



TEXTS ADOPTED

P10_TA(2025)0191

Strengthening Moldova's resilience against Russian hybrid threats and malign interference

European Parliament resolution of 10 September 2025 on strengthening Moldova's resilience against Russian hybrid threats and malign interference (2025/2811(RSP))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its previous resolutions on Moldova, in particular its resolution of 18 June 2025 on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova¹ and its resolution of 9 October 2024 on strengthening Moldova's resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential election and a constitutional referendum on EU integration²,
- having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part³, which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area,
- having regard to the European Council Conclusions on Moldova of 27 June 2025,
- having regard to the visit of three EU Heads of State or Government (of France, Germany and Poland) to Moldova on 27 August 2025 and the visit of the President of Romania to Moldova on 31 August 2025,
- having regard to the visit of the President of the Republic of Moldova to the European Parliament on 9 September 2025,
- having regard to the Joint Declaration following the first Republic of MoldovaEU Summit of 4 July 2025,
- having regard to the visit of the Commissioner for Enlargement to Moldova on 9 May 2025 (Europe Day),
- having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

¹ Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0131.

² OJ C, C/2025/204, 14.1.2025, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/204/oj>.

³ OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/492/oj.

- A. whereas on 28 September 2025 the Republic of Moldova will hold parliamentary elections that will determine the country's continued democratic consolidation and further progress towards EU accession, as well as its future as a free and sovereign democracy within the EU; whereas these parliamentary elections take place in a context mired by continued Russian interference and efforts to destabilise the country's political landscape and democratic electoral processes;
- B. whereas Moldova held a referendum on 20 October 2024, the outcome of which confirmed that EU accession would be enshrined into Moldova's constitution, despite an unprecedented level of manipulative interference by Russia to destabilise the country, including the illicit financing of political actors, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;
- C. whereas there are numerous reports of renewed and intensifying attempts at disinformation, destabilisation and interference by Russia and Russian proxies with the aim of derailing Moldova's process of democratic reform and European integration, reasserting political control over it and further refining hybrid tactics against Moldova, Ukraine and other European countries, such as recently in Romania;
- D. whereas following the 30 July 2025 meeting of the Supreme Security Council, President Maia Sandu presented findings from Moldova's specialised institutions on methods of hybrid warfare, identifying 10 principal instruments of foreign interference in Moldova's political and electoral processes;
- E. whereas on 15 July 2025, the EU imposed sanctions against seven individuals and three entities responsible for actions aimed at destabilising, undermining or threatening Moldova's sovereignty and independence, and democracy, the rule of law and stability in the country; whereas these sanctions target close associates of Ilan Shor and the banned ŞOR party, people who are actively involved in vote-buying schemes and bribing corrupt politicians;
- F. whereas Moldovan civil society and independent media play a crucial role in exposing disinformation, strengthening resilience and defending democratic values; whereas the Republic of Moldova has managed to significantly consolidate its democracy, continue its reform trajectory and develop its relations with the EU; whereas the improvements in the country's democratic system have been reflected in its progress on various international indexes; whereas Moldova has made notable progress with regard to judicial reforms, including vetting and restructuring of the judiciary, strengthening its independence and improving anti-corruption regulations; whereas public trust in democratic institutions is essential for Moldova's stability and resilience against malign interference;
- G. whereas a recent journalistic investigation, based on the infiltration of the ŞOR party network by an undercover reporter starting in 2024, revealed that hundreds of fake accounts, managed by activists from the 'Victory' political bloc under the control of Ilan Şor from Moscow, had been established to disseminate Russian propaganda on TikTok and Facebook; whereas this anti-European content, fully aligned with Kremlin narratives, was systematically monitored and coordinated through secret Telegram

groups and channels¹;

- H. whereas it is important to publicly demonstrate unwavering solidarity with the people of Moldova, who have been seriously affected by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as by continued, targeted Russian hybrid threats aiming to politically destabilise the country, undermine economic prosperity and weaken social cohesion;
 - I. whereas according to Moldovan estimates, Russian has already invested over EUR 200 million, equivalent to more than 1 % of Moldova's GDP, in propaganda and information operations in the Republic of Moldova;
 - J. whereas the participation of a European Parliament delegation in the International Election Observation Mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for the Moldovan parliamentary elections of 28 September 2025 demonstrates Parliament's commitment to supporting the integrity of electoral processes and strengthening democratic institutions in Moldova;
 - K. whereas the June 2025 European Council conclusions reaffirmed full support for Moldova's EU path and invited the Council to take the next steps in the accession process; whereas EU enlargement is based on strict conditionality and the principle that each candidate country is assessed on its own merits and reform progress;
1. Stands in solidarity with the people of the Republic of Moldova and reiterates its full support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, as well as for its efforts to defend the integrity of its democratic processes, the sovereignty of its foreign policy decisions and the socio-economic prospects of its people; calls, therefore, on Russia to respect Moldova's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and cease its attempts at undermining Moldova's constitutional order and democratic institutions;
 2. Condemns the repeated attempts by the Russian Federation, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country's democracy and progress towards EU accession through hybrid attacks, the manipulation of energy supplies to achieve political outcomes, illicit financing of political actors, and campaigns of disinformation, manipulation and intimidation targeting civil society organisations and independent media;
 3. Condemns the intensifying Russian hybrid operations and attempts at interference ahead of the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025 that clearly aim to destabilise the country and reverse its democratic course and sovereign decisions, in particular in relation to future EU membership;
 4. Commends Moldova's exemplary commitment and steady progress on EU accession-related reforms despite significant internal and external challenges – including Russia's full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine and targeted Russian hybrid threats against Moldova – which have made it possible for accession negotiations to start in June 2024,

