European Parliament resolution of 28 November 2024 on Hong Kong, notably the cases of Jimmy Lai and the 45 activists recently convicted under the national security law (2024/2950(RSP))

P10_TA(2024)0051 RC-B10-0208/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Hong Kong and China,

–  having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas after the introduction of the National Security Law (NSL) and the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO), fundamental freedoms and the rule of law in Hong Kong (HK) have deteriorated; whereas China has violated the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese joint declarations, the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, and the ICCPR; whereas over 200 people have been arrested under the NSL;

B.  whereas Jimmy Lai has been detained since 2020 on trumped-up charges; whereas his trial started in 2023 after various delays; whereas he denied these charges and faces life imprisonment; whereas his British lawyer has been refused permission to represent him;

C.  whereas 45 pro-democracy politicians, activists and journalists were sentenced for subversion, in the ‘Hong Kong 47’ case, for organising unofficial election primaries; whereas their trials were the largest national security trials to date;

D.  whereas political prisoners in HK endure difficult conditions, often affecting their health, throughout lengthy pre-trial detentions, as with 76-year-old Lai, who has diabetes and has been denied Communion in prison;

E.  whereas independent media outlets in HK have been forced to cease operations and two journalists of now defunct media outlets, Chung Pui-kuen and Patrick Lam, have been sentenced for ‘seditious publications’; whereas HK’s ranking in the World Press Freedom Index has dropped significantly;

1.  Condemns the sentencing of pro-democracy activists on national security charges, in violation of international law; calls for the repeal of the NSL and the SNSO; denounces the degradation of basic freedoms in HK;

2.  Urges the HK Government to immediately and unconditionally release all pro-democracy activists, including Lai and Chung, and to drop all charges against them;

3.  Condemns the extraterritorial application of the NSL and increasing transnational repression by the Chinese and HK authorities against diaspora communities within the EU; calls on the Member States to suspend extradition treaties with them;

4.  Condemns the exploitation of HK’s global trade position to evade international sanctions imposed on Russia, Iran and North Korea, particularly through the supply of advanced technologies, trade in oil, and the provision of financial services;

5.  Calls on the EEAS and the Member States to warn China that its actions in HK will have consequences for EU-China relations; calls on the Council to review its 2020 conclusions on HK and to impose targeted sanctions on John Lee and other HK and Chinese officials responsible for human rights violations, to revoke HK’s favourable customs treatment and review the status of the HK Economic Trade Office in Brussels; urges the Member States to file an ICJ case against China’s decision to impose the NSL on HK and Macau;

6.  Calls for an EU legal defence fund in support of democracy activists in HK and for the EU Office in HK to intensify prison visits and trial observation, and to establish a human rights focal point;

7.  Calls on HK to enable journalists to report freely and urges the EEAS to strengthen press freedoms in HK;

8.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the EU institutions, China and the HKSAR.

European Parliament resolution of 28 November 2024 on the increasing and systematic repression of women in Iran (2024/2951(RSP))

P10_TA(2024)0052 RC-B10-0188/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the systematic violations of women’s rights by the Islamic Republic of Iran and its ‘morality’ police have not decreased under President Pezeshkian;

B.  whereas the Iranian Government introduced mandatory veiling in 1983; whereas the ‘protection of the family through promoting the culture of hijab and chastity’ law was approved by the Guardian Council in September 2024 and will further strengthen the government’s suppression of women; whereas women who appear in public without a headscarf are frequently harassed, imprisoned, tortured, and even killed;

C.  whereas Ahoo Daryaei was harassed by security forces at university over a supposed headscarf violation; whereas in a courageous act of defiance, Daryaei removed her remaining clothing in protest and was then detained and, like countless other women, was labelled ‘mentally unfit’ and confined to a psychiatric facility;

D.  whereas the Iranian Government announced its intention to open a so-called treatment clinic for women who defy strict hijab laws; whereas the pathologisation of resistance is part of a systematic effort by the Iranian authorities to stifle women’s autonomy and punish those who oppose discriminatory laws such as compulsory veiling and gender segregation;

E.  whereas the 1991 ’Baha’i Question’ memorandum, signed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, calls for the ‘progress and development’ of the Bahá’í community to be ‘blocked’; whereas in March and April 2024, at least 72 of the 93 Bahá’ís summoned to court or imprisoned were women;

1.  Strongly condemns the increasing and systematic repression of women in Iran through laws and regulations that severely restrict their freedoms and rights; deplores the fact that authorities detained Ahoo Daryaei, labelling her ‘mentally unfit’, and committed her to a psychiatric facility; believes that repression of politically defiant women through psychiatric confinement is an act of torture;

2.  Calls on the Iranian authorities to repeal all legislation discriminating against women and girls and to urgently abolish the ‘morality’ police and all other repressive agencies;

3.  Strongly condemns the persecution of ethnic and religious minorities; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all women’s rights defenders and victims of arbitrary detention, including Bahá’ís women Neda Emadi and Parastoo Hakim, as well as EU citizens;

4.  Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation, noting that the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court’s ruling on the 2022 Bochum synagogue attack now provides the necessary legal grounds;

5.  Urges the Iranian Government to grant unrestricted access to the UN Fact-Finding Mission and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran; calls for a renewal and expansion of its mandate to include an accountability mechanism;

6.  Calls on the EU and its Member States to support the Women, Life, Freedom movement;

7.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the VP/HR, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the Office of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

European Parliament resolution of 28 November 2024 on the shrinking space for civil society in Cambodia, in particular the case of the labour rights organisation CENTRAL (2024/2952(RSP))

P10_TA(2024)0053 RC-B10-0190/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Cambodia,

