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Marţi, 3 mai 2022 - Strasbourg Ediţie revizuită

14. Pregătirea UE împotriva unor atacuri cibernetice în urma invaziei Rusiei în Ucraina (dezbatere)
Înregistrare video a intervenţiilor

  Predsedajúci. – Ďalším bodom programu je vyhlásenie Komisie o pripravenosti EÚ na kybernetický útok v nadväznosti na ruskú inváziu na Ukrajinu (2022/2649(RSP)).


  Margaritis Schinas, Vice-President of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, I would like to thank you all for putting this important point on the agenda.

As we speak, cyber—warfare is going on in our neighbourhood. It has started weeks before the Russian invasion and it continues. It is striking Ukraine’s most critical infrastructure and networks with a double aim to further destabilise the country and demoralise its people.

Ukrainian websites have experienced a tenfold increase in attacks since the Russian invasion and on the day of the invasion itself, a cyberattack against the Viasat and KSAT satellite network used by the Ukrainian military and police caused disruption to thousands of customers that use these connectivity services. While, in the meantime, Ukraine is being targeted by Russian-aligned criminal ransomware gangs, which can only add to the volatility of the situation.

We are doing our utmost, together with my colleagues, to support Ukraine’s cyber—resilience. The Commission and the European Action External Service have been coordinating with Member States and the private sector with the provision of technical assistance, equipment, software and relevant services, as per the needs of the Ukrainian Government.

Let me tell you that the case of Ukraine is not an isolated one. Over the last months and the year, our Member States have also been hit by waves of largescale cyberattacks targeting their most critical sectors from healthcare to telecom operators, to public administrations, to wind energy companies and health.

This is, unfortunately, the new reality of today’s world. This is what we must face, ad I’m really pleased to have the opportunity to set out our work to rise to this challenge.

Shielding our critical infrastructure against both physical and digital threats is our top priority. And let me put something very clearly up front in front of this House. It is more urgent than ever to adopt the revised Network Information Systems Directive, the so—called NIS2, together with our proposal for the renewed and modified Critical Entities Resilience Directive. These two proposals are two sides of the same coin. What is the point of putting all our efforts in protecting the networks of a nuclear power plant, if you can disrupt it by simply attacking its structures? I know that the negotiations on these two texts are progressing well, and I count on you to have them adopted as quickly as possible. They are needed now more than ever before.

I also take today’s opportunity to make a very solemn plea for the scope of these proposals, to stay at the level of ambition that we envisaged with our original proposal of the Commission. It would be greatly inconsistent if we take public administration out of the scope of these pieces of legislation, because public administration would need to have it to maintain high security standards. Shielding our Union against cyber—threats also requires shielding our Single Market. We need to make sure that the digital products in our Single Market are sufficiently resilient against cyber—threats. This is why President von der Leyen announced in this House a few months ago a new Cyber Resilience Act, which will be presented by the end of this year.

We have put a lot of efforts into building EU preparedness. This has even inspired our like—minded partners on the other side of the Atlantic to step up their own approach. But clearly the key question is will we, the European Union, be able to react in the event of a large—scale cyberattack? Let me share with you my conviction that, yes, we can.

In the past years, we have set up a number of tools and mechanisms to ensure effective coordination, both at technical and operational levels. The so—called cybersecurity ‘Blueprint’ sets out how to make the full use of existing cybersecurity entities to facilitate cooperation between Member States and the EU institutions in responding to such incidents and crisis.

We also have set up at technical level an EU network of National Computer Emergency Response Teams, the CSIRT network, which, together with our own institutional CERT—EU network, perform a central role in ensuring the sharing of technical information on network incidents in line with a blueprint. Early this year, this network was put in partial activation mode.

We also have the Cyber Crisis Liaison Organisation Network (CyCLONe), which brings together national cyber—agencies where the Commission participates as an observer. As I was telling you a few minutes ago, the proposals aiming and revising the NIS Directive and the Critical Entities Resilience Directive could be also essential to present the Commission as a full member of CyCLONe, in order to represent the overall EU interest.

What we now need is to continue building precisely on this culture of sharing information and expertise between Member States and across the cybersecurity constituencies, to bring together our best cybersecurity experts and response teams to work together and coordinate our action at operational level and, where necessary, help those that need it the most. And this is precisely the purpose that should serve the Joint Cyber Unit which, together with my colleague, Thierry Breton, we have announced should be operationalised as soon as possible.

Any operation at EU level will also benefit from the additional firepower and brainpower that the expertise of our agencies bring. We are working closely with ENISA, which now has years of experience in threat identification, and with Europol’s EC3, which is also working closely to counter malicious activities on the ground.

This is a true example of breaking the silos between the different strands of security to capitalise on all the knowledge and expertise available across the services and across Europe. This is precisely what our concept of an EU security union means – one single roof for all security—related policy action to be aligned far beyond and across vertical fiefdoms and vertical constituencies.

Another element that is of relevance to this debate is, of course, the heightened hybrid threat that is linked to disinformation. We have been urging, together with our External Action Service colleagues, the main platform signatories of the Code of Practice, to implement swiftly the Ukrainian—related sanctions and take further action to address the spread of war propaganda, lies and harmful disinformation related to the war.

All online platforms swiftly moved to suspend the transmission of Russia Today and Sputnik in the EU and to delist them from search engines. There are encouraging signs that the platforms have strengthened their monitoring and intervention tools to deprioritise disinformation content, remove the accounts of known disinformation purveyors, increase cooperation with fact checkers, and cut disinformation websites from advertising revenues. We shall keep monitoring progress in all these areas, and we will continue to push for more actions in our regular meetings with all major platforms.

Honourable Members, let me conclude by saying that the invasion of Ukraine has shown us a new side of war. From now on, war takes place not only on the battlefield but also in our information space, whether disinformation or cyberattack. These incidents have real life consequences for individual businesses, critical infrastructure, our society at large, and our democracy. Malicious cyber—activities, whether driven by political or criminal motives, not only threaten our economies, but also our model of society – what we stand for, our way of life, our freedoms and our values.

So now is the moment for a genuine step change in our collective response to these common threats. I am sure that you share with us the sense of urgency for greater efficiency and responsiveness of our mechanisms.


  Eva Maydell, on behalf of the PPE Group. – Mr President, I believe cyberattacks are just another front in Putin’s all-out attack against democracy and against democratic states. Every government, every company, every individual stands on the frontline of that war, of Putin’s war.

I’m very proud that this Parliament is currently working to deliver on the NIS2 Directive, which could offer a real opportunity for Member States and industry to be able to collaborate. Of course, businesses will need the resources and the scale to tackle those very complex and hybrid tricks. The same applies to institutions and to agencies that assist at both national but also European level.

