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Céimeanna an doiciméid sa chruinniú iomlánach
An doiciméad roghnaithe : RC-B6-0362/2007

Téacsanna arna gcur síos :


Díospóireachtaí :

PV 26/09/2007 - 11
CRE 26/09/2007 - 11

Vótaí :

PV 27/09/2007 - 9.4
CRE 27/09/2007 - 9.4
Mínithe ar vótaí

Téacsanna arna nglacadh :

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PE395.995v01-00} RC1
B6‑0367/2007} RC1
pursuant to Rule 103(4) of the Rules of Procedure, by
   Karl von Wogau, Stefano Zappalà, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, Hubert Pirker and Bogdan Klich, on behalf of the PPE-DE Group
   Ana Maria Gomes, Alain Hutchinson and Marie-Arlette Carlotti, on behalf of the PSE Group
   Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, Philippe Morillon and Thierry Cornillet, on behalf of the ALDE Group
   Ryszard Czarnecki and Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis, on behalf of the UEN Group
replacing the motions by the following groups:
   ALDE (B6‑0362/2007)
   UEN (B6‑0364/2007)
   PSE (B6‑0366/2007)
   PPE-DE (B6‑0367/2007)
on the ESDP operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR)

European Parliament resolution on the ESDP operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) 

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the conflict in Darfur and the wider regional impact, in particular on the eastern part of Chad and the northern part of the Central African Republic (CAR),

–  having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1706 of 31 August 2006, which pointed out that regional security aspects must be addressed to achieve lasting peace in Darfur,

–  having regard to the conclusions of the Council for General Affairs and External Relations meeting of 23-24 July 2007, asking ‘its competent bodies to continue planning with a view to a possible decision on a bridging operation, in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy, in support of a multidimensional UN presence in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic with a view to improving security in those areas’,

–  having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1769(2007) of 31 July 2007 establishing, for an initial period of 12 months, an AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID),

–  having regard to the report presented on 10 August 2007 by the UN Secretary-General, recommending that a multi-dimensional presence be deployed in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African republic, in order to improve the security of refugee and displaced populations, facilitate the supply of humanitarian aid and create the conditions for reconstruction and development work in these areas,

–  having regard to the Arusha meeting on peace in Darfur, which was held from 3 to 6 August 2007,

–  having regard to the signing in N’Djamena on 13 August 2007, in the presence of the international community and of the Chadian Head of State, President Idriss Deby Itno, of the political agreement with a view to the reinforcement of the democratic process in Chad by all relevant Chadian political parties in the majority and in the opposition,

–  having regard to the 27 August 2007 Presidential statement of the UN Security Council confirming its readiness to establish a UN mission in Chad and welcoming the EU’s intention to provide support in the form of a military ESDP mission,

–  having regard to the adoption by the Council on 10 September of the ‘crisis management concept’ by written procedure,

–  having regard to its resolution of 12 July 2007 on the situation in Darfur,

–  having regard to Rule 103(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  extremely worried about the worsening of the humanitarian situation in Chad where, owing to the conflict in Darfur and its cross-border consequences, about 238 000 refugees from Sudan, 44 600 refugees from the Central African Republic and 170 000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are hosted in 12 camps along Chad’s eastern border with Sudan,

B.  preoccupied by the security situation in the eastern part of Chad, which has deteriorated since 2006 as a result of clashes between Chadian security forces and Chadian rebels, and incursions of Janjaweed militias and armed groups from Sudan, to which banditry and attacks on humanitarian organisations must be added,

C.  whereas civilian populations in the north-east of the Central African Republic have also experienced attacks by rebel forces from Sudan,

D.  whereas a contribution must be made to securing this region affected by the Darfur conflict, as part of a global and regional approach,

E.  whereas long-term stability in Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic calls for respect for human rights, the rule of law and good governance,

F.  welcoming UN Security Council Resolution 1769(2007), which authorises the deployment of an AU/UN force of 26 000 soldiers in Darfur, which will help to pacify the whole region in combination with the deployment of a UN police force and the planned ESDP operation in the eastern part of Chad and the northern part of CAR,

G.  whereas the Chadian and Central African Republic authorities have given the UN Secretary-General confirmation of their agreement to the deployment of this EU multi-dimensional presence,

H.  supporting the efforts of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon to find a negotiated solution to the conflict in Darfur by promoting contacts between the Sudanese authorities and the various rebel groups,

I.  welcoming the signing in N’Djamena on 13 August 2007 by all the Chadian political parties of an agreement aimed at reinforcing the democratic process in Chad,

J.  noting the efforts by regional actors to find a solution to the internal conflict inside Chad with the groups which did not sign the previous agreement,

1.  Recalls that no peacekeeping mission in the eastern part of Chad and the northern part of the CAR can be successful without a genuine political reconciliation process;

2.  Calls therefore upon the Council, the Commission and the UN to coordinate their efforts in order to create the conditions that would enable the different parties to the conflict in the broader region of Darfur/Eastern Chad/Northern CAR to find a political solution which would put an end to insecurity and the subsequent humanitarian disaster, thus facilitating the return of the refugees and internally displaced persons to their places of origin;

3.  Gives its approval for the launch of an ESDP operation in the eastern part of Chad and the northern part of CAR, which will last for one year, but makes its final approval conditional on the fulfilment of the following points:

   (a)the mission of the European force (EUFOR) has to create the conditions for a secure environment for the work of the UN police force, the return of the internally displaced persons, the supply of humanitarian aid, the free movement of humanitarian personnel and the continuation of the dialogue between the political forces in the region,
   (b)it is extremely important that EUFOR is seen to be impartial; the composition of EUFOR should therefore be diverse and Member States should contribute the necessary troops as soon as possible;
   (c)at the same time, and in order to avoid becoming itself a target, EUFOR must remain neutral with regard to the complex political situation in the region by avoiding becoming involved in fights between governmental authorities and rebel groups,
   (d)in full compliance with the principles of international humanitarian law, EUFOR should not become involved or interfere with the tasks performed by the NGOs present in Chad and the CAR, in order not to endanger them,
   (e)EUFOR must establish effective coordination with UNAMID in order to secure the area under its responsibility in the most efficient way;
   (f)EUFOR has to work as a deterrent, which means that it must have a robust mandate under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and clear rules of engagement allowing the use of force when necessary, especially to prevent attacks on civilians, camps and villages, humanitarian workers or UN police officers, as well as in self‑defence,
   (g)in order to deter any potential aggressor, EUFOR must have the necessary number of troops and must be equipped appropriately. It must be able to secure its supply lines and conduct long-range patrols with armoured vehicles, helicopters (including transport and attack helicopters) and reconnaissance planes;
   (h)EUFOR must be considered as a ‘bridging force’ with a temporary mandate. A clear exit strategy must therefore be defined before the deployment begins, which should foresee the replacement of EUFOR by a successor operation (AU, UN or a hybrid force) in order to provide for the successful conclusion of its mandate and the timely return of the troops committed;

4.  Regrets that this ESDP operation cannot be conducted, for many reasons, from the newly established operations centre of the European Union in Brussels;

5.  Underlines that its final approval of the operation will be subject to its being kept fully informed of the different phases in the preparation of the operation (Crisis Management Concept, Joint Action, Concept of Operations, Operation Plan, Force Generation Process etc.);

6.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the African Union, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Presidents, Governments and Parliaments of Chad, the CAR and Sudan.

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