The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 14, 16, 21, 24, 36 and 41 thereof,

–  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(1),

–  having regard to the report of 20 June 2024 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our Priorities in 2024’,

–  having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, endorsed by the European Council on 21 March 2022,

–  having regard to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, adopted on 29 June 2022,

–  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 March 2024, 18 April 2024, 27 June 2024, 19 December 2024, 6 March 2025 and 20 March 2025,

–  having regard to the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 18 March 2024, 22 April 2024, 24 May 2024, 24 June 2024, 22 July 2024, 14 October 2024, 18 November 2024, 16 December 2024, 27 January 2025, 24 February 2025 and 17 March 2025,

–  having regard to the declaration of the Summit between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) adopted on 18 July 2023,

–  having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528(2),

–  having regard to the Political Guidelines of the Commission President for 2024-2029,

–  having regard to the 2024 enlargement reports presented by the Commission on 30 October 2024,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova(4),

–  having regard to Sauli Niinistö’s report of 30 October 2024 on strengthening Europe’s civil and military preparedness and readiness,

–  having regard to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, adopted in 2004, updated in 2008 and further supplemented in 2020 with a guidance note on the Guidelines’ implementation,

–  having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on European Economic Security Strategy (JOIN(2023)0020),

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018),

–  having in regard to the Commission Recommendation of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States (C(2023)6689),

–  having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States(5),

–  having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation(6),

–  having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2024 on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration(7),

–  having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan(8),

–  having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union(9),

–  having regard to its resolutions of 24 October 2024 on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia(10) and of 5 October 2023 on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh after Azerbaijan’s attack and the continuing threats against Armenia(11),

–  having regard to its resolutions on historical remembrance, including its resolutions of 2 April 2009 on European conscience and totalitarianism(12), of 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe(13), of 15 December 2022 on 90 years after the Holodomor: recognising the mass killing through starvation as genocide(14) and of 17 January 2024 on European historical consciousness(15),

–  having regard to the report of 9 May 2022 on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe,

–  having regard to the EU Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in External Action 2021-2025 (GAP III),

–  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), which entered into force in the EU on 1 October 2023,

–  having regard to the UN resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2015 at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York entitled ‘Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (Agenda 2030), which established the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

–  having regard to the UN resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 December 1949 on assistance to Palestine refugees,

–  having regard to the UN Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 on a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East situation,

–  having regard to the UN Security Council resolution of 11 August 2006on the situation in the Middle East,

–  having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide,

–  having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

–  having regard to the agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union of 28 April 2006 on cooperation and assistance(16),

–  having regard to the advisory opinion requested from the International Court of Justice by the UN General Assembly in its resolution of 30 December 2022 on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

–  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0010/2025),

A.  whereas the world faces rapid geopolitical shifts, with autocratic powers, both individually and in coordinated efforts, actively challenging the international rules-based order and its multilateral institutions, international law, democratic institutions and societies, as well as our alliances; whereas all EU leverage should be assessed in order to dissuade countries from supporting Russia’s aggression;

B.  whereas the BRICS summit held in Kazan, Russia, from 22 to 24 October 2024 underscores how Putin leverages international platforms to counteract isolation and build alliances; whereas a unified and strategic EU response is required to uphold the principles of the rules-based international order;

C.  whereas the EU and its Member States should review development assistance to governments of countries that openly support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and monitor their votes on relevant UN resolutions;

D.  whereas the geopolitical confrontation between democracies and authoritarian and dictatorial regimes is growing, conflicts are multiplying, and the use of force is increasingly treated as a standard tool for pursuing political aims; whereas force is wielded not only by states but also by an expanding array of non-state actors; whereas the EU needs to reinforce transatlantic relations and build constructive partnerships with like-minded partners in the Global South;

E.  whereas the geopolitical context in which the EU is operating has accentuated the need for more ambitious, credible, decisive and unified EU action and a fully fledged European foreign policy on the world stage and has highlighted the necessity for Member States to demonstrate the required political will to rebuild their defence capabilities, while strengthening the EU’s transatlantic bonds and partnerships with like-minded countries; whereas the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) needs to become a fully fledged EU policy through which the EU can address the key geopolitical challenges; whereas the EU should be guided in its external action by the values and principles enshrined in Article 2, Article 3(5) and Article 21 TEU, which have inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement; whereas it is in the EU’s interest to stand up accordingly for universal values, norms and principles such as freedom and democratic standards, as well as human rights, the rule of law, international justice and the Helsinki Final Act, in particular as regards the non-violation of international borders;

F.  whereas the EU is faced with the rapid rise of new threats at its borders and on its territory, which are destabilising the EU’s functioning, in particular targeted disinformation, cyber and hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of migratory flows, in addition to international terrorism and religious radicalism;

G.  whereas strategic autonomy requires the EU to act independently on the global stage when needed, particularly in foreign and security policy; whereas the EU has recognised the need to reduce undue reliance on external actors for safeguarding its interests in an unpredictable and multipolar world;

H.  whereas the EU needs to develop an independent and autonomous European diplomacy, including public and cultural, economic, climate, digital and cyber diplomacy, led by an EU diplomatic service which is driven by a common diplomatic culture;

I.  whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine violates the rules-based international order, fundamental principles of international law as enshrined in the UN Charter and key conventions and resolutions, the Helsinki Final Act and the European Convention on Human Rights;

J.  whereas the Russian violations of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War comprise executions of prisoners and the denial of access to humanitarian organisations and medical treatment for prisoners;

K.  whereas the ICC has issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin and the Russian High Commissioner for Children, Maria Lvova-Belova, for their involvement in the abduction of Ukrainian children to Russia; whereas Russia, assisted by the Belarusian regime, is undertaking to re-educate Ukrainian hildren and erase their Ukrainian identity; whereas Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus has to be held fully accountable for its complicity in the war of aggression against Ukraine and war crimes such as the abduction of thousands of Ukrainian children;

L.  whereas the ICC has additionally issued arrest warrants for Russian military leaders Sergei Shoigu, Valery Gerasimov, Viktor Sokolov and Sergei Kobylash, accused of directing attacks on civilian targets;

M.  whereas the Hungarian Government is blocking the EUR 5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund set up in March 2024 within the European Peace Facility (EPF); whereas the Hungarian Government has been blocking the eighth tranche of EPF reimbursements for Member States that have delivered military aid to Ukraine since May 2023;

N.  whereas Russian shadow fleet tankers pose a considerable risk to maritime and environmental security by turning off or manipulating their automatic identification systems; whereas these tankers provide an estimated USD 12 billion to Russia’s war budget each month, thereby directly funding its aggressive military operations;

O.  whereas Vladimir Putin’s regime has instrumentalised history in an attempt to secure the loyalty of the Russian population by creating nostalgia for the supposed greatness of the Soviet Empire, falsifying the history of Russia and Ukraine, rejecting Nikita Khrushchev’s policy to acknowledge and condemn Stalinist crimes, reneging on Mikhail Gorbachev’s recognition and condemnation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and declaring the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest tragedy of the previous century;

P.  whereas Russia and other malign actors in its neighbouring countries promote anti-Western and divisive rhetoric and exploit ethnic tensions in the Western Balkans in order to inflame conflict and divide communities, including through the instrumentalisation of the Serbian Orthodox Church;

Q.  whereas 2024 marked the 20th anniversary of the ‘big bang’ enlargement when 10 countries joined the EU; whereas enlargement is of the utmost strategic importance for the EU, as it represents a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability, security, climate protection and prosperity across the continent, and in particular in the face of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the preparation for enlargement requires reforms in the EU and whereas the EU should conduct the enlargement process in parallel with the institutional and decision-making reforms necessary to safeguard the EU’s integration capacity;

R.  whereas the EU must maintain the momentum for the acceleration of its enlargement policy while accession countries continue to reform and achieve the required benchmarks related to the EU acquis; whereas consistent messages and a clear path towards integration for candidate countries are vital for keeping the pro-European perspective alive;

S.  whereas the future of the Balkans and the countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood lies in the EU;

T.  whereas the Union is founded on the values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, which are part of the Copenhagen criteria, which are the key set of criteria for EU membership; whereas the accession process is a merit-based and reversible process;

U.  whereas joining the EU requires foreign policy alignment, including on the votes on United Nations General Assembly resolutions, support for Ukraine and alignment with sanctions against Russia; whereas most of the countries of the Western Balkans have reached high levels of alignment with the CFSP, a notable exception being Serbia;

V.  whereas North Macedonia concluded the Prespa Agreement with Greece and the Treaty of friendship, good-neighbourliness and cooperation with Bulgaria;

W.  whereas the citizens of Georgia have demonstrated their commitment to democratic values and to their country making progress with EU integration; whereas the democratic backsliding in Georgia needs to be reversed; whereas the Georgian authorities should heed the will of the Georgian people to join the EU and should ensure free and fair elections, stop democratic backsliding, abandon the laws that jeopardise Georgia’s European future and pursue pro-European democratic reforms; whereas Georgia should align with the EU’s CFSP, including the sanctions adopted unanimously against Russia;

