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Posėdžio stenograma
Trečiadienis, 2019 m. balandžio 3 d. - Briuselis Atnaujinta informacija

17. ES ir Kinijos santykiai (diskusijos)
Kalbų vaizdo įrašas

  Przewodniczący. – Kolejnym punktem porządku dziennego są oświadczenia Rady i Komisji w sprawie stosunków UE–Chiny (2019/2677(RSP)).


  Melania Gabriela Ciot, President-in-Office of the Council. – Mr President, China is currently very high up on the European political agenda. This is reflected in the recent dynamics of high—level EU-China meetings. In March, the European Council discussed overall EU relations with China in the global context and gave guidance on the future strategic priorities for the EU.

The key task for relations with China is to have a coordinated European approach toward China as a strategic partner, but also as a competitor and a rival. The essence of the relationship should be reciprocity in all areas so as to underpin our common economic interests. The upcoming EU-China summit on 9 April will be a good opportunity for the EU to push for its core priorities, notably in terms of trade and investment, human rights, global challenges and foreign policy.

Indeed, EU—China trade relations, on which I will concentrate today, are part of a wider political and economic relationship with China, touching upon issues relating to competition, industrial policy and internal market rules. China’s model of state capitalism has led to a number of imbalances. These imbalances in the level playing field are not unique to EU—China relations, as observed in the current US—China standoff on trade. The situation will inevitably have an impact on the EU and we will need to remain vigilant.

Parliament, in its resolution of 12 September 2018 regarding EU—China relations already touched upon the various aspects of our trade and investment relationship. The European Council also discussed this issue at its meeting in March. Clearly, we cannot ignore that China is – and will remain – a very important strategic market for EU exports of both goods and services, as well as for EU investment. China is the EU’s second biggest trading partner after the US, and the EU is China’s biggest trading partner. Generally, both economies are closely interlinked, including a fast evolving presence of Chinese companies in Europe. It is therefore important for us to reflect on how the EU can seize the opportunities that China provides, while at the same time addressing the numerous challenges in the relationship.

We also need to remember that China is indispensable as a partner if we are to deal with global challenges, which can only be addressed together. Climate change is an obvious example. We need close trade and investment links for our own economic growth and prosperity. At the same time, our economic relationship needs to be more balanced. Here we come to the heart of the matter.

A decade ago, our main focus was on how to improve access to the Chinese market and deal with the different barriers that exist. Today, the challenge of China’s state capitalist economic model is far greater as it creates systemic competition with liberal market economies. This had led to a lack of reciprocity and the absence of a level playing field in our economic relationship with China, which is pursuing its ambition to become the world leader in a number of key sectors, including key technologies. It has achieved this through massive market distorting subsidies, resulting in a dominant position of state-owned firms through forced technology transfer, industrial policies and non-tariff measures that discriminate against foreign companies, through poor protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, and through strategic investment in key sectors in the EU or other third countries.

In addition, the EU is being kept out of the Chinese market in sectors where the Union is strong, while China has wide-ranging access to the EU market, such as in the area of foreign direct investment or public procurement. Unfortunately, in aiming at realising its global ambition, China has no intention or constraints to play by the same rules as other players. We therefore urgently need to look at the EU toolbox to address Chinese behaviour in the area of trade and investment. Trade defence instruments or the new regulation on foreign direct investment screening are important here, but we also need to look at competition rules, state aid control, industrial policy and internal market rules more widely, while keeping the interests of consumers in mind. We also need to see how best to navigate between US—China rivalries and steer the dynamics of the triangular EU—US—China relationship. The US has been clear in its view that China has benefited massively from its WTO accession and thus it now needs to meet its commitments.

The upcoming EU—China summit on 9 April will be a good opportunity to urge China to address existing asymmetries and the lack of reciprocity, as well as to encourage China to live up to its responsibility to pursue policies that support an open, balanced and inclusive global economy which is beneficial to all. This includes assuming its responsibility in the WTO to contribute to a comprehensive collective effort to WTO reform, in line with its economic weight. China’s engagement to reform the WTO in certain key areas is therefore to be welcomed.

For the EU, market distorting industrial subsidies should be dealt with as a priority. Such subsidies are often channelled through state-owned enterprises and are currently not adequately captured under international trade rules. Forced technology transfer policies are another aspect that we would like to see effectively eradicated. We should continue with our efforts to convince China to address these irritants. In this regard, I hope that the EU—China Working Group devoted to WTO reform will start delivering quickly.

Bilaterally, the EU is currently negotiating a comprehensive investment agreement with China. This agreement is meant to be ambitious and comprehensive. It will be a crucial tool to level the playing field, rebalance our investment relations and secure equal treatment for EU companies operating in China. Provided the substance is there, we would like to see the negotiations on this agreement concluded next year. The negotiations also come at a crucial moment when China is revising its domestic laws on foreign investment. These negotiations have therefore become an important tool to help push regulatory changes in China.

The negotiations on a bilateral geographical indication agreement with China are now in their final stages. The conclusion of these negotiations will help ensure mutual recognition of geographical indications in each other’s markets. It is disappointing that progress has stalled, despite the commitments made by China at the last EU—China summit to conclude the negotiations by the end of October 2018. China has raised new issues and has backtracked on others. We therefore expect the upcoming summit to provide additional momentum with respect to both the comprehensive agreement on investment and the geographical indication agreement. This will be important if we want to maintain the credibility and ambition of these negotiations.


  Jyrki Katainen, Vice-President of the Commission. – Mr President, our relationship with China currently combines positive engagement with actions to contain the distorted effects of China’s state capitalist economy. Lately, there’s been increasing awareness in the EU that China is unlikely to change its economic model where the state and party have a strong influence in the economy. If China doesn’t change, then the question arises as to what we in the EU can do to change our approach towards China.

To answer this question, in a recent joint communication the Commission and the High Representative have therefore reviewed the EU’s relations with China in five broad areas and proposed 10 concrete actions to better respond to the opportunities and challenges we have with this partner. Firstly, we should engage more strongly with China to promote an effective rules-based multilateral order to fight climate change and to improve the governance of the oceans. The EU and China can be effective partners in doing so. We both realise the importance of upholding multilateralism as the best way of finding solutions to global problems.

We also both agree on the negative impact that emissions, pollution and unsustainable use of resources has on our planet, both on land and in the oceans. We have therefore decided to act resolutely on these fronts, but can and should, do more.

