



**2020/0359(COD)**

15.10.2021

## **OPINION**

of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

for the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council  
on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union,  
repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148  
(COM(2020)0823 – C9-0422/2020 – 2020/0359(COD))

Rapporteur for opinion (\*): Lukas Mandl(\*)

Associated committee – Rule 57 of the Rules of Procedure

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## SHORT JUSTIFICATION

The proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS2 Directive)<sup>1</sup> is part of a wider set of initiatives at Union level that seek to increase the resilience of public and private entities against threats. The proposal aims to address the shortcomings of the existing legislation and to enable the entities covered by its scope to respond better to the new challenges identified by the Commission in its impact assessment, which included an extensive stakeholder consultation. These challenges include in particular the increased digitisation of the internal market and the evolving security threat landscape.

The legal basis of the proposal is Article 114 TFEU, i.e. internal market. From a LIBE perspective it is however important to highlight that the measures imposed on network and information systems by the NIS2 Directive do not only serve to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. **The Directive should also help to contribute to the security of the Union as a whole**, inter alia by avoiding diverging vulnerability to cybersecurity risks between Member States.

To this end, it is crucial to **eliminate existing divergences between Member States** resulting from different interpretations of the law by the Member States. For this reason, the Rapporteur welcomes the uniform condition established by the Regulation to determine the entities falling within the scope of the Directive. Additional suggestions are made to prevent divergence in implementation, notably to oblige the Commission to issue guidelines on the implementation of the *lex specialis* and the criteria applicable to SMEs (which should also ensure legal clarity and avoid unnecessary burden) and to require the Cooperation Group to further specify non-technical factors to be taken into account in the supply chain risk assessments. It is moreover stressed that cooperation between competent authorities need to take place both within and *between* Member States, in real time.

The draft report also takes on board a number of **recommendations made by the EDPS** in its opinion on the Cybersecurity Strategy and the NIS 2.0 Directive<sup>2</sup>. Most importantly, it is clarified both in the recitals and in the operative part of the text that any personal data processing under the NIS2 Directive is without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR)<sup>3</sup> and Directive 2002/58/EC<sup>4</sup> (ePrivacy). Given the narrower scope of the term ‘security of networks and information systems’ (only covers protection of technology) compared to ‘cybersecurity’ (also covers activities to protect users) the former term is only used when the context is purely technical. In relation to domain names and registration data, clarifications are proposed regarding 1) the legal basis of the publication of ‘relevant

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<sup>1</sup> 2020/0359(COD).

<sup>2</sup> Opinion 5/2021: [https://edps.europa.eu/system/files/2021-03/21-03-11\\_edps\\_nis2-opinion\\_en.pdf](https://edps.europa.eu/system/files/2021-03/21-03-11_edps_nis2-opinion_en.pdf).

<sup>3</sup> Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance) *OJ L 119*, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88.

<sup>4</sup> Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), *OJ L 201*, 31.7.2002, p. 37–47.

information’ for the purposes of identification and contacting, 2) the categories of data domain registration data subject to publication (based on an ICANN recommendation), and 3) the entities that might constitute ‘legitimate access seekers’. It is also specified in the legal text that the proposal does not affect the attribution of jurisdiction and the competences of data protection supervisory authorities under the GDPR. Finally, a more comprehensive legal basis is provided for the cooperation and exchange of relevant information between the competent authorities under the Proposal and other relevant supervisory authorities, notably supervisory authorities under the GDPR.

**Other changes** introduced to the Commission proposal by the LIBE rapporteur relate to the following:

- To ensure coherence between the NIS2-Directive and the proposed Directive on resilience of critical entities (ECI)<sup>5</sup>, the language of some provisions was aligned with those of the ECI proposal. In line with a similar change envisaged for the ECI Directive which should cover the same sectors as the NIS2 Directive, it is proposed to add ‘food production, processing and distribution’ to the scope.
- As regards personal data, it is clarified that the scanning of networks and information systems by CSIRTs should not only be in line with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR)<sup>6</sup> but also with Directive 2002/58/EC<sup>7</sup> (ePrivacy). International transfers of personal data under this Directive should be in compliance with Chapter V of the GDPR.
- The Cooperation Group should meet twice rather than once a year to take stock of the latest developments regarding cybersecurity. The EDPB should participate in the meetings of the Cooperation Group as an observer.
- ENISA should issue annual rather than biennial reports on the state of cybersecurity in the Union. The report should also take into account the impact of cybersecurity incidents on the protection of personal data in the Union.
- The notification deadline of incidents is aligned with the deadline for the notification of breaches under the GDPR, namely 72 hours.
- While the notification of actual cybersecurity incidents by essential and important entities should indeed be mandatory, the notification of cyber threats should be voluntary to limit administrative burden and avoid over-reporting. To be considered significant, an incident should have caused actual damage and affected other natural and legal persons rather than such damage or effect being ‘possible’.
- The circumstances to be taken into account when deciding on a sanction following a breach of the cybersecurity rules are aligned with the GDPR. As this would go against the current liability practice in Union law, it should not be possible to impose a temporary ban of natural persons from exercising managerial functions.

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<sup>5</sup> 2020/0365(COD).

<sup>6</sup> Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance) *OJ L 119*, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88.

<sup>7</sup> Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), *OJ L 201*, 31.7.2002, p. 37–47.

- To avoid reputational damage, entities should not be obliged to make public aspects of non-compliance with the requirements under this Directive or the identity natural or legal persons responsible for the infringement.

## AMENDMENTS

The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs calls on the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, as the committee responsible, to take into account the following amendments:

### Amendment 1

#### Proposal for a directive

##### Recital 1

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(1) Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and the Council<sup>11</sup> aimed at building cybersecurity capabilities across the Union, mitigating threats to network and information systems used to provide essential services in key sectors and ensuring the continuity of such services when facing cybersecurity incidents, thus contributing to the Union's economy and society to function effectively.

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<sup>11</sup> Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (OJ L 194/1, 19.7.2016 p. 1).

*Amendment*

(1) Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and the Council<sup>11</sup> aimed at building cybersecurity capabilities across the Union, mitigating threats to network and information systems used to provide essential services in key sectors and ensuring the continuity of such services when facing cybersecurity incidents, thus contributing to the Union's ***security and to the effective functioning of its*** economy and society to function effectively.

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<sup>11</sup> Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (OJ L 194/1, 19.7.2016 p. 1).

### Amendment 2

#### Proposal for a directive

##### Recital 2

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(2) Since the entry into force of

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Directive (EU) 2016/1148 significant progress has been made in increasing the Union's level of cybersecurity resilience. The review of that Directive has shown that it has served as a catalyst for the institutional and regulatory approach to cybersecurity in the Union, paving the way for a significant change in mind-set. That Directive has ensured the completion of national frameworks by defining national cybersecurity strategies, establishing national capabilities, and implementing regulatory measures covering essential infrastructures and actors identified by each Member State. It has also contributed to cooperation at Union level through the establishment of the Cooperation Group<sup>12</sup> and a network of national Computer Security Incident Response Teams ('CSIRTs network')<sup>13</sup>. Notwithstanding those achievements, the review of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 has revealed inherent shortcomings that prevent it from addressing effectively contemporaneous and emerging cybersecurity challenges.

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<sup>12</sup> Article 11 of Directive (EU) 2016/1148.

<sup>13</sup> Article 12 of Directive (EU) 2016/1148.

### Amendment 3

Directive (EU) 2016/1148 significant progress has been made in increasing the Union's level of cybersecurity resilience. The review of that Directive has shown that it has served as a catalyst for the institutional and regulatory approach to cybersecurity in the Union, paving the way for a significant change in mind-set. That Directive has ensured the completion of national frameworks by defining national cybersecurity strategies, establishing national capabilities, and implementing regulatory measures covering essential infrastructures and actors identified by each Member State. It has also contributed to cooperation at Union level through the establishment of the Cooperation Group and a network of national Computer Security Incident Response Teams ('CSIRTs network'). Notwithstanding those achievements, the review of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 has revealed inherent shortcomings that prevent it from addressing effectively contemporaneous and emerging cybersecurity challenges.

***Moreover, the expansion of online activities in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of cybersecurity, which is essential for EU citizens to be able to trust innovation and connectivity, as well as large-scale education and training thereon. The Commission should therefore support Member States in the design of educational programmes on cybersecurity with a view to enable important and essential entities to recruit cybersecurity experts who allow them to comply with the obligations arising from this Directive.***

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<sup>12</sup> Article 11 of Directive (EU) 2016/1148.

<sup>13</sup> Article 12 of Directive (EU) 2016/1148.

**Proposal for a directive**  
**Recital 3**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(3) Network and information systems have developed into a central feature of everyday life with the speedy digital transformation and interconnectedness of society, including in cross-border exchanges. That development has led to an expansion of the cybersecurity threat landscape, bringing about new challenges, which require adapted, coordinated and innovative responses in all Member States. The number, magnitude, sophistication, frequency and impact of cybersecurity incidents are increasing, and present a major threat to the functioning of network and information systems. As a result, cyber incidents can impede the pursuit of economic activities in the internal market, generate financial losses, undermine user confidence *and* cause major damage to the Union economy *and* society. Cybersecurity preparedness and effectiveness are therefore now more essential than ever to the proper functioning of the internal market.

*Amendment*

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**Amendment 4**

**Proposal for a directive**  
**Recital 5**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(5) All those divergences entail a fragmentation of the internal market and

*Amendment*

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are liable to have a prejudicial effect on its functioning, affecting in particular the cross-border provision of services and level of cybersecurity resilience due to the application of different standards. This Directive aims to remove such wide divergences among Member States, in particular by setting out minimum rules regarding the functioning of a coordinated regulatory framework, by laying down mechanisms for the effective cooperation among the responsible authorities in each Member State, by updating the list of sectors and activities subject to cybersecurity obligations and by providing effective remedies and sanctions which are instrumental to the effective enforcement of those obligations. Therefore, Directive (EU) 2016/1148 should be repealed and replaced by this Directive.

are liable to have a prejudicial effect on its functioning, affecting in particular the cross-border provision of services and level of cybersecurity resilience due to the application of different standards. ***Ultimately, these divergences can lead to higher vulnerability of some Member States to cybersecurity threats, with potential spillover effects across the Union, both with regard to its internal market and its overall security.*** This Directive aims to remove such wide divergences among Member States, in particular by setting out minimum rules regarding the functioning of a coordinated regulatory framework, by laying down mechanisms for the effective ***and real time*** cooperation among the responsible authorities in each Member State, ***between the competent authorities of the Member States***, by updating the list of sectors and activities subject to cybersecurity obligations and by providing effective remedies and sanctions which are instrumental to the effective enforcement of those obligations. Therefore, Directive (EU) 2016/1148 should be repealed and replaced by this Directive.

## Amendment 5

### Proposal for a directive Recital 6

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(6) This Directive leaves unaffected the ability of Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure the protection of the essential interests of their security, to safeguard public policy and public security, and to allow for the investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, in compliance with Union law. In accordance with Article 346 TFEU, no Member State is to be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which would be contrary to the essential interests

#### *Amendment*

(6) This Directive leaves unaffected the ability of Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure the protection of the essential interests of their ***national*** security, to safeguard public policy and public security, and to allow for the ***prevention***, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, in compliance with Union law. In accordance with Article 346 TFEU, no Member State is to be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which would be contrary to



of its public security. In this context, national and Union rules for protecting classified information, non-disclosure agreements, and informal non-disclosure agreements such as the Traffic Light Protocol<sup>14</sup>, are of relevance.

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<sup>14</sup> The Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) is a means for someone sharing information to inform their audience about any limitations in further spreading this information. It is used in almost all CSIRT communities and some Information Analysis and Sharing Centres (ISACs).

## Amendment 6

### Proposal for a directive Recital 8

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(8) In accordance with Directive (EU) 2016/1148, **Member States were responsible** for determining which entities meet the criteria to qualify as operators of essential services ('identification process'). **In order to eliminate the wide divergences among Member States in that regard and ensure legal certainty for the risk management requirements and reporting obligations for all relevant entities**, a uniform criterion should be established that determines the entities falling within the scope of application of this Directive. That criterion should consist of the application of the size-cap rule, whereby all medium and large enterprises, as defined by Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC<sup>15</sup>, that operate within the sectors or provide the type of services covered by this Directive, fall within its scope. Member States should not be required to establish a list of the entities that meet this generally applicable size-related criterion.

the essential interests of its public security. In this context, national and Union rules for protecting classified information, non-disclosure agreements, and informal non-disclosure agreements such as the Traffic Light Protocol<sup>14</sup>, are of relevance.

