Vollständiger Text 
Ausführliche Sitzungsberichte
Dienstag, 16. April 2019 - Straßburg Überprüfte Ausgabe

17. Schutz der Integrität der Europawahl, insbesondere mit Blick auf internationale Bedrohungen der Cybersicherheit (Aussprache)
Video der Beiträge

  Przewodniczący. – Kolejnym punktem porządku dziennego są oświadczenia Rady i Komisji w sprawie ochrony rzetelności wyborów europejskich, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem międzynarodowych zagrożeń dla cyberbezpieczeństwa (2019/2696(RSP))


  Melania Gabriela Ciot, President-in-Office of the Council. – Mr President, honourable Members, next month the European elections will take place in a very different political context than the previous ones. Mass disinformation campaigns and malicious cyber—activities, including attacks on the electoral infrastructure, are increasingly aiming to discredit and undermine the electoral processes and our democracies, while polarising our societies.

As elections take place in all Member States during the same period of four days, they are particularly sensitive from the point of view of the risk associated with cyber—attacks and disinformation. If some attacks were to be successful in one Member State, it would most likely have a domino effect and affect the democratic processes in the other 27. Thus, it would discredit the EU institutions as a whole.

In addition, it is a particularly important period for our national authorities, as more than fifty presidential, national, local or regional elections are due to be held in Member States by 2020. When setting out our six-month Presidency programme, we identified as a priority the need for streamlined and sustained action to protect free and democratic EU elections. Combating disinformation and increasing the EU capacities to deter and respond to cyber—attacks were also regarded as key elements in view of securing the electoral process. We attach great importance to this subject, which has been recurrent on the agenda of the European Council in recent months.

The EU institutions and Member States have indeed an important and complementary role to play, each in the remit of their competences in the protection of the democratic processes. It requires concerted efforts by the EU and the Member States, but also from civil society and industry online platforms. Our response is comprehensive, with a focus on both the internal and external dimension of the threat.

In February 2019, the Council and its Member States adopted conclusions on securing free and fair European elections. They welcomed the Commission package, which included a legislative proposal amending the regulation on European political parties and foundations, which was in the meantime adopted by the co—legislators. They also welcomed the joint action plan against disinformation.

Honourable Members, I take this opportunity to thank you for the good cooperation which allowed for the swift adoption of the new rules to prevent the misuse by European political parties or foundations of personal data in the EP elections. The Council conclusions set out a comprehensive approach to protect the European elections from interference such as cyber—attacks and disinformation campaigns from inside and outside the EU. A comprehensive approach is our motto. We do not want to leave any loopholes. All strands of action and all actors should be connected.

To achieve this objective, the conclusions identified actions to be taken and which, indeed, have been implemented in the last month: the holding of regular meetings of the European election cooperation network, in which Member States share expertise and good practices and jointly identify threats; the setting—up and launch of the Rapid Alert System, where national contact points in Member States share information rapidly on disinformation campaigns; the enhancement of strategic communication dedicated to European values and policies; the strengthening of the European Media Ecosystem by facilitating networks of independent fact—checkers; the promotion of media and digital literacy and awareness—raising activities to protect the integrity of the electoral process, together with the private sector and civil society; the assessment of cyber—threats in the electoral context and measures to address them and preserve the integrity of the electoral system in this regard (and, following the recommendation in the Compendium on Cyber Security of Election Technology, a table—top exercise on protecting the 2019 European elections took place on Parliament’s premises two weeks ago); a call on social media platforms to invest in resources to deal in a responsible and accountable manner with election-related online activities; in the same vein, the European Council in March called for the full implementation of the Code of Practice; and finally, among this set of actions, cooperation with relevant international actors.

To contribute to the efforts of countering disinformation, the Presidency launched a mapping exercise to identify the actions undertaken at national level, which demonstrated the significant efforts made by Member States to combat disinformation. The answers provided by the delegations will form the basis for a synthesis report that will feed into the discussions on the possible ways forward, including beyond the 2019 elections, foreseen for the European Council in June.


  Julian King, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, this is indeed a timely debate – thanks for scheduling it. With the European Parliament elections rapidly approaching, we’re in what you might call the final straight when it comes to taking measures to ensure that they are secure. What have we been up to? Well, we’ve heard some of the things that we are doing. Briefly, to recap, over the last six months or so we’ve brought together the Member States election commissioners, cybersecurity experts, data protection experts in the reinforced election cooperation network, in order to share best practice and promote cooperation with a view to better securing our elections. We’ve set up a rapid alert system among the EU institutions and the Member States in order to spot and tackle coordinated disinformation campaigns. We have worked with this house, MEPs and the political parties to raise awareness around the transparency of particularly political advertising online as well as the security and resilience of electoral systems. Indeed, we organised a workshop with you, Mr President, in Parliament to that end. Earlier this month, as we heard, we carried out a table—top cybersecurity exercise, together with Parliament, Member States and our EU Cybersecurity Agency to check how cyber—secure. That, I’m glad to say, was opened by your colleague, Vice-President Wieland. We’ve seen the big internet platforms sign up to our Code of practice on disinformation, last summer, which was reinforced by the publication of our Action Plan on tackling disinformation in December.

Under the Code and the Action Plan, the platforms have been reporting month by month on their progress to tackle disinformation, particularly political disinformation. We recognise that there has indeed been progress, but those reports have been patchy, and they continue to show that – at least in some areas – efforts are lacking. While some credible progress has been made in the area of political ad transparency, platforms still need to improve independent scrutiny through better access for fact—checkers, researchers and civil society to the data they need. We don’t want the platforms to be marking their own homework. We want to see greater action against fake accounts and bots. We need see more quick and prominent corrections, for example, through a pilot programme of the Correct the Record initiative that’s been advocated by civil society.

We have now received the latest reports from the platforms on what they’re doing, covering the month of March and we’ll publish our assessment of those reports in the coming days. In a way, this represents a final push in areas where we can realistically still have a meaningful impact in the fight against disinformation before the EP elections. At first sight, the latest reports do indeed suggest further progress has been made, for example, in terms of transparency for political ads and indeed ads in general, but there are still some outstanding issues.

Finally, let me say that Member States’ computer security response teams are going to come together in a further exercise on election cybersecurity integrity in mid-May. That’ll be a last opportunity for us to test how robust our cybersecurity measures are in the run up to the EP elections.

One issue that I just want to mention, one of the outstanding issues that we’re dealing with the platforms, in particular with Facebook, is Facebook’s decision not to permit cross-border political advertising. I know that this has raised concerns in this House. As President Juncker said in his exchange of letters with President Tajani, this was a decision that Facebook made. There’s nothing in the Code of practice that limits political advertising to advertisers residing only in a given Member State. Obviously, it’s up to Facebook to respect the law. It’s also up to them to decide how they do so, and in this case the decision they’ve taken, the interpretation that they have given to respecting national electoral rules has raised concerns about the ability of EU institutions and bodies and Europe—wide political parties to communicate effectively in the run up to the EP elections. We discussed this in the Conference of Presidents last week and I’m glad to say now that the Secretary-General of this institution, the Council and the Commission have written to Facebook setting out again our concerns very clearly and asking that Facebook reconsider their approach in this area as a matter of urgency. We’ll have an opportunity to address these concerns direct with Facebook at an upcoming meeting that we are having with them.

