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Postup : 2018/2158(INI)
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Stadia projednávání dokumentu : A8-0073/2019

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PV 11/03/2019 - 23
CRE 11/03/2019 - 23

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PV 12/03/2019 - 9.23
CRE 12/03/2019 - 9.23
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Doslovný záznam ze zasedání
Pondělí, 11. března 2019 - Štrasburk Revidované vydání

23. Stav politických vztahů mezi EU a Ruskem (rozprava)
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  President. – The next item is the debate on the report by Sandra Kalniete, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, on the state of EU-Russia political relations (A8-0073/2019) (2018/2158(INI)).

I would like to inform you that during this debate there will be no catch-the-eye and no blue-card procedure.


  Sandra Kalniete, Rapporteur. – Mr President, the title of my report is ‘On the state of EU-Russia political relations’. It was not an easy task to produce a report on relations in a situation in which the European Union and its associated partners are being attacked by Russian state-sponsored actors that creatively use a wide range of hybrid warfare techniques. As a result, a significant part of the report addresses the resilience of the Union and its ability to deter hybrid threats.

Today, five years after the occupation of Crimea, we stress that there will be no return to ‘business as usual’ until Russia fully restores the territorial integrity of Ukraine. We need to reassess the basis of our relations with Russia, as it can no longer be considered a strategic partner. The outdated EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement should be reconsidered and any future framework for the EU-Russia relationship should be based on the full observance of international law and OSCE principles. The time for nice diplomatic language is over.

Unfortunately, there is no place, space or time for major new cooperation initiatives with Russia. There is very little room for any cooperation so long as Russia continues to occupy parts of Ukraine and hybrid attacks on other European countries continue. We should, however, continue selective engagement with Russia in areas of vital interest to the Union. The global challenges of climate change, energy security, digitalisation, non-proliferation and the fight against terrorism are a few of them.

We should stand firm on sanctions, which should be prolonged for as long as Russian violations of international law continue. I advocate a clear message to Russia regarding the sanctions: ‘more for more, less for less’.

As we witness serious deterioration in the human rights situation in Russia, the Council has to move on with adopting a European Magnitsky Act, establishing an individual sanctions regime for human rights violations. The key to a more effective EU policy towards Russia is coherence between internal and external policies. This applies in full to Nord Stream 2, a project that reinforces EU dependency on Russian gas supplies, threatens the EU internal market and is not in line with either European energy or foreign and security policy. It needs to be stopped.

The report’s list of recommendations for interaction with Russia is rather limited, but some of them should be mentioned: continued support for people-to-people contacts in general – particularly involving civil society activists and with a focus on young people – and a clear code of conduct concerning airspace used by military and civilian aircraft, in order to reduce the risk of misunderstandings, misinterpretation and misreading of each other’s intentions. There can only be political solutions to the conflict in eastern Ukraine and we have to encourage confidence-building measures in the Donbas region across the Line of Contact. The EU has to advance the idea of a UN-led peace operation in this region of eastern Ukraine.

To conclude, I would like to thank my shadow rapporteurs for their team spirit and for the constructive work done on this document.


  Tibor Navracsics, Member of the Commission, on behalf of the Vice—President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Mr President, thank you for this opportunity to discuss Ms Kalniete’s report and to review our relations with Russia, keeping in mind the EU’s five guiding principles set out in 2016.

In April 2018, EU Foreign Ministers shared the assessment that the strategic challenges we face in our relations with Russia will persist for some time. As highlighted by rapporteur Kalniete, central to these challenges remains Russia’s violation of international law by the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the ongoing destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. The dangerous increase in tensions in the Sea of Azov and the Strait of Kerch is another consequence of the illegal annexation.

The Foreign Ministers reconfirmed the relevance of the five guiding principles agreed in 2016 for EU policy towards Russia and highlighted the need to strengthen the resilience of the EU and its neighbours against Russian threats, including hybrid threats.

The EU has responded promptly and proactively, to promote EU values and interests and increase EU resilience in line with the five principles. High Representative Mogherini has personally taken every opportunity to raise the EU’s concerns in her meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, including the need for progress on the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, the illegal annexation of Crimea and the security situation in both the Sea of Azov and eastern Ukraine.

