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Onsdagen den 23 mars 2022 - Bryssel

23. Suisse Secrets – Hur tredjeländer skulle kunna tvingas att införa standarder för bekämpning av penningtvätt (debatt)

  Der Präsident. – Als nächster Punkt der Tagesordnung folgt die Aussprache über die Erklärungen des Rates und der Kommission zu „Suisse Secrets“ – Wie in Drittländern Standards zur Bekämpfung von Geldwäsche eingeführt werden können (2022/2572(RSP)).

Ich weise Sie darauf hin, dass Sie mithilfe Ihres Abstimmungsgeräts spontane Wortmeldungen beantragen und blaue Karten einsetzen können, nachdem Sie Ihre Abstimmungskarte eingeführt haben. Ich bitte Sie daher, stets Ihre Abstimmungskarte mitzubringen. Anleitungen liegen im Plenarsaal aus.

Wenn Sie sich für eine spontane Wortmeldung anmelden möchten, ersuche ich Sie, das bereits ab jetzt zu tun und nicht das Ende der Aussprache abzuwarten.

Ich weise Sie auch darauf hin, dass Wortmeldungen im Plenarsaal weiterhin vom zentralen Rednerpult aus erfolgen. Dies gilt allerdings nicht für spontane Wortmeldungen, blaue Karten und Wortmeldungen zur Geschäftsordnung.

Ich ersuche Sie daher, die Rednerliste im Blick zu behalten und sich kurz vor Beginn Ihrer Redezeit zum Rednerpult zu begeben.

Liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen, diese Durchsage kenne ich jetzt fast schon auswendig seit der Pandemie. Es kommt ein weiterer Hinweis dazu: Wenn Sie hier vorn vom Rednerpult sprechen, achten Sie bitte darauf, dass Sie das Mikrofon nicht berühren, weil wir sonst einen sehr lauten Ton haben, der für die Dolmetscher auch sehr schmerzhaft sein kann.

  Clément Beaune, président en exercice du Conseil. – Monsieur le Président, Madame la Commissaire, Mesdames et Messieurs les Députés, je vous remercie d’avoir invité la présidence à contribuer à ce débat sur un sujet sensible et important. La lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux et le financement du terrorisme est une priorité pour la présidence française du Conseil, pour laquelle le Conseil tient justement son engagement dans son ensemble.

Il s’agit d’un enjeu pour notre sécurité et d’un point de vigilance croissant pour nos concitoyens. Au cours de ces dernières années, le Parlement, le Conseil et la Commission ont travaillé en étroite collaboration sur ces sujets, de sorte que notre cadre de lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux a été considérablement renforcé et amélioré de manière progressive.

Comme nous le savons, malgré ces progrès, il reste encore beaucoup à faire. Dans ce sens, nous travaillons actuellement pour faire avancer les discussions sur le sixième paquet anti-blanchiment présenté par la Commission européenne, Madame la Commissaire, en juillet dernier. Nous poursuivons activement nos efforts sur ce dossier pour entamer les négociations interinstitutionnelles dès que possible.

Sur le dossier plus spécifique des Suisse Secrets, les soupçons suscités par ces fuites sont évidemment une très forte préoccupation. Ils sont extrêmement dommageables lorsqu’il s’agit de blanchiment de capitaux. Pour ce qui est de déterminer concrètement ce qu’il s’est réellement passé, compte tenu de la gravité des faits, je laisserai à la Commission l’appréciation d’éventuelles investigations. La Commission est naturellement directement chargée de notifier ces risques qui affectent le marché intérieur de l’Union européenne, en coopération, le cas échéant, avec des autorités judiciaires.

Au sein du Conseil, nous sommes évidemment prêts à examiner toute liste actualisée par la Commission et toutes conséquences qui devraient être tirées de l’établissement des faits, comme cela a toujours été le cas. Nous savons que, dans les semaines et les mois à venir, nous aurons l’occasion de définir le régime le plus efficace que nous ayons jamais mis en place pour lutter précisément contre le blanchiment de capitaux et le financement du terrorisme à travers cette activité.

Parmi les dossiers législatifs à l’examen, le règlement relatif à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux devrait justement permettre de continuer à codifier et à renforcer les règles de l’Union européenne relatives à notre politique à l’égard des pays tiers. En tant que tel, ce projet de législation constitue un très bon point de départ, selon la présidence, pour nos futures discussions, dès que nous aurons finalisé nos positions respectives au Conseil et au Parlement.