If cybercrime costed the world USD 1 trillion back in 2020 alone, well, I believe it’s only common sense to significantly make sure that we increase investment in our critical infrastructure and, most importantly, digital defence. We simply have to wargame the various scenarios together with the Internet service providers, together with the telephone companies, to make sure we can repel potential attacks and make sure we can restore basic functions at an unprecedented speed. We also have to make sure we build greater resilience among our populations. And this we could do with more cyber and media literacy efforts.

This item has to be very high on the agenda of the European Council and during its next meeting in June. I am actually surprised that we do not see the Council present here today. European leaders should stop shying away from topics related to tech and cyber – because the effects of a cyberattack can be instant, can be devastating, and they could be very far-reaching, knowing no borders. So this is why there is no time to waste for us to increase our resilience.


  Alex Agius Saliba, on behalf of the S&D Group. – Mr President, in the new digital world, we are facing new forms of aggression, taking the shape of hybrid and cyber warfare. We have witnessed destructive wiper attacks on hundreds of systems in the Ukrainian Government from IT, energy, financial organisations, nuclear plants, telecommunications to broadcasting companies. During the conflict, malicious cyberattacks have been a prominent component of Russian cyber operations, strongly correlated and sometimes directly timed with kinetic military operations, targeting services and institutions which are crucial for civilians, whether it is to steal data from nuclear plants or to cause chaotic disinformation in the environment, disrupting citizens’ access to reliable information and critical life services, shaking confidence in the country’s leadership.

All these cyberattacks are sparking concerns of more significant consequences and catastrophic effects that could also affect and target directly our European Union, our Member States. Every Member State, every EU organisation, large or small, must be prepared to respond to these disruptive incidents. Being prepared will ultimately protect civilians from attacks that can directly affect their lives and access to critical, important services.


  Nathalie Loiseau, au nom du groupe Renew. – Monsieur le Président, la guerre en Ukraine nous a ouvert les yeux. Dans nos relations avec la Russie, il y a un avant et un après le 24 février, date de l’agression militaire russe. Tant que Vladimir Poutine n’aura pas retiré ses troupes d’Ukraine et renoncé à menacer la sécurité de l’Europe, nous ne pourrons plus faire comme avant, plus faire comme si de rien n’était.

Quand je dis «nous», je pense d’abord à nos institutions européennes et en priorité à notre Parlement, dont nous sommes directement responsables. Je tiens à remercier notre présidente Roberta Metsola, qui s’est résolument engagée à renforcer la cybersécurité de notre Assemblée. Il était plus que temps: les cyberattaques nous ciblent sans répit, mais l’effort est engagé, et il faut l’encourager.

Ayant dit cela, je voudrais vous interpeller, chers collègues et en particulier les présidents de nos groupes politiques: nous devons prendre la sécurité de notre institution beaucoup plus au sérieux. Au moment où nous appelons à renforcer les sanctions à l’encontre de la Russie et l’aide à l’Ukraine, est-il normal que travaillent dans ce Parlement des doubles nationaux russes liés au pouvoir en place? Est-il raisonnable de traiter de sujets confidentiels en ligne sans savoir qui est connecté? Comment espérons-nous exercer un meilleur contrôle sur des sujets aussi importants que la défense européenne sans renforcer au préalable notre culture de sécurité?

Nous ne pouvons plus ignorer ce sujet. Renforcer notre sécurité, c’est renforcer notre crédibilité, notre efficacité, notre capacité à contrôler le travail du Conseil et de la Commission. C’est l’affaire de chacun d’entre nous, mais il est plus que temps de nous emparer du sujet et de comprendre qu’il n’est plus question de faire comme on a toujours fait, parce que vraiment on n’a pas fait assez.


  Rasmus Andresen, im Namen der Verts/ALE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Bevor Kriegsverbrecher Putin am 24. Februar seine brutale Invasion in die Ukraine begonnen hat, wurde ukrainische Satellitenkommunikation von Hackergruppen angegriffen. Angriffe auf internationale Flughäfen, das finnische Verteidigungsministerium oder aber auch auf deutsche Windanlagen: Putins fürchterlicher Angriffskrieg findet seit Jahren auch online statt.

Es ist das erklärte Ziel von putintreuen Hackergruppen, unsere Infrastruktur anzugreifen und Desinformation zu verbreiten. Moderne Kriegsführung findet auch online statt. Wenn unser Stromnetz ausfällt oder Sicherheitsbehörden lahmgelegt werden, werden wir handlungsunfähig. Zur Wahrheit gehört auch, dass IT-Sicherheit bei öffentlichen Behörden und vielen Unternehmen eine zu geringe Rolle spielt.

Unsere kritische Infrastruktur in der EU ist extrem verwundbar. Es ist nur eine Frage der Zeit, bis Cyberattacken uns große Probleme bereiten werden. Als Schattenberichterstatter für die NIS-2-Richtlinie stelle ich auch während der aktuell laufenden Verhandlungen immer wieder fest, dass die Mitgliedstaaten nicht bereit sind, ausreichend aktiv zu werden.

Und ich bin auch Ihnen, Herr Kommissar, sehr dankbar dafür, dass Sie es gerade eben noch einmal deutlich gemacht haben und auch kritisiert haben, dass beispielsweise öffentliche Administrationen aus dem Anwendungsbereich herausgenommen werden sollen.

Wir brauchen einen besseren europäischen Austausch von Informationen bei Cyberattacken, verpflichtende Sicherheitsstandards für kritische Infrastruktur und Privatunternehmen und für Systeme wie Smart Home.


  Anna Bonfrisco, a nome del gruppo ID. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, Vicepresidente Schinas, il tema della preparazione dell'Unione europea contro gli attacchi informatici a seguito dell'invasione russa in Ucraina è influenzato principalmente dal diverso livello e grado di preparazione degli Stati membri.

Stati membri forti fanno un'Unione forte, ma questo vale in tutti i campi, in tutti i settori e in tutti i domini. Anche l'attuale governo italiano ha aumentato la propria capacità, dando avvio all'Agenzia per la cibersicurezza nazionale, unificando tutte le attività di protezione dalle minacce informatiche, contribuendo così alla sicurezza dell'Unione europea. La cibersicurezza garantisce la difesa nazionale, la difesa dell'Unione europea, la stabilità socioeconomica, l'ordine democratico degli Stati, la coesione della società, il fatto che i cittadini possano contare su informazioni affidabili e rimanere psicologicamente integri, ovvero non perdano fiducia nella leadership dei loro paesi. Non solo, i cittadini europei devono contare su servizi vitali critici e devono essere difesi da spionaggio e disinformazione.

Nella guerra ibrida che si sta consumando in Ucraina abbiamo le prove degli attacchi letali della Federazione Russa. È nostro dovere aiutare il popolo e le organizzazioni ucraine a proteggersi. È nostro dovere estendere questo ombrello protettivo e capacitivo a tutti coloro che sono a noi affini e continuare nell'approfondimento con la NATO delle esercitazioni.