–  having regard to Rule 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas Cambodia’s civic space has been shrinking since 2017, with the Cambodian authorities and organisations aligned with the government targeting trade unions, the political opposition, human rights defenders, journalists, labour rights organisations and environmental defenders, including the Center for Alliance of Labour and Human Rights (CENTRAL), Equitable Cambodia and Mother Nature Cambodia;

B.  whereas the CENTRAL published an evaluation of the ILO’s Better Factories Cambodia programme that highlighted widespread violations of freedom of association, non-compliance with international labour standards and the government’s efforts to silence independent voices; whereas following this report CENTRAL and its programme manager, Khun Tharo, have faced baseless legal threats and harassment;

1.  Condemns the shrinking of the civic space in Cambodia; calls for the immediate release of all political prisoners, activists, journalists – including award-winning journalist Mech Dara –, human rights defenders and other civil society actors held on politically motivated charges; calls for the immediate cessation of all repression and harassment targeting civil society actors;

2.  Calls on the Cambodian authorities to dismiss all politically motivated charges against CENTRAL and its members, to halt politically motivated audits and smear campaigns, and to respect the role of civil society organisations, including Equitable Cambodia and Mother Nature Cambodia, in promoting labour and human rights and defending the environment;

3.  Urges the Cambodian authorities to amend the Trade Union Law, the Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organisations (LANGO) and any other relevant legislation to align it with international human rights and labour standards, ensuring the protection of workers and civil society;

4.  Calls on companies operating in the EU that source from Cambodia to conduct thorough human rights due diligence in their supply chains, ensuring responsible sourcing practices and leveraging their influence to promote and defend workers’ rights;

5.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to assess changes to tariff preferences (under the Everything but Arms scheme) based on the Cambodian Government’s non-cooperation on remedying and preventing human rights violations, as well as to send a clear message that improving human rights and safeguarding civil society freedoms are preconditions for economic cooperation, trade and investment;

6.  Urges the European Union and its Member States to further explore and engage on the adoption of ambitious and effective multilateral instruments on business and human rights;

7.  Calls for the EU and the international community to take immediate and effective action, including targeted sanctions against those responsible for political repression, to exert pressure on the Cambodian Government until all political prisoners are released;

8.  Calls for the Member States and the EEAS to increase all forms of support, including financial support, for Cambodian civil society and provide protection for human rights defenders, civil society representatives and persecuted opposition members;

9.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the EU institutions, the Member States, the Cambodian authorities and the secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

European Parliament resolution of 28 November 2024 on Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud (2024/2933(RSP))

P10_TA(2024)0054 RC-B10-0179/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia, in particular that of 9 October 2024 on democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia(1),

–  having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part(2),

–  having regard to the statement of preliminary findings and conclusions of the international election observation mission (I-EOM) led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE-ODIHR) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024 and to the statement by the Head of the European Parliament’s election observation delegation,

–  having regard to the Statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, of 29 October 2024 on the latest developments following the parliamentary elections in Georgia, and to the joint statement by the High Representative and the Commission of 27 October 2024 on the parliamentary elections in Georgia,

–  having regard to the joint statement by Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic, Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland on the situation in Georgia of 7 November 2024,

–  having regard to the joint statement by the Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Chair of the Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus and the Chair of the Delegation to the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly of 28 October 2024 on the parliamentary elections in Georgia,

–  having regard to the joint statement of EU ministers of 28 October 2024 on the elections in Georgia,

–  having regard to the joint statement by the Friends of Georgia, which represents European parliaments, of 6 November 2024 entitled ‘On international inquiry commission to investigate irregularities of elections in Georgia’,

–  having regard to Georgia’s status as an EU candidate country, granted by the European Council at its summit of 14 and 15 December 2023,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), which includes the first progress report on Georgia,

–  having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas parliamentary elections were held in Georgia on 26 October 2024; whereas the months leading up to the elections were characterised by significant attacks on democracy in Georgia, such as the hasty adoption of anti-democratic legislation criticised by the United Nations, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), and the EU; whereas the pre-election period failed to meet democratic standards due to actions by the ruling Georgian Dream party and the authorities that fostered a climate of fear, including through the arrest, home raids and intimidation of opposition politicians, civil society leaders, journalists, researchers and other persons critical of the government, and violence committed against them;

B.  whereas, during the campaign, the ruling Georgian Dream party exploited Georgian society’s natural fear of war by reiterating that it was the ‘party of peace’, claiming that the opposition would supposedly drag the country into war with Russia under orders from the West, conspiratorially referred to as the ‘Global War Party’; whereas leaders of the Russian Federation and its propagandists openly supported Georgian Dream both before and after the elections; whereas the top leaders of the ruling party made public statements during the campaign expressing their intent to ban key opposition parties following the elections, raising concerns about the fairness and inclusivity of the political process;

C.  whereas Georgia’s 26 October 2024 parliamentary elections offered a choice of candidates but were marred by serious irregularities, documented reports of vote manipulation and the suppression of voter freedoms, particularly through vote buying, observer harassment, removal of media from polling stations, intimidation of voters inside and outside of polling stations, tracking of voters and confiscation of identity documents in rural areas, which were then handed to loyal activists of the ruling party to vote, organised transportation of voters, hate speech, insufficient polling access for Georgian citizens abroad, and improbable differences in female and male voter turnout in rural precincts; whereas public sector employees and recipients of social benefits faced pressure to support the ruling party;

D.  whereas international observers noted deepening political divisions and a significant imbalance in the allocation of financial resources, as well as the many advantages enjoyed by the ruling party, making an already uneven playing field even more uneven; whereas the effectiveness of the financial oversight of the campaign was undermined by limited enforcement and concerns over the impartiality and political instrumentalisation of the oversight body;

E.  whereas Georgia’s parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 marked the country’s first full use of a proportional system, with electronic devices for voter identification and vote counting; whereas these technologies raised concerns over transparency, voter secrecy and a lack of independent verification​;