I just want to say that, of course, the issue of election security will not disappear after 26 May. As we’ve heard, elections continue – indeed there’s an election somewhere in Europe every week, and so we’re going to need to continue our efforts to protect elections and our political lives in this digital age. This process is going to include a discussion at the European Council in June on an initial assessment of how the EP elections have gone. Any lessons that we learn from that on the basis of a report prepared by the Presidency, the Commission and the High Representative will be an opportunity to look ahead, learn lessons and establish a strategy for the future.

Depending, indeed, on what happens between now and the end of May, I think we should discuss how to react, how to learn the lessons and to take the necessary steps for the future. We will also review the Code of practice later in the year and look again at whether we need to do more to reinforce transparency around the activity of online platforms in this political space.

I look forward to our debate today. This is not a challenge of just the next few weeks. This challenge will not go away. We need to maintain our current push for immediate action in the run—up to the EP elections, but we also need to look further ahead, to the future, to ensure that our democratic processes remain as robust as we need them to be.


  Danuta Maria Hübner, on behalf of the PPE Group. – Mr President, I would also like to thank both the Council and the Commission for the strong commitment visible here in what they said to us. For us, elections are an important element of democracy. Compromised cybersecurity in elections can lead to the loss of confidence in the electoral system, in democratic processes and in leadership. Europeans are increasingly aware and worried about all aspects of electoral security. A recent Eurobarometer survey showed that 61% were concerned about possible manipulation of the European elections via cyber—operations.

To fight against cyber—threats and ensure that the cyber—environment is safe we need a society—wide approach as well as international cooperation. In this context, amending European regulations on the statute and financing of European political parties and foundations, aiming at protecting the electoral process from online disinformation campaigns based on misuse of voters’ personal data, introducing financial sanctions on European political parties or foundations that infringe data protection rules deliberately to influence or attempt to influence the outcome of European elections, as well as the Commission’s actions to build strong cybersecurity in Europe, support and awareness at the level of the Member States, all that can help citizens to make their political choices in fair, secure and transparent elections.


  Claude Moraes, on behalf of the S&D Group. – Mr President, I welcome the measures the Commissioner has taken. He’s worked hard on this issue, but this is a very tough issue. Electoral interference is proven, it’s happened and it’s going to happen again. And there is a sense of urgency in all of this. When the Commission followed up Parliament’s calls on a code of conduct to stamp out the spread of fake news online and reported on the code of practice against disinformation, we looked at the progress and we saw that the Commissioner warned that Facebook still has 116 million fake accounts on its platforms. We really can’t control this spread unless we really use the tools that we have, so there is a sense of urgency.

Signatories to this: it’s not just Facebook, it’s Google and Twitter, and we know that the Commission will follow up this work and we really need to act as a team to ensure that this happens. But this is about online and offline actions. This is not just about cybersecurity. So online, we have called for full algorithmic accountability and transparency. This is essential for citizens to be able to protect themselves against any manipulation and to protect our electoral processes from foreign interference. We also have to look at how political parties and campaigns are using social platforms for campaign purposes.

Offline: we have to have electoral safeguards, such as rules on transparency and limits to spending, respect for silence periods, equal treatment of candidates, banning of profiling for electoral purposes, and social media platforms should label content shared by bots and speed up the process of removing fake accounts.

Offline and online is important, but we also need to ensure that we understand that the General Data Protection Regulation is not the only model for protection. We may need to end the deadlock on e—privacy regulation to ensure that the rights of citizens, especially regarding the protection of users against targeting, are protected. So, we need to think about what we do about Facebook and the Cambridge Analytica scandal, using all of the tools we have here in the European Union.

There are three regulators in the world: China, the United States and the European Union. I am in the European Union. I want the EU to act on foreign actors interfering in our elections. What is more important than that as we enter the European elections?

(The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question under Rule 162(8))


  Bill Etheridge (EFDD), blue-card question. – Thank you, Claude; it’s really not a hostile one. I’ve got to know you since we’ve been here; you’re a fair and reasonable man. Do you not see, despite all of the things that you’ve stated in your speech – much of which I can understand and go with you on – that there is a danger when these tools are applied from state level, from government level, that free speech itself could become impaired, particularly online? We disagree on many things, but I would always stand for your right to say what you believe. I would hope that would apply to everyone.


  Claude Moraes (S&D), blue-card answer. – What I said at the beginning – and I know that the Commissioner will agree with me when he finally sums up – is that we’re not talking just about free speech, which is the most valuable thing that we are protecting; we’re talking about interference in our sovereign elections by foreign powers. This is a proven issue in the 2016 presidential election and a proven issue in the Brexit referendum. Not make—believe; proven evidence. When that interference happens, our whole democratic structure is unstable, and many of the things like free speech and the things that we hold dear are then made unstable. That is my answer to you: that I hold free speech as dear as you do, but unless we can have integrity in our elections through these online and offline checks, we will have nothing.


  Anna Elżbieta Fotyga, on behalf of the ECR Group. – Mr President, information techniques, technology and influence operations have been used by Russia against the West for quite a long time already, including in elections. What for? To undermine faith and confidence in democracy, to exacerbate existing divisions, to confuse truth and to amplify narratives that are friendly to Russia. Now, today, the third reading was completed in the State Duma of the legal act isolating the Russian internet from the rest of the world. What for? We have to learn as soon as possible for our security as well as for the security of the Russian people.


  Pavel Telička, on behalf of the ALDE Group. – Mr President, I will refrain from repeating what you have said, because I think that a lot of what has been said is a reality and is something that one can subscribe to. I think that it is correct to say that we have made progress. It is also correct to say, as the Commissioner has said, that there is still an effort to be done, by all means. But, in order not to be repetitive, let me say that while all that has been said with regard to the platforms is definitely relevant and there is still a lot of room to cover, there are also other aspects that we need to be aware of. I need to draw a parallel with the recent negotiations on the Cyberecurity Act, because, after all, elections and our sovereignty are key, but also the health and lives of our people, are equally key. The fact, Madam Minister, is that regarding what you have said just a few minutes ago – as relevant as it is – I don’t see the backing in a number of Member States for that. I don’t see the recognition on the side of a number of Member States on different levels that we are facing the threat that some of the colleagues have already spoken about, whether it is the question of European elections and the other elections, lives or safety. We even see Trojan horses in the European Union; that is a reality. So I think it is fair to say that, while we have managed to progress both on the legislation as well as what you have said with regard to our safety, but also with regard to the European elections, what we really need – and the Commission knows my point of view on that, because we were in a debate just some weeks ago – is a real mindset change, because this is a reality. We are confronting a war which is led against us – not by means of arms, but something as dangerous as that – and I think that unless we recognise it and unless we are consistent in our attention and our efforts – and not just before European elections – we will be hit, we will be vulnerable and we will be damaged.