Ecco perché il mio appello permane perché si ponga fine alla disinformazione che affligge l'Unione europea perché forse troppo dimenticata da tutti noi.


  Adam Bielan, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Panie Przewodniczący! W czasie obecnego bestialskiego ataku Rosji na Ukrainę Kreml nasilił jednocześnie taktykę wojny hybrydowej, w tym zakrojonej na szeroką skalę kampanii dezinformacyjnej. To po raz kolejny dowodzi, jak niezwykle ważną rolę zaczęła odgrywać technologia cyfrowa. Nikt nie ma już chyba wątpliwości, iż obecny reżim rosyjski, dążąc znowu do zmiany granic i odebrania suwerenności kolejnym krajom, zagraża stabilizacji i bezpieczeństwu już nie tylko w państwach sąsiednich, ale na całym kontynencie. Unia Europejska nie może już dłużej przymykać oczu na to zagrożenie.

Dlatego również chciałbym wyrazić rozczarowanie absencją francuskiej prezydencji przy tak ważnej debacie. Czyżby po wyborach prezydenckich nie trzeba było się już starać? A właśnie w tej chwili potrzebujemy nie kolejnych telefonów do Putina, ale zdecydowanych działań na rzecz zwiększenia zdolności zapobiegania zagrożeniom hybrydowym płynącym z Rosji w obszarach takich jak terroryzm państwowy, cyberataki czy bezpieczeństwo energetyczne. Potrzebne są także dalsze kroki w celu umacniania współpracy Unii Europejskiej i NATO w zwalczaniu masowych ataków grup hakerskich. Wierzę, że wspólnie z naszymi sojusznikami będziemy w stanie przeciwstawić się totalitarnym zapędom Putina.


  Özlem Demirel, im Namen der Fraktion The Left. – Herr Präsident! Mit jedem technologischen Fortschritt der Kriegsführung steigt die Zerstörungsgewalt, und es droht der Rückfall der Zivilisation.

Ein Cyberkrieg bedeutet, dass per Knopfdruck kritische Infrastruktur, Krankenhäuser etc. zerstört werden können. Dagegen muss man sich schützen können. Aber vor allem muss klar sein, dass diese Technologien nicht zur Kriegsführung eingesetzt werden dürfen – um unkontrollierbare Eskalationsspiralen zu verhindern. Denn was Eskalation statt Entspannungspolitik bedeutet, das sehen wir gerade in der Ukraine: ein zu verurteilender brutaler Angriffskrieg Russlands, für den es keine annehmbare Begründung gibt, dessen Ursachen aber im Vorfeld nicht abgebaut wurden.

Ja, Russland muss sofort raus aus der Ukraine. Aber mittlerweile ist unübersehbar, dass die NATO diesen widerlichen Angriffskrieg für eigene Geopolitik verwertet: zum Beispiel um hier massiv aufzurüsten oder mit Waffenlieferungen den Krieg in die Länge zu ziehen, um den Preis für einen imperialen Rivalen in die Höhe zu treiben. Es ist und bleibt ein innerimperialer Machtkampf, der mit dem Blutzoll der Ukrainer, aber auch auf dem Rücken der Völker weltweit ausgetragen wird. Die Gefahr eines Flächenbrandes steigt weiter.

Die große Politik entscheidet sich für Krieg. Aber es sind selten die Söhne und die Töchter der Eliten, die in diesen Kriegen bluten. Deshalb sage ich deutlich: Kehrt endlich zurück an den Tisch der Diplomatie, damit nicht noch mehr Menschen sterben und entheimatet werden! Stoppt diesen Krieg! Und das geht nur am Verhandlungstisch.


  Fabio Massimo Castaldo (NI). – Mr President, according to some analysts, after the Russian criminal invasion of Ukraine, cyberattacks against the EU and its Member States have increased by 1000%. It goes without saying that these numbers must represent a wake—up call for us.

The number one priority must be to pursue strategic autonomy and technological serenity, pledging adequate resources to this end. In particular, a shift of approach is really required. We can no longer focus only on hardware capabilities, but we need to include ambitious projects on the research and development of specific software. Otherwise, we will always remain dependent on third parties.

Second, we should insist on those success stories which already exist, such as ENISA, whose role should be further enhanced. At the same time, and even more in line with the prerogative of our House, we need to streamline cyber diplomacy with the final aim to create a safe, reliable and open cyberspace worldwide. The cyber domain represents the apotheosis of interconnection among EU Member States and, even more than in other fields, there are no individual countries that can boast a satisfactory and independent level of security. Let’s make this field the pilot for further European integration.


  Tom Berendsen (PPE). – Voorzitter, de dreiging van cyberaanvallen op onze kritieke infrastructuur en op onze economie is toegenomen. Cybercriminelen hebben bijvoorbeeld ons energiesysteem in het vizier en we weten dat daar een politieke agenda achter zit. Daar moeten we ons beter tegen wapenen en ik dank dan ook de commissaris voor de voorstellen die hij op dat gebied gedaan heeft. In het cyberdomein zijn aanvallers altijd op zoek naar zwakke plekken. En als verdediger moet je alles goed doen, terwijl je als aanvaller maar één zwakke plek nodig hebt. Daarom moeten we veel strategischer nadenken over welke partijen we in onze kritieke infrastructuur toelaten om het risico op mogelijke cyberaanvallen te verminderen.

Ik vind het ontzettend naïef dat we Chinese scanapparatuur gebruiken in Europese havens en op Europese luchthavens om mensen en goederen te controleren die onze grens passeren. Ik vind het naïef dat we Chinese communicatietechnologie gebruiken in onze kernnetwerken. Dit zijn domeinen waar we risico’s moeten uitsluiten en de Europese industrie juist zouden moeten stimuleren. We zijn te lang naïef geweest in het beschermen van onze Europese ideeën, technologie en data. Economische veiligheid is niet alleen de verantwoordelijkheid van bedrijven zelf, het is een publiek belang. We zijn te kwetsbaar en laten we in Europa samenwerken om dat te verminderen.


  Łukasz Kohut (S&D). – Panie Przewodniczący! Panie Komisarzu! Chcesz pokoju, przygotuj się do wojny. Stare, ale jakże aktualne. Polityka obronna Unii Europejskiej to musi być teraz nasz priorytet. Mieliśmy wiele szczęścia, prezydent Stanów Zjednoczonych jest demokratą z krwi i kości i podjął się trudnej roli koordynatora i lidera w czasach rosyjskiego ataku na Ukrainę. Ale nie zawsze tak będzie. Musimy sami jako Unia Europejska być gotowi na wyzwania i ataki tak wojskowe, jak i cybernetyczne. Putin czy inny dyktator wcale nie musi napadać zbrojnie, by siać zamęt i niszczyć Unię Europejską czy poszczególne kraje.