F.  whereas recent amendments to the Electoral Code, including the removal of gender quotas, changed the composition of the Central Election Commission (CEC) and, along with the enactment of the ‘law on transparency of foreign influence’, have restricted fundamental freedoms, stigmatised civil society organisations and undermined the integrity of Georgia’s democratic institutions;

G.  whereas respected Georgian independent election observation missions concluded that a combination of pre-election coercion, election day manipulation and restricted observer access meant that the elections did not reflect the true will of the Georgian people; whereas a system of identity card confiscations, data gathering and unauthorised presence created a coercive environment, reinforcing the complicity of state actors in facilitating electoral fraud; whereas the principle of voter secrecy was widely violated on election day; whereas the elections were rigged through a combination of voter intimidation, obstruction of observation, and manipulation of voter procedures, and cannot be considered as free and fair;

H.  whereas widespread anomalies in voter turnout and party vote shares for the ruling party were consistent with many reports of electoral malpractice;

I.  whereas almost all the polls before the election suggested that Georgian Dream would fall short of a majority; whereas the discrepancy between pre-election polling and the election results reported by the CEC cannot be explained by a statistical margin of error;

J.  whereas the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, publicly condemned the elections as rigged, refused to recognise the validity of the result, and called for an international investigation and fresh elections; whereas the President asserted that acknowledging the outcome would be tantamount to ‘accepting Georgia’s subjugation to Russia’ and described the election process as a ‘Russian special operation’; whereas the four opposition coalitions that surpassed the electoral threshold rejected the election results and refused to legitimise the resulting parliament; whereas four opposition blocs – the United National Movement, the Strong Georgia Coalition, the Coalition for Change and Gakharia for Georgia – turned down their parliamentary mandates and refused to join the 11th convocation of parliament, arguing that the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 were illegitimate; whereas on 13 November 2024, repeating statements he made in August, Georgian Prime Minister Kobakhidze iterated plans to constitutionally ban major opposition parties if they refuse to accept their parliamentary mandates; whereas Georgia thus finds itself in a constitutional crisis;

K.  whereas the new parliament was convened on 25 November 2024 without the participation of opposition members; whereas President Salome Zourabichvili stated in reference to the inaugural session of parliament that ‘today the parliament of Georgia no longer exists’ as Georgian Dream has ‘trampled the constitution’;

L.  whereas, in his statement after the elections, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) recalled that the international observers had not declared the elections free and fair, asked for a transparent inquiry and investigation into the irregularities and the pressuring and intimidation of voters, and highlighted the need to reverse the trend of democratic backsliding in Georgia;

M.  whereas the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, travelled to Tbilisi to congratulate the Georgian Dream party before the final election results were published and without first consulting other EU leaders, and was the only EU leader to do so;

N.  whereas Georgian civil society organisations filed court complaints and called for investigations into electoral fraud, though in many cases investigative bodies did not initiate inquiries and did not properly examine the violations; whereas the CEC has so far refused to publish the commissioned audit on the electronic voting system, and has certified the results of the elections, notwithstanding the above-mentioned irregularities;

O.  whereas legal action by Georgian civil society organisations was followed by punitive measures by the authorities against civil society representatives, including unwarranted summons for questioning and heavy fines for speaking out about election fraud;

P.  whereas Georgian courts have continued to fast-track and dismiss, en masse, lawsuits brought by opposition political parties and local observers alleging voting irregularities, while rejecting motions to summon witnesses and motions that would oblige the CEC to hand over the delivery and receipt records of markers and papers procured and used for ballots;

Q.  whereas on 16 November 2024, despite numerous complaints and calls by independent election observers for the results to be annulled, Georgia’s CEC announced the final summary protocol of the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, attributing victory to the ruling Georgian Dream party, with 53,92 % of the vote;

R.  whereas protests in Tbilisi initially erupted on 28 October 2024, with thousands gathering to challenge the legitimacy of the ruling party’s declared victory; whereas the demonstrations continued on 4 November 2024, growing in scale and intensity; whereas police forcibly dispersed demonstrations in Tbilisi using disproportionate violence against peaceful protesters and journalists, and arrested several demonstrators;

S.  whereas, according to Article 78 of the Constitution of Georgia, ‘the constitutional bodies shall take all measures within the scope of their competences to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’;

T.  whereas Georgia, as an EU candidate country, should abide fully by the Association Agreement and fulfil the nine steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 8 November 2023; whereas although the European Council granted candidate status to Georgia in December 2023, its EU accession process has since been de facto halted due to the course of action taken by the Georgian Government since the spring of 2024;

U.  whereas oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, the leader of Georgian Dream, who also wields considerable influence over Georgia’s economy, has played a defining role in the country’s democratic backsliding and in undermining its Euro-Atlantic orientation in favour of a pivot towards Russia;

1.  Deplores the fact that Georgia, a candidate country for EU accession, held parliamentary elections on 26 October 2024 that did not respect international standards for democratic elections or its commitments as a member of the OSCE to carry out free and fair elections; emphasises that violations of electoral integrity are incompatible with the standards expected from an EU candidate country; highlights the fact that the conduct of the election was a further manifestation of the continuing democratic backsliding for which the ruling party is fully responsible;

2.  Strongly condemns the numerous and serious electoral violations, including documented cases of intimidation, vote manipulation, ballot-stuffing, interference with election observers and the media, reported manipulation involving electronic voting machines that allowed multiple votes per identity document, significant imbalances in financial resources, the advantages of incumbency and a failure to investigate severe procedural irregularities;

3.  Considers that the reported extensive electoral fraud undermines the integrity of the election process, the legitimacy of the results and the public’s trust in any new government, and that the results do not serve as a reliable representation of the will of the Georgian people;

