Doslovno izvješće

Utorak, 20. listopada 2020. - Bruxelles

14. Preporuka potpredsjedniku Komisije / Visokom predstavniku Unije za vanjske poslove i sigurnosnu politiku u vezi s pripremom postupka revizije Ugovora o neširenju nuklearnog oružja (NPT) 2020., kontroli nuklearnog oružja i mogućnostima nuklearnog razoružanja (rasprava)

  Die Präsidentin. – Als nächster Punkt der Tagesordnung folgt die Aussprache über den Bericht von Sven Mikser im Namen des Ausschusses für auswärtige Angelegenheiten über eine Empfehlung des Europäischen Parlaments an den Rat und den Vizepräsidenten der Kommission/Hohen Vertreter der Union für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik zur Vorbereitung des im Jahr 2020 vorgesehenen Verfahrens zur Überprüfung des Vertrags über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen (NVV), zur nuklearen Rüstungskontrolle und zu Möglichkeiten der nuklearen Abrüstung (2020/2004(INI)) (A9-0020/2020).

Auch in dieser Debatte sind weder spontane Wortmeldungen noch blaue Karten oder Wortmeldungen zur Geschäftsordnung zugelassen.

Es sind keine angemeldet, aber theoretisch würden wir auch hier Online-Zuschaltungen aus den Mitgliedstaaten vorsehen.

  Sven Mikser, rapporteur. – Madam President, the NPT or the Treaty on the Non—Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force over 50 years ago, in March 1970. The Treaty consists of three mutually reinforcing pillars which deal respectively with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and the civilian use of nuclear energy. The Treaty has been joined by 191 nations, which is the overwhelming majority of the global community, including all five of the recognised nuclear weapons states. As such the Treaty represents the only binding commitment by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to work towards global nuclear disarmament.

At the 1995 Review Conference the Treaty’s duration was extended indefinitely. A review conference of the Treaty is held every five years, but regrettably every other one of those review conferences in this century has ended without a consensus regarding the final document. Therefore I believe that it is of critical importance that the 50—year anniversary review conference, already postponed once because of the COVID pandemic, be a success.

Our 27 Member States joined the NPT as individual nations, but I believe that in order to contribute to the success of the upcoming review conference, it is necessary that a strong consensus position be forged among the EU Member States. The recommendations to the Council that we are going to vote on at this week’s plenary session are aimed at helping the Member States to agree on such a position.

I would argue that regarding its central objectives, the NPT has been relatively successful during the past half century. The nightmare scenarios painted during and after the Cold War regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons to dozens of countries around the world have not materialised, and after the end of the Cold War the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States were brought down significantly from the peak numbers of warheads.

Yet significant problems and challenges remain as many of the objectives of the Treaty have yet to be fulfilled and some important stones in the nuclear disarmament and non—proliferation architecture are still missing. The CTBT, or the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, negotiated in the 1990s is still awaiting ratification by a number of its Article 16 countries, and the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty is still under discussion at the UN Conference on Disarmament, with not much tangible progress to show during the past several years.

Moreover, even though a vast majority of the global community of nations have joined the NPT, there are still some outliers, including countries that are known or believed to be in possession of nuclear weapons or are believed to have pursued nuclear weapons programmes in the past. It must be noted that, with the exception of the five nuclear weapon states, all other countries are only able to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. While the immediate accession of the remaining outliers is thus not likely, a question remains as to how to make sure that they would not contribute to global or regional proliferation of nuclear weapons materials and know-how.

There are additional clouds on the horizon. Over the past several years, we have seen gradual erosion of important arms control regimes that have for decades been a critical element of European security. Following the consistent violations by Russia, the US has left the INF, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, last year. The future of the JCPOA, the so-called Iran nuclear deal, remains uncertain. The US announcement that it would leave the Open Skies Treaty throws in doubt the future of an important transparency and confidence building instrument. As the New START Treaty is expected to expire next year it is inevitable that the growing level of tensions and mistrust do not contribute positively to the atmosphere of negotiating its successor. Yet when it comes to the future of nuclear disarmament, it is the two countries in possession of the bulk of global nuclear arsenals that bear the greatest responsibility.