Kampania brexit, afera Cambridge Analitica, niejasne powiązania Ordo Iuris. Wiele wskazuje na to, że za tym wszystkim stoi Kreml i jego cybernetyczne macki. Pamiętajmy także o fabrykach trolli, które odpowiadają za dezinformację, hate speech i szkalowanie wartości demokratycznych. Musimy być gotowi na te wyzwania i pułapki. Musimy stworzyć system reagowania na te zmasowane cyberataki i rosyjski trolling w internecie.


  Morten Løkkegaard (Renew). – Hr. formand! Som om Putins aktuelle krig med tanks, bombardementer og myrderier i Ukraine ikke var slem nok, så har krigen i cyberspace været en ødelæggende realitet allerede længe. Her gælder krigen ikke kun kritisk infrastruktur i Ukraine. Der rettes faktisk angreb mod virksomheder i Europa hvert 11. sekund, mine damer og herrer, hvert 11. sekund! Krigen i cyberspace afslører jo, at vi i Europa står svagt. Derfor er vi nødt til at skærpe vores cyberforsvar på flere planer.

Først og fremmest skal vi opdatere EU's regler for cybersikkerhed, så vi styrker virksomhedernes og myndighedernes forsvar. Det sker lige nu i den såkaldte Nice II-lov, som flere kolleger har omtalt - jeg har selv været med til at forhandle den - og nu kører trilog-forhandlingerne på fuld tryk mellem Rådet, Kommissionen og Europa-Parlamentet, og vi har da visse forventninger til resultatet, kommissær. Det er helt afgørende, at medlemslande og virksomheder accepterer, at vi er nødt til at stille strengere krav. Dernæst er vi nødt til at afskrække lande som Rusland fra at angribe os. Derfor har vi brug for at kunne vedtage fælles sanktioner mod lande uden for EU, som angriber medlemslandene i cyberspace. Endelig skal vi have et helt anderledes tæt samarbejde om at spore cyberangreb meget tidligere. Det er min klare forventning, at vi vil se initiativer fra Kommissionen om et tættere samarbejde inden længe.


  Markéta Gregorová (Verts/ALE). – Mr President, I’ve seen many, many people cheer on the ‘hactivist’ group Anonymous when they wage their own war against Russians. When some of my friends travelled to Ukraine to help Ukrainians flee the country, others sit down behind a computer and show their heroism through ones and zeros. The same goes to other entities.

Ukraine built resilient cyber defence capabilities. The UK and US support Ukraine with their cyber mission teams. We are, however, nowhere to be seen in this field, even though each day I open the news, I see several new cyber attacks in Europe.

That brings the question: will our citizens have to hope that Anonymous will have the capacities to cover them too? Or are we prepared to protect our critical infrastructure, data and information space? My friends are nice and I am sure they will help if needed, but this is our political responsibility as long, as we support democracy that is.


  Marco Dreosto (ID). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, le azioni e i preparativi dei cyber attacchi russi erano iniziate un anno prima dell'invasione in Ucraina, a conferma che il conflitto era stato pianificato con largo anticipo. È ora chiaro che vi sia un'attività sinergica delle attività di guerra cibernetiche russe, destinate a destabilizzare alcune infrastrutture sensibili e strategiche di un territorio che la Russia aveva intenzione di colpire.

Un'espansione a Occidente, fuori dai confini ucraini degli attacchi cyber è uno dei possibili scenari dello sviluppo del conflitto e sapendo che queste azioni sono state preparate nuovamente da Mosca con grande anticipo, è necessario evidentemente non trovarsi impreparati. Non è il caso di aspettare ulteriori tensioni con la Russia per predisporre un piano di risposta e contenimento di questi attacchi.

È necessario invece individuare immediatamente una strategia per alzare al massimo le nostre difese. Dobbiamo anche avere una visione di prospettiva, una visione che combatta la guerra cibernetica, che non finirà con la fine del conflitto in Ucraina, anzi probabilmente verrà inasprita.

È necessaria una maggiore cooperazione non solo tra gli Stati europei dell'Occidente intero, evidentemente, ma anche un rafforzamento di quella che è la cooperazione con gli storici alleati, gli Stati Uniti, ma anche il Regno Unito e le organizzazioni internazionali come la NATO. Solo con l'unità dell'Occidente potremo fronteggiare queste minacce ibride e difenderci così e difendere soprattutto le nostre infrastrutture sensibili e strategiche, poiché quando si parla di cybersecurity non si parla solo di sicurezza informatica in senso stretto, ma di una vera e propria sicurezza nazionale.


  Witold Jan Waszczykowski (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Musimy odejść od marzeń, iż możemy budować bezpieczeństwo europejskie wraz z Rosją, z Rosją taką, jaką jest. Jeśli z Rosją, to oczywiście ze zmienionym demokratycznie reżimem. Pytam, czy mamy więc odwagę zmienić reżim w Rosji. Tak jak wielu tutaj ma odwagę i chęć zmienić rząd w Polsce. Musimy mieć zdolność właściwego odczytania intencji i polityki rosyjskiej. Po Czeczenii, Gruzji, Krymie większość Europy nie potrafiła rozpoznać zamiarów rosyjskich.

Potrzebujemy więc zdolności technicznej, ale przede wszystkim woli politycznej i realistycznego spojrzenia na Rosję. I wiedzy. Wola polityczna, wiedza, to potrzeba wiedzy o caracie, komunizmie i obecnej Rosji. Ulegamy często fake newsom, propagandzie, również tu na tej sali. Zdolności techniczne. Nie trzeba inwencji, by wynajdować koło czy proch, wystarczy powielić doświadczenia: Radia Wolna Europa, Radia Swoboda czy Voice of America.


  Κώστας Παπαδάκης (NI). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, η ένταση των ανταγωνισμών ανάμεσα σε Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, ΝΑΤΟ και Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση με τη Ρωσία τρέφουν την κλιμάκωση της ιμπεριαλιστικής σύγκρουσης στην Ουκρανία και μέσα από τον λεγόμενο κυβερνοπόλεμο, που συνοδεύεται από τον πόλεμο προπαγάνδας και τη λογοκρισία και από τις δύο πλευρές. Η δήλωση του Επιτρόπου Σχοινά, στα εγκαίνια της νέας έδρας του Οργανισμού της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης για την Κυβερνοασφάλεια στην Αθήνα, ότι ο πόλεμος δεν γίνεται μόνο στους δρόμους της Μαριούπολης, αλλά έχει ήδη ξεκινήσει και στο διαδίκτυο —το επανέλαβε και εδώ—, μαρτυρά ότι η Ελλάδα με τη συμβολή και όλων των ελληνικών κυβερνήσεων εμπλέκεται μέχρι τον λαιμό στον πόλεμο.

