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Pirmadienis, 2020 m. rugsėjo 14 d. - Briuselis Atnaujinta informacija

24. Ginklų eksportas. Bendrosios pozicijos 2008/944/BUSP įgyvendinimas (diskusijos)
Kalbų vaizdo įrašas

  Przewodnicząca. – Kolejnym punktem porządku dziennego jest sprawozdanie sporządzone przez Hannah Neumann w imieniu Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych w sprawie wywozu broni: wdrażanie wspólnego stanowiska 2008/944/WPZiB (2020/2003(INI)) (A9-0137/2020).


  Hannah Neumann, rapporteur. – Madam President, arms are not like any other export goods, because far too often they are used to suppress opposition or to kill civilians. And that is why it’s so important that once a year we discuss EU arms exports in this Parliament, and that’s also why it’s so important that we use this report to improve our way to control where arms end up in this world. And that’s why I decided to use my report to focus on two things: on transparency and on convergence. In our report we all together reached quite a lot. For example, we are calling on the European External Action Service to actually translate these 500 pages of numbers and columns into an online-searchable database so that public oversight is actually possible.

We also ask the European External Action Service to build up a joint EU-level end-user control, rather than forcing 27 Member States to do like a semi-functional system, and we have a number of other suggestions on which we reached broad consensus in our negotiations. And I think we can be very proud, because they help us to better scrutinise and regulate EU arms exports. But as proud as we all can be, this doesn’t solve the main problem, and the main problem is that we have one common position on arms export of the EU, but we have 27 national interpretations, 27 export systems, and an increasing divergence in actual exports of Member States. And the more we work together in arms production, the more this will be a problem ˗ the more this will be a problem for democratic control and oversight, because if Member States produce arms together, who actually decides over the exports? Is it the Member State that puts in the most parts? Is it the Member State that puts in the last screw? Can one block all? Do you need to vouch your rights for democratic control before you can join? This is not very clear. And the conflict between France and Germany last year over arms exports to Saudi Arabia clearly showed how easily this can create tensions.

But this divergence is also a problem for a common EU foreign and security policy. We were also happy about the good results of the Berlin Conference earlier this year. We even set up an EU mission in the Mediterranean to enforce the arms embargo against Libya, and this very same mission reported a violation of the arms embargo by Turkey and the UAE, yet EU Member States still supply Turkey, the UAE and all the other countries breaking this arms embargo with weapons, and some of these weapons end up with Sarraj, others end up with Haftar, all fuelling the violence. And Mr Borrell, I really wouldn’t want to be in your shoes trying to build a consistent EU foreign policy on that mess.

And then, my dear colleagues from EPP, there’s the arms industry: the arms industry that already today complains that all these national regulations make cooperation super difficult, that arms export decisions are not reliable and that they cannot do business that way. And to be frank, I totally get their point. And dear colleagues, all these examples clearly show that if we want to do joint arms production, we need to do joint arms export control as one EU. What I really don’t understand is why the Commission, the Member States and parts of this Parliament are pushing so much for an internal defence market for joint arms production ˗ even putting money into it ˗ and at the same time, the very same people refuse to even discuss an EU-level involvement in democratic oversight and export control and thereby undermine what they want to reach: a European defence union and strategic autonomy of the European Union.

I want to thank all my shadows for the very fierce and fair debates we had in the negotiations. We’ve reached a lot, but on this point we didn’t reach consensus, and that’s why I decided to bring it to the parliamentary debate today. I’m very much looking forward to the discussion.


  Josep Borrell Fontelles, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Madam President, I would like to start by thanking Ms Neumann and Members who have contributed to this important resolution on European arms exports. I think it includes many useful suggestions that will help me to deal with a difficult subject like this in a more convergent, transparent and responsible way.

You are right that decisions on arms exports receive great attention and are politically sensitive because indeed trade in arms may potentially carry the risk of serious breaches for human rights, humanitarian law and regional stability, and most of the time the three things together. A strict implementation by Member States of the agreed common positions on arms exports is therefore essential to uphold the European Union’s values and its strategic objective. As you state in your report, this is also crucial for our credibility as a geopolitical player. A high level of convergence with regard to its full application will indeed more effectively ensure respect for human rights and international law by all parties involved.