En ce qui concerne le règlement sur les transferts de fonds, pour continuer dans les dossiers législatifs, nous avons également l’intention d’entamer des négociations avec le Parlement européen dès que votre assemblée en aura ainsi décidé. Nous espérons qu’un accord politique pourra encore être trouvé au cours de notre semestre de présidence du Conseil.

Je vous remercie pour votre engagement sur ce sujet, pour votre engagement personnel, Madame la Commissaire, au sein du collège, et je me tiens évidemment à votre disposition pour continuer nos échanges.

  Mairead McGuinness, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, thank you for the opportunity to speak on a really important topic. Before I really get into the depth of the debate, can I thank you, Minister, for your commitment, and that of the French Presidency, for our anti-money-laundering package. It’s really important and I do appreciate the support and the work.

We’ve all followed successive revelations on money laundering with huge concern. These Swiss secrets are just the latest. They reveal that Credit Suisse maintained business relationships with dozens of corrupt government officials, criminals and alleged human-rights abusers for several years. In the Commission, we’ve made the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism a key priority. And we know that there is work to be done to tackle this issue. We stepped up the fight with the adoption of the legislative package in July of last year, and I know that we can rely on this House to work in a timely way on these proposals.

The Commission has put a particular focus on the enforcement of existing rules, as communicated in the action plan on money laundering in May 2020. We all share the view that we need to continue to strengthen our defences against money laundering and terrorism financing in the Union and that we need to address the risks from third countries.

So now I want to turn to the ‘Swiss secrets’ case in more detail. Like the European Parliament, the Commission regards these revelations as very concerning. I would like to reassure this House that we will not ignore the severe failings which this case has laid bare. I am determined to spare no effort in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism, both in the EU and in third countries.

The war in Ukraine is showing yet again that there is a need to clean up the financial system. We are determined to continue our work within the Union and with our allies to rid the global financial system of money laundering.

The Swiss secrets revelations focus on the shortcomings of Credit Suisse in its customer due diligence checks. Credit institutions need to verify customer identities and the source of funds to avoid their services being used to launder money. The intensity of these checks depends on the customer’s risk profile. The proper application of customer due diligence for onboarding customers and throughout the entire business relationship is a cornerstone of the EU’s preventative framework for anti-money laundering and countering terrorism financing.

We have carefully analysed the implications of the Swiss secrets revelations to ensure that the EU’s financial system is protected. To our knowledge, and according to the information from the investigative journalists, the cases revealed refer exclusively to this particular bank and its activities in Switzerland. I would like to underline that all subsidiaries and branches of third-country institutions in the EU must apply EU rules and are supervised for their implementation accordingly. However, deficiencies in a third country’s anti-money laundering framework can also pose a problem for the EU, where there is a high level of integration of the financial system and a high volume of cross-border transactions with the EU.

The Commission has a legal obligation to protect the functioning of the EU’s internal market, and that is why, in line with our Anti-Money Laundering Directive, the Commission has to identify third countries with strategic deficiencies in their national anti-money laundering and countering of terrorism regimes. Switzerland’s anti-money laundering framework and its implementation were assessed by the Commission in 2019. That assessment found deficiencies in the Swiss framework. This autonomous assessment also took into account the results of the mutual evaluation report of Switzerland in 2016 by the Financial Action Task Force – the global standard-setter in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.

The European Union and Switzerland have strong economic ties. As recently demonstrated, the Commission is working closely with Switzerland on sanctions imposed on Russia. An important element of our approach towards third countries is dialogue and cooperation with the countries concerned. The Commission has already engaged with its Swiss counterparts to improve Switzerland’s measures to fight money laundering. The Commission met with the Swiss authorities most recently on 1 March of this year.

This approach of dialogue and engagement is starting to show positive results. Switzerland has adopted reforms in relation to the fight against money laundering over the past few years. In March of last year, the Swiss Parliament passed amendments to the Swiss AML (anti-money laundering) Act. These amendments include an obligation for banks to verify beneficial owners and apply higher standards of ‘know your customer’ procedures. My services are taking a closer look at these latest reforms and are analysing whether they address the issues revealed by Swiss secrets. We understand that these amendments enter into force in July of this year. This is a step in the right direction, but effective implementation is of the utmost importance and the Commission will closely follow up on this. We are intensifying contact with Swiss counterparts to impress on them our concerns. We will maintain our dialogue with Switzerland to ensure deficiencies are tackled and we will thoroughly monitor developments.