¹ <https://www.zdg.md/en/kremlins-digital-army-an-undercover-investigation-its-paid-let-me-tell-you-its-paid-directly-from-moscow/>.

only six months after the relevant decision by the European Council on 14 December 2023 and less than two years after Moldova's application for EU membership on 3 March 2022; calls on the Council and the Commission to uphold the merit-based principle by assessing each candidate country individually, ensuring that progress on accession steps, including the opening of negotiation chapters, is determined by its own achievements and circumstances; reaffirms its unwavering support for Moldova's prospects for EU membership; urges the Council, furthermore, and to swiftly open accession negotiations on Cluster 1 (fundamentals) in recognition of Moldova's substantial progress in advancing crucial reforms;

5. Calls for the EU to continue to support the Republic of Moldova in ensuring the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections; underlines the key role of international observers not only in monitoring the electoral process, but also in monitoring and documenting malicious foreign interference, including disinformation, illicit financing and coordinated cyber or influence operations;
6. Expresses its firm belief that Moldova's capacity to consolidate its current progress on EU accession-related reforms and sustain its ambitious pace towards EU membership will require the strong and genuine support of its parliament;
7. Notes with satisfaction the EU's efforts to provide political support to Moldova at the highest level, notably the first-ever EU-Moldova summit in Chişinău on 4 July 2025, the visit of EU Heads of State or Government (of France, Germany and Poland) to Moldova on 27 August 2025, and the visit of the President of Romania to Moldova on 31 August 2025, which all served to emphasise again the clear prospect of Moldova joining the EU based on merit and respect for democratic principles;
8. Reiterates its call for the EU to continue to complement its political support with increasing financial and technical support for the Moldovan Government's efforts to counter foreign interference in the country's democratic processes, including through additional sanctions listings such as those of 15 July 2025, the granting of additional support to the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in Moldova, the exchange of information on suspicious financial flows, including cryptocurrencies, and on opaque or illegal funding networks, the sharing of expertise in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), countering hybrid threats and strengthening resilience; renews its call for the Moldovan authorities and the EU to increase their support for independent media and pro-democracy civil society, to enable journalists at national and regional level to counter FIMI and strengthen digital literacy; welcomes the Commission's announcement of a new regional hub for the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) to support Moldova and Ukraine in fighting disinformation; urges all major online platforms, in particular Meta, Google, Telegram, TikTok, Microsoft and Rakuten, to closely cooperate with the Moldovan authorities, civil society and the new EDMO hub; calls on Moldova to align its legislation with the EU Digital Markets Act¹ and Digital Services Act² without delay; calls on the Commission to provide

¹ Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj>).

² Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive

Moldova with dedicated support in this regard;

9. Encourages the Moldovan authorities to make full use of the EUPM's expertise to counter any repeated electoral interference ahead of the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025; encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to use all available EU instruments to support Moldova in countering hybrid threats, including through the Hybrid Rapid Response Team, the Cyber Rapid Response Team and the Cybersecurity Reserve; welcomes, and calls for the EU to increase its support for, the efforts of Moldova's Centre for Strategic Communications and Countering Disinformation to coordinate the fight against foreign interference among the various Moldovan institutions, and the efforts of the National Agency for Cyber Security and the National Institute for Cyber Security Innovations; reiterates the importance of improving information sharing and intelligence cooperation on security threats between Moldova and the EU and its Member States; calls for the EU to learn lessons from the experience gained in Moldova that can be applied to protect the EU's own electoral processes and democratic institutions;
10. Notes Moldova's consistent alignment with the EU's common foreign and security policy positions and the implementation of its Security and Defence Partnership with the EU since 2024 and its new 2024-2034 national defence strategy; calls, therefore, on the Member States to increase funding for Moldova through the European Peace Facility, also in the light of repeated violations of Moldovan airspace by Russian drones and missiles, and to include Moldova in joint defence procurement under the European Defence Industrial Programme; stresses Moldova's role in the security and stability of the EU's eastern border and the Black Sea region, amid the humanitarian and energy crises caused by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine;
11. Calls on the Russian Federation to withdraw its military forces, equipment and ammunition from the Transnistrian region and to support a peaceful resolution of the conflict in accordance with international law and Moldova's sovereignty and territorial integrity;
12. Urges Moldova's authorities and civil society and the EU to enhance strategic communication, debunking and combating false narratives promoted by Russia about the EU and its policies and highlighting the concrete short- and long-term benefits of EU accession for people throughout Moldova, with a special focus on communication in regions such as Gagauzia and in socio-economically disadvantaged communities in rural areas; expresses its readiness to continue supporting the Parliament of Moldova through mutually agreed democracy support activities; recommends, therefore, that full use be made of the European Parliament Liaison Office in Chişinău for disseminating information, countering disinformation and supporting citizen engagement, thereby contributing to strengthening Moldova's democratic resilience; is deeply concerned about Russia's extensive campaign of exploiting homophobia, including intimidation and physical attacks, and calls on the Commission, the Member States and Moldova to invest in Moldovan society's resilience by advocating for equality for all, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity;
13. Notes that Russia's National Security Strategy, approved by President Putin on

