Verbatim report of proceedings

Wednesday, 3 October 2018 - Strasbourg

18. Risks of money laundering in the EU banking sector (debate)

  Przewodniczący. – Kolejnym punktem porządku dziennego są oświadczenia Rady i Komisji w sprawie ryzyka prania pieniędzy w sektorze bankowym UE (2018/2860(RSP)).

  Juliane Bogner-Strauss, President-in-Office of the Council. – Mr President, the issue of money laundering in the EU banking sector is extremely topical at the present time. The Presidency and the Council as a whole fully share the sense of urgency and the commitment of Parliament and the Commission to addressing this issue. Our three institutions have worked together closely in recent years in a common endeavour to establish an effective regime to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The amendment adopted earlier this year to the Anti-Money Laundering Directive is just the latest example of our good cooperation.

Turning to the issue at hand, the recent cases involving money laundering in some EU banks have shown that, unfortunately, anti-money laundering rules are not always supervised and enforced effectively across the European Union. This is a great cause of concern, and I can therefore only support the Commissionʼs push towards ensuring that anti-money laundering rules are effectively supervised and that authorities cooperate closely with each other.

Ministers at yesterday’s meeting of the Ecofin Council heard a presentation by the Commission on its proposal of 12 September, an important contribution that the Council is ready to consider very thoughtfully. Beyond that proposal, we also need to consider a longer term solution and improvements to the current system. With this in mind, the Council will be considering setting out comprehensive and long—term measures in this area by December. This is something that the Council’s Financial Services Committee is discussing today.

The Presidency is, of course, fully committed to maintaining and promoting the existing cooperation between the institutions. I am therefore naturally very interested in Parliament’s views on the content of this latest proposal, as well as in the legislative approach that Parliament will take. I look forward to hearing your views.

  Věra Jourová, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, like you, the Commission has been shocked by the recent money laundering scandals in European banks and also by the failings that have come to light regarding the quality of national supervision and information sharing. These scandals endanger the reputation and integrity of Europe’s financial system.

While Europe has the strongest anti-money laundering rules in the world, they need to be better enforced. The Commission firmly believes that we need to enhance supervision in the EU. We are using existing powers and have asked the European Banking Authority to immediately investigate whether other supervisors in the Member States concerned have breached EU law. Some investigations have already been concluded, while others are still ongoing. At the same time, we cannot wait for further scandals to emerge. We must ensure the integrity of the EU’s financial system and we need to do so urgently. That is why, on 12 September, the Commission tabled a legislative proposal to strengthen the powers of the EU supervisory authorities in anti—money laundering issues.

As President Juncker made clear in his State of the Union address on the same day, we need to strengthen the enforcement of our anti—money laundering rules. Our legislative proposal is part of a broader strategy to strengthen the EU’s framework for prudential and anti-money laundering supervision for financial institutions. Through our amendments to our European supervisory authorities review proposal, which Parliament is currently considering, we are proposing to concentrate tasks and resources within the European Banking Authority for anti-money laundering purposes, reinforce the tools for carrying out anti—money laundering tasks and strengthen the coordinating role of the European Banking Authority in international anti—money laundering issues.

Our accompanying policy communication also sets out improvements in the way that prudential supervisors reflect anti—money laundering considerations in their work and includes recommendations to the European Central Bank. We are also advocating further enhancement of the prudential framework for banks by improving information exchange and reinforcing the duty of cooperation between prudential and anti-money laundering authorities and bodies. The Capital Requirements Directive is currently under negotiation between the Council and Parliament, and Parliament has tabled useful amendments to that end. Finally, the communication touches on longer term considerations as to whether a greater degree of harmonisation of anti—money laundering rules will be needed and whether we need a centralised anti—money laundering authority at EU level. Alternatives could also be considered in order to ensure seamless information exchange and optimal cooperation between all relevant authorities in the EU, including those in the field of taxation. But, for now, I would again like to stress the need to move rapidly and decisively. In particular we need to quickly agree on the legislative proposal so that it can be adopted before the end of this term and the European Banking Authority (EBA) can quickly assume its new tasks, which means that we have no time to lose.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to commend Parliament for its persistent efforts, especially the work of the PANA and TAXE committees, to highlight the critical importance of the fight against financial crime, including tax evasion and money laundering, and to call to account all actors from both the private and the public sector. It is clear that collectively more can – and must – be done to address these failings and repair the damage that has been done to the EU’s international reputation.

  Luděk Niedermayer, on behalf of the PPE Group. – Mr President, we have now less than one hour to discuss a very serious problem – the problem worth billions of dirty money. So let me try to illustrate, in the following 100 seconds, how serious the issue is, starting this some names: ABLV Latvia, Versobank Estonia, Pilatus Bank Malta, Danske Bank branch Estonia, and ING bank.

These are just a few names of banks that showed serious weaknesses in the area of money laundering, and some of them collapsed and some of them suffered significant losses and have had to pay significant fines. But that is not enough: we all remember the ‘Azerbaijani laundromat’ and the problems related to the use of crypto-assets for the financing of corruption or terrorism. Money laundering is a very serious issue that is closely related to the crime, corruption, tax evasion and other acts that are seriously damaging our society – and we have to act.

So far, it doesn’t seem that we are doing so sufficiently. Take the example of insufficient regulation of crypto-asset exchanges, or the fact that the US authorities have to help us to find certain weaknesses in our financial sector. The protection of our financial sector against money laundering is clearly only as strong as the weakest point, and the weakest point seems to be very weak.

In terms of improvement, I guess the focus should not be on approving new legislation, as it often has been. Also, I am not sure that we should establish a powerful new institution. We should focus instead on enforcement and on strengthening the weakest spots in our system. The European Supervisory Authority (ESA) review provides a good opportunity to find the right balance between the responsibility of supervisors and that of other branches of governments, including the police. We should not miss this opportunity, as clocks are ticking and the problem is very serious.

  Jeppe Kofod, on behalf of the S&D Group. – Mr President, Europe has a huge money-laundering problem, from Denmark to Estonia, Latvia, the Netherlands, Malta, Germany and France. Scandal after scandal has been uncovered, each one bigger than the last. In the Danske Bank case alone, upwards of EUR 200 billion has been laundered through a single branch, in Estonia, and at least some of these funds have been actively used to bribe European politicians to corrupt our institution and to whitewash authoritarian regimes.

EUR 200 billion: that is about ten times the size of Estonia’s GDP.

We have long known that these banks have grown ‘too big to fail’, but now, apparently, what has happened in these banks is that the people supposedly responsible have become too rich to jail – or at least impunity is more the rule than the exception. Take the case of Danske Bank: not one member of the board has been kicked out. Not a single executive has been fired, not even the CEO who was responsible for the Estonian branch. No, they have been stepping down of their own accord, with full pay and a golden parachute.

