European Parliament resolution of 13 February 2025 on the recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye (2025/2546(RSP))

P10_TA(2025)0016 RC-B10-0100/2025

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas Türkiye is expected, as a candidate country, to align with the EU acquis in all areas, including adherence to the rule of law and fundamental rights, as outlined in the Copenhagen criteria; whereas the accession process has been stalled since 2018 due to a continued deterioration in democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law;

B.  whereas Türkiye has systematically misused counter-terrorism laws to target elected officials, opposition politicians and human rights defenders, as noted by the UN Special Rapporteur and the Venice Commission;

C.  whereas Türkiye’s practice of replacing democratically elected mayors with government-appointed trustees instead of a member of the municipal council is a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy, predominantly targeting Kurdish regions;

D.  whereas since the 2024 local elections, the interior ministry has dismissed eight mayors from the pro-Kurdish DEM Party and two from the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), replacing them with Ankara-appointed trustees; whereas this practice has been enabled by legal amendments introduced through an emergency decree in 2016;

E.  whereas several mayors, including DEM mayors Mehmet Sıddık Akış (Hakkâri) and Abdullah Zeydan (Van), have been arrested or convicted on the basis of vague and unsubstantiated terrorism-related allegations; whereas Ekrem İmamoğlu, Mayor of Istanbul, is facing multiple legal challenges and possible political disqualification;

1.  Condemns the arbitrary dismissal and imprisonment of democratically elected mayors and their replacement by unelected government trustees, a practice that violates democratic principles and disenfranchises millions of voters;

2.  Calls for the immediate release, acquittal and reinstatement of all elected mayors, unless there is credible, court-verified evidence of wrongdoing, in line with international legal standards;

3.  Expresses deep concern over the impact of these actions on local governance, particularly in Kurdish-majority areas; underlines the need to resume the Kurdish peace process;

4.  Calls for judicial reforms to abolish the trustee system, in line with the recommendation by the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission, and restore the independence of the judiciary;

5.  Urges Türkiye to align its policies with the ECHR and fully implement all ECtHR rulings, in line with Article 46 ECHR, including in cases involving political imprisonment;

6.  Recalls that financial assistance to Türkiye under the IPA III and the NDICI is conditional upon respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights, and that sufficient funding needs to be allocated to civil society;

7.  Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to supporting democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Türkiye, and calls for the EU to closely monitor the situation and take the necessary diplomatic measures; calls on the VP/HR to consider imposing restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against Turkish officials assuming the role of trustee and those appointing them;

8.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the VP/HR, the Council of Europe and the Turkish authorities.

European Parliament resolution of 13 February 2025 on repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular (2025/2547(RSP))

P10_TA(2025)0017 RC-B10-0126/2025

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Nicaragua,

–  having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas since 2018, the Nicaraguan regime has systematically, repeatedly and arbitrarily persecuted human rights defenders (HRDs), opposition and religious representatives, among others; whereas over 5 600 NGOs have been dissolved, including religious groups – mainly Catholic – and their assets confiscated;

B.  whereas imprisoned political opponents, along with HRDs, have been expelled from the country, stripped of their nationality and deprived of their political rights; whereas since 2018, 245 members of the clergy have been arbitrarily arrested or expelled, including Bishop Rolando Álvarez, Sakharov Prize finalist;

C.  whereas in January 2025, the regime passed a constitutional reform that eliminates the separation of powers and political pluralism, establishing an Ortega-Murillo co-presidency that controls all branches of government, independent institutions and the media, and ignores adherence to international human rights conventions and treaties;

1.  Strongly condemns the Ortega-Murillo regime’s widespread, systemic human rights violations against its population, democratic opposition, students, civil society organisations (CSOs) and its persecution of religious leaders, primarily Catholic; urges the immediate release of all those arbitrarily detained, and the restoration of the rule of law and the legal status of all organisations, freedoms and the rights of exiled individuals, including their safe return; insists that these are essential conditions for any prospect of meaningful dialogue;

2.  Denounces the use of statelessness and exile as a weapon against dissenting voices; reiterates the need to end restrictions on civic space and to respect the right to dissent;

3.  Calls on the Ortega-Murillo regime to reverse its constitutional reform and all repressive laws institutionalising totalitarianism, to fully respect its international human rights obligations, and to implement the recommendations made by the UN Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua; calls for its mandate to be extended;