Perhaps even more worrisome is the increasing reliance by some nuclear weapon states on those weapons in their military doctrines. With nuclear disarmament efforts having stalled significantly, a new delivery system is being designed and built, the danger of intentional or unintentional escalation involving the use or effective use of nuclear weapons is growing. All that is why the success of the NPT Review Conference is of utmost importance for global as well as European security.

But let me end with a word of caution. It is clear that our eventual goal must be a nuclear-free world and the elimination of nuclear weapons, but it is a goal that we must approach pragmatically, evaluating very carefully both the immediate and long-term security consequences and implications of each step along the way. A nuclear-free world cannot be negotiated and agreed upon without the participation of the five nuclear weapon states. No false parity must be created between the five nuclear weapon states and those actors that are pursuing nuclear weapons illegally.

While on the one hand every nuclear warhead less is a step towards a more secure world, it is also true that the world where the only remaining nuclear weapons are the illegal ones is not a safer place for us to live in. Therefore I strongly believe that while looking for all possible alternative avenues to reach our eventual goal, we should not choose the ones that risks bringing the time-tested NPT and its review process to a standstill.

  Josep Borrell Fontelles, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Madam President, I would like to thank the rapporteur and all Members of Parliament who have contributed to these recommendations ahead of the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This upcoming review conference is the next most important event on global non-proliferation and disarmament – at least what remains of it. Despite current uncertainty about when the conference will take place, it remains the most important event in the world on non-proliferation and disarmament.

We are all concerned about the deteriorating security environment and the continued pressure on the nuclear non-proliferation architecture, as illustrated by the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. We very much regretted it when it happened and we continue to regret it now.

It is essential that all state parties comply with their Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations and fully implement all commitments under the Treaty. Upholding and preserving the Non-Proliferation Treaty must remain a key priority for European Union foreign policy. The European Union strongly supports all three pillars of the Treaty – non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy – and we will continue to promote a comprehensive, balanced and full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan.

Through intensive diplomatic engagement, backed up by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), under the Council decision we are promoting the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the preparation of negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. We are also proud to support the regional conference in preparation for the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. We are also going to double our efforts to uphold international norms, to restore dialogue and trust, and to promote transparency and confidence-building measures. Together with Member States, we are preparing a strong and forward-looking common European Union position for the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and I would like to stress some of the key elements of our position in the context of your report.

First, we will continue to call strongly on the United States and Russia to extend the New START Treaty before February 2021, and we will encourage negotiations for a broader future agreement. Second, we welcome the various initiatives for nuclear disarmament, including the Stockholm Initiative. Third, we acknowledge the increased attention given to risk reduction and we hope discussions on this topic gain broad support.

The promotion of universal adherence and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, as I have already mentioned, remain top priorities for the European Union and this conference will also provide an opportunity to address the non-proliferation crisis. We continue to call on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to refrain from further provocations and to take concrete steps towards abandoning all its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes.

We will also reaffirm our commitment and support for the Iran nuclear deal, the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We deeply regret the United States’ 2018 withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the subsequent reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran. At the same time, we are gravely concerned by Iran’s activities that are inconsistent with the JCPOA and have severe proliferation implications.

Finally, let me underline that we also take due note of your proposal to encourage talks on the possibility of a multilateral ballistic missile treaty.

Thank you for all your comments, observations and proposals. Mr Mikser, Honourable Members, I look forward to listening to your views and I thank you for your attention.

  Lukas Mandl, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! Sehr geehrter Herr Hoher Außenbeauftragter und Außenkommissar, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen. Wir müssen uns die verheerende Zerstörungskraft von Atomwaffen vor Augen führen. Wir müssen auch dafür sorgen, dass es nicht in Vergessenheit gerät, wie anders als alle anderen Waffen Atomwaffen sind. Und wir wissen, dass in der Vergangenheit oft von Abschreckung die Rede war und davon, dass die gegenseitige Abschreckung ein gewisses Maß an Sicherheit bieten würde. Das stimmt sicher bis zu einem gewissen Grad, aber noch besser als Abschreckung, nämlich viel besser, ist Abrüstung bei Atomwaffen.