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<sup>14</sup> The Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) is a means for someone sharing information to inform their audience about any limitations in further spreading this information. It is used in almost all CSIRT communities and some Information Analysis and Sharing Centres (ISACs).

#### *Amendment*

(8) **The responsibility of Member States** in accordance with Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Member States were responsible for determining which entities meet the criteria to qualify as operators of essential services ('identification process') **has led to wide divergences among Member States in that regard. Without prejudice to the specific exceptions provided in this Directive**, a uniform criterion should be established that determines the entities falling within the scope of application of this Directive **to eliminate these divergences and ensure legal certainty regarding the risk management requirements and reporting obligations for all relevant entities**. That criterion should consist of the application of the size-cap rule, whereby all medium and large enterprises, as defined by Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC<sup>15</sup>, that operate within the sectors or provide the type of services covered by this Directive, fall within its scope. Member States should not be

required to establish a list of the entities that meet this generally applicable size-related criterion.

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<sup>15</sup> Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36).

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<sup>15</sup> Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36).

## Amendment 7

### Proposal for a directive Recital 8 a (new)

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(8 a) Taking into consideration the differences in the national public administration frameworks, Member States retain their decision-making capacity regarding the designation of entities within the scope of this Directive.***

## Amendment 8

### Proposal for a directive Recital 9

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(9) ***However***, small or micro entities fulfilling certain criteria that indicate a key role for the economies or societies of Member States or for particular sectors or types of services, should also be covered by this Directive. Member States should be responsible for establishing a list of such entities, and submit it to the Commission.

(9) Small or micro entities fulfilling certain criteria that indicate a key role for the economies or societies of Member States or for particular sectors or types of services ***based on a risk-assessment, including entities defined as critical entities or entities equivalent to critical entities under Directive (EU) XXX/XXX of the European Parliament and the Council<sup>1a</sup>***, should also be covered by this Directive. Member States should be responsible for establishing a list of such entities, and submit it to the Commission.

## Amendment 9

### Proposal for a directive

#### Recital 10

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(10) The Commission, in cooperation with the Cooperation Group, **may** issue guidelines on the implementation of the criteria applicable to micro and small **enterprises**.

*Amendment*

(10) The Commission, in cooperation with the Cooperation Group, **should** issue guidelines on the implementation of the criteria applicable to micro and small **entities**.

## Amendment 10

### Proposal for a directive

#### Recital 12

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(12) Sector-specific legislation and instruments can contribute to ensuring high levels of cybersecurity, while taking full account of the specificities and complexities of those sectors. Where a sector-specific Union legal act requires essential or important entities to adopt cybersecurity risk management measures or to notify incidents or significant cyber threats of at least an equivalent effect to the obligations laid down in this Directive, those sector-specific provisions, including on supervision and enforcement, should apply. The Commission **may** issue guidelines in relation to the implementation of the lex specialis. This Directive does not preclude the adoption of additional sector-specific Union acts addressing cybersecurity risk management measures and incident notifications. This Directive is without prejudice to the existing implementing powers that have been

*Amendment*

(12) Sector-specific legislation and instruments can contribute to ensuring high levels of cybersecurity, while taking full account of the specificities and complexities of those sectors. Where a sector-specific Union legal act requires essential or important entities to adopt cybersecurity risk management measures or to notify incidents or significant cyber threats of at least an equivalent effect to the obligations laid down in this Directive, those sector-specific provisions, including on supervision and enforcement, should apply. The Commission **should** issue guidelines in relation to the implementation of the lex specialis. This Directive does not preclude the adoption of additional sector-specific Union acts addressing cybersecurity risk management measures and incident notifications. This Directive is without prejudice to the existing implementing powers that have been

conferred to the Commission in a number of sectors, including transport and energy.

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## Amendment 11

### Proposal for a directive

#### Recital 14

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(14) In view of the interlinkages between cybersecurity and the physical security of entities, a coherent approach should be ensured between Directive (EU) XXX/XXX of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>17</sup> and this Directive. To achieve this, Member States should ensure that critical entities, and equivalent entities, pursuant to Directive (EU) XXX/XXX are considered to be essential entities under this Directive. Member States should also ensure that their cybersecurity strategies provide for a policy framework for enhanced coordination between the competent **authority** under this Directive and the one under Directive (EU) XXX/XXX in the context of information sharing on incidents and cyber threats and the exercise of supervisory tasks. Authorities under both Directives should cooperate and exchange information, particularly **in** relation to the identification of critical entities, cyber threats, cybersecurity risks, incidents affecting critical entities as well as on the cybersecurity measures taken by critical entities. Upon request of competent authorities under Directive (EU) XXX/XXX, competent authorities under this Directive should be allowed to **exercise their supervisory and enforcement powers on an** essential entity identified as critical. Both authorities should cooperate and exchange information for this purpose.

##### *Amendment*

(14) In view of the interlinkages between cybersecurity and the physical security of entities, a coherent approach should be ensured between Directive (EU) XXX/XXX of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>17</sup> and this Directive, **wherever possible and appropriate**. To achieve this, Member States should ensure that critical entities, and equivalent entities, pursuant to Directive (EU) XXX/XXX are considered to be essential entities under this Directive. Member States should also ensure that their cybersecurity strategies provide for a policy framework for enhanced coordination between the competent **authorities within and between Member States**, under this Directive and the one under Directive (EU) XXX/XXX in the context of information sharing on **cyber** incidents and cyber threats and the exercise of supervisory tasks. Authorities under both Directives **within and between Member States** should cooperate and exchange information, particularly **on** relation to the identification of critical entities, cyber threats, cybersecurity risks, incidents affecting critical entities as well as on the cybersecurity measures taken by **competent authorities under this Directive relevant for** critical entities. Upon request of competent authorities under Directive (EU) XXX/XXX, competent authorities under this Directive should be allowed to **assess the cybersecurity of** essential entity identified as critical. Both authorities should cooperate and exchange information **in real time** for this purpose.

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<sup>17</sup> [insert the full title and OJ publication reference when known]

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## **Amendment 12**

### **Proposal for a directive Recital 18**

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(18) Services offered by data centre service providers may not always be provided in a form of cloud computing service. Accordingly, data centres may not always constitute a part of cloud computing infrastructure. In order to manage all the risks posed to *the security of network and information systems*, this Directive should cover also providers of such data centre services that are not cloud computing services. For the purpose of this Directive, the term ‘data centre service’ should cover provision of a service that encompasses structures, or groups of structures, dedicated to the centralised accommodation, interconnection and operation of information technology and network equipment providing data storage, processing and transport services together with all the facilities and infrastructures for power distribution and environmental control. The term ‘data centre service’ does not apply to in-house, corporate data centres owned and operated for own purposes of the concerned entity.

#### *Amendment*

(18) Services offered by data centre service providers may not always be provided in a form of cloud computing service. Accordingly, data centres may not always constitute a part of cloud computing infrastructure. In order to manage all the risks posed to *cybersecurity*, this Directive should cover also providers of such data centre services that are not cloud computing services. For the purpose of this Directive, the term ‘data centre service’ should cover provision of a service that encompasses structures, or groups of structures, dedicated to the centralised accommodation, interconnection and operation of information technology and network equipment providing data storage, processing and transport services together with all the facilities and infrastructures for power distribution and environmental control. The term ‘data centre service’ does not apply to in-house, corporate data centres owned and operated for own purposes of the concerned entity.

## **Amendment 13**

### **Proposal for a directive Recital 20**

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(20) Those growing interdependencies are the result of an increasingly cross-

#### *Amendment*

(20) Those growing interdependencies are the result of an increasingly cross-

border and interdependent network of service provision using key infrastructures across the Union in the sectors of energy, transport, digital infrastructure, drinking and waste water, health, certain aspects of public administration, as well as space in as far as the provision of certain services depending on ground-based infrastructures that are owned, managed and operated either by Member States or by private parties is concerned, therefore not covering infrastructures owned, managed or operated by or on behalf of the Union as part of its space programmes. Those interdependencies mean that any disruption, even one initially confined to one entity or one sector, can have cascading effects more broadly, potentially resulting in far-reaching and long-lasting negative impacts in the delivery of services across the internal market. The COVID-19 pandemic *has* shown the vulnerability of our increasingly interdependent societies in the face of low-probability risks.

border and interdependent network of service provision using key infrastructures across the Union in the sectors of energy, transport, digital infrastructure, drinking and waste water, ***food production, processing and distribution***, health, certain aspects of public administration, as well as space in as far as the provision of certain services depending on ground-based infrastructures that are owned, managed and operated either by Member States or by private parties is concerned, therefore not covering infrastructures owned, managed or operated by or on behalf of the Union as part of its space programmes. Those interdependencies mean that any disruption, even one initially confined to one entity or one sector, can have cascading effects more broadly, potentially resulting in far-reaching and long-lasting negative impacts in the delivery of services across the internal market. The ***intensified attacks against information systems during the COVID-19 pandemic have*** shown the vulnerability of our increasingly interdependent societies in the face of low-probability risks. ***Therefore, further investments in cybersecurity are required.***

#### **Amendment 14**

##### **Proposal for a directive Recital 20 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(20 a) It is crucial to raise cyber-awareness and cyber-resilience in all critical and important entities, including public administration entities.***

#### **Amendment 15**

##### **Proposal for a directive**

## Recital 21

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(21) In view of the differences in national governance structures and in order to safeguard already existing sectoral arrangements or Union supervisory and regulatory bodies, Member States should be able to designate more than one national competent authority responsible for fulfilling the tasks linked to the security of the network and information systems of essential and important entities under this Directive. Member States should be able to assign this role to an existing authority.

*Amendment*

(21) In view of the differences in national governance structures and in order to safeguard already existing sectoral arrangements or Union supervisory and regulatory bodies, Member States should be able to designate more than one national competent authority responsible for fulfilling the tasks linked to the security of the network and information systems of essential and important entities under this Directive. Member States should be able to assign this role to an existing authority ***and ensure that it has adequate resources to carry out its tasks effectively and efficiently.***

## Amendment 16

**Proposal for a directive**

### Recital 22

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(22) In order to facilitate cross-border cooperation and communication among authorities and to enable this Directive to be implemented effectively, it is necessary for each Member State to designate a national single point of contact responsible for coordinating issues related to ***the security of network and information systems*** and cross-border cooperation at Union level.

*Amendment*

(22) In order to facilitate cross-border cooperation and communication among authorities and to enable this Directive to be implemented effectively, it is necessary for each Member State to designate a national single point of contact responsible for coordinating issues related to ***cybersecurity*** and cross-border cooperation at Union level.

## Amendment 17

**Proposal for a directive**

### Recital 23

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(23) Competent authorities or the CSIRTs should receive notifications of

*Amendment*

(23) Competent authorities or the CSIRTs should receive notifications of

incidents from entities in an effective and efficient way. The single points of contact should be tasked with forwarding incident notifications to the single points of contact of other *affected* Member States. At the level of Member States' authorities, to ensure one single entry point in every Member States, the single points of contacts should also be the addressees of relevant information on incidents concerning financial sector entities from the competent authorities under Regulation XXXX/XXXX which they should be able to forward, as appropriate, to the relevant national competent authorities or CSIRTs under this Directive.

incidents from entities in an effective and efficient way. The single points of contact should be tasked with forwarding incident notifications *in real time* to the single points of contact of *all* other Member States. At the level of Member States' authorities, to ensure one single entry point in every Member States, the single points of contacts should also be the addressees of relevant information on incidents concerning financial sector entities from the competent authorities under Regulation XXXX/XXXX which they should be able to forward, as appropriate, to the relevant national competent authorities or CSIRTs under this Directive.

## Amendment 18

### Proposal for a directive Recital 25

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(25) As regards personal data, CSIRTs should be able to provide, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>19</sup> *as regards personal data*, on behalf of and upon request by an entity under this Directive, a *proactive scanning* of the *network and* information systems used for the provision of their services. Member States should aim at ensuring an equal level of technical capabilities for all sectorial CSIRTs. Member States may request the assistance of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) in developing national CSIRTs.

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<sup>19</sup> Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of

#### *Amendment*

(25) As regards personal data, CSIRTs should be able to provide, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>19</sup> *and with Directive 2002/58/EC*, on behalf of and upon request by an entity under this Directive, a *security scan* of the information systems *and the network range* used for the provision of their services *to identify, mitigate or prevent specific threats*. Member States should aim at ensuring an equal level of technical capabilities for all sectorial CSIRTs. Member States may request the assistance of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) in developing national CSIRTs. *Furthermore, cybersecurity risks should never be used as a pretext for violations of fundamental rights.*

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<sup>19</sup> Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of



27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).

