

**Priority question for written answer P-001059/2024  
to the Commission**

Rule 138

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Subject: Investigation into Viet Nam's use of Predator to spy on officials and MEPs

At the beginning of October 2023, an investigation by the European Investigative Collaborations, a consortium of journalists, revealed that the Vietnamese secret services had acquired Predator spyware, via the French company Nexa, to try to infiltrate the phones of EU officials and MEPs, including the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, and the Chair of Parliament's Committee on Fisheries<sup>1</sup>.

Reports suggest that the spying is linked to the 'yellow card' that the EU issued to Viet Nam under the sustainable fisheries framework, which means there are now restrictions on Vietnamese seafood imports.

The Commission and the European External Action Service appear to have conducted an investigation and the case is now closed.

1. Can the Commission say under what conditions the investigation was conducted and what factors allowed for the investigation to be closed? What guarantees did Viet Nam provide?
2. What lessons has it drawn from this incident, particularly in the light of the recommendations from the Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of the Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware, which concluded its work in June 2023<sup>2</sup>?

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/global-predator-files-spyware-scandal-reveals-brazen-targeting-of-civil-society-politicians-and-officials>.

<sup>2</sup> [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0244\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0244_EN.html).