Doslovný zápis z rozpráv

Štvrtok, 1. júna 2023 - Brusel

2. Zahraničné zasahovanie do všetkých demokratických procesov v Európskej únii vrátane dezinformácií - Integrita volieb a posilnenie odolnosti pred voľbami do Európskeho parlamentu v roku 2024 (rozprava)

  Presidente. – L'ordine del giorno reca, in discussione congiunta,

– la relazione di Sandra Kalniete, a nome della commissione speciale sulle ingerenze straniere in tutti i processi democratici nell'Unione europea, inclusa la disinformazione, e sul rafforzamento dell'integrità, della trasparenza e della responsabilità al Parlamento europeo, sulle ingerenze straniere in tutti i processi democratici nell'Unione europea, inclusa la disinformazione (2022/2075(INI)) (A9-0187/2023), e

– l'interrogazione con richiesta di risposta orale alla Commissione su Integrità elettorale e resilienza in vista delle elezioni europee del 2024, presentata da Raphaël Glucksmann, a nome della commissione speciale sulle ingerenze straniere in tutti i processi democratici nell'Unione europea, inclusa la disinformazione, e sul rafforzamento dell'integrità, della trasparenza e della responsabilità al Parlamento europeo (O-000018/2023 - B9-0019/2023) (2023/2625(RSP)).

  Sandra Kalniete, rapporteur. – Madam President, dear colleagues, today it is my great honour to present my second report on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation.

I often hear that democracy around the world is in retreat. I would say that is an incorrect statement. Democracy is not simply in retreat; democracy is under attack. In today’s intervention, I would like to especially focus on two overarching aims of the report.

First, link our work in the ING2 Committee with following up the implementation of the recommendations of the first report, which was approved last year.

Second, we must examine the issues under the mandate of our committee vis-a-vis Russia’s ongoing brutal war against Ukraine and to build on the lessons learned.

Our assessment shows that we have significantly increased our situational awareness, and several necessary steps have been launched and progress has been attained (Digital Services Act, Democracy Defence package is on the way, growing expertise acquired).

However, in view of the upcoming EU elections in 2024, we still should urge for stronger measures and more coordination to protect our European democracy.

Allow me to outline some of the priorities from our report, which would make a significant difference in making our Union more resilient.

First of all, we need to move beyond a reactive approach centred on fact-checking, debunking, etc., and instead focus on resilience-building and ‘vaccination’ of our societies against disinformation.

Therefore, we need to establish a dedicated EU programme to invest in our democracy in a sustainable way. It will not give a solution tomorrow and it will be expensive, but it is certainly a worthwhile long-term investment.

Another important conclusion of our report is that in tackling disinformation, the EU is still suffering from a fragmented approach, without a clear coordination mechanism and goals. We simply cannot afford splintering our resources when our democracy is at stake.

Third, we should also greatly raise the costs for perpetrators. Therefore, I reiterate that the toolbox of the EU countermeasures should include a specific sanctions regime on foreign information manipulation and interference.

Russia’s imperial war of aggression against Ukraine has clearly exposed the interconnection between hostile information warfare, weaponisation of energy, attacks on critical infrastructure, and threats to the EU, to our immediate neighbourhood, as well as to global security and stability.

Europe now understands that the Cold War logic of buffer states is over. Today, grey zones in European security only create instability, risk and opportunities for hostile interference. The EU must invest in closing these grey zones and supporting the resilience and integration of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia into our European family and NATO.

To strengthen our resilience, we must learn both from our partners like Ukraine, in building resilience and tackling disinformation, but also from our own misjudgement allowing to fall into the trap of energy dependency and elite capture in the past. When I recall the state of affairs even three years ago, I am glad to say that, today, Europe is far less naive about Russia, China, and other adversaries.

A few words about structural priorities and the new challenges we are facing. For years, we have been following a country-agnostic approach that treats all foreign influence efforts in the same way, regardless of their source country and thus the aim, scale and the impact. We should not be afraid to call out those seeking intentionally and in a coordinated way to manipulate our democracy.

Therefore, we are suggesting moving towards a risk-based approach based on objective criteria. A similar approach already has been used in the EU legislation in money laundering and terrorist financing.

An immense challenge is presented by the rapid development of artificial intelligence tools. If so far we still are able to identify what is fake, artificial intelligence will make creating disinformation at scale much easier and cheaper, and much more difficult to recognise. We await the artificial intelligence act with great expectation.

Another challenge is the speed of decision-making process. We must face the fact that today’s legislation concerning consequences of the digital revolution already addresses the problems of yesterday. This is not only the EU challenge. It is a global problem to be addressed together with like—minded partners.

Moreover, I am convinced that this House in the next legislation will need a dedicated, cross-sectoral committee dealing with foreign interference and information manipulation issues, including new technological challenges.

In conclusion, I would like to thank my shadow rapporteurs for the excellent cooperation through this entire process, and also the secretariat and our political advisors.

Working on the challenges of the INGE1 and INGE2 Committees has certainly been one of the most important missions throughout my time as a Member of the European Parliament.

I truly hope that all of you can support the report.

  Raphaël Glucksmann, auteur. – Madame la Présidente, Madame la Vice-Présidente, chers collègues, il est des moments dans l’histoire où l’indolence devient coupable, et la légèreté criminelle. Nous vivons l’un de ces moments, et après bientôt trois ans de travail à la tête de la commission spéciale sur les ingérences étrangères, je veux aujourd’hui partager avec vous les conclusions vertigineuses auxquelles nous sommes parvenus.

Pendant 20 ans, les dirigeants européens ont fait preuve de naïveté et de complaisance. Pendant 20 ans, ils ont laissé des tyrans s’essuyer les pieds sur notre souveraineté, et nos démocraties européennes être la cible d’attaques extérieures coordonnées et sophistiquées. Pendant 20 ans, ils ont ouvert grand les portes de nos cités à leurs ennemis.

Chers collègues: financement de partis politiques anti-Union européenne, cyberattaques, campagnes de désinformation, corruption des élites. La guerre hybride que des régimes hostiles ont lancée contre nos démocraties et que nos dirigeants ont si longtemps refusé de voir, prend différentes formes. Elle arbore différents visages. Elle prend parfois dans nos téléphones, sur nos réseaux sociaux, le visage d’un troll ou d’un bot, élevé dans les fermes d’Evgueni Prigojine à Saint-Pétersbourg.

Le constat de notre commission est implacable. Les campagnes de manipulation de l’information sont une arme de destruction démocratique massive. Des acteurs privés, mus par l’appât du gain, comme la société israélienne Team Jorge, et des dictatures mues par la haine viscérale de nos démocraties, comme la Chine ou la Russie, visent à affecter le choix des électeurs, amplifier les polémiques, diviser, exploiter les vulnérabilités de nos sociétés ouvertes et encourager les discours de haine dans nos pays.

Tout ce qui polarise notre débat, entretient une atmosphère de confusion et de guerre civile sur nos réseaux, tout ce qui sape la confiance envers nos institutions répond à leur stratégie. Le chaos informationnel dans lequel nous évoluons désormais est une aubaine pour les tyrans, et un poison mortel pour les démocrates, comme l’est la corruption.

Chers collègues, la corruption des élites précipite toujours la chute des cités, et nous avons consenti à ce que le poison de la corruption se distille au sommet de nos États.

Comment avons-nous pu accepter pendant si longtemps que tant de chefs de gouvernement, de ministres, de hauts fonctionnaires aillent travailler pour les intérêts russes ou chinois? Comment la démocratie allemande, par exemple, a-t-elle pu tolérer que Gerhard Schröder parte travailler ainsi pour Gazprom, quelques semaines seulement après la fin d’une chancellerie marquée par des choix stratégiques dont son futur employeur serait le principal bénéficiaire? Comment les démocraties française, mais aussi autrichienne, belge et de tant d’autres pays européens qui se targuent d’avoir un système démocratique, ont-elles pu accepter que des ministres aillent travailler ainsi pour Gazprom ou pour d’autres entreprises qui font partie du système Poutine? Et comment acceptent-elles aujourd’hui que tant de ministres aillent travailler pour les intérêts chinois?

Nos classes dirigeantes ne doivent plus être les supermarchés dans lesquels les régimes autocratiques viennent tranquillement faire leurs courses. Il ne s’agit pas ici de morale, mais de sauvegarde de nos intérêts vitaux.

Chers collègues, la trahison de nos nations et de nos démocraties prend aussi le visage de démagogues d’extrême-droite prêts à se vendre à l’ennemi. Et des financements se transforment en asservissement quand il s’agit, pour des partis politiques européens, de répondre à une stratégie imposée de l’extérieur. C’est le cas notamment de Marine Le Pen qui, encore il y a peu à l’Assemblée nationale, a épousé la vision stratégique d’un régime auquel son parti doit aujourd’hui encore des millions d’euros.