Ich bin daher froh, dass es den Atomwaffenverbotsvertrag gibt. Ich bin nicht froh, dass erst drei EU-Mitgliedstaaten, nämlich Irland, Malta und mein Heimatland Österreich, den Atomwaffenverbotsvertrag bereits ratifiziert haben. Ich möchte uns alle auch daran erinnern, dass eine große Gefahr auch davon ausgeht, dass nichtstaatliche Akteure in den Besitz von Atomwaffen kommen können, und die verheerenden Auswirkungen, wenn Terrorakte mit Atomwaffen verübt werden, sind fast nicht vorstellbar.

Ich finde es richtig, dass die USA und Russland über ein Nachfolgeabkommen für das vom Hohen Außenbeauftragten bereits genannte START-Abkommen verhandeln. Ich finde es gut, dass das in der Hauptstadt meines Heimatlandes Österreich, in Wien, stattfindet. Ich finde es schlecht, dass China sich völlig entzieht. Ich finde es schlecht, dass China ganz einfach nicht teilnimmt an solchen Verhandlungen, aber wir sollten nicht zurückstecken dabei, Atomwaffen zurückzuschrauben, abzurüsten und – ja – auch an eine atomwaffenfreie Welt eines Tages zu glauben.

  Andreas Schieder, im Namen der S&D-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin, Hoher Beauftragter! Fünfzehntausend Atombomben gibt es weltweit, und eine einzelne heutige Atombombe hat ein Vielfaches, ein Zigfaches der Sprengkraft jener Bomben, die auf Hiroshima und Nagasaki geworfen wurden. Mit dem Kernwaffenarsenal, das auf der Welt existiert, könnte man die Welt 150 Mal vernichten, und Russland hat 2019 zehn Milliarden US-Dollar, die USA 35 Milliarden US-Dollar und selbst Frankreich fünf Milliarden Dollar für das jeweilige Atomarsenal ausgegeben.

Was ich will, sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, ist eine atomwaffenfreie Welt, und dafür braucht es ein starkes, funktionierendes internationales Kontrollsystem. Der Atomwaffensperrvertrag ist zentral, insbesondere seit dem Ende des INF-Vertrags. Die USA und Russland müssen den Dialog über Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle unter Einbeziehung Chinas schnellstens wiederherstellen.

Und das Ziel einer atomwaffenfreien Welt schließt auch ein, dass wir ein atomwaffenfreies Europa schaffen. Ein Europa, in dem keine Atomwaffen besessen werden, in dem aber auch keine Atomwaffen von anderen Mächten stationiert sind. Und das schließt auch einen kernwaffenfreien Mittleren Osten ein – auch das ist mir ein ganz zentrales Anliegen. Und außerdem braucht es mehr Anstrengung und Umsetzung bei der Ratifizierung des auch von meinem Heimatland Österreich mit initiierten Atomwaffenverbotsvertrages. Hier müssen wir mehr Energie dahinter legen – das ist notwendig.

Albert Einstein, sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, hat einmal gesagt: Der Mensch erfand die Atombombe, doch keine Maus der Welt würde eine Mausefalle konstruieren. Arbeiten wir an einer atomwaffenfreien Welt!

  Petras Auštrevičius, on behalf of the Renew Group. – Madam President, this year we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This Treaty is a great success. Of the 191 states that have signed up, only nine have nuclear weapons. This is a much smaller number than anyone could have predicted when the Treaty entered into force 50 years ago.

Our biggest challenge now is to make North Korea and Iran adhere to the Treaty. If not, why would any of the other signatory states do so. Saudi Arabia has already declared it will develop nuclear arms if Iran has access to a nuclear bomb, and Turkey might very well follow suit. In this environment, we should not blame Israel for having nuclear weapons. They are essential for its survival.

The EU must continue its efforts to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons, preferably via the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, but if Iran is not willing to honour its engagements, we will have to find other means.

North Korea will not be persuaded by the West alone. For that, we need the Chinese on board. I am afraid that as long as China does not see a North Korean nuclear weapon as a problem, it will be difficult to make any substantial progress.