Before concluding, I would like to address the demands raised by some political groups and members to consider adding Switzerland to our list of high-risk jurisdictions in the immediate future. At this stage, the Commission is of the view that including Switzerland in our list of high-risk third countries would be premature. The Swiss secrets refer to one Swiss bank and concern issues which, in some instances, date back several years. We have a constructive dialogue with Switzerland, and recent reforms appear to deal with shortcomings related to customer due diligence procedures in the Swiss framework. According to our rules, the EU listing cannot occur before the dialogue with the relevant third country has been exhausted. We have ongoing engagement with Switzerland and we must ensure that this dialogue with our Swiss counterparts yields positive results and ultimately addresses our concerns regarding the Swiss anti-money laundering and countering of terrorism framework. But I really want to assure this House this evening that we will carefully monitor Switzerland’s progress. Should this progress be insufficient, or current engagement be broken, we do not rule out taking further action. And, of course, the Commission will keep the European Parliament fully informed on all developments.

  Емил Радев, от името на групата PPE. – Господин Председател, скандали като „Панама пейпърс“, „Парадайс пейпърс“ и „Пандора пейпърс“ доказват, че изпирането на пари продължава да бъде сериозен проблем в Европа. Към тази дълга поредица от разкрития трябва да добавим и така наречените „Швейцарски тайни“, които осветлиха съмнителните бизнес практики на голямата швейцарска банка „Креди Сюис“.

Това не е просто най-мащабният досега теч на данни от голяма швейцарска банка, а скандал за близо 100 милиарда евро, свързани с повече от 30 000 клиенти на финансовата институция. Замесени са десетки видни държавни служители и бизнесмени от над 120 юрисдикции, предимно извън границите на Европейския съюз. На този фон Асоциацията на банкерите на страната обяви, че по сметки в швейцарските банки има между 160 и 213 милиарда долара, които принадлежат на руски клиенти. Специалисти твърдят, че действителният размер на средствата е многократно по-голям от обявения.

Разкритията придобиха и нов смисъл в контекста на военната агресия срещу Украйна и санкциите, които Европейският съюз налага на Русия. Швейцарските банки поддържат тесни връзки с останалите европейски банки, така че установените пропуски в борбата с прането на пари не бива да се разглеждат като изолирани случаи, а като проблем за целия европейски финансов сектор. Очевидна е необходимостта да се направи детайлна и обективна оценка на риска. В противен случай, при липсата на ефективен надзор, всяко отклонение от правилата може да отвори пробойна в сигурността на финансовата система на Европейския съюз.

  Marek Belka, on behalf of the S&D Group. – Mr President, Commissioner, for long have we heard that the Swiss banking sector has changed, that the banking sectors giving a possibility for criminals to launder money is a lazy and outdated stereotype. The Swiss Leaks have shown that the government was telling us lies, or at least not the whole truth.

Nothing – or not much – has changed. The due diligence made by Credit Suisse was virtually non-existent, enabling criminals, people covered by EU sanctions or linked to dictators to use their services. Well I hope I’m wrong, but maybe Switzerland will be included one day in our blacklist of countries having strategic deficiencies in their regime on anti-money-laundering legislation.

Now, with the EU putting sanctions on Russian oligarchs with such weak due diligence, how do we know that they do not live their life to the fullest with the money on their Swiss accounts? Let us not fool ourselves that everything has changed. Switzerland, unfortunately, is not helping us enough in our fight against tax fraud and money laundering.

  Ramona Strugariu, on behalf of the Renew Group. – Mr President, over 100 billion at their peak. Among account holders reported and identified, dozens of corrupt government officials, alleged human rights abusers and criminals. This is not the only Swiss scandal, but the biggest one, involving the second-largest bank in the country, fully ignoring Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations and all anti-money laundering (AML) rules because Swiss law allows them to.

Commissioner, if Swiss banking secrecy laws are at least immoral and Swiss legislators are behaving like enablers of financial crimes, why isn’t Switzerland on the list of high—risk third countries? On any list, as a matter of fact. This is wrong, and as long as it will continue, we cannot apply our rules related to high-risk third countries to these jurisdictions. If this happens here at our door, how exactly are we to be taken seriously with our new strategy and our new rules? This will never happen.