So, I ask you colleagues, Commission and Council: how is this justice, in the eyes of the people? What message does it send to would-be whistle-blowers who have inside information on illegal activities in European banks but fear to come forward?

In the Danske Bank scandal, the whistleblower wasn’t even contacted by the Danish financial supervisory authority, despite the fact they had his contact information. So, supervision of European banks seem to rely on a trust and honour system, and this clearly isn’t working. Too many banks have abused our trust.

Therefore, we need a dedicated EU authority to supervise and assist national supervisory authorities in these complex money-laundering cases. We need drastically to improve protection of whistle-blowers in Europe and we need to force national authorities to cooperate loyally, effectively and systematically because they are simply not doing that today and they are not implementing the anti-money-laundering legislation.

Bank fines in money laundering cases must no longer be counted in millions, but in billions. And we need to strengthen fit and proper requirements to ensure that those responsible never set foot in a bank boardroom again. We have a lot to do. I look forward to this debate.

  Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, ECR-ryhmän puolesta. – Arvoisa puhemies, vuonna 2009 pankeille tuli velvollisuus ottaa selvää asiakkaistaan ja pankin kautta kulkevien rahojen alkuperästä, mutta kyseisen lain täytäntöönpano ontuu edelleen.

On kulunut yli 10 vuotta siitä, kun Viron ja Venäjän viranomaiset varoittivat ensimmäisen kerran Danske Bankin tuottoisan Viron tytäryksikön epäilyttävistä asiakkaista. Viisi vuotta sitten Danske Bank sai sisäisen ilmiannon. Neljä vuotta sitten Viron rahoitusvalvonta ryhtyi toimiin, ja kaksi vuotta sitten Tanskan rahoitusvalvonta määräsi pankille sanktioita. Nyt vasta keskustellaan Danske Bankin mahdollisista jättisakoista.

Tänään Viron pääministeri Jüri Ratas vakuutti omassa unionin tulevaisuutta käsittelevässä puheenvuorossaan, kuinka heillä Virossa on nollatoleranssi rahanpesuun. Jos näin on, niin toivottavasti kaikki EU-valtiot alkavat noudattaa vastaavanlaista nollatoleranssia rahanpesun suhteen.

  Petr Ježek, on behalf of the ALDE Group. – Mr President, some unbelievably large money-laundering cases have been revealed. At the same time, in hearings and missions of our TAXE 3 Committee, also dealing with money laundering, it was pointed out that some countries, especially smaller ones, are not capable of coping fully with this problem.

Therefore I welcome the Commission proposal to reinforce the role of the European Banking Authority (EBA) in anti-money laundering supervision of the financial sector. Parliament has called a number of times for a more centralised anti-money laundering supervisory architecture. We can see that Parliament is always a step ahead. However, we must get it right. These new tasks need to be followed by reinforced human and other resources. Can we ensure that the EBA will be given sufficient human resources to conduct its new tasks? The numbers I read seem modest to me: from two persons to slightly less than ten. Could the Commission tell us how many more persons should be allocated to these new tasks?

Finally, with this proposal, the EU is obviously putting a lot of effort into fighting money laundering in the banking sector, but we must not forget that money laundering also affects other sectors, for example real estate and gambling services. How will the Commission ensure that we do not lose sight of the rest of the actors?

PRESIDENZA DELL’ON. FABIO MASSIMO CASTALDO
Vicepresidente

  Sven Giegold, im Namen der Verts/ALE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident, Frau Kommissarin! Das Ausmaß der Geldwäsche im Finanzsektor ist ein Sicherheitsrisiko. Es ist auch eine Gefahr für fairen Wettbewerb in der Europäischen Union, und es schadet der Reputation unserer gemeinsamen Währung. Es ist also höchste Zeit, dass wir hier eine andere Härte an den Tag legen. Ich danke Ihnen für Ihre Vorschläge bezüglich der Europäischen Bankenaufsichtsbehörde. Ich danke Ihnen auch für die konkreten Maßnahmen, die Sie jetzt – wie in der Financial Times zu lesen war – gegenüber Malta angewiesen haben. Das ist sinnvoll, das ist richtig.

Wir brauchen in der Umsetzung Ihrer Beschlüsse jetzt ein schnelles Handeln der Ko-Gesetzgeber. Deshalb möchte ich gerne vom Rat wissen: Wie wollen Sie dafür sorgen, dass dieser Beschluss in einem Eilverfahren, was der Sache angemessen ist, jetzt tatsächlich die Institution passiert? Und umgekehrt haben wir die Verantwortung, in einem schnellen Verfahren zu einem Beschluss zu kommen.

Wir wissen aber darüber hinaus, dass außer in Malta wir auch schwere Defizite mindestens in Lettland, Estland und Zypern haben. Ich frage mich: Wann, Frau Kommissarin, leiten Sie Vertragsverletzungsverfahren ein? Die Informationen dazu finden sich fast im Tagesrhythmus in der Finanzpresse.

Zudem findet natürlich Geldwäsche nicht nur im Finanzsektor statt. Wir wissen, dass zum Beispiel im Immobilienmarkt systematisch Schwarzgeld in großem Maße die Preise nach oben treibt. Die Verdachtsmeldungen, die von Verpflichteten wie Immobilienmaklern oder auch Rechtsanwälten, Notaren und so weiter abgegeben werden, sind völlig unter den gesetzlichen Vorschriften. Deshalb frage ich Sie, Frau Kommissarin: Wann werden Sie europaweit dafür sorgen, dass das europäische Recht auch im Immobiliensektor bezüglich Schwarzgeld durchgesetzt wird?

Es ist klar: Sie können das nicht alles auf einmal machen mit so wenig Personal. Herr Juncker hatte uns versprochen, das Personal aufzustocken. Wann stocken Sie in Ihrer eigenen Behörde das Personal deutlich auf? Ich rede hier nicht von ein, zwei Stellen, sondern schaffen Sie eine wirkliche Arbeitseinheit!

Und zu guter Letzt: Diese Sofortmaßnahmen ersetzen natürlich nicht das, was wir langfristig brauchen: eine europäische Institution zur Kontrolle von Geldwäsche.