X.  whereas any partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan – including on energy – must have strong conditions attached on the respect of international law, fundamental rights and international obligations and, in particular, on Azerbaijan making substantial progress towards a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement with Armenia;

Y.  whereas the Mediterranean is of great importance to the EU, both historically and geographically; whereas the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood play an important role in ensuring that irregular migration flows are managed on the basis of the principles of solidarity, balance, shared responsibility and in full compliance with applicable EU and international law and, in particular, human rights and humanitarian law;

Z.  whereas strategic partnerships and agreements between the EU and countries of origin and transit, such those between EU and Mauritania, are proving to be a successful model for the prevention of irregular migration and the fight against migrant smugglers;

AA.  whereas the supply of thousands of Shahed drones from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Russia has further cemented Iran’s role as a pariah state; whereas North Korea and China further demonstrate their unwavering disregard to international laws and norms;

AB.  whereas on 28 May 2024, Norway, Ireland and Spain recognised the State of Palestine, followed on 4 June 2024 by a decision of Slovenia’s parliament to do the same;

AC.  whereas China defines itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’ and endeavours to develop, in close partnership with Russia, a Polar Silk Road;

AD.  whereas the Belt and Road Initiative, known in China as the One Belt One Road, challenges the EU’s interests;

AE.  whereas on 14 October 2024 the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the British Foreign Secretary agreed to launch strategic consultations on issues such as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific, the Western Balkans and hybrid threats;

AF.  whereas all UN agencies embody the rules-based international order as they uphold and implement both the letter and the spirit of the UN Charter, to which all UN Member States must abide;

AG.  whereas the EU’s credibility and coherence is a paramount requirement for the correct implementation of its external action, as this reinforces trust in the EU among various actors and non-EU countries; whereas the efficiency of the EU’s actions worldwide is contingent on ensuring the highest level of coordination and coherence in the EU’s external action; whereas coordination between the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) should be strengthened, particularly due to the insufficient operational budget of the EEAS;

AH.  whereas the implementation of gender equality and the WPS agenda requires initiatives that promote gender-responsive leadership, protect women’s rights and combat sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict settings; whereas the funding of these initiatives is essential for supporting local civil society organisations and providing survivor-centred support;

AI.  whereas human rights defenders (HRDs) are the EU’s main allies in defending and promoting human rights abroad; whereas HRDs are increasingly at risk of attacks and threats from state and non-state actors; whereas Parliament has consistently called for the proper and coordinated implementation of the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders (2008); whereas the Member States, alongside the EU institutions, should implement these Guidelines, which include a range of specific commitments, such as regular reporting, coordination and action in support of HRDs;

AJ.  whereas the consequences of climate change will have an ever-increasing effect on various spheres of human life, including geopolitical order and global stability; whereas it is of crucial importance that fighting climate change, necessitating climate action, and aiding those who are hardest hit by its repercussions, becomes a cornerstone of the CFSP; underlines the fundamental role which the Commission and the Member States, in a joint approach, must play in the advancement of climate diplomacy globally;

AK.  whereas the report entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’, presented by Sauli Niinistö, Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, provides strategic recommendations for enhancing Europe’s civilian and military preparedness in the light of escalating and complex security threats;

AL.  whereas this report first reviews the VP/HR’s annual CFSP report and subsequently complements it with Parliament’s positions on the CFSP objectives in 2025; whereas in so doing, the report expands particularly on (1) the global consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, (2) conflict and peace in the Middle East, (3) cooperation with like-minded partners and (4) the general visibility and influence of EU action abroad; whereas Parliament’s forward-looking CFSP position is ultimately underlined by key demands concerning the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the parliamentary oversight of the MFF; whereas there is a need to defend and strengthen the rules-based international order, the universal norms, values and principles of the UN Charter such as human rights and international justice, multilateralism, and the Helsinki Final Act, in particular as regards the non-violation of international borders;

1.  Underscores that its resolutions on the implementation of the CFSP are a key component of its contribution to EU foreign policymaking; underlines that these resolutions manifest the practical implication of the strengthened right of scrutiny in the area of foreign policy conferred on Parliament by the Treaty of Lisbon; recalls that the 2024 resolution is the first of this nature in this legislative term and aims to serve as a guide for the EU executive when setting foreign policy priorities for this term; highlights the fact that in an ever volatile international environment, the EU needs to simultaneously tackle numerous foreign policy challenges affecting it directly or indirectly, such as the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the conflicts in the Middle East, increasing great power competition, constant attempts to undermine the multilateral rules-based international order and an increased nexus of foreign and internal crises; strongly believes that in order to stay relevant on the international stage, the EU needs to pursue a determined, disciplined and assertive foreign policy that fulfils the EU’s own strategic objectives and continues defining, asserting and defending its interests in the world; recalls that the EU should be guided in its external action by the values and principles enshrined in Article 2, Article 3(5) and Article 21 TEU, which have inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement, including democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, and the principles of equality and solidarity; further believes that the CFSP should ensure the implementation of the UN’s 2030 Agenda and the SDGs;

2.  Emphasises that the core principles of the EU’s CFSP are rooted in the EU’s steadfast commitment to a rules-based, multilateral international order, as enshrined in the UN Charter, and in the EU’s clear preference for peaceful, diplomatic cooperation among all its Member States; encourages all parties to resolve disputes through dialogue, with mutual respect for international law, sovereignty and territorial integrity; reaffirms its dedication to advancing global peace and stability by promoting diplomatic initiatives aimed at conflict prevention and dispute resolution and which foster international collaboration on key global challenges, such as climate change, human rights and sustainable economic development; calls for ongoing partnerships with international actors to ensure the effectiveness of global peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts;

I.The VP/HR’s 2024 annual report

3.  Notes that the report was submitted to the European Parliament on 20 June 2024; recalls that the report should be forward-looking in nature; comments hereinafter on several developments emphasised by the VP/HR in his report;

4.  Welcomes in particular:

5.  Condemns in particular:

6.  Concurs with:

II.CFSP objectives in 2025

7.  Identifies, in the following section, Parliament’s CFSP objectives in 2025, thus complementing the views expressed in the VP/HR’s annual CFSP report;

Addressing the global consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine

8.  Emphasises that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its consequences, including economic uncertainty, food insecurity and high energy prices, in combination with the revisionist behaviour of the Russian Federation against a number of states neighbouring the Black Sea, destabilises and threatens the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, which in turn erodes the European security architecture; underlines, in this context, the need for reinforcing the EU’s capacities to support democratic institutions in our immediate neighbourhood; underlines, also, the importance of the protection of the EU’s eastern border, which contributes to the security of the entire EU; stresses that the East Shield and the Baltic Defence Line should be the flagship EU projects for fostering deterrence and overcoming potential threats from the east and would establish an integrated land border management system that is designed to strengthen the EU’s external land border with Russia and Belarus against military and hybrid threats;

9.  Notes that the EU’s response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is being closely watched by autocratic actors around the world and will have a decisive influence in shaping their behaviour on the international stage; is concerned by the growing cooperation and coordination among autocratic regimes, including through their material or other support for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; urges the Council to impose restrictive measures against countries that deliver military goods, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and surface-to-surface missiles, to the Russian Federation for use against civilian targets; recalls that the use of such military goods against civilian targets is a war crime; notes, with grave concern, the increasing cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and underscores that the employment of North Korean troops by Russia is widening the scale of the conflict; emphasises, equally, the urgent need for further sanctions against Belarus, mirroring all sanctions against Russia;

10.  Holds the view that the EU and its Member States are now Ukraine’s only strategic allies and accordingly calls for the EU and its Member States to meaningfully increase and speed up military and economic support, humanitarian assistance, as well as financial aid in every possible way to put Ukraine in a position of strength, in order to liberate all its people and to deter any further aggression by Russia following a potential ceasefire agreement; suggests, to this end, strengthening the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine, which has trained approximately 75 000 Ukrainian troops, and underlines the urgent need to provide Ukraine with increased air defence and surface-to-surface capacities to defend its critical energy infrastructure, and calls on the Member States to immediately lift restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems, such as long-range Taurus missiles, delivered to Ukraine, against legitimate military targets on Russian territory, which would be fully in line with Ukraine’s right to self-defence according to the UN Charter;

11.  Reaffirms its commitment to supporting Ukraine’s desire for a just and lasting peace and to the peace formula and Victory Plan put forward by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy; recalls that any initiative, in particular diplomatic solutions, aimed at ending the Russian war of aggression and achieving a just and lasting peace needs to be based on terms and input provided by Ukraine and ultimately accepted by the Ukrainian people; expresses, in this context, deep concern over the apparent shift in the United States’ stance on the Russian war of aggression, which has included openly blaming Ukraine for the ongoing war, suspending US military aid and attempting to coerce Ukraine into relinquishing its legitimate right to self-defence; strongly deplores any attempts at blackmailing Ukraine’s leadership into surrendering to the Russian aggressor for the sole purpose of announcing a so-called peace deal and considers that the current attempt by the US administration to negotiate a ceasefire and peace agreement without the involvement of European states, which will ultimately have to bear the outcome, is counterproductive, as it empowers the belligerent Russian State, thus showing that aggressive policy is not punished but rewarded; is cautiously optimistic about the proposal for a 30-day ceasefire agreement; recalls that a ceasefire can be an effective tool for suspending hostilities, but only if the aggressor fully adheres to it; expects, therefore, Russia to agree to it and follow it by ceasing all attacks on Ukraine, its military positions, civilian population, infrastructure and territory; concludes, nevertheless, taking into account the history of Russia’s violations of previous agreements, that peace can only be achieved by empowering Ukraine through robust security guarantees; is, conversely, of the opinion, that any settlement that undermines Ukraine’s legitimate aspirations, such as its right to choose its own security arrangements, or which lacks credible security guarantees, will risk subjecting Ukraine and other European countries to renewed Russian aggression; insists, therefore, that the EU engage in security commitments towards Ukraine as recommended in the Kyiv Security Compact in order to deter further Russian aggression;