  Marisa Matias, em nome do Grupo GUE/NGL. – Senhor Presidente, este é, de facto, um problema muito complexo. As fake news, a interferência e a ingerência nos processos eleitorais combatem-se através de cibersegurança, mas não apenas. Para não repetir o que já foi dito, quero realçar apenas alguns dos aspetos que não foram referidos. Penso que enquanto não se defender o direito à informação e proteger os jornalistas e o jornalismo, estaremos a criar espaços para que a informação fácil, viral e sem qualquer verificação nas redes, à qual toda a gente tem um acesso muito mais fácil por via das redes sociais, continue a proliferar. É óbvio que se tem de combater também as manipulações internas, como aqui foi referido, mas também em relação ao Facebook, quero dizer que, se continuarmos a aplaudir o Sr. Zuckerberg por alterar as regras de privacidade do Facebook sem parar para pensar por um segundo sobre aquilo que as pode fazer ainda mais semelhantes ao que é utilizado atualmente no WhathsApp, só significa que tudo pode ficar pior e mais difícil para quem está por detrás de cada uma das campanhas. Por isso precisamos, obviamente, de soluções de cibersegurança, mas também de ações que tenham a ver com a educação digital, de proteger o jornalismo e de mais democracia.


  Klaus Buchner, im Namen der Verts/ALE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Wenn es um den Schutz unserer fairen, freien und geheimen Wahlen im digitalen Zeitalter geht, stehen wir als Gesetzgeber noch ganz am Anfang. Unsere Aktionen kommen sehr spät und sind nur erste, allerdings gründliche, Versuche. Deswegen gilt mein Dank zunächst einmal vor allem der Kommission, die sich dieses Themas ernsthaft annimmt.

Aber ich habe ein Problem bei der ganzen Sache: Wir brauchen eine Zurückdämmung der Versuche, unsere Wahlen von außen zu beeinflussen. Um das zu erreichen, brauchen wir die Dual-use-Vereinbarung. Die Dual-use-Regulierung wird bis jetzt vom Ministerrat seit über einem Jahr blockiert. Das bedeutet, dass EU-feindliche Kräfte leicht auf unsere Technologie zurückgreifen können, um auch unter anderem Wahlen zu beeinflussen. Deshalb meine dringende Bitte an den Ministerrat, hier endlich die Blockade zu beenden.


  Bill Etheridge, on behalf of the EFDD Group. – Mr President, so we have to protect ourselves from these evil Russians who are controlling the internet, do we? Who are sending misinformation; who single—handedly won the referendum on Brexit because of their bots, apparently. But we don’t worry at all about the fact that actually what this could lead to is censorship and control of free speech. We talk about power. The power of the establishment forces over the mainstream media is unparalleled. Look at the BBC in the UK – one of the largest, if not the largest distributor onto the internet – highly biased in favour of the state. That’s okay, it seems, because it’s not an anti-EU force. What we’re looking at here is very, very dangerous.

Of course, Facebook and other profiles need to weed out bots and so on and so forth, but if you give the State power, if you give laws, rules and regulations this way to clamp down, who is using them? Just imagine for a second if a right of centre, pro—capitalist, anti—green lobby took control of the European Union. Just imagine it. Horrifying, isn’t it? If that were to happen and they suddenly clamped down on the free speech on the internet of people protesting against them, how would you feel? Is it not conceivable that we should allow people the right and the freedom to express themselves. We always hear about freedoms here. What’s more important than the freedom of expression and freedom of speech? In my opinion, there is nothing greater.

There are many people – if not most people – in this room who I disagree with, but I would be the first to man the barricades and fight to defend your right to express your opinions, however you choose to do it.

(The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question under Rule 162(8))


  Pavel Telička (ALDE), blue-card question. – I would definitely agree with you on the question of freedom of expression, but I did not detect in your remarks any concern regarding, let’s say, possible cyber-attacks from the east or elsewhere with interference in European any other elections. So my question is: do you share that concern, and if you do, how would you tackle it in terms of means to confront that risk and how would you minimise it?


  Bill Etheridge (EFDD), blue-card answer. – Thank you for the question; it’s a well put question. I do share that concern. I don’t want interference from any agency that gets in the way of free elections. But, if it were a choice between the risk – because life is all about risks – of giving up that ability for people to freely express themselves and freely make their views, and the risk of the state and potentially a road towards totalitarianism, I choose the risk involved in free speech, but I do accept that we need to try our best to avoid foreign agencies.


  Jean-Marie Le Pen (NI). – Monsieur le Président, Mesdames et Messieurs, à cette tribune, il y a 25 ans, François Mitterrand lança une formule lapidaire, mais inexacte: le nationalisme, c’est la guerre. L’image était forte, mais la pensée de courte vue.

En effet, naguère, c’étaient des armées nationales qui s’affrontaient. Désormais le danger qui menace le continent boréal de Vladivostok à Gibraltar n’est pas imputable à un ou des nationalismes, mais à un phénomène démographique mondial de dimension tellurique. Civile, l’invasion de nos territoires n’en est pas moins une terrible menace sur nos indépendances, nos libertés et même notre survie. Nous avons le droit et le devoir d’y faire face, avec tous les moyens nécessaires pour la vaincre. Or, l’Union européenne est aujourd’hui un carcan qui paralyse les nations qui la composent, au moment où leur défense et donc leur capacité de mobilisation est plus nécessaire que jamais. Il n’y a pas, quoi qu’en pensent les fédéralistes, de nation européenne, ni de peuple européen. Votre assemblée elle-même est élue par les peuples des nations composant l’Union européenne. La nation est le cadre légal, moral et politique de tous les pays du monde et leur expression supérieure est l’ONU, l’Organisation des Nations unies. La nation reste donc le cadre le plus naturel et le plus efficace pour faire vivre et défendre les peuples qui s’y sont assemblés. C’est d’elle que procèdent le sentiment national, l’amour de son sol, de son histoire, l’amour de sa patrie. C’est elle qui dépasse et prolonge les destinées individuelles et qui est la garante de l’avenir des générations. En revanche, il y a une civilisation européenne éblouissante et un concert d’instincts qui créent la nécessité d’une étroite coopération des nations du continent boréal, au-delà même de la seule Europe de l’Ouest. La révolution démographique, qui a porté en 50 ans la population mondiale de 3 à 8 milliards d’habitants, chiffre en croissance exponentielle, a déclenché un phénomène migratoire géant dont nous ne percevons que les prémices. Il menace de submerger le continent boréal dont fait partie l’Europe qui est, elle, en déficit démographique. Un immense fossé est en train de se créer de surcroît entre les besoins et les productions du monde. La misère du monde fait apparaître ce continent comme un eldorado, alors qu’il n’est plus guère qu’un radeau de la Méduse qui coulerait sous le poids de nouveaux arrivants.