It is a pity because the new package has very good provisions on the relationship of our obliged entities with these third countries which can lead to closing down operations if the law of that third country does not permit compliance with EU requirements. And this would hurt. But first we need to make sure that our own backyard is clean and that we name and shame those who deserve to be named and shamed.

  Ernest Urtasun, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group. – Mr President, well I think that we’re in front of a new, important scandal and now affecting a Swiss bank. Well, the record of problems of the Swiss financial sector are well known. I know the Commissioner just said that probably under their assessment Switzerland maybe should not be in the AML blacklist yet. Well, one of the problems maybe is how do we do that list and what kind of criteria do we use? And this is something as well that the fact that Switzerland is not yet in that list should also make a reflection on how are we using and how are we making that listing.

Secondly, I think that the cooperation with third countries should be improved. I think this is something that we can also take as a conclusion of this scandal, particularly because we don’t have enough bilateral agreements with some countries where we know AML enforcement is really a problem. And also, we need to be aware that those kinds of problems can also happen at some point in the EU because we have real problems yet on the implementation and enforcement of AMLD5, for instance, which is not fully implemented.

So I think that once again this scandal should give us an impulse to improve our legislation and our measures.

  Assita Kanko, on behalf of the ECR Group. – Mr President, Switzerland has bomb shelters for its entire population. Good. But they also have and provide financial shelter for those who make us need bomb shelters: Russian oligarchs evading EU sanctions.

The investigative report showing that Switzerland’s second bank, Credit Suisse, harbours dirty money from, among others, Russian oligarchs, reminds us that we have to be alert for Swiss loopholes that can undermine EU sanctions against Putin’s friends. Oligarchs installed not before, but after Russia started its insane war in Ukraine, although Switzerland joined these sanctions.

According to the Financial Times, Credit Suisse sent letters to investors requesting them to destroy documents linked to the securitisation of assets. These documents show for example that Russian oligarch Alisher Usmanov – identified as ‘one of Putin’s favourite oligarchs’ and subject to an asset freeze and EU travel ban – is linked to about 27 secret corporate accounts. We must review Swiss banking and money-laundering practices.

Behind the Russian soldiers shooting at Ukrainian children and committing war crimes in Ukraine right now, there are those Swiss banks and the oligarchs they support. They are all accountable. To quote the Ukrainian soldiers: ‘they should all go fuck themselves’.

  Clare Daly, on behalf of The Left Group. – Mr President, I think it’s ironic that we’re calling this debate ‘Suisse Secrets’, given it’s absolutely no secret at all the role played by Switzerland in facilitating global financial crime. It’s been carrying out this global daylight robbery for years, and the billions and billions Credit Suisse accumulates every year by criminal elites has been permitted in the name of profit maximisation and western enrichment. And we have to say that the EU has been complicit by failing to call Switzerland out. And we heard it again tonight. Excuses before, ‘oh, it might damage the banking sector’ but we’ve no problem in listing the likes of Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen and so on, countries where there’s hardly a banking sector at all.

We’ve got to get real about this. Western financial secrecy centres in the Netherlands, in Luxembourg and at home in Ireland are complicit in this system. These cross-border transfers take over a trillion dollars every year, gutting southern and developing nations. This isn’t our money. The EU will have no credibility unless we deal with all of these issues.

  Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D). – Señor presidente, este escándalo revela lo que no deja de ser un hecho. Y es que hay un sector de la banca suiza que no coopera contra el blanqueo de capitales y no cumple los estándares comunes de comunicación de información cuando se trata de clientes de alto riesgo. Todo esto tiene lugar en el contexto de las sanciones impuestas por la Unión Europea contra los oligarcas rusos y subraya la vulnerabilidad estratégica y geopolítica que supone cualquier defecto en la lucha contra el blanqueo de capitales.

Pero este Parlamento Europeo está comprometido, como lo pone de manifiesto el que estamos en estos momentos legislando nada menos que sobre el nuevo paquete de lucha contra el blanqueo de capitales: cinco Reglamentos, uno de los cuales se refiere a una autoridad central europea contra el blanqueo.

Hay que imponer a cualquier banco que incumpla la legislación, incluida la banca suiza, no solamente diligencia debida, sino sanciones para que se impongan leyes más estrictas. Y hay que asegurar que la Autoridad Bancaria Europea ejerza su papel de supervisión sobre las unidades de inteligencia financieras en relación con las autoridades nacionales contra el blanqueo. Solo de ese modo podremos sacar una lección de cada hecho o de cada escándalo.