Secondly, we want to deepen our action in support of international peace, security and sustainable development. Building on the positive cooperation with China on the Iran nuclear agreement, we want to work with it, for instance, on the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, the peace process in Afghanistan, or in addressing the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar. China should, however, accept binding arbitration rulings issued under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea relating to its maritime claims in the South China Sea.

We also want to cooperate with China and promote high governance standards, sustainability and a level playing field in respect to investment and economic cooperation with third countries in Asia, the Western Balkans or Africa, in particular in the fields of infrastructure.

Thirdly, we need to achieve a more balanced and reciprocal trade and investment relationship with China. With more than one billion euro of trade in goods every day, the EU and China are strategic markets for one another. However, distortions in the Chinese economy, where the state retains a strong influence, have negative spillover effects in the EU, notably when overcapacity leads to dumping. China’s state-driven industrial policy and ambition to develop domestic champions is also problematic when it leads to non-reciprocal market openness and an uneven playing field for EU companies.

We therefore want China to deliver on its commitment to reform WTO rules and accept stronger discipline on industrial subsidies and forced technology transfer. We also have a shared interest to conclude our bilateral agreement with China on investment by 2020, and aviation safety or geographical indications in the near future. Finally, we call on the Council and the European Parliament to adopt as quickly as possible the international procurement instrument, which will help to ensure more reciprocity with their countries in the field of access to the public procurement market.

Fourthly, the EU must strengthen its competitiveness and ensure a level playing field in Europe. Let me be clear that this is homework the EU needs to do regardless of China and is not directed against China. What we want to avoid is having global competition on state subsidies. In order to ensure fair competition, EU state-aid rules limit strictly subsidies that Member States can grant to private companies. However, they do not apply to foreign subsidies and WTO rules on subsidies are less stringent than EU state-aid rules. This is why we want to reform and strengthen WTO rules on subsidies. But we also need to be able to act on our domestic market. The Commission will therefore identify before the end of 2019 how to address more effectively the distortive effects of foreign state ownership and state financing in Europe and fill the gap in EU law.

In order to promote high standards of quality, security, sustainability and social responsibility, the Commission will also publish guidance on the participation of foreign bidders in the EU’s procurement market and conduct an overview of the EU’s procurement framework. Based on renewed EU industrial policy strategy, the EU will encourage the development of strategic value chains and key technologies in Europe, such as we do with the Action Plan on Artificial Intelligence. Finally, we encourage co-legislators swiftly to agree on the Horizon Europe programme which will support innovation in Europe, while also including clear rules on exploitation of results and reciprocal access to research and development funding when we cooperate with third countries.

Fifthly, we must strengthen the security of the EU’s critical infrastructure and technology. 5G networks will provide the future backbone of our societies and economies, connecting billions of objects and systems, including sensitive information. The Commission therefore adopted on 26 March a recommendation for a common EU approach to 5G security networks.

We have called on Member States to start preparing for the implementation of the new EU foreign investment screening system that will enter into force in April 2019 – this year – and will allow detecting and addressing this year the security that may be posed by foreign takeovers of critical assets, technologies and infrastructures.

Finally, we called on the Council to adopt swiftly the EU modernised rules on export control of dual-use goods. All these steps will reinforce EU resilience and security regarding potential risk in critical sectors.

Let me conclude by saying that the upcoming EU-China Summit on 9 April provides a good opportunity to take stock of the progress achieved since the summit of last July and to insist on China’s more substantive engagement on all issues of EU interest. Until now, China has continued to downplay concerns raised by the EU and sought to keep the focus on areas of common ground. Its interest is in a feel-good summit with the EU to display EU-China cooperation to the world. However, a feel-good summit is only possible if China is able to deliver concrete results. We are doing our utmost to prepare well for this event.


  Godelieve Quisthoudt-Rowohl, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Auch wenn ein nicht enden wollender Brexit-Prozess die Aufmerksamkeit der Öffentlichkeit auf sich zieht, dreht sich die Welt natürlich weiter. Dies kann man auch ganz besonders gut an den Veränderungen Chinas in den letzten zehn Jahren erkennen.

Deshalb begrüße ich es, dass die Europäische Union darauf besonnen und klug reagiert und nun einen vorsichtigen, aber richtigen Wandel in ihrer Außenpolitik mit der Volksrepublik China vollzieht. Nicht zuletzt das Projekt der Neuen Seidenstraße zeigt, dass Chinas autoritäre Regierung zunehmend über ihre wirtschaftliche Expansion auch global geopolitischen Einfluss gewinnen möchte. Diese Erkenntnis sollte keinen überraschen, denn Staaten verfolgen seit Menschengedenken ihre Interessen. Die entscheidende Frage ist daher lediglich, wie wir mit einer solchen Expansion umgehen. China ist und bleibt eine unermesslich große Chance für die europäische Wirtschaft.

Demnach sollte es selbstverständlich sein, dass wir in unsere Beziehungen auch entsprechend viel Zeit und Kraft investieren. Dabei sollten wir aber nicht nur den kurzfristigen Gewinn im Kopf haben, sondern vor allem auf die langfristigen Auswirkungen unseres heutigen Handels achten. Chinas Unternehmen haben mehr oder weniger einen freien Zugang zur EU, und deswegen sollten wir ebenso freien Zugang zum Markt in China haben. Es geht im Endeffekt ganz einfach darum, zwischen der EU und China möglichst gleiche Wettbewerbsbedingungen herzustellen – zum Vorteil beider Seiten.


  Alessia Maria Mosca, a nome del gruppo S&D. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, la chiave strategica per relazionarci con il colosso cinese è il mantenimento della nostra unità. Il dialogo con Pechino è imprescindibile, ma affinché esso sia efficace dobbiamo parlare con una voce sola.

Il mercato europeo è la principale piazza commerciale a livello globale, la capacità negoziale che ne discende è formidabile. Gli Stati membri non devono cadere in tentazione e cedere alle lusinghe cinesi in cambio di qualche investimento poco trasparente. Come possiamo pensare di fronteggiare la crescente aggressività economica cinese da soli? Il presidente Xi ha capito, prima di noi, che uniti siamo più forti. Dobbiamo far fronte comune per garantire maggiore giustizia sociale e ambientale contro ogni forma di competizione sleale.