12.  Highlights that the financial support provided by the EU and its Member States to Ukraine exceeds that of any single country, reflecting the EU’s unparalleled commitment to Ukraine; underscores that the EU’s role in any negotiations impacting the security of Europe must be commensurate with its political and economic weight; reaffirms that there can be no negotiations relating to European security without the EU at the table;

13.  Expects the Member States to keep its sanctions against Russia in place as long as needed to secure a just and lasting peace and until accountability has been achieved; calls, in the interim, for the EU and the Member States to reinforce the effectiveness and impact of its sanction packages adopted so far and to agree on new ones as soon as the need arises; points, in this context, towards sectors of special importance for the Russian economy, in particular banking, the metallurgy, nuclear, chemical and agricultural sectors, and raw materials such as aluminium, steel, uranium, titanium and nickel; calls for a ban or targeted tariffs on Russian imports to the EU with the aim of fully closing the flow of grain, potash and fertilisers; recalls that the strict implementation and uniform application of restrictive measures in all Member States is a precondition for the credibility and effectiveness of the EU’s external action; underscores, thus, the importance of ending all EU imports of Russian energy and supporting G7 efforts to lower the oil price cap; calls on the Commission to impose penalties on all European companies that continue to engage in business with the Russian Federation, as well as to further assess and combat sanction circumvention;

14.  Appeals for proactive diplomacy with non-EU countries in order to minimise the circumvention of these sanctions; calls on the Commission to critically assess EU assistance to non-EU countries that actively support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and urges the Council to impose restrictive measures on non-EU countries enabling Russia’s war of aggression, whether through the facilitation of sanction circumvention or through the provision of direct military assistance, such as in the case of Belarus, Iran or North Korea; calls on all countries to fully align with all EU sanctions packages;

15.  Deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and China, in particular the renewed commitment to strengthen their military ties; welcomes the Council’s decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies for their support of Russia’s war in Ukraine;

16.  Expresses its most serious concerns over Russia’s and China’s surveillance and sabotage of critical maritime infrastructures, such as seabed communication cables and offshore energy facilities; expresses in particular its strong concern about the damage to two subsea communications cables, one linking Finland and Germany and the other connecting Sweden to Lithuania, within less than 24 hours on 17 and 18 November 2024, and about the damaging by a tanker of the Russian shadow fleet of the EstLink2 power cable, linking Estonia and Finland, on 25 December 2024; calls on the EU to put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems and regional coastguard cooperation to ensure the prevention and rapid detection of attacks against such infrastructures; welcomes in that regard, the launch of the operation ‘Baltic Sentry’ by NATO, with the participation of several Member States, to improve the security of critical undersea infrastructures in the Baltic Sea; calls on Member States to fully abide by the commitments of the New York joint statement on the security and resilience of undersea cables; recalls also that similar sabotage activities targeting critical underwater infrastructure are taking place in the Taiwan Strait;

17.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to exercise strict control over, prevent and limit the activities of Russia’s shadow fleets which, in addition to violating EU and G7 sanctions, poses an immense ecological threat to ecosystems as a result of its technical deficiencies and frequent breakdowns; urges the Commission to take swift action, within the framework of the EU’s cooperation with the International Maritime Organization, and to design more targeted sanctions against the shadow fleet in the next sanctions package against Russia; specifies that such sanctions should designate all possible individual shadow fleet vessels, as well as their owners, operators, managers, etc.; recommends banning tanker sales to countries facilitating trade with Russia; notes that the flag states contributing to the Russian shadow fleet are thereby also helping the Russian war effort;

18.  Reiterates its call for the necessary measures to be taken to return forcibly deported and illegally adopted Ukrainian children from Russia or occupied Ukrainian territory;

19.  Calls on the Commission and the Council to designate the Russian State-funded private military Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation; draws attention to the so-called ‘Africa Corps’ that was created following the death of the Wagner Group’s former leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023, and placed directly under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defence, in an effort to regroup Wagner elements under government control;

20.  Reiterates that Ukraine, as a victim of aggression, has the legitimate right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls on the VP/HR, the Commission the Council and the Member States concerned to enable effective Ukrainian countermeasures against Russia; recalls that Russia has violated international law and that the full seizure of the frozen Russian assets is an appropriate step towards enforcing Russia’s obligation to abide by international law, and to compensate Ukraine and other injured parties for the losses caused by Russia’s war of aggression; calls on the Commission to establish a sound legal regime for the confiscation of Russian State assets frozen by the EU; reminds the Commission that any such proposal does not take away the need for continued financial, political, military and humanitarian support; calls for the inclusion of all assets of the Russian State, Russian local authorities, Russian State-owned companies, and of individuals on the EU sanctions list, and for those assets to be used to compensate Ukraine for the damage caused by this war;

21.  Points to the estimate of the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment that at least EUR 506 billion will be required over the next decade for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction; welcomes the EU’s Ukraine Facility, which has a budget of almost EUR 50 billion, and the EU’s Loan Cooperation Mechanism, which offers loans to Ukraine of up to EUR 45 billion and which responds to Parliament’s call and builds upon the decision of the Council to direct extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian State assets to the Ukraine Assistance Fund and the Ukraine Facility, as well as upon the G7’s decision to offer Ukraine a USD 50 billion loan secured through immobilised Russian State assets; expresses its conviction that the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism is a substantive step towards making Russia financially compensate for the massive damage it continues to cause in Ukraine;

22.  Denounces the abusive use by the Hungarian Government of its veto power to delay or effectively block EU essential aid from being granted to Ukraine, attempting to undermine the unified EU position on Ukraine; calls on the VP/HR and the Council President as well as the Member States to use all available tools to prevent the Hungarian Government from further blocking aid;

23.  Urges the VP/HR and the other Member States to overcome the blockade by the Hungarian Government of the EPF’s funding and disbursement decision, i.e. the one of EUR 450 million to Poland, being compensation for equipment delivered to Ukraine; urges them to guarantee that the EU’s only instrument in support of military aid to Ukraine becomes fully functional again; calls on the VP/HR to advance proposals to prevent such blockades in the future or to find an alternative mechanism that is fully reliable;

24.  Underscores the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to push for the creation of a special international tribunal with jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies; condemns the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russian forces; underscores that no peace will be sustainable without justice; welcomes the establishment of the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine in The Hague; expresses support for all the activities of the ICC and International Court of Justice in prosecuting the crimes committed on Ukrainian territory; welcomes Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which allowed it to become a state party to it as of January 2025;

25.  Commends Ukraine for its progress in the EU accession screening process despite wartime conditions and calls on Ukraine to continue its progress towards EU membership using all the resources made available to it under the Ukraine Facility and to ensure the meaningful involvement of its civil society in the implementation and monitoring phases thereof; recalls that EU accession is a strictly merit-based process that requires the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, including those concerning democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental values and the fight against corruption;

26.  Believes that both Ukraine’s and Moldova’s accession to the EU would be a mutually beneficial investment in a united and strong Europe; welcomes the growth plan for the Republic of Moldova and the adoption of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova, worth EUR 1,9 billion, which serves the purpose of accelerating EU-related reforms; expresses concern about the negative consequences of the suspension of USAID to Moldova; considers that this gap should be offset to the extent possible by EU sources, the European Endowment for Democracy and others; encourages the VP/HR to additionally enhance the CFSP partnership with Ukraine and Moldova and in this context welcomes the signature of the security and defence partnership between the EU and Moldova in May 2024; recalls the fact that the security of the Republic of Moldova is inextricably linked to the security of Ukraine; underscores, hence, the need to increase financial contributions from the EPF to further enhance Moldova’s defence capabilities;

27.  Praises the Moldova for running the presidential election and the referendum professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite the continued massive interference from Russia and its proxies; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 Moldovan European Union membership referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; expresses its support to Moldova in defending its democracy; strongly condemns such constant and coordinated attempts by the Russian Federation, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise the Republic of Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-European direction through hybrid attacks, the weaponisation of energy supplies, disinformation campaigns, bomb threats and staged protests as well as the threat or use of violence; commends the establishment and operations of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova which have enhanced the Moldovan authorities’ capabilities to address Russian interference; calls on the Council, the Commission and the EEAS to provide the additional resources, including human and financial resources, equipment and civilian experts, necessary to continue implementing the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025;