  Rina Ronja Kari, for GUE/NGL-Gruppen. – Hr. formand! Først og fremmest tak fordi vi tager denne debat. Problemer er der rigtig mange af. Flere store banker har igennem de sidste mange år været skyld i stor elendighed. Først kaster de os ud i en finanskrise, der koster hundredtusindvis af arbejdspladser, sender mennesker ud i fattigdom og i det hele taget koster vores samfund dyrt. Derudover har flere af dem aktivt hjulpet skumle personer og virksomheder med at hvidvaske penge og snyde i skat. Bankerne har med andre ord svindlet og bedraget os alle sammen, alt imens de har udbetalt svimlende beløb til den ene direktør efter den anden. For at gøre det endnu værre har vi som samfund hældt milliarder af kroner i lommen på netop de banker. Hvorfor? Jo fordi vi er bange for, at vores samfund ikke kan overleve, hvis bankerne går ned.

Men det er da skammeligt - skammeligt for bankerne, skammeligt for os, og ikke mindst for det system, som tillader det. Et system, som vender det blinde øje til og ser igennem fingre med skatteunddragelse, og oven i købet med, at nogle landes myndigheder har hjulpet til med at omgå reglerne. Nu står vi så her igen med endnu et eksempel på en stor bank, som endnu en gang på alle måder har bedraget os alle sammen. Og svaret? Svaret er nogle vage formuleringer om at stramme lidt op med tilsyn og efterretninger. Men helt ærligt: hvis vi skal kunne se os selv i øjnene, så er vi nødt til at gøre mere end det. Vi er nødt til at tage fat, hvor det gør ondt.

Og løsningen? Løsningen er sjovt nok heller ikke denne gang, at vi bare skal have mere EU. Nej løsningen er derimod at give medlemslandene flere rettigheder, retten til at opdele de største banker, så vi ikke længere behøver at acceptere ”too big to fail”-banker, og vi skal give landene mulighed for at oprette fornuftige statsbanker, så almindelige borgere kan vælge en bank, der ikke spekulerer i profit. Ikke mindst vil jeg lade landene begrænse bankernes uregulerede bevægelighed over grænserne. Det er de store, der vinder på den uhæmmede frie bevægelighed for kapital. Vores samfund står som taber.

  David Coburn, on behalf of the EFDD Group. – Mr President, I have an interesting tale to tell you, so you can all sit up and listen to this one. We’ve all read with concern the substantial allegations against Danske Bank: the long-term, large—scale laundering of Russian funny money – billions of it, apparently. But these are the actions of a regulated bank. Imagine what an unregulated European Investment Bank could get up to in London, where Theresa May’s Withdrawal Agreement will grant it immunity from UK financial services regulation.

Did you notice that, anyone? I don’t suppose you did. It’s in Articles 105 and 119. Imagine unregulated European bankers let loose in London. Your worst nightmare, I should think!

Of course, this is what the Commission wants. That’s why they snuck it into the Withdrawal Agreement. They want a lawless European Investment Bank in order to pursue and finance their foreign policy, in particular busting American sanctions against the totalitarian, theocratic regime in Tehran. The Commission wants to use the City of London as its own personal Wild West financial centre. Is that what you want, especially you, Mr Giegold: is that what you want? I should think not.

The Withdrawal Agreement is being used to avoid democratic accountability – not just the European Investment Bank’s accountability to UK law, but also its accountability to the European Parliament. The European Investment Bank will be operating large parts of its EUR 500 billion of assets in a post—Brexit London, out of sight and out of mind. This should worry all those here who support democratic accountability and the rule of law.

  Mario Borghezio, a nome del gruppo ENF. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, c'è una grande discrasia fra gli impegni formali e anche il reiterarsi di queste importanti discussioni al Parlamento europeo e i dati concreti.

Questa Commissione, presieduta dall'ineffabile signor Juncker, che rappresenta, direi in maniera addirittura palese, gli interessi di uno Stato paradiso fiscale, sulla trasparenza delle cui banche, diciamo, tutti possiamo facilmente avere contezza, rappresenta in maniera plastica, direi quasi evidente, direi addirittura arrogante il disinteresse totale di questa Commissione nei confronti di un impegno che dovrebbe essere prioritario, perché è chiesto da coloro che combattono in prima fila, a cominciare dalle forze dell'ordine, le varie Gendarmerie e la Guardia di Finanza italiana.

Vi offro un dato, quello degli accertamenti fatti nel sistema bancario italiano da Bankitalia, la Banca centrale del mio paese, 43 000 segnalazioni, delle quali oltre 41 000 ritenute molto interessati, cioè l'83% sono gravi e nei confronti dell'entità di questa situazione, che cosa fa la Commissione? Ci propone parole, parole, parole, parole, parole.

  Brian Hayes (PPE). – Mr President, listening to Mr Coburn, I thought he was making the point that the UK should remain in the European Union, given the outcome of his logic that all of this dirty money would be sloshing around the City of London, brought about by European oligarchs. Quite extraordinary!

I have a number of points. We have existing law: let’s implement it. I commend the fact that the Commission is taking action against some Member States – little known action that I think will make a difference. We have a huge difference when it comes to the reporting of information by banks to Member States, and on to Europe-wide authorities. We need to improve data exchange. We need to recognise that we have a policing regime which, in some Member States, is not fit for purpose when it comes to investigating and resolving all these issues. And chiefly, we give policing authorities first responsibility here.

So there are weaknesses that we have to resolve. Can they be resolved by a new super-agency? My view is no. If anything, we need to increase the powers of the European Banking Authority and certainly to increase its resources. This is an organisation of fewer than 200 people: if they are really going to tackle this, they need to be brought up to a standard and a number and a level of resources that will have application. The essential point is that, if we don’t tackle this, it is another potential undermining of financial stability in the European Union.

We’ve got to move quickly. We’ve done that with anti-money laundering legislation, in terms of many of the directives there – I think we are up to five at the moment, and I also believe we need a consistency of approach right across the European Union.

(The speaker agreed to take a blue—card question under Rule 162(8))

  David Coburn (EFDD), blue-card question. – Thank you, Brian, very kind of you. I think you misunderstood me. I wasn’t saying that it is a good idea for us to stay in the European Union. What I am explaining to you is that there is nothing wrong with banks if they are regulated by the City of London – a great and ancient institution, much older than any other institution in Europe – but the problem I was putting forward was not that of European oligarchs mucking about with money in London. I’m talking about the European Investment Bank, run by this place.

That’s what I’m concerned about. What the European Union wants to do is to have the European Investment Bank using London as a base to do all sorts of strange things, but basically undermining American foreign policy. That’s what I’m trying to get through to you. Do you now understand me or agree with me?

  Brian Hayes (PPE), blue-card answer. – No, I profoundly disagree with you. The European Investment Bank is the bank of the European Union. It lends money right across the European Union and into our neighbourhood. It lends significant amounts of money to the United Kingdom and it gets that money back. That’s the job of the European Investment Bank. It invests in housing projects and commercial projects right across the United Kingdom. That’s the reality of the European Investment Bank, and it has a very strict mandate in terms of what it can and cannot do. If you’re trying to take cheap pots at the EIB, go ahead, but it really doesn’t add up to much in relation to the scrutiny you are arguing for.