In February 2019, EU Foreign Ministers reiterated the Union’s support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and its condemnation of the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russia. It was also agreed to provide further EU support for Ukrainian regions affected by the situation in the Sea of Azov.

We have also raised with Foreign Minister Lavrov international issues such as Syria. We have stressed the need to preserve the ceasefire in Idlib and prevent another humanitarian emergency.

We are continuing to discuss not only how to support the western workers in their economic development and EU integration efforts but also Iran and Afghanistan, the need to preserve the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the importance of Russia’s remaining in the Council of Europe.

The report rightly highlights the fact that the space for civil society in Russia is shrinking and human rights defenders face a difficult situation. The EU delegation in Moscow maintains ongoing close engagement with the Russian authorities on human rights issues, including, among others, the situation of human rights defenders, women’s rights, gender equality, LGBTI persons and Ukrainian prisoners. EU support has been tireless, through frequent contacts with defenders, high-level demarches, media statements, field visits and trial observation.

In order to strengthen contacts with the Russian people, the EU continues to maintain an intense level of support. Russian citizens continue to be the largest group of recipients of Schengen visas and Russian students are the largest group of beneficiaries of Erasmus+ exchanges.

We will explore further ways to continue to convey the message that the European Union supports the Russian people. We are close to Russia and its people. We share centuries of history and culture, and this will not change, despite any disagreement with the Russian authorities. Russia is an important interlocutor for the EU, and we work well together on various issues, from Iran to the Arctic. Yet we are deeply worried about certain aspects of Russia’s behaviour, not only in Ukraine and Syria but also in Salisbury and in relation to the espionage against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Following the attack in Salisbury, and in line with the Council conclusions, we have redoubled our efforts to strengthen EU resilience, including in relation to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-related risks, and to continue strengthening our capacity to address hybrid threats.

A new EU regime against the use and proliferation of chemical weapons was set out in October 2018. In January, the Council imposed sanctions under this new regime, and also against the four Russian GRU (intelligence agency) officials deemed responsible for the attack in Salisbury. Work is ongoing to establish a new EU sanction regime to counter cyber-attacks as part of our wider diplomatic toolbox.

We are looking at strengthening our capacity to address the hybrid threats mentioned in the report, including in the areas of cyber-strategy communication and counter-intelligence.

We are also reinforcing our work on tackling disinformation. In December 2018, the EU adopted an action plan against disinformation, responding to the European Council’s call for a coordinated response to challenges, particularly with a view to the forthcoming European elections. I know that Parliament will hold a specific discussion about this tomorrow.

I will take this opportunity to highlight our common interest in retaining a realistic and balanced approach towards Russia, as underlined by the report. Despite increased tensions, it is essential for the EU to maintain open channels with Russia on issues of strategic interest for Europe and for the world. We will retain a policy of transparency towards Russia and explore cooperation in areas of mutual interest, such as regional connectivity, while also working to support the resilience of partners in the region.


  Cristian Dan Preda, au nom du groupe PPE. – Monsieur le Président, tout d’abord, je voudrais féliciter ma collègue Sandra Kalniete, qui a travaillé sur ce rapport et sur l’actualisation très bienvenue des incidents survenus entre l’Union et la Russie du point de vue des relations internationales. Bien sûr, nous avons eu des mauvaises nouvelles, dont nous avons déjà discuté ici (par exemple la situation dans le détroit de Kertch et la militarisation de la mer d’Azov), mais je voudrais plutôt insister sur un autre aspect.

Monsieur le Commissaire l’a mentionné, nous sommes à la veille des élections européennes et nous entendons parler depuis quelques temps déjà de l’influence du Kremlin dans les affaires politiques de nos démocraties. Cette forte présence de la Russie est redoutée et il ne s’agit pas ici d’une question de relations politiques au sens des affaires étrangères. Je vois que la présidence roumaine du Conseil est absente – c’est déjà une habitude – et je m’adresse donc à la Commission. Serait-il possible de clarifier certains points avant les élections européennes: dans quelles démocraties la Russie est-elle présente? Avec quels partis le Kremlin travaille-t-il concrètement? Où l’argent russe est-il investi?