Face à ces perspectives angoissantes, l’Europe se révèle impuissante. Pire, elle paralyse les réactions nationales qui devraient mobiliser les peuples qui la constituent. Députés, vous qui êtes restés aveugles, sourds et muets, la postérité vous maudira.

(Applaudissements de son groupe)


  Przewodniczący. – Dziękuję bardzo Panu Jean-Marie Le Pen. Prawdę mówiąc, nie było to dokładnie na temat debaty, którą prowadzimy. Tym niemniej bardzo Panu dziękuję.


  Carlos Coelho (PPE). – Senhor Presidente, Senhor Presidente do Conselho, Senhor Comissário King, nas eleições europeias de maio os cidadãos terão de escolher que Europa querem para enfrentar os desafios do futuro. E essa escolha tem de ser livre. Não sejamos ingénuos. Há quem queira destruir o projeto europeu. Temos forças externas que querem minar a União e que contam com aliados cá dentro. E que, como se viu em eleições recentes, estão dispostas a usar todas as armas que têm à sua disposição, sobretudo no mundo digital.

Mas desengane-se quem pensa que os europeus não estão conscientes dessas ameaças. 73% dos cidadãos estão preocupados com campanhas de desinformação, 67% estão preocupados com a proteção dos seus dados e 55% estão preocupados com a sua liberdade de intervenção pública online. É a estes receios que temos de responder.

Temos de assegurar a segurança da infraestrutura dos nossos sistemas eleitorais blindando-os a qualquer ataque informático. Temos de proteger os dados dos nossos cidadãos exigindo das plataformas digitais os mais elevados padrões de exigência. E temos de combater as campanhas de desinformação e as notícias falsas, as fake news, apelando à responsabilidade dos media tradicionais e das redes sociais.

Liberdade, democracia e Estado de direito são mais do que valores da União. São a nossa identidade. Uma identidade que alguns querem destruir com novas armas. Defendê-la não é uma decisão que tenhamos que tomar, é uma obrigação a que temos de responder.


  Eugen Freund (S&D). – Mr President, let me say at the outset this should not be a partisan issue. We should actually all be united in the fight against fake news, disinformation and propaganda. But I’m afraid – and this is also what Mr Telička said – that the Member States are not aware of this issue and they do not pay enough attention to the dangers that arise from that. I will continue in German, unfortunately, Mr King.

Das digitale Medienumfeld, das in den letzten Jahren entstanden ist, bringt viele positive Veränderungen mit sich. Umgekehrt munitioniert es aber auch zunehmend Gegner der Demokratie und der Pressefreiheit. Die Wahl Donald Trumps und das Brexitreferendum haben es gezeigt: Manipulation der öffentlichen Meinung über das Internet und die sozialen Media-Plattformen nehmen zu.

Das Ausmaß ist mittlerweile so groß, dass es demokratische Wahlen beeinflussen kann. Diese Entwicklungen werden auch für die kommende Wahl zum Europäischen Parlament eine Rolle spielen und ein Problem darstellen. Wenn nämlich eine Falschmeldung erst einmal im Raum steht, dann dauert es seine Zeit, bis diese widerlegt ist. Hinzu kommt der technische Fortschritt. Auch hier dürfen wir hinter den aktuellen Entwicklungen nicht hinterherhinken. So spielt neben klassischen Social-Media-Kanälen wie Facebook, Instagram und Twitter natürlich auch Whatsapp eine, sagen wir mal, fragwürdige Rolle.

Darüber hinaus wird künstliche Intelligenz es möglich machen, Falschmeldungen oder Propaganda in bisher noch ungeahnter Weise zu verbreiten. Will die Europäische Union die Legitimität der Europawahl und anderer Wahlen schützen, dann muss sie diese Entwicklungen so früh wie möglich erkennen und entsprechende Gegenmaßnahmen setzen. Europa benötigt eine schlagkräftige, ganzheitliche Strategie, um auf die Verbreitung von Lügen, Unwahrheiten und die Manipulation von Meinungen zu reagieren.

(Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte” gemäß Artikel 162 Absatz 8 der Geschäftsordnung zu beantworten.)




  Paul Rübig (PPE), Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Ich möchte mich insbesondere beim Kollegen Freund bedanken, weil er als Journalist die Problematik gut erkannt hat. Wir wissen, dass wir diese Woche noch den Cyber security Centre Act in der ersten Lesung beschließen werden. Es ist wichtig, dass wir in allen 28 Mitgliedstaaten hier dementsprechende Vorkehrungen treffen.

Bei STOA, dem Scientific Technology Options Assessment Panel des Europäischen Parlaments, gibt es vier Studien über Cybersicherheit, und wir haben einen Science-Media Hub gegründet, um analytics zu testen. Glauben Sie, dass diese Maßnahmen für die Europäische Union ausreichen, oder sollte man hier in diesem Bereich mehr unternehmen?


  Eugen Freund (S&D), Antwort auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Ich glaube, man kann nie, lieber Herr Kollege Rübig, genug unternehmen, um hier entschieden vorzugehen. Ich fürchte nur, dass das jetzt im Zusammenhang mit dem Problem und der Problematik, von der wir sprechen – nämlich der europäischen Wahl –, zu spät kommt, dass wir dieser Problematik hier aber besondere Aufmerksamkeit werden schenken müssen, weil wir sonst in eine Situation kommen, wie wir sie schon beim Brexit und bei Trump erlebt haben.


  Ангел Джамбазки (ECR). – Г-н Председател, безспорно е, че нашата демокрация е нещо, което трябва да пазим и за което трябва да се борим. Очевидно е също така, че редица представители на тази институция се притесняват, че предстоящите избори за Европейски парламент ще бъдат похитени от някакъв външен фактор. Като пример за това често в тази зала чуваме заклеймяването на популисткото „дясно“ и колко опасни са електоралните успехи на десните партии в Европа.

Наглостта на либералите в тази зала няма край и не спира да ни учудва. Те подценяват здравия разум на европейския избирател, опитват се да пробутват тези, че щом определени партии имат успех на избори, то задължително това е резултат от някаква мистериозна външна намеса.

Нека припомня на уважаемите представители от либералните елити, че вече повече от две години слушаме как мощна руска намеса на президентските избори в Съединените щати през 2016 г. била помогнала на президента Тръмп. Разследването, водено от Робърт Мюлер, не откри никакви конспирации. Разберете, не можем да обвиняваме всеки, чиито позиции не харесваме, че е избран благодарение на външни сили. Това подкопава доверието не само към институциите, но и към демокрацията и по-специално към способността на хората да правят информиран избор за бъдещето си.


  Marietje Schaake (ALDE). – Mr President, the democratic rights of all European citizens are at stake with attempts at hacking election systems and the sprawling of disinformation by those seeking to trick people into votes they might not have independently cast without having been exposed to automated lies that spread online like wildfire. And whether it’s foreign or domestic meddling, or profit-driven, we need to be vigilant.

Of course, we see the ad hoc efforts that the tech platforms are promising, like YouTube, Facebook, Google or Twitter, but without independent oversight over algorithms, we outsource our responsibility, because without algorithmic accountability and research, no one can say for sure what the impact of technology use is on our democracy, and that is unacceptable. We must act now.