4.  Acknowledges Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili’s strong condemnation of the elections as rigged and her decision not to recognise the results; appreciates the efforts made by Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili to steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development;

5.  Considers that, with the legitimacy of the vote severely undermined by the magnitude of the violations, the international community should not recognise the election results; rejects, therefore, any recognition of the parliamentary elections and calls for them to be re-run within a year, with the process conducted in an improved electoral environment by an independent and impartial election administration, under diligent international observation, in order to ensure a genuinely fair and transparent electoral process;

6.  Supports the call for an independent, transparent international investigation into the allegations of electoral manipulation, voter intimidation and systemic violations, which were reported to have taken place in the pre-election period and on election day;

7.  Welcomes the decision by the European External Action Service (EEAS) to send a technical mission to Georgia; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to establish a broad mission mandate that would go beyond the limitations of the OSCE election observation framework and methodology, which is significantly different from the EU election observation methodology, because the OSCE methodology is not always capable of adequately capturing everything that occurs in a country before election day, particularly in countries such as Georgia where there is a well-established system of pressure on public officials, voter intimidation and obstruction of local election observers;

8.  Expresses concern about the seizure by the Prosecutor’s Office of voter verification devices and election documentation; calls on the authorities to allow verification by voters of their participation in the elections in accordance with the highest standards of data protection; underlines the importance of safeguarding all election-related data and making these accessible to relevant stakeholders, given that they could contain key evidence of any irregularities;

9.  Expresses serious concern about the coordinated dismissal by Georgian judicial institutions of numerous election fraud and manipulation complaints and the CEC’s complete failure to investigate any of the reported election incidents; considers that, by not responding to the genuine concerns within society and the reports by local and international observers, the Georgian authorities are wilfully steering the country to the verge of a domestic political crisis and a state of international isolation from Georgia’s democratic partners;

10.  Expresses deep concern at the significant decline in female political representation in Georgia, compounded by the abolition of gender quotas, and calls for legislative changes to encourage gender equality in politics;

11.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to impose personal sanctions on the officials and political leaders in Georgia who are responsible for the democratic backsliding, violations of electoral laws and standards, administrative abuses and misuse of state institutions, such as Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, Mayor of Tbilisi and Secretary General of the ruling Georgian Dream party Kakha Kaladze, Speaker of the Georgian Parliament Shalva Papuashvili, and chairman of the Georgian Dream party Irakli Garibashvili, and to extend these sanctions to judges passing politically-motivated sentences; reiterates its call on the Council and the EU’s democratic partners to impose immediate and targeted personal sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili and to freeze all his assets within the EU for his role in the deterioration of the political process in Georgia and for acting against the country’s constitutionally declared interests, including efforts to restore Russia’s sphere of influence over the country;

12.  Emphasises that respect for fundamental rights is vital to the EU’s visa liberalisation benchmarks and urges the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspension if it is considered that EU standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not being upheld;

13.   Calls for the EU to severely limit formal EU-level contacts with the Georgian Government and Parliament;

14.  Condemns Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s visit to Georgia, which was a violation of EU positions and another attempt to undermine the EU’s common foreign and security policy; emphasises that, once again, Prime Minister Orbán did not speak for the EU;

15.  Recalls that as a result of the adoption of new anti-democratic legislation, such as the ‘law on transparency of foreign influence’ and the ‘law on family values and protection of minors’, the process of Georgia’s integration into the EU has effectively been suspended; recalls that the EU has also frozen the allocation of funds to Georgia; underscores that the continuing democratic backsliding in Georgia is not only a regrettable development, considering that Georgia was once a champion of Euro-Atlantic aspirations, but also needs to be reversed and the said pieces of anti-democratic legislation repealed in order for the country’s relations with the EU to get back on track; regrets that the political environment in Georgia indicates an authoritarian shift by the ruling party and a betrayal of the pro-European aspirations of the Georgian people; recalls its steadfast support for Georgia’s democratic development and the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of its people; reminds the Georgian Government that a large majority of the population strongly supports the country’s pro-Western course and its accession to the EU;

16.  Is alarmed by the climate of intimidation and polarisation fuelled by statements by Georgian Government representatives and political leaders, as well as by attacks against political pluralism, including through threats to ban opposition parties, to arrest their leaders and even ordinary supporters, and to silence dissent; warns the Georgian authorities that any attempts to ban legally established political parties would alienate Georgia from the EU and make any move towards EU accession impossible;

17.  Strongly condemns Russia’s systematic interference in democratic processes within Georgia, including through voter intimidation, vote buying and disinformation, such as the ‘Global War Party’ conspiracy; deplores the disinformation narratives disseminated and amplified by ruling party officials and government-affiliated media in the run-up to the elections; calls on the Georgian authorities to ensure fact-based information and communication, to refrain from anti-EU propaganda that is at odds with the stated goal of EU accession, and to strengthen the resilience of Georgian society to Russian disinformation and propaganda;)

18.  Recalls that the European Council granted Georgia candidate country status at its summit of 14 and 15 December 2023 on the understanding that the relevant steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 would be taken; stresses that the recent parliamentary elections clearly run counter to this ambition; agrees with the assessment presented in the Commission’s 2024 Enlargement Package, which states that Georgia’s EU accession process is to be halted indefinitely as a result of the democratic backsliding initiated by the Georgian Government; underlines that the policies implemented by Georgian Dream are incompatible with Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration;

19.   Reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and their wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, free from corruption, that fully respects fundamental freedoms, protects human rights and guarantees an open society, independent media and free and fair elections; urges the Georgian authorities to guarantee the right of citizens to assemble and to refrain from using unwarranted force against them;

20.  Calls on the Council, the Commission, the EEAS and the new VP/HR to conduct a comprehensive review and overhaul of EU policy towards Georgia; calls on the Commission to use the frozen EUR 120 million originally intended as support for the Georgian authorities to enhance the EU’s support for Georgia’s civil society, in particular the non-governmental sector and independent media, which are increasingly coming under undue pressure from the ruling political party and the authorities, as well as to support programmes supporting democratic resilience and electoral integrity; welcomes the proposal of VP/HR Borrell to do so; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment;

21.  Strongly reiterates its urgent demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds; emphasises that the Georgian Government bears full and undeniable responsibility for the life, health, safety and well-being of former President Mikheil Saakashvili and must be held fully accountable for any harm that befalls him; reiterates its call on President Salome Zourabichvili to use her constitutional right to pardon him;

22.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of Georgia.

