješće pokazuje da postižemo rezultate kroz promjene u javnom sektoru, obrazovanju, poštivanju ljudskih prava, uspostavi pravne države, učinkovitog i neovisnog pravosuđa, borbi protiv korupcije, a sve su to preduvjeti društava koja se grade na povjerenju i u kojima je moguće osigurati mir i stabilnost te gospodarski rast i razvoj.

Upravo to želimo postići kroz naš utjecaj i djelovanje izvan Europske unije. Sustav instrumenata EU-a za vanjsko djelovanje moramo pojednostavniti, svi ste to posebno istaknuli, i jasnije povezati s očekivanim ciljevima te uspostaviti kvalitetnije praćenje postizanja rezultata.

Zbog toga se potpuno slažem s konstatacijom povjerenika Mimice koji je istaknuo da instrumente moramo prilagoditi politikama, našoj misiji i ciljevima, a ne obrnuto – politike instrumentima. Isto tako, postizanje rezultata mora biti iznad zadanog plana te je fleksibilnost u korištenju ključna.

Interventions à la demande

  Julie Ward (S&D). – Madam President, I want to speak about the proposed merger of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) with other financial instruments, because this continues to be of great concern to those of us who care about human rights.

The EIDHR is a one-of-a-kind programme. It is the largest human rights and democracy fund in the world, and was established by us – the European Parliament – in 1994. It is the only current programme that provides independent and impartial funding to civil society and human rights defenders, including protection and support for human rights defenders at risk. It is unique among EU external action instruments. Many organisations and individual human rights defenders will simply not be able to access funds without it.

The maintenance of a dedicated, separate instrument would also allow for better parliamentary scrutiny of funding, with greater accountability and transparency. A separate instrument for human rights and democracy guarantees funding for these key priorities in European external action and promotes key aspects of sustainable development, societal resilience and the root causes of migration.

  Νότης Μαριάς (ECR). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, η λειτουργία των μηχανισμών χρηματοδότησης της εξωτερικής δράσης της Ένωσης πρέπει να γίνεται με τέτοιο τρόπο ούτως ώστε να υπάρχει πλήρης σεβασμός στα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα. Δεν είναι δυνατόν να υπάρχει χρηματοδότηση χωρών όπως είναι η Τουρκία που παραβιάζει τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα. Πριν λίγο συζητήσαμε για την άδικη και παράνομη κράτηση των δύο Ελλήνων στρατιωτικών στις φυλακές της Τουρκίας, εκεί όπου υπάρχουν χιλιάδες πλέον πολιτικοί κρατούμενοι. Δεν είναι δυνατόν να δίνονται στην Τουρκία δάνεια χαμηλότοκα από την Ευρωπαϊκή Τράπεζα Επενδύσεων.

Ομοίως, δεν μπορεί η εξωτερική δράση να στηρίζει χώρες στις οποίες δεν τηρούνται τα εργασιακά δικαιώματα, χώρες στις οποίες υπάρχει παιδική εργασία, χώρες στις οποίες παραβιάζεται το δικαίωμα υγιεινής και ασφάλειας και, από κει και πέρα, προφανώς, οι συγκεκριμένοι μηχανισμοί δεν μπορούν να χρηματοδοτούν δράσεις σε χώρες οι οποίες δεν τηρούν την προστασία του περιβάλλοντος.

(Fin des interventions à la demande)

  Neven Mimica, on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Madam President, I thank the honourable Members for this debate. The Commission will publish its proposal for the next MFF on 2 May. We are looking forward to an intensive exchange and negotiations with Parliament thereafter. This would be a true opportunity to fully justify the background to the Commission’s proposals, as well as to address and clarify some of the concerns flagged in the report and in the debates today.

Let me conclude by reiterating that simplification is not an end in itself. It will enable us to become more coherent, exploit complementarities, create synergies, overcome fragmentation and silo approaches and reduce artificial boundaries and inconsistencies between instruments. With the new architecture, we intend to make our cooperation more efficient and effective. In this manner, we will also make the EU visible as a major global actor.