  Kira Marie Peter-Hansen (Verts/ALE). – Mr President, we’ve heard it all before. We’ve had this debate before. LuxLeaks, the Panama Papers, Pandora Papers, Paradise Papers, and so on. And now Suisse Secrets. I wonder how many scandals do we need to take this crime seriously.

We learned from all those leaks that we have in the recent years that not only Switzerland but several EU countries have actively helped Russian oligarchs to launder money, avoid taxes and hide their wealth. Luckily, the EU showed that we are ready to take actions against Russia with economic sanctions as we have done with the oligarch freezing assets actions.

And I call on us now to use this situation as a wakeup call and make sure that we are as ambitious as possible with the anti—money-laundering package. This means banning golden visas, ensuring transparency on beneficial ownership and proper exchange of tax information, and making sure that Member States transpose and enforce existing anti—money-laundering rules. And it also includes a proper risk of high—risk countries. So I hope and I count on all the EU institutions to take up the task.

Spontane Wortmeldungen

  Mick Wallace (The Left). – (start of speech off mike) … revelations about the practices of Credit Suisse and their secretive clientele. I support the recommendations of Transparency International, which calls for extra supervision of mechanisms by national supervisory authorities, centralised and verified beneficial ownership registers and strong punitive action against misbehaving banks.

However, does it really come as any surprise to us that Swiss banks have dodgy customers? We’ve known this for years. Why did it take a whistle—blower to start this discussion? Sure, we should tackle anti—money laundering (AML) practices on the EU’s doorstep, but we also have to look inside our own house. We have countries like Barbados and the Cayman Islands on the AML blacklist, but not Switzerland or even the UK. What are we doing about the weaknesses in our own system? We have countries like Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands where shell companies and transparency laws make it nearly impossible to see who owns what or where the money is coming from. We do need to tackle anti—money laundering, but we need to tackle it everywhere.

(Ende der spontanen Wortmeldungen)

  Mairead McGuinness, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, thank you to the colleagues for this debate. I think we should acknowledge that Suisse Secrets are no longer secrets because of the work of investigative journalists, and we should be grateful that there are investigative journalists and that we have press freedom.

I mentioned in my opening remarks that we’re very committed to maintaining a tough approach in the fight against money laundering, both inside Europe and with third countries. I mentioned also that we are not resiling from watching whether progress is made or indeed if progress stalls, and we will take further measures if that is required.

I want to thank you for mentioning Europe’s own anti-money laundering efforts. We’ve had five iterations of the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Directive, and it’s not enough because some Member States haven’t fully implemented. And indeed we know that we need to go further. So I hope that we can work together on this package, which is a strong package that has to tidy up the more-than-loose ends in our current legislation. But we do need to work hard and we need to work fast, and indeed the French Presidency are showing great leadership.

I think the other point which has really come into sharp focus is the aggression by Russia in Ukraine and our sanctions. We now realise how much vulgar wealth there is in the hands of very few, globally. And I think that that visibility is really repulsive to our citizens. We are freezing assets, but we do have a Task Force in the Commission and its title is Freeze and Seize. And I know Member States will be looking at the second part of that with their own legislation, and I do believe this is a moment we should not allow to pass by without making a firm commitment that the financial system has got to be cleaned up both inside the European Union and outside.

  Clément Beaune, président en exercice du Conseil. – Monsieur le Président, Madame la Commissaire, je serai extrêmement bref, d’abord pour vous remercier une nouvelle fois d’avoir organisé ce débat et exercé votre vigilance sur cette question, qui nécessite avant tout un renforcement de notre législation, nous l’avons dit. Je le répète, la Commission européenne a proposé des textes il y a quelques mois, l’été dernier pour le sixième paquet. La présidence française est très engagée pour avancer le plus rapidement possible au cours de ce semestre sur ces textes, en lien, évidemment, avec le Parlement européen.

Je voulais, au-delà de cela, redire que nous aurons sans doute encore à renforcer, dans le contexte que nous connaissons, notre vigilance à l’égard des pays tiers, et que nous faisons confiance, sur ce dossier spécifique, à la Commission européenne pour apprécier la réalité des faits et pour en tirer les conséquences vis-à-vis de nos partenaires suisses.