Chers collègues, les élections se tiendront en 2024 dans un contexte de guerre en Europe et nous devons défendre leur intégrité. Nous comptons sur la Commission pour organiser dès maintenant cette défense. Je m’adresse donc à vous, Madame la Vice-Présidente: que prévoyez-vous concrètement pour lutter efficacement contre la manipulation de l’information pendant la campagne? Comment la Commission s’assurera-t-elle que les nouvelles initiatives, telles que le paquet de défense de la démocratie, seront opérantes dans les prochains mois et permettront d’assurer l’intégrité de la campagne électorale? Comment la Commission s’assurera-t-elle que les acteurs du numérique, et notamment les très grandes plateformes, obéissent enfin à nos exigences et à nos règles? Comment la Commission garantira-t-elle un niveau élevé de cybersécurité pour toutes les institutions concernées par les élections? Comment la Commission envisagera-t-elle de se coordonner avec les gouvernements des États membres pour garantir que ces élections sont protégées?

Ces élections feront suite à notre mandat ébranlé par les ingérences extérieures, qu’elles soient liées à la pandémie de COVID-19 ou au retour brutal de la guerre sur notre continent, ou même au Qatargate. L’enjeu est crucial. Nous devons montrer que démocratie ne rime plus avec faiblesse et qu’Europe ne rime plus avec impuissance. C’est tout le sens du travail que nous avons mené ensemble de manière transpartisane, avec la commission spéciale sur les ingérences étrangères depuis son instauration en septembre 2020.

Nous comptons sur vous, nous comptons sur la Commission, nous comptons sur les États membres, mais nous comptons aussi sur nous-mêmes pour protéger nos démocraties. C’est la mission la plus sacrée d’un parlementaire: protéger cette maison qui nous permet d’exprimer nos différences, la protéger contre des régimes qui suppriment chez eux les libertés et qui entendent les malmener chez nous.

Chers collègues, nous sommes forts et nous serons puissants si nous décidons de l’être. Le moment est venu de décider de l’être.

  Věra Jourová, Vice-President of the Commission. – Madam President, honourable Members, rapporteur, the topic of foreign interference is both timely and important. I would like to thank the European Parliament and the Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including disinformation, for its hard and relevant work.

The work of the INGE Committee and this House has been a real source of inspiration for the Commission. I want to congratulate the rapporteur, Sandra Kalniete, for bringing forward this work, which seems to command broad support across this House. That is testament to the importance of the report in analysing the phenomena of foreign interference and reflecting the need for a truly whole-of-society approach.

The report explores many dimensions. It looks at interference via elite capture, national diasporas, universities and cultural events. It includes valuable and concrete recommendations on sanctions against foreign interference.

In recent years, the Commission and the European External Action Service have stepped up their work to protect our democracies from foreign interference. This was a key strand of the European democracy action plan. For example, the Commission is working intensely with platforms and I am confident that the recently adopted Digital Services Act and the revised Code of Practice on disinformation will help limit the foreign information manipulation and interference online.

The Commission is very conscious of the danger of information manipulation and interference in the electoral processes. This is why my proposal on the transparency and targeting of political advertising will introduce common high standards of transparency for political advertising services for all media. It will also limit and frame the use of personal data in targeting and amplifying political ads.

The European External Action Service, in close cooperation with the Commission, has continued its work on foreign information, manipulation and interference. The progress made on a common analytical framework and methodology in conjunction with the work on the Information Sharing and Analysis Centre, will significantly increase our situational awareness and understanding of suspicious and malicious activities and cooperation in a whole-of-society approach.

In conclusion, the European democracy action plan allowed us to undertake unprecedented legal and other actions on strengthened resilience of elections, to promote independence of the media and address disinformation. But you are right, this is not enough. Our citizens are asking us to do more. We heard this also in the Conference on the Future of Europe.

As announced by President von der Leyen, the Commission is working on the defence of democracy package with a special focus on covert foreign interference through interest representation services. The package will include a communication, a directive on transparency of interest representation, a recommendation on elections in the EU, and a recommendation of promoting the engagement and effective participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policymaking processes. Because, while we must protect ourselves from outside interference, we must also build democratic resilience from within by supporting Member States in engaging with citizens and civil society in their policymaking processes.

The idea is for the EU to be equipped with a new generation of transparency tools to shed light on foreign influence while staying committed to freedom of expression and association. In particular, the proposed directive on transparency of interest representation on behalf of third countries would aim to ensure that companies, organisations or persons carrying out activities for third country governments that seek to influence public decision-making in the EU do so in a transparent manner.

This law will help us to better understand the financial flows to the EU from third countries that may want to undermine or destabilise our political processes. And it will help citizens to understand who is behind what they read or listen to, and also what is behind the policymaking environment. It would not ban or criminalise any such activities – the EU remains open and democratic. But we cannot be naive, and actors that receive this type of funding, irrespective of what they are, should be transparent about it.

Let me also reassure you that the proposal will be very different from national foreign agents laws proposed elsewhere, such as the withdrawn NGO law in Georgia or the Russian foreign agent legislation. The approach is very different in terms of aim, scope, supervision and sanctions.

Together with the President, we decided to take more time to consult broadly and gather more information in order to address also the concerns we heard in this House. We will reinforce the analysis underlying the proposal and upgrade it into a full impact assessment. This is important legislation and I want to make sure it will be balanced, meaningful and effective.

Now, turning back to the next elections to your parliament, we would like to explain how we will continue our close cooperation with Member States. In its communication activities ahead of the European elections, the Commission will inform citizens about the EU and its policy actions so that they can make informed decisions and engage in the European democratic debate. We will also support Member States’ cooperation on election-related matters in the framework of the European cooperation network on elections and the European External Action Service managed Rapid Alert System on disinformation.

Honourable Members, since the start of last year, the Commission has been working with Member States on a joint mechanism for electoral resilience to support the exchange of expertise in areas such as disinformation and cybersecurity. In October we will organise a high-level event on elections with Member States. Our objective is to exchange best practices on how to promote the exercise of electoral rights in the 2024 elections to the European Parliament. Thank you for your attention and I am sorry for being so long, but I had too much to say.

  Vladimír Bilčík, za skupinu PPE. – Vážená pani predsedajúca, odkedy Rusko zákerne vojensky napadlo nášho suseda, o čosi viac verím, že nik súdny nedovolí podceňovať hrozby od zlovoľných krajín. Je mi len ľúto, že to muselo dospieť až takto ďaleko, aby sme úplne precitli. Pri hrozbe z tretích krajín z ďaleka nejde len o vojenské nebezpečenstvo, ale aj o dlhodobé, tiché, no sústredené akcie, ktorých cieľom je podrývať našu spoločnosť, našich ľudí a naše inštitúcie.

Musíme preto reagovať rýchlo a premyslene, nepodceňovať hrozby a čerpať z toho, že sme silné európske spoločenstvo. Som rád, že práve dnes schvaľujeme správu pod taktovkou spravodajkyne, kolegyne Sandry Kalniete a verím, že Európska komisia čoskoro príde s ďalšími krokmi na obranu demokracie. Potrebujeme ich ako soľ.

Platformy, na ktorých sa naši občania dozvedajú informácie a čítajú správy, musia rešpektovať naše európske pravidlá už teraz. Nesmie sa stávať to, čo sa, žiaľ, deje v niektorých štátoch, že máme doslova prekonšpirované prostredie a občania sa nevedia vyznať v tom, čo je a čo nie je pravda. Ak to podceníme, dámy a páni, môžeme byť veľmi nešťastní, pretože takéto prostredie plné lží má dôsledky pre výsledky volieb a áno, aj európske rozhodnutia. Potrebujeme zabezpečiť slobodné a férové voľby. Už v najbližších mesiacoch vo viacerých krajinách vrátane Slovenska a o rok sa európski občania vyberú k volebným urnám v celej Európskej únii. Musia tam ísť informovaní a nie zmätení, klamstvami a dezinformáciami. Voľby, dámy a páni, sa však nerozhodujú len v deň volieb. Dôležité je predovšetkým demokratické a slobodné prostredie, v ktorých sa odohrávajú, vrátane kampane. Členské štáty a európske inštitúcie sa musia navzájom inšpirovať, aby bola naša demokracia otvorená i odolná voči tým, ktorí si neprajú nič iné, len ju narušovať. Moje otázky na Komisiu, pani podpredsedníčka, sú dnes veľmi krátke. Kedy budú plánované návrhy súčasťou bežného života? A ako vieme európskej demokracii pomôcť už dnes?

  Andreas Schieder, im Namen der S&D-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin, Frau Vizepräsidentin, werte Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Unsere Demokratie ist verwundbar. Und das europäische offene Gesellschaftsmodell ist bedroht – feindliche Einflussnahmen aus dem Ausland, Desinformationskampagnen, hybride Bedrohungen, Cyberangriffe und, und, und. Diese Bedrohungen nehmen zu und werden bis zur Europawahl im Juni 2024 noch viel, viel stärker werden. Und dagegen müssen wir uns schützen.

Der vorliegende Bericht will einerseits wachrütteln – endlich klarmachen: Wir müssen hier etwas tun! –, aber auch die Resilienz unserer offenen, lebendigen Demokratie mit einer Fülle von Maßnahmen stärken. Im Bericht findet sich eine lange Liste von vielfältigen Ansätzen: das Verbot von ausländischen Parteispenden, die gemeinsamen europäischen Regeln für politische Kampagnen, Wahlkämpfe und Parteienfinanzierung, die wir so dringend brauchen, Elite Capturing durch staatsnahe Unternehmen von Drittstaaten wie Russland, China, dem arabischen Raum, mehr Transparenz und Verantwortung aber auch von Internetplattformen – mehr Argumente, weniger Fake News ist hier das Grundprinzip.

