

**Question for written answer E-003403/2022
to the Commission**

Rule 138

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Subject: Availability of raw materials and geopolitical aspects of the Green Deal

The energy transition in general and the production of electric vehicles and their batteries in particular require significantly more raw materials compared to conventional alternatives. A study by KU Leuven from April 2022 shows that, without investing in domestic mines and refineries at high European standards, Europe is and will remain almost completely dependent on imports until a recycling industry is set up. These imports include the urgently needed raw materials lithium, nickel and cobalt and the rare earth metals dysprosium, neodymium and praseodymium.

The study concludes that, without an increase in global mining investment, supply chain bottlenecks are likely to develop for these raw materials and for copper. Globally, these bottlenecks could last until 2030 or as late as 2040 for some raw materials.

1. How will the ban on the internal combustion engine and the switch to electro mobility change the EU's geostrategic dependency?
2. What effects will the availability (or possible bottleneck situations) of raw materials have on the expected price development of electric vehicles?
3. As part of the Fit for 55 package and the REPowerEU programme, has there been a detailed analysis of the availability of raw materials and the resulting geostrategic dependencies of the 27 Member States, and how does the Commission intend to diversify supply and decrease these dependencies?