To conclude, the European Union must continue to promote the NPT and that its Members honour their commitments. We must pursue this in close cooperation with other democracies, because a rules-based world order is our best chance of ensuring peace.

  Jérôme Rivière, au nom du groupe ID. – Madame la Présidente, le sujet de la puissance nucléaire est la parfaite incarnation de l’impossibilité d’une diplomatie qui soit purement européenne.

Outil de souveraineté par excellence, la bombe atomique, sur laquelle s’est construite la dissuasion et donc la paix, est aujourd’hui, depuis le Brexit, seule propriété de la France au sein de l’Union européenne. Sauf à partager cette dissuasion avec nos voisins, la souveraineté européenne n’existe donc pas. L’Allemagne le souhaiterait bien sûr, confortée par les contradictions d’Emmanuel Macron, mais il est hors de question, pour les défenseurs d’une Europe des nations que nous sommes, que cet outil soit partagé ou dilué. Seul l’État-nation doté du droit inaliénable de se défendre lui-même est le cadre légitime d’utilisation de cette force suprême.

Le TNP, s’il est un gage de stabilité et d’équilibre nécessaire, ne saurait interdire à notre nation souveraine, la France, de posséder cet outil. Je mets d’ailleurs en garde cette assemblée contre le traité d’interdiction des armes nucléaires qui se cache désormais derrière le TNP. Ce traité-là ne servira pas la cause du désarmement. Aucun État disposant de l’arme nucléaire ne le signera et n’en déplaise aux plus naïfs, l’atome ne sera jamais désinventé.

Plus que des incantations, notre groupe préfère se concentrer sur les trois sujets qui menacent véritablement la sécurité du continent européen: la Turquie, le terrorisme islamiste et l’arsenalisation généralisée de l’espace.

  Mounir Satouri, au nom du groupe Verts/ALE. – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Haut-représentant, l’Union européenne et ses États membres, dont mon pays, la France, peuvent jouer un rôle important dans le désarmement nucléaire.

Cette force d’initiative fait aujourd’hui cruellement défaut alors que les accords de contrôle des armes nucléaires s’effondrent les uns après les autres et que le risque de détonation nucléaire voulue ou fortuite augmente. Les recommandations que nous donnons aujourd’hui au Conseil et au Haut-représentant de l’Union sont donc d’une importance majeure.

Nous pouvons rester en retrait, et attendre que les politiques délétères des gouvernements qui détiennent ces arsenaux produisent des effets désastreux, ou nous pouvons nous inscrire, pour notre sécurité collective, dans la démarche et l’élan historiques d’une initiative pour le désarmement. Le traité sur la non-prolifération de 1968 posait déjà l’obligation de négocier le désarmement. Pour soutenir pleinement sa mise en œuvre, ce Parlement doit apporter son soutien clair au traité d’interdiction des armes nucléaires. À son adoption, en 2017, certains disaient que ce traité, qui fâche les convaincus de la puissance et de la dissuasion nucléaires, peinerait à entrer en vigueur. Aujourd’hui, son entrée en vigueur est imminente. Au sein de notre Union, l’Autriche, l’Irlande et Malte l’ont déjà ratifié et de nouvelles villes viennent le soutenir.

J’entends certains parler de désarmement réaliste. Le seul réalisme dont je souhaite m’armer, c’est celui qui opte pour protéger les citoyennes et les citoyens et pour faire avancer l’objectif atteignable d’un monde libre sans menace nucléaire. Mesdames et Messieurs, je vous invite donc à soutenir les amendements intergroupes que je porte au nom du groupe des Verts afin de garantir que ce rapport soit à la hauteur de sa mission.

  Özlem Demirel (GUE/NGL). – Frau Präsidentin! Vor 75 Jahren wurden US—Atomwaffen auf Hiroshima und Nagasaki abgeworfen. Eine Wucht der Zerstörung, noch jahrzehntelang spürten Mensch und Natur die Folgen. Eine wichtige Lehre daraus war der Atomwaffensperrvertrag, doch die Abrüstung wird gerade umgekehrt.