Il serait selon moi préférable que nous disposions de ces informations avant les élections européennes et non pas après, sans quoi nous nous retrouverons dans une situation semblable à celle des États-Unis, où règne une crise post-électorale due justement à cette incertitude. Monsieur le Commissaire, voulez-vous, ou non, nous éclairer sur ces points?


  Liisa Jaakonsaari, on behalf of the S&D Group. – Mr President, unfortunately, EU-Russia relations are not in a good shape and the reasons are well known: Russian violations of the principles of international law in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s support for the extreme right and populist national parties and governments in the EU, such as Mr Orbán in Hungary, and the spread of disinformation and fake news.

In such times of tension, it is important to do everything possible to reduce escalations. Unfortunately, this report doesn’t serve that purpose. The implementation of the Minsk agreements would demonstrate Russia’s goodwill with regard to solving the conflict in eastern Ukraine. We need to engage in consultations with Russia to reduce the risk of misunderstanding. One official platform for such consultations is our interparliamentary dialogue within the EU-Russia delegation. I believe such a dialogue is an important tool just in times of tensions. Therefore, both sides should remove the obstacles for dialogue to take place again.

We need to continue our pragmatic engagement with Russia in areas of common interests and with regard to global governance. The Northern Dimension initiative, cross-border cooperation and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council are good examples for constructive engagement that benefits citizens.

It is really important that we step up the protection of human rights defenders.

For people-to people-contact, Erasmus+ is highly popular and its funding needs to be increased.


  Anna Elżbieta Fotyga, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Panie Przewodniczący! Rosja obiecuje, kiedy jest do tego zmuszona. I nie dotrzymuje swych obietnic z chwilą, kiedy zyskuje siłę. Te słowa wymówił 100 lat temu wielki Polak, Józef Piłsudski. Potwierdziły to swoim losem całe pokolenia Polaków i innych narodów mojej części Europy. Współcześnie słowa te potwierdziły się po 2008 r. w Gruzji, po 2014 r. na Ukrainie, na Bliskim Wschodzie, w Arktyce, w Rosji wobec własnego społeczeństwa i bardzo wielu innych miejscach. Popieram raport Sandry Kalniete i bardzo dziękuję za współpracę.


  Hilde Vautmans, namens de ALDE-Fractie. – Voorzitter, commissaris, ik ben heel blij dat we hier vanavond kunnen spreken over de politieke relaties tussen Europa en Rusland. We moeten het niet onder stoelen of banken steken: de relatie tussen Europa en Rusland is niet goed, en dat is dan waarschijnlijk nog een understatement.

We hebben nu minder contacten met Rusland en we onderhandelen minder met Rusland dan in de tijden van de Koude Oorlog. Dat moet ons toch aan het denken zetten over hoe we verder met deze realiteit moeten omgaan, rekening houdend met het feit dat we al vijf jaar in een politieke impasse van sanctie en tegensanctie zitten. De dialoog is ver te zoeken.

Om uit die impasse te raken, kan ik u zeggen dat de ALDE-Fractie een hele mooie paper heeft opgesteld over een nieuwe Rusland-strategie. Een strategie waarbij wij de volledige EU-Rusland-relatie in een breder perspectief plaatsen. Een strategie die de deur openlaat voor dialoog, want Rusland is en blijft de grote buur van Europa. Een strategie gebaseerd op voorwaardelijk engagement, gebaseerd op het Helsinki-proces van de jaren 1970, via parallelle processen waarbij telkens wanneer er vooruitgang wordt geboekt in één domein, men een samenwerking in een ander domein opstart, waarbij men niet enkel kijkt naar de economische sancties in relatie tot de Minsk-akkoorden. Een strategie waarbij we onvoorwaardelijk de hand reiken – en dat vind ik zelf toch wel heel belangrijk – naar de Russische burgers en het maatschappelijk middenveld.

Weet u, collega's, op dit ogenblik groeit er een hele generatie Russen op met anti-Europese gevoelens. Dat baart mij zorgen, en daarom is het belangrijk dat wij hier in het Europees Parlement een signaal geven, dat we de dialoog moeten bekijken en dat we samenwerking moeten opzetten waar dat nodig is.