Εκτός από το τεράστιο δίκτυο αμερικανονατοϊκών βάσεων-ορμητηρίων του ιμπεριαλιστικού πολέμου στην Ουκρανία, την αποστολή όπλων και στρατιωτικών δυνάμεων, όπως και τις κυρώσεις, από τη στιγμή που αποτελεί βασικό κυβερνοκέντρο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, μπορεί να αποτελέσει εν δυνάμει και κυβερνοστόχο αντιποίνων, όπως για παράδειγμα έχει διακηρύξει η Ρωσία σε ανύποπτο χρόνο. Ενάντια στους επικίνδυνους ιμπεριαλιστικούς σχεδιασμούς, πρέπει να δυναμώσει η αυτοτελής πάλη του λαού, ώστε να απεμπλακεί η Ελλάδα από τον ιμπεριαλιστικό πόλεμο.


  Othmar Karas (PPE). – Herr Präsident, meine Herren Vizepräsidenten, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Wir spüren es doch: Es ist Zeit aufzuwachen. Cyberkriegsführung beherrscht zunehmend unseren Alltag. Cyberattacken finden nicht nur gegenüber Ländern im Krieg statt. Bisher wurden 40 Cyberattacken Russlands registriert: gegen das Stromnetz, die Trinkwasserversorgung, die Wasserversorgungsysteme, militärische Koordinierungseinrichtungen und gegen kritische Infrastruktur in vielen anderen Ländern.

Wir benötigen aus diesem Grund eine gemeinsame EU-Cyberabwehr. Ich trete für eine gemeinsame Cyber-Defence-Einheit der EU ein. Und um konsequent und schnell gegen hybride Attacken und illegale Inhalte vorgehen zu können, braucht es eine Kompetenzausweitung der Europäischen Union in diesem Bereich, eine Stärkung der Kapazitäten des Europäischen Zentrums für Cyberkriminalität von Europol und eine verbesserte Zusammenarbeit nationaler Sicherheits- und Nachrichtendienste.

Gleichzeitig müssen wir mehr in die Aufklärung und digitalen Kompetenzen unserer Bürgerinnen und Bürger investieren. Es geht darum, von klein auf zu lernen, unabhängig zu beurteilen, ob eine Information vertrauenswürdig ist oder nicht. Wir haben viel zu tun – gemeinsam.


  Javi López (S&D). – Señor presidente, señor comisario, la guerra en Ucrania es una muestra más de cómo los ciberataques se han convertido en elementos del campo de batalla. Y, lamentablemente, van a formar parte del paisaje de las tensiones internacionales durante los próximos años.

Por eso, con buen criterio, la Brújula Estratégica nos explica cómo la ciberseguridad y los ciberataques son una de las principales amenazas a las que se enfrenta Europa. Una amenaza para su prosperidad, pero también una amenaza para su seguridad nacional e incluso para su democracia.

Por eso, tenemos que aprender a combatirlos con contundencia y determinación como europeos.

Aprender, ¿a qué?

Aprender, en primer lugar, a responder, teniendo herramientas claras para poder responder frente a los ciberataques. En segundo lugar, a resistir, que quiere decir proteger infraestructuras críticas y nuestros sistemas electorales. Y, en tercer lugar, atribuir claramente quién está detrás para luego poder aplicar sanciones.

Resistir, responder, atribuir. Todo ello para convertirse también en un actor geopolítico en el ámbito digital.


  Ivars Ijabs (Renew). – Mr President, when Vladimir Putin plans a so-called ‘special military operation’, he probably hoped for a quick and victorious war. However, Ukrainian resistance turned out to be fierce and Western support for them is helping Ukrainians to fight back so heroically.

It is obvious now that Russia is going to use all possible non-conventional means to hurt Ukraine and its allies, and the increased intensity of cyber is clearly a case in point. They are affecting our critical infrastructure, water and electricity supply, transport, medicine and our supply chains. We shouldn’t be naive, as violent, cynical and inhumane as Putin’s regime is in a physical war, it is also going to be in the cyberspace.

What we need in Europe is to proceed swiftly with a new cyber resilience act. Let me emphasise two elements here. First, strengthening the cooperation between computer security incident response teams in the Member States, in identifying the threats timely, not being ‘behind’ the hackers.

Second, the development and coordination of offensive – not just defensive – capacities among Member States. It is very often crucial not just to block and prevent an attack. You have to be capable to seek out and to disrupt the malignant activities. This is what is needed to neutralise Putin’s army of cyber criminals.


  Viola Von Cramon-Taubadel (Verts/ALE). – Mr President, before Russian bombs fell on Kyiv, Odesa and Mariupol, there were Russian cyber-attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure. Microsoft alone documented over 200 such attacks. In 2015, the Russian military intelligence hacker group, Sandworm, shut down critical infrastructure and triggered a power cut for thousands of Ukrainians. The Kremlin tried to repeat that trick two weeks ago but, thanks to the US, the attack could be prevented.

In times of hybrid warfare, the EU faces a new threat. We cannot always rely on the help of our allies or on the incompetence of our adversary. As we phase out Russian oil and gas, Putin will only intensify cyber-attacks on our energy sector.

The continent, Europe, of prosperity and highly educated people has all the resources needed to bolster European defence against cyber-attacks. However, we also need more political will and leadership. It is time to grow cyber-capabilities at home and not to outsource the development of hardware and software abroad.


  Patryk Jaki (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Panie Komisarzu! Trzeba przede wszystkim walczyć z dezinformacją na temat państw, które najbardziej pomagają Ukrainie, takich jak Polska. I to charakterystyczne, że atakujecie Polskę akurat w święto Konstytucji 3 Maja. I to jest wręcz niesamowite, jak historia lubi się powtarzać. Wtedy Zachód przestraszył się, że Polska z nową konstytucją i wolnością – której nie było nigdzie w Europie tyle ile w Polsce – bardzo szybko będzie coraz silniejsza, i postanowił razem z Rosją ją zniszczyć, oczywiście z pomocą swoich przekupnych Polaków z Targowicy.

Dzisiaj, 231 lat później, znów denerwują Was wolnościowe aspiracje Polaków. No i oczywiście to, że ciągle upominamy się o Ukrainę. I znów z pomocą swoich Polaków ku uciesze Rosji wprowadzacie kolejne projekty osłabienia Polski. Dlaczego? Bo chcecie powrotu do biznesu z Rosją. I to nie jest tak, jak tutaj mówiliście, że wszyscy chcemy tego samego. Nie. Wy chcecie, żeby ta wojna szybko się skończyła, a my chcemy, żeby Ukraina wygrała. To są dwie różne rzeczy. I jeszcze jedno: nie będziecie Polaków pouczali, Polaków, którzy dla Europy stworzyli pierwszą konstytucję, nie będziecie pouczali, czym jest wolność i czym jest praworządność. To od nas możecie się jej uczyć. Wiwat trzeci maj. Wiwat Konstytucja 3 maja.