27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).

## Amendment 19

### Proposal for a directive Recital 27

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(27) In accordance with the Annex to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1548 on Coordinated Response to Large Scale Cybersecurity Incidents and Crises ('Blueprint')<sup>20</sup>, a large-scale incident should mean an incident with a significant impact on at least two Member States or whose disruption exceeds a Member State's capacity to respond to it. Depending on their cause and impact, large-scale incidents may escalate and turn into fully-fledged crises not allowing the proper functioning of the internal market. Given the wide-ranging scope and, in most cases, the cross-border nature of such incidents, Member States and relevant Union institutions, bodies and agencies should cooperate at technical, operational and political level to properly coordinate the response across the Union.

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<sup>20</sup> Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584 of 13 September 2017 on

#### *Amendment*

(27) In accordance with the Annex to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1548 on Coordinated Response to Large Scale Cybersecurity Incidents and Crises ('Blueprint')<sup>20</sup>, a large-scale incident should mean an incident with a significant impact on at least two Member States or whose disruption exceeds a Member State's capacity to respond to it. Depending on their cause and impact, large-scale incidents may escalate and turn into fully-fledged crises not allowing the proper functioning of the internal market ***or posing serious public security risks in several Member States or the Union as a whole***. Given the wide-ranging scope and, in most cases, the cross-border nature of such incidents, Member States and relevant Union institutions, bodies and agencies should cooperate at technical, operational and political level to properly coordinate the response across the Union. ***Member States should monitor the way in which EU rules are implemented, support each other in the event of any cross-border problems, establish a more structured dialogue with the private sector and cooperate on security risks and the threats associated with new technologies, as was the case with 5G technology.***

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<sup>20</sup> Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584 of 13 September 2017 on

coordinated response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises (OJ L 239, 19.9.2017, p. 36).

coordinated response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises (OJ L 239, 19.9.2017, p. 36).

## Amendment 20

### Proposal for a directive

#### Recital 33

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(33) When developing guidance documents, the Cooperation Group should consistently: map national solutions and experiences, assess the impact of Cooperation Group deliverables on national approaches, discuss implementation challenges and formulate specific recommendations to be addressed through better implementation of existing rules.

##### *Amendment*

(33) When developing guidance documents, the Cooperation Group should consistently: map national **and sectoral** solutions and experiences, assess the impact of Cooperation Group deliverables on national **and sectoral** approaches, discuss implementation challenges and formulate specific recommendations to be addressed through better implementation of existing rules.

## Amendment 21

### Proposal for a directive

#### Recital 34

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(34) The Cooperation Group should remain a flexible forum and be able to react to changing and new policy priorities and challenges while taking into account the availability of resources. It should organize regular joint meetings with relevant private stakeholders from across the Union to discuss activities carried out by the Group and gather input on emerging policy challenges. In order to enhance cooperation at Union level, the Group should **consider inviting** Union bodies and agencies involved in cybersecurity policy, **such as the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3)**, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Union Agency for Space Programme

##### *Amendment*

(34) The Cooperation Group should remain a flexible forum and be able to react to changing and new policy priorities and challenges while taking into account the availability of resources. It should organize regular joint meetings with relevant private stakeholders from across the Union to discuss activities carried out by the Group and gather input on emerging policy challenges. In order to enhance cooperation at Union level, the Group should **invite relevant** Union bodies and agencies involved in cybersecurity policy, **notably Europol**, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Union Agency for Space Programme (EUSPA) to participate in its

(EUSPA) to participate in its work.

work.

## Amendment 22

### Proposal for a directive

#### Recital 36

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(36) The Union should, where appropriate, conclude international agreements, in accordance with Article 218 TFEU, with third countries or international organisations, allowing and organising their participation in some activities of the Cooperation Group and the CSIRTs network. **Such agreements should ensure adequate protection of data.**

*Amendment*

(36) The Union should, where appropriate, conclude international agreements, in accordance with Article 218 TFEU, with third countries or international organisations, allowing and organising their participation in some activities of the Cooperation Group and the CSIRTs network. **To the extent that personal data is transferred to a third country or international organisation, Chapter V of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 should apply.**

## Amendment 23

### Proposal for a directive

#### Recital 37

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(37) Member States should contribute to the establishment of the EU Cybersecurity Crisis Response Framework set out in Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584 through the existing cooperation networks, notably the Cyber Crisis Liaison Organisation Network (EU-CyCLONe), CSIRTs network and the Cooperation Group. EU-CyCLONe and the CSIRTs network should cooperate on the basis of procedural arrangements defining the modalities of that cooperation. The EU-CyCLONe's rules of procedures should further specify the modalities through which the network should function, including but not limited to roles, cooperation modes, interactions with other relevant actors and templates for information sharing, as well as means of

*Amendment*

(37) Member States should contribute to the establishment of the EU Cybersecurity Crisis Response Framework set out in Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584 through the existing cooperation networks, notably the Cyber Crisis Liaison Organisation Network (EU-CyCLONe), CSIRTs network and the Cooperation Group. EU-CyCLONe and the CSIRTs network should cooperate on the basis of procedural arrangements defining the modalities of that cooperation. The EU-CyCLONe's rules of procedures should further specify the modalities through which the network should function, including but not limited to roles, cooperation modes, interactions with other relevant actors and templates for information sharing, as well as means of

communication. For crisis management at Union level, relevant parties should rely on the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements. The Commission should use the ARGUS high-level cross-sectoral crisis coordination process for this purpose. If the crisis entails an important external or Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) dimension, the European External Action Service (EEAS) Crisis Response Mechanism (CRM) should be activated.

communication. For crisis management at Union level, relevant parties should rely on the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements. The Commission should use the ARGUS high-level cross-sectoral crisis coordination process for this purpose. If the crisis ***concerns two or more Member States and is suspected to be of criminal nature, the activation of the EU Law Enforcement Emergency Response Protocol should be considered.*** If the crisis entails an important external or Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) dimension, the European External Action Service (EEAS) Crisis Response Mechanism (CRM) should be activated.

## Amendment 24

### Proposal for a directive Recital 45

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(45) Entities should also address cybersecurity risks stemming from their interactions and relationships with other stakeholders within a broader ecosystem. In particular, entities should take appropriate measures to ensure that their cooperation with academic and research institutions takes place in line with their cybersecurity policies and follows good practices as regards secure access and dissemination of information in general and the protection of intellectual property in particular. Similarly, given the importance and value of data for the activities of the entities, when relying on data transformation and data analytics services from third parties, the entities should take all appropriate cybersecurity measures.

#### *Amendment*

(45) Entities should also address cybersecurity risks stemming from their interactions and relationships with other stakeholders within a broader ecosystem. In particular, entities should take appropriate measures to ensure that their cooperation with academic and research institutions takes place in line with their cybersecurity policies and follows good practices as regards secure access and dissemination of information in general and the protection of intellectual property in particular. Similarly, given the importance and value of data for the activities of the entities, when relying on data transformation and data analytics services from third parties, the entities should take all appropriate cybersecurity measures ***and report any potential cyber attacks that they identify.***

## Amendment 25

**Proposal for a directive**  
**Recital 46 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(46 a) Particular consideration should be given to the fact that ICT services, systems or products subject to specific requirements in the country of origin that might represent an obstacle to compliance with EU privacy and data protection law. Where appropriate, the EDPB should be consulted in the framework of such risk assessments. Free and open source software as well as open source hardware could bring huge benefits in terms of cybersecurity, in particular as regards transparency and verifiability of features. As this could help address and mitigate specific supply chain risks, their use should be preferred where feasible in line with Opinion 5/2021 of the EDPS<sup>1a</sup>.***

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***<sup>1a</sup> Opinion 5/2021 of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Cybersecurity Strategy and the NIS 2.0 Directive, 11 March 2021***

**Amendment 26**

**Proposal for a directive**  
**Recital 47**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(47) The supply chain risk assessments, in light of the features of the sector concerned, should take into account both technical and, where relevant, non-technical factors ***including*** those defined in Recommendation (EU) 2019/534, in the EU wide coordinated risk assessment of 5G networks security and in the EU Toolbox on 5G cybersecurity agreed by the Cooperation Group. To identify the supply chains that should be subject to a coordinated risk assessment, the following

(47) The supply chain risk assessments, in light of the features of the sector concerned, should take into account both technical and, where relevant, non-technical factors ***that should be further specified by the Coordination Group, and which include*** those defined in Recommendation (EU) 2019/534, in the EU wide coordinated risk assessment of 5G networks security and in the EU Toolbox on 5G cybersecurity agreed by the Cooperation Group. To identify the supply

criteria should be taken into account: (i) the extent to which essential and important entities use and rely on specific critical ICT services, systems or products; (ii) the relevance of specific critical ICT services, systems or products for performing critical or sensitive functions, including the processing of personal data; (iii) the availability of alternative ICT services, systems or products; (iv) the resilience of the overall supply chain of ICT services, systems or products against disruptive events and (v) for emerging ICT services, systems or products, their potential future significance for the entities' activities.

chains that should be subject to a coordinated risk assessment, the following criteria should be taken into account: (i) the extent to which essential and important entities use and rely on specific critical ICT services, systems or products; (ii) the relevance of specific critical ICT services, systems or products for performing critical or sensitive functions, including the processing of personal data; (iii) the availability of alternative ICT services, systems or products; (iv) the resilience of the overall supply chain of ICT services, systems or products against disruptive events and (v) for emerging ICT services, systems or products, their potential future significance for the entities' activities.

## **Amendment 27**

### **Proposal for a directive Recital 48 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(48a) Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) often lack the scale and resources to fulfil abroad and growing range of cybersecurity needs in an interconnected world with an increase of remote work. Member States should therefore address in their national cybersecurity strategies guidance and support for SMEs.***

## **Amendment 28**

### **Proposal for a directive Recital 50**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(50) Given the growing importance of number-independent interpersonal communications services, it is necessary to ensure that such services are also subject to appropriate security requirements in view of their specific nature and economic

(50) Given the growing importance of number-independent interpersonal communications services, it is necessary to ensure that such services are also subject to appropriate security requirements in view of their specific nature and economic

importance. Providers of such services should thus also ensure a level of security ***of network and information systems*** appropriate to the risk posed. Given that providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services normally do not exercise actual control over the transmission of signals over networks, the degree of risk for such services can be considered in some respects to be lower than for traditional electronic communications services. The same applies to interpersonal communications services which make use of numbers and which do not exercise actual control over signal transmission.

## **Amendment 29**

### **Proposal for a directive**

#### **Recital 52**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(52) Where appropriate, entities should inform their service recipients of particular and significant threats and of measures they can take to mitigate the resulting risk to themselves. The requirement to inform those recipients of such threats should not discharge entities from the obligation to take, at their own expense, appropriate and immediate measures to prevent or remedy any cyber threats and restore the normal security level of the service. The provision of such information about security threats to the recipients should be free of charge.

## **Amendment 30**

### **Proposal for a directive**

#### **Recital 53**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(53) In particular, providers of public electronic communications networks or

importance. Providers of such services should thus also ensure a level of ***cybersecurity*** appropriate to the risk posed. Given that providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services normally do not exercise actual control over the transmission of signals over networks, the degree of risk for such services can be considered in some respects to be lower than for traditional electronic communications services. The same applies to interpersonal communications services which make use of numbers and which do not exercise actual control over signal transmission.

##### *Amendment*

(52) Where appropriate, entities should ***be enabled to*** inform their service recipients of particular and significant threats and of measures they can take to mitigate the resulting risk to themselves. The requirement to inform those recipients of such threats should not discharge entities from the obligation to take, at their own expense, appropriate and immediate measures to prevent or remedy any cyber threats and restore the normal security level of the service. The provision of such information about security threats to the recipients should be free of charge.