(1) Texts Adopted, P10_TA(2024)0017. (2) OJ L 261, 30.8.2014, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/494/oj.

European Parliament resolution of 28 November 2024 on reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia (2024/2940(RSP))

P10_TA(2024)0055 RC-B10-0191/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia, in particular those of 17 July 2024 on the need for the EU’s continuous support for Ukraine(1) and of 19 September 2024 on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States(2), and to its previous resolutions on the situation on the Korean Peninsula,

–  having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

–  having regard to the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances,

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility(3), to Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2024 establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine(4), and to other forms of EU support for Ukraine,

–  having regard to the joint statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea Cho Tae-yul and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell of 4 November 2024 on DPRK-Russia Cooperation,

–  having regard to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s address to the European Parliament on 19 November 2024, marking 1 000 days since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine,

–  having regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea, including UN Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) of 14 October 2006,

–  having regard to the statement of the North Atlantic Council of 8 November 2024 on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,

–  having regard to the 2010 EU-Republic of Korea Strategic Partnership,

–  having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas Russia has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, in a continuation of its aggression since 2014, including the illegal annexation of Crimea and the occupation of parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, persistently, blatantly and grossly violating the principles of the UN Charter and international humanitarian law, as established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949;

B.  whereas Russia’s forces have systematically and indiscriminately attacked residential areas and civilian infrastructure, causing the deaths of thousands of Ukrainian civilians and the destruction of public and private property; whereas Russian forces are responsible for forced deportations, disappearances, including of children, illegal imprisonments, torture, executions of civilians, soldiers and prisoners of war, and acts of terror, including the use of sexual violence and mass rape as weapons of war, and they continue to alter the ethnic composition of the occupied territories of Ukraine;

C.  whereas Russia has escalated its air attacks against Ukraine, deploying significant numbers of missiles and drones to target electricity generation and transmission infrastructure nationwide, leading to power disruptions and necessitating nationwide rationing measures announced by Ukrenergo, Ukraine’s primary electricity provider, to stabilise the energy system;

D.  whereas the EU and its Member States stand in solidarity with Ukraine, committing significant humanitarian, financial and military support to aid Ukraine’s defence until its victory and recovery; whereas, however, there continues to be an insufficient level of military aid both in terms of quality and quantity, and a delay in actual delivery of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine after delivery decisions are taken; whereas a significant number of the systems that Ukraine was supposed to receive after the decision taken at the NATO Summit have not yet been delivered;

E.  whereas a number of third countries, notably Iran, North Korea and Belarus, have provided Russia with substantial deliveries of weapons and ammunitions, and Belarus has allowed Russia to use its territory to attack Ukraine;

F.  whereas the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea, signed on 18 June 2024, mandates mutual military assistance, including nuclear and conventional support, in the event of armed aggression, thereby deepening military ties between the two nations; whereas this development combines significant security challenges in both Asia and Europe, further complicating global stability;

G.  whereas North Korea and Russia have directly escalated the conflict in Ukraine with the deployment of North Korean troops alongside Russian forces, marking a dangerous expansion of the war with severe implications for regional and global security; whereas North Korea’s arms transfers to Russia, including the provision of munitions and military equipment, constitute a clear violation of UN Security Council sanctions aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons from North Korea;

H.  whereas Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has reported that 11 000 North Korean soldiers have already been deployed near Ukraine’s borders, with this contingent potentially increasing further; whereas North Korea, in exchange for supplying ammunition and troops, receives much-needed food, oil and money from Russia, and possibly assistance in developing nuclear weapons and missile technology know-how;

I.  whereas North Korea has escalated its threats, abandoned its unification policy and continued provocations in the region, particularly through missile tests and military demonstrations, which increase the risk of military conflict and undermine efforts for a peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict;

J.  whereas Russia’s armed forces have reportedly recruited hundreds of Houthi Yemeni mercenaries to fight in the conflict in Ukraine, facilitated by a shadowy trafficking operation that shows the increasing ties between Moscow and the Houthi rebel group;

K.  whereas Iran has transferred shipments of Fath-360 close-range ballistic missiles to Russia; whereas the EU, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have introduced new sanctions against Iran in response;

L.  whereas China is today the biggest supplier of dual-use goods and military items sustaining Russia’s military base and war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the EU has conclusive evidence that armed drones are being produced for the Russian military in China’s western Xinjiang region;

M.  whereas the newly elected European Parliament and Commission Presidents each immediately pledged to uphold their unwavering support for Ukraine; whereas the President-elect of the United States is expected to do the same; whereas anything but victory for Ukraine would be widely perceived as a strategic defeat for both Europe and the United States and would have far-reaching consequences for their security;

N.  whereas US President Joe Biden has authorised Ukraine to use US-made Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) in the Kursk region of the Russian Federation; whereas France and the United Kingdom have provided Storm Shadow / SCALP cruise missiles to Ukraine, with both countries allowing their use against Russian targets; whereas Germany continues its policy of refraining from the delivery of Taurus long-range missiles to Ukraine;