  Pervenche Berès (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, Madame la Commissaire, lutter contre le blanchiment d’argent et l’évasion fiscale, lutter contre le financement de la criminalité organisée et contre le terrorisme sont des priorités absolues pour tout démocrate.

Des milliards d’euros sont blanchis en Europe chaque année, ce qui fragilise l’intégrité et la stabilité du système financier. Ces derniers mois, notre actualité a été surdéterminée par des cas de blanchiment d’argent impliquant des banques européennes. Les agissements d’ABLV en Lettonie, de Versobank en Estonie, de Danske Bank et d’ING aux Pays-Bas ont ainsi été révélés, tandis que Pilatus Bank à Malte vient seulement de perdre sa licence bancaire. Cela révèle de graves lacunes inacceptables dans la réglementation de l’Union européenne contre le blanchiment d’argent.

D’abord, certains États et leurs autorités de régulation bancaire et financière ne disposent manifestement pas des ressources nécessaires pour mener l’enquête et sanctionner les pratiques frauduleuses, comme on a pu le voir en Lettonie. D’autres autorités compétentes d’États membres ne parviennent pas à coopérer entre elles de façon suffisamment efficace et rapide, comme on l’a vu dans le cas des Pays-Bas et de la Lettonie à propos de Danske Bank.

Nous avons ainsi besoin d’une supervision des autorités européennes renforcée. Le Parlement européen, dans sa commission ECON, avec les travaux autour de Danièle Nouy, mais aussi dans sa commission TAXE, avec les auditions sur la lutte contre le blanchiment d’argent dans le secteur bancaire, a démontré son engagement à favoriser une architecture de supervision européenne plus adaptée afin de parvenir à une meilleure application du cadre juridique dans la lutte contre le blanchiment d’argent. Mais cela ne suffit pas. Des efforts supplémentaires sont encore nécessaires dans ce domaine et la directive sur les fonds propres réglementaires, actuellement en négociation, doit permettre de compléter cet arsenal.

Nous avons également besoin d’une réforme générale qui s’attaquera à la racine du problème en proposant un cadre européen harmonisé et efficace, dans lequel une autorité européenne serait dotée de véritables pouvoirs de lutte contre le blanchiment d’argent.

Vous avez proposé que l’Autorité bancaire européenne devienne le pilier de la supervision et de la lutte contre le blanchiment d’argent. Soyez certaine qu’en tant que corapporteure de la réforme des autorités de supervision européenne, je ferai preuve d’un engagement plein et entier pour faire aboutir cette réforme avant la fin de ce mandat.

  Νότης Μαριάς (ECR). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, συζητούμε σήμερα τη νομιμοποίηση εσόδων από παράνομες δραστηριότητες στον τραπεζικό τομέα, που πλέον έχει γίνει καθεστώς στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Και είναι δεδομένο ότι πρέπει να ληφθούν μέτρα για να αντιμετωπιστεί όλη αυτή η κατάσταση.

Από πού προκύπτουν αυτά τα τεράστια ποσά; Πρώτα απ’ όλα, από εγκληματικές δραστηριότητες, αλλά και από φοροδιαφυγή και φοροαποφυγή. Και εδώ πρέπει να προσέξουμε. Τα θέματα αυτά πρέπει να ρυθμιστούν, προκειμένου να μην μπορεί να γίνεται αυτή η φοροδιαφυγή, η φοροαποφυγή, κυρίως με τις τριγωνικές σχέσεις που κάνουν οι πολυεθνικές.

Θεωρούμε λοιπόν ότι πρέπει να ληφθούν συγκεκριμένα μέτρα, διότι οι τράπεζες –συγκεκριμένες από αυτές, γνωρίζουμε ποιες είναι– με τη λειτουργία τους συμβάλλουν στο ξέπλυμα αυτών των παράνομων εσόδων. Απαιτούνται λοιπόν μέτρα αποφασιστικά. Και φυσικά τα κράτη μέλη τα οποία δεν τηρούν τη νομοθεσία πρέπει να παραπεμφθούν στο Δικαστήριο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.

  Molly Scott Cato (Verts/ALE). – Mr President, the sheer volume of dirty money flowing into Europe is turning our continent into a playground for kleptocrats and crime bosses while pricing ordinary citizens out of their homes. While people from outside the EU need to have passports to move around our continent, their money can flow freely and often too rapidly to be monitored and controlled.

I represent the beautiful city of Salisbury, where Russian agents poisoned three of my constituents and a fourth woman, who died. We also know that Putin’s regime is deliberately undermining European democracy, including involvement in the Brexit referendum and I’m just back from a TAX3 mission to Latvia where we heard first hand of the vast scale of Russian money flowing into the EU through that country.

What I’m asking myself is why are we allowing the money of Putin’s cronies to flow through our banks, bringing with it crime and undermining the rule of law? We agree with the Commission that there need to be far more resources and powers at the European level to detect and deter money laundering, so we welcome their proposals.

The Council must now show that it also is serious about fighting transfers of illegal money and treat these new proposals with the utmost urgency.

But beyond that it is surely time to end the double standards with regard to Russia where on the one hand we impose sanctions, but on the other we allow the free flow of money from this kleptocratic and hostile state.

(The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question under Rule 162(8))

  David Coburn (EFDD), blue-card question. – Are you not concerned, Molly, about the situation with the EIB? I mean that the office of the EIB may be able to do all sorts of things without regulation in London and do it outside the EU’s view as well. Don’t you think this is rather concerning? It’s all part of the agreement that the Prime Minister seems to have come to.

Also, I understand what you’re saying about Russian money and am as concerned as next man about what the Russians are up to London and in your beautiful city of Salisbury, but you should also realise that we have to do business with Russia. If we don’t do business with Russia there will be enormous trouble. It’s better to do business with them than to fight them, would you not agree?

  Le Président. – Madame Berès, pour votre information, j’accepte toutes les questions «carton bleu». Je ne les refuse jamais. Ce n’est pas à moi de les refuser, c’est plutôt à l’orateur de le faire s’il ne souhaite pas y répondre.

Maintenant, j’accepte la question «carton bleu» demandée par M. Brok, mais après la réponse de Mme Cato.

  Molly Scott Cato (Verts/ALE), blue-card answer. – With regard to Putin, I do have a lot of concerns. I’m not sure how well I can treat your words there, because obviously we see a lot of retweeting by you and other Brexiteers of a lot of Russian disinformation, and maybe this is also what we’ve heard during this debate, from your side.