##### *Amendment*

(53) In particular, providers of public electronic communications networks or

publicly available electronic communications services, should inform the service recipients of particular and significant cyber threats and of measures they can take to protect the security of their communications, for instance by using specific types of software or encryption technologies.

publicly available electronic communications services, should **implement security by design and by default and be enabled to** inform the service recipients of particular and significant cyber threats and of measures they can take to protect the security of their **devices and** communications, for instance by using specific types of software or encryption technologies. **To increase the security of hardware and software, providers should be encouraged to use open source and open hardware.**

### Amendment 31

#### Proposal for a directive Recital 54

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(54) In order to safeguard the security of electronic communications networks and services, the use of encryption, and in particular end-to-end encryption, should be promoted and, where necessary, should be mandatory for providers of such services and networks in accordance with the principles of security and privacy by default and by design for the purposes of Article 18. The use of end-to-end encryption should be reconciled with the Member State' **powers** to ensure the protection of their essential security interests and public security, and to permit the **investigation**, detection and prosecution of criminal offences in compliance with Union law. Solutions for lawful access to information in end-to-end encrypted communications should maintain the effectiveness of encryption in protecting privacy and security of communications, **while providing an effective response to crime.**

##### *Amendment*

(54) In order to safeguard the security of electronic communications networks and services **as well as the fundamental rights to data protection and privacy**, the use of encryption, and in particular end-to-end encryption, should be promoted and, where necessary, should be mandatory for providers of such services and networks in accordance with the principles of security and privacy by default and by design for the purposes of Article 18. The use of end-to-end encryption should be reconciled with the Member State' **responsibility** to ensure the protection of their essential security interests and public security, and to permit the **prevention**, detection and prosecution of criminal offences in compliance with Union **and national** law. Solutions for lawful access to information in end-to-end encrypted communications should maintain the effectiveness of encryption in protecting privacy and security of communications. **Nothing in this Regulation should be viewed as an effort to weaken end-to-end encryption through "backdoors" or similar solutions, as encryption shortfalls may be exploited**



*for malicious purposes. Any measure aimed at weakening encryption or circumventing the technology's architecture may incur significant risks to the effective protection capabilities it entails. Any unauthorised decryption or monitoring of electronic communications other than by legal authorities should be prohibited to ensure the effectiveness of the technology and its wider use. It is important that Member States address problems encountered by legal authorities and vulnerability researchers. In some Member States entities and natural persons researching vulnerabilities are exposed to criminal and civil liability. Member States are therefore encouraged to issue guidelines for non-prosecution and non-liability of information security research.*

## Amendment 32

### Proposal for a directive Recital 56

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(56) Essential and important entities are often in a situation where a particular incident, because of its features, needs to be reported to various authorities as a result of notification obligations included in various legal instruments. Such cases create additional burdens and may also lead to uncertainties with regard to the format and procedures of such notifications. In view of this and, for the purposes of simplifying the reporting of security incidents, Member States should establish a single entry point **for all notifications** required under this Directive and also under other Union law such as Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC. ENISA, in cooperation with the Cooperation Group should develop common notification templates by means of guidelines that would simplify and

#### *Amendment*

(56) Essential and important entities are often in a situation where a particular incident, because of its features, needs to be reported to various authorities as a result of notification obligations included in various legal instruments. Such cases create additional burdens and may also lead to uncertainties with regard to the format and procedures of such notifications. In view of this and, for the purposes of simplifying the reporting of security incidents, Member States should establish a single entry point required under this Directive and also under other Union law such as Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC. ENISA, in cooperation with the Cooperation Group **and the European Data Protection Board**, should develop common notification templates by means

streamline the reporting information requested by Union law and decrease the burdens for companies.

of guidelines that would simplify and streamline the reporting information requested by Union law and decrease the burdens for companies.

### Amendment 33

#### Proposal for a directive

##### Recital 57

###### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(57) Where it is suspected that an incident is related to serious criminal activities under Union or national law, Member States should encourage essential and important entities, on the basis of applicable criminal proceedings rules in compliance with Union law, **to** report incidents of a suspected serious criminal nature to the relevant law enforcement authorities. Where appropriate, and without prejudice to the personal data protection rules applying to Europol, it is desirable that coordination between competent authorities and law enforcement authorities of different Member States be facilitated by the **EC3** and ENISA.

###### *Amendment*

(57) Where it is suspected that an incident is related to serious criminal activities under Union or national law, Member States should encourage essential and important entities, on the basis of applicable criminal proceedings rules in compliance with Union law, **should** report incidents of a suspected serious criminal nature to the relevant law enforcement authorities. Where appropriate, and without prejudice to the personal data protection rules applying to Europol, it is desirable that coordination between competent authorities and law enforcement authorities of different Member States be facilitated by the **European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) of Europol** and ENISA.

### Amendment 34

#### Proposal for a directive

##### Recital 58

###### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(58) Personal data are in many cases compromised as a result of incidents. In this context, competent authorities should cooperate and exchange information on all relevant matters with data protection authorities and the supervisory authorities pursuant to Directive 2002/58/EC.

###### *Amendment*

(58) Personal data are in many cases compromised as a result of incidents. In this context, competent authorities should cooperate and exchange information on all relevant matters with data protection authorities and the supervisory authorities pursuant to **Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and** Directive 2002/58/EC.

## Amendment 35

### Proposal for a directive Recital 59

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(59) Maintaining accurate and complete databases of domain names and registration data (so called ‘WHOIS data’) and providing lawful access to such data is essential to ensure the security, stability and resilience of the DNS, which in turn contributes to a high common level of cybersecurity within the Union. Where processing includes personal data such processing shall comply with Union data protection law.

*Amendment*

(59) Maintaining accurate and complete databases of domain names and registration data (so called ‘WHOIS data’) and providing lawful access to such data is essential to ensure the security, stability and resilience of the DNS, which in turn contributes to a high common level of cybersecurity within the Union. Where processing includes personal data such processing shall comply with ***applicable*** Union data protection law.

## Amendment 36

### Proposal for a directive Recital 62

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(62) TLD registries and the entities providing domain name registration services for them should make ***publicly*** available domain name registration data ***that fall outside the scope of Union data protection rules***, such as ***data that concern legal persons***<sup>25</sup>. TLD registries and the entities providing domain name registration services for the TLD should also enable lawful access to specific domain name registration data concerning natural persons to legitimate access seekers, in accordance with ***Union data protection law***. Member States should ensure that TLD registries and the entities providing domain name registration services for them should respond without undue delay to requests from ***legitimate access seekers*** for the disclosure of domain name registration data. TLD registries and the entities providing domain name registration services for them should

*Amendment*

(62) ***To comply with a legal obligation in terms of Article 6(1)(c) and Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679***, TLD registries and the entities providing domain name registration services for them should make ***publicly*** available ***certain*** domain name registration data ***specified in the Member State law to which they are subject***, such as ***the domain name and the name of the legal person***. TLD registries and the entities providing domain name registration services for the TLD should also enable lawful access to specific domain name registration data concerning natural persons to legitimate access seekers, ***notably to competent authorities under this Directive or supervisory authorities under Regulation (EU) 2016/679*** in accordance with ***their powers***. Member States should ensure that TLD registries and the entities providing domain name registration services for them should

establish policies and procedures for the publication and disclosure of registration data, including service level agreements to deal with requests for access from legitimate access seekers. The access procedure may also include the use of an interface, portal or other technical tool to provide an efficient system for requesting and accessing registration data. With a view to promoting harmonised practices across the internal market, the Commission may adopt guidelines on such procedures without prejudice to the competences of the European Data Protection Board.

respond without undue delay to ***lawful and duly justified*** requests from ***public authorities, including competent authorities under this Directive, competent authorities under Union or national law for the prevention, investigation or prosecution of criminal offences, or supervisory authorities under Regulation (EU) 2016/679***, for the disclosure of domain name registration data. TLD registries and the entities providing domain name registration services for them should establish policies and procedures for the publication and disclosure of registration data, including service level agreements to deal with requests for access from legitimate access seekers. The access procedure may also include the use of an interface, portal or other technical tool to provide an efficient system for requesting and accessing registration data. With a view to promoting harmonised practices across the internal market, the Commission may adopt guidelines on such procedures without prejudice to the competences of the European Data Protection Board.

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***<sup>25</sup> REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL recital (14) whereby “this Regulation does not cover the processing of personal data which concerns legal persons and in particular undertakings established as legal persons, including the name and the form of the legal person and the contact details of the legal person”.***

#### **Amendment 37**

##### **Proposal for a directive Recital 63**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(63) All essential and important entities

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*Amendment*

(63) ***For the purposes of this Directive,***

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under this Directive should fall under the jurisdiction of the Member State where they provide their services. If the entity provides services in more than one Member State, it should fall under the separate and concurrent jurisdiction of each of these Member States. The competent authorities of these Member States should cooperate, provide mutual assistance to each other and where appropriate, carry out joint supervisory actions.

all essential and important entities under this Directive should fall under the jurisdiction of the Member State where they provide their services. If the entity provides services in more than one Member State, it should fall under the separate and concurrent jurisdiction of each of these Member States. The competent authorities of these Member States should ***agree on constituent classifications***, cooperate ***wherever possible***, provide ***real time*** mutual assistance to each other and where appropriate, carry out joint supervisory actions.

## Amendment 38

### Proposal for a directive Recital 64

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(64) In order to take account of the cross-border nature of the services and operations of DNS service providers, TLD name registries, content delivery network providers, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers and digital providers, only one Member State should have jurisdiction over these entities. Jurisdiction should be attributed to the Member State in which the respective entity has its main establishment in the Union. The criterion of establishment for the purposes of this Directive implies the effective exercise of activity through stable arrangements. The legal form of such arrangements, whether through a branch or a subsidiary with a legal personality, is not the determining factor in that respect. Whether this criterion is fulfilled should not depend on whether the network and information systems are physically located in a given place; the presence and use of such systems do not, in themselves, constitute such main establishment and are therefore not decisive criteria for determining the main establishment. The

#### *Amendment*

(64) In order to take account of the cross-border nature of the services and operations of DNS service providers, TLD name registries, content delivery network providers, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers and digital providers, only one Member State should have jurisdiction over these entities. ***For the purposes of this Directive***, jurisdiction should be attributed to the Member State in which the respective entity has its main establishment in the Union. The criterion of establishment for the purposes of this Directive implies the effective exercise of activity through stable arrangements. The legal form of such arrangements, whether through a branch or a subsidiary with a legal personality, is not the determining factor in that respect. Whether this criterion is fulfilled should not depend on whether the network and information systems are physically located in a given place; the presence and use of such systems do not, in themselves, constitute such main establishment and are therefore not decisive criteria for

main establishment should be the place where the decisions related to the cybersecurity risk management measures are taken in the Union. This will typically correspond to the place of the companies' central administration in the Union. If such decisions are not taken in the Union, the main establishment should be deemed to be in the Member States where the entity has an establishment with the highest number of employees in the Union. Where the services are carried out by a group of undertakings, the main establishment of the controlling undertaking should be considered to be the main establishment of the group of undertakings.

determining the main establishment. The main establishment should be the place where the decisions related to the cybersecurity risk management measures are taken in the Union. This will typically correspond to the place of the companies' central administration in the Union. If such decisions are not taken in the Union, the main establishment should be deemed to be in the Member States where the entity has an establishment with the highest number of employees in the Union. Where the services are carried out by a group of undertakings, the main establishment of the controlling undertaking should be considered to be the main establishment of the group of undertakings.

### **Amendment 39**

#### **Proposal for a directive**

#### **Recital 69**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(69) The processing of personal data, to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security by entities, public authorities, CERTs, CSIRTs, and providers of security technologies and services should constitute a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned, as referred to in Regulation (EU) 2016/679. That should include measures related to the prevention, detection, analysis and response to incidents, measures to raise awareness in relation to specific cyber threats, exchange of information in the context of vulnerability remediation and coordinated disclosure, as well as the voluntary exchange of information on those incidents, as well as cyber threats and vulnerabilities, indicators of compromise, tactics, techniques and procedures, cybersecurity alerts and configuration tools. Such measures may require the

##### *Amendment*

(69) The processing of personal data, to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security by entities, public authorities, CERTs, CSIRTs, and providers of security technologies and services ***is necessary for compliance with their legal obligations under national law transposing this Directive, and is therefore covered by Articles 6(1)(c) and 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Moreover, such processing*** should constitute a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned, as referred to in ***Article 6(1)(f) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679***. That should include measures related to the prevention, detection, analysis and response to incidents, measures to raise awareness in relation to specific cyber threats, exchange of information in the context of vulnerability remediation and coordinated disclosure, as well as the voluntary

processing of *the following types* of personal data: IP addresses, uniform resources locators (URLs), domain names, and email addresses.

exchange of information on those incidents, as well as cyber threats and vulnerabilities, indicators of compromise, tactics, techniques and procedures, cybersecurity alerts and configuration tools. ***In many cases, personal data are compromised following cyber incidents and, therefore, the competent authorities and data protection authorities of EU Member States should cooperate and exchange information on all relevant matters in order to tackle any personal data breaches.*** Such measures may require the processing of *certain categories* of personal data, ***including*** IP addresses, uniform resources locators (URLs), domain names, and email addresses.