Wir müssen aber auch unsere Kapazitäten hier im Europäischen Parlament stärken und rasch die Arbeit am Paket zur Verteidigung der Demokratie mit der Europäischen Kommission beginnen und die Umsetzung ganz, ganz rasch machen.

Liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen, die Zeit der Naivität ist vorbei. Und das heißt auch hier im Haus, im Europäischen Parlament die richtigen Schlüsse zu ziehen aus Katar- und Marokko-Gate und mehr Transparenz, strengere Regeln und weniger Lobbyismus im Halbschatten, im Verborgenen hier im Haus zuzulassen.

Ich möchte zum Abschluss aber auch der Berichterstatterin Sandra Kalniete, den Schattenberichterstattern aus den verschiedenen Fraktionen und auch dem Vorsitzenden Raphaël Glucksmann für die gute Zusammenarbeit im Dienste unserer offenen, lebendigen Demokratie danken.

  Bart Groothuis, on behalf of the Renew Group. – Madam President, Commissioner, colleagues, in the same week that this House rings the alarm bells on malign foreign interference, disinformation, growing hatred and the declining trust in our democracies, often enabled by social media, in that same week, the CEO of Twitter decides to abandon the EU’s code of practice directed to counter disinformation and malign interference. And earlier, the CEO of Twitter had already fired the majority of his staff dealing with such problems.

Mr Elon Musk seems to think that he’s in the American Wild West. Well he’s not. He’s operating in Europe, too, and there’s a new sheriff in town here in Europe. From this August onwards, the Digital Services Act enables the European Commission to fine up to 6% of the yearly revenue of Twitter.

Dear Commissioner, I urge you to set an example and show how Europe deals with companies undermining our democracy, undermining our security. Because the report we vote on today shows how Russia, how China, how they vehemently continue to do so if we don’t regulate or act.

  Viola von Cramon-Taubadel, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group. – Madam President, Commissioner, colleagues, first I would like to thank our rapporteur, Sandra Kalniete, for her overall very good cooperation. Over a year ago, I stood right here praising the report that should have become the EU blueprint for combating disinformation. The fact that we needed a second report to reiterate says everything.

Playing catch-up during a huge digital transformation risks rendering the EU irrelevant. We have countless examples of how modern wars are fought not only with guns but also with disinformation. If you are threatened by tanks, everyone knows what this means and why we need to protect our citizens. Hybrid threats are much more sophisticated. Democracy should never be taken for granted. It must be defended. Malign actors compromise our democracy by interfering in our elections, co-opting our officials – our Chair has mentioned that, acquiring our critical infrastructure, spreading disinformation. Russia and China choose these methods only because they have high payoffs and low punishment. This equation finally needs to change.

To prevail over foreign interference, we need three core qualities: unity, commitment to democratic principles and resilience. First, unity is our strength. Malign foreign actors have an interest to divide us, because together we are too strong. In this line our group regrets very much that some colleagues attempted to use this report for their own political agenda, which might lead to cracks in our unity.

Second, we must be aware of dangers of gazing into the abyss. Our democratic principles should be the guiding light. We should not compromise on freedom of expression, media, assembly or scientific research in this process. Let us win this fight without betraying our democratic DNA.

Lastly, resilience is our guarantee for prevailing. It is based on critical thinking, highly educated citizens, and on our resourcefulness. United, resilient and equipped with democratic principles we will triumph over those who wish harm to our democracy and to our societies.

  Beata Szydło, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Pani Przewodnicząca! Pani Komisarz! Na wstępie dołączam się do podziękowań dla pani przewodniczącej, pani sprawozdawczyni Sandry Kalniete za przygotowanie tego sprawozdania i konstruktywne podejście do naszej współpracy.

Obce ingerencje w procesy demokratyczne są faktem. Szczególnie po rozpoczęciu brutalnej wojny przez Putina na Ukrainie i po aferze Qatargate mamy namacalne dowody na to, że nie możemy przechodzić obojętnie obok sygnałów, które pojawiają się na temat tych ingerencji. I dobrze, że to sprawozdanie powstało. To jest dobry punkt wyjścia do rozpoczęcia dalszych prac nad wzmocnieniem naszych procesów demokratycznych.

Żałuję, że w sprawozdaniu pojawiły się zapisy, które uderzają bezpośrednio w niektóre państwa członkowskie. Szczególnie chodzi mi o zapisy dotyczące dezinformacji na temat praw osób ze środowiska LGBTI. Zapisy, które nie mają podstaw do tego, ażeby tutaj się znaleźć.

Ale z drugiej strony dobrze, że pojawiły się takie zapisy, które dotyczą przeciwdziałania wpływom Rosji, Chin i Iranu, zapisy wspierania Ukrainy, Tajwanu. Zwrócono także uwagę na polityczne wpływy Rosji w niektórych państwach i przywoływane już tutaj przykłady współpracy polityków, na przykład niemieckich, na rzecz rosyjskich firm.

Szanowni Państwo, warto też wyciągnąć wnioski z tego wszystkiego. I apeluję także do Komisji, żeby Komisja Europejska również miała pewną refleksję, że nie zawsze trzeba tak schematycznie podchodzić do tego, jakie procesy zachodzą i co dzieje się w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich tylko dlatego, że opozycja z tego państwa aktualnie atakuje dany rząd. Wczoraj debatowaliśmy na temat powstania w Polsce podobnej komisji jak nasza komisja INGE, która to komisja chce zbadać rosyjskie wpływy w życiu społecznym, politycznym, gospodarczym Polski. Zupełnie niezrozumiała debata, zupełnie niezrozumiały atak. I mam nadzieję, że Komisja zrozumie, że chodzi właśnie o to, ażeby wyeliminować rosyjskie wpływy z życia politycznego w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich. W naszym przypadku chodzi tutaj o to, ażeby zbadać, jakie wpływy Putin miał na to, co działo się w Polsce.

  Anna Bonfrisco, a nome del gruppo ID. – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, grazie alla relatrice Sandra Kalniete. Lo spirito di unità sul testo della collega dimostra che è interesse di tutti difendere le voci libere dei popoli europei da ogni forma di interferenza straniera, compresa la disinformazione.

È un impegno che comincia dalla lotta all'antisemitismo, ad esempio, la madre di tutte le sfide nella battaglia globale delle narrative dannose per la nostra democrazia. È così, infatti, che gli autoritarismi di questo mondo saranno più isolati. È così che gli Stati membri potranno coltivare radici culturali giudaico-cristiane più robuste. È così che i cittadini potranno attestare forti valori costituzionali, liberali, democratici e occidentali.

Da qui nasce il dovere dell'Unione europea di impegnarsi di più, signora Commissaria, con il resto del mondo, a partire, ad esempio, dal Mediterraneo allargato. Infatti, il grave ferimento dei soldati in Kosovo, di cui 14 italiani, è anche figlio delle interferenze straniere in quell'area. Ed è con lo stesso spirito che siamo impegnati a rendere il mondo un luogo di pace e di dialogo e dove affrontiamo tutte le minacce ibride ai nostri confini e quelle che entrano dentro di noi, a condizione che lo facciamo però nella ricerca della verità e non della strumentalizzazione politica.

  Clare Daly, on behalf of the The Left Group. – Madam President, President Trump and Brexit should have been a wake-up call for neoliberals, but rather than accept their own responsibility and make amends, they chose to pretend that they hadn’t really lost. They found a foreign scapegoat, ramped up the blame game, and so the myth of Russian interference was born. Does Russia meddle? Of course it does. But the Kremlin did not swing elections in 2016. That is a paranoid conspiracy theory and always has been. Every investigation – the Mueller report, the UK ICO report, the Durham report – showed the opposite. If Russia meddled, it had no effect; inconsequential, it is not an existential threat to our democracy. But the big lie is too useful to let go.

Russian interference is now the go-to slur for anything or anyone who disagrees. The anti-war movement? Kremlin stooges. Catalan independence? Putin puppets. Journalists, climate actions, trade unions – Russian agents. Every slander more cynical than the last. This is a sign of a deeply unhealthy political culture. We warned at the beginning that this would end in tears. Now we’ve NGOs in uproar over the foreign agents law, the Polish Government accusing the opposition of Russian collusion. I stand by our minority report. This report is a travesty to an open society. Some of its provisions likely breach EU fundamental rights law. If introduced, it will be abused. We need to put a stop to this madness now.

  Mislav Kolakušić (NI). – Poštovana predsjedavajuća, poštovani kolege, dragi građani – dezinformacije. Jedini koje sigurno neće zamijeniti umjetna inteligencija su mainstream kvazi novinari. Nijedna inteligencija, pa niti ona umjetna, ne može toliko lagati i izmišljati kao oni pa će njihova propagandna radna mjesta ostati sigurna. U Hrvatskoj i Europskoj uniji, što si veći lažljivac i potpuno amoralan lik, to je veća šansa da te proglase novinarom. Bez obzira jesi li završio neku školu ili nisi, ti možeš postati, u danu, znanstveni novinar. Danas su činjenice i istina najveći neprijatelj novovalne vakserske CO2 demokracije. Međutim, svakim danom sve je više građana koji su svjesni lažnih informacija koje im se svakodnevno serviraju putem mainstream medija. Kako se boriti protiv njih? Treba ih jednostavno isključiti i ignorirati kao da ne postoje.