I think we can say that we, the European Union, are moving fast in the field of defence. The European Defence Fund and the European Peace Facility will serve to strengthen internal collaboration on defence matters to make the European Union a more capable security provider at the global level. Our defence industries will become ever more closely intertwined. They will strengthen our strategic autonomy and the protection of our citizens, fostering innovation and saving cost. All that is right, but, at the same time, in this context, further convergence of arms export policies becomes still more important.

As mentioned in your motion for a resolution, maintaining a vibrant and innovative defence industry in the European Union is a key component of our strategic autonomy and our European defence. It serves to ensure our capabilities and reduce dependency, while the defence industry is also a major source of technological innovation. I will give you some examples. In 2018, it generated more than EUR 100 billion in revenue and supported more than 400 000 jobs in Europe – 400 000 jobs!

To ensure a thriving defence industry, exports are essential, but of course the defence industry is different from other industrial sectors and deserves special consideration, taking into account its obvious links to national and international security, human rights and humanitarian values. That’s why the European Union Member States have also exported control rules in place for military equipment since 2008. Under the common position on arms export, Member States assess arms export license applications against a number of criteria established to ensure our strategic interests and also our values. A review of this text was finalised last year. The Council agreed that the common position will serve this purpose but introduce some changes to bring the text into line with the adopted Arms Trade Treaty and other recent developments.

In your own statement on the common position on arms export control, you stress three key objectives: the need for increased control, convergency and transparency. First, your support for an increase control. Let me start by saying that I am grateful the report welcomes operations within these objectives to implement a United Nations arms embargo on Libya. This is a concrete example of what the European Union does to prevent arms ending up in the wrong hands. Further, as a global actor, the EU supports outreach activities to assist countries in the European neighbourhood and beyond in setting up arms export control mechanisms and implementing the Arms Trade Treaty.

Second, on transparency, European Union Member States are already among the most transparent countries, including in arms exports. Still, in order to increase the possibility to further scrutinise accountability, I am glad to say that this year the European External Action Service will launch a public, searchable database on its website to allow all stakeholders to consult and analyse Member States’ arms exports in a user-friendly way. So everybody will be able to know what the Member States’ arms exports are about – everybody will be able to find out whatever data they want to know about it.

Third, and lastly, increased convergence. Member States are holding regular exchanges to share information on policies, denial of licences and possible measures. As a concrete result, a new initiative has been launched and the working party on arms exports is currently preparing a Council decision to set rules on end-user certificates for the export of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition.

Let me conclude by anticipating that the next annual European Union arms export report on 2019 will become available shortly, probably in October, two months earlier than in previous years, and it will bring a lot of precious information about these developments. I would like to thank you for your attention. I am looking forward to hearing your points or views.


  Arnaud Danjean, au nom du groupe PPE. – Madame la Présidente, merci à la rapporteure et à tous les collègues qui se sont impliqués sur ce texte difficile.

Difficile, parce que ce sujet mêle des considérations industrielles, juridiques et morales, on l’a bien compris dans l’exposé d’introduction, sur un sujet sensible. Et puis difficile aussi parce qu’il faut bien l’avouer, ce Parlement n’a pas de prérogatives sur le sujet.

Je comprends que cela chagrine beaucoup de collègues qui aimeraient pouvoir se saisir du contrôle des exportations d’armement mais ce n’est pas le cas, c’est une prérogative nationale. Là où je m’inscris en faux contre ce qui a été dit en introduction de ce débat, c’est que ce n’est pas parce que ce Parlement européen n’exerce pas de contrôle sur un sujet, que le contrôle démocratique n’existe pas. Le contrôle démocratique existe dans nos parlements nationaux sur ce sujet très précis des contrôles d’exportation d’armement. C’est une des réserves assez fortes que mon groupe a sur ce rapport, à savoir que ces prérogatives nationales ne doivent pas engendrer une suspicion systématique de la part de notre Parlement.

L’autre point de réserve concerne un point abordé par la rapporteure, qui est la production d’armement à l’échelle européenne. Cependant, Mesdames et Messieurs, l’Union européenne en tant que telle ne produit pas d’armement et les instruments que vous évoquez, le Fonds européen de défense par exemple, sont encore des instruments virtuels. Je vous rappelle que ce fonds n’a ni budget, pour l’instant, ni même règlement d’application et que quand il entrera en vigueur, il portera vraisemblablement sur un milliard par an. Chacun sait que les programmes d’armement sont bien plus vastes que cela. Donc, on en parlera en temps utile. Quand ces programmes d’armement européens, véritablement européens, existeront, nous pourrons peut-être parler des modalités de contrôle. Pour l’instant, c’est du virtuel. Donc, je comprends l’impatience de certains collègues à vouloir faire jouer un rôle plus actif à cette chambre, mais nous n’en sommes pas là. C’est pour cela que mon groupe a de fortes réserves sur les motivations très idéologiques de ce rapport, même si nous soutiendrons tout ce qui va dans le sens de la convergence, de la transparence et de la bonne information.