4.  Calls for the EU to include specific guarantees of human rights compliance when allocating EU funds, including through multilateral and financial institutions, and to ensure that the funds do not contribute to strengthening the Ortega-Murillo regime;

5.  Highlights the key role played by CSOs, HRDs, the Catholic Church and journalists in Nicaragua; calls for the EU to reinforce its regular dialogue with them, including those in exile, to support their vital work, as well as countries receiving migrants fleeing Nicaragua, such as Costa Rica;

6.  Calls on the Member States, in accordance with the Rome Statute, to open investigations through the International Criminal Court into the Ortega-Murillo regime for crimes against humanity;

7.  Reiterates its demand that the democratic clause of the EU Association Agreement be triggered; rejects any prospect of holding any parliamentary dialogue with members of Nicaragua’s regime-controlled National Assembly;

8.  Reiterates its call to expand the list of sanctioned individuals to include Ortega, Rosario Murillo and their inner circle;

9.  Calls for the immediate extradition of Alessio Casimirri to Italy;

10.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, Commission, the VP/HR, the Member States and the Nicaraguan authorities.

European Parliament resolution of 13 February 2025 on continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu (2025/2548(RSP))

P10_TA(2025)0018 RC-B10-0101/2025

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Nigeria,

–  having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas on 10 August 2020, Nigerian singer Yahaya Sharif-Aminu was brought before an Upper Sharia Court in Kano State where he was tried without legal representation and sentenced to death by hanging for song lyrics allegedly containing derogatory comments regarding the Prophet Muhammad; whereas his family faced harassment and persecution following his arrest;

B.  whereas in January 2021, the Kano State High Court ordered a retrial and in August 2022, the Court of Appeal upheld it, while affirming the constitutionality of Sharia blasphemy laws, posing serious risk that the death sentence will be confirmed; whereas Sharif-Aminu appealed to the Supreme Court in November 2022, which remains pending; whereas he is reportedly in critical condition in prison as his health has deteriorated and he lacks sufficient food, clothing and medication;

C.  whereas other Nigerians remain imprisoned on blasphemy charges;

D.  whereas Nigeria’s blasphemy laws violate its international human rights commitments, the African Charter and the Nigerian Constitution; whereas blasphemy accusations frequently lead to harassment, violence and mob killings; whereas Nigeria is one of seven countries where an individual can be sentenced to death for blasphemy;

E.  whereas everyone has the right to freedom of expression, religion and belief;

1.  Urges the Nigerian authorities to immediately and unconditionally release Yahaya Sharif-Aminu, drop all charges against him, guarantee his safety and due process rights, and ensure adequate access to food, clothing and medical treatment; calls on the Supreme Court of Nigeria to ensure an expedited and fair appeals process; calls for the release of all others facing blasphemy allegations;

2.  Recalls that blasphemy laws are in clear breach of international human rights obligations, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and are contrary to the Nigerian Constitution, which guarantees freedom of religion and expression;

3.  Urges the Nigerian authorities to uphold human rights throughout the country by ensuring that federal, state and Sharia laws do not deny Nigerians the protections afforded by the national constitution and international conventions; stresses Nigeria’s responsibility to lead by example in abolishing blasphemy laws, including religious insult in criminal law, that systematically endanger religious minorities, violate fundamental freedoms and fuel sectarian violence;

4.  Urges Nigeria to impose a nationwide moratorium on executions and work towards fully abolishing the death penalty;

5.  Urges the Nigerian Government to combat the impunity surrounding blasphemy accusations by penalising the purveyors of false allegations and bringing perpetrators of mob violence to justice;

6.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to raise individual cases, human rights concerns and blasphemy laws with the Nigerian authorities and to ensure the diplomatic observation of legal proceedings when Sharif-Aminu’s trial commences at the Supreme Court; commends the acquittal of Rhoda Jatau and release of Mubarak Bala;

7.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, Council, European External Action Service and VP/HR, and the Government and Parliament of Nigeria.

