

**Question for written answer E-000790/2023**

**to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**

Rule 138

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**Subject:** Cuban authorities' use of EU funds for increased violence and repression

Since 1988, the EU has provided EUR 300 million to fund over 200 development projects in Cuba. 80 projects worth EUR 155 million are still ongoing.

The EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) includes a conditional clause that makes implementing the agreement dependent on the improvement of freedoms and human rights in Cuba.

Little is known about how these funds are spent.

According to NGOs<sup>1</sup>, aid often ends up in the hands of Cuban police and military forces<sup>2</sup> and the funds are spent on buying oppressive tools that are used against protesters. As such, they contribute to strengthening the totalitarian regime.

In its resolution of 16 December 2021, Parliament expressed its regret that, despite the adoption of the PDCA, the situation with regard to democracy and human rights has seriously deteriorated.

1. How does the Commission monitor the spending of EU funds and verify that they are not used to increase oppression?
2. How does the Commission check that goods are not re-exported to other oppressive regimes such as those in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia or Iran?
3. Will the EU uphold the essential elements clause of the PDCA and respond to Parliament's call to trigger Article 85(3b) and put conditionality in practice in response to the deteriorating situation?

**Supporter<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Such as Frente Hemisferico por la Libertad.

<sup>2</sup> Communist Party upper echelons and Communist Party organisations.

<sup>3</sup> This question is supported by a Member other than the authors: Emmanouil Fragkos (ECR)