  Rebecca Harms, im Namen der Verts/ALE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Auch ich hätte lieber gute Beziehungen zu den Bürgern Russlands. Aber ich weiß auch, was dagegensteht: die Besetzung der Krim, der andauernde Krieg gegen die Ukraine mit inzwischen 13 000 Toten, ein abgeschossenes Passagierflugzeug, das Elend der Menschen im Donbass, die erneute Vertreibung der Krimtataren von der Krim, Schauprozesse in Russland, in denen zurzeit Marinesoldaten der Ukraine mit psychiatrischen Behandlungen bedroht werden. Die Aggression Putins richtet sich nicht alleine gegen die Ukraine, vielmehr waren unsere östlichen Partnerstaaten Moldau und Georgien schon vor dem Krieg gegen die Ukraine von dieser Aggression betroffen. Und wir haben inzwischen festgestellt, dass sich die Aggression auch gegen die Europäische Union richtet. Ich muss sagen, dass für mich die konventionelle und erst recht die atomare Aufrüstung, die Russland systematisch betreibt, diese Aggression gegen die Europäische Union noch unterstreicht.

Die Finanzierung antieuropäischer Parteien auf dem extrem rechten, aber auch auf dem linken Spektrum, Einmischungen in EU-Volksabstimmungen, Cyberattacken, Scharfmacherei in Mazedonien und jüngst auch auf französischen Straßen im Zusammenhang mit den Gelbwesten, Giftmordanschläge – das sind alles keine Einladungen, mit denen Russland dafür werben würde, dass wir zu besseren Beziehungen zurückkehren. Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Russland gegen Bürgerrechtler, oppositionelle Journalisten und Minderheiten sind alltäglich.

Der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, der Europarat und auch das Europäische Parlament haben Entscheidungen getroffen, Entschließungen verabschiedet, die bisher folgenlos geblieben sind. Wir wünschen uns in der Tat ein besseres Verhältnis zu russischen Bürgern. Wir wünschen uns, dass Russland im Europarat bleibt, aber die Bedingungen müssen stimmen.


  Helmut Scholz, im Namen der GUE/NGL-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident, Herr Kommissar!

Die bilateralen Beziehungen EU-Russland sind tatsächlich auf dem niedrigsten Stand seit 1990, und sie taumeln weiter dem Abgrund entgegen. Wir stehen vor einer prinzipiellen Entscheidung: Wie wollen wir Frieden und partnerschaftliche Beziehungen mit Russland im Interesse der Lösung gravierender Probleme auf unserem Kontinent in unmittelbarer Nachbarschaft, Kollegin Harms, der EU und Russland und auch unsere Verantwortung für Konflikte in anderen Regionen der Erde künftig gewährleisten?

Die Erfahrung des 20. Jahrhunderts, aber auch der letzten zwei Jahrzehnte lehren uns: Stabilität und Frieden, Lösungsansätze bei allen unterschiedlichen Interessenslagen beteiligter Akteure sind nicht gegen, sondern nur mit Russland umzusetzen.

Liebe KollegInnen, liebe Berichterstatterin, wir haben beim Bericht darüber diskutiert, ob die Beziehungen auf gegenseitiger Abschreckung basieren sollen. Ich bleibe dabei: Das ist falsch! Wir manövrieren uns immer tiefer in die Sprachlosigkeit und Sackgasse. Angesichts der Spannungen, Rüstungswettläufe und einer wachsenden politischen und militärischen Konfrontation muss zu Differenzen ein sachlicher, kritischer sowie ergebnisorientierter Dialogleitfaden ohne Vorbedingungen in Angriff genommen und entwickelt werden, und dazu gehört auch die Aufhebung der gegenseitigen Sanktionsregime, die es oft statt der parlamentarischen Zusammenarbeit gibt. Die EU sollte ihre durchaus berechtigte kritische Bewertung der Innen- und Außenpolitik Russlands durch eine selbstkritische Analyse ihrer eigenen Politik ergänzen. Und das erwarte ich ebenso von allen politischen Verantwortlichen in der Russischen Föderation.