28.  Stresses the importance of the EPF for enhancing the EU’s ability to prevent conflicts, build peace and strengthen international security;

29.  Welcomes the launch of the Belarus-EU consultative group to enable continuous dialogue between the EU and the Belarusian democratic forces; reiterates its support for the release of all political prisoners and the brave activists and journalists in Belarus who continue to resist the regime of the illegitimate leader in spite of ongoing crackdowns, notably the refusal to renew the passports of Belarussians abroad, and who have expressed their desire for democratic development in Belarus and for membership of the EU, including at the New Belarus Conference held in Warsaw in August 2023; underlines that such efforts demonstrate the fundamental role of civil society in strengthening democracy;

Resolving conflict and supporting peace in the Middle East

30.  Affirms the right of Israel to defend itself as enshrined in and constrained by international law; recalls that Israel has the obligation to address the risk of mass starvation and the outbreak of disease epidemics in Gaza; recalls that Israel also has the obligation to protect the civilian population and that military operations must be proportionate and in line with international humanitarian law; expresses its concern about the military action by the Israeli Defence Forces in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank and in Lebanon; calls for an immediate and permanent ceasefire including the unconditional release of all hostages;

31.  Deeply regrets the breakdown of the ceasefire in Gaza, which has caused a large number of civilian casualties in recent air strikes; deplores, in this context, the refusal of Hamas to hand over the remaining hostages; calls for an immediate return to the full implementation of the ceasefire-hostage release agreement and stresses the need for progress towards its second phase; praises the commitment of mediators, including the US, Egypt and Qatar, whose efforts were pivotal in achieving the ceasefire-hostage release agreement in the first place; stands ready to engage in discussions on future concrete contributions to support a ceasefire; considers that it is crucial that all obligations made under the deal are upheld, ensuring the release of all hostages and establishing a lasting cessation of violence, as well as allowing unrestrained access and sustained distribution of humanitarian and medical assistance in the Gaza Strip; welcomes, to that end, the redeployment of EUBAM Rafah on 31 January 2025 to support the Palestinian Authority in facilitating crossings for medical evacuations; expresses its unease about the recent closing of the Rafah Crossing Point until further notice as a result of military operations in Gaza initiated on 18 March 2025; calls for all parties to fully commit to their obligations and to prioritise the protection of civilians; urges all European and international actors to actively oversee the implementation of the ceasefire and hold accountable those who fail to comply;

32.  Believes that the Association Council with Israel, held in Brussels on 24 February 2025, was a first step towards re-engaging in frank and open discussion with the Israeli Foreign Minister, which will require following up; acknowledges the value of engaging with Israel to strengthen the EU’s role in the Middle East, while stressing that the partnership must be based on full respect for rights and values; recalls that compliance with Article 2 of the Association Agreement is a crucial element of the partnership and calls for continued monitoring and assessment of its implementation by the Israeli Government; welcomes the anticipated High-Level Dialogue with the Palestinian Prime Minister in April 2025;

33.  Reiterates its unwavering support for a negotiated two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders, with two sovereign, democratic states as peaceful neighbours and with Jerusalem as their shared capital, which remains the most viable path to lasting peace and security for both Israelis and Palestinians; calls for the VP/HR to support all efforts to this end, and in particular the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the two-State Solution; calls on all parties to renew efforts to remove the obstacles to this solution and to engage in dialogue aimed at achieving mutual understanding and respect; welcomes the prospect of a return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza; regrets the fact that the Palestinian Authority has not held elections since 2005, which hampers its credibility, and expects elections to be held soon; is convinced that there can be no prospect for peace, security, stability and prosperity for Gaza as well as for reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian populations as long as Hamas and other terrorist groups play a role in the Gaza Strip; calls, therefore, on the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process to support efforts to counteract the further radicalisation of young people in the region; condemns the acceleration of the illegal Israeli settlement of Palestinian territory, which violates international law, undermines efforts towards achieving a two-state solution, and poses a significant obstacle to lasting peace; expresses concern over the rising violence committed by Israeli forces and extremist settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and welcomes sanctions adopted against extremist Israeli settlers; reiterates the important role of the Abraham Accords as a framework for achieving durable peace stability and prosperity in the Middle East; welcomes the Arab Recovery and Reconstruction Plan presented at the Cairo Summit on 4 March 2025, which represents a serious basis for discussions on the future of the Gaza Strip; encourages the VP/HR and the Commissioner for the Mediterranean to engage constructively with Arab partners to provide credible solutions for the reconstruction, governance and security of Gaza; rejects, on the other hand, the ‘Trump-Gaza’ proposal, which ignores the volatile security conditions across the Middle East; holds the opinion that the extent of destruction and human suffering in Gaza requires comprehensive international engagement, with the United States, together with the EU, the UN, Arab states, and other international partners, complementing each other’s efforts in order for negotiations to resume and to be constructive; is committed to the future normalisation efforts between Israel and Arab states in the region;

34.  Supports a just and viable solution to the question of Palestinian refugees; underscores that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) plays an important role in providing humanitarian aid and essential services which in the present circumstances must not be interrupted, and considers that all UN agencies active in the region must be supported in their efforts; recalls, however, its concern regarding serious allegations made against staff members of UNRWA which suggest that UNRWA has employed members of the terrorist organisation Hamas; welcomes the actions taken by the UN following the allegations regarding the Agency’s staff and welcomes UNRWA’s full commitment to implement the recommendations stemming from the ‘Colonna report’; echoes the European Council conclusions of 17 October 2024 which condemn any attempt to abrogate the 1967 agreement between Israel and UNRWA; insists that the Commission ensure that no funds from the EU budget finance, contribute to or support the activities of Hamas or Hezbollah; stresses that additional measures may be needed in the future to strive for even more transparency and accountability;

35.  Expresses concern about rising tensions in the Middle East and urges all involved parties to uphold international humanitarian law, to show maximum restraint and to commit to de-escalation, as a regional conflict must be avoided at all costs; deplores the loss of thousands of civilian lives; urges the disarmament of Hezbollah as part of broader measures to reduce hostilities and ensure regional stability; calls on the VP/HR to come forward with a comprehensive EU Middle East strategy, to increase the EU’s effective presence in the region, to promotes long-term stability and peace in the region and to strengthen partnerships with key regional stakeholders; stresses that the strategy must be fleshed out within the first months of the new Commission’s mandate and should be reflected in the forthcoming MFF for it to have any tangible impact on a rapidly deteriorating situation; underscores the need for Member States to step up their diplomatic efforts with international partners, including with the Gulf countries, in order to encourage urgent de-escalation and meaningful dialogue; underlines the need to prioritise and strengthen civil society organisations in the region, particularly organisations working on the protection of human rights and peacebuilding;

36.  Strongly condemns the destabilising role that the Iranian regime and its network of non-state actors play in the region; recalls that Iran has stepped out of the shadow of its proxies and condemns Iran’s two direct and open attacks on Israel’s territory in 2024, to which Israel retaliated both times, representing an unprecedented scaling up of the conflict; strongly condemns Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel which led to an Israeli ground invasion in Lebanon causing a high number of civilian casualties, forced displacement and escalating violence in Lebanon; takes note of the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, agreed on 27 November 2024 for a period of 60 days; urges Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701; recalls the need for a permanent cessation of hostilities as soon as possible to create space for a diplomatic solution along the Blue Line; demands the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in its entirety, as the only path to de-escalate tensions and stabilise the Israel-Lebanon border in a durable manner and fully restore the sovereignty, territorial integrity and stability of Lebanon; welcomes the Council Decision of 21 January 2025 to adopt a third assistance measure under the European Peace Facility worth EUR 60 million to the benefit of the Lebanese Armed Forces;

37.  Calls on the Council and the VP/HR to add Hezbollah in its entirety to the EU list of terrorist organisations;

38.  Takes note of the arrest warrant issued by the ICC on 21 November 2024;

39.  Echoes the call of ICC President Judge Tomoko Akane for the EU to take immediate action to protect the ICC and the rule of law in the international community, including by swiftly amending the EU blocking statute to bring the ICC within its scope;

40.  Welcomes the formation of a new government; wishes President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam success in delivering on the aspirations of the Lebanese people; is committed to supporting the country in rebuilding state institutions capable of fulfilling their mission at the service of all citizens, in taking forward a reform-oriented and forward-looking agenda, particularly regarding civil liberties and the rule of law; supports reconstruction efforts while embarking on a path of political stabilisation and socio-economic recovery; calls on the VP/HR to relaunch the EU-Lebanon Partnership, including by holding an Association Council soon;

41.  Strongly condemns recent attacks against the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) by the Israeli Defence Forces and Hezbollah; reiterates the inviolability of all UN personnel and premises and reaffirms the essential stabilising role played by UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, to which 16 Member States contribute, and calls for an immediate end to these attacks;