  Željana Zovko (PPE). – Mr President, cyberattacks are a fast—growing criminal activity. While the Russian invasion in Ukraine is mostly an offensive on the ground, experts warn for increasing cyberattacks as a countermeasure against our sanctions.

The EU has to be prepared. We cannot allow a reactive approach. We need a proactive cyber—defence. I regret to learn that the Court of Auditors recently concluded that the European Union bodies and agencies are insufficiently secured. A few days ago, the head of EU Cybersecurity Agency said that its incident reporting system is too bureaucratic and does not work.

I call on the negotiators of the update to the EU Directive on the security of network and information systems to address these issues and to provide the blueprint for a better—secured European Union. Digitalisation is crucial for our economic well—being, but the more we digitalise key infrastructures and critical sectors, the more vulnerable we get for cyber—criminality. We have called for a stronger European defence, and cybersecurity is an essential part of it.


  Marina Kaljurand (S&D). – Lugupeetud istungi juhataja!

Venemaa hübriid-, info- ja küberrünnakud ei ole midagi uut, Venemaa on neid aastakümneid kasutanud oma poliitiliste eesmärkide saavutamiseks ning Ukraina on aastaid olnud Vene küberrünnakute katsepolügooniks. On igati tervitatav, et Euroopa Liit reageeris juba enne 24. veebruari agressiooni ning lähetas Ukrainasse küberreageerimise rühma. Ukraina abistamist tuleb jätkata. Samas ei tohi unustada Euroopa Liidu enda ja liikmesriikide kübervõimekust ja küberkaitset. ENISA, Euroopa Liidu strateegiline kompass tunnistavad puudusi nendes valdkondades, selles kontekstis tahaksin rõhutada kolme punkti. Esiteks, küberjulgeolek peab saama poliitiliseks prioriteediks koos selleks vajalike rahaliste ja inimressurssidega. Teiseks tuleb parandada infovahetust ja koostööd NATOga ja kolmandaks, Venemaa rünnakud ei tohi jääda vastuseta. On oluline neile reageerida, alustades rünnakute avalikustamisest ja omistamisest ning lõpetades ühiste vastumeetmetega.


  Anna Júlia Donáth (Renew). – Tisztelt Elnök úr! Gyakran éri az Európai Uniót az a kritika, hogy túl lassú, túl bürokratikus, ezért döntésképtelen és gyenge. Ha volt is alapja ezeknek a kritikáknak és vádaknak, az Ukrajna elleni orosz agresszió sok negatív sztereotípiát elfeledtetett. Európa ugyanis megmutatta, hogy milyen az, amikor félreteszi a túlzott bürokráciát és nagyhatalomként kezd el viselkedni. Ez azért is kritikusan fontos, mert egy egységes, az orosz befolyástól megszabaduló Európától ma talán jobban tart Putyin, mint a NATO-tól. De 2022-ben ideje lenne a kibertérben is egy egységes nagyhatalomként fellépnünk. Ennek érdekében közösen kell felépítenünk egy digitális pajzsot Európa köré, és gyorsan kell lépnünk. Pár hete ugyanis kiderült például, hogy Putyin évek óta benne van a magyar külügyminisztérium összes digitális rendszerében, még a legtitkosabb információkhoz is hozzáférnek. Mindezt a magyar kormány tudtával, ami mind Európa mind a NATO biztonságát aláássa. Éppen ezért a 21. században nem kevesebb, hanem több Európára van szükség. Szabadítsuk meg Magyarországot és Európát az orosz befolyástól és végre viselkedjünk nagyhatalomként a modern háborúk legújabb színterén, a kibertérben is.


  Kosma Złotowski (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Panie Komisarzu! Szanowni Państwo! Rosja toczy wojnę w cyberprzestrzeni przeciwko Unii Europejskiej od wielu lat. Agresja na Ukrainę była poprzedzona atakami hakerskimi na instytucje publiczne, urzędników państwowych i infrastrukturę krytyczną w wielu państwach członkowskich, także w Polsce. Budowanie odporności na konflikt, który toczy się w internecie, to kwestia fundamentalna dla naszego bezpieczeństwa. Warto wykorzystać w tym celu potencjał zaawansowanych technologii, w tym także sztucznej inteligencji.

Mamy europejskie firmy, które mogą dostarczyć odpowiednich narzędzi z obszaru cyberbezpieczeństwa w kontekście militarnym, jak i cywilnym. Ale musimy im stworzyć odpowiednie warunki rozwoju. Projekt AI Act, nad którym właśnie pracujemy, to doskonała okazja, aby to zrobić i ułatwić prowadzenie badań i inwestowanie w środki służące do ochrony przed cyberatakami.


  Seán Kelly (PPE). – A Uachtaráin, cyber-attacks from Russia did not start on 24 February, nor will they end when the war ends in Ukraine. Europe must be prepared for the war to expand online, with critical infrastructure at risk. As technology advances and becomes further intertwined into our economies and infrastructure, we must be aware that cyber-threats are also rapidly evolving in nature and sophistication.

The EU and all Member States need a digital security architecture to defend us robustly against cyber-attacks. Ireland is a neutral country. Yet in May 2021, our health-care systems suffered the biggest cyber-attack in the history of the State. This affected most of the country’s health services, including coronavirus testing, maternal care services, cancer care, COVID-19 tracking and routine referrals for secondary care at a time when the whole system was under pressure.

This, it appears, was at the hands of Russian hackers and criminals. This has led to a shift in thinking in Ireland, as we’ve seen that neutrality per se doesn’t mean that you’re exempt from Russian attacks. We have to take our defence much more seriously, within the confines of neutrality. Cyber-defence should be a priority, which means investment. That is what we must do.


  Pina Picierno (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, in questo tempo inedito, complesso, difficile, abbiamo imparato che sono tante le cose che noi possiamo classificare come guerra, dai missili che stanno colpendo in questi minuti Leopoli – e da quest'Aula vorrei che giungesse la solidarietà al sindaco, alla popolazione colpita esattamente in questi minuti, mentre noi discutiamo.

Ai vecchi strumenti di propaganda, di disinformazione, agli stivali nel fango delle invasioni della fanteria, che abbiamo riscoperto esistere in questi mesi, fino alle minacce di cui discutiamo stasera che corrono lungo le fibre del mondo, la cosiddetta guerra ibrida. Abbiamo imparato a conoscerla in questi mesi, e nonostante il fatto che la natura di questo conflitto sia articolata, complicata, le risposte delle nostre istituzioni devono essere unitarie e forti, dall'alleanza sempre più strutturale tra gli Stati membri, fino a strumenti inediti di difesa contro le aggressioni ingiustificate e brutali di Putin. E su questo ci faremo trovare ancora una volta pronti.