European Parliament resolution of 13 February 2025 on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia (2025/2522(RSP))

P10_TA(2025)0019 RC-B10-0106/2025

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia, in particular that of 28 November 2024 on Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud(1),

–  having regard to Georgia’s status as an EU candidate country, granted by the European Council at its summit of 14 and 15 December 2023,

–  having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which demands the implementation of all possible measures to guarantee Georgia’s complete integration into the EU and NATO,

–  having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,

–  having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the democratic backsliding in Georgia has dramatically accelerated since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which were deeply flawed and marked by grave irregularities, and failed to meet international democratic standards and Georgia’s OSCE commitments; whereas these elections violated the democratic norms and standards set for free and fair elections, failing to reflect the will of the people and rendering the resulting ‘parliament’, and subsequently the ‘president’, devoid of any democratic legitimacy; whereas from the very beginning of its activity, the current Georgian parliament has operated as a one-party (Georgian Dream) organ, which is incompatible with the essence of pluralistic parliamentary democracy;

B.  whereas Article 2 of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement(2) concerns the general principles of the agreement, which include democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms;

C.  whereas Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution states that the constitutional bodies must take all measures within the scope of their competences to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union;

D.  whereas the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, publicly condemned the parliamentary elections as rigged, declared that she would not recognise them and called for an international investigation; whereas the current Georgian regime, led by the Georgian Dream party and its founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, has orchestrated an unconstitutional usurpation of power, systematically dismantling democratic institutions, undermining judicial independence and eroding fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, thereby deepening Georgia’s political and constitutional crisis;

E.  whereas Georgia has officially held the status of EU candidate country since December 2023; whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations;

F.  whereas on 28 November 2024, peaceful mass anti-government protests began across the country, demanding new, free and fair elections, an end to political violence and repression, and the return of the country to its European path; whereas the protests have been taking place without interruption for over 75 days;

G.  whereas on 14 December 2024, the de facto parliament held a ‘presidential election’ with a single candidate from the Georgian Dream party, former footballer Mikheil Kavelashvili, elected with 224 out of 225 votes cast;

H.  whereas Georgia’s self-appointed authorities have plunged the country into a fully fledged constitutional and political crisis, as well as a human rights and democracy crisis; whereas this has been marked by the brutal repression of peaceful protesters, political opponents and media representatives, with judges, prosecutors and police officers actively fabricating politically motivated administrative and criminal charges against protesters, journalists and opposition figures detained during peaceful anti-government demonstrations; whereas, as of December 2024, more than 460 people have been arrested or punished since the protests began, with this number growing by the day;

I.  whereas riot police deliberately lacking force identification numbers have forcefully dispersed protesters with tear gas and water cannons; whereas numerous journalists have reported being targeted and beaten, and having their equipment destroyed and personal items stolen; whereas dozens of protesters have been brutally assaulted, and several hundred people have been arrested; whereas Georgia’s Public Defender has revealed that 80 % of those detained reported experiencing violence and inhumane treatment at the hands of law enforcement officers; whereas despite international condemnation, the illegitimate Georgian Government has awarded medals to officials involved in the crackdown;

J.  whereas independent media outlets, including TV Formula, TV Mtavari and TV Pirveli, face severe operational and financial constraints due to the regime’s interference, while dozens of media representatives are being subjected to various forms of intense physical and psychological pressure; whereas numerous violent attacks on journalists have been documented, including the severe beatings of Aleksandre Keshelashvili, Maka Chikhladze and Giorgi Shetsiruli, and the harassment of detained journalist Saba Kevkhishvili; whereas on 12 January 2025, the Georgian authorities arrested journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli, who has been in pre-trial detention since then and is on hunger strike in solidarity with all political prisoners in Georgia; whereas she faces between four and seven years in prison;

K.  whereas, on the night of 14 January 2025, Giorgi Gakharia, opposition leader of the For Georgia party and former Prime Minister, and Zviad Koridze, journalist and Transparency International activist, were physically assaulted by Georgian Dream officials in separate incidents at the same venue in Batumi;

L.  whereas on 2 February 2025, Nika Melia, a leader of the pro-European Akhali party, and Gigi Ugulava, the former mayor of Tbilisi, were arrested during the anti-government protests and subjected to physical violence in detention; whereas on 12 January 2025, Elene Khoshtaria, leader of the Droa political movement, was detained in Batumi;

M.  whereas the de facto Georgian authorities have used disproportionate force and excessive violence against peaceful protesters and resorted to arbitrary mass arrests to thwart dissent; whereas independent human rights organisations have reported the systemic mistreatment of detainees, including torture; whereas to date, not a single law enforcement official involved in the brutal crackdowns, arbitrary arrests and mistreatment has been brought to justice;