## Amendment 40

### Proposal for a directive Recital 71

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(71) In order to make enforcement effective, a minimum list of administrative sanctions for breach of the cybersecurity risk management and reporting obligations provided by this Directive should be laid down, setting up a clear and consistent framework for such sanctions across the Union. Due regard should be given to the ***nature, gravity*** and duration of the infringement, the actual damage caused or losses incurred or potential damage or losses that could have been triggered, the intentional or negligent character of the infringement, actions taken to prevent or mitigate the damage and/or losses suffered, the degree of responsibility or any relevant previous infringements, the degree of cooperation with the competent authority and any other aggravating or mitigating factor. The ***imposition of*** penalties including administrative fines should be subject to appropriate procedural safeguards in accordance with the general

#### *Amendment*

(71) In order to make enforcement effective, a minimum list of administrative sanctions for breach of the cybersecurity risk management and reporting obligations provided by this Directive should be laid down, setting up a clear and consistent framework for such sanctions across the Union. Due regard should be given to the ***seriousness*** and duration of the infringement, the actual damage caused or losses incurred or potential damage or losses that could have been triggered, ***any relevant previous infringements, the manner in which the infringement became known to the competent authority,*** the intentional or negligent character of the infringement, actions taken to prevent or mitigate the damage and/or losses suffered, the degree of responsibility or any relevant previous infringements, the degree of cooperation with the competent authority and any other aggravating or mitigating factor. The penalties ***imposed,*** including

principles of Union law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including effective judicial protection and due process.

administrative fines should be subject to appropriate procedural safeguards in accordance with the general principles of Union law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including effective judicial protection and due process.

## Amendment 41

### Proposal for a directive

#### Recital 74

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(74) Member States should be able to lay down the rules on criminal penalties for infringements of the national rules transposing this Directive. However, the imposition of criminal penalties for infringements of such national rules and of related administrative penalties should not lead to a breach of the principle of ne bis in idem, as interpreted by the Court of Justice.

##### *Amendment*

(74) Member States should be able to lay down the rules on criminal penalties for infringements of the national rules transposing this Directive. ***Those criminal penalties may also allow for the deprivation of the profits obtained through infringements of this Regulation.*** However, the imposition of criminal penalties for infringements of such national rules and of related administrative penalties should not lead to a breach of the principle of ne bis in idem, as interpreted by the Court of Justice.

## Amendment 42

### Proposal for a directive

#### Recital 76

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(76) In order to further strengthen the effectiveness and dissuasiveness of the penalties applicable to infringements of obligations laid down pursuant to this Directive, the competent authorities should be empowered to apply sanctions consisting of the suspension of a certification or authorisation concerning part or all the services provided by an essential entity ***and the imposition of a temporary ban from the exercise of***

##### *Amendment*

(76) In order to further strengthen the effectiveness and dissuasiveness of the penalties applicable to infringements of obligations laid down pursuant to this Directive, the competent authorities should be empowered to apply sanctions consisting of the suspension of a certification or authorisation concerning part or all the services provided by an essential entity. Given their ***seriousness*** and impact on the entities' activities and



***managerial functions by a natural person.***

Given their ***severity*** and impact on the entities' activities and ultimately on their consumers, such sanctions should only be applied proportionally to the severity of the infringement and taking account of the specific circumstances of each case, including the intentional or negligent character of the infringement, actions taken to prevent or mitigate the damage and/or losses suffered. Such sanctions should only be applied as *ultima ratio*, meaning only after the other relevant enforcement actions laid down by this Directive have been exhausted, and only for the time until the entities to which they apply take the necessary action to remedy the deficiencies or comply with the requirements of the competent authority for which such sanctions were applied. The imposition of such sanctions shall be subject to appropriate procedural safeguards in accordance with the general principles of Union law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including effective judicial ***protection***, due process, presumption of innocence and right of defence.

ultimately on their consumers, such sanctions should only be applied proportionally to the severity of the infringement and taking account of the specific circumstances of each case, including the intentional or negligent character of the infringement, actions taken to prevent or mitigate the damage and/or losses suffered. Such sanctions should only be applied as *ultima ratio*, meaning only after the other relevant enforcement actions laid down by this Directive have been exhausted, and only for the time until the entities to which they apply take the necessary action to remedy the deficiencies or comply with the requirements of the competent authority for which such sanctions were applied. The imposition of such sanctions shall be subject to appropriate procedural safeguards in accordance with the general principles of Union law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including effective judicial ***remedies***, due process, presumption of innocence and right of defence.

**Amendment 43**

**Proposal for a directive  
Recital 77**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(77) This Directive should establish cooperation rules between the competent authorities and the supervisory ***authorities in accordance with*** Regulation (EU) 2016/679 to deal with infringements related to personal data.

*Amendment*

(77) This Directive should establish cooperation rules between the competent authorities ***under this Directive*** and the supervisory ***under*** Regulation (EU) 2016/679 to deal with infringements related to personal data.

**Amendment 44**

**Proposal for a directive**  
**Recital 79**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(79) A peer-review mechanism should be introduced, allowing the assessment by experts designated by the Member States of the implementation of cybersecurity policies, including the level of Member States' capabilities and available resources.

*Amendment*

(79) A peer-review mechanism should be introduced, allowing the assessment by experts designated by the Member States of the implementation of cybersecurity policies, including the level of Member States' capabilities and available resources. ***The EU should facilitate a coordinated response to large-scale cyber incidents and crises and offer assistance in order to aid recovery following such cyber attacks.***

**Amendment 45**

**Proposal for a directive**  
**Recital 82 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(82 a) This Directive does not apply to Union institutions, offices, bodies and agencies. However, Union bodies could be considered essential or important entities under this Directive. To achieve a uniform level of protection through consistent and homogeneous rules, the Commission should publish a legislative proposal to include Union institutions, offices, bodies and agencies in the EU-wide cybersecurity framework by 31 December 2022.***

**Amendment 46**

**Proposal for a directive**  
**Recital 84**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(84) This Directive respects the fundamental rights, and observes the principles, recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European

*Amendment*

(84) This Directive respects the fundamental rights, and observes the principles, recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European

Union, in particular the right to respect for private life and communications, the protection of personal data, the freedom to conduct a business, the right to property, the right to an effective remedy before a court and the right to be heard. This Directive should be implemented in accordance with those rights and principles,

Union, in particular the right to respect for private life and communications, the protection of personal data, the freedom to conduct a business, the right to property, the right to an effective remedy before a court and the right to be heard. This Directive should be implemented in accordance with those rights and principles, ***and in full compliance with existing Union legislation regulating these issues. Any processing of personal data under this Directive is subject to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, in their respective scope of application, including the tasks and powers of the supervisory authorities competent to monitor compliance with those legal instruments.***

#### Amendment 47

##### Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1

###### *Text proposed by the Commission*

1. This Directive applies to public and private entities of a type referred to as essential entities in Annex I and as important entities in Annex II. This Directive does not apply to entities that qualify as micro and small enterprises within the meaning of Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36).

###### *Amendment*

1. This Directive applies to public and private entities of a type referred to as essential entities in Annex I and as important entities in Annex II. This Directive does not apply to entities that qualify as micro and small enterprises within the meaning of Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC.<sup>28</sup> ***Article 3 Paragraph 4 of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC is not applicable.***

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<sup>28</sup> Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36).

## Amendment 48

### Proposal for a directive

#### Article 2 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. However, regardless of their size, this Directive also applies to entities referred to in Annexes I and II, where:

*Amendment*

2. However, regardless of their size **and based on a risk assessment according to Article 18**, this Directive also applies to entities referred to in Annexes I and II, where:

## Amendment 49

### Proposal for a directive

#### Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point c

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(c) the entity is the sole provider of a service **in a Member State**;

*Amendment*

(c) the entity is the sole provider of a service **at national or regional level**;

## Amendment 50

### Proposal for a directive

#### Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point d

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(d) a **potential** disruption of the service provided by the entity could have an impact on public safety, public security or public health;

*Amendment*

(d) a disruption of the service provided by the entity could have an impact on public safety, public security or public health;

## Amendment 51

### Proposal for a directive

#### Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point e

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(e) a **potential** disruption of the service provided by the entity could induce systemic risks, in particular for the sectors where such disruption could have a cross-border impact;

*Amendment*

(e) a disruption of the service provided by the entity could induce systemic risks, in particular for the sectors where such disruption could have a cross-border impact;

## Amendment 52

### Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 4 a (new)

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**4a. Any processing of personal data pursuant to this Directive shall comply with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and with Directive 2002/58/EC and shall be limited to what is strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of this Directive.**

## Amendment 53

### Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 5

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

5. Without prejudice to Article 346 TFEU, information that is confidential pursuant to Union and national rules, such as rules on business confidentiality, shall be exchanged with the Commission and other relevant authorities only where that exchange is necessary for the application of this Directive. The information exchanged shall be limited to that which is **relevant and proportionate** to the purpose of that exchange. The exchange of information shall preserve the confidentiality of that information and protect the security and commercial interests of essential or important entities.

5. Without prejudice to Article 346 TFEU, information that is confidential pursuant to Union and national rules, such as rules on business confidentiality, shall be exchanged with the Commission and other relevant authorities only where that exchange is necessary for the application of this Directive. The information exchanged shall be limited to that which is **necessary** to the purpose of that exchange. The exchange of information shall preserve the confidentiality of that information and protect the security and commercial interests of essential or important entities.

## Amendment 54

### Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 6 a (new)

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**6 a. Before 31 December 2021, the Commission shall publish a legislative**

*proposal to include Union institutions, offices, bodies and agencies (EUIs) in the overall EU-wide cybersecurity framework, with a view to achieving a uniform level of protection through consistent and homogeneous rules.*

## Amendment 55

### Proposal for a directive

#### Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(b) any device or group of inter-connected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a program, perform automatic processing of digital data;

*Amendment*

(b) any device or group of inter-connected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a program, perform automatic processing of digital data, ***and that are integrated into the IT system and are used for the provision of their intended services;***

## Amendment 56

### Proposal for a directive

#### Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(4) ‘national strategy on cybersecurity’ means a coherent framework of a Member State providing strategic objectives and priorities on the ***security of network and information systems*** in that Member State;

*Amendment*

(4) ‘national strategy on cybersecurity’ means a coherent framework of a Member State providing strategic objectives and priorities on the ***cybersecurity*** in that Member State;

## Amendment 57

### Proposal for a directive

#### Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 12

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(12) ‘***internet exchange point (IXP)***’ means a network facility which enables the interconnection of more than two independent networks (autonomous systems), primarily for the purpose of

*Amendment*

***deleted***

*facilitating the exchange of internet traffic; an IXP provides interconnection only for autonomous systems; an IXP does not require the internet traffic passing between any pair of participating autonomous systems to pass through any third autonomous system, nor does it alter or otherwise interfere with such traffic;*

## **Amendment 58**

### **Proposal for a directive**

#### **Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 22**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(22) ‘social networking services platform’ means a platform that enables end-users to connect, share, discover and communicate with each other across multiple devices, and in particular, via chats, posts, videos and recommendations);*

*deleted*

## **Amendment 59**

### **Proposal for a directive**

#### **Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 24**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(24) ‘entity’ means any natural **or** legal person created and recognised as such under the national law of its place of establishment, which may, acting under its own name, exercise rights and be subject to obligations;

(24) ‘entity’ means any natural **person or any** legal person created and recognised as such under the national law of its place of establishment, which may, acting under its own name, exercise rights and be subject to obligations;

## **Amendment 60**

### **Proposal for a directive**

#### **Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point a**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(a) a definition of objectives and

(a) a definition of objectives and

priorities of the Member States' strategy on cybersecurity;

priorities of the Member States' strategy on cybersecurity, ***taking into account the general level of cybersecurity awareness amongst citizens as well as on the general level of security of consumer connected devices***;

## Amendment 61

### Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point f

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(f) a policy framework for enhanced coordination between the competent authorities under this Directive and Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>38</sup> [Resilience of Critical Entities Directive] for the purposes of information sharing on incidents and cyber threats and the exercise of supervisory tasks.

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<sup>38</sup> [insert the full title and OJ publication reference when known]

#### *Amendment*

(f) a policy framework for enhanced coordination between the competent authorities under this Directive and Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>38</sup> [Resilience of Critical Entities Directive], ***both within and between Member States***, for the purposes of information sharing on incidents and cyber threats and the exercise of supervisory tasks.

