



2023/2072(INI)

11.9.2023

AMENDMENTS

1 - 65

Draft opinion
Iuliu Winkler
(PE750.148v01-00)

Security and defence implications of China's influence on critical infrastructure
in the European Union
((2023/2072(INI))

Amendment 1
Emmanouil Fragkos

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Highlights the fact that in 2022, China was the EU's second largest trade in goods partner; ***expresses concern about the increasingly unbalanced trade and investment relationship between the EU and China***, which is also highlighted by the EU's record trade deficit of EUR 396 billion in 2022;

Amendment

1. Highlights the fact that in 2022, China was the EU's second largest trade in goods partner; ***notes the high dependence on Chinese imports and investments***, which is also highlighted by the EU's record trade deficit of EUR 396 billion ***with China*** in 2022;

Or. el

Amendment 2
Helmut Scholz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Highlights the fact that in 2022, China was the EU's second largest trade in goods partner; expresses concern about the increasingly unbalanced trade and investment relationship between the EU and China, which is also highlighted by the EU's record trade deficit of EUR 396 billion in 2022;

Amendment

1. Highlights the fact that in 2022, China was the EU's second largest trade in goods partner; expresses concern about the increasingly unbalanced trade and investment relationship between the EU and China, which is also highlighted by the EU's record trade deficit of EUR 396 billion in 2022; ***notes that through trade with China, in particular electronic consumer goods, and ICT devices have become affordable for EU citizens, and that EU companies are producing on a large scale in China, including for export to the EU***;

Or. en

Amendment 3

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Highlights the fact that in 2022, China was the EU's second largest trade in goods partner; expresses concern about the increasingly unbalanced trade and investment relationship between the EU and China, which is also highlighted by the EU's record trade deficit of EUR 396 billion in 2022;

Amendment

1. Highlights the fact that in 2022, China was the EU's second largest trade in goods partner; expresses concern about the increasingly unbalanced trade and investment relationship between the EU and China, which is also highlighted by the EU's record trade deficit of EUR 396 billion in 2022; ***highlights China's unbalanced international trade policy in the context of its Dual Circulation Strategy; asks the European Commission to raise European concerns with China on its managed trade practices;***

Or. en

Amendment 4
Helmut Scholz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

1a. Is mindful that the positive image products originating in the EU enjoy among the growing Chinese middle class, which outnumbers already the entire population of the EU, has been a key to success for EU exports to China, which were exceeding a combined value of 230 billion Euro in 2022;

Or. en

Amendment 5
Iuliu Winkler, Christophe Hansen, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Andrey Kovatchev, Jörgen Warborn, Gabriel Mato, Daniel Caspary, Seán Kelly

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Draft opinion

2. Notes that Chinese investments in Europe continued to decline in 2022, reaching a 10-year low of EUR 7.9 billion;

Amendment

2. Notes that Chinese investments in Europe continued to decline in 2022, reaching a 10-year low of EUR 7.9 billion; ***recalls a shift in Chinese FDI from mergers and acquisitions (M&A) towards greenfield investments, primarily in battery technology, which is a key sector of the Green Transition^{1a}***;

^{1a} <https://rhg.com/research/chinese-fdi-in-europe-2022-update/>

Or. en

Amendment 6
Reinhard Bütikofer, Saskia Bricmont, Anna Cavazzini

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Draft opinion

2. Notes that Chinese investments in Europe continued to decline in 2022, reaching a 10-year low of EUR 7.9 billion;

Amendment

2. Notes that Chinese investments in Europe continued to decline in 2022, reaching a 10-year low of EUR 7.9 billion; ***welcomes Chinese investment if it doesn't hurt security or the public order; emphasizes that at the same time adequate investment screening must be pursued***;

Or. en

Amendment 7
Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Svenja Hahn

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Draft opinion

2. Notes that Chinese investments in

Amendment

2. Notes ***that China was the seventh***

Europe continued to decline in 2022, reaching a 10-year low of EUR 7.9 billion;

biggest investor in the EU in 2021 and that Chinese investments in Europe continued to decline in 2022, reaching a 10-year low of EUR 7.9 billion, following a different pattern than the global recovery in FDI flows seen in 2021;

