

**Question for written answer E-004355/2021  
to the Commission**

Rule 138

**Gunnar Beck (ID)**

**Subject:** Serious deficiencies in the Commission's surveillance of Member States exiting a macroeconomic adjustment programme: impact on fostering reforms

According to special report 18/2021 of the European Court of Auditors, there are some serious deficiencies in the Commission's surveillance of Member States exiting a macroeconomic adjustment programme.

The report notes that there is no evidence that the Commission's surveillance has a significant impact on fostering reform implementation and assuring creditors. In fact, the post-programme surveillance (PPS) reports included assessments of structural reforms that were neither directly related to the macroeconomic adjustment programme, nor backed by a robust legal base. For all four Member States under PPS, the Commission did not formally specify the structural reforms to be monitored.

The report also mentions reform fatigue among the Member States concerned and the loss of incentives to implement reforms after regaining access to market financing at acceptable rates, especially since the pandemic, which has caused significant implementation delays.

1. How will the Commission specify to the Member States concerned which structural reforms will be monitored?
2. How will it battle reform fatigue in the Member States concerned?
3. How will it prevent delays and speed up delayed reforms?