42.  Welcomes the EU’s decision to renew sanctions against Iran until July 2025, including by sanctioning Iran’s production of unmanned drones and missiles and its supply thereof to Russia and the wider Middle Eastern region; highlights the strong links between Iran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its proxies such as the Houthis and militias operating in Iraq and Syria; strongly condemns the high number of terrorist and assassination attacks, or attempted attacks, perpetrated by the IRGC all over the world, including on European soil, over the past few decades; reiterates its call for the IRGC to be added to the EU list of terrorist organisations; points out that the sanctioning options that have not yet been exhausted include a much more restrictive approach to technology transfers through exports of products that are not categorised as ‘dual-use’;

43.  Strongly condemns the destabilising Houthi attacks against commercial as well as military vessels transiting the Red Sea; stresses that these have caused significant disruption to global trade as shipping companies are forced to reroute much of the Red Sea’s traffic around the southern tip of Africa; calls for collective action and encourages enhanced EU engagement and international cooperation, and strongly urges for continued action to ensure the freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most critical waterways; calls for the immediate cessation of these illegal attacks;

44.  Shares the objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons at all costs; points, however, to the fact that the regime in Tehran has clearly rejected a revival of the JCPOA and has refused to cooperate in its ongoing dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency; highlights that, at the same time, Iran has increased its nuclear weapons capability; regrets the fact that there is currently no strategy in place to persuade Iran to refrain from building military nuclear capacity, nor a plan of action for the event that Iran does cross the nuclear threshold; calls upon the VP/HR to put forward a revised strategy towards Iran that prepares for all events;

45.  Expresses concern regarding the inflammatory rhetoric, fuelled by mis- and disinformation, that surrounds this conflict, and its instrumentalisation by malicious actors to sow distrust and hatred including within European societies, as illustrated notably, but not solely, by the worrying rise of antisemitism; warns that it should be a primary focus of the EU fight against disinformation and calls for a coordinated approach by the Commission, taking into account the external and internal dimensions of its policies, including but not limited to the forthcoming strategic communication plan to promote the EU’s role in the Southern Neighbourhood;

46.  Welcomes the historic fall of the Assad regime in Syria; recalls that it only survived so long thanks to the support of its Russian and Iranian allies and that its collapse shows they are weakened; welcomes the fresh start in EU-Syria relations, manifested by the appointment of an EU Chargé d'Affaires in Damascus, diplomatic engagement and high-level meetings undertaken by Member States and EU leaders, as well as the ninth Brussels Conference that took place on 17 March 2025 with the participation of interim Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani; considers that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the new Syrian authorities should not be a pretext for leniency for Member State nationals who fought as part of Islamist groups in Syria; declares that these fighters still represent a threat to the countries of which they are nationals and to all Member States of the EU; reiterates its unwavering support for the territorial integrity of Syria and highlights the need to urgently step up humanitarian aid and protection for the 16,7 million people in need; welcomes, to this end, the indefinite extension of humanitarian exemptions and the gradual, yet conditional, suspension of sanctions on a range of economic sectors so as to provide the Syrian economy with a much-needed lifeline; pledges to closely monitor the political transition process and to call on the Member States to reverse the lifting of sanctions should the Syrian authorities not live up to their stated commitments; recognises the challenge for orderly state-building linked to the risk of insurgency by armed groups loyal to the former regime and encourages the caretaker authorities to urgently organise paramilitary and civilian disarmament, especially following the inacceptable retaliatory targeting of the Alawite community based on its perceived association with the Assad regime; calls for the EU and its Member States to support the implementation process of the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF, in order to guarantee the Kurdish community full recognition and political participation in Syria; calls on all parties to contribute to a peaceful and Syrian-led political transition towards an inclusive, democratic governance model that ensures the representation, participation and equal rights of women, minorities and all members of Syrian society regardless of ethnicity or religion and that puts the good functioning of the state institutions and the wellbeing of the Syrian people at the heart of their actions; welcomes the caretaker President al-Sharaa’s acknowledgement of Syria’s diversity, while taking note that the composition of the current interim government is lacking in this regard; strongly believes that the success of the Syrian political transition, notably the safeguarding of civil peace and the building of trust in state institutions, hinges on transitional justice and reconciliation as a path to fighting the impunity of all parties responsible for violations of international humanitarian law; stresses that the fight against impunity in Syria is a moral and political imperative for Europe and the international community; calls on the EU and its Member States to support the work of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011; encourages Syria to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and align national legislation accordingly, as well as give the ICC retroactive jurisdiction through a declaration; calls on the EU and its Member States to consider the establishment of a special mission, in cooperation with international partners, to help document cases of serious crimes by the Assad regime, as well as by all other factions; stresses the importance of preserving the territorial integrity of Syria, also to help preserve stability in the region; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to take immediate steps to prevent any re-establishment or reinforcement of Russian forces, paramilitaries or intelligence in the country;

Incentivising cooperation with like-minded partners

47.  Acknowledges that the requirement for unanimity forces the Member States to work relentlessly to achieve compromise and unity, which is the source of the EU’s political leverage on the world stage; points out, however, that the trade-off between the ideal of unity and the high costs of unanimity in terms of credibility on the global stage should be assessed critically, particularly bearing in mind the effective functioning of an enlarged EU;

48.  Regrets, in this context, the fact that individual Member States have used their veto right to water down agreements, delay decision-making or thwart a common policy altogether; regrets that the potential for fast, efficient and effective foreign, security and defence action, as provided for, inter alia, by the passerelle clauses of the TEU, has never been used;

49.  Reiterates its call for the Council to gradually switch to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the CFSP that do not have military or defence implications; acknowledges the concerns of some Member States, which fear a decreased ability to influence foreign and security policy at EU level; encourages, pending the full application of qualified majority voting to decisions without military or defence implications, the full use of all currently existing possibilities to enhance decisiveness in this regard, including the use of constructive abstention in line with Article 31(1) TEU; recognises that progress towards the application of qualified majority voting can only be gradual, building on the formation of a European strategic culture;

50.  Highlights that the world is becoming more multipolar and less multilateral; emphasises that multilateral forums, chief among them the UN and its agencies, should be considered the EU’s format of cooperation of choice; calls on the Member States to reinforce inclusive forms of multilateral governance and encourages, in this context, the Commission, the EEAS and the Council to step up interinstitutional cooperation with multilateral organisations that are integral to the international rules-based order and thereby protect the UN and the multilateral system as a whole; expresses concern, in this respect, about the increasing relevance of exclusive formats of cooperation, which experience increasing competition; expresses concern at the growing membership of the BRICS group, which currently includes 45 % of the world’s population; stresses that such cooperation provides Russia with the means to circumvent measures intended to politically isolate the country and enables China to further extend its influence through its modus operandi of financing infrastructure projects; underlines that the seriousness of China’s engagement will depend on its willingness to make concessions to address the management and the restructuring of the debt of the countries of the Global South; observes, at the same time, that international institutions and norms are increasingly being instrumentalised and undermined by autocratic regimes; stresses that this trend puts the EU in a delicate position, having to balance the need to appeal for a broad and inclusive concept of multilateralism while reinforcing cooperation with selected, like-minded partners;

51.  Calls on the Commission and the Council to re-evaluate and reassess the EU’s approach towards the BRICS group and its partners and to develop a separate EU policy towards BRICS+;

52.  Calls strongly for a review of EU financial assistance to third countries to ensure that it does not support governments that challenge European values, spread anti-Western propaganda, support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and undermine the current international order that upholds democracy, human rights and the fight against corruption;

53.  Stresses, in this context, that the geopolitical context in which the EU is operating remains marked by radical uncertainty and a shift from cooperation to competition; observes with concern how all types of interaction are being weaponised and notes that this trend impairs international cooperation at a time when global transitions need to accelerate in order to effectively address global challenges; recalls that the EU cannot afford to turn inwards and must remain open and engaged in the world to defend its values and its interests; underlines that, in light of intensified efforts by third countries to destabilise the international order and undermine multilateralism through the spread of disinformation, enhanced cooperation and coordination with like-minded partners is essential;

54.  Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to actively support a comprehensive institutional reform of multilateral institutions, first and foremost the UN system and particularly the UN Security Council, which should include measures aimed at limiting the use of veto powers, boosting regional representation, making the executive body accountable to the assembly that elects it and redefining the composition to better reflect geopolitical reality, including by establishing a permanent seat for the EU; stresses that such reforms are essential to strengthen multilateralism, improve global governance and values-based decision-making, and address international challenges more inclusively and responsively;

55.  Recalls the importance of a strong and constructive partnership with the UK given not only the existence of an unprecedentedly comprehensive Trade and Cooperation Agreement, the foundation of shared values such as democracy, support for multilateralism and human rights, but also the scope of the issues of common interest in fields such as defence, climate and energy, border management, the fight against terrorism, organised crime and the promotion of peace and stability; welcomes, especially, the renewed impetus from the new UK Government to reflect with the EU on possibilities for closer and more permanent foreign policy and security cooperation, underpinned by concrete actions and building on the good cooperation at UN level as well as the effective coordination between the EU and the UK on the adoption and monitoring of the implementation of sanctions against Russia; believes that such coordination is of added value for both the EU and the UK and hence welcomes the agreement to work towards the creation of an EU-UK security partnership based on shared interest and collective responsibility; believes that in the scope of such a partnership, topics such as maritime security should be consulted on; demands that Parliament be duly involved and informed in such reflections before and after the anticipated UK-EU Summit;