Or. en

Amendment 8 Helmut Scholz

Draft opinion Paragraph 2

Draft opinion

2. Notes that Chinese investments in Europe continued to decline in 2022, reaching a 10-year low of EUR 7.9 billion;

Amendment

2. Notes that Chinese investments in Europe ***remains way below its potential, and even*** continued to decline in 2022, reaching a 10-year low of EUR 7.9 billion; ***observes that Chinese greenfield investments in the EU reached a ten-year-high at the same time;***

Or. en

Amendment 9 Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Svenja Hahn

Draft opinion Paragraph 2 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

2a. Highlights that according to an Evaluation from the European Union Court of Auditors, Chinese investments in the EU have been concentrated during 2000-2020 in strategic areas such as transport and infrastructure, information and communication technologies, and energy;

Or. en

Amendment 10
Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Svenja Hahn

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 b (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

2b. Points out that the political system in China provides for investors based on a combination of private and state actors or of state-owned enterprises, closely linked to the ruling party, and therefore brings ambiguity regarding the interest behind their investments in third countries' critical infrastructure;

Or. en

Amendment 11
Emmanuel Maurel

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

Amendment

3. Is *nevertheless* convinced that the **trade and investment** relationship between the EU and China **is of strategic importance and should be rules-based, with the multilateral trading system and the principle of reciprocity at its core;**

3. Is convinced that the **imbalance in the trade** relationship between the EU and China, **the longstanding absence of reciprocity owing to the practices of the Chinese Government and the companies which it controls directly or indirectly, as well as the negative economic outlook for our industry, especially in the green technology and electric vehicle sectors, means that all appropriate trade defence measures should be taken, with the priority objective of locating companies in these sectors on our continent;**

Or. fr

Amendment 12

Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Svenja Hahn

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Is nevertheless convinced that *the* trade and investment *relationship* between the EU and China *is of strategic* importance and should be *rules-based*, *with* the multilateral trading system and the *principle of reciprocity at its core*;

Amendment

3. Is nevertheless convinced that trade and investment *relations* between the EU and China *are of economic* importance and *that these* should be *reciprocal and rules based, be it on a bilateral level or under* the multilateral trading system; *regrets that this is not the case today and believes that the enlarged EU trade toolbox with autonomous measures such as the FDI screening, the International Procurement and the Foreign Subsidies Instruments, the Enforcement as well as the Anti-Coercion regulations, are of major importance when it comes to foreign ownership, control or access to EU critical infrastructure*;

Or. en

Amendment 13
Emmanouil Fragkos

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. *Is nevertheless convinced* that the trade and investment relationship between the EU and China is of strategic importance and should be *rules-based*, with the multilateral trading system *and the principle of reciprocity at its core*;

Amendment

3. *Welcomes the fact* that the trade and investment relationship between the EU and China is of strategic importance and should be *based on clear rules*, with the multilateral trading system *at its core*; *notes that Chinese investments in the EU should be in line with EU and national law, as European investments in China are, in compliance with the principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity*;

Or. el

Amendment 14
Reinhard Bütikofer, Saskia Bricmont, Anna Cavazzini

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Is nevertheless convinced that the trade and investment relationship between the EU and China is of *strategic* importance and should be rules-based, *with the multilateral trading system and the principle of reciprocity at its core*;

Amendment

3. Is nevertheless convinced that the trade and investment relationship between the EU and China is of importance and should be rules-based; *emphasizes in this context the expectation that China would support ambitious WTO-reform; insists on more reciprocity and advocates strong EU actions against unfair Chinese regulations affecting trade and investment*;

Or. en

Amendment 15
Helmut Scholz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. *Is nevertheless* convinced that the trade and investment relationship between the EU and China is of strategic importance and should be rules-based, with the multilateral trading system and the principle of reciprocity at its core;

Amendment

3. *Recognises the conclusions on China adopted by the European Council at its meeting on 29 and 30 June 2023, and is equally* convinced that the trade and investment relationship between the EU and China is of strategic importance and should be rules-based, with the multilateral trading system, *balanced engagement* and the principle of reciprocity at its core;

Or. en

Amendment 16
Iuliu Winkler, Christophe Hansen, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Andrey Kovatchev, Jörgen Warborn, Gabriel Mato, Daniel Caspary, Seán Kelly

Draft opinion

Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Is nevertheless convinced that the trade and investment relationship between the EU and China is of strategic importance and should be rules-based, with the multilateral trading system and the principle of reciprocity at its core;