O.  whereas under international law, Ukraine’s right to self-defence includes proportional military action extending beyond its own territory; whereas Ukraine has reportedly used the donated long-range weapons systems against military targets within Russian territory following the recent lifting of restrictions by donor countries;

P.  whereas Russia attacked the Ukrainian city of Dnipro on 21 November 2024 with an intermediate-range ballistic missile;

Q.  whereas since February 2022, the EU has adopted 14 packages of sanctions aimed in particular at limiting as far as possible the Kremlin’s ability to finance the war it has unleashed; whereas these sanctions are set for a period of six months at a time; whereas a proposal to extend the duration of sanctions to three years has not been adopted; whereas the proposal has been blocked by the Hungarian Government’s veto, which hampers secure, longer-term stability and support for this loan structure;

R.  whereas the EU’s overall military support for Ukraine – provided through the European Peace Facility (EPF) and by Member States directly – amounts to around EUR 43,5 billion; whereas in August 2024, the EU mobilised only the first tranche – EUR 1,4 billion – of windfall profits from frozen assets of the Central Bank of Russia through the EPF to support further military assistance for Ukraine;

S.  whereas the EU, together with the G7 countries, adopted the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, which uses the windfall profits from the frozen Russian assets to pay back the loans provided by the EU to Ukraine; whereas these frozen assets are not yet being used directly to support Ukraine financially, but only the windfall profits of these frozen assets; whereas the EU will provide up to EUR 35 billion in new macro-financial assistance as part of the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism;

T.  whereas the Hungarian Government is blocking both the newly established EUR 5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund set up in March 2024 within the EPF and the eighth tranche of EPF reimbursements for Member States that have been delivering military aid to Ukraine for nearly two years; whereas the Hungarian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs travelled to Moscow to engage with an aggressor state;

U.  whereas President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in his address to the Verkhovna Rada on 19 November 2024, presented Ukraine’s Internal Resilience Plan, comprising 10 key points: unity, front, armament, money, energy, security, communities, human capital, cultural sovereignty and heroes policy; whereas President Zelenskyy presented Ukraine’s Peace Formula in September 2022, outlining 10 requirements for a just peace for Ukraine and for restoring the rules-based order;

1.  Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which has lasted for more than 1 000 days, not counting the aggression that began in 2014, and of the involvement and support of third countries in this war; demands that Russia immediately cease all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, release Ukrainian prisoners of war and unlawfully detained Ukrainian civilians, return abducted Ukrainian children and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land, nature and infrastructure;

2.  Further condemns Russia’s continuous escalation in its war of aggression, in particular its bombings of civilians and critical infrastructure, its recourse to North Korea to provide troops to fight against the Ukrainian army and its testing of new ballistic missiles in Ukraine; considers that these recent escalatory steps represent a new phase in the war and a new risk for Europe’s security as a whole; calls for the EU, its Member States and Ukraine’s other partners to respond accordingly;

3.  Recalls that any nuclear threats by Russia will not deter the EU from providing further assistance to Ukraine for its self-defence; urges all states to reject the normalisation of nuclear intimidation;

4.  Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine; reiterates the EU’s unwavering commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and emphasises the need for increased and accelerated EU solidarity in providing political, military, humanitarian, economic and financial support to Ukraine until Ukraine’s victory, in order to end Russia’s war of aggression and allow Ukraine to liberate all its people; reiterates that Ukraine, as a victim of aggression, has a legitimate right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter; reaffirms the EU’s commitment to a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, based on its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and supports Ukraine’s Peace Formula as a framework for international engagement;

5.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war, which must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for war crimes and the crime of aggression committed by Russia, and Russian reparations and other payments for the massive material and immaterial damage caused in Ukraine; insists that no negotiations about Ukraine can take place without Ukraine; calls for the engagement of the EU and the Member States in implementing Ukraine’s Peace Formula and establishing the necessary conditions for holding the second Summit on Peace, also engaging countries from the Global South; is convinced that the EU and its Member States must participate in establishing Ukraine’s future robust security guarantees, based on Ukraine’s Peace Formula and Victory Plan, with a clear strategy, specific goals and a concrete roadmap; regrets the German Chancellor’s recent phone call with Vladimir Putin;

6.  Denounces Iran, Belarus and North Korea for their military support to Russia, and in particular all North Korea’s military support for Russia, which further exacerbates the conflict; reiterates that both Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and North Korea’s participation in the war and its nuclear and missile programmes constitute grave threats to the rules-based international order; condemns the signing and recent ratification of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea, a regime that is under the most comprehensive sanctions regime imposed by the UN; urges North Korea to withdraw its troops and end military cooperation with Russia; calls on Russia to cease all forms of military and technological cooperation with North Korea and to abide by its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and multiple UN Security Council resolutions; warns of the serious implications of this military partnership in inspiring other autocratic regimes to become actively involved in military conflicts;

7.  Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, China’s supply of dual-use goods and military items to Russia; reminds China of its responsibilities, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to stand up in defence of the rules-based international order, and therefore calls on Beijing to end all military or dual-use assistance to Russia and its war of aggression against Ukraine; underlines that a refusal to change course on this matter risks seriously affecting bilateral EU-China relations; highlights China’s significant influence over North Korea and Russia and urges China to help to reduce tensions and prevent further escalation of hostilities; expresses deep concern about the effect that European dependencies on China have on the credibility of the Member States’ ability to safeguard their national security and the EU as a whole;