For example, the US Department of Housing has filed a case against Facebook because the platform allows for the selling of ads in a way that likely discriminates. So let us begin by ensuring that what is not allowed offline isn’t allowed online either. But in order to deliver on that promise we need to investigate the collection of data and the practices of micro-targeting ads and conduct stress tests on election technology. We have no time to lose.

But lastly – and this is an appeal to everyone in this room and in this Chamber – all political parties of Europe, we need to take our own responsibility. So I call on colleagues and fellow candidates for the European Parliament elections to all sign the election pledge on because we must all stand for the very principles that are at stake through election meddling and take our own responsibility. Europe is only as strong as our weakest link and we have to make sure that in our measures we respect the fundamental rights of all Europeans.


  Indrek Tarand (Verts/ALE). – Mr President, the integrity of electoral systems is a must, but the more difficult and equally important task is to ensure the integrity of elections as a whole, and we must prevent the legitimate manipulations of voters by players like Cambridge Analytica and AggregateIQ. I very much agree with what Ms Schaake has been saying just now, but I would like to underline that Facebook is such a big company and we – as legislators – could consider doing something to make it responsible for giving data to third parties, like the above—mentioned Cambridge Analytica, for instance.

Once the data is out there, that is it. There is no way to put the cat back in the bag, as the data set can be copied and duplicated indefinitely. In this sense, rogue data sets are much like nuclear waste, and that’s why Facebook has to keep its user data on a tight leash or be fined or punished, whatever this Parliament decides to apply.

Thank you, colleagues, and leave Facebook – it makes you a better person. I did it, and I’m happy.

(The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question under Rule 162(8))


  Maria Grapini (S&D), Întrebare adresată conform procedurii „cartonașului albastru”. – Domnule Tarand, ați spus, între altele - și sunt de acord - că sunt manipulări făcute de platforme. Pe de altă parte, ați spus că nu sunteți prieten cu Facebook. Totuși, digitalizarea trebuie să existe, avem acest program. Cum vedeți, atunci, să nu se mai facă manipularea? Cum vedeți ca Facebook, unde, cu toate avertismentele pe care noi le-am dat aici, există încă conturi false, există copia datelor de identitate, îl blochezi și apare din nou... Cum vedeți să putem să eliminăm aceste lucruri, mai ales acum în preajma alegerilor electorale?


  Indrek Tarand (Verts/ALE), blue-card answer. – I wish I were so smart to reply to your question but I agree with what Marietje Schaake said: what is not allowed offline shouldn’t be allowed online. I closed Facebook because most of the comments were: ‘I’m going to kill you, bastard’. So why should I be in this dirt? I closed it and now they can kill themselves until they come to the conclusion that they need to leave Facebook as well, which is not to say that digitalisation and social media should not be developed but it must be controlled. It has to remain a human space rather than a sort of violent, inhuman – I don’t know an English word even, it’s a four-letter word anyway.


  Gilles Lebreton (ENF). – Monsieur le Président, les élections européennes doivent être libres et équitables, j’approuve donc l’adoption par le Conseil d’un texte qui vise à les protéger contre d’éventuelles campagnes informatiques de désinformation. La création d’un réseau européen de coopération électorale est également à saluer dans la mesure où elle favorise l’échange d’informations entre États membres, sans porter de nouvelle atteinte à leur souveraineté.

Je mets toutefois les institutions européennes en garde contre leur propension à glisser du souci légitime d’assurer la cybersécurité à la tentation de censurer les réseaux sociaux et de formater l’information. Les partis nationaux ont le droit de critiquer l’Union européenne et même de proposer de la remplacer par une Europe des nations. Il ne faut jamais l’oublier, sous peine de porter atteinte à la liberté d’expression politique qui est au cœur des démocraties européennes.


  Емил Радев (PPE). – Г-н Председател, в последните години международната среда се промени значително и станахме свидетели на редица кибератаки, ръководени както от държавни, така и от недържавни участници, по време на предизборния процес в САЩ, Франция и други страни. Тези атаки са предназначени да сътворят хаос и да попречат на нормалното протичане на най-демократичния процес, да подкопаят доверието в неговото изпълнение и резултат, да създадат усещането, че демокрацията е лесно уязвима – с един клик и тя може да бъде поставена на колене.

С оглед на предстоящите избори за Европейски парламент – най-демократичната институция на Европейския съюз, нашето задължение е да гарантираме, че изборният процес ще протече нормално, без да бъде възпрепятстван, и неговата легитимност няма да бъде поставена под въпрос заради кибератака. Тук са необходими усилията не само на европейско ниво чрез споделяне на информация за заплахите, но и подготовка от страна на националните органи, които ще гарантират киберсигурността на вота.

Затова приветствам наскоро проведената симулация, която събра на едно място представители на националните органи за киберсигурност, Европейския парламент, Европейската комисия и Европейската агенция за киберсигурност. Важно е такива симулации да се случват и на ниво държави членки, за да бъде подготвена всяка една от тях да реагира на евентуална кибератака преди и по време на вота.

Нека да бъда ясен – ако изборите дори в една държава членка бъдат поставени под съмнение, изборите в целия Европейски съюз ще бъдат поставени под съмнение. Това би била недопустима победа за тези, които искат да разделят Европейския съюз и да отслабят неговата сила, и ние не трябва да го допускаме.


  Jeppe Kofod (S&D). – Mr President, thank you for this very important debate. I think it’s very important for us, as we are the only institution that is directly representing the people of Europe.

We are keen to protect their free right to vote in an election without being subject to cyber-attacks, disinformation, vile deception or any other type of meddling in the free right of free elections. And I don’t think we need to be naive. We will see a lot of attacks on our free elections in Europe, we have seen it already, and we will see more. Therefore, I agree with my colleagues. The platforms need to be very transparent and accountable and follow the law which goes on in normal society and also goes on in the online society; they need to be transparent. But I want to say that democracy is also a way of culture, a way of life, and we need also to agree across all parties to stick to the truth and fight any lies from foreign powers who want to interfere in our elections. We need to stand together and protect our European democracy.


  Sajjad Karim (ECR). – Mr President, the web has been woven right across the European Union. Practically no Member State is untouched. Through this web narratives are constructed and propagated, a result of which is that compromised political actors today sit in this very Chamber and in Chambers right across the European Union. In the Commissioner’s country and mine, the United Kingdom, we have left it simply to individual journalists to call it out: people like Carole Cadwalladr, James O’Brien.

Brexit’s dark money and influence through Facebook tackled by Damian Collins, Chair of the Select Committee for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport; executive—level action, literally nothing; and now the Brexit Party. PayPal, through donations of under GBP 500, is facilitating the flow of money into the European Union and to Nigel Farage. And I ask him as a Member of this House to come and explain to this House: Nigel Farage, where is your money actually coming from?