Amendment

3. Is nevertheless convinced that the trade and investment relationship between the EU and China is of strategic importance and should be rules-based, with the multilateral trading system and the principle of reciprocity at its core;
welcomes a strategy built on the concept of ‘de-risking’, alongside higher degrees of awareness as regard vulnerabilities linked to the possible weaponisation of economic dependencies and the foreign control or influence on critical infrastructure;

Or. en

Amendment 17 Emmanuel Maurel

Draft opinion Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

4. Emphasises that ***trade and investment are key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation and innovation and that the EU should therefore maintain its economic openness¹***;

Amendment

4. Emphasises that ***sustainable development, job creation and innovation depend on a multiplicity of factors, including meeting climate commitments and bringing production closer to the place of consumption; calls on the EU to fully understand the consequences of these requirements by engaging in a frank dialogue with China, including on its energy mix, or, failing that, by significantly strengthening its carbon border adjustment mechanism;***

¹ ***Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066).***

Amendment 18**Reinhard Bütikofer, Saskia Bricmont, Anna Cavazzini****Draft opinion****Paragraph 4***Draft opinion*

4. Emphasises that trade and investment **are** key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation and innovation and that the EU should therefore maintain its economic openness¹ ;

¹ Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066).

Amendment

4. Emphasises that trade and investment **should be** key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation and innovation and that the EU should therefore maintain its economic openness¹ ;

¹ Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066).

Amendment 19**Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Jérémy Decerle, Svenja Hahn****Draft opinion****Paragraph 4***Draft opinion*

4. Emphasises that trade and investment are key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation **and** innovation and that the EU should therefore maintain its economic openness¹ ;

Amendment

4. Emphasises that trade and investment are key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation, innovation and that the EU should therefore maintain its economic openness ¹ ***Meanwhile the European Union must strike a balance between investment attractiveness and the defence of its critical infrastructures and at the same time its autonomy; in this sense welcomes the new de-risking strategy in the Commission’s and the High Representative’s Communication on a European Economic Security Strategy***

in June 2023;

¹ Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066).

¹ Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066).

Or. en

Amendment 20 **Helmut Scholz**

Draft opinion **Paragraph 4**

Draft opinion

4. Emphasises that trade and investment are key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation and innovation and that the EU should therefore maintain its economic openness¹ ;

¹ Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066).

Amendment

4. Emphasises that trade and investment are key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation and innovation and that the EU should therefore maintain its economic openness¹ ; ***stresses that increased investment and international cooperation in research and development are needed in order to develop and roll-out innovations that can help mitigate the effects of global warming and other environmental challenges, in accordance with commitments in respective international agreements;***

¹ Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066).

Or. en

Amendment 21 **Iuliu Winkler, Christophe Hansen, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Andrey Kovatchev, Jörgen Warborn, Gabriel Mato, Daniel Caspary, Seán Kelly**

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

4. Emphasises that trade and investment are key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation and innovation and that the EU should therefore maintain its economic openness¹ ;

¹ Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066).

Amendment

4. Emphasises that trade and investment are key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation and innovation and that the EU should therefore maintain its economic openness¹; ***stresses however that a strategic balance must be found between the open character of the EU Single Market and the related security vulnerabilities, especially concerning economic coercion or threats to the integrity of European critical infrastructure;***

¹ Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066).

Or. en

Amendment 22
Jordi Cañas

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

4. Emphasises that trade and investment are key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation and innovation and that the EU should therefore maintain its economic openness¹ ;

¹ Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and

Amendment

4. Emphasises that trade and investment are key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation and innovation and that the EU should therefore ***attempt to maintain its economic openness¹ vis-à-vis China when possible, whilst being aware of the possible use of state-owned enterprises for political influence;***

¹ Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and

Assertive Trade Policy'
(COM(2021)0066).

Assertive Trade Policy'
(COM(2021)0066).