In gioco non ci sono solo milioni di posti di lavoro, la nostra rilevanza sullo scacchiere globale e la salvaguardia dell'ambiente. Stiamo parlando della sopravvivenza del nostro modello sociale, del nostro welfare e del nostro sistema liberaldemocratico fondato su democrazia, mercato e rispetto dei diritti umani. Accogliamo quindi con favore la presentazione della nuova strategia europea, una buona sintesi fra le grandi opportunità e le altrettante distorsioni create da un'economia statalista.

La Cina ha beneficiato ampiamente dell'apertura dei mercati e di un commercio libero. La partecipazione agli scambi globali ha permesso a circa un milione di cinesi di uscire dalla soglia di povertà. Questo dato è straordinario e ci dimostra quanto il commercio possa sostenere crescita e occupazione. Ma il passaggio da economia in via di sviluppo ad attore preminente del commercio globale comporta l'assunzione di responsabilità: non si gode dei privilegi dell'appartenenza a una comunità senza rispettarne le regole.

È chiaro che in questo clima di apertura indiscriminata la Cina non abbia interesse a cambiare lo status quo, ma la situazione non è sostenibile per le nostre aziende e soprattutto per i nostri lavoratori, costretti a una competizione basata su un dumping sociale e ambientale. Il nostro obiettivo deve essere uno: maggiore reciprocità. È quindi necessario un cambio di paradigma. Per ottenerlo dovremo parlare con una voce sola, quella europea.


  Bas Belder, namens de ECR-Fractie. – Voorzitter, de tijd dringt dat de Europese Unie en haar lidstaten afscheid nemen van naïviteit tegenover strategische partner China, [...] die in werkelijkheid al vele jaren een problematische partner blijkt te zijn.

Hoe problematisch bleek begin deze week weer eens. Toen publiceerde de Frankfurter Allgemeine am Sonntag een bijdrage onder de veelzeggende titel "Tatort China". Duitse managers slaan alarm over de toename van steeds driestere bedrijfsspionage. Berlijn schat de schade op 100 miljard euro per jaar. En dan hebben we het alleen over Duitsland.

Voor betere belangenbehartiging in de handelsrelaties met China dienen de EU en de lidstaten het externe beleid van Peking van binnenuit nauwlettend en diepgaand te volgen. En dan komt een kwetsbaar [...] naar voren, waar experts zelfs lange crisisjaren voorzien. Dan klinkt ook een discussie over de toekomst van de private sector in China. En daar moeten we voor opletten en bij dit binnenlandse discours aansluiten. Alleen op basis van solide kennis van de drijfveren van China valt een passend solide Europees antwoord op Pekings staatsverminking van [...] te formuleren.


  Elsi Katainen, ALDE-ryhmän puolesta. – Arvoisa puhemies, Kiinan vaikutusvalta ja taloudellinen voima ovat todellakin kasvaneet laaja-alaisesti, ja komissio on oikeassa siinä, että Kiinaa ei voi pitää enää alikehittyneenä maana ja siihen pitääkin suhtautua tasavertaisena toimijana.

Joka tapauksessa Kiinalta on vaadittava sopeutumista sääntöihin, joiden kulmakiviä ovat YK ja WTO. EU:n on myös edellytettävä Kiinalta vastavuoroisuutta. Eurooppalaisten yritysten toimintaedellytykset Kiinassa eivät ole samat kuin heidän yrityksillään EU:ssa. Meidän on pidettävä huoli nykyistä paremmin siitä, että esimerkiksi lelujen ja tekniikan tuonnissa noudatetaan EU:n turvallisuusstandardeja.

Teollisuuden kilpailukyvyn suhteen EU:n ei pidä käyttää samoja keinoja kuin Kiina tekee. Esimerkiksi kilpailu- ja valtiontukisääntöjä kiertämällä emme voittaisi mitään. Yritysten kasvattamiseen on todellakin löydettävä ihan muut keinot. Sen sijaan meidän täytyy tehdä Euroopasta mahdollisimman houkutteleva ja kilpailukykyinen, niin että huippuyritykset tänne sitten sijoittavat ja myöskin jäävät.

Tarvitsemme sisämarkkinan, jossa kaikilla on samat säännöt, on investoitava tutkimukseen ja innovaatioihin, on vahvaa kauppapolitiikkaa ja EU:n yhtenäisyyttä. Näillä pärjäämme kyllä myös Kiinan kanssa.

Selvää on, että EU ja Kiina ovat kilpailijoita ja kilpailua on yhä enemmän myös kolmansissa maissa. Meidän on tehtävä nykyistä enemmän yhteistyötä myöskin Afrikan kanssa, missä Kiina jo vahvasti on läsnä. Samalla on pyrittävä yhteistyöhön, jossa on valtavasti mahdollisuuksia muun muassa ilmastonmuutoksen vastaisessa taistelussa, jossa sekä Kiina että EU ovat globaaleja johtajia, kun Pariisin sopimusta toimeenpannaan. EU:n ja Kiinan on harkittava yhteistyötä myös päästökaupassa, jossa molemmat maat ovat todellakin edelläkävijöitä.


  Helmut Scholz, im Namen der GUE/NGL-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Ich erkenne an, dass die Kommission mit der Neuorientierung strategische Partnerschaft, Wettbewerber und strategische Rivalität das eigentliche Problem endlich mal auf den Tisch gelegt hat. Dass China eine Marktwirtschaft chinesischer Prägung ist, ist nun wirklich kein Novum. Seit 40 Jahren geht dieser Weg voran. Und deshalb möchte ich klar feststellen: China ist keine Gefahr und auch nicht unser Gegner. Kolonialismus und Imperialismus wurden nicht von China in die Welt getragen. Ich meine, wir müssen alle gemeinsam lernen, in dieser veränderten globalen Situation miteinander auszukommen. Das schließt Konkurrenz und Wettbewerb nicht aus. Die Regeln dafür müssen wir aber gemeinsam festlegen. Die Zeit der Diktate von einer Seite ist vorbei.

China stellte in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten sein Wirtschaftssystem komplett um. Dabei sind die Menschen nicht in Massen verhungert, sondern 600 Millionen Menschen müssen nicht mehr in Armut leben. Das Rezept heißt inklusives Wachstum. Die Marktöffnung musste dafür wohldosiert erfolgen. Haben wir bessere Rezepte anzubieten für die Transition von 1,3 Milliarden Menschen?