In terms of the EIB, my main concern is that if Britain leaves the EU and therefore ceases to have the opportunity to have investment from the EIB, we will lose investment in some of the most important sectors, particularly renewables, where Britain has done very well from EIB investment in recent years.

(The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question under Rule 162(8))

  Elmar Brok (PPE), Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Frau Kollegin! Würden Sie mir den Gefallen tun, dem Kollegen der UKIP zu erklären, dass die Europäische Investitionsbank die größte staatliche Investitionsbank im Vereinigten Königreich ist, weil die keine eigene nationale Investitionsbank haben? Das Vereinigte Königreich nutzt die EIB als ihre nationale Investitionsbank. Das wird ein großes Problem für Sie nach dem Brexit, weil Sie dann dieses Finanzierungsinstrument für Ihre öffentlichen Investitionen verlieren. Und deswegen würde ich Ihnen einfach vorschlagen, dass die Frau Kollegin Ihnen mal ein Seminar darüber gibt, in welcher Weise Sie endlich mal Ihr Grundwissen über Europa verbessern können.

  Molly Scott Cato (Verts/ALE), blue-card answer. – Thank you very much, Mr Brok, for explaining very clearly yourself to our UKIP colleague the true role and function of the EIB. As colleagues will know, I’m a great fan of the German banking system and I’ve actually invited a German banker, Thorsten Höche, who runs the German public banking association, to Plymouth. I’m hoping we will be able to follow your example of public banks, and I absolutely agree that we could do with a national public investment bank – and that is indeed Green party policy.

  Miguel Urbán Crespo (GUE/NGL). – Señor presidente, una vez más los bancos se revelan como uno de los eslabones débiles de la economía europea: los mismos bancos que han sido rescatados con el dinero público; bancos a los que se les permiten impuestos de sociedades cercanos a cero y a los que los discursos públicos consideran prioritario ayudar y proteger.

Estos mismos bancos son los que organizan masivamente la evasión fiscal y el lavado de dinero, amparándose en una estructura de paraísos fiscales que son el verdadero agujero negro de las finanzas europeas. A pesar de ello, la Comisión Europea se ha negado a incluir a ningún país de la Unión Europea —como Malta o Luxemburgo, que actúan sistemáticamente a favor de las grandes fortunas con la opacidad— en la lista negra de paraísos fiscales.

Señorías: sin una voluntad clara de enfrentarse a esta realidad, cualquier intento de lucha contra la evasión fiscal y el lavado de dinero es papel mojado. Señorías: papel mojado.

  Barbara Kappel (ENF). – Herr Präsident! Frau Kommissarin! Frau Ministerin! Es gibt in der EU strenge Regeln zur Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche, und diese Regeln wurden im Rahmen der fünften AMLD, welche im April dieses Jahres in diesem Haus beschlossen wurde, noch verschärft. Nur: Nicht alle haben die vierte Geldwäscherichtlinie bis jetzt umgesetzt. Insgesamt haben acht Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union die vierte nur teilweise oder unzureichend oder gar nicht umgesetzt.

Die jüngsten Fälle von Geldwäsche in einigen EU-Banken – Beispiele wurden von den Kollegen genannt – haben natürlich Bedenken ausgelöst, dass die EU-Vorschriften zur Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche nicht wirksam überwacht und durchgesetzt werden. Ein Versäumnis, das fatale Folgen hat für die Integrität und die Reputation des europäischen Finanzsektors und auch für die Finanzstabilität bestimmter Banken. Kritik kommt dabei auch von den Aufsehern. Die Vorsitzende des SSM, Frau Nouy sagt, dass die derzeitigen Aufsichtsinstrumente nicht ausreichen, um Geldwäschepraktiken ausreichend zu versorgen. In dieselbe Richtung stößt Präsident Draghi, der jetzt in einer ECON-Sitzung im September gesagt hat, dass auch er sich für eine zentrale Aufsichtsbehörde einsetzt.

Die Kommission geht einen anderen Weg. Sie sagt, die EBA, die Europäische Bankenaufsichtsbehörde, soll gestärkt werden, die Zusammenarbeit mit den nationalen Aufsichtsbehörden muss stärker werden, und die Konvergenz der Aufsichtsstandards muss sichergestellt werden. Die EBA hat derzeit zwei Mitarbeiter, die sich mit AML beschäftigen. Ich denke, dass das sicherlich zu wenig sein wird.

Die Qualität der Aufsicht soll durch die gemeinsamen Standards, regelmäßige Überprüfungen der nationalen Aufsichtsbehörden und Risikobewertungen verbessert werden, auch der Informationsaustausch zwischen den Aufsehern und der Informationsaustausch mit nicht EU-Ländern.

Gestern wurde im ECOFIN eine Verschärfung der potenziellen Anti-Geldwäsche-Aufsicht beschlossen. Die österreichische Ratspräsidentschaft wird bis Jahresende einen Vorschlag vorlegen, um den Informationsaustausch und die Konvergenz zu verbessern.

  Othmar Karas (PPE). – Herr Präsident, meine Damen und Herren! Wir hören es von allen Rednern: Wir haben zwar strenge Vorschriften zur Geldwäschebekämpfung, aber die jüngsten Beispiele in Banken der Mitgliedstaaten, aber auch außerhalb des Bankensektors und außerhalb der Europäischen Union, die in engster Verbindung mit der Europäischen Union sind, zeigen, dass unsere Regeln nicht überall wirksam überwacht und durchgesetzt werden, und dass es zu einem mehrstelligen Milliardenbetrag an Geldwäsche innerhalb der Europäischen Union kommt.

Ich verstehe daher den Unmut des Kommissionspräsidenten Jean-Claude Juncker, den Unmut vieler Bürgerinnen und Bürger, dass wir unsere Regeln verschärfen müssen, die Kontrolle verbessern müssen und die Zusammenarbeit der Aufsichtsbehörden stärken müssen. Und wir brauchen wahrscheinlich– wie das schon gesagt wurde – eine zentrale Agentur, eine zentrale Behörde, die für die Kontrolle und für Sanktionen sorgt, aber auch die Verbindung zwischen Geheimdiensten, Polizei und dem Finanzmarkt erhöht.

Wir müssen daher die Frage stellen: Ist die EBA dafür geeignet, oder brauchen wir nicht mehr? Wir müssen uns natürlich die Fragen stellen: Wie beseitigen wir die unterschiedlichen Aufsichtsbefugnisse und -pflichten innerhalb der Bankenunion, wie beseitigen wir die ungleichen Professionalitätslevel bei den nationalen Behörden, und wie sorgen wir für eine höhere Verzahnung zwischen den Aufsichts- und den Anti-Geldwäsche-Vorschriften für Banken? Das werden wir im Ausschuss tun.

(Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ gemäß Artikel 162 Absatz 8 der Geschäftsordnung zu beantworten.)

  Sven Giegold (Verts/ALE), Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Geschätzter Othmar, lieber Kollege Karas! Sie wissen, wie sehr ich Ihr Engagement hier im Europäischen Parlament schätze. Ich würde deshalb gerne wissen, ob Ihnen bekannt ist, dass Ihr Heimatland ein Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen mit Zypern hat, das zu einer Doppel-Nichtbesteuerung führt und regelrecht dazu einlädt, dass russisches Geld aus Zypern dann letztlich mal in Österreich doppelt nicht besteuert wird. Und ist Ihnen bekannt, dass Österreich gegenüber Liechtenstein darauf verzichtet, die Informationen über steuerliche Daten zu bekommen, die sonst überall auf der Welt zwischen den Finanzverwaltungen ausgetauscht werden? Und ich frage Sie: Werden Sie sich dafür einsetzen, dass sich das irgendwann mal ändert, lieber Kollege Karas?

  Othmar Karas (PPE), Antwort auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. Herr Kollege Giegold! Sie wissen, dass die Frau Kollegin Berès und ich selbst Ko-Berichterstatter beim ESA-Review sind, dass wir gemeinsam mit dem ESA-Review die Vorschläge der Kommission behandeln werden. Und ich habe soeben auch angedeutet, dass wir wahrscheinlich über diese Vorschläge hinausgehen müssen, um die bestehenden offenen Fragen anzugehen, nicht nur im Bankenbereich, in den Mitgliedstaaten, im Finanzsektor und außerhalb des Finanzsektors – wir selbst waren bei dem Hearing und haben einiges über die Schweiz gehört. Es geht jetzt nicht, dass wir jedem erklären, was er falsch macht. Sondern es geht darum, dass wir alles, was falsch läuft, auf den Tisch bringen und dass wir dem endlich ein Ende setzen. Denn es kann nicht sein, dass wir uns auf der einen Seite loben, wie starke Regeln wir haben, und uns auf der anderen Seite die Geldwäsche davonläuft.

  Evelyn Regner (S&D). – Herr Präsident! Wir brauchen bei der Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche mehr Kooperation zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten, mehr europäische Kontrolle. Wir haben das ja schon in Panama-Bericht gefordert, und insofern ist ein klarer roter Faden drin.

Wir haben auch die Kommission dringend aufgefordert, zu prüfen und zu berichten, ob gerade zur Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche nicht ein einheitlicher Rechtsraum geschaffen werden sollte. Hier läuft trotz vieler Überarbeitungen vieles schief. Zum einen setzen die Mitgliedstaaten die Richtlinie nur teilweise um und zum anderen gibt es nach wie vor massig Schlupflöcher – wie im Fall des berüchtigten und jetzt schon vielfach erwähnten Falls der Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Danske-Bank und der estnischen Finanzaufsicht. Die Umsetzung der Regeln muss sichergestellt werden, egal ob mit einer Ausweitung der Kompetenzen der Bankenaufsicht oder mit einer eigenen Anti-Geldwäsche-Verordnung. Diese dreckigen Geschäfte sollen endlich ein Ende haben.

  Ernest Urtasun (Verts/ALE). – Señor presidente, dos billones de dólares al año se blanquean en el mundo, y Europa es un grandísimo agujero negro. 2018 ha sido el año de los escándalos ABLV, Versobank, Pilatus, Danske Bank, que han reflejado una deficiencia inmensa en el régimen europeo de control y regulación. Tenemos un sistema de control totalmente fragmentado y sin coordinación a escala de la Unión Europea.

Las medidas que ha presentado la Comisión son un paso adelante: dotar de más competencias a la ABE y, en la revisión de la Directiva sobre requerimientos de capital, que la supervisión en materia de requerimientos de capital se vincule también a la lucha contra el blanqueo, pero debemos ir mucho más allá.

Y es muy importante tener, efectivamente, una agencia especializada que investigue, que recaude información, que se coordine con los servicios secretos para poder combatir este fenómeno, como lo es también que vayamos hasta el final y controlemos también no solo el sector financiero, sino también otras actividades que tienen que ver con el blanqueo: los contables, los despachos de abogados, etcétera, etcétera. Y, finalmente, hay que dotar de más recursos a la ABE y a la propia Comisión para poder afrontar este problema.

  Martin Schirdewan (GUE/NGL). – Herr Präsident! Die jüngsten Geldwäscheskandale zeigen ja, wie löchrig die europäische Gesetzgebung in diesem Bereich noch immer ist. Laut Financial Times sind seit 2007 bis zu 200 Milliarden Euro illegal erwirtschafteter Gelder über die estnische Filiale der Danske Bank gewaschen worden. Kriminellen wird es immer noch viel zu leicht gemacht, ihr schmutziges Geld ins europäische Finanzsystem einzuspeisen. Der volkswirtschaftliche Schaden, der dadurch entsteht, ist enorm – und das angesichts einer Union, die sich nur langsam von ihrer wirtschaftlichen Krise erholt, deren verheerende soziale Folgen noch überall in Europa brutal sichtbar sind.

Die im Frühling überarbeitete Geldwäscherichtlinie bringt zwar Verbesserungen, bleibt aber in einigen zentralen Punkten viel zu schwach. So wird das Ziel umfassender Transparenz weder für Trusts und Stiftungen noch im Immobiliensektor, einem der Geldwäsche-Hotspots, erreicht. Und auch auf härtere Strafen bei Verstößen gegen die Richtlinie hat man sich leider nicht einigen können. Hier, Frau Kommissarin, gilt es, dringend nachzubessern, auch weil einige nationale Regierungen bereits überlegen, wie sie die Richtlinie bei der Implementierung untergraben können. All das zeigt: Der Kampf gegen das schmutzige Geld ist noch lange nicht gewonnen.

  Емил Радев (PPE). – Г-н Председател, дами и господа, Европейският съюз разполага с едно от най-строгите законодателства относно борбата срещу изпирането на пари и прилага изключително високи стандарти за превенция на този вид престъпление. В последните шест месеца обаче няколко европейски банки в различни страни ясно демонстрираха как съществуващите правила невинаги се прилагат на практика и дори понякога биват игнорирани целенасочено в името на финансова печалба.

Нека бъда ясен – никакъв ръст в печалбите за банките не може да бъде въз основа на нарушаване на което и да било законодателство. Случаите от последните месеци доказаха още, че борбата срещу изпирането на пари не се води единствено във и от частния сектор. Нужни са също постоянни координирани усилия от надзорните органи на държавите членки, както и непрекъснат и безпрепятствен обмен на информация между компетентните органи, така че борбата срещу този вид престъпление да бъде по-ефективна.