56.  Takes note of the result of the presidential and congressional elections in the United States; expresses concern over the fast pace at which the new US administration has been reversing established partnerships and diplomatic tradition; expresses dismay concerning the current policy of appeasing Russia and targeting traditional allies; regrets recent comments made by US Vice President Vance, which question shared values underpinning the transatlantic partnership; warns that through such erratic policy, the Trump administration is gambling with a scarce good, namely trust in the US; believes, nonetheless, that the transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for the security of the partners on both sides of the Atlantic and is therefore worth investing in; deems it more crucial than ever to continue engaging with US counterparts at federal and state level; encourages Member States to pursue bilateral diplomatic channels with counterparts in the US as the format of cooperation preferred by the US administration, showing unity and commitment to a common EU position; reiterates the importance of EU-US summits to be held on a regular basis to provide top-level impetus to the future cooperation; fully supports the deepening of cooperation in the framework of the EU-US transatlantic dialogue, such as through transatlantic parliamentary diplomacy;

57.  Deplores the decision by the US to bring a sudden halt to most of its humanitarian aid and development assistance, including but not limited to the aid provided until now by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), with devastating effects on countless people’s lives, but which also risks severe consequences for human rights and global security; recognises that the EU cannot replace USAID, but needs to strategically and smartly reallocate resources through a Team Europe approach so as to mitigate impacts, in both the interests of the countries affected and our own interests; welcomes the announcement by the Commission and the EEAS that efforts are underway to inject liquidity in severely affected areas through redeploying and increasing pre-financing; commends the decision to initiate mapping at EU level, which should also take into account secondary effects, and asks for the results to be shared with the Member States and with Parliament; asks the Commission to issue a statement taking stock of the holistic response of the EU to this crisis;

58.  Calls on the Commission to foster closer ties with Canada in order to counter global challenges that affect our shared values, interests, security and prosperity; believes that the bilateral security and defence dialogue as well as the upcoming security and defence partnership provide the basis for enhanced security and defence cooperation, including on respective initiatives to boost defence industry production;

59.  Reiterates, irrespectively, the need for Member States to fully operationalise the concept of EU strategic autonomy and defence readiness and to this end make collective and well-coordinated investments in their security and defence with the objective of achieving a genuine European Defence Union that is interoperable and complementary with the NATO alliance and can act independently when needed; considers that the EU must act urgently to reduce its dependencies on non-EU countries for its defence capabilities, in particular for strategic enablers, ensuring its own autonomous security; recalls that the EDTIB is a strategic asset for both the Union’s security and defence and for its foreign policy; calls for its significant strengthening and for the deepening of defence industrial partnerships and integration of the industrial basis of like-minded reliable partners into the EDTIB, first and foremost Ukraine;

60.  Encourages close relations with western European non-EU countries, in particular cooperation in certain areas of EU external action; welcomes in this context the conclusion of negotiations on a broad package of measures for future EU-Switzerland relations, which mark a significant milestone in advancing and deepening the already close relationship; calls on the Commission to modernise and deepen bilateral relations between the EU and Switzerland; stresses the importance of promoting stronger relations with Norway, particularly in the scope of the security and defence partnership as well as the cooperative management of shared stocks and the continuation of long-standing fishing activities; calls for the swift signing of the association agreement between the EU and Andorra and San Marino;

61.  Welcomes the new momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; calls on the Commission and the Council to actively support Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU; expresses full support for the newly launched work on the EU-Armenia Partnership Agenda, establishing more ambitious joint priorities for cooperation across all dimensions;

62.  Expresses its strong support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size and extend its duration; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to agree to have such a civilian mission on their side of the border as well;

63.  Is of the view that the centre of gravity in the global order is shifting towards the Indo-Pacific and that the EU must strengthen its active role and presence in this region to safeguard its interests, promote stability and uphold a rules-based international order; reiterates that a peaceful, free, stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific region is of vital European interest; is concerned that great power competition in the region is imposing parameters on the EU’s ability to promote multilateralism in the region; points out, in this context, that the Asia-Europe Meeting is still hamstrung because of the geopolitical tensions with Russia; calls, in this context for enhanced foreign, security and defence policy ties with like-minded partners in the region in line with the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific; encourages the VP/HR to promote the visibility and impact of the EU’s external action together with our Indo-Pacific partners, particularly Australia, India, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan;

64.  Recalls, in this context, the strategic partnership the EU enjoys with Japan, which should serve as a role model for a fruitful bilateral partnership that allows effective policy-shaping in multilateral contexts; notes that the EU and Japan are celebrating 50 years of their respective diplomatic missions in 2024 and strongly emphasises the EU’s interest in deepening and broadening this partnership bilaterally in the 50 years to come; welcomes, to this end, the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), the latter of which provides for, among other things, consultations on the development of respective defence initiatives including exchange of information on defence industry-related matters, as well as the exploration of possible mutual involvement in respective defence initiatives;

65.  Notes that geopolitical challenges have strengthened the shared interest of the EU and India in ensuring security, prosperity and sustainable development; calls for an India-EU summit to keep bilateral relations high on the agenda; identifies climate change and green growth, digitalisation and new technologies, research and development, connectivity, trade and investment, foreign, security and defence policy as the key areas of cooperation; calls, in this respect, for stronger buy-in from Member States; calls, equally, on the Member States to expand and broaden the India-EU cooperation on maritime security in response to China’s evolving presence in the Indo-Pacific; highlights the need to engage with India on its heavy military dependency on Russia as well as its supply of restricted critical technologies to Russia; urges India to condemn Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and to join the EU sanctions policy towards Russia;

66.  Considers India an important democratic partner and encourages the EU to strictly engage with the Indian Government on the respect of human rights and rule of law, both internally and worldwide; calls for the full implementation of the EU Strategy on India of 2018 and the EU-India Roadmap to 2025 in close coordination with Member States’ own actions; stresses in particular the need to promote greater synergies in foreign and security policy through existing dialogue mechanisms and other forums set up under the EU-India Roadmap to 2025; believes that the momentous visit of the President of the Commission and the College of Commissioners to India on 27 and 28 February 2025 marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of EU-India relations and reaffirmed the strategic link and its untapped potential; welcomes the announcement of a forthcoming strategic EU-India agenda;

67.  Recalls the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as one of the principles of EU-China relations; underscores that Taiwan is a key democratic partner for the EU in the Indo-Pacific region; recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector, and urges the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan in order to further boost economic, trade and investment ties; encourages the Commission to launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on an investment agreement with Taiwan; emphasises that any attempt from authoritarian regimes to restrict the benign development of EU-Taiwan relations is not acceptable;

68.  Strongly condemns China’s continued military provocations against Taiwan and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, cannot be accepted and will have high costs; highlights that China’s territorial claims have no basis in international law and that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people; denounces, furthermore, China’s blocking of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in multilateral organisations, such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, by its continuous distortion of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758; calls, accordingly, for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations;

69.  Expresses deep concern about the latest shifts in China’s domestic and military posture since the 20th national congress of the Chinese Communist Party; holds the view that China demonstrates that it has both the intent and increasingly the economic, diplomatic, technological and military power to redefine the global order; underscores that the military-civil fusion strategy is a testament to such means; stresses, in this context, that the EU needs to be more assertive and unified in its approach to China and therefore calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to review the strategy towards China that takes full account of the increasingly oppressive domestic policies, the assertive foreign policy as well as the use of economic coercion as a means by which China aims to reach its objectives; considers that the challenges stemming from the rise of China as a global actor require a balanced multi-dimensional response along the principle of ‘cooperate where possible, compete where needed and confront where necessary’, through which the EU maintains its selective engagement with China as a permanent member of the UN Security Council on a number of key issues;

70.  Highlights that the PRC’s increasingly aggressive posture poses a threat to the freedom of navigation and jeopardises the stability which is vital for global trade; emphasises that this situation is being watched with concern by a growing number of like-minded partners committed to peace and stability in the region; underlines the need to shore up deterrence against destabilising behaviour, including through regular operations to assert freedom of navigation over the PRC’s attempts to impose control over international waters and airspace;

71.  Holds the view that China, through the continued growth of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers, (indirectly) enables the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine;

72.  Reiterates its condemnation of China’s violation of its international commitments, its breaches of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ‘one country, two systems’ principle and the Hong Kong Basic Law as well as the crackdown on the special administrative region’s autonomy and opposition figures, including members of civil society and their family members; calls on the Commission to assess the autonomous status of Hong Kong and Macao in the light of China’s breaches of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations and the crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy;

73.  Is concerned about the growing economic penetration of Chinese companies within the EU, including in strategic sectors such as battery manufacturing; stresses the urgent need to continue the policy of de-risking by continuing to reduce economic dependence in critical sectors, in line with the EU’s economic security strategy;