  José Inácio Faria (PPE). – Senhor Presidente, caros Colegas, a União Europeia, que durante demasiado tempo escolheu a pior das opções para lidar com o problema das ciberameaças internacionais a fingir que ela não existia, não pode agora, depois de escândalos como o da Cambridge Analitica, ignorar o impacto dos algoritmos do Facebook e da Google nas democracias europeias. Nem a formação da opinião pública, especialmente dos jovens, com o recurso a aplicações que automatizam e massificam discursos de ódio, fortalecendo eurocéticos e populistas que querem paralisar a União a partir do seu centro.

O risco de manipulação das próximas eleições europeias por fake news, campanhas de desinformação e ataques informáticos é amplificado ainda pela influência nefasta de países de fora da União, como mostram o financiamento russo da campanha do que conduziu ao desastre que é o Brexit, como o nosso colega ali acabou de referir. A comprovada interferência também do Sr. Putin nas eleições francesas de 2017 ou as suspeitas de espionagem chinesa em dispositivos de quinta geração móvel, apenas para dar alguns exemplos. Uma vez que estas ameaças no ciberespaço não conhecem fronteiras, só uma abordagem conjunta da União, que inclua a partilha de informações entre os Estados-Membros, impedirá que, em maio próximo, as tropas cibernéticas chinesas, ou as fábricas de hackers e trolls do Kremlin, possam minar a credibilidade das democracias liberais europeias.


  Mercedes Bresso (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, signor Commissario, l'uso massiccio di Internet e la digitalizzazione delle nostre economie hanno creato, come molti hanno ricordato, una nuova emergenza strategica che è quella di garantire a tutti i cittadini e agli attori economici la possibilità di crescere e svilupparsi in spazi virtuali protetti.

Dobbiamo agire rapidamente, proprio nel momento in cui stiamo discutendo dello sviluppo della rete 5G, delle sue possibilità e dei suoi rischi, e delle possibili interferenze della Russia e di altri soggetti nelle prossime elezioni. A quaranta giorni dalle elezioni queste minacce sono estremamente reali. Le istituzioni pubbliche, in Germania, Estonia, e in altri paesi sono già state oggetto di attacchi coordinati. Per questa ragione abbiamo la responsabilità di rispondere a questi pericoli.

L'azione della Commissione, che ha proposto un pacchetto normativo su tali sfide, va accolta favorevolmente, ma l'Unione purtroppo è ancora in ritardo, e abbiamo il compito di andare oltre. Abbiamo bisogno di maggiori investimenti, di rafforzare il coordinamento degli Stati membri, evitare interferenze inaccettabili come quella di Cambridge Analytica che ben conosciamo. Questo è l'obiettivo che dobbiamo perseguire tutti insieme.


  Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner (ECR). – Arvoisa puhemies, vapaissa ja demokraattisissa vaaleissa kansalaiset saavat ilmaista oman tahtonsa siitä, mikä on politiikan suunta seuraavien vuosien aikana. Tulevat Euroopan parlamentin vaalit ovat ratkaisevan tärkeät, sillä EU on maahanmuuttokriisin ja brexitin myötä tienhaarassa.

Näkemyseroistamme huolimatta olemme kaikki varmasti yhtä mieltä siitä, että demokratiaa on suojeltava. Vain kansalaisten on saatava päättää EU:n tulevasta suunnasta. Ulkopuoliset toimijat, kuten vieraat valtiot tai jopa yksittäiset pahantekijät, voivat pyrkiä vaikuttamaan vaalitulokseen esimerkiksi levittämällä disinformaatiota teknisiä työkaluja hyödyntäen tai tietomurtojen tai palvelunestohyökkäysten avulla, mikä on havaittava ja ehkäistävä ajoissa.

Motiivina tällaisessa toiminnassa voi olla myös pyrkimys vaikuttaa mielikuvaan vaalien luotettavuudesta. Meidän on vahvistettava kansalaisten luottamusta poliittiseen järjestelmään, jos haluamme saada alhaiselle tasolle monessa maassa vajonneen äänestysaktiivisuuden jälleen nousuun.


  Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE). – Pane předsedající, vážení kolegové, tato debata je hezká, je hezká v tom, jak všichni chceme udělat více pro to, aby tyto volby byly, řekl bych, neutrální ve světě kybernetické bezpečnosti. Ale já bych vám chtěl říct jednu věc: Není tato debata příliš pozdě? Není tato debata jenom vyměňováním si, řekl bych, názorů na to, jakým způsobem jsme měli dříve zasáhnout proti různým aktérům, kteří ovlivňovali důležité dění v Evropské unii?

I já vítám balíček, který připravila Evropská komise, ale pane komisaři, ruku na srdce, tyto volby s tímto balíčkem stejně zvláštním způsobem nebudeme chránit. Je potřeba pracovat systematicky i potom, co nebudete komisařem, na dalších opatřeních, aby žádné volby, žádná referenda a žádné jiné akty demokracie nebyly nikým ovlivňovány.

Bylo zde napříč politickým spektrem zmíněno, jak chceme bojovat proti šíření fake news, ale proti fake news můžete bojovat pouze tím, že budete mít vzdělané občany, kteří se nebudou bát ověřovat informace a budou zkoušet hledat pravdu. Já vás, milí kolegové, vyzývám, chtějme informované občany, kteří hledají pravdu.


  Νότης Μαριάς (ECR). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, η διασφάλιση της ακεραιότητας των ευρωεκλογών είναι κάτι πολύ σημαντικό. Σημαίνει ότι τα μέσα μαζικής ενημέρωσης πρέπει να διασφαλίζουν την πολυφωνία. Όταν υπάρχει φίμωση και λογοκρισία είναι βέβαιο ότι αυτό θα οδηγήσει και σε fake news, γιατί επί της ουσίας αποκρύπτεται η αλήθεια. Έχω επανειλημμένα καταγγείλει εδώ τον αποκλεισμό και τη φίμωση του κινήματός μας, «Ελλάδα - Ο άλλος δρόμος», καθώς και τη δική μου φίμωση από τα συστημικά μέσα μαζικής ενημέρωσης στην Ελλάδα, είτε δημόσια είτε ιδιωτικά, τα οποία δεν δίνουν την ευκαιρία για προβολή των απόψεών μας· μάς έχουν κυριολεκτικά φιμώσει. Ταυτόχρονα, στο ίδιο μήκος κύματος κινούνται και οι δημοσκοπικές εταιρείες, οι οποίες δεν βάζουν το κόμμα μας στο ερωτηματολόγιο που απευθύνουν στους πολίτες.

Με τέτοιους όρους δεν μπορεί να λειτουργήσει η δημοκρατία στην Ελλάδα και δεν μπορούμε να πάμε σε ελεύθερες ευρωεκλογές στην Ελλάδα. Αυτό είναι κάτι το οποίο έχουμε καταγγείλει ως ECR και έχουμε στείλει επιστολές διαμαρτυρίας και στα ίδια τα μέσα μαζικής ενημέρωσης και στις δημοσκοπικές εταιρείες και στον υπουργό Εσωτερικών και θέλουμε, κύριε Επίτροπε, την παρέμβασή σας. Με τέτοιους όρους δεν διασφαλίζεται η ελεύθερη κυκλοφορία ιδεών στις επερχόμενες ευρωεκλογές στην Ελλάδα. Κυριολεκτικά μας έχουν φιμώσει.