Der bevorstehende Gipfel ist durchaus eine Chance, uns gemeinsam mit China zu verständigen, wie wir uns auf den Weg machen, um die Weltwirtschaft zu stärken, neue Strukturen, Standards und einen regelbasierten multilateralen Handel zu entwickeln, den Klimawandel zu verhindern, die Technologiesprünge und ihre Folgen zu bewältigen und die Nachhaltigkeitsziele der Vereinten Nationen zu erreichen. Dafür bleiben uns nur noch elf Jahre. Und mit unseren Konzepten von Partizipation, Menschenrechten und Mut zur Vielfalt haben wir in eine Kooperation mit China die Basis des hohen kreativen Potenzials einzubringen.


  Reinhard Bütikofer, im Namen der Verts/ALE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Ein neuer Wind beginnt zu wehen in den EU-China-Beziehungen. Über die letzten 40 Jahre ist der Ostwind immer massiver geworden und über die letzten sieben Jahre immer unangenehmer. Es ist ein Wind des radikalisierenden Autoritarismus, des Staatskapitalismus und des nationalen Hegemoniestrebens. Neu ist die Entschlossenheit, jetzt den Westwind zu verstärken, und das wird ein Wind des Realismus und des europäischen Selbstbewusstseins. Dabei will ich klar sagen: Basis ist nach wie vor unsere Kooperationsbereitschaft, aber es muss eine Kooperation sein mit klaren Kanten. Und dabei wollen wir, dass China eine Ein-Europa-Politik verfolgt, und wir werden das auch durchsetzen.

Es ist richtig, dass das Verhältnis auf den Begriff der systemischen Rivalität gebracht worden ist. Dazu gehört, dass wir Dinge klar benennen, etwa wenn in Xinjiang der schlimmste Polizeistaat geschaffen wird, den es auf der Welt gibt, etwa wenn China Versprechungen macht beim letzten EU-China-Gipfel, die es dann nicht einhält, oder wenn China Multilateralismus sagt, aber nur eine Politik im Auge hat, die dem eigenen Nutzen dient.

Wir müssen auch entsprechend handeln. Und deswegen bin ich klar dagegen, dass wir zulassen, dass hier ein Wohlfühlgipfel inszeniert wird. Es muss ein Gipfel werden, wie es Kommission und Rat gesagt haben: mit klaren Ergebnissen.


  Tiziana Beghin, a nome del gruppo EFDD. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, è naturale che si debba parlare alla Cina con un'unica voce nel prossimo summit, ma è altrettanto naturale che quella voce non possa essere solo quella dell'ipocrisia.

Molti governi europei, la Commissione, i popolari e i socialisti hanno tutti pesantemente criticato il governo italiano per aver firmato un memorandum con la Cina. Io non ho niente contro il diritto di critica, peccato però che, come spesso accade in Europa, si guardi la pagliuzza negli occhi del vicino senza guardare la trave nei propri. Non è solo il governo italiano ad aver firmato questa intesa. Ben altri quattordici paesi europei – da ultimo il Lussemburgo di Juncker – lo hanno fatto.

E anche quelli che non hanno firmato alcun accordo non possono certo far finta di nulla. La Germania, per esempio, ospita un colossale terminal ferroviario per le merci cinesi, dove ogni settimana arrivano da Pechino 30 treni. Il Belgio ha venduto alla Cina il terminal per il gas naturale nel suo porto di Zeebrugge, la Spagna la gestione dei container nei porti di Bilbao e Valencia, per non parlare della Grecia dove è arrivato un miliardo di euro di investimenti cinesi per il Pireo, dell'Ungheria dove ne sono arrivati 200 milioni per una ferrovia, o Croazia, Portogallo e molti altri.

Germania e Francia esportano in Cina rispettivamente 9 e 2 volte più di quanto non facciamo noi italiani, ma ovviamente, colleghi, il problema è l'intesa firmata dal mio governo. Per anni avete raccontato che i populisti destabilizzavano gli equilibri internazionali, che erano pericolosi per la pace e la democrazia. Peccato però che oggi quelli che voi chiamate populisti firmano intese per la cooperazione, gli investimenti e la cultura, intese che incitano la Cina a rispettare le regole europee, mentre il Presidente Juncker continua a definirla un competitor e un rivale sistemico, come se non fosse già un dato di fatto che la Cina è uno dei principali partner commerciali di tutti i nostri paesi.

Nessun problema, possiamo continuare a diffondere falsità, seminare odio, oppure possiamo continuare a lavorare per un mondo più unito, giusto e coeso come noi stiamo facendo.


  France Jamet, au nom du groupe ENF. – Monsieur le Président, «puisque ces mystères nous dépassent, feignons d’en être les organisateurs», disait le poète. Nous nous retrouvons aujourd’hui à débattre de la Chine, qui nous pose un véritable problème, effectivement, car elle refuse un certain ordre géopolitique dont l’Union européenne et les États-Unis ont longtemps tenu tous les leviers – et cet ordre prend fin sous nos yeux.

Les pays d’Europe doivent dialoguer avec la Chine, qui est l’un des multiples partenaires du monde de demain, un monde multipolaire. Et je ne vois pas pourquoi l’Union voudrait empêcher certains pays de défendre leurs intérêts dans le cadre d’une coopération approfondie. Mon pays, la France, a toujours eu des relations équilibrées avec la Chine. Il en est ainsi depuis que le général de Gaulle a été le premier à reconnaître la Chine populaire.

On n’ignore pas 1,4 milliard de personnes. Si concurrence déloyale il y a, le protectionnisme et le localisme sont les seules réponses appropriées. Nier cela, c’est basculer dans une logique pernicieuse de choc des civilisations et à ce jeu-là, personne ne sortira gagnant.


  Cristian Dan Preda (PPE). – Monsieur le Président, tout d’abord, je suis content de voir que la thématique de ce débat a été élargie, comme je l’avais demandé en début de séance. Il aurait été absurde de discuter seulement de commerce.

Je veux saluer et soutenir l’importance de cette nouvelle stratégie adoptée par l’Union européenne concernant nos relations avec la Chine. Tout d’abord parce qu’on a rompu avec la langue de bois et qu’on dit clairement, qu’on admet que la Chine est en concurrence avec nous, non seulement sur les questions commerciales, mais également pour la promotion d’un modèle de gouvernance à l’opposé de nos valeurs.