  Petras Auštrevičius (Renew). – Mr President, Russia’s military and hybrid aggression against Ukraine only confirms the global nature and importance of cybersecurity. Russia’s direct and indirect attacks against Ukraine have also increased the impact of the ongoing ‘Cold hybrid war’ on the West.

Deterring cyber threats emanating from Russia and its allies, such as Belarus – don’t forget that – requires immediate attention to strengthening the EU’s cyber resilience. We need to reassess existing threats and take the necessary decisions to protect our critical infrastructure and, more importantly, our people.

We need to understand that cyber threats are here to stay and can have serious consequences if not properly addressed. We must pay particular attention to protecting our information space and our people from Russian trolls and attempts to interfere in our democratic processes by manipulating public opinion.

With Russia waging a brutal war against democracy and freedom in Ukraine, we no longer have the luxury of talking about action. Now it’s time to act and ensure the EU’s and our partners’ cybersecurity.


  Tonino Picula (S&D). – Mr President, we are all aware that wars are not limited to traditional types of warfare. The Russian invasion on Ukraine is just an evident example. The Kremlin started testing its tactics in Ukraine many years ago, targeting even a power grid. Disinformation examples are well—known, and particularly Russia disseminated 70% of all disinformation and fake news lately.

Russian state—sponsored hackers and cybercriminals are still increasing their presence. They are very keen to target critical infrastructure.

Those are basically the same actors, with the same intentions, that launched cyberattacks during the COVID pandemic, on hospitals or our Medicines Agency.

That’s why it is of utmost importance to be prepared. These attacks may have unimaginable repercussions and our unity is a prerequisite for safety. Therefore, EU cybersecurity needs to be shown in practice. We absolutely have to support our Agency for Cybersecurity to strengthen the capacities of our Member States. With enough efforts and enough resources. Otherwise, we risk too much.


  Vlad Gheorghe (Renew). – Domnule președinte, în 2022, cu război la graniță, ne întrebăm dacă suntem pregătiți pentru atacuri cibernetice. Deși pandemia ne-a arătat exact ce vulnerabili suntem, ne-a costat enorm că nu aveam deja o Uniune a Sănătății, că nu am digitalizat suficient, că nu am digitalizat integral.

Digitalizarea înseamnă deschiderea statului pentru oameni, înseamnă transparență, rapiditate, debirocratizare, mai puțină corupție, dacă digitalizăm cum trebuie, nu doar să bifăm niște indicatori. După doi ani de online, instituțiile naționale, dar și europene, tot cer dosar cu șină.

Suntem pregătiți pentru atacurile Rusiei? Cu siguranță nu. Dar de ce? Discutăm de zeci de ori până luăm o decizie. Stăm ani de zile cu propuneri la sertar. Negociem după interese de partid sau de grup, nu ale tuturor europenilor. Ascultăm politruci din birouri, nu profesioniști din teren. De asta nu suntem pregătiți. Nu vom fi până nu schimbăm ceva, modul de lucru, iar cetățenii ne vor spune la vot până înțelegem.


  Adriana Maldonado López (S&D). – Señor presidente, señor comisario, la ciberseguridad es una cuestión de democracia. Ahora mismo, la guerra que vivimos, que afecta a niños, mujeres y hombres, tiene rostros, pero también el rostro de la informática. Por ello, la Unión Europea tiene que estar a la altura de las circunstancias.

Ucrania se está enfrentando a ciberataques nunca antes vistos al ministerio de Defensa y también a la banca.

La Unión Europea tiene el reto de actualizar su Estrategia de Ciberseguridad. Es importante, y lo decía el comisario, actualizar la Directiva sobre Ciberseguridad.

Necesitamos estar a la altura de las circunstancias, pero también debemos hacer un análisis más profundo de qué consideramos infraestructuras críticas. Ya no se trata de las infraestructuras tradicionales, las centrales nucleares, las cadenas de valor o, por ejemplo, las centrales eléctricas, sino que ahora también entre esas infraestructuras críticas figuran la digitalización, los sistemas bancarios y también los sistemas electorales.

La Unión Europea tiene que ser capaz de dar una respuesta coordinada y proteger su mercado único. La guerra y la ciberseguridad cada día también están más de la mano. La Unión Europea debe ser más digital y proteger su ciberseguridad.


  Andreas Schieder (S&D). – Herr Präsident, Herr Kommissar, sehr geehrte Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Hiermit schon ausreichend gehört: die Cyberattacken Russlands, und Europa ist nicht genügend vorbereitet. Ich möchte aber eine andere, zusätzliche Frage stellen, nämlich: Sind wir als europäische Demokratie, als freie Welt in der Lage, der russischen Zivilbevölkerung die Wahrheit zu übermitteln?

Wir kennen den Informationskrieg, den Krieg und Angriff auf die Demokratie, auf die Ukraine in Europa, aber auch auf die Pressefreiheit in Russland, die das erste Opfer von Putins Diktatur geworden ist. Wir kennen die tausenden Demonstrantinnen und Demonstranten, die in Russland gegen den Krieg demonstriert haben und dafür von Putins Polizei eingesperrt wurden.

Und was wir auch brauchen, sind Kanäle, digitale und Informationskanäle, die die unverfälschte Lage – die Wahrheit, wenn man so will – in die Wohnzimmer der Russinnen und Russen bringen. Weil auch das ist notwendig, damit die Zivilbevölkerung in Russland aufwachen kann.


  Isabel Santos (S&D). – Senhor Presidente, a guerra na Ucrânia e os ciberataques que a precederam e a acompanham mostram a necessidade de a Europa aumentar a sua capacidade de proteção das infraestruturas críticas e de resposta a este tipo de ataques.

A Rússia tem mostrado capacidade de levar ataques altamente disruptivos e verdadeiras campanhas de desinformação, causando problemas não só à população ucraniana, mas também aos Estados-Membros da União Europeia e às nossas democracias.

Tal como no campo militar, também na cibersegurança a União Europeia necessita de criar mecanismos comuns de defesa e resposta a ciberataques e de aprofundar o diálogo com os nossos aliados. Só juntos, mobilizando os Estados, a administração pública, as empresas, os especialistas, seremos capazes de proteger as nossas infraestruturas e o nosso modelo de sociedade.

Temos de fazer mais e investir mais. Não podemos adiar.


  Pierfrancesco Majorino (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, la terrificante guerra di Putin porta con sé un carico di violenza e morte che si presenta ogni giorno di fronte ai nostri occhi.

Siamo però davanti – ed è bene esserne fino in fondo consapevoli – ad una guerra multidimensionale che è giocata anche su campi meno visibili, assumendo quindi anche la forma di una guerra informatica, ibrida, cibernetica.