74.  Reiterates that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a crucial partner in reinforcing rules-based multilateralism; supports ASEAN’s efforts to finalise negotiations with China on an effective and substantive code of conduct in the South China Sea; encourages enhanced EU engagement and cooperation with ASEAN and efforts towards a comprehensive strategic partnership, building on economic ties and sustainable growth, and in particular on political cooperation with regard to human rights and democracy; calls for increased support for Myanmar’s national unity government and for greater pressure to be applied to ASEAN countries to align on international sanctions against Myanmar’s military junta;

75.  Urges the VP/HR and the Member States to focus on bilateral relations with partners in Africa, among others South Africa, Ghana, Morocco, Kenya, Senegal and Mauretania, taking into account mutual needs and interests in order to foster real and balanced partnerships; believes that the ‘more for more’ principle should be integrated fully into relations with non-EU countries, whereby the EU develops stronger partnerships with those countries that uphold the principles of the CFSP and the common security and defence policy (CSDP), and the fundamental values of the EU; is of the belief that the EU needs to maintain a continued focus on Africa, which is already a strategic continent and will become an increasingly important player in the future;

76.  Calls for the EU to suspend both its Memorandum of Understanding on raw materials and all military cooperation with Rwanda, including through the EPF and any other mechanisms, until Rwanda ends its illegal support for armed groups and fully respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); condemns the breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the eastern DRC by the rebels of M23; condemns the capture of Goma and Bukavu by the M23 armed group and its continued offensive in South Kivu, which has further exacerbated the acute humanitarian crisis, heightened the risk of the DRC’s destabilisation and a full-blown regional war; supports the Luanda Nairobi peace process to achieve a political solution to the conflict by diplomatic means and urges the VP/HR to continue diplomatic outreach to the conflict and regional parties and to increase pressure on parties to re-engage in peaceful negotiations, including through the postponing of the EU Security and Defence Consultations with Rwanda and adoption of sanctions depending on the situation on the ground and progress in ongoing regional mediations processes; is deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation of thousands of displaced persons in the area; urges the VP/HR to engage in clear actions in line with the EU’s Great Lakes strategy in order to restore stability and to cooperate with the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) for the protection of civilians in the eastern DRC;

77.  Underlines that the recent developments in Tunisia have raised concerns about human rights and democratic standards, with reports indicating limited transparency, restricted opposition participation and reduced political competition in the presidential election; underlines the EU’s continued commitment to and support for Tunisia during this politically and socio-economically sensitive period, through maintaining contact at various levels;

78.  Underscores that the EU has a direct and vital interest in the stability, security and economic growth of the Mediterranean basin as well as the wider Southern Neighbourhood; recalls that the European neighbourhood policy was launched with the laudable goals of fostering stability, prosperity and good governance in the southern Mediterranean; acknowledges, however, that it is evident today that its instruments, objectives and principles are no longer aligned with the region’s current realities; regrets that, almost 30 years after the launch of the so-called Barcelona Process, the creation of an area of shared prosperity, stability and freedom with the Mediterranean countries of the Southern Neighbourhood has not been achieved; calls on the Commission to present a new pact for the Mediterranean; believes that the EU and the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood should conclude memorandums of understanding aimed at promoting stability, prosperity and the defence of human rights, conditional on cooperating on migration; recalls that instability and insecurity in the Southern Neighbourhood remains an ongoing challenge for European external border management; argues that, while prioritising bilateral relations with countries in the region, the EU should also continue to foster regional cooperation through existing frameworks such as the Union for the Mediterranean; welcomes the appointment of a Commissioner in charge of the Mediterranean;

79.  Stresses the need for the EU to strengthen and deepen its cooperation with Arab countries and the Gulf, in response to the pressing geopolitical, social, and economic challenges facing the region; emphasises that enhanced collaboration should prioritise key areas such as migration, digital transformation, security, the green transition and cultural exchange to build a resilient partnership; calls for a strategic approach that tailors engagement with each country to foster sustainable development and mutual understanding;

80.  Welcomes the successful conclusion of the first EU-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit and believes this summit to have marked a pivotal moment in the relationship between the EU and its partners from the GCC, stressing mutual commitment to strengthening ties across key strategic, economic, and cultural areas;

81.  Underlines the importance of upholding and promoting democratic values in the region; condemns the rise of hate speech, including against the European institutions, and attacks on individual freedoms and the international order, both within Member States and abroad;

82.  Emphasises that the countries of the EU, Latin American and the Caribbean are like-minded and share values, languages, history, culture and religion, which should make them natural partners in today’s geopolitical context; notes that the EU’s engagement in the region has dwindled in recent decades, which has created a vacuum for the growing influence of China and Russia; urges countries across Latin America to adopt a firmer attitude of condemnation of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to pursue proactive diplomacy in the region, with a strong emphasis on defending the multilateral global order, international law and respect for democracy and human rights; urges for multilateral initiatives to address political instability in the most volatile countries in the region, for instance in Haiti;

83.  Welcomes the signing of the EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement and calls for its swift and full ratification; welcomes, equally, the conclusion of the negotiations on the modernised EU-Mexico Global Agreement, which was announced by the Commission on 17 January 2025 and for which Parliament still has to give its consent; highlights that the agreement would reinforce the EU’s strategic partnership with Mexico, recognising the country’s pivotal role in Latin America and its ambition to diversify trade and political partnerships to reduce economic dependency on the US;

84.  Takes note of the conclusion of the agreement with Mercosur; expresses concern regarding its potentially negative impact on EU sustainability and safety standards and on the competitiveness of the EU agri-food sector, and underlines that Parliament must examine whether the agreement meets the EU sustainability standards and complies with the reciprocity principle, before ratification can be considered;

85.  Welcomes the EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) informal meeting and the implementation of initiatives under the EU-CELAC Roadmap 2023-2025 and, in this regard, underlines the need to adopt a new and ambitious roadmap at the 2025 summit, that keeps strengthening the partnership and takes into account best practices accomplished so far;

86.  Underlines the need for a tougher approach to address violence against environmental defenders and to step up the EU’s efforts to assist in the preservation of biodiversity and in adaptation to the climate emergency; suggests further strengthening cooperation against organised crime and drug trafficking which also has an impact on the EU; calls for a substantial increase in bi-regional cooperation in the fight against this phenomenon;

87.  Calls on the VP/HR to make the work with like-minded democracies a priority of her term and to systematise cooperation and consultation with democratic like-minded partners in order to promote democracy and improve common preparedness and access to crisis response resources; reiterates, in this context, the recommendation to deepen ties with regional organisations such as ASEAN and the African Union to enhance cooperative security frameworks;

88.  Reiterates its support for the European Political Community as a platform for discussion, dialogue and cooperation with European partners on the foreign policy and security challenges we are facing, with the aim of strengthening security and stability in Europe and pursuing political and security cooperation based on shared interests; calls for the close involvement of Parliament in the clarification of the scope and the future work of this community; underlines that, for the future success and coherence of this format, some level of alignment on democratic values and principles is essential; reiterates that the European Political Community may under no circumstances become a pretext for delays to the EU accession of enlargement countries;

89.  Believes also in the significance of building new alliances, inter alia with the countries in our neighbourhood as well as in the Global South, taking into account mutual needs and interests in order to foster real, balanced and equal partnerships; stresses the importance of establishing these political agreements with third countries, based on common European values and fundamental rights; calls for the EU to respond to partner countries’ expectations and to deliver quickly on political agreements with them in order to show that the EU is a reliable and strategic partner and demonstrate that the international rules-based system can meet contemporary challenges; calls on the Commission to ensure the active involvement of Parliament in the establishment, implementation and monitoring of the future clean trade and investment partnerships; calls, in this context, for collaborative initiatives between the EU and Global South countries to assess and tackle the debt crisis; notes that agreements with the Global South, especially on raw materials, should contribute to local economic development rather than deepening dependence and excessive resource exploitation;

Fostering EU action abroad

90.  Highlights the role of the VP/HR as a bridge-builder between the CFSP and EU external relations to ensure the highest level of coordination and coherence in EU external action; stresses the need for the EU to foster the visibility and effectiveness of its external action and development cooperation efforts, regrets, nonetheless, that in some cases there is a lack of clarity in the external representation of the EU, hindering the EU’s strategic communication abroad; stresses the need to clearly define the competences of the VP/HR, the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council with regard to the EU’s external action and representation so that the EU’s voice is coherent and perceived as such by its partners; calls on the Commission to strengthen its coordination with the EEAS in external action, including by ensuring full compliance with Articles 3.2 and 9 of the EEAS Decision(17), which may need to be updated;

91.  Calls for the EEAS – both its headquarters and EU delegations – to be strengthened through the provision of the appropriate financial and human resources so that the EU can be better prepared for current and emerging global challenges; calls for the EEAS to be able to select and recruit its permanent EU diplomatic staff and to ensure a fair gender and geographical balance among Member States across all levels within the EEAS; calls on the VP/HR to swiftly come up with proposals for the future operational structure of the EU’s external action and to that end to fully take into account Parliament’s recommendation of 15 March 2023 taking stock of the functioning of the EEAS and for a stronger EU in the world(18); stresses the need to strengthen strategic communication and the EU’s work on countering disinformation via dedicated resources and offices in strategically relevant regions and countries;