Имайки предвид начина, по който функционират банките в Европейския съюз чрез техните паспортни права за различните държави членки, е логично да се замислим за по-засилен европейски контрол. Но каквито и промени да бъдат предприемани, те трябва да са вследствие на внимателен анализ и обсъждане. Освен това трябва да се намери подходящ баланс между координираните действия и суверенитета на държавите членки.

Дами и господа, борбата срещу изпирането на пари е непрекъснат процес, който изисква непрекъснати усилия и смели приложими на практика решения. Крайният резултат следва да бъде милиардите евро, които в момента губим годишно вследствие на това престъпление, да бъдат пренасочени в полза на обществото.

  Ramón Jáuregui Atondo (S&D). – Señor presidente, yo creo que es importante recordar que el dinero negro es el origen, o la consecuencia, de muchos más males o peligros que la simple amenaza a la estabilidad financiera. Es el origen de problemas para nuestra salud, para nuestra democracia, inclusive para la paz. El origen de la lucha contra el lavado de dinero viene fundamentalmente de la lucha contra el narcotráfico y el terrorismo, y hay que aprovechar esa oportunidad para abordar otros sectores a los que está afectando el dinero negro.

Yo hoy quiero hacer dos sugerencias a la señora comisaria. En primer lugar, todos los bancos europeos tienen ya potentes servicios de investigación sobre el origen del dinero, y esas experiencias, esas mejores prácticas, hay que incorporarlas a la agencia europea para que haga mejor su trabajo. Y, en segundo lugar, hay que ponerse en contacto con la agencia norteamericana de lucha contra el lavado de dinero, porque esta experiencia norteamericana es el origen de la eficacia en la lucha contra el dinero negro en todo el mundo. Es una lucha global que hay que abordar globalmente.

  Jordi Solé (Verts/ALE). – Mr President, money laundering is a huge economic problem but also a risk for security and financial stability in the European Union. The huge amount of dirty money flowing into Europe is a scandal and has to be urgently tackled. What we can see in recent money laundering cases around Europe is that often, even if the legislation is in place, the rules are not properly supervised and implemented. Enforcement is carried out by different national authorities that often have different standards and sometimes do not cooperate enough. Thus the Commission must ensure that anti—money laundering rules are timely and consistently transposed, implemented and enforced in the EU Member States.

I welcome the new anti—money laundering responsibilities that are to be entrusted to the European Banking Authority, but I believe we should move towards centralised enforcement with a separate EU authority – a kind of European financial intelligence unit. This would definitely improve the consistency and effectiveness of the legislation.

  Stanislav Polčák (PPE). – Pane předsedající, paní komisařko, navzdory posílenému legislativnímu rámci přijatému v posledních letech jsme byli v poslední době svědky skutečně vážných problémů spojených s praním špinavých peněz, a proto je namístě obava, zdali náš právní rámec je skutečně dostatečný a nejsou v něm mezery či nedostatky.

Případ kolapsu lotyšské banky, zmrazení aktiv maltské banky z důvodu podezřelých transakcí jejího iránského vlastníka ukazují, že dnešní evropský právní rámec boje proti praní špinavých peněz skutečně postrádá potřebnou odolnost vůči selhání vlastníků či manažerů bank, či dokonce tedy národních dohledových orgánů.

O varovně nízké přeshraniční spolupráci národních dohledových orgánů svědčí také odhalení v souvislosti s kauzou Panama Papers, že do různých bank v EU přiteklo z Ruska 21 miliard kapitálu nelegálního původu. Jsem proto toho názoru, že situace vyžaduje rozhodnou reakci Komise, a děkuji Vám, paní komisařko, za to, že jste v této iniciativě v čele. Účinný boj proti praní špinavých peněz by měl být naší prioritou. Výhrady, které můžeme mít k současné podobě pravidel: nedostatečná či opožděná činnost dohledových orgánů, nedostatky v oblasti spolupráce a sdílení informací dohledových orgánů na vnitrostátní úrovni nebo dokonce mezi orgány v různých členských státech nebo s orgány třetích zemí v bojích právě proti praní špinavých peněz. Proto vítám, že Komise přistoupila k akci a že přišla s návrhem příslušné legislativní změny, zejména té upravující bankovní unii. Je třeba, aby evropský orgán byl vybaven dnes silnějším mandátem v boji proti praní špinavých peněz.

(Procedura “catch the eye”)

  Seán Kelly (PPE). – Mr President, I must say I am appalled at the extent of money laundering that is taking place in the European Union. I listened to the debate carefully. One message that we need to send out from here is that no individual should be too big to jail, no bank too big to fail, and no Member State too big to nail. If we do that we will make a good effort at solving this ridiculous situation that is denying citizens so much in terms of jobs and wealth.

I agree with my colleague, Mr Hayes, that rather than creating a new agency, we should give increased resources to the EBA to apply the rules that are there and, if the rules are not sufficiently strong, to introduce more draconian rules and penalties. The best deterrent for this is a huge draconian penalty.

Finally, I do not like the EIB being associated with this discussion. From my knowledge of them, they do tremendous work for Europe and EFSI especially is there for all to see.

  Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D). – Señor presidente, señora comisaria Jourová, hemos compartido esta tarde algunos de nosotros con usted debates importantes: Eurojust, decomiso de dinero procedente de negocios ilícitos y, ahora, lavado de dinero a través del sistema bancario en la Unión Europea. Todo esto requiere cooperación para hacer frente a la criminalidad organizada y a los beneficios de los delitos que se cometen.

Billones de euros se lavan a través de casos notorios en bancos europeos —procedentes, a menudo, de Rusia, de las antiguas repúblicas soviéticas—, pero, en todo caso, enseñando lecciones muy claras: ausencia de mecanismos eficaces, de acuerdos de cooperación con terceros países y, sobre todo, retraso en la gestión del problema y escala nacional de la respuesta, que ponen de manifiesto que nos hace falta un mecanismo europeo, eficaz y de calidad, de supervisión bancaria para que emitamos un mensaje muy claro al que tienen derecho los ciudadanos europeos.

Ningún banco puede ser demasiado grande para caer —lo ha demostrado la crisis económica—, pero tampoco ningún banco puede permitirse ser demasiado poderoso como para no ser supervisado.

(Fine della procedura “catch the eye”)

  Věra Jourová, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, I agree with all honourable Members who declared here that it must be our common priority to fight money laundering. There are at least two serious reasons. Many of you mentioned here that we have to stop the reputational risk to the European banking and financial sector. The second thing has been mentioned many times here, the illicit money – the money which comes to Europe to be laundered – serves in many cases to finance organised crime, trafficking in human beings, drugs trafficking and terrorism. So this is indeed connected with the previous discussions we had here today which concerned the need to be better in ensuring security in Europe.

