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Parliamentary question - E-007752/2012Parliamentary question
E-007752/2012

    Crackdown on online dissent by the Belarusian authorities — authorisation requirements for ICT exports to Belarus

    Question for written answer E-007752/2012
    to the Commission
    Rule 117
    Marietje Schaake (ALDE)

    On 30 August 2012 it was reported[1] that a number of administrators of social networking websites in Belarus linked to pro-opposition groups had been detained in Minsk. The Belarus KGB allegedly hacked pro-opposition communities on the Russian ‘VKontakte.ru’ social network. The groups are: ‘We’re fed up with Lukashenko’, which has over 37 000 members, and ‘Only SHOS’, with 15 000 members. According to the local human rights group Vesna‑96, four people, among them Pavel Euthyakheeu, Andrei Tkachou and Raman Pratesevich, have been detained and asked to surrender the passwords of the online groups. In 2011 the Lukashenko administration outlawed all forms of protest and empowered the KGB to conduct searches and arrests without warrant on suspicion of political dissent. Given that parliamentary elections are scheduled for 23 September 2012, this action, which is in clear violation of freedom of expression and assembly online, is extremely worrying.

    1. What pressure will the Commission put on the Belarusian authorities to ensure that they respect digital freedoms and the detained web administrators are released?

    2. Given the upcoming elections and the claims of hacking of websites by the KGB, is the Commission able and willing to impose an EU‑wide ad hoc authorisation requirement, based on Article 8 (1) of Regulation EC 428/2009 (‘the regulation’), on the export of the following dual-use items, which are not listed in Annex A to the regulation on grounds of public security and human rights considerations: public LAN database centralised monitoring systems, Internet and 2G/3G services (including operational support and services), including: communication flows drawing equipment, interface and mediation systems for system components, monitored flows processing power, monitored flows processing software, data filing storage, database management workstations, database management software and LAN infrastructure? If not, why not?

    3. If the Commission is not able to implement an ad hoc EU‑wide authorisation requirement under Article 8(1) of the regulation, can it explain why?

    4. Is the Commission willing to impose ad hoc sanctions on Belarus, to include exports of the abovementioned technologies and services, similar to the sanctions applying to Syria[2] (Article 4, Annex A) and Iran[3]? If not, why not?

    5. Does the Commission agree that freedom of expression and assembly also extend to the online sphere, and that all efforts by the EU to protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in Belarus (and elsewhere) should also aim to uphold and protect digital freedoms? If not, why not?

    OJ C 270 E, 19/09/2013