Or. en

Amendment 23
Helmut Scholz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

4a. *Points out that the quality of a foreign investment should be measured by its medium and long-term impact on the receiving region or business; reiterates that foreign investors must comply with their obligations as investors and respect EU and Member State legislation regarding workers' rights and including works councils, health at the working place, and environmental legislation and regulations;*

Or. en

Amendment 24
Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Raphaël Glucksmann, Paolo De Castro, Pedro Silva Pereira, Kathleen Van Brempt, Marek Belka

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

4a. *Calls the European Commission and the Member States to deliver on open strategic autonomy to regain lost ground in all those fields where China's dominant position creates a risk of overdependence to the EU.*

Or. en

Amendment 25
Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

4a. Calls on the Commission to consider ways of making its FDI screening opinions more impactful, in order to avoid distortions of the internal market and a race to the bottom between Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 26
Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Raphaël Glucksmann, Paolo De Castro, Pedro Silva Pereira, Kathleen Van Brempt, Marek Belka

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

4b. Calls on the European Commission and the Member States to conduct a process to increase the harmonization of the regulations on screening and control of foreign investments, and to fully implement the Foreign Direct Investment screening mechanism . Likewise, the Commission and the Member States must pay attention to investments by third countries, which could carry an indirect control position by China, through ownership or relevant participation in companies from those third countries.

Or. en

Amendment 27
Jordi Cañas

**Draft opinion
Paragraph 5**

Draft opinion

5. Acknowledges that ***in certain cases, foreign*** trade and investment can create security vulnerabilities, including with regard to foreign ownership of, control of or access to EU critical infrastructure;

Amendment

5. Acknowledges that trade ***with*** and investment ***from China*** can create security vulnerabilities, including with regard to foreign ownership of, control of or access to EU critical infrastructure; ***stresses the need to build appropriate expertise to ensure that governments are better attuned to China's changing goals and methods, in order to identify the multiform and often intertwined threats of Chinese foreign policy to the EU's open strategic economy and democracy;***

Or. en

**Amendment 28
Emmanuel Maurel**

**Draft opinion
Paragraph 5**

Draft opinion

5. Acknowledges that ***in certain cases,*** foreign trade and investment can create security vulnerabilities, including with regard to foreign ownership of, control of or access to EU critical infrastructure;

Amendment

5. Acknowledges that foreign trade and investment can create security vulnerabilities, including with regard to foreign ownership of, control of or access to EU critical infrastructure;

Or. fr

**Amendment 29
Helmut Scholz**

**Draft opinion
Paragraph 5**

Draft opinion

5. Acknowledges that in certain cases,

Amendment

5. Acknowledges that in certain cases,

foreign trade and investment can create security vulnerabilities, including with regard to foreign ownership of, control of or access to EU critical infrastructure;

foreign trade and investment can create security vulnerabilities, including with regard to foreign ownership of, control of or access to EU critical infrastructure;
notes that there is a tremendous deficit in investment in the EU in the modernisation of its infrastructure, in particular with regard to the energy grid and other infrastructure of crucial importance for a successful green transition;

Or. en

Amendment 30

Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Raphaël Glucksmann, Paolo De Castro, Pedro Silva Pereira, Kathleen Van Brempt, Margarida Marques, Marek Belka

Draft opinion

Paragraph 5 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

5a. Is concerned about China's assertive geopolitical and economic rise that has a considerable impact on the global economic and political developments particularly of the Global South, through its Belt and Road Initiative; calls on the Commission and the Member States to screen with a particular attention China's acquisitions of critical infrastructures in the Western Balkans and in the EU neighbourhood countries; calls on China to increase transparency on Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) projects, given that many BRI loans that have underperformed and became not financially viable.

Or. en

Amendment 31

Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero

Draft opinion

Paragraph 5 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

5a. Stresses that, as a reliable partner, the EU should engage on equal footing with partner countries, building long term, mutually beneficial partnerships. Calls on the Commission and EEAS to ensure that EU investments, notably via Global Gateway projects, in partner countries support partner countries in their own just and sustainable transition, delivering benefits on the ground in line with international climate agreements, ILO conventions, our Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights;

Or. en

**Amendment 32
Helmut Scholz**

**Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)**

Draft opinion

Amendment

5a. Recommends that a rejection of a Chinese investor shall not result in the failing of the development of the concerned infrastructure, and should therefore be compensated by a public investment, embeded both in EU and Member State economic policies;

Or. en

**Amendment 33
Jordi Cañas**

**Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)**

5a. *Is concerned about the impact of large-scale investments by Chinese companies on the usability of European ports by NATO forces;*

Or. en

Amendment 34
Emmanuel Maurel

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. *Welcomes* the Commission's proposed European economic security strategy², which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU's economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic interdependencies; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies;

² Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on 'European Economic Security Strategy' (JOIN(2023)0020).