  Joachim Schuster, im Namen der S&D-Fraktion. – Sehr geehrte Frau Präsidentin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Auch ich möchte der Berichterstatterin danken für die viele Arbeit, die in dem Entwurf steckt. Ich glaube, es gibt viele Gründe, die es nahelegen, dass die EU außen- und sicherheitspolitisch stärker zusammenrückt.

Und ein Element einer größeren außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Souveränität liegt sicherlich auch in einer verstärkten Zusammenarbeit bei der Rüstungsproduktion. Europäische Kooperation macht kostspielige Doppelstrukturen überflüssig und kann damit auch öffentliche Mittel einsparen, die wir dringend für friedliche Konfliktbearbeitung und für die Beseitigung von Konfliktursachen benötigen.

Aber vermehrte Rüstungskooperation, sei es nun im Rahmen der EU oder sei es zwischen einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten, erfordert auch eine europäische Rüstungsexportkontrolle, gerade angesichts der Tatsache, dass die EU-Staaten zusammen der zweitgrößte Rüstungsexporteur der Welt hinter den USA sind. Denn strikte Rüstungsexportkontrolle ist unzweifelhaft verbunden mit einer stärkeren europäischen Kooperation und kann dann eben nicht mehr nur noch als nationale Angelegenheit betrachtet werden.

Schon 2008 hat die EU Kriterien verabschiedet, die im Falle von Rüstungsexporten durch die Mitgliedstaaten geprüft und eingehalten werden sollen. Allerdings werden die Kriterien bis heute nicht immer beachtet. Das gilt selbst bei Waffenexporten an Länder, die sich an den Kriegen im Jemen und in Libyen beteiligen.

Waffenexporte ermöglichen zum Teil erst militärische Auseinandersetzungen oder verlängern sie. Häufig wird es durch sie ermöglicht, Völkerrecht zu brechen. Das heißt, es reicht nicht nur, hehre Absichten zu bekunden und Mitgliedstaaten folgenlos aufzufordern, sich entsprechend der gemeinsamen Kriterien zu verhalten. Wir brauchen auch einen Sanktionsmechanismus für den Fall, dass einzelne Mitgliedstaaten die vereinbarten gemeinsamen Kriterien ignorieren, denn europäische Kooperation erfordert auch europäische Durchsetzung.

Und ein Weiteres, was aktuell hinzugekommen ist: Wir brauchen einen sofortigen Stopp aller Rüstungsexporte in die Türkei. Die Türkei bedroht uns mit Krieg. Es wäre doch absurd, wenn wir der Türkei auch noch die Waffen dazu liefern, um EU-Bürger umzubringen. Deswegen möchte ich Sie bitten, den Änderungsantrag der S&D-Fraktion zu unterstützen.


  Klemen Grošelj, on behalf of the Renew Group. – Madam President, the report assesses the implementation of the Common Position on arms export and related technologies, and evaluates the progress that the EU, and especially Member States, have made so far.

This report is a political compromise that reflects the complex nature of the topic. It spans from the basic right of every state to self-defence, enshrined in the UN Charter, to the eternal aspiration of human kind for universal peace and security. Arms export and related technologies are inevitably subject to fierce ideological discussion.

The report reflects the steps forward made by Member States towards respecting the EU Common Position on arms export, and more and more Member States are following the Common Position and its eight criteria on arms export and related technologies. Although greater progress is needed, it is important to recognise all efforts made in this report. And we must bear in mind that arms export is still a Member State competence, which is why the progress made in respecting the Common Position is even more important.

The future development of the Union and of the international environment will require greater convergence among Member States on arms export. A growing number of joint development programmes in the field of defence production will expose the need for a common approach to arms export among Member States as well as at EU-level. Defence production is destined to become more European and arms export control mechanisms will need to reflect this new reality. This new reality, in turn, will need to be reflected in EU legislation as well.