  David McAllister (PPE). – Mr President, as Chair of AFET, I would just like to add a few words on the foreign policy dimension of protecting the integrity of our upcoming European elections.

Just in March, this plenary adopted the second report on the EU’s strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties. This report underlined how central freedom of speech and expression, as well as media pluralism, and identified Moscow’s aggressive campaigns as the main source of disinformation. I therefore welcome that the European External Action Service is increasing the staffing of the East Strategic Communication Task Force to better enable them to detect, to analyse, and to expose disinformation.

I agree with many colleagues here tonight, but moreover we must strive at both EU level and national level to defend our values and the fight of cyber and information warfare through a robust defence of our electoral processes. We need to raise awareness about these challenges, closely cooperating with the media, civil society organisations and social media platforms. And last, but not least, of course it is crucial that we improve the way in which we communicate about our EU values and policies.

(The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question under Rule 162(8))


  Bruno Gollnisch (NI), question «carton bleu». – Monsieur McAllister, vous avez évoqué les fausses informations en provenance de Moscou. Je n’ai pas beaucoup d’exemples en tête et je ne suis pas l’avocat du gouvernement russe, mais je voudrais savoir si vous avez des fausses informations émanant de Russie d’une gravité comparable à celles, par exemple, qu’a répandues dans le monde le gouvernement des États-Unis d’Amérique, en faisant agiter à la tribune de l’ONU, par le secrétaire d’État Colin Powell, une prétendue arme chimique de destruction massive qui ne contenait en réalité qu’une poudre inoffensive.


  David McAllister (PPE), Antwort auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Herr Kollege Gollnisch! Erlauben Sie, dass ich Ihnen auf Deutsch antwortete. Ich weiß nicht, ob Sie jetzt eine ernsthafte Antwort auf Ihre Frage erwarten. Es war mir klar, dass ein Vertreter der französischen Rechten keine Chance auslassen würde, um die russische Führung in Moskau zu verteidigen.

Ich will Ihnen eines deutlich machen, und das hat der Bericht, den wir im März beschlossen haben, klar zum Ausdruck gebracht: Es gibt massive russische Versuche, unsere europäische Einheit zu untergraben. Und es ist kein Zufall, dass ausgerechnet Russen Parteien wie die Ihre aktiv unterstützen. Sie sollten sich schämen, hier in diesem Europäischen Parlament auch nur den Ansatz zu unternehmen, diese Aktivitäten zu verteidigen!


Procedura “catch-the-eye”


  Seán Kelly (PPE). – Mr President, this is a very opportune discussion, especially with our European elections only six weeks away. I’d like to compliment Commissioner King for his proposals and his efforts to get to grips with this very worrying situation. Indeed, going back to Mark Zuckerberg when he appeared here in the European Parliament, he did indicate that the incidence of interference was in decline and obviously we need to ensure that it is reduced further.

I’m just wondering, especially in relation to all these fake accounts – 116 million – and I presume the people that were threatening to kill our good friend Mr Tarand probably had fake accounts as well, is there some way that we should look at monitoring fake accounts before they actually are accounts? In other words, is there some type of passport, proving your identity before you actually get on Facebook and the other social media platforms, because as long as fake accounts are there, they’re going to be able to do what they like with impunity, to a large degree.


  Dariusz Rosati (PPE). – Mr President, Commissioner, this is indeed a timely debate, as many speakers have said. I think that we have a lot of evidence, a lot of signals, of hostile interference in different instances in the European elections and also outside of Europe by Russian trolls and Russian vote participants – unwelcome participants in these elections. I am sure that this is something we have to confront very seriously, because this is indeed a practice that undermines the trust of European citizens in the European Union. We cannot just stay idle in front of these practices.

I would like to tell you, Commissioner, that I think that the exchange of information or exchanging good practices is OK, but still, this is not sufficient. It is not enough. I think we should be much more determined in confronting these practices, and I welcome the announcement that the task force devoted to this task will be strengthened. I think we all should take it very seriously, because otherwise this is going to be a threat to the unity and integrity of the European Union.


  Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D). – Señor presidente, comisario King, la libertad de expresión no da derecho a insultar, ni a injuriar, ni a calumniar. Y la libertad de información no da derecho a mentir, manipular ni intoxicar. Y, sin este principio elemental, la sociedad abierta es frágil, y la democracia vulnerable a menos que los demócratas hagamos algo al respecto.

Por eso es imprescindible, ante la revolución cibernética, que la democracia se defienda con una estrategia de ciberseguridad, que es lo que exigimos exactamente de la Comisión y del comisario de Seguridad ante este Parlamento Europeo. Para luchar contra las fake news, contra las guerras híbridas de troles y de perfiles falsos en la red. Y exactamente para que haya un debate informado ante las elecciones europeas del 26 de mayo.

Nada de eso nos exime, sin embargo, a los europeístas de comunicar y explicar en esas elecciones lo que realmente está en juego. Nada menos que el futuro de la Unión Europea. En un espacio democrático que merezca ese nombre, con un debate público en una sociedad abierta y libremente informada.

Ese es nuestro deber, porque el desafío de la Unión Europea, no les quepa la menor duda, en esta ocasión es realmente existencial.


  Ruža Tomašić (ECR). – Poštovani predsjedavajući, za demokraciju na europskom kontinentu od iznimne je važnosti zaustaviti pokušaj svakog vanjskog uplitanja u izbore na svim razinama, pa tako i u izbore za Europski parlament. Nužno je uložiti sve moguće napore kako bi izborni proces bio što transparentniji, a svi alati koji se u njemu koriste provjereni i sigurni.

Ali, za demokraciju u Europi ništa manje opasno nije ni često potpuno neutemeljeno svaljivanje krivnje za promjene na političkoj karti Europe na Rusiju, Ameriku i druge globalne igrače. Bojim se da nas nakon izbora čeka dugo razdoblje samozavaravanja u redovima federalista kakvo možemo vidjeti u Americi, među demokratima.

Političke snage koje su Uniju dovele do toga da je napušta jedna od najvećih, najbogatijih i najutjecajnijih članica bit će kažnjene na ovim izborima. Europljani ne žele superdržavu ni briselsko gaženje država članica. Žele suverene nacije i to će na izborima i pokazati.


  Ana Miranda (Verts/ALE). – Señor presidente, esta mañana me insultaron en Twitter con un perfil falso. Esta misma mañana, un partido político me pidió el voto sin haber sido amiga suya en Facebook.

Esta mañana, sentí la necesidad de venir a este debate cuando vi que estaba en el orden del día. No era un asunto personal, sino que era el debate de la manipulación, el ataque a la pluralidad, el ataque a la democracia.

Señor comisario, esta guerra cibernética va más allá de actuar ahora, a última hora, pero, por lo menos, se han dado algunos pasos, ¿no?