En effet, alors que l’Union européenne fait de la défense des droits de l’homme, Madame, des libertés, Madame, et de l’état de droit, Madame, l’un des piliers de sa diplomatie, la Chine promeut l’autoritarisme, Madame, et la loi du plus fort, Madame, c’est ce qui vous plaît, Madame? Mais allez en Chine, alors, Madame! Si vous n’aimez plus la liberté, emmenez votre amie italienne et allez bénéficier de la magnifique atmosphère de la Chine populaire, Madame!

Les droits de l’homme doivent être au centre de notre stratégie. Il ne faut pas craindre de porter atteinte à nos intérêts commerciaux tout simplement parce que chaque fois que nous parlons des valeurs démocratiques, Xi Jinping est mal à l’aise. Notre objectif, ce n’est pas le bien-être de Xi Jinping, c’est le droit des individus et ce sont les intérêts commerciaux de l’Europe tout entière, et non pas ceux des nations individuelles. Ce n’est pas le gouvernement de Salvini qui va sauver nos relations et qui va améliorer le sort des citoyens européens. Travaillons ensemble et ne pensons plus selon cette logique autarcique qui est en fait une vraie preuve de malhonnêteté, une trahison de l’Europe.


  Bernd Lange (S&D). – Herr Präsident, Frau Ministerin, Herr Kommissar! Ja, wir haben unterschiedliche Auffassungen mit China. Wir haben Investitionsbegrenzungen von europäischen Unternehmen in China. Ja, wir haben den Diebstahl von geistigem Eigentum in China. Wir haben keinen Zugang zu öffentlicher Beschaffung in China. Wir haben eine Ungleichbehandlung von privaten Unternehmen zu staatlichen Unternehmen. Und wir haben auch keine Respektierung der ILO-Kernarbeitsnormen, und die Stärkung der Arbeitnehmerrechte – das ist übrigens heute noch gar nicht gesagt worden –, ist für mich sehr wichtig. Das ist der Fakt, und das sollten wir auch klar so benennen.

Aber wir müssen auch sehen, dass China natürlich einen Wandel durchgemacht hat: Millionen von Menschen sind aus der Armut herausgekommen, China ist Mitglied des Pariser Klimaschutzabkommens, und der CO2-Abdruck in China pro Kopf ist noch etwa ein Zehntel des Abdrucks hier bei uns. Also insofern gibt es eine gemeinsame Verantwortung.

Und wir müssen überlegen, wie wir strategisch vorgehen. Und da ist natürlich die Priorität die WTO, dass wir alle in einem Zelt halten und gemeinsam die WTO reformieren und versuchen, genau diese Punkte, bei denen wir mit China über Kreuz liegen, über die WTO auch zu lösen – also neue Regeln im WTO-Bereich über geistiges Eigentum, über Staatsunternehmen und so weiter.

Und zum Zweiten, bilateral: Ja, wir müssen mehr Energie reinbringen, um das Investitionsabkommen durchzubringen und auch das Abkommen über die geografischen Herkunftsbezeichnungen.

Und ein Drittes müssen wir machen: Wir können nicht nur defensiv sein und sagen: „die bösen Chinesen“, sondern wir müssen auch mehr proaktiv sein, unsere eigene Industriepolitik nach vorne bringen – Reinhard Bütikofer und ich haben lange dafür gekämpft – oder auch das Wettbewerbsrecht überprüfen, damit wir industriell wieder nach vorne kommen.

Also insofern heißt das für den Gipfel: Klarheit, ja, aber auch Kooperation statt Konfrontation und nicht im Fahrwasser von anderen weltweit uns bewegen.


  Emmanuel Maurel (GUE/NGL). – Monsieur le Président, oui, la Chine mène une politique offensive en matière commerciale, en matière diplomatique, et même en matière militaire. Et oui, l’Union européenne a trop longtemps été naïve à l’égard de la Chine, et je vois dans ce document une sorte de réveil tardif. Je le salue, mais c’est un réveil qui est à la fois incomplet et parfois un peu hypocrite.

Incomplet, parce que ce document ne parle pas de la contrefaçon: ce sont près de 250 milliards de dollars de perdus pour des pays comme l’Allemagne, l’Italie ou encore la France. Incomplet sur le développement durable: on ne peut pas se contenter de vaines admonestations face à un pays qui est l’un des plus gros pollueurs de la planète. Hypocrite, enfin, parce qu’il faut poser clairement la question de la réciprocité commerciale et dire clairement que l’Europe ne peut pas se laisser faire.

Les marchés publics européens sont grands ouverts; les marchés chinois ne le sont pas. Les entreprises chinoises réalisent des investissements stratégiques en Europe dans des secteurs aussi divers que l’aéroportuaire, les nouvelles technologies, et même le secteur des canalisations – comme en France, aujourd’hui, avec Saint-Gobain. Par contre, les entreprises européennes ne peuvent pas le faire. Il ne faut pas être hypocrite. Il faut imposer la réciprocité, ou alors il faut tout simplement nous protéger, protéger nos territoires et protéger nos salariés et nos entreprises.


  William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFDD). – Mr President, let’s start with the context. In 2017 China’s exports of goods to the EU were EUR 375 billion. This gigantic figure is roughly equivalent to the entire economy of Nigeria. And now some more key facts. China is not in the EU’s single market. There is no Customs Union between China and the EU. There is no regulatory convergence beyond those goods that China actually sells in the EU. There is no free movement of people between China and the EU. China does not have a trade agreement with the EU. Nevertheless, China has access to the EU’s single market. Indeed, access enough to sell these goods in this massive volume. How come? Perhaps this is permitted because the EU has a trade surplus with China? Far from it. The EU’s trade deficit with China in 2017, including services, was EUR 160 billion. This deficit was roughly equivalent to the entire economy of Romania, if you would pay attention.

So there you have it. China has full access to the EU’s single market. By comparison, the EU demands of the UK, for example, payments of GBP 39 billion that the UK does not even owe, the supremacy of the European Court of Justice, which should really be called the European Court of injustice and, worse still, the effective regulatory annexation of the province of Northern Ireland. Well may the representative of the Commission snigger away. And this is in return for access. It is as if the EU was asking of China the same regulatory annexation of the province of Sinkiang.

From this debate, it seems that the EU would like good trade relations with China. A great idea, but one question: does the EU want, let alone seek, the same good trade relations with the UK? It certainly does not seem that way.