But despite great ambitions, we are not yet at that point. This is why we are not in favour of an ad hoc sanction mechanism in this field and prefer a future European solution instead. This can be achieved through a gradual approach, in parallel with the development and strengthening of the common security and defence policy.

Regardless of all differences, the report reiterates that the Common Position and its necessary mechanisms must ensure that exported arms and related technologies are not used in a wrong way and above all, are not in the possession of the wrong actors. We need to ensure that exported arms and technologies are not used for violating human rights and basic values.


  Jérôme Rivière, au nom du groupe ID. – Monsieur le Président, depuis le début de cette mandature, certains groupes, sous le regard bienveillant de la Commission, manifestent une folle volonté de s’ingérer dans un domaine régalien par excellence, qui n'appartient qu'aux nations, celui de la défense.

Après avoir essayé de détourner des crédits pour les perdre dans un Fonds européen de défense, qui viendrait soutenir des programmes d'armement sans qu'un besoin opérationnel d'état-major les ait validés, ils tentent avec ce texte de réguler les exportations d'armement. Tous les prétextes sont bons pour arracher aux États les derniers pans de leur souveraineté. Quel aveuglement!

Plus que jamais, le monde est incertain. En Méditerranée, cet espace historique, économique et culturel, éclatent des tensions qui vont façonner notre avenir. L'Union européenne démontre son incapacité à agir; pire, elle marque de fortes divergences entre un bloc continental, emmené par l'Allemagne, et les pays du Sud. Menacée par la Turquie, c'est bien la France qui, par sa politique souveraine d'exportation d'armements, dans les aires autonomes de son armée et de sa marine, livre à la Grèce dans un temps record les Rafale dont elle a besoin.

Chaque fois, l'actualité démontre l'absurdité de ces projets. Nous continuerons à nous opposer à cette vision centralisatrice, réductrice et affaiblissante, qui consiste à éloigner les peuples des nations et de leurs parlements, seuls centres légitimes de la prise de décision politique.


  Salima Yenbou, au nom du groupe Verts/ALE. – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur Borrell, dites -moi comment l'Union européenne peut encore être crédible dans ses discours sur les droits humains, si ses propres États membres continuent d’exporter des armes utilisées contre les populations vers des zones de guerre, parfois sous des prétextes sécuritaires, souvent en réalité dans un but économique. Comment pouvons-nous accepter que, dans mon pays et ailleurs, une ministre de la défense puisse se cacher derrière le manque de transparence pour nier que des armes françaises participent à la perpétuation de crimes de guerre, notamment au Yémen?

La situation actuelle est inacceptable. Nous attendons de la Commission von der Leyen et de la présidence allemande une véritable stratégie pour faire en sorte que cela cesse. Je rappelle que parmi les dix premiers pays exportateurs d'armes au monde, sept sont européens. C’est une raison supplémentaire d'exiger qu'aucune arme européenne ne puisse être utilisée contre les populations civiles, nulle part dans le monde. La transparence la plus totale doit être instaurée. L'Union européenne ne doit plus fermer les yeux sur ces scandales. Pour finir, soyons cohérents de nos paroles à nos actes.


  Özlem Demirel, im Namen der GUE/NGL-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin, Herr Borrell! Die Friedensnobelpreisträgerin EU lässt nicht nur unmenschliche Zustände in Moria zu, nein, mit Waffenexporten werden sogar Fluchtursachen geschaffen.

Diese Politik ist in keiner Weise zu relativieren oder zu entschuldigen. Beispiele wären: Jemen, ein brutaler Krieg, mit dabei Waffen made in EU. Syrien, Dschihadisten auf Leopardpanzern, ein völkerrechtswidriger Einmarsch, mit dabei Waffen made in EU. Östliches Mittelmeer, eine Eskalationsspirale. Griechenland bekommt Waffen aus Frankreich, die Türkei Waffen aus Deutschland. Was heißt das? Wieder Waffen made in EU!

Liebe Kollegen, die EU ist Vize-Weltmeisterin in Waffenexporten. Die Kassen der Rüstungskonzerne klingeln. Und ich frage mich, was ist eigentlich mit dem gemeinsamen Standpunkt, der Rüstungsexporte in Krisengebiete verbietet, untersagt – interessiert das hier überhaupt noch? Ich finde, wir brauchen Sanktionen für diese Missbräuche, denn der gemeinsame Standpunkt muss eingehalten werden. Und dafür sind auch Sie in der Pflicht, Herr Borrell!