N.  whereas the self-appointed authorities introduced new draconian legislation that came into force on 30 December 2024 and amended the Criminal Code, the Code of Administrative Offences and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations, imposing further arbitrary restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, introducing, among other things, hefty fines for putting up protest slogans and posters, and granting police the power to detain individuals ‘preventively’ for 48 hours on suspicion of planning to violate the rules governing public assembly; whereas on 3 February 2025, the Georgian Dream party unveiled further draft legislation designed to tighten control, ramping up penalties for a variety of offences directly targeting protestors, critics and political dissent, such as harsher punishments for ‘insulting officials’, the criminalisation of road blocks and an increase in the duration of administrative detention from 15 to 60 days;

O.  whereas on 27 January 2025, the Council decided to suspend parts of the EU-Georgia visa facilitation agreement for Georgian diplomats and officials, but failed to impose individual sanctions in response to the continued crackdown; whereas the Hungarian and Slovak Governments have been consistently blocking impactful EU-wide sanctions, preventing the remaining 25 Member States (EU-25) from effectively introducing sanctions against the self-appointed Georgian authorities;

P.  whereas several Member States, including Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Czechia, have imposed bilateral sanctions on some Georgian politicians, judges and other officials responsible for the brutal crackdown on protesters, violations of human rights and abuse of the rule of law; whereas in December 2024, the United States sanctioned Bidzina Ivanishvili, alongside Georgia’s ‘Minister of Internal Affairs’ Vakhtang Gomelauri and Deputy Head of the Special Tasks Department Mirza Kezevadze, for their involvement in brutal crackdowns on media representatives, opposition figures and protesters; whereas the UK and Ukraine have imposed similar sanctions on high-level Georgian officials; whereas Ivanishvili, through hastily adopted laws tailored to his personal situation, is moving his offshore assets to Georgia in anticipation of further sanctions;

Q.  whereas on 29 January 2025, Georgian Dream announced that it would withdraw its delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) after it demanded new, genuinely democratic parliamentary elections, the release of political prisoners and accountability for perpetrators of violence; whereas UN experts have condemned the pattern of repression and human rights violations in Georgia, while the OSCE has called this suppression a serious breach of the right to freedom of assembly;

R.  whereas the ruling Georgian Dream party convened the new parliament in violation of the country’s constitution, resulting in a boycott of parliament by the opposition; whereas on 5 February 2025, the self-appointed ‘parliament’ voted to approve the early termination of the mandates of 49 out of 61 members of parliament, representing the Coalition for Change, Strong Georgia and the United National Movement, in order to strip them of their immunity and facilitate their arrest and prosecution; whereas the same ‘parliament’ established a commission to punish former ruling party United National Movement;

S.  whereas a growing number of civil servants have been dismissed after speaking out against the halting of Georgia’s EU accession process; whereas Georgian Dream has amended laws on public service, simplifying procedures to dismiss public servants, several of whom have been dismissed for participating in protests, in a clear attempt to silence critical voices;

1.  Condemns the Georgian Dream ‘authorities’ and urges them to immediately cease the violent repression of peaceful protesters, political opponents and media representatives; underlines that Georgia’s self-appointed authorities are currently violating fundamental freedoms, basic human rights and the core international obligations of the country, thereby undermining decades of democratic reforms driven by the country’s political class and civil society; considers Georgia as a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party has abandoned its path towards European integration and NATO membership; recalls that the ongoing democratic backsliding and adoption of anti-democratic laws has effectively suspended Georgia’s EU integration process; reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and their wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country;

2.  Does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities of the Georgian Dream party established following the rigged election of 26 October 2024, which was neither free nor fair, was held in violation of democratic norms and standards, and did not reflect the will of the people of Georgia; underlines that the extensive electoral fraud has undermined the integrity of the election process, cast doubt on the legitimacy of the result and eroded public trust, both domestically and internationally, in any new government;

3.  Calls for the EU and its Member States, as well as national parliaments and interparliamentary institutions, not to recognise the legitimacy of the Georgian Dream one-party parliament and their appointed president; calls, therefore, on the international community to join the boycott of the self-proclaimed Georgian authorities;

4.  Continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development; calls on the President of the European Council to invite President Zourabichvili to represent Georgia at an upcoming European Council meeting and at the next European Political Community summit;

5.  Underlines that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections; demands that new elections take place in Georgia within the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process; encourages the Member States and EU officials to firmly demand new elections and to make any future engagement explicitly conditional on setting a new date for parliamentary elections and establishing a mechanism to ensure they are free and fair;