  Mario Borghezio (ENF). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, la trasformazione strutturale dell'economia avviata negli ultimi anni, ma anche le pressioni da parte di paesi terzi e dell'Europa per una maggiore reciprocità negli scambi commerciali, mettono indubbiamente la leadership cinese di fronte alla necessità di trovare un nuovo equilibrio fra competitività e liberalizzazione.

Consideriamo la cautela con la quale il governo cinese ha stilato il suo rapporto annuale. Questa ha risentito indubbiamente della disputa in corso con gli Stati Uniti per la guerra commerciale e delle pressioni esercitate sull'economia cinese, che indubbiamente hanno avuto effetti molto pesanti, soprattutto sul sistema delle piccole e medie imprese cinesi, a seguito della politica sui dazi dell'amministrazione Trump.

Ora, tutto questo però non ci deve far perdere di vista un'esigenza fondamentale. Nel mio paese, l'Italia, tutte le settimane arriva dalla Cina, nei pressi di Milano, a Rho, un treno che arriva pieno di merci e riparte vuoto. Voi volete un'Europa che si faccia ancora danneggiare dalla concorrenza cinese o volete un'Europa competitiva, come sostenete? E per competere bisogna collaborare, bisogna lavorare, certo con la prudenza indicata da Salvini, che dice che non vogliamo diventare noi, Italia, una colonia della Cina, e vogliamo tutelare il nostro paese dai rischi nei settori più delicati e difendere quindi gli interessi nazionali.


  Iuliu Winkler (PPE). – Mr President, it was high time that the EU narrative in relation to China changed. This converges to the EPP Group’s position, which I have recently expressed in the Committee on International Trade (INTA). Our calls to see concrete changes on the ground will intensify and I am glad to observe that the Commission also addresses much attention to trade—related aspects in this recently retitled communication. A robust trade policy is key to the future relationship with China.

The three main priorities of the EPP Group are already very well—known, but let me just reiterate them. We want improved conditions for European companies to better market access, we want concrete action to level the playing field on the Chinese market, especially concerning state-owned enterprises, and we highlight the importance of reciprocity in our trade and investment relations.

Concerning the upcoming EU—China summit, we urge the Commission to maintain its assertive position. Indeed, also at last year’s summit the joint declaration included some clear promises which have yet to be met by our Chinese partners. So, our message to them is very clear: the time to act is now. China needs to start delivering on the promises it has made numerous times, especially on advancing the investment treaty negotiations while addressing the issues related to state—subsidised industries and technology transfers. We want to see a concrete change on the ground to benefit European businesses, European investors and all the citizens of the European Union.


  Nicola Danti (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, la Cina è sicuramente un partner strategico ma anche un grande competitor, ma troppo spesso non giochiamo ad armi pari. Il prossimo vertice Unione europea-Cina rappresenta una buona occasione per far fronte comune e dimostrare di avere una strategia che tuteli il tessuto produttivo europeo e miri a più reciprocità nell'accesso ai rispettivi mercati. Negli ultimi anni l'Unione europea si è dotata di meccanismi di difesa più efficaci, dall'antidumping allo screening sugli investimenti esteri, che aiutano le aziende europee ad operare in condizioni più eque.

Ma questo non basta. Questo è uno dei casi in cui è necessaria più Europa. Non possiamo tollerare che alcuni paesi europei siano conniventi con gli interessi cinesi non effettuando controlli doganali adeguati alle frontiere, spianando la strada all'ingresso di prodotti non sicuri nel nostro mercato. Né possiamo limitarci a concludere accordi nazionali, come ha fatto recentemente l'Italia, con un accordo che mette il cappio al collo al sistema manifatturiero italiano, o lasciare che l'interlocutore di Pechino sia il direttorio franco-tedesco.

(L'oratore accetta di rispondere a una domanda "cartellino blu" (articolo 162, paragrafo 8, del regolamento))


  Tiziana Beghin (EFDD), domanda "cartellino blu". – Onorevole Danti, lei parla di approccio europeo. Le consiglio di dirlo al Lussemburgo del Presidente Juncker, che ci ha criticato duramente per aver siglato un memorandum, fatto salvo fare la stessa cosa esattamente il giorno successivo. E le direi di dirlo anche al Presidente Macron, che nasconde dietro al suo finto europeismo, in realtà, interessi nazionali, visto che negli stessi giorni in cui criticava l'Italia strappava trenta miliardi di affari con la Cina. Lo dica alla Cancelliera Merkel, che si reca in Germania più di tutti i leader europei, ma soprattutto lo dica al suo partito, visto che Gentiloni nel 2017 dichiarava a Pechino che l'Italia doveva essere leader nella Via della Seta.


  Nicola Danti (S&D), risposta a una domanda "cartellino blu". – Grazie, onorevole Beghin. Io non so davvero come ringraziarla per questa domanda perché, vede, non ha ascoltato il mio intervento. Ho detto che ci vuole più Europa e non va bene nemmeno il direttorio franco-tedesco, ma quello che voi avete fatto, svendendo i porti italiani, svendendo la manifattura italiana e lasciando che chi tirerà il cappio al collo a questa saranno i cinesi, decideranno loro quando tirare il cappio al collo alla manifattura italiana. Voi avete aperto i nostri porti, noi abbiamo lavorato per avere una sorveglianza dei mercati più forte, per avere dogane più forti. Dov'è l'onorevole Beghin che faceva la battaglia contro la Cina dai nostri banchi? Vi siete venduti alla Cina, onorevole Beghin.


  Michał Marusik (ENF). – Panie Przewodniczący! Jeszcze kilka pokoleń wstecz wszystkie najbogatsze i najpotężniejsze państwa świata znajdowały się tutaj w Europie, bo kierowały się elementarnym rozsądkiem gospodarczym. Bardzo chętnie przyjmowały produkty z rejonów, gdzie produkcja i surowce były tanie. Europa była potężna i bogata.

Teraz Europa zdaje się chronić przed napływem taniej produkcji i wręcz popiera zwiększanie kosztów produkcji u nas. Wobec czego Unia Europejska jest tym kawałkiem świata, który rozwija się najwolniej, a Chiny należą do tych części świata, które rozwijają się najszybciej. I co ciekawe, Chińczykom wcale Europa do niczego potrzebna nie jest. Oni sobie bez nas poradzą. Naszym problemem w relacjach gospodarczych z Chinami nie jest zachowanie Chin tylko zachowanie Unii Europejskiej, która swoimi rozporządzeniami paraliżuje gospodarkę i zwiększa koszty produkcji w Europie. I to jest największe nieszczęście.


  Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D). – Señor presidente, señor vicepresidente, valoro positivamente la Comunicación de la Comisión sobre las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y China. No así las descafeinadas conclusiones del Consejo. Porque la Unión Europea necesita aumentar su influencia global y eso, sin duda alguna, requiere nuestra determinación y unidad de acción.

China ejerce su competencia desleal porque se le permite y se le ha permitido. Somos socios estratégicos, pero también competidores. Y competimos en el mismo tablero internacional con diferentes reglas. La Unión Europea no es proteccionista, pero tampoco puede ser ingenua.

Nuestras relaciones comerciales y de inversión tienen que basarse en la reciprocidad y debemos proteger nuestra economía de las distorsiones que ocasiona la política industrial china y de las restricciones que impone a nuestras empresas europeas. El nuevo Reglamento sobre el control de las inversiones tiene que implementarse con diligencia, y el nuevo instrumento de contratación pública internacional, ver la luz cuanto antes.

Pero también debemos profundizar nuestras relaciones con China, basadas en el diálogo y en la confianza mutua, y trabajar conjuntamente para combatir el cambio climático, la defensa del multilateralismo y la reforma de la OMC.


  Gilles Lebreton (ENF). – Monsieur le Président, depuis vingt ans, la Chine s’est ouverte au commerce international. Son entrée à l’OMC en 2001 en témoigne: elle souhaite aujourd’hui renforcer ses relations commerciales avec l’Europe à travers la création d’une nouvelle route de la soie.

Il faut certes commercer avec la Chine, mais en restant prudent. Il faut s’assurer que cette route de la soie favorisera les flux dans les deux sens, et pas seulement de la Chine vers l’Europe. Il faut aussi résister à la stratégie chinoise qui consiste à nous imposer des transferts de technologie en échange de notre accès à son marché. Dans les négociations en cours menées par l’Union, nous devons enfin obtenir de la Chine qu’elle respecte nos indications géographiques protégées.

Mais, plus profondément, nous devons toujours nous souvenir que la Chine n’est pas un partenaire comme un autre. C’est un État totalitaire qui vient d’inscrire dans sa constitution un étrange hommage à la pensée du président Xi Jinping. C’est aussi un État communiste qui subventionne massivement ses sociétés nationales et qui rend ainsi quasi impossible la libre concurrence loyale que voudrait instituer l’Union.


  Aleksander Gabelic (S&D). – Herr talman! Det är bra att vi sätter i gång en ordentlig diskussion om EU:s relationer med Kina och ökar pressen för en schysst handelsrelation. Det finns många utmaningar att ta tag i. Det är hög tid att EU och Kina kommer längre i samtalen om handel och investeringar. Vi måste inse vilken viktig aktör Kina är i omställningen till en grön ekonomi. Här måste EU finnas med och trycka på. Här måste våra företag på ett mycket bättre sätt få vara med och erbjuda smarta gröna lösningar. Vi ska inte besvara oschysst protektionism med mer protektionism.

Samtidigt ska vi inte vara naiva när det gäller investeringar som kan påverka vår egen säkerhet. Vi måste fortsätta trycka på i världshandelsorganisationen WTO för att Kina ska börja spela enligt reglerna och inse värdet av ett fungerande internationellt handelssystem. Det gynnar Kina och det gynnar oss alla. Vi måste få med oss Kina i strävan för FN:s globala mål. Vi måste samtidigt vara extremt tydliga med Kina när det gäller respekten för mänskliga rättigheter. Utmaningar är många och det är viktigt att EU-länderna i de här sammanhangen, när det gäller relationen mellan EU och Kina, talar med en samlad röst.


  Andrejs Mamikins (S&D). – Mr President … (the speaker spoke Chinese) … which in English means that the EU and China should be friends, should have cooperation.

With the recent signing by Italy of the One Belt, One Road Initiative, we’ve now got 11 EU Member States who have formal business relations with China outside the EU trade framework.

The One Belt and Road Initiative is China’s reaction to the Bretton Woods system and in their quest for a historical relaunch Chinese are now winning strategic structures in the EU, but sincerely we cannot blame China for promoting its economic interests if we do not even have a truly European trade strategy towards it. Instead, we call it an economic competitor and a systemic rival, giving away our playing cards into the hands of Trump. As a result, EU countries will pay the bill of trade wars between China and the United States. Paradoxically, in order to resist the Chinese economic offensive on the EU, we must ease the tariff tensions we have with the United States of America. In the meantime, we also need to build a solid strategy towards China, especially in relations to subsidies and, of course, technology transfers.


Zgłoszenia z sali


  Maria Gabriela Zoană (S&D). – Mr President, trade and investment are one of the key pillars in EU—China relations. China is the EU’s biggest source of imports and the second biggest export market. A healthy and balanced trade relation and fair access to Chinese markets are key interests of the Union. Although the EU currently has a trade deficit with China, we should see there are huge potentials and increasing opportunities in the Chinese market which could be further explored when China loosens its restrictions on market access for foreign companies, particularly in the financial services sector. We are pleased that the Chinese Government has made several commitments since 2018. I am much expecting its implementation.

The last point I want to mention is that the EU and China are both committed to multilateralism and free trade, even if we have different political and economic systems. EU—China collaboration on World Trade Organisation reform would be a good chance to put China on a level playing field and to promote its fair practices.


  Kateřina Konečná (GUE/NGL). – Pane předsedající, německý ministr průmyslu Altmeier se nedávno dal slyšet, že hlavní konkurenti Německa a potažmo tedy i celé EU jsou USA a Čína.

Osobně se domnívám, že to má primárně dva důvody. Prvním je, že v těchto zemích výrazně působí jakožto investor stát. Např. v USA, se kterými chce většina EP uzavírat dohody o volném obchodu, se tak děje přes ministerstvo obrany a také politiku America first, která vedla k obchodní válce s EU. Druhým důvodem je, že nám v EU ujel kvůli politice škrtů vlak. Teď je již pozdě, bojíme se o naši technologickou a průmyslovou suverenitu.