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<sup>38</sup> [insert the full title and OJ publication reference when known]

## Amendment 62

### Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point b

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(b) guidelines regarding the inclusion and specification of cybersecurity-related requirements for ICT products and service in public procurement;

#### *Amendment*

(b) guidelines regarding the inclusion and specification of cybersecurity-related requirements for ICT products and service in public procurement, ***including but not limited to encryption requirements and the promotion of the use of open source cybersecurity products***;

## Amendment 63

### Proposal for a directive



**Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point d a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**(da) a policy related to sustaining the use of open data and open source as part of security through transparency;**

**Amendment 64**

**Proposal for a directive**

**Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point d b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**(db) a policy promoting the privacy and security of personal data of users of online services;**

**Amendment 65**

**Proposal for a directive**

**Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point e**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(e) a policy on promoting and developing cybersecurity skills, awareness raising and research and development initiatives;

(e) a policy on promoting and developing cybersecurity skills, awareness raising and research and development initiatives, **including the development of training programmes on cybersecurity to provide entities with specialists and technicians;**

**Amendment 66**

**Proposal for a directive**

**Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point f**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(f) a policy on supporting academic and research institutions **to develop** cybersecurity tools and secure network infrastructure;

(f) a policy on supporting academic and research institutions **that contribute to the national cybersecurity strategy by developing and deploying** cybersecurity tools and secure network infrastructure **that contribute to the national cybersecurity**

*strategy, including specific policies addressing issues related to gender representation and balance in this sector;*

## **Amendment 67**

### **Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point h**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(h) a policy addressing specific needs of SMEs, in particular those excluded from the scope of this Directive, in relation to guidance and support in improving their resilience to cybersecurity threats.

*Amendment*

(h) a policy addressing specific needs of SMEs, in particular those excluded from the scope of this Directive, in relation to guidance and support in improving their resilience to cybersecurity threats ***and their capability to respond to cybersecurity incidents.***

## **Amendment 68**

### **Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 2**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. ENISA shall develop and maintain a European vulnerability registry. To that end, ENISA shall establish and maintain the appropriate information systems, policies and procedures with a view in particular to enabling important and essential entities and their suppliers of network and information systems to disclose and register vulnerabilities present in ICT products or ICT services, as well as to provide access to the information on vulnerabilities contained in the registry to all interested parties. The registry shall, in particular, include information describing the vulnerability, the affected ICT product or ICT services and the severity of the vulnerability in terms of the circumstances under which it may be exploited, the availability of related patches and, in the absence of available patches, guidance

*Amendment*

2. ENISA shall develop and maintain a European vulnerability registry. To that end, ENISA shall establish and maintain the appropriate information systems, policies and procedures with a view in particular to enabling important and essential entities and their suppliers of network and information systems to disclose and register vulnerabilities present in ICT products or ICT services, as well as to provide access to the information on vulnerabilities contained in the registry to all interested parties. The registry shall, in particular, include information describing the vulnerability, the affected ICT product or ICT services and the severity of the vulnerability in terms of the circumstances under which it may be exploited, the availability of related patches and, in the absence of available patches, guidance

addressed to users of vulnerable products and services as to how the risks resulting from disclosed vulnerabilities may be mitigated.

addressed to users of vulnerable products and services as to how the risks resulting from disclosed vulnerabilities may be mitigated. ***To ensure security and accessibility of the information included in the registry, ENISA shall apply state of the art security measures and make the information available in machine-readable formats through corresponding interfaces.***

## Amendment 69

### Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 3 – point a

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(a) objectives of national preparedness measures and activities;

*Amendment*

(a) objectives of national ***and, where relevant and applicable, regional and cross-border*** preparedness measures and activities;

## Amendment 70

### Proposal for a directive Article 10 – paragraph 2 – point e

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(e) providing, upon request of an entity, a ***proactive scanning*** of the ***network and*** information systems used for the provision of their services;

*Amendment*

(e) providing, upon request of an entity, a ***security scan*** of the information systems ***and network range*** used for the provision of their services ***to identify, mitigate or prevent specific threats; the processing of personal data in the context of such scanning shall be limited to what is strictly necessary, and in any case to IP addresses and URLs;***

## Amendment 71

### Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 4

*Text proposed by the Commission*

4. To the extent necessary to effectively carry out the tasks and obligations laid down in this Directive, Member States shall ensure appropriate cooperation between the competent authorities and single points of contact and law enforcement authorities, data protection authorities, and the authorities responsible for critical infrastructure pursuant to Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX [Resilience of Critical Entities Directive] and the national financial authorities designated in accordance with Regulation (EU) XXXX/XXXX of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>39</sup> [the DORA Regulation] within that Member State.

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<sup>39</sup> [insert the full title and OJ publication reference when known]

*Amendment*

4. To the extent necessary to effectively carry out the tasks and obligations laid down in this Directive, Member States shall ensure appropriate cooperation between the competent authorities and single points of contact and law enforcement authorities, data protection authorities, and the authorities responsible for critical infrastructure pursuant to Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX [Resilience of Critical Entities Directive] and the national financial authorities designated in accordance with Regulation (EU) XXXX/XXXX of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>39</sup> [the DORA Regulation] within that Member State ***in line with their respective competences.***

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<sup>39</sup> [insert the full title and OJ publication reference when known]

**Amendment 72**

**Proposal for a directive  
Article 11 – paragraph 5**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

5. Member States shall ensure that their competent authorities regularly provide information to competent authorities designated pursuant to Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX [Resilience of Critical Entities Directive] on cybersecurity risks, cyber threats and incidents affecting essential entities identified as critical, or as entities equivalent to critical entities, pursuant to Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX [Resilience of Critical Entities Directive], as well as the measures taken by competent authorities in response to those risks and incidents.

*Amendment*

5. Member States shall ensure that their competent authorities regularly provide ***timely*** information to competent authorities designated pursuant to Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX [Resilience of Critical Entities Directive] on cybersecurity risks, cyber threats and incidents affecting essential entities identified as critical, or as entities equivalent to critical entities, pursuant to Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX [Resilience of Critical Entities Directive], as well as the measures taken by competent authorities in response to those risks and incidents.

## Amendment 73

### Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 3 – introductory part

*Text proposed by the Commission*

3. The Cooperation Group shall be composed of representatives of Member States, the Commission and ENISA. The European External Action Service shall participate in the activities of the Cooperation Group as an observer. The European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) in accordance with Article 17(5)(c) of Regulation (EU) XXXX/XXXX [the DORA Regulation] may participate in the activities of the Cooperation Group.

*Amendment*

3. The Cooperation Group shall be composed of representatives of Member States, the Commission and ENISA. The European External Action Service, ***the European Cybercrime Centre at Europol and the European Data Protection Board*** shall participate in the activities of the Cooperation Group as an observer. The European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) in accordance with Article 17(5)(c) of Regulation (EU) XXXX/XXXX [the DORA Regulation] may participate in the activities of the Cooperation Group.

## Amendment 74

### Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

*Text proposed by the Commission*

Where ***appropriate***, the Cooperation Group ***may*** invite representatives of relevant stakeholders to participate in its work.

*Amendment*

Where ***relevant for the performance of its tasks***, the Cooperation Group ***shall*** invite representatives of relevant stakeholders to participate in its work ***and the European Parliament to participate as observer***.

## Amendment 75

### Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 8

*Text proposed by the Commission*

8. The Cooperation Group shall meet regularly and at least ***once*** a year with the Critical Entities Resilience Group established under Directive (EU)

*Amendment*

8. The Cooperation Group shall meet regularly and at least ***twice*** a year with the Critical Entities Resilience Group established under Directive (EU)

XXXX/XXXX [Resilience of Critical Entities Directive] to *promote* strategic cooperation and *exchange of* information.

XXXX/XXXX [Resilience of Critical Entities Directive] to *facilitate* strategic cooperation and *real time* information *exchange*.

## Amendment 76

### Proposal for a directive Article 13 – paragraph 2

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. The CSIRTs network shall be composed of representatives of the Member States' CSIRTs and CERT-EU. The Commission shall participate in the CSIRTs network as an observer. ENISA shall provide the secretariat and shall actively support cooperation among the CSIRTs.

*Amendment*

2. The CSIRTs network shall be composed of representatives of the Member States' CSIRTs and CERT-EU. The Commission *and the European Cybercrime Centre at Europol* shall participate in the CSIRTs network as an observer. ENISA shall provide the secretariat and shall actively support cooperation among the CSIRTs.

## Amendment 77

### Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 2

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. EU-CyCLONe shall be composed of the representatives of Member States' crisis management authorities designated in accordance with Article 7, the Commission and ENISA. ENISA shall provide the secretariat of the network and support the secure exchange of information.

*Amendment*

2. EU-CyCLONe shall be composed of the representatives of Member States' crisis management authorities designated in accordance with Article 7, the Commission and ENISA. *The European Cybercrime Centre at Europol shall participate in the activities of EU-CyCLONe as an observer.* ENISA shall provide the secretariat of the network and support the secure exchange of information.

## Amendment 78

### Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 6

*Text proposed by the Commission*

6. EU-CyCLONe shall cooperate with

*Amendment*

6. EU-CyCLONe shall cooperate with

the CSIRTs network on the basis of agreed procedural arrangements.

the CSIRTs network on the basis of agreed procedural arrangements, **and with law enforcement in the framework of the EU Law Enforcement Emergency Response Protocol.**

## Amendment 79

### Proposal for a directive

#### Article 15 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. ENISA shall issue, in cooperation with the Commission, **a biennial** report on the state of cybersecurity in the Union. The report shall in particular include an assessment of the following:

*Amendment*

1. ENISA shall issue, in cooperation with the Commission, **an annual** report on the state of cybersecurity in the Union. The report shall **be delivered in machine-readable format and** in particular include an assessment of the following:

## Amendment 80

### Proposal for a directive

#### Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**(ca) the impact of cybersecurity incidents on the protection of personal data in the Union.**

## Amendment 81

### Proposal for a directive

#### Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point c b (new)

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**(cb) an overview of the general level of cybersecurity awareness and use amongst citizens as well as on the general level of security of consumer-oriented connected devices put on the market in the Union.**

## Amendment 82

### Proposal for a directive Article 17 – paragraph 2

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. Member States shall ensure that members of the management body follow specific trainings, on a regular basis, to gain sufficient knowledge and skills in order to apprehend and assess cybersecurity risks and management practices and their impact on the operations of the entity.

*Amendment*

2. Member States shall ensure that members of the management body **and responsible specialists for cybersecurity** follow specific trainings, on a regular basis, to gain sufficient knowledge and skills in order to apprehend and assess **evolving** cybersecurity risks and management practices and their impact on the operations of the entity.

## Amendment 83

### Proposal for a directive Article 18 – paragraph 1

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. Member States shall ensure that essential and important entities shall take appropriate and proportionate technical and organisational measures to manage the risks posed to the **security** of network and information systems **which those entities use in** the provision of their services. Having regard to the state of the art, those measures shall ensure a level of **security** of network and information systems appropriate to the risk presented.

*Amendment*

1. Member States shall ensure that essential and important entities shall take appropriate and proportionate technical and organisational measures to manage the risks posed to the **cybersecurity** of network and information systems **used for** the provision of their **services, and in view of assuring the continuity of these** services **and to mitigate the risks posed to the rights of individuals when their personal data are processed**. Having regard to the state of the art, those measures shall ensure a level of **cybersecurity** of network and information systems appropriate to the risk presented.

## Amendment 84

### Proposal for a directive Article 18 – paragraph 2 – point g

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(g) the use of cryptography and

*Amendment*

(g) the use of cryptography and **strong**



encryption.

encryption.

## Amendment 85

### Proposal for a directive Article 18 – paragraph 3

*Text proposed by the Commission*

3. Member States shall ensure that, where considering appropriate measures referred to in point (d) of paragraph 2, entities shall take into account the vulnerabilities specific to each supplier and service provider and the overall quality of products and cybersecurity practices of their suppliers and service providers, including their secure development procedures.

*Amendment*

3. Member States shall ensure that, where considering appropriate ***and proportionate*** measures referred to in point (d) of paragraph 2, entities shall take into account the vulnerabilities specific to each supplier and service provider and the overall quality of products and cybersecurity practices of their suppliers and service providers, including their secure development procedures.  
***Competent authorities shall provide guidance to entities on the practical and proportionate application.***

## Amendment 86

### Proposal for a directive Article 18 – paragraph 6 a (new)

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***6 a. Member States shall give the user of a network and information system provided by an essential or important entity the right to obtain from the entity information on the technical and organisational measures in place to manage the risks posed to the security of network and information systems. Member States shall define the limitations to that right.***

## Amendment 87

### Proposal for a directive Article 19 – paragraph 1

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

1. The Cooperation Group, in cooperation with the Commission and ENISA, **may** carry out coordinated security risk assessments of specific critical ICT services, systems or products supply chains, taking into account technical and, where relevant, non-technical risk factors.