  Javier Zarzalejos (PPE). – Señora presidenta, señora vicepresidenta, la verdad es que el magnífico informe del que es autora nuestra colega Sandra Kalniete habla por sí mismo. Es un documento del que nos podemos sentir orgullosos quienes hemos participado en esta comisión porque, para empezar, es una contribución crucial a la toma de conciencia de lo que representan esta amenaza y este desafío. Y, en segundo lugar, porque creo que es un informe que cumple con la necesidad de objetividad a través de hechos probados, con recomendaciones y con iniciativas, y que realiza el seguimiento de la aplicación del primer informe que aprobó esta comisión.

Estamos ante un desafío que se desarrolla en las sombras y, frente a la oscuridad, lo mejor es arrojar luz. Este informe arroja luz sobre la dimensión del desafío y sobre quiénes son sus responsables. Por tanto, es importante que hablemos con nombres y apellidos de China, de Rusia, de Venezuela; que hablemos de estrategias de influencia maligna como Qatar y como Marruecos; que seamos conscientes de que allí donde exista una crisis habrá interesados en incendiarla. Y nosotros tenemos algunas experiencias: algunas experiencias, como la del proceso secesionista ilegal en Cataluña, que contó con el apoyo y con el acompañamiento de agentes rusos.

Dentro de un año se van a celebrar elecciones al Parlamento Europeo. Seamos conscientes de que, de nuevo, se intentará condicionar la decisión libre de nuestros sistemas democráticos.

  Gabriele Bischoff (S&D). – Frau Präsidentin, Frau Vizepräsidentin, Kolleginnen! Ich möchte als Allererstes den Kolleginnen und Kollegen danken, die hier eine so gute Arbeit geleistet haben, um den Schleier der Naivität, was ausländische Einflussnahme anbelangt, zu heben. Und das war beileibe keine einfache Arbeit.

Aber ich bin auch in Sorge – in Sorge, wenn ich höre, dass das Demokratiepaket immer weiter verschoben wird, wenn wir wissen, dass das Datum für die Europawahlen feststeht und wir bis dahin ein stärkeres Schutzschild gegen Einflussnahme brauchen. Aber ich möchte auch noch einmal unterstreichen, wie wichtig die Zivilgesellschaft – eine unabhängige Zivilgesellschaft –für eine stabile Demokratie ist.

Und deshalb bin ich sehr besorgt, dass einige auch diese Debatte nutzen wollen, um genau diese unabhängige Zivilgesellschaft zu diskreditieren. Wir müssen den Rahmen schaffen, damit auch die Zivilgesellschaft ihre Rolle spielen kann, damit die Demokratie, die Rechtsstaatlichkeit geschützt wird. Und deshalb bin ich froh, dass Frau Jourová noch einmal unterstrichen hat, dass unser Ansatz sich von anderen Autokratien unterscheidet, wie wir Desinformation und Einflussnahme bekämpfen.

  Nathalie Loiseau (Renew). – Madame la Présidente, aujourd’hui à Chisinau, plus de 40 dirigeants européens viennent dire leur soutien à la Moldavie. Mais chaque jour, à Chisinau, la Russie mène une guerre hybride contre ce pays. Elle utilise tous les moyens en sa possession pour tenter d’affaiblir, de déstabiliser et de soumettre un pays souverain qui a fait le choix de la démocratie et de l’Europe. Désinformation, cyberattaques, achat de votes ou de manifestants, fausses alertes à la bombe, chantage à l’énergie, tentatives de coup d’État, tout est bon.

Aujourd’hui démarre en Moldavie une mission civile de l’Union européenne pour aider ce pays à lutter contre les menaces hybrides. C’est une mission d’un type entièrement nouveau. Je salue sa création, mais ne nous faisons pas d’illusions: ce que la Moldavie subit tous les jours, nous le subissons également. Les ingérences étrangères contre nos démocraties nous ciblent pour ce que nous sommes. Notre commission spéciale en a fait le constat accablant depuis deux ans.

Je dois dire devant vous que je ne suis pas encore certaine que notre Union soit passée du constat à l’action. Il y a bien ici et là des initiatives, mais pas encore de vision d’ensemble. J’attends avec impatience les propositions de la Commission pour protéger nos démocraties. J’espère qu’elles seront à la hauteur et suffisamment ambitieuses face au défi qui nous est lancé.

  Markéta Gregorová (Verts/ALE). – Madam President, dear colleagues, Commissioner, six days ago, Twitter left the voluntary code of practice on disinformation; the voluntary code, by the way, which even Chinese spyware TikTok promised to follow.

Commissioner Breton promised Elon Musk that the Digital Services Act is coming anyway. I cannot emphasise enough how glad I am that there is at least one regulation. But will the DSA really protect our elections? The defence of democracy package is promising one directive on foreign funding and only recommendations to Member States on election integrity. The integrity of our electoral processes is being tested like never before in the midst of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the global conflict between democracies and autocratic regimes. We need to bolster election integrity. And you said it yourself, Commissioner Jourová, There is not enough in the defence of democracy package. So why is there not a majority in the Commission to come up with more than recommendations again? It is a matter of political will and nothing else and we all know that.

  Ryszard Czarnecki (ECR). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Pani Komisarz! Ważna debata o ważnym problemie. Szkoda, że niestety jest to przykład pewnej hipokryzji. Ja się bardzo cieszę, jako koordynator mojej grupy politycznej ECR w tej komisji, że my podejmujemy bardzo ważne wyzwania. Można w Parlamencie Europejskim – dobrze. Można, panie przewodniczący Glucksmann, w parlamencie francuskim – słusznie, dobrze. A dlaczego nie można w Polsce? Powołaliśmy taką komisję, jest ona pod bardzo silnym atakiem, a przecież chodzi o to samo, chodzi o zewnętrzne, obce wpływy, i to przez wiele lat.

W tym sprawozdaniu, jak już mówiła przed chwilą moja koleżanka, pani Beata Szydło, są rzeczy zupełnie niepotrzebne. Myśmy jednak głosowali za tym sprawozdaniem, ponieważ uznaliśmy, że w sumie są tam rzeczy ważne. Tak, Rosja, chociaż nie tylko Rosja, żeby było jasne, chce nam przeszkadzać. Rosja nas infiltruje – trzeba o tym mówić głośno. To sprawozdanie jest tego dowodem. Tylko nie zamykajcie usta tym, którzy chcą robić to samo we własnych krajach.

PŘEDSEDNICTVÍ: DITA CHARANZOVÁ
místopředsedkyně

  Gunnar Beck (ID). – Frau Präsidentin, Frau Kommissarin! Gehen Wahlen nicht so aus, wie es Brüssel wünscht, folgen sogleich Vorwürfe, Russland hätte manipuliert oder den Sieger finanziert. Dabei betreffen doch die beiden größten Fälle ausländischer Einmischung in unsere Politik hier die EU selbst.

Erstens: Im Katargate-Skandal wurden 1,5 Millionen Euro bei EU-Abgeordneten daheim oder in Koffern gefunden, plus 22 Millionen auf Konten in Panama – Zahlungen, mit denen sich Katar und andere Regierungen Stimmen in diesem Haus kauften.

Zweitens: Vor den italienischen Wahlen im September 2022 drohte Ursula von der Leyen den italienischen Wählern: Sollte es zur Bildung einer euroskeptischen Regierung kommen, würde die Kommission geeignete Maßnahmen ergreifen – bis hin zur Streichung üppiger Gelder aus Brüssel.

Beides, liebe Kollegen, sind eklatante Beispiele für ausländische Einmischung in den demokratischen Prozess. Russische Vermögen werden eingefroren auf bloßen Verdacht. Wieso aber beschlagnahmen sie nicht die Vermögen der Familie von der Leyen und setzen sie auf die Sanktionsliste? Denn hier liegen Amtsmissbrauch und Vorteilnahme auf der Hand.

  Ivan Vilibor Sinčić (NI). – Poštovana predsjedavajuća, Izvješće o vanjskom upletanju u sve demokratske procese u Europskoj uniji. Naravno, autorima ovog dokumenta, nemojmo se zavaravati, ne smeta svako vanjsko uplitanje, nego samo nepodobno vanjsko uplitanje. Kao i uvijek, ideja ovog dokumenta je obračun s onim strankama i vladama koje ne misle kako im Bruxelles kaže da trebaju misliti i ne rade onako kako im Bruxelles kaže da trebaju raditi. Nije demokracija i nisu pošteni izbori ako birači ne izaberu miljenika Bruxellesa. Demokracija je samo ako naši pobijede.

Što se tiče vanjskih uplitanja, evo jedan primjer kako se to radi po Europi: procurili su podaci s online sastanka koji je održan nedavno u Bugarskoj u procesu formiranja koalicije i vlade. Među ostalim, moglo se čuti kako se kadrovira u institucijama, u demokraciji. Promijenit ćemo voditelje obavještajnih i istražnih službi. Sva imena već su sinkronizirana i odobrena od strane ambasade naših atlantskih partnera. Ovo nije usamljen primjer među europskim zemljama. Je li ostalo što osobne časti i nacionalne časti u europskoj politici ili je prevladalo sluganstvo i poslušništvo? Ambasade ne smiju kadrovirati, čije god jesu, jer je to smrt suvereniteta.