Amendment

6. *Notes* the Commission's proposed European economic security strategy², which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU's economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic interdependencies; *considers, nevertheless, that the probability of achieving these two objectives at the same time is low*; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies;

² Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on 'European Economic Security Strategy' (JOIN(2023)0020).

Or. fr

Amendment 35
Enikő Győri

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. **Welcomes** the Commission's proposed European economic security strategy², which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU's economic openness while minimising **the** risks resulting from economic interdependencies; **approves of the fact** that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies;

² Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on 'European Economic Security Strategy' (JOIN(2023)0020).

Amendment

6. **Takes note of** the Commission's proposed European economic security strategy², which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU's economic openness while minimising **eventual** risks resulting from economic interdependencies; **states** that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies;

² Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on 'European Economic Security Strategy' (JOIN(2023)0020).

Or. en

Amendment 36
Jordi Cañas

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. Welcomes the Commission's proposed European economic security strategy², which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU's economic openness while minimising **the risks resulting from economic interdependencies**; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies;

² Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative

Amendment

6. Welcomes the Commission's proposed European economic security strategy², which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU's economic openness while minimising economic **security risks**; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies;

² Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative

of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’ (JOIN(2023)0020).

of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’ (JOIN(2023)0020).

Or. en

Amendment 37

Reinhard Bütikofer, Saskia Bricmont, Anna Cavazzini

Draft opinion

Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. Welcomes the Commission’s proposed European economic security strategy², which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU’s economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic *interdependencies*; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies;

² Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’ (JOIN(2023)0020).

Amendment

6. Welcomes the Commission’s proposed European economic security strategy² *and the de-risking paradigm*, which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU’s economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic *dependencies*; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies;

² Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’ (JOIN(2023)0020).

Or. en

Amendment 38

Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Jérémy Decerle, Svenja Hahn

Draft opinion

Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. Welcomes the Commission’s

Amendment

6. Welcomes the Commission’s

proposed European economic security strategy², which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU's economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic interdependencies; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies;

² Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on 'European Economic Security Strategy' (JOIN(2023)0020).

proposed European economic security strategy², which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU's economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic interdependencies **and to protect, promote and strengthen the European open autonomy strategy**; Approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies;

² Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on 'European Economic Security Strategy' (JOIN(2023)0020).

Or. en

Amendment 39 **Helmut Scholz**

Draft opinion **Paragraph 6**

Draft opinion

6. Welcomes the Commission's proposed European economic security strategy², which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU's economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic interdependencies; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies;

Amendment

6. Welcomes the Commission's proposed European economic security strategy², which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU's economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic interdependencies; **stresses nevertheless the need for enhanced international cooperation in the interest of citizens and for strengthening the EU economies**; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies; **is highly concerned by the growing number of EU-based businesses that were targeted for blackmail, industrial espionage,**

sabotage, or data theft, and that China has become the second most common country of origin of these attacks; calls on the authorities in China and the EU to cooperate in the fight against cybercrime;

² Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’ (JOIN(2023)0020).

² Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’ (JOIN(2023)0020).

Or. en

Amendment 40 **Jürgen Warborn**

Draft opinion **Paragraph 6**

Draft opinion

6. Welcomes the Commission’s proposed European economic security strategy², which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU’s economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic interdependencies; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies;

² Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’

Amendment

6. Welcomes the Commission’s proposed European economic security strategy², which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU’s economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic interdependencies; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies; ***recommends that proposed outbound investment screening mechanism is built on an impact assessment that includes strong consultation from businesses to minimise any potential negative consequences on European competitiveness;***

² Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’

Amendment 41

Iuliu Winkler, Christophe Hansen, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Andrey Kovatchev, Jörgen Warborn, Gabriel Mato, Daniel Caspary, Seán Kelly

Draft opinion

Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. Welcomes the Commission's proposed European economic security strategy², which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU's economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic interdependencies; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies;

² Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on 'European Economic Security Strategy' (JOIN(2023)0020).

Amendment

6. Welcomes the Commission's proposed European economic security strategy², which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU's economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic interdependencies; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies; ***is convinced that the protection of critical infrastructure should be a key element in the implementation of the strategy;***

² Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on 'European Economic Security Strategy' (JOIN(2023)0020).