1. The Cooperation Group, in cooperation with the Commission and ENISA, **shall** carry out coordinated security risk assessments of specific critical ICT services, systems or products supply chains, taking into account technical and, where relevant, non-technical risk factors.

## Amendment 88

### Proposal for a directive Article 20 – paragraph 1

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

1. Member States shall ensure that essential and important entities notify, without undue delay, the competent authorities or the CSIRT in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of any incident having a significant impact on the provision of their services. **Where appropriate**, those entities shall notify, without undue delay, the recipients of their services of incidents that are likely to adversely affect the provision of that service. Member States shall ensure that those entities report, among others, any information enabling the competent authorities or the CSIRT to determine any cross-border impact of the incident.

#### *Amendment*

1. Member States shall ensure that essential and important entities notify, without undue delay **and in any event within 24 hours**, the competent authorities or the CSIRT in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of any incident having a significant impact on the provision of their services, **and the competent law enforcement authorities if the incident is of a suspected or known malicious nature**. Those entities shall notify, without undue delay, **and in any event within 24 hours**, the recipients of their services of incidents that are likely to adversely affect the provision of that service **and provide information that would enable them to mitigate the adverse effects of the cyberattacks. By way of exception, where public disclosure could trigger further cyberattacks, those entities may delay the notification**. Member States shall ensure that those entities report, among others, any information enabling the competent authorities or the CSIRT to determine any cross-border impact of the incident.

## Amendment 89

### Proposal for a directive Article 20 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. Member States shall ensure that essential and important entities notify, ***without undue delay***, the competent authorities or the CSIRT of any significant cyber threat that those entities identify that could have potentially resulted in a significant incident.

*Amendment*

2. Member States shall ensure that essential and important entities ***are able to*** notify the competent authorities or the CSIRT of any significant cyber threat that those entities identify that could have potentially resulted in a significant incident.

**Amendment 90**

**Proposal for a directive**

**Article 20 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

Where applicable, those entities shall notify, ***without undue delay***, the recipients of their services that are potentially affected by a significant cyber threat of any measures or remedies that those recipients can take in response to that threat. Where ***appropriate***, the entities shall also notify those recipients of the threat itself. The notification shall not make the notifying entity subject to increased liability.

*Amendment*

Where applicable, those entities shall ***be allowed to*** notify the recipients of their services that are potentially affected by a significant cyber threat of any measures or remedies that those recipients can take in response to that threat. Where ***such notification is provided***, the entities shall also notify those recipients of the threat itself. The notification shall not make the notifying entity subject to increased liability.

**Amendment 91**

**Proposal for a directive**

**Article 20 – paragraph 4 – point c – introductory part**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(c) a ***final*** report not later than one month after the submission of the report under point (a), including at least the following:

*Amendment*

(c) a ***comprehensive*** report not later than one month after the submission of the report under point (a), including at least the following:

**Amendment 92**

**Proposal for a directive**

**Article 20 – paragraph 4 – point c – point ii**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(ii) the type of threat or root cause that likely triggered the incident;

*Amendment*

(ii) the type of **cyber** threat or root cause that likely triggered the incident;

**Amendment 93**

**Proposal for a directive**

**Article 20 – paragraph 4 – point c – point iii**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(iii) applied and ongoing mitigation measures.

*Amendment*

(iii) applied and ongoing mitigation measures **or remedies**.

**Amendment 94**

**Proposal for a directive**

**Article 20 – paragraph 6**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

6. Where appropriate, and in particular where the incident referred to in paragraph 1 concerns two or more Member States, the competent authority or the CSIRT shall inform the other affected Member States and ENISA of the incident. In so doing, the competent authorities, CSIRTs and single points of contact shall, in accordance with Union law or national legislation that complies with Union law, preserve the entity's security and commercial interests as well as the confidentiality of the information provided.

*Amendment*

6. Where appropriate, and in particular where the incident referred to in paragraph 1 concerns two or more Member States, the competent authority or the CSIRT shall inform the other affected Member States and ENISA of the incident. ***If the incident concerns two or more Member States and is suspected to be of criminal nature, the competent authority or the CSIRT shall inform EUROPOL.*** In so doing, the competent authorities, CSIRTs and single points of contact shall, in accordance with Union law or national legislation that complies with Union law, preserve the entity's security and commercial interests as well as the confidentiality of the information provided.

**Amendment 95**

**Proposal for a directive**

**Article 22 – paragraph 2**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. ENISA, in collaboration with Member States, shall draw up advice and guidelines regarding the technical areas to be considered in relation to paragraph 1 as well as regarding already existing standards, including Member States' national standards, which would allow for those areas to be covered.

*Amendment*

2. ENISA, ***after having consulted the EDPB and*** in collaboration with Member States, shall draw up advice and guidelines regarding the technical areas to be considered in relation to paragraph 1 as well as regarding already existing standards, including Member States' national standards, which would allow for those areas to be covered.

**Amendment 96**

**Proposal for a directive  
Article 23 – paragraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. For the purpose of contributing to the security, stability and resilience of the DNS, Member States shall ensure that TLD ***registries and the entities providing domain name registration services for the TLD shall collect and maintain*** accurate and complete domain name registration data in a dedicated database facility with ***due diligence subject*** to Union data protection law as regards data which are personal data.

*Amendment*

1. For the purpose of contributing to the security, stability and resilience of the DNS, Member States shall ensure that TLD ***have policies and procedures in place to ensure that*** accurate and complete domain name registration data ***is collected and maintained*** in a dedicated database facility ***in accordance*** with to Union data protection law as regards data which are personal data. ***Member States shall ensure that such policies and procedures are made publicly available.***

**Amendment 97**

**Proposal for a directive  
Article 23 – paragraph 2**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. Member States shall ensure that the databases of domain name registration data referred to in paragraph 1 contain ***relevant*** information to identify and contact the holders of the domain names and the points of contact administering the domain names

*Amendment*

2. Member States shall ensure that the databases of domain name registration data referred to in paragraph 1 contain ***the*** information ***necessary*** to identify and contact the holders of the domain names, ***namely their name, their physical and e-mail address as well as their telephone***

under the TLDs.

**number**, and the points of contact administering the domain names under the TLDs.

## Amendment 98

### Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 3

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

3. **Member States shall ensure that the TLD registries and the entities providing domain name registration services for the TLD have policies and procedures in place to ensure that the databases include accurate and complete information. Member States shall ensure that such policies and procedures are made publicly available.**

**deleted**

*Justification*

*This paragraph has been included in Article 23(1).*

## Amendment 99

### Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 4

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

4. Member States shall ensure that the TLD registries and the entities providing domain name registration services for the TLD publish, without undue delay after the registration of a domain name, domain registration data **which are not personal data**.

4. Member States shall ensure that the TLD registries and the entities providing domain name registration services for the TLD publish, **in accordance with Article 6(1)(c) and Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and** without undue delay after the registration of a domain name, **certain domain name** registration data, **such as the domain name and the name of the legal person**.

## Amendment 100

### Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 5

*Text proposed by the Commission*

5. Member States shall ensure that the TLD registries and the entities providing domain name registration services for the TLD provide access to specific domain name registration data upon lawful and duly justified requests of **legitimate access seekers**, in compliance with Union data protection law. Member States shall ensure that the TLD registries and the entities providing domain name registration services for the TLD reply without undue delay to all requests for access. Member States shall ensure that policies and procedures to disclose such data are made publicly available.

*Amendment*

5. Member States shall ensure that the TLD registries and the entities providing domain name registration services for the TLD provide access to specific domain name registration data upon lawful and duly justified requests of **public authorities, including competent authorities under this Directive, competent authorities under Union or national law for the prevention, investigation or prosecution of criminal offences, or supervisory authorities under Regulation (EU) 2016/679**, in compliance with Union data protection law. Member States shall ensure that the TLD registries and the entities providing domain name registration services for the TLD reply without undue delay to all **lawful and duly justified** requests for access. Member States shall ensure that policies and procedures to disclose such data are made publicly available.

## Amendment 101

### Proposal for a directive Article 24 – paragraph 3

*Text proposed by the Commission*

3. If an entity referred to in paragraph 1 is not established in the Union, but offers services within the Union, it shall designate a representative in the Union. The representative shall be established in one of those Member States where the services are offered. Such entity shall be deemed to be under the jurisdiction of the Member State where the representative is established. In the absence of a designated representative within the Union under this

*Amendment*

3. If an entity referred to in paragraph 1 is not established in the Union, but offers services within the Union, it shall designate a representative in the Union. The representative shall be established in one of those Member States where the services are offered. **Without prejudice to the competences of the supervisory authorities under Regulation (EU) 2016/679**, such entity shall be deemed to be under the jurisdiction of the Member

Article, any Member State in which the entity provides services may take legal actions against the entity for non-compliance with the obligations under this Directive.

State where the representative is established. In the absence of a designated representative within the Union under this Article, any Member State in which the entity provides services may take legal actions against the entity for non-compliance with the obligations under this Directive.

## Amendment 102

### Proposal for a directive

#### Article 25 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. ENISA shall create and maintain a registry for essential and important entities referred to in Article 24(1). The entities shall submit the following information to ENISA by [12 months after entering into force of the Directive at the latest]:

*Amendment*

1. ENISA shall create and maintain a **secure** registry for essential and important entities referred to in Article 24(1). The entities shall submit the following information to ENISA by [12 months after entering into force of the Directive at the latest]:

## Amendment 103

### Proposal for a directive

#### Article 26 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. Without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Member States shall ensure that essential and important entities may exchange relevant cybersecurity information among themselves including information relating to cyber threats, vulnerabilities, indicators of compromise, tactics, techniques and procedures, cybersecurity alerts and configuration tools, where such information sharing:

*Amendment*

1. Without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 **or Directive 2002/58/EC**, Member States shall ensure that essential and important entities may exchange relevant cybersecurity information among themselves including information relating to cyber threats, vulnerabilities, indicators of compromise, tactics, techniques and procedures, cybersecurity alerts and configuration tools, **and the location or identity of the attacker** where such information sharing:



## Amendment 104

### Proposal for a directive Article 28 – paragraph 2

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. Competent authorities shall work in close cooperation with **data protection** authorities when addressing incidents resulting in personal data breaches.

*Amendment*

2. Competent authorities shall work in close cooperation with **supervisory** authorities when addressing incidents resulting in personal data breaches **without prejudice to the competences, tasks and powers of supervisory authorities pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016/679. To this end, competent authorities and supervisory authorities shall exchange information relevant for their respective area of competence. Moreover, competent authorities shall, upon request of the competent supervisory authorities, provide them all information obtained in the context of any audits and investigations that relate to the processing of personal data.**

## Amendment 105

### Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 4 – point h

*Text proposed by the Commission*

**(h) order those entities to make public aspects of non-compliance with the obligations laid down in this Directive in a specified manner;**

*Amendment*

**deleted**

## Amendment 106

### Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 5 – point b

*Text proposed by the Commission*

**(b) impose or request the imposition by the relevant bodies or courts according to national laws of a temporary ban**

*Amendment*

**deleted**

*against any person discharging managerial responsibilities at chief executive officer or legal representative level in that essential entity, and of any other natural person held responsible for the breach, from exercising managerial functions in that entity.*

#### **Amendment 107**

##### **Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*These sanctions* shall be applied only until the entity takes the necessary action to remedy the deficiencies or comply with the requirements of the competent authority for which such sanctions were applied.

*Amendment*

*This sanction* shall be applied only until the entity takes the necessary action to remedy the deficiencies or comply with the requirements of the competent authority for which such sanctions were applied.