  Benoît Lutgen (PPE). – Madame la Présidente, chers collègues, d’abord merci et bravo à la rapporteure pour la qualité du travail. Vous avez maintenant, au niveau de la Commission, un plan d’action assez complet pour protéger effectivement notre démocratie. En tout cas, je souhaite que la Commission présente rapidement des propositions pour mettre en œuvre les propositions émises par le Parlement.

Plus largement, s’il y a des formes d’ingérence en Europe, c’est aussi parce qu’il y a des Européens qui accueillent à bras ouverts toute une série de pays comme la Chine, la Russie hier ou le Qatar aujourd’hui, et peut-être encore demain, dans toute une série de domaines.

Protégeons aussi nos ports, nos aéroports, pour éviter qu’ils ne passent dans des mains chinoises, avec toutes les conséquences que cela peut avoir pour nos démocraties, la réalité de nos terres agricoles et forestières. Protégeons aussi même le sport – quand je vois que, dans certains pays, il y a effectivement un accueil très favorable à des investissements de pays tiers qui n’ont pas tout à fait les mêmes valeurs démocratiques que les nôtres et qui utilisent effectivement ces moyens-là dans des secteurs stratégiques aussi importants que l’énergie, que le numérique, que l’alimentation.

Dans ces secteurs stratégiques, l’autonomie de l’Europe, ce sera la porte fermée, la plus fermée possible à toute forme d’ingérence.

  Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (S&D). – Madam President, the content of the second INGE report shows that while the threat of foreign interference remains high and ever present, the methods and techniques of our adversaries are evolving. And now, on the day of adopting the updated report, we are already facing a new challenge: misinformation and disinformation fuelled by artificial intelligence, most famously the recent example of ChatGPT.

We cannot be naive: technology will keep evolving and we are already starting to witness AI-created fake photos and videos that are nearly indistinguishable from reality. As their creation and distribution becomes easier and cheaper, bad actors will become more sophisticated in their use, just like they had mastered the use of fake news before.

This time we cannot be just reactive. It is crucial that the defence of democracy package and the Artificial Intelligence Act not only cover existing and known issues, but also are forward—looking enough so that new laws and regulations will not become obsolete the day they are adopted. The health of our democracies depends on it.

  Morten Løkkegaard (Renew). – Fru formand! Det europæiske fællesskab befinder sig midt i en hybrid krig, som vi ikke er godt nok forberedt på. Det er et faktum. Cyberangreb, spionage, systematiske desinformationskampagner og sabotage af kritisk infrastruktur – listen over hybride trusler er lang. Der er akut behov for at ruste EU til at tackle truslerne fra autokrater som Putin. Derfor er det en god dag i dag, hvor Europa-Parlamentet lancerer anden runde af vores anbefalinger til at bekæmpe den hybride krig og de trusler, der er der. Vi skal blandt andet kunne sanktionere lande, der kontinuerligt fører hybrid krig mod EU-lande, og vi skal også kunne retsforfølge individer i EU, som systematisk spreder desinformation på sociale medier. Der er en lang række gode forslag i den betænkning, som netop er vedtaget, og det er derfor glædeligt. Tillykke til vores ordførere, med at det er lykkedes at komme igennem med det her med et massivt flertal. Nu er det så op til Kommissionen at føre disse forslag ud i livet. Det ser jeg frem til.

  Gwendoline Delbos-Corfield (Verts/ALE). – Madam President, foreign interference is not something that we can take lightly, especially when EU values and our democracies are called into question. In order to safeguard our democracies we all know that the most important is to improve transparency. This is crucial. This means not only for us as Members of this Parliament, but also for think tanks, foundations and the private companies that we work with.

However, we need to get the balance right. At times, this narrative of monitoring and legislating against foreign interference veers dangerously close to calling for the censorship and criminalisation of NGOs. But without defending a free and functioning civil society, we cannot claim to defend EU values. Civil society organisations are precisely the actors that have defended EU values, worked to prevent foreign Russian interference in the EU and in its neighbourhood countries, and put pressure on us to act to prevent further authoritarian backsliding. If we criminalise civil society, we run the risk of undermining the very values upon which this Union is built.

  Rob Rooken (ECR). – Voorzitter, commissaris, collega’s, het “Hoofddirectoraat voor de bescherming van staatsgeheimen in de pers”, zo heette het in de Sovjet-Unie. “Het Centraal Propagandadepartement”, zo heet het in China. En met het zogenaamde EU DisinfoLab hebben ook wij ons ministerie van Waarheid, dat bepaalt wat mensen mogen zeggen.

Hoe ver gaat de EU in haar kruistocht tegen dissidente meningen? Begin vorig jaar verbood de EU de Russische tv-zender Russia Today en nu ligt hier de buitenlandse beïnvloeding bij verkiezingen onder de loep. Ik ken nog wel een paar voorbeelden, zoals dat van een Nederlandse ICT-ondernemer die enkele jaren terug bij de Duitse verkiezingen meer dan 1 miljoen EUR doneerde aan de Grünen. Of dat van een Amerikaanse filantroop die 20 000 EUR aan Volt doneerde en meer dan 200 000 EUR aan de voorcampagne schonk bij het Oekraïnereferendum in Nederland.

Gaat de EU hier ook achteraan? Ik verwacht het niet. En dan is de conclusie: dit gaat niet echt over democratie, maar over het inperken van de vrijheid van meningsuiting. Dat is nog nooit een goed idee geweest en ook nu niet.

  Jaak Madison (ID). – Madam President, first of all I think the foreign interference for the elections in the EU is not very important topic because we have just now 10 colleagues here in the room. So probably it’s not the best question what you want to discuss.

Secondly I think it’s really worrying how some countries in the world are trying to interfere in elections in Europe or in the US, but at the same time when we are criticising some countries, we have to be really careful about what we are doing ourselves about interference, because we are expecting that when we are criticising some other countries that we ourselves are absolutely perfect – we are following our democracy, our rule of law ideas and we are not interfering elections in some countries in the EU.

Just for one small example, in 2019 after elections in Estonia, parliamentary elections, we were forming the government with our Conservative Party together with the Centre Party from the Renew Group, and the Renew started investigation because they were forming a government with the conservatives, after elections in Estonia...

(The President cut off the speaker)

  Miroslav Radačovský (NI). – Vážená pani predsedajúca, keď som si prečítal túto správu, tak som dospel k záveru, že tí, čo ju spracovali, si zaslúžia Nobelovu cenu za dezinformácie a Sacharovovu cenu za vedenie hybridnej vojny. Len tak stručne článok 105. Európska únia je znepokojená Číňanmi, že zavliekajú svojich občanov cez nejaké nelegálne policajné stanice do Číny. No to už je na hospitalizáciu. No Čína má tak malý počet obyvateľov, že musí svojich Číňanov zavliekať domov. To skutočne niekomu Covid ohrozil mozog a nie pľúca. V článku 86 sa spomína Slovensko. Ja neviem, odkiaľ tieto informácie Európska únia dostala. Že vraj homofóbia, xenofóbia Slovákov je príčinou toho, že boli zavraždení dvaja mladí ľudia na Slovensku. No tých dvoch mladých ľudí predsa zabil človek, o ktorom ani nevieme, kto je, čo je, prečo ja a aký je. Ja som bol, slúžil som v armáde. Bolo tam tisíce chlapcov, bol som 30 rokov sudcom, mám aj svoj vek. Ja som nezažil to, aby na Slovensku existovali nejaké homofóbne alebo iné prejavy. To si nikto zo Slovákov takúto, takto urážať Slovákov nikto... (predsedajúca prerušila rečníka)... Toto je pamflet, ktorý netreba ani čítať ani sa k nemu... (predsedajúca odobrala rečníkovi slovo)

(Rečník súhlasí so zodpovedaním otázky položenej zdvihnutím „modrej karty“)

  Markéta Gregorová (Verts/ALE), otázka položená zvednutím modré karty – Paní předsedající, za prvé bych chtěla napravit tu dezinformaci, kterou tady pan Radačovský řekl ohledně čínských policejních stanic. Samozřejmě, že ten článek 105 je napsaný na základě toho, že ano, skutečně tady ty čínské policejní stanice byly a ty občany odváděly.

Nicméně to není otázka. Ta otázka je: Proč si tedy myslíte, že dva slovenští občané, mladí lidé, zemřeli střelbou nedávno v klubu Teplárna, pokud to nebylo kvůli homofobii na Slovensku? Nestydíte se za to?

  Miroslav Radačovský (NI), odpoveď na otázku položenú zdvihnutím modrej karty. – to kvôli tomu, že tam pani prezidentka si vodí návštevy zahraničné a robí hanbu Slovensku? Za 30 rokov, čo som bol sudca, slúžil som v armáde, mám svoj vek som nezažil ... (predsedajúca prerušila rečníka)... ale to nie je dôvod, aj keby to tak bolo, my máme svojich, svoje lesby radi. To sú naše lesby, naši homosexuáli a nikto nám nebude zasahovať do toho tu a označovať ako za národ xenofóbov... (predsedajúca odobrala rečníkovi slovo)

  Salvatore De Meo (PPE). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, signora Commissaria, le elezioni europee si svolgeranno nel 2024, sullo sfondo della guerra di aggressione russa contro l'Ucraina e con la pressione di regimi autoritari che cercano da anni di attaccare le democrazie in generale e quella europea, dove la libertà e la difesa dei diritti umani, i nostri valori, unitamente alla prosperità economica, sono elementi che fanno paura.