Amendment 42

Iuliu Winkler, Christophe Hansen, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Andrey Kovatchev, Jörgen Warborn, Gabriel Mato, Daniel Caspary

Draft opinion

Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Underlines that EU responses must be built around an augmented understanding of the relevant strategic picture centred on cross-policy and cross-national threat assessments and vulnerability studies on critical infrastructure; is of the opinion that a decentralised or lacunar perception, lacking clear visibility and scrutiny over projects with strategic significance for Europe's defence and security can greatly harm the Union's geopolitical interests^{1a}; recalls vulnerabilities linked to foreign interference, specifically in the information space, and the interplay between FDI projects and information manipulation operations by malign foreign actors;

^{1a} *Security implications of China-owned critical infrastructure in the European Union - DG EXPO in-depth analysis*

Or. en

Amendment 43

Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Raphaël Glucksmann, Paolo De Castro, Pedro Silva Pereira, Kathleen Van Brempt, Margarida Marques, Marek Belka

Draft opinion

Paragraph 6 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

6a. Urges the Commission and the Member States to secure the main use of EU infrastructures is preserved and protected, to allow the normal development of EU economic activity and trade, notably transport (ports, airports, train, and roads) energy and telecommunication infrastructures. Calls on the Commission to periodically report to the European Parliament on: a) the detection of possible dual use of strategic

infrastructures that provide logistical and intelligence support to China; b) the full respect of EU trade legislation, especially due diligence, anti coercion and forced labour of goods entering the EU markets.

Or. en

Amendment 44
Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Svenja Hahn

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

6a. *Raises concerns over the fact that Chinese investment in critical infrastructure in third countries may lead to gaining control in or over some sectors, which in turn could facilitate espionage and control of access; believes in this respect that cooperation between EU Member States is key, in ensuring security and public order when it comes to foreign direct investments into the EU but also in order to ensure incentives for Union wide strategic cooperation that makes configurations like the 14+1 less attractive ;*

Or. en

Amendment 45
Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

6a. *Is of the opinion that fair, transparent, sustainable and mutually reinforcing trade relationships between the EU and China are of strategic importance and should be rules-based,*

with the multilateral trading system, the principle of reciprocity, and international labour and environmental agreements at its core;

Or. en

Amendment 46
Enikő Győri

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

6a. *Calls on the Commission to pursue a pragmatic and holistic approach when implementing the European economic security strategy, by taking into consideration the strategy's impact on the economic interests and the competitiveness of the European Union.*

Or. en

Amendment 47
Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Raphaël Glucksmann, Paolo De Castro, Pedro Silva Pereira, Kathleen Van Brempt, Margarida Marques, Marek Belka

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 b (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

6b. *Calls on the European Commission in coordination with the Member States, to design a rapid mechanism of response, in case of detection of dual use, or misuse, of the infrastructures in the EU, which are under property, participation or concession to China, that could lead to the cancellation of the rights of concession, and/or the suspension of the capacity of domain in the cases or property and participation.*

Amendment 48

Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Raphaël Glucksmann, Paolo De Castro, Marek Belka

Draft opinion

Paragraph 6 c (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

6c. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, to activate procedures for the suspension and revocation of China's capacity of domain, or concessions in case that, in the context of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, China involves in the conflict on the side of the aggressor, to avoid any possible dual or direct use, jeopardising EU and/or Ukrainian security.

Or. en

Amendment 49

Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Paolo De Castro, Pedro Silva Pereira, Margarida Marques

Draft opinion

Paragraph 6 d (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

6d. Calls on the European Commission and China to explore coordinated ways to boost trade and investment, looking to better adaptation of China to EU legislation and to the international and multilateral trade provisions.

Or. en

Amendment 50

Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Raphaël Glucksmann, Paolo De Castro, Pedro Silva Pereira, Kathleen Van Brempt, Margarida Marques, Marek Belka

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 e (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

6e. Calls on the Commission to fully put in force the recently developed legislation and mechanisms to address the unbalanced trade relationship and mitigate EU vulnerabilities, such as the screening of Foreign Direct Investment, the review of Trade Defence Instruments, the International Procurement Instrument, the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation, the export controls, the anti-coercion instrument the Critical Raw materials proposal, the Net Zero Industries Act, and the European Economic Security Strategy. Calls on China to cooperate to level the playing field limiting the assistance and the intervention in Chinese companies and removing the restrictions of European companies' access.