Jak nedávno napsala česká ekonomka Ilona Švihlíková: „Ne, proškrtat se k prosperitě opravdu nejde.“ K prosperitě se jde jen chytře proinvestovat. To ovšem bez podpory státu a potažmo celé EU nejde a pravice politikou škrtů umožnila konkurenčním státům růst a teď se prostě diví. Jedinou cestou je nyní investování do reálného hospodářství a vytváření důstojných a bezpečných pracovních míst.


(Koniec zgłoszeń z sali)


  Jyrki Katainen, Vice-President of the Commission. – Mr President, thank you very much for the very good debate. Even though there have been some differences in views, I would say that that we have a relatively unified position which is attitude-free. By saying this, I mean that it’s not wise to have any particular negative attitude in our relationship with China; what is needed is an honest assessment of the current state of play. That’s why our communication is based on the assumption that our future relationship with China must be based on fairness, multilateralism and reciprocity.

It’s supposed to be very easy to defend by everyone. As I said before, and as everybody should know, China and the EU are strategic partners. We have cooperated, and will cooperate, and want to cooperate with China very closely on various foreign policy-related issues – and also in security-related issues – upholding and enhancing multilateralism on trade.

It’s also worth acknowledging that Chinese companies are sometimes better than our companies. They can compete with our companies even without state subsidies. But it’s equally important to acknowledge that this is not always the case. We have to make sure that Europe can improve its competitiveness, as China will be a major player in the global economy in the coming years, and we have to make sure that our economies can develop so that we can compete on an equal footing when there is a level playing field. Even without China, we have to improve our competitiveness when it comes to innovations and other dimensions of competitiveness.

China wants to be seen as a developing country. To a certain extent, it is a developing country. When looking at the number of poor people or at democracy or other dimensions of the society, there are features which we can acknowledge as features of a developing country. But, at the same time, it’s fair to say – and honest to say – that China is a military superpower, it’s a political superpower, it’s a technology leader, and it’s a market leader in some areas. That’s why we have to treat China as a normal competitor and strategic partner and cooperating partner. There’s nothing bad and unfair about expecting reciprocity. Strategic partners are supposed to provide and base their cooperation on a reciprocal way to cooperate.

Multilateralism and rules-based systems are very often mentioned by Chinese leaders, and when I have had a chance to cooperate with many Chinese authorities and leaders, I generally believe that they believe that multilateralism is a good basis for international cooperation. Having said this, it’s also honest to acknowledge that sometimes China is using multilateralism and a rules-based world order rather selectively. Again, we as strategic cooperating partners must agree that multilateralism means multilateralism, a rules-based system means a rules-based system, and we have to make sure that reciprocity is respected.

Our relationship with China is very active, and we are willing to deepen this relationship in various fields. But, at the same time, whilst technology, the market and China have developed positively, there are new challenges in our relationship and we want to solve those challenges. We have not chosen the same way as the United States to deal with China. We want to be constructive but fair, and expect reciprocity.


  Melania Gabriela Ciot, President-in-Office of the Council. – Mr President, this has been a useful debate and I would like to thank you for the Parliament’s continuous engagement and interest in this topic.

To conclude, China brings immense opportunities but also important challenges for the EU. Addressing this, we require a long-term engagement, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Without losing sight of the areas of positive cooperation, it is clear that we need to reflect on how to engage China to undertake market reforms, how to ensure a level playing field, and how to tackle systemic challenges linked to the WTO reform process. Also, it is of utmost importance that our cooperation with China is based on agreed principles and that it fully respects EU values. This is why human rights are one of the issues to be addressed in our forthcoming summit with China. Finally, maintaining EU unity both the within the EU institutions and among the Member States is of crucial importance. Speaking with one voice is the only way that we can respond successfully to the challenges that trade relations with China present while seizing the opportunities that China provides.


  Przewodniczący. – Zamykam debatę.

Oświadczenia pisemne (art. 162)


  Dominique Bilde (ENF), par écrit. – Après des années de déficit commercial record, de stratégies prédatrices et de dumping massif, l’Union européenne feint d’avoir pris conscience que les relations économiques avec l’Empire du Milieu n’étaient pas “gagnant-gagnant.” Du reste, le déséquilibre semble être leur marque de fabrique. Dans bien des secteurs, par exemple dans celui du bois, l’Empire du Milieu se montre souvent avide de matières premières pour déverser ensuite sur nos marchés ouverts aux quatre vents des produits finis bon marché. Las, les mauvaises nouvelles se succèdent. En l’espace de quelques jours, ma terre natale de Lorraine a ainsi reçu deux coups de massue - l’arrêt de la production de Smart à Hambach et la probable prise de participation de 60 % du Chinois XinXing dans l’entreprise historique de canalisation, Saint-Gobain PAM. Cette dernière affaire souligne avec acuité les implications du commerce avec la Chine, que le Président américain avait eu le courage de dénoncer, en ce qui concerne les transferts de technologies, de propriété intellectuelle et de savoir-faire. Alors que la France est d’ores et déjà l’État membre le plus désindustrialisé, le dépeçage d’un autre de nos fleurons s’accompagnera immanquablement d’une perte de souveraineté industrielle.


  Nicola Caputo (S&D), per iscritto. – Per l'Unione europea la partnership con la Cina è di fondamentale importanza, ma va chiarito in modo netto, che il gigante asiatico è anche un avversario economico. Ogni forma di collaborazione deve essere portata avanti collettivamente. Non capisco, ad esempio, la scelta che ha fatto l'Italia di distanziarsi dai partner europei lo scorso mese, astenendosi sulla proposta di introdurre uno strumento di controllo degli investimenti esteri diretti (IED). Il governo italiano è stato l'unico a non votare a favore di questa proposta chiave, in particolare considerando il fatto che gli investimenti dalla Cina sono aumentati di sei volte negli ultimi 20 anni e sono rivolti, ultimamente, ai settori ad alta tecnologia e spesso attraverso società di proprietà dello Stato. Gli Stati membri stanno cercando di intrattenere rapporti più equi con la Cina tramite l'UE, ma Pechino, da parte sua, vuole trattare individualmente con ogni singolo paese per accrescere più facilmente la propria influenza. Basti pensare all'iniziativa cinese denominata 16+1, che conta solo 11 Stati membri, divisiva per l'UE. Serve più Europa nelle relazioni internazionali e tutti gli Stati membri devono assumersi la responsabilità di agire uniti nei confronti di Pechino.

Atnaujinta: 2019 m. birželio 26 d.Teisinė informacija - Privatumo politika