  Jonathan Arnott, on behalf of the EFDD Group. – Mr President, I don’t support what Russia has done in the Crimea, or its recent actions in the Sea of Azov, and I don’t see why anyone who’s gay would want to live under a regime that oppresses gay people. I don’t want to see Oleg Sentsov still in jail as a political prisoner.

This year, Russia has entered the Open Doors World Watch List, a list of nations which do the most persecution of Christians on the planet, a fact that hasn’t made it into the report. I can’t believe for one second that Russian officers just happened to be visiting Salisbury Cathedral at the time of the Novichok attack, so don’t expect me to have anything positive to say about the Putin regime in Russia.

It seems to me that a large chunk of Russia’s foreign policy approach is the nation-state equivalent of trolling. They’re trying to provoke us into overreacting to the wrong things, they’re trying to wrong-foot us, and it seems to me that in this House some people are falling for it hook, line, and sinker.

And this notion that Russia was meddling in the British referendum campaign is nonsense. During the campaign, Facebook tells us that Russian operatives spent 97 cents – that’s US cents, about 80 euro cents – on political advertising, and even that was a mistake because it was material targeted at an American audience that missed. Putin wants to be the villain of the piece. It suits his strategy to do so. It suits the interests of this place to try to claim that there was something up with the British referendum because frankly you don’t like the result.

There were indeed some accidental rule breaches on both sides in the British referendum campaign. The pro-EU Lib Dems were fined, the pro-EU Open Britain were fined for rule breaches. Some other allegations were simply not followed up on.

Nothing, though, was material to the outcome as per the UK Court of Appeal ruling of 4 March. There is no evidence that gives rise to any soundly based grounds for believing the outcome of the referendum would have been different if those breaches had not occurred. The very fact that this constant assault on the referendum result and upon British democracy in general is being recycled time and time again, shows a pathological reluctance to accept the will of the British people.


  Jean-Luc Schaffhauser, au nom du groupe ENF. – Monsieur le Président, chers collègues. Madame Kalniete, vous avez été une enfant du goulag. Je comprends que vous agissiez contre ce système, car vous l’avez subi dans votre chair. J’ai moi-même combattu le système communiste, parce qu’il est essentiellement fondé sur le mensonge. Nous ne devons néanmoins pas confondre deux choses: d’une part un système et d’autre part un pays. Les Russes ont été les premiers à subir également les méfaits du stalinisme. Dans beaucoup d’institutions, le bolchevisme, nous n’en sommes nous-mêmes pas exempts. Par conséquent, lorsque nous adoptons une certaine stratégie vis-à-vis de la Russie, n’y voyez pas une mauvaise main. La France, l’Allemagne, la Tchéquie, la Hongrie, la Pologne, même, y voient quelquefois simplement leur intérêt, et cela va dans le sens de l’Europe. Il serait tout à fait faux, et ce sont des méthodes bolcheviques, que de considérer que les mouvements populistes sont une cinquième colonne... (le Président retire la parole à l’orateur).


  Tibor Navracsics, Member of the Commission, on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Mr President, I would like to thank the rapporteur and the honourable Members for their interventions. From this debate, I conclude that we all share a common interest in retaining a united and realistic approach towards Russia. We will continue to look at how best to use all the instruments available to us in strengthening our own resilience, supporting our partners, continuing political exchanges in selected issues and supporting Russian civil society, human rights and democracy, and people-to-people contacts.

May I close by signalling once again my appreciation of Parliament’s role in keeping this important issue on the agenda.


  Sandra Kalniete, referente. – Godātais sēdes vadītāj! Es vēlos pateikties visiem kolēģiem, kas šodien piedalījās rezolūcijas apspriešanā. Ir rezignēti jākonstatē, ka, salīdzinot ar līdzīga satura rezolūciju, ko Eiropas Parlaments pieņēma 2015. gadā, Eiropas Savienības un Krievijas attiecības nav uzlabojušās, bet gan pasliktinājušās, un es neredzu nekāda pamata cerībām, ka pārskatāmā nākotnē Kremlis varētu mainīt savu ideoloģiju un stratēģiju, kas vērsta uz Eiropas Savienības destabilizāciju un Krievijas pašizolāciju.