Partageant l’appréciation que la commissaire McGuinness a formulée au début de notre débat, je crois qu’aujourd’hui nous ne sommes pas dans un moment où il faudrait tirer des conséquences générales à l’égard de la Suisse. Aussi discuterons-nous et débattrons-nous – sans aucune complaisance je crois, ni au Parlement européen ni au Conseil, soyez-en certains – de toute proposition que la Commission pourrait faire à la lumière des faits qui seront établis. Encore une fois, la confiance que nous plaçons dans la Commission est absolue sur ce dossier. Merci, Madame la Commissaire, de le porter très fortement ces derniers mois et pour l’avenir.

  Der Präsident. – Die Aussprache ist geschlossen.

Schriftliche Erklärungen (Artikel 171)

  Ibán García Del Blanco (S&D), por escrito. – La investigación «Suisse Secrets» abarca más de 18 000 cuentas ocultas de Credit Suisse que llegaron a acumular fondos por más de 100 000 millones de dólares y que el banco mantuvo abiertas pese a las señales de alarma. En muchos casos, pertenecían a clientes acusados de delitos graves o vinculados a regímenes autocráticos.

Es vital impedir que la banca pueda ayudar a delincuentes y cleptócratas ―incluidos los oligarcas rusos vinculados a Putin― a ocultar sus fortunas ilegales y a tomar participaciones en sectores clave, poniendo en peligro la seguridad de nuestros ciudadanos y de nuestras economías.

Con ese objetivo, el Grupo S&D lidera la batalla contra el blanqueo de capitales: nuestros coponentes en el Reglamento y Directivas LBC impulsarán un régimen más estricto en la UE, limitando la discrecionalidad de los bancos en el trato a clientes de alto riesgo. Propondremos también que la UE tenga herramientas más potentes para actuar contra entidades en terceros países. Asimismo, exigimos a Suiza la adopción de leyes para proteger a los denunciantes de irregularidades y la derogación de las desmesuradas penas por violación del secreto bancario. Por último, solicitamos a la ABE que investigue la posible existencia, en las filiales de Credit Suisse en la UE, de cuentas implicadas en el escándalo.

  Nacho Sánchez Amor (S&D), por escrito. – La investigación «Suisse Secrets» abarca más de 18 000 cuentas ocultas de Credit Suisse que, en algunos momentos, llegaron a acumular fondos por más de 100 000 millones de dólares y que el banco mantuvo abiertas pese a las señales de alarma. En muchos casos, pertenecían a clientes acusados de delitos graves (tortura, tráfico de personas o asesinato) o vinculados a regímenes autocráticos.

Es vital impedir que la banca pueda ayudar a delincuentes y cleptócratas ―incluidos los oligarcas rusos vinculados a Putin― a ocultar sus fortunas ilegales y a tomar participaciones en sectores clave, poniendo en peligro la seguridad de nuestros ciudadanos y de nuestras economías.

Con ese objetivo, el Grupo S&D lidera la batalla contra el blanqueo de capitales: nuestros coponentes en el Reglamento y Directivas LBC impulsarán un régimen más estricto en la UE, limitando la discrecionalidad de los bancos en el trato a clientes de alto riesgo. Propondremos también que la UE tenga herramientas más potentes para actuar contra entidades en terceros países. Este escándalo reabre el debate sobre la inclusión de Suiza en la lista de países de alto riesgo, mientras mantenga su secreto bancario y su supervisor no actúe diligentemente. Asimismo, exigimos a Suiza la adopción de leyes para proteger a los denunciantes de irregularidades.

  Alfred Sant (S&D), in writing. – There are still weaknesses in the EU anti-money laundering framework. While scandals have already forced many reforms, over-reliance on them to stimulate reforms unduly politicises AML initiatives. Threats posed by third countries, especially those with such close ties to the EU as Switzerland, endanger the integrity of the EU’s financial system as a whole. As AML practices are increasingly toughened inside the EU, interested parties seek to circumvent the system using third country channels.

Switzerland could be placed on the blacklist of ‘countries at risk’ for money laundering, in the hope of triggering changes in the country’s anti-money laundering mechanisms and deeper reforms. A few years ago, the Commission placed Tunisia on it, just when the country needed economic support from the EU, in order to push forward difficult democratic reforms. However, such blacklisting decisions are in reality highly political.

One alternative solution proposed is that non-EU legal persons with an EU connection must register their beneficial owners in EU registers of beneficial owners. These registers would comply with harmonised rules at European level to present information in real time. While there may be merits to blacklisting, with much more cumbersome control procedures for transactions, truly effective solutions should be more proactive and objective in nature.