Debašu stenogramma

Trešdiena, 2024. gada 17. janvāris - Strasbūra

8.14. Drošības un aizsardzības jautājumi saistībā ar Ķīnas ietekmi uz kritisko infrastruktūru Eiropas Savienībā (A9-0401/2023 - Klemen Grošelj) (balsošana)

– Vor der Abstimmung:

  Klemen Grošelj, rapporteur. – Mr President, when we speak of China as a direct or indirect owner of critical infrastructure, we need to bear in mind that its socio-political system is profoundly different from ours.

The main element of the Chinese system is a full and complete military-civilian fusion that means the state leads state-directed programmes and plans to make use of all state and commercial power to strengthen the PLA.

There are several security and defence risks associated with it: a risk of transfer of technology and technological know-how to companies directly or indirectly connected to China’s military; the risk of China’s monopoly in certain technology fields, such as batteries, silicon production, not to mention a monopoly on rare earths and other critical materials that constitutes a risk to EU defence and industry.

Undersea cable communication is a third important security concern, due to the technology used, and services provided to EU diplomatic and military structures.

As President von der Leyen said, we should not strive for decoupling from China, but rather de-risking. We need to develop a toolkit to efficiently address the EU security and defence concerns. European critical infrastructure remains vulnerable. Therefore, we need to develop a holistic model of screening foreign direct investments, as well as all actors involved in EU critical-infrastructure projects.

We need a swift adoption, and full implementation, of an expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could have security implications for the EU, especially in the field of enabling technologies with military applications.

Dual-use technologies need to be clearly defined and based on forward-looking criteria, and we need a legal framework to mitigate the security risks coming from the suppliers of undersea cable systems and services to prevent unauthorised intelligence and data gathering – and we must support and strengthen the resilience of our closest partners, especially candidate countries and strategic allies.

I would like to thank all who took part in the preparation of this report.