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Parliamentary questions
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30 June 2020
E-003850/2020
Question for written answer E-003850/2020
to the Commission
Rule 138
Jean-Lin Lacapelle (ID), Hélène Laporte (ID), Maxette Pirbakas (ID), Annika Bruna (ID), Herve Juvin (ID), André Rougé (ID), Gilles Lebreton (ID), Gilbert Collard (ID), Filip De Man (ID), Catherine Griset (ID), Jérôme Rivière (ID), Virginie Joron (ID), Gunnar Beck (ID), Maximilian Krah (ID), Stefania Zambelli (ID), France Jamet (ID), Julie Lechanteux (ID), Jean-François Jalkh (ID), Gianantonio Da Re (ID), Luisa Regimenti (ID)
 Answer in writing 
 Subject: Abuses in collection of users’ personal data for coronavirus tracing in France

The StopCovid application, the end-result of an unprecedented EU-wide collection of telephone data, guarantees users an extremely high confidentiality level. However in reality, according to an article in Le Monde (1) , the application forwards to the central server data on every person with whom the user crosses paths. This contravenes the commitments made by both the French authorities and the European Commission, as well as regulations surrounding the application’s development.

The reason put forward for this mass surveillance is that while a user’s digital identity changes every 15 minutes, 15 minutes is also the length of time in which a physical contact becomes a risk, meaning this contact may straddle two different digital identities per user. Hence all contacts are registered for screening so that the length of a contact does not have to be reset. This is no excuse: this is a fault in the application’s design involving the authorities.

As this mode of operation is completely contrary to the applicable regulations, can the Commission answer the following:

1. How will it work with the French authorities to put an end to this?

2. What real and urgently required guarantees can it present to ensure similar misuse of data does not occur now or in the future, in France or elsewhere in Europe.

Supporter(2)

(1)‘L’application StopCovid collecte plus de données qu’annoncé’ [StopCovid application collects more data than announced], Le Monde, 16 June 2020, https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2020/06/16/l-application-stopcovid-collecte-plus-de-donnees-qu-annonce_6043038_4408996.html
(2)This question is supported by a Member other than the authors: Jean-Paul Garraud (ID)
Original language of question: FR
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