I would like to answer the direct question of Mr Giegold, there were two questions: when will I guarantee that there will be no money laundering in Europe and the second was about when the Commission will do something. Maybe it’s not exact but you asked about the activities and actions of the Commission, the current ones and what are the plans. The second question was on the capacities, so let me briefly answer. While the role of the Commission is clear, we have in fact four roles here: set the rules, enforce the rules in the Member States, monitor the application of the rules, and then the forth role, which I call a fireman role, to act in case there is an incident, which are the cases we are talking about today here.

First on the rules, as I said before, I think that the EU has the best system compared with the global systems, or the systems which work outside Europe. They cover prevention, which cover very thorough due diligence, checking of further suspicious transactions, detection, investigation, penalisation.

In our European rules, the roles and obligations of different players and different institutions and also concrete people are very precisely described.

There are roles for the European Union, Commission, Member States, institutions at the level of the Member States, be it supervisory body, be it law enforcement level, be it financial intelligence unit and, of course, the banking sector and other sectors which are concerned.

There is also a role for individuals, and it will be very interesting after the investigation in Denmark and Estonia is be finalised – which I hope will be next year, because the investigations already started – to understand better who failed, what failed. Were there rules which allowed these failures, by leaving some gaps and loopholes, or was it the failure at the level of the institutions? Was it the supervisor or were there concrete people working in the banks who committed some wrongdoing by negligence or intentional wrongdoing? We will know more, hopefully, as I said, next year.

On enforcement, you know that we do a lot to enforce and to guarantee the proper implementation of the 4th Anti—Money Laundering Directive (AML) and also that we are helping the Member States to prepare for the 5th Anti—Money Laundering Directive. Both pieces of legislation are dramatically increasing transparency; they are covering other sectors than the banking sector. You asked about the real estate sector; it is being covered now. We are covering cryptocurrencies, which pose a new kind of risk, also for our financial sector. We have issued new standards for financial intelligence units, where we see the gaps in cooperation.

Coming back to the enforcement of the implementation of the 4th AML, we have launched infringements in the case of 16 Member States, we have referred two Member States for the lack of notification to the Court. So we are pushing very intensively, and I must say that the Member States take it seriously and we are in constant dialogue.

Now a little bit on the monitoring role. We are of course monitoring the situation in all the Member States, but the enhanced monitoring, of course, is in the States where we see problems. You know that I am working very intensively on the Maltese situation. Very probably we will issue an opinion – following the European Banking Authority’s (EBA) findings – on the Maltese case in the middle of November. We are monitoring the situation in Latvia, and of course now in Denmark, Estonia, in Cyprus and in Germany. The detection of problematic places is quite precise thanks to the continuous risk analysis we are doing, and we are monitoring very precisely.

The last thing which I wanted to mention is the role of the fireman. The Commission acts when something wrong is happening. I think that it shouldn’t be the role of the Commission, because we have quite limited competences here. You know that in the case of Malta, in the case now of Denmark, I asked the European Banking Authority to go to the country and to run the investigation. This is the core principle which we introduce in the new legislation, that the European Banking Authority should be equipped with the competences to collect the data, to coordinate and to act in case of first alert that there is something wrong happening. I am sure that if the EBA had had the competence before the Danske Bank problem, there would have been some action between 2007 and 2015 when money laundering in the scope of EUR 200 billion was up and running. It would have been a solution. I believe that we are proposing something which will be very practical for these emergency situations.

Why have such a competence on a European level? Well, because if one Member State fails, it is a problem for the whole of Europe. We have to improve shared management and by taking part of the power we are also taking part of the responsibility, speaking about the European Banking Authority. I want to urge you to support these proposals because this is based on bad lessons and on our very strong effort and will to improve the situation and not to let these situations and scandals happen again.

A last comment on the capacities. For the European Banking Authority it is foreseen that by 2020 they should have 12 people, but in case of need I am sure that the capacities will be enlarged. What if not this? This is a cardinal and key issue and problem we face in Europe, as I said at the beginning, connected with endangering our security. I’m sure that the capacities will be deployed on the necessary level and the same applies for the Commission. You know that Mr Juncker promised to enlarge the capacities in my DG. We have now a very well—working unit dealing with the matters connected with financial crime. We will increase the capacities. The experts who are in my team are now intensively working on the European list of high—risk third countries. Everything we promised the Committee of Inquiry into Money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion (PANA) and the Special Committee on Financial Crimes, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance (TAX3) would happen, we are now doing, because this is a very serious situation and this is a very big task ahead of us.

Thank you very much for your attention, sorry to be a little bit longer, but I wanted to explain the context and to express my personal strong determination to solve the problems we are facing now.

  Juliane Bogner-Strauss, President—in—Office of the Council. – Mr President, thank you again for giving me the floor. I have followed Members’ valuable contributions with great interest. I have also heard the input from the Commission.

There is definitely a problem with money laundering that we need to understand and that we have to solve. The various investigations taking place will add much needed clarity. It is indeed very damaging if the information on money laundering and financing of terrorism does not flow where it should and if no action is taken in good time to remedy the situation.

The avenue proposed by the Commission could be very helpful in this respect by ensuring that AML rules are effectively supervised across the EU and that different authorities cooperate closely with each other. Yesterday, the proposal was presented in the Ecofin Council and it will now be examined at technical level. As already mentioned, the Council will also set out comprehensive and long term measures in this area by December. The Presidency will remain available for exchanges on the subject as needed.

  Presidente. – La discussione è chiusa.

Dichiarazioni scritte (articolo 162)

  Dariusz Rosati (PPE), in writing. – First, I would like to thank the Commissioner for acknowledging our work in the PANA and TAX3 Committees when it comes to the fight against money laundering issues. Still, the recent months have shown that despite the EU’s tireless efforts, money laundering in the European Union’s banking sector is still an issue costing us billions of euros. The money laundering scandals connected to Danske Bank, ING, Pilatus Bank and ABLV have shocked many Europeans. I do not want to get into the examples of terrorist financing or the laundromat cases... If our rules and the cooperation between Member States are so strong, why in some cases did we need the US authorities to help us in finding our own – European – weaknesses? From our PANA and TAX3 observations hitherto, we know that, for the time being, we probably might not need new institutions, but it is improving Member States’ cooperation and information exchange which can facilitate the fight against money laundering. What we need in the era of populism is trust – trust in the institutions and what we do in the EU. Fighting against money laundering will bring that. We need to do it.