Or. en

Amendment 51
Helmut Scholz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

Draft opinion

Amendment

7. Recalls that the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments³ addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside the EU; notes that critical infrastructure is among the factors that may be taken into consideration by the Member States or the Commission in determining whether an investment is likely to affect security or public order.

7. Recalls that the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments³ addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside the EU; **recalls also that according to this regulation, the decision on whether to set up a screening mechanism or to screen a particular foreign direct investment remains the sole responsibility of the Member State concerned**; notes that critical infrastructure is among the factors that may be taken into consideration by the

Member States or the Commission in determining whether an investment is likely to affect security or public order.

³ Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ L 79I, 21.3.2019, p. 1).

³ Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ L 79I, 21.3.2019, p. 1).

Or. en

Amendment 52 Jordi Cañas

Draft opinion Paragraph 7

Draft opinion

7. Recalls that the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments³ addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside the EU; notes that critical infrastructure is among the factors that may be taken into consideration by the Member States or the Commission in determining whether an investment is likely to affect security or public order.

Amendment

7. Recalls that the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments³ ***partly*** addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside the EU; ***welcomes the Commission's 2023 consultation on the regulation and looks forward to its report to the European Parliament and Council evaluating the functioning and effectiveness thereof, with a view to ensuring that it is fit for purpose in the current global security context***; notes that critical infrastructure is among the factors that may be taken into consideration by the Member States or the Commission in determining whether an investment is likely to affect security or public order; ***highlights, however, the need to reinforce and toughen the existing mechanism, for instance by limiting foreign countries' capacity to get hold of critical infrastructures or technologies by purchasing them directly***;

³ Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the

³ Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the

European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ L 79I, 21.3.2019, p. 1).

European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ L 79I, 21.3.2019, p. 1).

Or. en

Amendment 53

Reinhard Bütikofer, Saskia Bricmont, Anna Cavazzini

Draft opinion

Paragraph 7

Draft opinion

7. Recalls that the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments³ addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside the EU; notes that critical infrastructure is among the factors that may be taken into consideration by the Member States or the Commission in determining whether an investment is likely to affect security or public order.

³ Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ L 79I, 21.3.2019, p. 1).

Amendment

7. Recalls that the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments³ addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside the EU; notes that critical infrastructure is among the factors that may be taken into consideration by the Member States or the Commission in determining whether an investment is likely to affect security or public order; ***encourages the Commission to present an ambitious legislative proposal on a revised EU FDI screening Regulation adequately addressing all the loopholes that have emerged during the implementation of the present Regulation, as well as a legislative proposal on a screening mechanism for outbound investments.***

³ Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ L 79I, 21.3.2019, p. 1).

Or. en

Amendment 54

Iuliu Winkler, Christophe Hansen, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Andrey Kovatchev, Jörgen Warborn, Gabriel Mato, Daniel Caspary, Seán Kelly

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

Draft opinion

7. Recalls that the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments³ addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside the EU; notes that critical infrastructure is among the factors that may be taken into consideration by the Member States or the Commission in determining whether an investment is likely to affect security or public order.

³ Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ L 79I, 21.3.2019, p. 1).

Amendment

7. Recalls that the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments³ addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside the EU; notes that critical infrastructure is among the factors that may be taken into consideration by the Member States or the Commission in determining whether an investment is likely to affect security or public order; ***reiterates the key added value of the screening mechanism as a pertinent tool giving the Union and its Member States a better strategic overview and situational awareness regarding trends, targets, means and methods deployed by foreign actors to increase their economic and political influence;***

³ Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ L 79I, 21.3.2019, p. 1).

Or. en

Amendment 55
Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Svenja Hahn

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

Draft opinion

7. Recalls that the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments³ addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside

the EU; notes that critical infrastructure is among the factors that may be taken into consideration by the Member States or the Commission in determining whether an investment is likely to affect security or public order.

the EU; notes that critical infrastructure is among the factors that may be taken into consideration by the Member States or the Commission in determining whether an investment is likely to affect security or public order; ***expresses strong concerns that all Member States do not have in place or use screening on foreign investment in critical infrastructure and believes that there is scope and need for strengthening the Regulation in its upcoming review at the end of the year;***

³ Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ L 79I, 21.3.2019, p. 1).

³ Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ L 79I, 21.3.2019, p. 1).