8.  Urges the international community to take swift and decisive action to address this alarming escalation; calls for strengthened international cooperation to prevent arms shipments from North Korea to Russia, including enhanced monitoring and enforcement mechanisms within the UN framework and through multilateral alliances; urges the EU to take decisive action to sanction individuals and entities in North Korea who are involved in arms and troops transfers, as well as intermediaries facilitating these transactions; welcomes the efforts of the international community to crack down on North Korea’s illicit arms trade and emphasises the need for sustained pressure on Pyongyang to cease its destabilising actions; calls on all EU and UN member states to do their utmost to ensure the implementation of all UN Security Council resolutions regarding North Korea and to proactively block any routes for North Korea to obtain financing, materials or knowledge for its illegal weapons programmes;

9.  Urges the Member States to further broaden and strengthen the sanctions regime against North Korea, Belarus and Iran in light of these countries’ military support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and to add to the EU sanctions lists all the main Chinese entities and individuals who directly support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and Russia’s defence and security sector;

10.  Expresses deep concern about the possibility of any transfer of nuclear- or ballistic missile-related technology to North Korea, which would undermine international non-proliferation efforts and pose a grave threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and globally; calls for the EU and its Member States, in cooperation with G7 and G20 partners, to develop and promote an alternative mechanism to the UN Panel of Experts in order to ensure efficient monitoring and enforcement of sanctions on North Korea;

11.  Expresses deep concern over the ongoing and severe human rights violations in North Korea, where the regime’s oppressive policies and systemic neglect of basic needs have resulted in widespread suffering among the country’s people; condemns the diversion of resources towards military activities and external conflicts, including support for Russia’s war of aggression, at the expense of addressing urgent humanitarian needs within North Korea; calls for the EU and international partners to enhance efforts to hold the North Korean regime accountable for its human rights abuses; urges increased support for civil society organisations and human rights defenders working to document abuses and provide aid to North Korean citizens; urges the Chinese Government to cease refoulement practices and provide North Korean refugees with access to international protection; calls on North Korea to grant UN human rights bodies access to the country to assess the human rights situation, enforced disappearances and the conditions of detainees and returned refugees, including the cases of Kim Cheol-ok and South Korean missionaries Kim Jung-wook, Kim Kook-kie and Choi Chun-gil;

12.  Highlights the need for a comprehensive EU strategy to address the broader implications of authoritarian alliances, particularly between Russia, North Korea, Belarus, Iran, China and other states undermining the rules-based international order; calls for active efforts by the EU and its Member States to promote the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and for closer cooperation with international partners to reduce tensions in the Indo-Pacific region;

13.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to further strengthen their military support for Ukraine, including through the provision of aircraft, long-range missiles, including Taurus missiles, modern air defence systems, including Patriots and SAMP/T, and ammunition, as well as MANPADS, artillery and training programmes for Ukrainian forces, and calls for accelerated delivery of the equipment pledged to meet Ukraine’s urgent needs; reiterates its position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily, with no less than 0,25 % of their GDP annually; welcomes the signing of the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine and calls for the Commission and Member States to act swiftly to effectively implement the commitments made; calls on the Commission and the Council to prioritise making the European IRIS2 space communication capabilities fully operational and to grant Ukraine (and Taiwan) access as soon as possible;

14.  Calls on the Council to extend its sanctions against Russia; calls for further sanctions against sectors of special economic importance for Russia (the metallurgical, nuclear, chemical, agricultural and banking sectors) and on Russian raw materials, such as aluminium, steel products, uranium, titanium and nickel, for a full embargo on imports into the EU of Russian fossil fuels and liquefied natural gas (LNG), and for the price cap on Russian petroleum products to be lowered further in coordination with G7 partners, in order to stop contributing to the financing of Russia’s illegal war of aggression; calls for stronger and more targeted sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet; underlines the need to cease any cooperation with Russia in the nuclear energy sector; highlights that Russia is shifting from reliance on gas exports to gas-derived fertilisers, which provide a major source of revenue and foreign currency earnings for the Russian state, directly fuelling its war machine, while simultaneously compromising EU economies and threatening food security; calls for the EU to address this challenge properly, urgently and with strong, decisive actions, as the EU’s reliance on Russian fertilisers is growing at an alarming rate;

15.  Calls, in particular, on those Member States that are not living up to their own commitments regarding the production of defence products and direct support for relevant production capacities to engage in joint ventures with Ukraine or directly place orders in Ukraine; calls on the Member States to accelerate direct investments in scaling up Ukraine’s military industrial capacity, following the model used by Denmark; calls for the EU to include this model in the Ukraine Assistance Fund;

16.  Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to actively contribute towards maintaining unity on sanctions and to swiftly pursue the adoption of the 15th package of sanctions; urges the Member States to actively pressure the Hungarian Government to end its irresponsible blockade of the European Peace Facility, including the newly established Ukraine Assistance Fund, which has prevented the release of EUR 6,6 billion in partial reimbursements to Member States providing military support to Ukraine; stresses that if the EPF remains blocked until the next European Council, a new format must immediately be established that only includes those Member States that are willing and able to provide military aid to Ukraine, or national contributions must be reimbursed in order not to hamper the smooth financing of bilateral aid;

17.  Urges the Council and the Member States to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by EU-based companies and individuals, third parties and non-EU states and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and providing Russia’s military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment, ensuring that no loopholes are exploited to channel arms or resources to Russia; considers it essential to strengthen controls on the export and maintenance of high-tech equipment produced in the EU, and to increase law enforcement measures and cooperation to prevent sanctions circumvention; calls to urgently intensify the review of EU Member States’ trade with Central Asian countries, as well as with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, among others, as they are clearly used in EU sanctions evasion;

18.  Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to revise the current duration of the sanctions imposed on Russia, extending the validity period from the current six months to a more robust and strategic three years; notes that such a measure would enhance the consistency and predictability of the EU’s foreign policy stance and shield it from abusive instrumentalisation of unanimity requirements, strengthen the impact of the sanctions and send a clear message of commitment to upholding international law and European security, while also reducing the administrative burden of frequent renewals;