31 December 2015, building on the Military Doctrine of 25 December 2014, explicitly defends so-called traditional Russian spiritual and moral values against perceived Western influence, thereby demonstrating Russia's instrumentalisation of these values and their institutions for strategic purposes; expresses concern over Russia's instrumentalisation of so-called traditional Russian values and stresses that one of the primary channels for Russian propaganda in Moldova is the Moscow-affiliated Metropolis of Chişinău and All Moldova under the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church; underlines that in April 2024 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recognised the Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument of Kremlin propaganda, and in August 2024 the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople denounced it as militaristic, ethno-nationalist and heretical; condemns the intimidation of the clergy of the Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia by Russian proxies¹;

14. Recognises the Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia as a victim of Soviet oppression; notes that after it was abusively abolished by the Soviet authorities, the Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia was not officially recognised until 2002, following a decision by the European Court of Human Rights;
15. Notes the important contributions of civil society organisations in countering disinformation and the malign influence of anti-reform political actors and Russian proxies, as well as in defending human rights, promoting transparency and monitoring governance and progress on democratic and EU accession-related reforms;
16. Underlines that comprehensive reform of the justice system and the fight against corruption are crucial, both for Moldova's resilience against foreign interference and hybrid threats and for the success of democratic and EU accession-related reforms; recognises Moldova's sustained efforts to build an independent, impartial, accountable and professional judicial system and to complete the vetting process by the end of 2026; highlights the need to ensure enhanced coordination among all key anti-corruption and justice institutions in order to fully implement the comprehensive reforms on the rule of law, achieve convincing results in terms of effective prosecution in corruption cases, while respecting due process and the right to a fair trial, and maintain public trust in democratic institutions and the reform process; calls, therefore, on the future government to maintain the current level of ambition and complete the rule of law reforms;
17. Underlines the crucial importance of energy independence and connectivity for increased resilience against Russian hybrid threats in the energy sector and calls, therefore, for the Growth Plan to be implemented more swiftly; condemns Russia's continued instrumentalisation of energy supplies and welcomes Moldova's progress in diversifying its energy sources, deploying renewables and energy storage systems, reducing reliance on Russian gas and integrating with the EU energy market;
18. Commends the Republic of Moldova on the significant progress it has made in phasing out Russian energy sources, accelerating the decarbonisation and digitalisation of its energy mix, and integrating into the EU energy market; reiterates its call for the EU and the Member States to continue supporting Moldova's energy security, supporting the

¹ <https://pace.coe.int/en/files/33808/html>,
<https://www.thetablet.co.uk/news/bartholomew-accuses-russian-church-of-ethno-nationalist-heresy/>.

construction and financing of new electricity interconnections with neighbouring countries, promoting energy efficiency and deploying renewables and energy storage systems in accordance with the targets set in its national energy and climate plan;

19. Welcomes the smooth adoption of the EUR 1,9 billion Growth Plan for Moldova, which represents an unprecedented level of support aimed at boosting the Moldovan economy and advancing the country's path toward EU membership by accelerating key reforms in sectors such as energy, the environment, the digital sector, transport and others; welcomes the disbursement of the prefinancing tranche of EUR 270 million from the EUR 1.9 billion growth plan and calls for the swift release of the first ordinary tranche to support key reforms in infrastructure, human capital, business development and the digital and green transitions; urges the EU and Moldova to accelerate the country's gradual integration into the EU single market in order to deliver tangible socio-economic benefits even before formal EU accession; welcomes the recent agreement to review and update the trade provisions of the EU-Moldova Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which will provide increased market access for Moldovan agricultural exports that have not yet been liberalised; supports the inclusion of Moldova in the pre-accession instrument under the next multiannual financial framework; commends the Council's decision of 25 July 2025 to integrate Moldova into the 'roam like at home' area as of 1 January 2026, following a similar decision for Ukraine adopted on 14 July 2025;
20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of Moldova.