92.  Recalls that the EU has a strategic interest in advancing sustainable development, poverty reduction and equality globally, as these efforts contribute to long-term global peace and security; calls on the Commission to effectively and swiftly use the Global Gateway Initiative as a sustainable alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and as an instrument to increase the EU’s presence and visibility worldwide; recalls that the Global Gateway Initiative is to be understood as a strategic concept integrating foreign, economic and development policy, including the climate and digital transitions, as well as infrastructure investment in order to strengthen close partnership based on mutual benefits, economic development and resilient supply chains; stresses, in this context, that coordination with international financial institutions, well-defined private-sector involvement and tailored strategic communications, including in the recipient countries, are essential in order for the instrument to reach the desired scale; is concerned by reports that a number of Global Gateway projects are being implemented by Chinese companies in direct violation of the initiative’s aims and objectives, which includes the strengthening of the EU’s economic security and fostering economic development and mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries; calls, therefore, for an immediate investigation and the removal of all Chinese companies involved in Global Gateway; stresses that the EU’s support should complement other initiatives such as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor and the Lobito Corridor, and should in particular aim at achieving the Sustainable Development Goals;

93.  Reiterates that Parliament plays an integral role in the CFSP and makes a specific contribution thereto by virtue of its parliamentary diplomacy and its distinct instruments, channels and contacts, including its democracy support programmes, the Foreign Affairs Committee, regular parliamentary dialogues and official delegations; emphasises that parliamentary diplomacy has a great potential to engage key political stakeholders and facilitate democratic governance; stresses, in particular, the added value of parliamentary diplomacy during the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and highlights, in this context, the valuable cooperation at political and technical level between the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the European Parliament;

94.  Firmly believes that diplomacy is a significant part of EU action; calls, in this light, for the further development of the EU’s preventive diplomacy as a proactive external policy tool to pre-empt, mediate and peacefully resolve conflict between parties, calls on the EEAS to integrate the EU’s preventive diplomacy tools within structural prevention mechanisms and actions, such as political agreements among different actors involved in conflicts, national dialogues for reconciliation, peacebuilding and transitional justice, as well as truth and reconciliation commissions; urges the EEAS to conduct ‘lessons learnt’ exercises to assess diplomatic efforts, identify areas for improvement and integrate best practice into future initiatives; calls for the EEAS’ capacities in those regards to be increased, in particular in the relevant crisis preparedness and response divisions; stresses the urgent need to double the relevant EU budget within the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument and strongly increase EU action on mediation, dialogue and reconciliation;

95.  Reaffirms the role of the EU special representatives (EUSRs), who promote the EU’s policies and interests in specific regions and countries and play an important role in the development of a stronger and more effective CFSP by providing the EU with an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a ‘voice’ and ‘face’ for the EU and its policies; emphasises the importance of equipping EUSRs with sufficient resources enabling them to effectively implement those tasks; stresses the importance for EUSRs of having a broad, flexible mandate, capable of adapting to evolving geopolitical circumstances in order to promote the EU’s policies and interests in specific regions and countries and play an active role in preventive diplomacy efforts; insists that the appointment of new EUSRs should take place only after a hearing in Parliament;

96.  Underlines that corruption enables and exacerbates human rights violations, abuses, and the erosion of democratic principles and the rule of law; calls for the EU and its Member States to address the risks that corruption poses to stability, governance and peace, and to prevent and counter these threats to EU interests and to global prosperity and security, particularly in the EU’s eastern and southern neighbourhoods; encourages closer coordination between the EU, its Member States and allies and partners wherever possible, in order to tackle systemic corruption that empowers autocratic regimes, facilitates the spread of malign influence, deprives societies of essential resources and undermines democratic values, human rights and the rule of law; stresses the crucial role of civil society and independent journalists in non-EU countries in monitoring and exposing corruption; calls, therefore, for the EU to adopt a comprehensive and swiftly implemented anti-corruption framework within its foreign policy, encompassing the EU sanctions regime, the proposed anti-corruption directive and the broader EU anti-corruption strategy; urges the VP/HR to propose concrete and far-reaching measures in this regard, and supports the inclusion of anti-corruption provisions in EU trade agreements with non-EU countries;

97.  Underlines the EU’s missions and operations abroad for promoting peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world; calls on the VP/HR:

98.  Calls on the VP/HR to follow up on the examples of the successful evacuation actions in Sudan and of the stepped-up consular protection, and to work towards a comprehensive system of protection for EU citizens abroad; stresses that the impact of continuous crises and conflicts worldwide can entail the risk of overloading Member States’ consular protection and/or assistance capacities and calls, in this regard, for the strengthening of the capabilities and resources of the EEAS Crisis Response Centre and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism; recalls its longstanding position of applying a similar level of protection for the local staff in EU delegations and CFSP missions and operations;

III.The next MFF and its parliamentary oversight

99.  Believes that there is a need for stronger institutionalised parliamentary oversight of the EU’s external action, including regular and timely, yet secure, access to confidential information and briefings in the European Parliament in line with Article 36 TEU; emphasises the need for more feedback from the VP/HR and the EEAS about the actions taken and the effects achieved, in order to fulfil Parliament’s recommendations outlined in the resolutions on foreign affairs matters;

100.  Underlines that in the CFSP, which comprises the CSDP, the European Parliament exercises its budgetary function jointly with the Council; recalls that the European Parliament also exercises the function of political control and consultation over those policies as referred to in Article 36 TEU;

101.  Recalls that in line with Article 41 TEU, all CFSP and CSDP administrative and operating expenditure should be charged to the EU budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications;

102.  Underlines that CFSP or CSDP decisions entailing expenditure always constitute basic choices for those policies and must be subject to parliamentary oversight; calls on the VP/HR to consult Parliament before proposing CFSP or CSDP decisions, thereby ensuring transparency and accountability in line with Article 36 TEU;

103.  Recalls that Parliament’s exercise of its budgetary function is inextricably linked to its function of political control and consultation; recalls that Article 36 TEU establishes a specific relationship between the VP/HR and the European Parliament, which is a prerequisite for Parliament to exercise those functions, and that the VP/HR should support Parliament in those regards;

104.  Regrets that the budget for civilian CSDP missions is insufficient; recalls that the number and tasks of such missions have increased, the security environment has become more challenging, and the cost of operations has increased; urges the European Council to provide for a substantive increase in CFSP funding placed under a separate Civilian CFSP and Crisis Management heading; calls for the efficient use of the funds allocated to civilian CSDP missions to be ensured, in order to make sure that these missions are able to respond effectively to crisis situations and unforeseen events; calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to come forward with joint proposals to those ends;

105.  Is deeply concerned that the EEAS is structurally underfunded and that this already entails serious and far-reaching negative consequences for the EU’s external action and the performance of the EU institutions in this area; underlines that a specific approach to the EEAS’ administrative budget is necessary and recalls that the absence of corrective action risks having a severe impact on the EU’s relations with third countries;

106.  Calls on the Commission to consider in its proposal for the next MFF under the EU external action heading:

107.  Calls on the Commission to present its proposals for the next MFF in the first semester of 2025 to allow for sufficient time to negotiate the programmes; underlines the need for a more detailed budgetary nomenclature in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance and the CFSP budget, which allow the budgetary authority to set policy and geographic priorities in the framework of the annual budgetary procedure;

108.  Underlines that each matter raised above requires an appropriate response by the executive; calls on the VP/HR to respond to Parliament’s calls, requests and concerns swiftly and in writing; considers that oral statements in committee or plenary can only constitute a sufficient response in exceptional or urgent cases; stresses that in the current challenging geopolitical context, close cooperation and partnership between the European Parliament and the VP/HR are of strategic importance; expects more systematic exchanges prior to the adoption of mandates and CFSP strategies and an improved flow of information on negotiations and the implementation of international agreements, as well as memoranda of understanding; expects, in addition, Parliament to be effectively incorporated throughout EU external policies and action, thereby mobilising parliamentary diplomacy in support of the VP/HR’s efforts;

o
o   o

109.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2020/1222/oj. (2) OJ L 102, 24.3.2021, p. 14, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2021/509/2024-03-18. (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj. (4) OJ L, 2025/535, 21.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/535/oj. (5) OJ L 129 I, 17.5.2019, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2019/797/oj. (6) OJ C, C/2023/1226, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1226/oj. (7) OJ C, C/2025/204, 14.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/204/oj. (8) OJ C, C/2025/487, 29.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/487/oj. (9) OJ C, C/2024/5719, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5719/oj. (10) OJ C, C/2025/486, 29.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/486/oj. (11) OJ C, C/2024/1188, 23.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1188/oj. (12) OJ C 137 E, 27.5.2010, p. 25. (13) OJ C 171, 6.5.2021, p. 25. (14) OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p. 112. (15) OJ C, C/2024/5721, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5721/oj. (16) OJ L 115, 28.4.2006, p. 50, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2006/313/oj. (17) Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (OJ L 201, 3.8.2010, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2010/427/oj). (18) European Parliament recommendation of 15 March 2023 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy taking stock of the functioning of the EEAS and for a stronger EU in the world (OJ C, C/2023/410, 23.11.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/410/oj).