Šajā nedēļas nogalē Maskavā un Voroņežā bija plaši protesti pret Kremļa ieceri izolēt Krievijas internetu no pārējās pasaules. Tā ir kārtējā zīme, cik ļoti Putina režīms baidās no informācijas dažādības, jo apzinās, ka atvērtība ir drauds režīma pastāvēšanai. Ja PSRS sabrukums, runājot Putina vārdiem, bija 20. gadsimta lielākā ģeopolitiskā katastrofa, tad Kremļa izvēlētais kurss uz Krievijas valsts un tautas izolāciju var novest līdz lielākajai 21. gadsimta ģeopolitiskajai katastrofai.

Tāpēc mums Eiropā ir jāatmet ilūzijas, ka izdosies atgriezties tajā cerīgajā sadarbības stāvoklī, kas starp Eiropas Savienību un Krieviju veidojās pēc Dzelzs priekškara krišanas. Diemžēl tas nenotiks tik drīz, katrā ziņā ne Putina valdīšanas laikā. Šī īstenība mums ir jāpieņem un atbilstoši tai jāveido mūsu politika attiecībās ar Krieviju.


  President. – The debate is closed.

The vote will take place on Tuesday, 12 March 2019.

Written statements (Rule 162)


  Antanas Guoga (PPE), in writing. – Today it is a very symbolic day to have these debates in the plenary. Twenty-nine years ago, on 11th March, Lithuania regained its independence from the Soviet Union and started its freedom and democracy chapter. Therefore, I fully support my colleague Kalniete and her own—initiative report. It is crucial to talk loud about Russia’s military interventions into Ukraine’s – an independent country’s – territory. These cruel, anti—democratic actions are happening right across the European border. Therefore, the EU should express its full support for Ukraine. The EU cannot and should not return to ‘business as usual’ with Russia until that country fully implements the Minsk Agreement and restores the territorial integrity of Ukraine. This message should be sent to Putin loud and clear. Therefore, I call on the EU to strengthen sanctions for Russia, especially from the economic point of view. Russia’s aggression has to be stopped.


  Julia Pitera (PPE), na piśmie. – Po pierwsze, chciałabym podkreślić, że Rosja nie wykonała ponad tysiąca wyroków Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka. Świadczy to o tym, że Rosja nie wypełnia międzynarodowych zobowiązań wynikających ze swojego członkostwa w Radzie Europy. Pojawia się więc pytanie, czy Rosja chce jeszcze w ogóle być częścią cywilizowanego świata?

Po drugie, cieszę się, że Parlament Europejski jasno wzywa państwa członkowskie do zakończenia tzw. programów złotych wiz i paszportów dla najbogatszych, z których korzystają również rosyjscy oligarchowie. „Złote wizy” to programy ułatwień pobytowych dla inwestorów uprawniające obywatela państwa trzeciego do przebywania w danym kraju członkowskim, ale również do swobodnego podróżowania w strefie Schengen. Obecnie wydaje je 20 państw UE: Bułgaria, Chorwacja, Cypr, Czechy, Estonia, Francja, Grecja, Hiszpania, Holandia, Irlandia, Litwa, Luksemburg, Łotwa, Malta, Polska, Portugalia, Rumunia, Słowacja, Wielka Brytania i Włochy. Natomiast "złote paszporty" to programy przyznawania inwestorom obywatelstwa na mniej rygorystycznych warunkach niż zwykle, np. nie trzeba fizycznie przebywać na terenie danego kraju ani mieć z nim innych faktycznych powiązań. "Złote paszporty" są wydawane przez Bułgarię, Maltę i Cypr i kosztują od miliona do dwóch milionów euro. Złote wizy i paszporty stanowią zagrożenie dla UE, ponieważ stwarzają warunki sprzyjające praniu pieniędzy, korupcji i uchylaniu się od opodatkowania oraz mogą osłabić skuteczność sankcji międzynarodowych.

Poslední aktualizace: 10. září 2019Právní upozornění - Ochrana soukromí