Or. en

Amendment 56

Iuliu Winkler, Christophe Hansen, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Andrey Kovatchev, Jörgen Warborn, Gabriel Mato, Daniel Caspary, Seán Kelly

Draft opinion

Paragraph 7 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

7a. Highlights the role of the EU as a promotor of quality infrastructure projects abroad, through initiatives such as the Global Gateway or through the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment; underlines the EU's need to deliver on its value-based and sustainability-driven rhetoric of international infrastructure projects, acknowledging the vital geostrategic role such programs can have at the level of diversification, supply chain resilience, standard setting and regulatory alignment;

Or. en

Amendment 57
Helmut Scholz

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

7a. Points out that the security of citizens should not be characterised merely under military defence aspects, as safeguarding their well-being includes economic, social and environmental dimensions; calls therefore on the EU institutions and Member States to increase their joint efforts to implement own policies and realise investments to lift up economic abilities in order to deliver high well-being standards for all people in the EU;

Or. en

Amendment 58
Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Raphaël Glucksmann, Paolo De Castro, Pedro Silva Pereira, Kathleen Van Brempt, Margarida Marques, Marek Belka

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

7a. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen the EU strategic autonomy notably by building diversified, secure and resilient supply chains and by increasing its actions in key areas such as research and development, cutting-edged technologies, critical raw materials, reindustrialisation and new infrastructures.

Or. en

Amendment 59

Jordi Cañas

Draft opinion

Paragraph 7 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

7a. Recalls that the EU must continuously, and actively, work towards the attainment of its strategic autonomy.

Or. en

Amendment 60

Iuliu Winkler, Christophe Hansen, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Andrey Kovatchev, Jörgen Warborn, Gabriel Mato, Daniel Caspary, Seán Kelly

Draft opinion

Paragraph 7 b (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

7b. Argues that a key area of EU critical infrastructure is also its network of research institutes and R&D facilities, which play a pertinent role in the Union's ability to deliver on its green and digital transitions, alongside key arenas such as space of defence; reminds of security vulnerabilities linked to forced technology transfers, IP-theft and knowledge leaks, both at home and abroad, and calls for increased vigilance in accounting for such threats to the EU's ability to innovate and foster growth.

Or. en

Amendment 61

Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Raphaël Glucksmann, Paolo De Castro, Pedro Silva Pereira, Kathleen Van Brempt, Marek Belka

Draft opinion

Paragraph 7 b (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

7b. Calls on the Commission to design actions to reduce the risks for EU own security and to develop internal resilience, strengthening the security and integrity of its critical infrastructures, the supply chains and the technology base, notably the 5G and 6G networks, all of them essential for our normal economic activity and trade; calls the Commission and the Member States to review their networks security toolbox.

Or. en

**Amendment 62
Helmut Scholz**

**Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 b (new)**

Draft opinion

Amendment

7b. Recommends to reduce risks rather by a focus on trust-building EU-China initiatives such as establishing a formal decarbonisation partnership, also as a further step towards setting multilateral rules and standards on sustainability ;

Or. en

**Amendment 63
Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Raphaël Glucksmann, Paolo De Castro, Pedro Silva Pereira,
Kathleen Van Brempt, Marek Belka**

**Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 c (new)**

Draft opinion

Amendment

7c. Calls on the Commission, the EU institutions and the Member States to terminate any research funding to

Chinese companies active in the areas of critical and strategic importance for the EU, such as ICT, and to channel risks related to contracting operators using Chinese equipment.

Or. en

Amendment 64

Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Raphaël Glucksmann, Paolo De Castro, Pedro Silva Pereira, Kathleen Van Brempt, Margarida Marques, Marek Belka

Draft opinion

Paragraph 7 d (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

7d. Calls on China to put in place and implement a responsible digital governance, with respect for privacy rights, freedom of expression and the rule of law in its digital governance policies, in the framework of WTO and multilateral standards; calls on the Commission to assess other areas under risk such as the semiconductors, quantum computing, blockchains, space, AI or biotechnologies, and consider legislation or tools for further protection against malicious software and cyber espionage.

Or. en

Amendment 65

Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Raphaël Glucksmann, Paolo De Castro, Pedro Silva Pereira, Kathleen Van Brempt, Margarida Marques, Marek Belka

Draft opinion

Paragraph 7 e (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

7e. Requires the Commission to share with the European Parliament, before the end of this parliamentary term, a detailed analysis of the risks for EU trade,

regarding the semiconductors, quantum computing, blockchain, space, AI or biotechnologies and the possible need of EU action in these fields.

Or. en