Esa necesidad de prevenir los riesgos asociados a la desinformación y a las noticias falsas está de actualidad, con incidentes de ciberseguridad en Facebook que han comprometido las noticias de millones de usuarios, también europeos y europeas.

Esta alteración de la democracia es, en definitiva, una injerencia electoral, pero ¿sabe para qué fundamentalmente? Para los partidos de extrema derecha; fundamentalmente para los partidos que incitan al odio y a la xenofobia y que amplifican un discurso racista y xenófobo. Lo estamos viviendo en estos momentos en el Estado español.

La eliminación de cuentas falsas en Twitter y Facebook, que no se permita el control no solo online, sino también offline, los análisis independientes y la transparencia política serían nuestro objetivo.


  Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski (PPE). – Panie Przewodniczący! Przez dwa lata pracowałem w komisji ds. terroryzmu. Tam bardzo często problematyka bezpieczeństwa w sieci była poruszana. Cyberbezpieczeństwo uznane zostało za jeden z ważniejszych problemów. Chcę wyraźnie podkreślić pojawiające się informacje, że terroryści działają nie tylko poprzez wysadzanie konkretnych materiałów wybuchowych. Mogą wysadzać systemy wyborcze także fake newsami. Ale chcę podkreślić jeszcze jeden bardzo ważny element. Rzeczywiście dziś, rozmawiając o sygnalistach, mówiliśmy o dwóch rzeczach jednocześnie: o konieczności ochrony tych, którzy sprawdzają fałszywe informacje, przekazują prawdziwe informacje o stanie instytucji publicznych. Ale też ważne jest, aby, krótko mówiąc, zwalczać także tych, którzy budują fałszywe przekazy, fałszywe oskarżenia, fake newsy, jak również oskarżenia pod adresem określonych partii politycznych czy osób. Jeżeli Europa ma być bezpieczna, to system wyborczy Europy musi być także bezpieczny. Ważna jest nieuchronność skutków wykrycia określonych nieprawidłowości. Ważna jest reaktywność instytucji europejskich, ale i instytucji rządowych wobec ingerencji zewnętrznych w procesy wyborcze. Ale ważna jest także edukacja samych wyborców, aby na to wszystko byli wyczuleni.


(Fine della procedura “catch-the-eye”)


  Julian King, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, thank you for this debate. I’m just going to respond on two points, if that’s alright. First of all there have been a number of suggestions, particularly from behind me, that in some way the work that we’re doing to tackle disinformation is against free speech, that in some way it amounts to censorship.

I want to be absolutely clear about this. We have never suggested, we will not suggest, that it is the responsibility of someone, whether it is public authorities, still less private sector, to judge whether a piece of political speech or a piece of political information is true or false, good or bad. The measures that we are seeking to promote through the Code are measures to promote greater transparency around political debate and political speech, greater transparency around the provenance of particular pieces of information – where does it come from? – so that we as citizens can be better equipped to assess that information and form our own judgments about it.

That’s what is involved in the measures that we are promoting through the Code, to have greater transparency around political adverts, sponsored content, to tackle the problems of bots and fake accounts, to use fact checkers more effectively, to have that independent scrutiny that many of you have spoken about, so that we know what is happening on these social media platforms, to have effective corrections when some piece of demonstrable disinformation has been circulated. For me, that’s the essence of defending free speech and free debate, and it is as far away as you can be from any sense of censorship.

The second thing that I want to react to: the importance of our cyber resilience, protecting ourselves from cyber-attacks, cyber-enabled interference. This is absolutely crucial. It’s why the Cybersecurity Act that you have voted and supported is so important, the new Cybersecurity Agency and the role that goes with it. But as a number of you have underlined, this needs to be implemented. I can assure you that we will do everything we can from the Commission side to follow up the effective implementation of the Cybersecurity Act, and indeed I hope that you will also support the cybersecurity competence centres and the research into cybersecurity that is going to underpin our future cybersecurity resilience.

We have to protect our critical digital infrastructure, the plumbing of our digital lives, of our digital political debate. Which is why it’s so important that we’ve now got these measures on foreign direct investment (FDI) screening, that we’ve got measures proposed around 5G security, so that people understand the importance not just of making judgments about digital infrastructure on the basis of price and cost, but also integrating security into those decisions.

Abraham Lincoln said: ‘Elections belong to the people. It’s their decision’. We need to make sure it stays that way.


  Melania Gabriela Ciot, President-in-Office of the Council. – Mr President, it is our duty to protect our elections, in full respect of fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, media and association. We do not want to be the ‘ministry of truth’, but we cannot be naive. These elections will not be business as usual, and our citizens have the right to vote freely.

Protecting elections is at the core of defending our European values. So far, the EU institutions and the Member States have spared no efforts to ensure preparedness. We understood the need for working together, learning from each other with the exchange of information and best practices, and putting in contact authorities which in the past worked in silence.

We put in place measures encouraging greater online transparency, accountability and integrity, ensuring the application of the General Data Protection Regulation and enhancing cybersecurity for the European elections to preserve the integrity of their electoral systems and infrastructure, strengthening citizens’ resilience and critical thinking. We are ready for the possible challenges ahead.

Allow me to quote from 1984 by George Orwell, who wrote: ‘Power is in tearing human minds to pieces and putting them together again in new shapes of your own choosing’. Some may want to interfere in the free elections of our political classes, reshape the minds of our voters by micro-targeting political advertisements and disinformation attacks. It is our role to protect democracy and internet freedom from such powers. We owe it to our citizens.


  Presidente. – La discussione congiunta è chiusa.

Ieri il Presidente ha annunciato due interpretazioni del regolamento proposte dalla commissione per gli affari costituzionali. Il gruppo EFDD ha presentato un’obiezione all’interpretazione dell’articolo 32, paragrafo 5, primo comma, secondo trattino, di conseguenza questa interpretazione del regolamento sarà messa ai voti domani.

Per quanto riguarda l’interpretazione dell’articolo 149 bis, paragrafo 2, non sono state sollevate obiezioni entro il termine di ventiquattrore, questa interpretazione quindi è ritenuta approvata conformemente all’articolo 226.

Dichiarazioni scritte (articolo 162)


  Urmas Paet (ALDE), kirjalikult. – Oluline on tagada Euroopa Parlamendi valimiste usaldusväärsus ja turvalisus küberjulgeoleku seisukohast. Juba varem on Euroopa Parlament nentinud, et näiteks Venemaa väärinfokampaaniad on Euroopas peamine väärinfo allikas. Samuti on tunda Venemaa, Hiina, Iraani ja Põhja-Korea üha agressiivsemaid samme, millega püütakse õõnestada Euroopa demokraatia aluseid. Vaja on õigusraamistikku hübriidohtude, sh küber- ja inforünnakute vastu võitlemiseks ELi ja rahvusvahelisel tasandil.

Letzte Aktualisierung: 25. Juli 2019Rechtlicher Hinweis - Datenschutzbestimmungen