#### **Amendment 108**

##### **Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 7 – point c**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(c) the actual damage caused or losses incurred *or potential damage or losses that could have been triggered*, insofar as they can be determined. Where evaluating this aspect, account shall be taken, amongst others, of actual or potential financial or economic losses, effects on other services, number of users affected or potentially affected;

*Amendment*

(c) the actual *material or non-material* damage caused or losses incurred insofar as they can be determined. Where evaluating this aspect, account shall be taken, amongst others, of actual or potential financial or economic losses, effects on other services, number of users affected or potentially affected;

#### **Amendment 109**

##### **Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 7 – point c a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**(ca) any relevant previous infringements by the entity concerned;**

#### **Amendment 110**

**Proposal for a directive  
Article 29 – paragraph 7 – point c b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**(cb) the manner in which the infringement became known to the competent authority, in particular whether, and if so to what extent, the entity notified the infringement;**

#### **Amendment 111**

**Proposal for a directive  
Article 29 – paragraph 7 – point g**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(g) the level of cooperation **of the natural or legal person(s) held responsible** with the competent authorities.

(g) the level of cooperation with the competent authorities **in order to remedy the infringement and mitigate possible adverse effects of the infringements;**

#### **Amendment 112**

**Proposal for a directive  
Article 29 – paragraph 7 – point g a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**(ga) any other aggravating or mitigating factor applicable to the circumstances of the case, such as financial benefits gained or losses avoided, directly or indirectly, from the infringement.**

## Amendment 113

### Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 9

*Text proposed by the Commission*

9. Member States shall ensure that their competent authorities inform the relevant competent authorities of **the** Member **State concerned** designated pursuant to Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX [Resilience of Critical Entities Directive] when exercising their supervisory and enforcement powers aimed at ensuring compliance of an essential entity identified as critical, or as an entity equivalent to a critical entity, under Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX [Resilience of Critical Entities Directive] with the obligations pursuant to this Directive. Upon request of competent authorities under Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX [Resilience of Critical Entities Directive], competent authorities may exercise their supervisory and enforcement powers on an essential entity identified as critical or equivalent.

*Amendment*

9. Member States shall ensure that their competent authorities inform **in real time** the relevant competent authorities of **all** Member **States** designated pursuant to Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX [Resilience of Critical Entities Directive] when exercising their supervisory and enforcement powers aimed at ensuring compliance of an essential entity identified as critical, or as an entity equivalent to a critical entity, under Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX [Resilience of Critical Entities Directive] with the obligations pursuant to this Directive. Upon request of competent authorities under Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX [Resilience of Critical Entities Directive], competent authorities may exercise their supervisory and enforcement powers on an essential entity identified as critical or equivalent.

## Amendment 114

### Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 4 – point g

*Text proposed by the Commission*

**(g) order those entities to make public aspects of non-compliance with their obligations laid down in this Directive in a specified manner;**

*Amendment*

**deleted**

## Amendment 115

### Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 4 – point h

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(h) make a public statement which identifies the legal **and natural** person(s) responsible for the infringement of an obligation laid down in this Directive and the nature of that infringement;

*Amendment*

h) make a public statement which identifies the legal person(s) responsible for the infringement of an obligation laid down in this Directive and the nature of that infringement;

**Amendment 116**

**Proposal for a directive  
Article 31 – paragraph 2**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. Administrative fines shall, **depending on the circumstances of each individual case**, be imposed in addition to, or instead of, measures referred to in points (a) to (i) of Article 29(4), Article 29(5) and points (a) to (h) of Article 30(4).

*Amendment*

2. Administrative fines shall be imposed in addition to, or instead of, measures referred to in points (a) to (i) of Article 29(4), Article 29(5) and points (a) to (h) of Article 30(4), **depending on the circumstances of each individual case**.

**Amendment 117**

**Proposal for a directive  
Article 31 – paragraph 3**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

3. **Where** deciding whether to impose an administrative fine **and** deciding on its amount in each individual case due regard shall be given, as a minimum, to the elements provided for in Article 29(7).

*Amendment*

3. Deciding whether to impose an administrative fine **shall depend on the circumstances of each individual case, and when** deciding on its amount in each individual case due regard shall be given, as a minimum, to the elements provided for in Article 29(7).

**Amendment 118**

**Proposal for a directive  
Article 32 – paragraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. Where the competent authorities

*Amendment*

1. Where the competent authorities

have indications that the infringement by an essential or important entity of the obligations laid down in Articles 18 and 20 entails a personal data breach, as defined by Article 4(12) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 which shall be notified pursuant to Article 33 of that Regulation, they shall inform the supervisory authorities competent pursuant to Articles 55 and 56 of that Regulation within *a reasonable period of time*.

#### **Amendment 119**

##### **Proposal for a directive Article 32 – paragraph 3**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

3. Where the supervisory authority competent pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 is established in another Member State than the competent authority, the competent authority *may* inform the supervisory authority established in the same Member State.

#### **Amendment 120**

##### **Proposal for a directive Article 34 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

#### **Amendment 121**

##### **Proposal for a directive**

have indications that the infringement by an essential or important entity of the obligations laid down in Articles 18 and 20 entails a personal data breach, as defined by Article 4(12) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 which shall be notified pursuant to Article 33 of that Regulation, they shall inform the supervisory authorities competent pursuant to Articles 55 and 56 of that Regulation *without undue delay and in any case* within *24 hours*.

*Amendment*

3. Where the supervisory authority competent pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 is established in another Member State than the competent authority, the competent authority *shall* inform the supervisory authority established in the same Member State.

*Amendment*

##### *Article 34 a*

###### *Liability for non-compliance*

*Without prejudice to any available administrative or non-judicial remedy, the recipients of services provided by essential and important entities, having incurred damages as a result of the providers' non-compliance with this Directive, shall have the right to an effective judicial remedy.*

## Article 35 – paragraph 1

*Text proposed by the Commission*

The Commission shall **periodically** review the functioning of this Directive, and report to the European Parliament and to the Council. The report shall in particular assess the relevance of sectors, subsectors, size and type of entities referred to in Annexes I and II for the functioning of the economy and society in relation to cybersecurity. For this purpose and with a view to further advancing the strategic and operational cooperation, the Commission shall take into account the reports of the Cooperation Group and the CSIRTs network on the experience gained at a strategic and operational level. The first report shall be submitted by... **/54 months after the date of entry into force of this Directive/**.

*Amendment*

The Commission shall review the functioning of this Directive **every 3 years**, and report to the European Parliament and to the Council. The report shall in particular assess **to what extent the Directive has contributed to ensuring a high common level of security and integrity of network and information systems, while giving an optimal protection to private life and personal data, and** the relevance of sectors, subsectors, size and type of entities referred to in Annexes I and II for the functioning of the economy and society in relation to cybersecurity. For this purpose and with a view to further advancing the strategic and operational cooperation, the Commission shall take into account the reports of the Cooperation Group and the CSIRTs network on the experience gained at a strategic and operational level. The first report shall be submitted by... **/36 months after the date of entry into force of this Directive/**.

## Amendment 122

### Proposal for a directive

#### Annex I – Point 5 (Health) – indent 6 (new)

*Text proposed by the Commission*

Sector	Subsector	Type of entity
5. Health		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Healthcare providers referred to in point (g) of Article 3 of Directive 2011/24/EU (90 )</li><li>– EU reference laboratories referred to in Article 15 of Regulation XXXX/XXXX on serious cross-border threats to health<sup>91</sup></li><li>– Entities carrying out research and development activities of medicinal products referred to in Article 1 point 2 of Directive 2001/83/EC (<sup>92</sup> )</li><li>– Entities manufacturing basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations referred to</li></ul>

in section C division 21 of NACE Rev. 2

- Entities manufacturing medical devices considered as critical during a public health emergency ('the public health emergency critical devices list') referred to in Article 20 of Regulation XXXX<sup>93</sup>

<sup>91</sup> [Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 1082/2013/EU, reference to be updated once the proposal COM (2020)727 final is adopted]

<sup>92</sup> Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the community code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ L 311, 28.11.2001, p.67).

<sup>93</sup> [Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a reinforced role for the European Medicines Agency in crisis preparedness and management for medicinal products and medical devices, reference to be updated once the proposal COM(2020)725 final is adopted]

#### *Amendment*

Sector	Subsector	Type of entity
5. Health		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Healthcare providers referred to in point (g) of Article 3 of Directive 2011/24/EU (90 )</li><li>– EU reference laboratories referred to in Article 15 of Regulation XXXX/XXXX on serious cross-border threats to health<sup>91</sup></li><li>– Entities carrying out research and development activities of medicinal products referred to in Article 1 point 2 of Directive 2001/83/EC (<sup>92</sup> )</li><li>– Entities manufacturing basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations referred to in section C division 21 of NACE Rev. 2</li><li>– Entities manufacturing medical devices considered as critical during a public health emergency ('the public health emergency critical devices list') referred to in Article 20 of Regulation XXXX<sup>93</sup></li><li>– <b><i>Entities holding a distribution authorisation referred to in Article 79 of Directive 2001/83/EC</i></b></li></ul>

<sup>91</sup> [Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 1082/2013/EU, reference to be updated once the proposal COM (2020)727 final is adopted]

<sup>92</sup> Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the community code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ L 311, 28.11.2001, p.67).

<sup>93</sup> [Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a reinforced role for the European Medicines Agency in crisis preparedness and management for medicinal products and medical



devices, reference to be updated once the proposal COM(2020)725 final is adopted]

## PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

<b>Title</b>	Measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148		
<b>References</b>	COM(2020)0823 – C9-0422/2020 – 2020/0359(COD)		
<b>Committee responsible</b> Date announced in plenary	ITRE 21.1.2021		
<b>Opinion by</b> Date announced in plenary	LIBE 21.1.2021		
<b>Associated committees - date announced in plenary</b>	20.5.2021		
<b>Rapporteur for the opinion</b> Date appointed	Lukas Mandl 12.4.2021		
<b>Discussed in committee</b>	16.6.2021	3.9.2021	11.10.2021
<b>Date adopted</b>	12.10.2021		
<b>Result of final vote</b>	+: –: 0:	44 14 4	
<b>Members present for the final vote</b>	Magdalena Adamowicz, Katarina Barley, Fernando Barrena Arza, Pietro Bartolo, Nicolas Bay, Vladimír Bilčík, Vasile Blaga, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Patrick Breyer, Saskia Bricmont, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Damien Carême, Caterina Chinnici, Clare Daly, Marcel de Graaff, Anna Júlia Donáth, Lena Düpont, Cornelia Ernst, Laura Ferrara, Nicolaus Fest, Maria Grapini, Sophia in 't Veld, Patryk Jaki, Marina Kaljurand, Assita Kanko, Fabienne Keller, Peter Kofod, Moritz Körner, Jeroen Lenaers, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Lukas Mandl, Roberta Metsola, Nadine Morano, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Maite Pagazaurtundúa, Nicola Procaccini, Emil Radev, Paulo Rangel, Terry Reintke, Diana Riba i Giner, Ralf Seekatz, Michal Šimečka, Birgit Sippel, Sara Skytvedal, Martin Sonneborn, Tineke Strik, Ramona Strugariu, Annalisa Tardino, Milan Uhrík, Tom Vandendriessche, Bettina Vollath, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Javier Zarzalejos		
<b>Substitutes present for the final vote</b>	Olivier Chastel, Tanja Fajon, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Philippe Olivier, Anne-Sophie Pelletier, Thijs Reuten, Rob Rooken, Maria Walsh		

## FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

44	+
ID	Nicolas Bay, Nicolaus Fest, Peter Kofod, Philippe Olivier, Annalisa Tardino, Tom Vandendriessche
NI	Laura Ferrara
PPE	Magdalena Adamowicz, Vladimír Bilčík, Vasile Blaga, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Lena Düpont, Jeroen Lenaers, Lukas Mandl, Roberta Metsola, Nadine Morano, Emil Radev, Paulo Rangel, Ralf Seekatz, Sara Skyttedal, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Maria Walsh, Javier Zarzalejos
Renew	Olivier Chastel, Anna Júlia Donáth, Sophia in 't Veld, Fabienne Keller, Moritz Körner, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Maite Pagazaurtundúa, Michal Šimečka, Ramona Strugariu
S&D	Katarina Barley, Pietro Bartolo, Caterina Chinnici, Tanja Fajon, Maria Grapini, Marina Kaljurand, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Thijs Reuten, Birgit Sippel, Bettina Vollath
Verts/ALE	Damien Carême

14	-
ECR	Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Patryk Jaki, Assita Kanko, Nicola Procaccini, Rob Rooken, Jadwiga Wiśniewska
ID	Marcel de Graaff
NI	Martin Sonneborn, Milan Uhrík
Verts/ALE	Patrick Breyer, Saskia Bricmont, Terry Reintke, Diana Riba i Giner, Tineke Strik

4	0
The Left	Pernando Barrena Arza, Clare Daly, Cornelia Ernst, Anne-Sophie Pelletier

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

- : against

0 : abstention