

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

16 May 2000

B5-0414/2000}
B5-0421/2000}

RC1

JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

pursuant to Rule 42(5) of the Rules of Procedure

by the following Members:

Ahern, Lambert and Echerer, on behalf of the Verts/ALE

Cossutta, Morgantini and Brie, on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group

Blokland, on behalf of the EDD Group

Banotti, Doyle, Hume, De Rossa, Gallagher, Fitzsimons, Collins, Andrews, Hyland and Crowley

replacing motions by:

- the Verts/ALE Group (B5-0414/2000)
- the UEN Group (B5-0421/2000)

on safety problems at British Nuclear Fuels' Sellafield site

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the European Union's duties under the Euratom Treaty, and specifically Chapters 3 and 7 thereof dealing with health and safety and safeguards respectively, as well as the more general duty to promote sustainable development and environmental protection under the EU Treaty and Article 6 of the EC Treaty,
 - having regard to all its previous resolutions relating to Sellafield,
- A. whereas in recent months British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) has had damning criticism levelled at it in reports by the UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), firstly on the falsification of mixed oxide nuclear fuel (MOX) data, and secondly on safety procedures and the implementation of safety recommendations,

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PE 290.488}
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- B. whereas these problems highlight again the absence of a proper legal base for nuclear safety, which leaves EU citizens at risk from installations in neighbouring states,
- C. whereas the European Commission is committed under the OSPAR Convention to work towards substantial reductions in radioactive discharges to the sea by this year, and close to zero concentrations in the marine environment by 2020,
1. Severely condemns the falsification of the MOX test results by BNFL and the low levels of safety at BNFL and, while welcoming the management changes at the company and the BNFL programme to improve the safety of their operations, does not see this as at all adequate in terms of meeting the genuine concerns of citizens or those of neighbouring states;
 2. Affirms that the unacceptable levels of radioactive pollution in the north-east Atlantic and the Irish Sea are essentially due to the reprocessing of spent fuel at Sellafield;
 3. Calls for the immediate cessation of reprocessing at Sellafield, and supports the resolution by the Irish and Danish Governments to the OSPAR meeting in June to that effect;
 4. Also calls for the permanent cessation of MOX production at the pilot MDF plant, and for the new BNFL MOX plant not to be licensed;
 5. Calls on the UK Government to consider a change in the role of Sellafield to one of a body dealing appropriately with its part of the inheritance of the British nuclear industry, under the strictest direct government control, whereby all of the materials, including the plutonium, currently on site not due to be returned to commercial clients would be classified as waste, and where the production of the vitrification plant would be greatly increased, if necessary with French help, so as to make all such waste as safe as possible well before the 2015 deadline specified by the NII;
 6. Calls on the Council and Commission, working together with Parliament, to reconsider the justification for nuclear reprocessing and the production of MOX fuel *per se*, based on Article 6(2) of Directive 96/29/EC, in view of the implications of the recent accidents and incidents;
 7. Calls for an urgent Euratom directive to harmonise standards to the highest level possible in the EU for the safe and reliable design, construction and operation of all nuclear-related installations, including management safety systems, particularly in view of the practical problems arising from the forthcoming accession of Eastern European countries;
 8. Further calls for the establishment of an independent EU inspectorate to verify compliance with these standards, and for appropriate measures to be taken to ensure that EU safeguards inspectors are deployed in a manner which secures their absolute independence in the execution of their duties;
 9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Member States, the accession states, the Japanese Government, the UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate and BNFL.