Il lavoro della commissione ING è stato solo il primo passo nel riconoscere e affrontare le ingerenze straniere che tentano di entrare nei nostri processi decisionali, utilizzando la manipolazione delle informazioni e altre tattiche per indebolire i nostri governi democratici. Oggi più che mai, in previsione delle prossime elezioni, dobbiamo respingere ogni tipo di intrusione che tenti di condizionare o compromettere l'integrità dei nostri processi elettorali.

Il nostro impegno deve proseguire con una strategia coordinata dell'Unione europea contro ogni forma di ingerenza, che tenga conto della complessità della natura multidimensionale delle minacce, rafforzando la nostra sicurezza informatica e la resilienza delle nostre comunità. I nostri cittadini ci hanno chiesto un'Europa più forte e più credibile che potremmo avere solo contrastando anche chi tenta di minare le nostre istituzioni.

  Mercedes Bresso (S&D). – Signora Presidente, signora Commissaria, onorevoli colleghi, la nostra democrazia e i processi liberi e partecipati con cui la esprimiamo e la pratichiamo sono un bene preziosissimo, non dobbiamo darlo per scontato e dobbiamo difenderlo in tutti i modi.

La relazione della Commissione sulle interferenze straniere dimostra che siamo entrati nell'era della consapevolezza. Però non basta essere consapevoli. Dobbiamo con urgenza colmare le lacune che tuttora esistono nelle nostre legislazioni e che ci rendono permeabili alle strategie di interferenza di potenze straniere. Strategie che sono diverse ed articolate, così come devono essere le nostre risposte.

Nella relazione che voteremo ci sono proposte precise per rafforzare la resilienza delle istituzioni, proposte su cui ci aspettiamo una risposta pronta da parte della Commissione. Le prossime elezioni europee saranno un passaggio delicato per la nostra democrazia, per cui servirà grande attenzione. Viene tracciato un cammino al quale dovremo dare continuità, strutturando in maniera consolidata anche il nostro lavoro qui in Parlamento.

  Maite Pagazaurtundúa (Renew). – Señora presidenta, señora comisaria, si el informe que vamos a votar hoy causa tanto escozor en los populistas de ultraizquierda y en los de ultraderecha, señora Kalniete, significa que usted ha hecho un gran trabajo.

El hecho es que la Unión Europea es un actor central en las democracias del mundo y que las autocracias la atacan muy intensamente porque somos sociedades abiertas y tenemos que seguir siéndolo. Pero lo que no podemos hacer es asistir a la impunidad de la injerencia y de la desinformación dañosa. Tenemos que gobernar bien, con transparencia, evitando todas las formas de corrupción, por supuesto, la corrupción electoral o la corrupción de la injerencia o la cooptación de líderes, sin trampas.

La semana pasada se revelaba una supuesta trama de venta de votos en Melilla (España) para interferir en las elecciones; se sospecha que ha habido injerencia directa de Marruecos. Nueve detenidos. Además, ya han ocurrido otros hechos anteriormente: esta es la cuestión, la injerencia marroquí no es una sorpresa para nadie en este Parlamento. Como también son conocidas las conexiones de Rusia con partidos políticos, con políticos o con la injerencia en las actividades contra la democracia europea en Cataluña.

Lo que está claro es que necesitamos normas, que las recomendaciones de esta Comisión que van a ser votadas tienen que ser consideradas por la Comisión Europea, y que tenemos que convertirlas en leyes y defendernos; porque el hecho es que nos van a atacar.

  Anders Vistisen (ID). – Fru formand! Ethvert forsøg på at gå imod demokratiet og gå imod de demokratiske spilleregler er naturligvis problematisk, og derfor skal man heller ikke acceptere misinformation eller desinformation, men jeg har på fornemmelsen, når jeg hører debatten her i salen i dag, at det mest handler om den desinformation, der går flertallet imod. Det at man bevilliger enorme summer af skatteborgernes kroner til at propagandere for EU lige før et EU-valg, det har I jo allesammen været for. Det at taletiden her i parlamentet godt kan overskrides, hvis man siger noget pænt om unionen, men bliver afbrudt, hvis man siger noget mindre pænt, det har I jo ikke noget problem med. Det at give bøder til politiske modstandere for at bruge deres ytringsfrihed i Europa-Parlamentet, synes man, er en fin måde at opdrage de medlemmer, som vælgerne har valgt, men som I er uenige med. Så hvis man virkelig vil bekæmpe misinformation og desinformation, så skal man hylde ytringsfriheden. Under den kolde krig havde Rusland langt mere misinformation, end vi ser i dag. Alligevel smed vi ikke kommunister på universiteterne i fængsel i Danmark. Vi forhindrede ikke kommunistpartiet i at stille op. Vi brugte vores ytringsfrihed til at bekæmpe idiotien. Og det er ytringsfriheden, der er det bedste sollys, ikke jeres kontrol med dem, I er uenige med.

  Laura Ferrara (NI). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, la minaccia delle ingerenze straniere, pur aumentando in occasione delle elezioni nazionali ed europee, si manifesta di fatto in molteplici forme e in maniera continua in tutta l'Unione europea.

Disinformazione e manipolazione delle informazioni sui media tradizionali e sui social, attacchi informatici mirati alle infrastrutture critiche, traffico di influenze, corruzione, finanziamenti occulti che coinvolgono soggetti politici e funzionari sono solo alcune delle ricorrenti pratiche per influenzare i processi democratici ed elettorali.

Il ruolo delle tecnologie in questo campo è sempre più forte, come dimostra la pubblicità basata sui dati personali e algoritmi opachi su cui si regge il modello commerciale delle piattaforme online, sfruttato sempre più massivamente per plasmare e polarizzare l'opinione pubblica.

E allora, oltre agli sforzi per migliorare la trasparenza e l'integrità delle nostre istituzioni, unitamente alle attese misure del Defense of democracy package, è fondamentale rafforzare la democrazia dall'interno e ciò si ottiene promuovendo una cultura civica di impegno democratico e partecipazione attiva dei cittadini.

  Sunčana Glavak (PPE). – Poštovana predsjedavajuća, kolegice i kolege, čestitam kolegici Kalniete na odličnom izvješću, a osvrnut ću se samo na neke izazove kao što su izazovi koji prijete integritetu izbora, dezinformacije, digitalni napadi i politički pritisci. Oni su zapravo kontinuirani.

Integritet izbora je ključna komponenta demokracije i povjerenja građana u političke procese. Jedan od načina na koji možemo ojačati integritet izbora izgraditi otpornost jest unapređenje sigurnosti i transparentnosti izbornog procesa. To uključuje osiguranje kvalitetnih biračkih registara, pouzdane identifikacije birača, sigurnog prikupljanja i prebrojavanja glasova te stroge kontrole financiranja političkih kampanja. Važno je uložiti napore u obrazovanje građana jer obrazovani građani manje su podložni manipulacijama i dezinformacijama.

Kolegice i kolege, industrija dezinformacija uključuje ozbiljne igrače. Nemojmo se zavaravati: njihova prisutnost stalna je. To nije nikakva kratkoročna prijetnja i zato zahtijeva našu proaktivnost.

  Nacho Sánchez Amor (S&D). – Señora presidenta, quiero agradecer a la señora Kalniete y a los negociadores que hayan vuelto a incluir un apartado específico sobre elecciones en el segundo Informe de la Comisión Especial sobre Injerencias Extranjeras.

Las elecciones son un objetivo porque son trascendentes políticamente, pero también porque son vulnerables. Hay mucha gente que solo se engancha a la información política cuando llegan las elecciones. Se produce una mayor tecnificación, una mayor digitalización. Las redes sociales crean un entorno en el que esas elecciones pueden ser muy vulnerables.

Además, por una investigación reciente de periodistas de investigación europeos, hemos descubierto que hay un mercado mundial de la interferencia electoral que ha afectado a varias elecciones en África. Tenemos que ser especialmente cuidadosos con las elecciones europeas. No solo porque afecten a un actor muy relevante, sino también porque las elecciones europeas —siendo unas solas elecciones— se celebran en veintisiete países, con veintisiete sistemas electorales e infraestructuras electorales diferentes. Por lo cual, basta con encontrar el eslabón débil de la cadena para provocar una interferencia que afectará no solo a ese país, sino a todas las elecciones europeas.

Por tanto, la seguridad y la integridad de las elecciones europeas tienen que estar muy arriba en nuestra agenda en esta última parte de la legislatura.

Catch-the-eye procedure

  Радан Кънев (PPE). – Г-жо Председател, днес обсъждаме изключително важния въпрос за намесата в изборния процес в държавите от Европейския съюз. В моята родина България обаче се вижда следващата стъпка на враждебната намеса във вътрешните ни работи, и тя е намесата в следизборния процес, в самото формиране на държавно управление. Днес сме свидетели на абсолютно безпрецедентен опит за блокиране на създаването на общо управление между първите две политически сили в държавата. Опит, в който очевидно участват, от една страна, организираната престъпност, от друга страна, компрометираната прокуратура, която е призвана да се бори с нея.