  Fabio Massimo Castaldo (NI). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, gentile Alto rappresentante, negli ultimi quattro anni i 28, ora 27 Stati membri dell'UE sono stati complessivamente il secondo maggior fornitore mondiale di attrezzature militare con il 26% dell'export totale.

Cifre importanti che, da un lato, dimostrano la competitività del settore industriale, dall'altro mettono in discussione lo strumento guida per quanto riguarda la concessione di licenze di export, quella posizione comune giuridicamente vincolante, ma spesso, anzi quasi sempre, non rispettata, perché mancano ripercussioni per le violazioni. Credo fortemente che questo processo debba essere accompagnato da altrettanti strumenti di controllo finalmente comunitari che vadano oltre la posizione comune.

Abbiamo fatto tanto per la difesa, creando il nuovo fondo europeo per la difesa e parlando di mobilità militare, ma questo non può non andare di pari passo con l'introduzione di un regime comune in materia di esportazioni, che comprenda un organo di vigilanza e un robusto meccanismo sanzionatorio per tutti i governi violatori.

È necessario fare questo per essere credibili, se vogliamo davvero essere quell'attore globale campione di pace e diplomazia che spesso dichiariamo.


  Νίκος Ανδρουλάκης (S&D). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, κύριε Αντιπρόεδρε, σήμερα συζητάμε για την εφαρμογή της κοινής θέσης του Συμβουλίου για τις εξαγωγές όπλων σε τρίτες χώρες. Αν θέλουμε να είμαστε ειλικρινείς με τους εαυτούς μας, η κοινή αυτή θέση παραμένει ένα ευχολόγιο. Χαρακτηριστικό παράδειγμα είναι η Τουρκία: Μόνο τα τελευταία δύο χρόνια, έχουμε παράνομες εισβολές στη Συρία και μία παράνομη εισβολή στο Ιράκ, τον μη σεβασμό της απόφασης για εμπάργκο όπλων στη Λιβύη —όπου μάλιστα η Τουρκία απείλησε φρεγάτα που δρούσε στο πλαίσιο της επιχείρησης «Ειρήνη»—, τις παραβιάσεις των κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων Ελλάδας και Κύπρου, και βεβαίως μια απειλή πολέμου — το γνωστό «casus belli» που χρονολογείται από το 1995. Παρόλα αυτά, και ενώ το Συμβούλιο έχει ζητήσει ήδη από τον περασμένο Οκτώβριο την αυστηρή εφαρμογή της κοινής θέσης απέναντι στην Τουρκία, τίποτα δεν έχει αλλάξει. Για αυτό τον λόγο σας ζητούμε, με τροπολογία που καταθέσαμε, να αναλάβετε πρωτοβουλία ώστε να σταματήσουν οι εξαγωγές ευρωπαϊκών όπλων προς την Τουρκία. Δεν μπορεί να χρησιμοποιούνται τα ευρωπαϊκά όπλα για να απειλούνται δύο κράτη μέλη μας. Και μάλιστα αυτό που πρέπει να κάνετε είναι το ελάχιστο δείγμα αλληλεγγύης, και πρέπει να γίνει άμεσα.


  Clara Ponsatí Obiols (NI). – Madam President, this Parliament has repeatedly called for arms exports to Saudi Arabia to stop. But these calls are ignored. Spain has a long tradition of arms deals with Saudi Arabia and the government of Mr Sánchez, keeping up with this tradition, has authorised sales for about 400 million in 2019. Deals with the Saudis are the family business of the Spanish royals, a business that operates under the complacent watch of all Spanish governments since 1975. King Juan Carlos’s affairs with his Saudi buddies are now finally under investigation, but not in Spain – in Switzerland. What are the Spanish authorities doing about this? Nothing. They not only refused to investigate, they participated in the cover-up. They sent the King to Abu Dhabi to hide away from Swiss justice and they keep on selling weapons to the Saudis. This must stop. Corrupt interest in Member States cannot take precedence over our moral obligations.


  Pierfrancesco Majorino (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, il commercio e l'esportazione di armi devono obbedire non solo a delle logiche industriali ma innanzitutto a delle strategie di politica estera europea e, in questo contesto, al rigoroso rispetto dei diritti umani e dei nostri valori fondamentali.