  Marietje Schaake, rapporteur. – Madam President, I would especially like to thank all the colleagues who broadly support the compromise in the resolution. In replying after the debate, we have one key question left that can be summarised in one word, and that is ‘how’. We hear, on the one hand, that the mid-term review concludes that the instruments are fit—for—purpose. On the other hand, we get a proposal to radically change the instruments. I think the Commission and the External Action Service really urgently need to explain how – and not only to us (we are budget and foreign policy geeks, not a big group of people, although we would have been interested in an actual outline and we have asked for it before), but what about our citizens and what about our partner countries? This cannot wait until the last minute, if you really want this to be a success. I think, generally, the notion of better communication has been raised by MEPs throughout many discussions we have had. So I unfortunately have to conclude that there is still no clarity on governance. It is a broad ask and, frankly, I think it is a missed opportunity that this debate was not used to outline how the reform of the instruments will be governed.

On a number of focus areas that you outlined in your introduction, such as public diplomacy, the Western Balkans and a digital values—based approach, I think we generally have common ground, but I am concerned when I hear things like ‘we will work according to what the people want’. Of course, this is a highly political discussion and I suspect it will be for the entire multiannual period that we are talking about, and I urge the External Action Service and the Commission not to lose sight of long-term goals and objectives: even though short-term solutions can be very tempting, they can also be a populist trap. I really think that we, the EU, have a bigger promise than only to look at short-term goals. Certainly when everything gets framed in the context of migration management, I do not think that that is a long-term and a sustainable and values-based solution. I know a lot of colleagues are very unhappy if that is the direction we are going in.

To conclude: yes, our money should be focused on policy goals, and should be spent efficiently with the appropriate oversight and parliamentary scrutiny, while respecting our values. We can only really talk about whether we agree with the new architecture if we know how it is going to be governed.

  La Présidente. – Le débat est clos.

Le vote aura lieu demain, le mercredi 18 avril 2018.

Déclarations écrites (article 162)

  Andrea Bocskor (PPE), írásban. – Üdvözlöm az EU külső finanszírozási eszközeinek végrehajtásáról szóló jelentést, hiszen az Unió külső fellépése egyre fontosabb az európai polgárok számára. Ezen finanszírozási eszközök közé soroljuk az Előcsatlakozási Támogatási Eszközt (IPA II), az Európai Szomszédsági Támogatási Eszközt (ENI), illetve az Ukrajna számára fontos stabilitás és a béke elősegítését szolgáló eszközt (IcSP). Fontosnak tartom hangsúlyozni, hogy az eszközök összevonását nem támogatom, és örülök, hogy ebben egyetértünk itt az Európai Parlamentben. Az eszközök költségvetése pedig emelkedő tendenciát kell, hogy mutasson, mivel ezek az eszközök jelentik az Unió globális színtéren történő fellépését támogató fő mechanizmust. A sikeres projektek érdekében érdemes lenne kommunikációs és tájékoztatási kampányok útján is fokozni a külső finanszírozási eszközök láthatóságát az érintett régiókban.

Osztom az előadó véleményét, miszerint az Európai Szomszédsági Támogatási Eszköz programozási prioritásainak a társadalmi-gazdasági fejlődésre, az ifjúságra és az energiaforrások fenntartható kezelésére is ki kell terjednie. Támogatom az unió bővítésének folyamatát, amihez hiteles pénzügyi segítségre van szükség, így a minél erősebb Előcsatlakozási Támogatási Eszköz és Európai Szomszédsági Támogatási Eszköz alapvető érdek számomra.

  Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD), per iscritto. – Ci troviamo in un momento storico particolare. I teatri di conflitto e di morte si moltiplicano, l'instabilità e il caos di paesi "lontani" ma "vicini" risuonano minacciosi in un'Unione europea impreparata, incapace di parlare con un’unica voce e di proiettarsi come attore credibile a livello internazionale. Siria, Yemen, Libia, Turchia: solo alcuni esempi di sfide esterne che si intrecciano a quelle interne, alimentando il senso di insicurezza dei cittadini. In un contesto così drammatico, è necessaria una visione politica chiara e di lungo termine alla base della politica estera dell'Unione degli strumenti finanziari dell’azione esterna. Maggiore coerenza, trasparenza, condizionalità e controllo democratico devono essere gli ingredienti essenziali di una possibile riforma dell’architettura presente. Ribadisco anche l'importanza dello strumento EIDHR, che non deve essere assemblato agli altri, perché l'unico a non richiedere il consenso dello Stato per il supporto diretto alla società civile e ai difensori dei diritti umani. Solo così, potremmo concretamente contribuire a uno sviluppo sostenibile e bottom-up dei paesi terzi.

  Andor Deli (PPE), írásban. – Tisztelt képviselő társaim! Üdvözlöm a jelentés azon részét, amely felismerte az Előcsatlakozási Támogatási Eszköz, a jelenlegi úgynevezett IPA 2 stratégiai fontosságát. Mindazonáltal úgy gondolom, hogy a tagjelölt államoknak előlátott előcsatlakozási pénzügyi segítség csekély tekintettel az Európai Unió pénzügyi forrásaira és a tagjelölt országok előtt álló reformokra és azok költségeire. Szerbia a hétéves periódusban megközelítőleg 1,5 milliárd euró pénzügyi támogatásra jogosult, azaz évi 200 millió euróra, ami 28 euró lakosonként éves szinten. Habár ez egy jelentős összeg, messze elmarad a reformok végrehajtásához szükséges forrásoktól. Például a környezetvédelem terén végrehajtandó feladatok becslések szerint 4 milliárd eurót fognak igénybe venni a csatlakozásig.

Úgy gondolom, hogy elengedhetetlen, hogy a következő többéves pénzügyi terv kidolgozása során figyelembe vegyük a tagjelölt országok valós igényeit, különösképpen a két élenjáró ország, Szerbia és Montenegró tekintetében. Ezzel segítenénk a reformok gyorsabb és hatékonyabb végrehajtását, ami elengedhetetlen a bővítési stratégiában megszabott 2025-ös csatlakozási határidő megvalósulásához. Köszönöm, hogy meghallgattak.

  Karol Karski (ECR), na piśmie. – Proponowane m.in. przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel Mogherini zwiększenie elastyczności w wykorzystywaniu dotychczasowych instrumentów finansowych UE w celu lepszego reagowania na regionalne i globalne wyzwania wydaje się zasadne. Parlament Europejski w sprawozdaniu Schaake zgadza się, że mechanizm instrumentu wymaga przeglądu i aktualizacji, głównie z powodu braku strategicznej i nadrzędnej wizji oraz faktu, że zarządzają nim różne służby zarówno w Komisji, jak i w ESDZ.

Wydaje się jednak, że pomysł, aby połączyć wszystkie instrumenty w jeden dla jego uproszczenia jest zbyt daleko idący. W szczególności popieramy postulaty krajów Europy Środkowej, aby jako odrębny pozostawić Europejski Instrument Sąsiedztwa (ENI), zgodnie z zasadą „nie psujmy tego, co działa dobrze”. Popieramy uproszczenie i dostosowanie mechanizmów finansowych do celów politycznych. Tym niemniej wydaje się, że odrębność Instrumentu Pomocy Przedakcesyjnej (IPA II) oraz Europejskiego Instrumentu Wspierania Demokracji i Praw Człowieka (EIDHR) powinna być utrzymana właśnie ze względu na cele polityczne UE.

Zachowanie odrębnych ENI oraz koszyków geograficznych i tematycznych jest istotne jako sygnał, że UE dostrzega europejskie aspiracje partnerów Partnerstwa Wschodniego. Reforma instrumentów finansowych powinna być przeprowadzona w taki sposób, aby wzmacniała politykę UE, szczególnie względem krajów sąsiedztwa.