От една страна, службите за сигурност, от друга страна, петата колона в българската политика, срещу която тези служби би трябвало да ни защитават. И всичко това се случва под егидата на българския президент и на ръководеното от него служебно правителство. Отправям това послание към Вас и като призив за подкрепа, но и като много сериозно предупреждение накъде води разпадането на правовата държава.

  Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D). – Señora presidenta, durante su mandato, esta comisión, que ha estudiado las interferencias extranjeras en los procesos democráticos, ha producido un documento de conclusiones muy relevante. Me interesan sobre todo sus conclusiones tercera y quinta porque son las que conectan las plataformas tecnológicas —y la necesidad de someterlas a un marco regulatorio europeo— con la defensa ante las injerencias extranjeras.

Porque las grandes empresas tecnológicas no tienen como objetivo producir una opinión pública libre a través de un debate pluralista, sino exclusivamente explotar algoritmos que radicalizan y confrontan a sus usuarios. Es por eso que la inteligencia artificial supone una vuelta de tuerca en una revolución tecnológica que amenaza con poder fabricar y difundir imágenes y voces falsas con apariencia de veracidad.

La Unión Europea tiene que estar a la vanguardia en la defensa de su idea de democracia, no solamente por ella misma, sino por la democracia en el mundo. Y a ello apunta el documento de conclusiones.

  Beata Mazurek (ECR). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Unia Europejska jest wciąż podatna na obce ingerencje oraz dezinformację. Putin doskonale wiedział, kto będzie najsilniej wspierał Ukrainę podczas wojny. Dlatego przez ostatnie lata próbował zdyskredytować nas, mój kraj, Polskę na arenie międzynarodowej, podważając działania podejmowane przez demokratycznie wybrany polski rząd.

Niestety, wielu z Państwa powtarzało te niezweryfikowane frazesy. Tymczasem, o czym wspomina dzisiejsze sprawozdanie, to elity polityczne w Niemczech realizowały program Gazpromu i wyrażały stałe poparcie dla dostaw gazu z Rosji, uzależniając od nich całkowicie swój kraj, co dało Putinowi możliwość kształtowania europejskiej polityki przez zakręcanie kurka z gazem.

Nie zapominajmy także o skandalu korupcyjnym ujawnionym tu, w Parlamencie Europejskim, który wyraźnie pokazał brak odporności instytucji unijnych na nadużycia i ingerencję ze strony państw trzecich.

Zachęcam wszystkich Państwa do głębszej refleksji na temat funkcjonowania instytucji europejskich. Tylko wzmocnienie uczciwości, przejrzystości i odpowiedzialności może odbudować nadszarpnięty wspomnianą aferą wizerunek Unii w oczach wszystkich obywateli.

  Thierry Mariani (ID). – Madame la Présidente, à quoi va servir ce rapport? Principalement à contrôler davantage le paysage médiatique en Europe. À l’article 33, vous voulez contrôler les experts qui interviennent sur les médias dits traditionnels. À l’article 35, vous voulez un comité européen des médias dont nous ne doutons pas qu’il diffuserait l’idéologie de la Commission européenne. Le ministère de la vérité n’est pas très loin. Vous voulez toujours davantage contrôler internet, et notamment la plateforme Twitter, dont l’attachement à la liberté d’expression hérisse le poil de la Commission.

Vous continuez à répandre l’idée que la Russie voulait influencer les prochaines élections européennes, sans apprendre des manipulations commises par les démocrates américains, dont les accusations viennent une nouvelle fois d’être balayées par deux rapports différents du département américain de la justice. Ces rapports affirment clairement qu’il n’y a aucune preuve d’une ingérence russe dans la campagne présidentielle américaine.

Quand on lit ce rapport, finalement, on est en droit d’être inquiets. Ceux qui ne partagent pas vos conceptions sont soit manipulés, complotistes, ou agents. Ils ont peut-être tout simplement une opinion différente. Garderont-ils ce droit encore longtemps?

  Mick Wallace (The Left). – Madam President, we are exceptional in both our victimhood and in the righteousness of our actions. When the EU backs military and right—wing coups in Brazil, Peru, Bolivia and Sudan, this is not interference in democratic processes; it’s a defence of democracy. When the Council imposes crushing sanctions on disobedient countries, killing tens of thousands of men, women and children and displacing more, somehow this isn’t foreign interference, this is about protecting human rights. This is a lie. To quote High Representative Josep Borrell, our sanctions are a means of ‘coercive capacity’.

The report highlights the need to turn this coercive capacity against people in the EU suspected of engaging in this new and vaguely defined crime of foreign interference. Who will judge if someone is guilty? The Council? They don’t even adhere to basic standards of due process. They are an unaccountable political body who operate in secret. It’s about time people started to look and see and focus on the growing threat to basic civil liberties coming from Brussels.

  Александър Александров Йорданов (PPE). – Г-жо Председател, военната агресия на Русия стана възможна, защото руското общество от десетилетия съществува в условията на дезинформация. В основата на тази дезинформация е все още силната комунистическа интерпретация на историята. Но същото днес наблюдаваме и в някои държави от Западните Балкани, които са кандидати за членство. Например, дискриминационната политика на Скопие спрямо българите в тази страна и изобщо антибългарската политика на Северна Македония е резултат от десетилетна дезинформационна комунистическа пропаганда. Същевременно основна причина за политическата криза и дестабилизация в България през последните две години е руското проникване в българския политически, стопански и културен елит. В този момент българският президент се явява не обединител на нацията, а фактор за дестабилизация на България. Хибридната война на Русия срещу България и Европа продължава. Това е опасно.

  Maria Grapini (S&D). – Doamnă președintă, sigur, dezbatem un lucru foarte important, mai ales că este un an înainte de alegeri. Clar, dezinformarea duce la o alegere greșită, le induce cetățenilor un alt drum. Problema este: cum facem? Am definit foarte clar ce înseamnă ingerință străină, pentru că vedem, acum a apărut un conflict în Serbia și Kosovo, conflictul din Ucraina, primim informații greșite și cred că dezinformarea este cel mai grav lucru, care duce la alegeri greșite și la imixtiunea în actul democratic dintr-un stat membru.

Problema pe care eu o pun acum aici – și vreau să fiu înțeleasă corect – este că trebuie să vedem ingerințele străine din toate părțile, pentru că aleargă domnul Soroș în toate statele membre și în țara mea și finanțează anumite ONG-uri, anumite persoane care, evident, dezinformează. Cum facem să oprim dezinformarea? Da, noi reglementăm aici, dar problema este de aplicare în statele membre și cred că și statele membre au o obligație extrem de mare, împreună cu Uniunea Europeană, să oprească odată dezinformarea și să nu mai fie ingerințe străine în actul democratic. Cetățenii să decidă.

  Liudas Mažylis (PPE). – Pirmininke, vice Pirmininke, kolegos. Būtinybė stiprinti ES atsparumą – žodžiai, kurių pastaraisiais metais skirtinguose kontekstuose nesiliaujame vartoję. Realus karas, vykstantis dėl pasibaisėtinų Rusijos veiksmų Ukrainoje, dar labiau sustiprino poreikį didinti mūsų atsparumą. Į tai įeina ir pasipriešinimas užsienio valstybių kišimuisi į demokratinius procesus ES. Dar labiau suintensyvėjęs piktavališkas elgesys tikėtinas 2024-aisiais, prieš būsimus Europos Parlamento rinkimus. Viliuosi, kad atsakingos institucijos ir ES valstybės narės rimtai pažvelgs į INGE ir INGE2 komitetų rezoliucijose pateiktas rekomendacijas ir jas kuo skubiau atsakingai įgyvendins. Kol mes tebediskutuojame kaip reikėtų elgtis, priešiškos valstybės, tokios kaip Rusija, jau šiandien vykdo realius veiksmus Europoje, kenkiančius mūsų demokratijai. ES atsako, kuris atliktas iki dabar, akivaizdžiai nepakanka.

(End of catch-the-eye procedure)

  Věra Jourová, Vice-President of the Commission. – Madam President, honourable Members, it’s a tough task to use two minutes to react on such a broad and such an important debate. One year before elections, we discussed here about a crucial phenomenon which is foreign interference and endangering of our electoral processes.

I agree with many of you who said that we are strong, but we need to be stronger because we face many – some new, some older – new threats and really high pressure, especially in light of the Russian aggression in Ukraine, increase of abuse of technologies against our democracies and so on. And I agree with Ms Bischoff, who said that we should stop only analysing. We have to act. And we are acting: I don’t have time to enumerate all the initiatives which have been already adopted and the plans we had. I just want to say that whatever we do, we have to do it in a European way. So to take decisive actions, to adopt legislation to invite the society, because everybody who wants to keep a democratic system and live in a democratic system has some task or some role, be it the politicians here – I have to comment also that I agree with those that who say that the foreign interference cannot be efficient without having internal proxies in the EU. And I think that we also have to look at this.

So to react in a European way is to invite everybody to contribute, be it politicians, independent media, be it civil—society organisations, be it citizens. Because I believe that the main pillar of democratic system is a well—informed and engaged citizen.

So I think there is something for everyone and to do it in a European way means that by an efficient fight against foreign interference and endangering electoral processes we have to guarantee that the freedom of speech will be fully protected, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of entrepreneurs, and that we will strengthen these important principles which we definitely need in the time of crisis.