Su questo terreno già da diversi anni, per la verità, assistiamo ai tentativi stranieri di condizionare i processi democratici dell'Unione europea. E dobbiamo aprire gli occhi di più. Occorre un investimento enorme per aumentare rapidamente capacità e competenze strategiche in questo campo, con un'attenzione particolare alle infrastrutture critiche. Ciò deve essere parte integrante di un progetto comune di sicurezza e difesa e di una controffensiva – come diceva giustamente l'onorevole Schieder – riguardanti il sostegno attivo alle voci libere in Russia.

Noi dobbiamo sostenere anche su questi terreni chi si oppone in Russia alla terrificante guerra di Putin.


Vystúpenia podľa postupu prihlásenia sa o slovo zdvihnutím ruky


  Eugen Tomac (PPE). – Domnule președinte, domnule comisar, avansul tehnologic ne-a adus oportunități extraordinare și ne-a schimbat mult viața în bine, însă vedem că atunci când state precum Federația Rusă utilizează instrumentele moderne pentru a ataca state, pentru a ataca entități, pentru a pune în pericol democrația europeană, acest lucru necesită un răspuns rapid și unit.

Este esențial ca Uniunea Europeană să își creeze o unitate de cibernetică comună pentru că avem nevoie de apărare comună pe acest teren extrem de periculos. Zilele trecute, mii de atacuri cibernetice au fost îndreptate împotriva României și cred că este absolut esențial să înțelegem că acest inamic pe care îl avem, acest imperiu condus de un criminal devine din ce în ce mai periculos și avem nevoie de instrumente moderne pentru a ne apăra zi de zi valorile și democrația.


  Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D). – Señor presidente, vicepresidente Schinas, el vertiginoso suceso de la guerra de Putin contra Ucrania ha venido a cambiarlo todo, desde lo local a lo global.

Leemos mucho estos días y escuchamos mucho acerca de la conducción de la guerra en el plano militar, por tanto, en el plano bélico, pero hay otras guerras de Putin donde se libra una batalla en la que Rusia es una superpotencia como en lo nuclear, principalmente en la desinformación y en la manipulación. Porque Putin controla autocráticamente los medios de comunicación públicos y privados, sin contrapesos y, por supuesto, da la batalla del relato, como vimos en la comisión que pusimos en marcha sobre la manipulación e injerencia de Rusia en los procesos democráticos y electorales en la Unión Europea, que arrojó algunas lecciones concluyentes: la necesidad de legislar a nivel europeo, la necesidad de proteger a la ciudadanía europea frente a las fake news y a las deep fakes, también la transparencia en los algoritmos, sanciones eficaces y disuasorias, pero, sobre todo, una inversión suficiente en materia de ciberseguridad que proteja los valores y la seguridad europea frente a los ataques a sus infraestructuras críticas y a sus procesos democráticos.


  Clare Daly (The Left). – Mr President, I think if we are worried about cybersecurity, then it’s a mistake to think of it solely in terms of cyber defence. Not all cybersecurity threats are state actors. Some are purely engineering problems. Some are problems with how our economy works. And we’re approaching everything as a defence issue. We may overlook this and undermine our actual cybersecurity.

We have allowed a thriving private sector to enrich itself on cyber—surveillance technology. We’ve seen an offence of hacking software proliferating. This has led us to Pegasus and so on. We’ve seen Western intelligence agencies tasked with cyber defence who, instead of reporting bugs in software, stockpiled them and they are then released afterwards to criminal gangs. And this is a good example because Vladimir Putin is no more responsible for the hack on the Irish health service than the Irish Prime Minister is for the criminal actions of the Kinahan crime gang. This was an attack on a weak system, with basic IT security practices, no updating of systems, no updating of software. If we allowed the depletion of this vital infrastructure, devoid of public infrastructure, it would be open to public attack by criminal gangs and we must protect ourselves better.


  Stanislav Polčák (PPE). – Pane předsedající, i já se připojuji k volání svých kolegů po nepřijatelnosti těchto útoků a samozřejmě po zvyšování odolnosti našeho kybernetického bezpečí. Bohužel, tak trochu vidíme naši slabost a evropskou kybernetickou bezpečnost v praxi. Určitě každý členský stát EU podléhá zranitelnosti a viděli jsme tyto útoky v praxi. V mé zemi to nejsou jenom útoky na vládní úřady, ale jsou to dokonce útoky na nemocnice, na dopravní společnosti. Musíme si uvědomit, jak vážnou hrozbu tyto útoky přinášejí i našim členským státům a jejich občanům, firmám a institucím. Zároveň bychom měli budovat odolnost našeho systému a připravenost na tyto útoky a také změnit naše směrnice, jak o tom hovořili naši kolegové. Kybernetická bezpečnost je součástí naší kritické infrastruktury. A měli bychom také pomoci Ukrajině, protože já skutečně vnímám to, že my máme agenturu EU pro kosmický program, ale internet na Ukrajině zachraňoval Elon Musk. Myslím si, že bychom se měli nad tím vážně zamyslet.


(Ukončenie vystúpení podľa postupu prihlásenia o slovo zdvihnutím ruky)


  Margaritis Schinas, Vice-President of the Commission. – Mr President, thank you for this rich debate. This is a defining moment for a Europe that protects. We are now at a crossroads.

What is happening in Ukraine and in our neighbourhood is not isolated. It is a sign of things to come. It prefigures what modern warfare will be like. Cyber-security is no longer a side tech issue of concern to the specialists. It is a fundamental pillar of the security of our economies, of our societies and of our democracies. It has nothing to do with industry. It has a lot to do with democracy.

We have no time to lose if we want our Union to be prepared, resilient and able to respond to these threats. The perpetrators will not wait for us. We need to work together, now more than ever, and put in full motion what we have already identified and announced in our 2020 EU cyber-security strategy. The whole lot leads to critical infrastructures, the Cyber Resilience Act, the cyber-security skills gaps and, of course, investment. These are the foundations of our European cybersecurity shield.

But, even more importantly, this is now the moment to move from a cyber-shield to an actual cyber-defence capability, and I am sure that we will be able to rise to this challenge.

Let me conclude with a final point. Members of the European Parliament, Mr Waszczykowski and Mr Papadakis, after thousands of dead, after bombarding the innocent and the vulnerable, after five million Ukrainian refugees that have been kicked out of their homes, in today’s debate suggested that we should be ‘realistic’ with Russia. That’s their assessment of what needs to be done

Well, with all respect, I think it’s not us that have to be realistic with Russia. It’s Russia that has to be respectful to us, and they should stop warfare now, be it with bombs, cannons or with computers. The best moment to stop is now.


  Predsedajúci. – Rozprava sa skončila.

Ultima actualizare: 1 iulie 2022Aviz juridic - Politica de confidențialitate