

**Question for written answer Z-000032/2023  
to the European Central Bank**

Rule 140

**Clara Ponsatí Obiols (NI)**

**Subject:** Follow-up to answer to question (QZ-000026/2023) on the independence of governing bodies of national central banks

In our question QZ-000026/2023 we enquired whether the forced resignation of Professor Antonio Cabrales from the Governing Council of the *Banco de España* was compatible with the principle of independence provided for in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

In her answer, President Lagarde indeed acknowledges that ‘undue pressure should not be placed on [members of the decision-making bodies of national central banks] to resign, as this would raise concerns from the perspective of the principle of independence.’ However, President Lagarde fails to confirm a breach of the principle in the case of Professor Cabrales because ‘no complaint nor allegation of a forced resignation has been communicated to the European Central Bank by the parties involved.’

However, given that, as explained in our original question on the matter (QZ-000005/2023), there are credible reports of undue influence<sup>1</sup>, including of a phone call by the Secretary-General of the *Partido Popular* to Professor Cabrales, should the ECB examine the matter even if no allegations have come from the parties involved?

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<sup>1</sup> [La Vanguardia, El PP forzó la renuncia de Cabrales como consejero del Banco de España, 15 February 2023.](#)