19.  Welcomes US President Joe Biden’s decision to allow Ukraine to use advanced rocket systems on military targets within Russian territory, highlighting that this authorisation respects Ukraine’s legitimate right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls for the EU and its Member States to adopt similar measures, removing restrictions on the use of military systems for legitimate defensive operations beyond Ukraine’s borders to deter further Russian aggression;

20.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to engage with the incoming administration in Washington to strengthen mutually beneficial transatlantic cooperation, emphasising the shared strategic interest of supporting Ukraine, and to highlight that Russia and its allies pose not only a threat to European stability but also a significant danger to global security and the rules-based international order; expects the incoming Trump administration to maintain support for Ukraine and remain steadfast in its commitment to NATO, and meanwhile urges the EU and its Member States to put words into action and establish a genuine Defence Union, also as a European pillar of NATO, starting with strengthening its defence capabilities;

21.  Calls for accountability for war crimes and violations of international law committed by Russia and its allies, including North Korea, through strengthened cooperation with the International Criminal Court and other judicial bodies; urges the EU and international partners to intensify efforts to hold all perpetrators accountable;

22.  Calls on the Commission to propose additional measures to support the Ukrainian economy by providing further financial support and facilitating investment opportunities; welcomes the agreement with the Council on macro-financial assistance for Ukraine of up to EUR 35 billion, making use of frozen Russian assets as well as the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism; calls for the swift implementation of both tools in order to allow Ukraine to benefit as quickly as possible from these new funding possibilities;

23.  Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to take more substantive steps towards establishing creative solutions under a sound legal regime allowing for the confiscation of Russian state-owned assets frozen by the EU, and for their use to address the various implications of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including the prevention of further destruction and loss of life, reconstruction of the country and compensation for the victims of Russia’s aggression; stresses that any future claim by Russia to these assets may only be settled after an overall consideration of the outstanding reparations due to Ukraine; stresses the importance of the Ukraine Facility as a mechanism for long-term financial support, reconstruction and recovery efforts, and urges its swift and efficient implementation; calls on the Commission to propose long-term financial assistance beyond 2027 for the reconstruction of Ukraine, building on the experience of the Ukraine Facility;

24.  Emphasises the need to create a more stable and predictable framework for EU-Ukraine trade relations; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to accelerate consultations with Ukraine under Article 29 of the Association Agreement and urges both sides to agree on the most ambitious level of liberalisation possible; calls on the Commission to closely involve Parliament in the review of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA); notes the restrictions on imports of agri-food products from Ukraine imposed unilaterally by several Member States, which touch on the EU’s exclusive competence for trade under the common commercial policy and the EU’s obligations under the DCFTA with Ukraine; calls on the Commission to find European solutions to potential market distortions caused by increased inflows of Ukrainian agri-food products, in consultation with Ukraine and the relevant Member States;

25.  Calls, in view of the harsh winter months, for a significant increase in EU humanitarian aid to address the dire situation caused by Russia’s systematic attacks on civilian infrastructure, in particular energy infrastructure, which have left millions of Ukrainians without essential services; acknowledges the work of many Ukrainian and other civil society organisations in assisting families of abducted Ukrainian children, prisoners of war and illegally detained Ukrainian civilians and their tireless efforts to bring their loved ones home; calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to support their activities and to use all available international forums to pressure Russia to return abducted Ukrainian children, Ukrainian prisoners of war and illegally detained Ukrainian civilians;

26.  Deplores the deliberate killing and mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russia and calls on Russia to comply with its international obligations, in particular the Geneva Convention, and to allow international organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit prisoners of war and to assess their state of health; calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community, in particular the UN, to review and adapt international conventions and the work of the relevant international organisations to today’s realities and to make them more responsive to the needs of prisoners of war;

27.  Notes with concern that Russia is actively recruiting individuals from distant regions, including Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, using deception or coercion, in order to send them to fight in the war against the people of Ukraine; calls on the UN, the African Union and countries whose populations are targeted by Moscow to take active measures to counter this recruitment;

28.  Highlights again the constructive role of South Korea in the rules-based international order, including its unwavering commitment to Ukraine; calls for the EU and its Member States to engage with South Korea and seek to shift its position on arming Ukraine, in order to provide significant military resources to aid Ukraine’s defence operations; welcomes the first-ever EU-Republic of Korea Strategic Dialogue, held in Seoul on 4 November 2024, and the subsequent Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and South Korea; supports the deepening of the EU’s relations with South Korea and enhanced bilateral cooperation on security and defence; calls for the EU and its Member States, in cooperation with Ukraine and South Korea, to encourage and be prepared for the possible defection of members of the Korean People’s Army; calls for the EU and its Member States to deepen their cooperation with South Korea on Ukraine’s future, focusing on its EU aspirations, security guarantees and reconstruction; calls for closer cooperation with other like-minded partners, particularly Japan, Australia and Taiwan, and emphasises the need for greater dialogue in the Indo-Pacific;

29.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue providing support to the Russian democratic opposition, to ensure their protection and to encourage them to fight against the Putin regime, in particular the militarist, chauvinist and imperialist sentiments in Russian society, and to strongly express and actively seek support for Ukraine;

30.  Condemns recent acts in the Baltic Sea that have damaged European critical infrastructure; stresses the urgent need to investigate these grave incidents and release information about the perpetrators and their intentions; underlines that several representatives of European governments believe that the most recent incident constitutes a grave act of sabotage; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to respond with appropriate measures against any state or non-state actors responsible, if evidence proves their involvement;

31.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Russian Government, the South and North Korean governments and the other governments concerned, and the United Nations.

(1) OJ C, C/2024/6129, 22.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6129/oj. (2) Texts adopted, P10_TA(2024)0012. (3) OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj. (4) OJ L, 2024/2773, 28.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2773/oj.