Per questo dobbiamo migliorare la trasparenza e il controllo parlamentare e definire un meccanismo di sanzioni che garantiscano l'assoluto rispetto delle regole.

La situazione è davvero molto preoccupante: ce lo dobbiamo dire. Pensiamo al fatto che diversi Stati membri continuano ed esportare in Egitto armi e strumenti utilizzati per la repressione interna, in un paese dove è conclamata l'assenza di diritti umani e democratici, e ciò nonostante una decisione del Consiglio europeo del 2013, palesemente ignorata. O agli affari – pensiamo anche a questo – sempre legati all'industria degli armamenti, che troppi fanno in Turchia, o a quel che accade in Libia.

Il controllo sulla vendita di armi non è certamente la soluzione di tutti i problemi ma è un elemento essenziale per mandare segnali politici chiari e forti di cui c'è un enorme bisogno.


  Josep Borrell Fontelles, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Madam President, I understand the criticism. I heard some interesting points for sure. Let me summarise some of your points.

First, criticism on exports from Member States to sensitive destinations. Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have been mentioned, but as one of the members that participated in the debate rightly remembered, decisions when issuing export licences are taken at the national level. So there is very little we can do from the European Commission. This is something that is taken at the national level, but we can call for more conversions in arms export policies as the Member States implement it. And on that, I agree completely. Here we are together, because we think that we can behave together in accordance with general rules which reflect our values. So it’s a Member State competence, but we need more convergence on the way each Member State implements these competences.

There are also calls for arms embargoes for specific destinations. I could also agree, but an arms embargo to a specific destination requires unanimity in the Council. You should be aware of that, and you know how difficult it is to get unanimity today. But for sure, we can try to agree an arms embargo, but then you have to implement them and experience shows how difficult it is to do so, as we tried to do with the Irini operation in Libya. First unanimity, and second the willingness to really implement the decision.

Military weapons have an indispensable role in the preservation of security, freedom and peace, provided that they are used in accordance with international law, human rights law and international humanitarian law. You cannot pretend to have security, and to protect freedom and peace, without having military resources. But you have to use them according to the law, and weapons of war are, by definition, capable of inflicting death and destruction. This ambivalence means that governments that export the weapons must ensure that they are traded and used in a responsible and accountable way, and prevent their diversion to terrorists, criminals and other unauthorised users. This must remain our ambition: to control the use of these weapons in order that they are not being misused. But by definition weapons inflict death and destruction, and our role is to try to be sure that they are used in accordance with the rules of war, and with the rules that protect human rights.

Accountability for arms export decisions can only take place when authorities are transparent, and the European Union does all it can to ensure that utmost transparency is being upheld. This enables national parliaments, civil society and also the European Parliament to hold informed debate, and the Council and the Parliament clearly agree that the strengthening of the European defence technologies and industrial base should be accompanied by closer cooperation and conversions in the control of exports of military technology and equipment.

I will continue working in the process of increased convergence, and promoting more transparency in arms exports in the framework of the competences of the Commission and of the High Representative.


  Hannah Neumann, rapporteur. – Madam President, we reached a lot with this report and I would be very happy if we could confirm our many forward-looking proposals in the final version on Wednesday. But let’s not stop halfway. If we want the EU to play a role in this world in chaos, and if we want to build a true European defence union, we need to join in arms production, but we also need to join in oversight and arms export control. Et je comprends bien que ce sujet est une prérogative nationale, oui, but there is one thing that this European project has taught us: no one is going to come, Mr Borrell, and give this European Union and this Commission any competences all by themselves, and no one is going to come and offer this Parliament any rights for scrutiny, oversight or control. If we do not claim it and fight for it, it’s not going to happen.

And that’s why I call on all pro-European parties in this House – and I deliberately include PPE and Renew in this one – to vote tomorrow for Amendment 19; to vote for Amendment 19 that calls on the Member States and Commission to translate the Common Position on EU arms export, the Common Position that was reaffirmed by all 27 Member States one year ago, to transfer this Common Position into EU law. And to do it, to finish what we started, and make sure that the European Union can really control where EU arms, arms produced inside the EU, end up in this world in chaos.


  Przewodnicząca. – Zamykam debatę.

Głosowanie nad poprawkami odbędzie się we wtorek 15 września 2020 r., a głosowanie końcowe – w środę 16 września 2020 r.

Atnaujinta: 2020 m. gruodžio 8 d.Teisinė informacija - Privatumo politika