Aber nicht einmal die Drohung mit Atomwaffen ist akzeptabel! Es ist ein Trugschluss, dass Atomwaffen mehr Sicherheit bedeuten. Noch immer ist die Erde voll von tausenden Kernwaffen, und sie ist verseucht davon. Derzeit trainiert die deutsche Luftwaffe mit belgischen, niederländischen und italienischen Kampfjets und übt den Abwurf von Atombomben. Hinter den Kulissen verhandelt Deutschland mit Frankreich, um mehr Zugriff auf französisches Atomwaffenarsenal zu bekommen.

Wollen wir das wirklich, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen? Nein! Europa muss eine atomwaffenfreie Zone werden. Auch US—Waffen gehören abgerüstet. Die ganze Welt muss atomwaffenfrei werden. Französische, britische, amerikanische oder russische Atombomben, jegliche Atombomben, gehören endlich ausgelöscht, damit eben nicht jegliches Leben ausgelöscht werden kann. Dafür muss der Vertrag für ein Verbot von Atomwaffen auch von allen – ausnahmslos allen – EU-Mitgliedstaaten unterzeichnet werden.

Puhetta johti HEIDI HAUTALA
varapuhemies

  Fabio Massimo Castaldo (NI). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, Alto rappresentante, il deteriorarsi dei rapporti tra gli Stati dotati di armi nucleari, le campagne di modernizzazione degli arsenali e dei sistemi di lancio, il collasso del trattato INF e lo stallo negoziale del trattato START, l'uscita degli Stati Uniti dall'accordo sul nucleare iraniano e dal trattato Open Skies, la pericolosa retorica sull'utilità delle armi nucleari sono tutti segnali estremamente preoccupanti di una ripresa alla corsa degli armamenti che il mondo non può assolutamente permettersi.

Per questo sono convinto che il rinvio della decima Conferenza di revisione del TNP debba essere interpretato come una vera e propria opportunità. Come europei dobbiamo riaffermare con forza, ancora una volta, la centralità e l'imprescindibilità del TNP, e anzi rilanciare, essere ancora più ambiziosi, perché l'alternativa è semplicemente terrificante.

Approfittiamo di questo tempo aggiuntivo per intensificare il dialogo, tanto con quegli attori che condividono le nostre stesse preoccupazioni, suggerendo nuove iniziative congiunte, quanto con gli attori che ne sono distanti, cercando compromessi su tutti quei temi che rischiano di complicare o persino di minare alla base il successo della conferenza.

È quindi fondamentale che gli Stati membri arrivino alla conferenza con una posizione forte e coordinata a livello europeo, anche basata sulla posizione che voteremo in questa plenaria, che affermi chiaramente che la pace e la sicurezza internazionali sono rafforzate in un mondo libero dall'esistenza o dalla proliferazione delle armi nucleari, che il disarmo nucleare non significa solo la riduzione del numero di testate attive, ma anche il ridimensionamento del ruolo militare e politico che viene assegnato a questo tipo di armi.

  Josep Borrell Fontelles, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Madam President, I thank you and the Honourable Members for all your contributions to this important debate. Some of you have mentioned figures in the region of 15 000 nuclear bombs. Why so many? This a clear evidence that human intelligence could be used in a better way.

We are firmly convinced of the enduring values of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Upholding the integrity of the rules-based international system, with effective multilateralism as a key principle, remains the European Union’s objective. We need to continue working to achieve results and not allow the pandemic to bring multilateralism to a standstill. The field of nuclear prevention is one of those in which we can and should continue working.

Downgrading international treaties and regimes and adopting unilateral measures to enforce compliance with non-proliferation will hardly have the desired results. The major global challenges of our era can only be addressed by working in partnership with others. This pandemic that affects all of us should not stop us from continuing our diplomatic and political engagements to deliver results on the critical issue of the non-proliferation of nuclear arms and nuclear disarmament. I can assure you that we will continue to remind Member States of our common positions and we will continue looking at what else we can do in order to look for common ground and avoid further polarisation.

I can assure you that we will continue to encourage the United States and the Russian Federation to seek further reductions of their arsenals of both strategic and tactical, as well as deployed and non-deployed, nuclear weapons.

  Puhemies. – Keskustelu on päättynyt.

Tarkistuksista äänestetään tänä iltana.