I sharply disagree with those who said that we are close to the Ministry of Truth. It’s not true. Whatever we do, all our initiatives, on the contrary, are directed on stronger protection of the freedom of speech.

So this is from my side. I want to thank you for your report, for the very inspiring discussion. And I promise that the Commission will not only get inspired, but also take further actions in order to protect the EU against the foreign pressures and all the risks which we see now for our democratic system.

  Sandra Kalniete, rapporteur. – Madam President, dear colleagues, Madam Commissioner, I want to thank you for this very detailed discussion we had here. But even during that discussion, it was so evident how the tentacles of disinformation are reaching the politicians from the far right and from the far left. This is very regrettable and that’s why we are working, trying to find the ways to protect our democracy. What I would like to reiterate is that the EU must focus more on resilience—building and vaccination of our societies against disinformation to protect our democracy.

It has been a long journey for us all, but I am confident that our Parliament and our Union has come out stronger and more aware of the threats we face and the vulnerabilities we have.

So I am looking forward to the vote and hope that you all will be able to support the report, which is not only mine, but a collective endeavour.

  President. – The joint debate is closed. The vote will be held today.

Written statements (Rule 171)

  Sara Cerdas (S&D), por escrito. – As próximas eleições europeias vão realizar-se entre 6 e 9 de junho de 2024, aproximadamente dentro de um ano. Em 2019, a abstenção atingiu recordes e, no caso de Portugal, as últimas eleições europeias tiveram uma taxa de abstenção de 69,3 %, a mais alta desde 1987.

A desinformação contribui para a falta de confiança nas instituições, destrói o discurso público e, em última análise, enfraquece as democracias, o que indiretamente contribui para o aumento da abstenção. Dada a importância de combater tanto a abstenção, como a desinformação, a Comissão Europeia deve adotar estratégias que combatam a manipulação da informação e a desinformação de forma eficaz e rápida. Uma maior cooperação com as plataformas digitais, a adoção de mecanismos de cibersegurança e prevenção contra ataques de hackers e uma maior coordenação com os Estados-Membros para garantir que as eleições europeias estão bem protegidas contra a interferência estrangeira, ameaças híbridas e desinformação, serão medidas necessárias para assegurar a integridade e a confiança pública nas próximas eleições europeias.

  Karol Karski (ECR), na piśmie. – Problem dezinformacji oraz wrogiej propagandy nie jest kwestią nową. Już w trakcie poprzedniej kadencji z inicjatywy mojej grupy, to jest Europejskich Konserwatystów i Reformatorów, Parlament Europejski przyjął dwa sprawozdania dotyczące początkowo rosyjskich działań w tym zakresie, a następnie szerzej samego zjawiska oraz tego, jak podatne są społeczeństwa demokratyczne na tego typu wpływy. Głosowane dzisiaj sprawozdanie poseł Sandry Kalniete jest doskonałym przykładem, jak złożony i skomplikowany jest ten problem oraz jak wielu sfer życia dotyka. Od wojny hybrydowej, poprzez farmy trolli, stosowanie sztucznej inteligencji, ataki na krytyczną infrastrukturę, programy zbierające informację o użytkownikach ukryte w aplikacjach, których używamy na co dzień, aż po tzw. „deep fakes” oraz instrumentalne wykorzystanie platform społecznościowych – dezinformacja przybiera różne, czasami bardzo niebezpieczne, postacie. Jednocześnie to, jak bardzo kompleksowa jest ta sprawa, pozwala zrozumieć, że poszczególne państwa nigdy nie będą w stanie w pełni obronić się przed zagrożeniami i jak ważna jest koordynacja wysiłków na poziomie międzynarodowym. Doskonałym przykładem jest tu NATO, ale również w ramach UE mamy olbrzymie pole do działania, które powinniśmy w pełni wykorzystać.

  Urmas Paet (Renew), kirjalikult. – Euroopal on vaja kooskõlastatud strateegiat välissekkumise ja teabega manipuleerimise vastu, et suurendada ELi vastupanuvõimet ja tagada Euroopa Parlamendi 2024. aasta valimiste puutumatus. Enne 6.–9. juunil 2024 toimuvaid Euroopa Parlamendi valimisi kasvab välissekkumise ja valeinfo oht ning sageneda võivad demokraatia õõnestamise püüded ja keerulised inforünnakud. Selle taustal on oluline käsitleda eelkõige võimalikku sekkumist veebiplatvormidel, kriitilise tähtsusega taristu ja strateegiliste sektorite kaitset, valimisprotsesside kindlust, poliitilise tegevuse varjatud välisrahastamist ja küberrünnakute tõrjumist. Eriti tuleb keskenduda Venemaa ja Hiina murettekitavale sekkumise ohule ELis, ELiga ühineda soovivates riikides (nt Lääne-Balkanil) ja maailma lõunapoolsetes riikides. Hukkamõistu väärt on ohtlik nn ostetav desinformatsiooniteenus, mille puhul valitsused ja valitsusvälised osalejad tellivad valimisprotsesside vastaseid rünnakuid näiteks pimeveebist. Selleks et kolmandate riikide keelatud rahastus ei pääseks ELi poliitilisse süsteemi, peab Euroopa Komisjoni lihtsustama annetuste jälgimist. Lisaks peaksid liikmesriigid ohjama kolmandate riikide annetusi riiklikele erakondadele. Tähelepanu tuleb ka pöörata majandusliku sõltuvuse, spionaaži ja sabotaaži ohule, mis kaasneb ELi elutähtsa taristu sattumisega välisettevõtete kontrolli alla. Ühtlasi tuleb kõigil riiklikel valitsustasanditel ja ELi institutsioonides keelustada rakendus TikTok ning ELi Nõukogu ja Euroopa Komisjoni peaksid keelama ohtlikumatest riikidest, eriti Hiinast ja Venemaalt pärit seadmed ja tarkvara (nt ByteDance Huawei, ZTE, Kaspersky, NtechLab või Nuctech).

  Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner (ECR), kirjallinen. – On tärkeää tiedostaa, että ulkopuoliset vihamieliset tahot pyrkivät systemaattisesti sekaantumaan päätöksentekoon sekä kansallisella että EU:n tasolla. Ilmiö ei ole mitenkään uusi. Pidän hyvänä sitä, että asiasta on nyt herätty puhumaan laajemmin. Keinoja epäasiallisen vaikuttamisen torjuntaan löytyy paljon. Esimerkiksi poliittisten puolueiden, puolueyhdistysten ja ehdokkaiden saamat rahalahjoitukset toimintansa ja vaalikampanjoidensa rahoittamiseen tulisi saada nykyistä selkeämmin päivänvaloon. Suuret vaalibudjetit ovat liian usein avainasemassa poliittisten kampanjoiden onnistumiselle. Rahalla voidaan ostaa vaikutusvaltaa, joten olisi äärimmäisen tärkeää saada kaikki poliittinen rahoitus ja erityisesti vaalirahoitus nykyistä avoimemmaksi. Tämä koskee niin puolueita kuin yksittäisiä ehdokkaita. Rahalla ostetaan laadukkaita mainoskampanjoita, näkyvyyttä, toistoja ja sitä kautta uskottavuutta. Ilman isoja satsauksia ehdokkaan on vaikea saada sanomaansa suuren yleisön tietoisuuteen. Ehdokkaille lahjoittamansa taloudellisen tuen avulla eri tahot pyrkivät ostamaan tukea omille näkökannoilleen ja intresseilleen. Vaalirahoituksella poliitikkoon luodaan riippuvuussuhde, mistä seuraa, että valituksi tultuaan edustaja ei välttämättä olekaan äänestäjän asialla vaan jää kiitollisuudenvelkaan rahoittajalleen, mitä sitten maksaa, kun äänestää rahoittajallensa tärkeistä lainsäädäntöhankkeista. Jos vihamieliset tahot onnistuvat vaikuttamaan päätöksentekoprosessiin, kansalaisten luottamus demokraattisiin instituutioihin ja vaaliprosesseihin horjuu, mikä heikentää entisestään koko järjestelmän uskottavuutta. Vaalirahoituksen sääntelyä ja valvontaa on yleisesti tiukennettava. Avoin ja läpinäkyvä vaalirahoitus, sen valvonta ja seuranta on välttämätöntä, jotta voidaan varmistaa, että poliittiset kampanjat eivät ole riippuvaisia epäilyttävistä ulkopuolisista lähteistä.

  Alfred Sant (S&D). – The EU is right in seeking to monitor and suppress foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU, including disinformation. Foreign interference in the internal affairs of nations did not start yesterday as the resolution implies. It has been done ‘legally’ and ‘illegally’ by the US, European powers, the former USSR, for donkey’s years. Should we forget about this as we proclaim our attachment to the defence of democratic processes?

There are many ways by which interference in democratic processes can be run from outside. Some are clearly indefensible. Others are at the margin of being between ambiguous and less than transparent. As of now, the EU and Member States themselves apply the latter strategy quite openly. In the past, a Maltese Labour Party government argued against foreign interference in national politics and legislated against it. For this, it was ostracised.

What is now being attempted here lacks historical balance and carries a Eurocentric emphasis that rings false in third countries which have been, and still are, subject to Western meddling in their internal affairs. So though I agree that outside interference in the internal affairs of nation states and the EU should be monitored and rolled back, I disagree with the approach that is being proposed.