6.  Calls on the Council and the Member States, particularly the EU-25 on a bilateral and coordinated basis, to impose immediate and targeted personal sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family and his companies, and to freeze all his assets within the EU for his role in the deterioration of the political process in Georgia, enabling democratic backsliding and acting against the country’s constitutionally declared interests of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls on the French Government to strip Bidzina Ivanishvili of the Legion of Honour and impose individual sanctions on him; welcomes, in this regard, the sanctions imposed bilaterally by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Czechia, as well as those already imposed by the US and the UK;

7.  Calls for the EU and its Member States, in particular the EU-25 on a bilateral and coordinated basis, to impose personal sanctions on the officials and political leaders in Georgia responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Secretary General of the ruling Georgian Dream party Kakha Kaladze, and Chair of the Georgian Dream party Irakli Garibashvili; calls for them to extend these sanctions to judges, including those of the Constitutional Court of Georgia who are passing politically motivated sentences, and representatives of the law enforcement services, as well as to financial enablers tacitly or openly supporting the regime and the owners of regime-aligned media outlets, including TV Imedi, Pos TV and Rustavi 2 TV, for their role in spreading disinformation and seeking to manipulate public discourse in order to sustain the current ruling party’s authoritarian rule;

8.  Calls on the Council and the Member States to impose sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili’s network of enablers, elite entourage, corrupt financial operatives, propagandists and those facilitating the repressive state apparatus, including, among others, Ekaterine Khvedelidze, Uta Ivanishvili, Tsotne Ivanishvili, Bera Ivanishvili, Gvantsa Ivanishvili, Alexander Ivanishvili, Shmagi Kobakhidze, Ucha Mamatsashvili, Natia Turnava, Ivane Chkhartishvili, Sulkhan Papashvili, Giorgi Kapanadze, Tornike Rizhvadze, Ilia Tsulaia, Kakha Bekauri, Lasha Natsvlishvili, Vasil Maglaperidze, Grigol Liluashvili, Mikheil Chinchaladze, Levan Murusidze, Irakli Rukhadze, Tinatin Berdzenishvili, Tamaz Gaiashvili, Anton Obolashvili and Gocha Enukidze;

9.  Maintains the view that the measures taken so far by the EU in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments does not yet fully reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and the latest developments; welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials, but considers it as only a first step, which must be followed by tougher measures; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on introducing sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia;

10.  Emphasises that respect for fundamental rights is vital to the EU’s visa liberalisation benchmarks; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspension if it is considered that EU standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not being upheld;

11.  Strongly condemns the brutal violence and repression used by Georgia’s ruling regime against peaceful protesters since 28 November 2024; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and those detained during the anti-government protests; demands the release of journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli, who has been on hunger strike for over four weeks now because of her unjust detention and risks facing critical, irreversible and life-threatening consequences; denounces the assault and beating of former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, resulting in his hospitalisation, followed by the arrest on 2 February 2025 of political leaders including Nika Melia and Gigi Ugulava, as a shocking escalation of state-orchestrated violence by Georgian Dream and its allies against peaceful demonstrators and political opponents; reminds of the detention of Elene Khoshtaria on 12 January 2025 in Batumi;

12.  Reiterates its solidarity with the people of Georgia and its vibrant civil society in fighting for their legitimate democratic rights and for a European future for their country; urges the Georgian Government to reverse its current political course and return to implementing the will of the Georgian people for continued democratic reforms that would reopen the prospect of future EU membership;

13.   Strongly condemns the enactment of draconian legislation that imposes unjustified restrictions on freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, and demands the annulment of such recently adopted repressive legislation; urges the Georgian authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all individuals detained for peacefully exercising their fundamental rights to freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, and to ensure prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into all allegations of unlawful and disproportionate use of force by the law enforcement agencies; considers that the Georgian justice system has been weaponised to stifle dissent, instil fear and silence free speech;

14.  Calls for the ‘Georgian authorities’ to take immediate action to ensure the safety and freedom of journalists and to investigate all instances of violence and misconduct by law enforcement agencies; emphasises the importance of fostering a democratic environment where media, civil society and the opposition can operate freely without fear of retaliation or censorship;

15.  Demands an independent, transparent and impartial investigation into police brutality and the excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators; calls for those responsible for human rights violations, including law enforcement and government officials ordering acts of repression, to be held fully accountable before the law;

16.  Denounces the launch of an investigation by the Prosecutor’s Office on 8 February 2025 into non-governmental organisations accused of aggravated sabotage, attempted sabotage and assisting foreign and foreign-controlled organisations in hostile activities aimed at undermining the state interests of Georgia, for which they could receive multiple-year sentences; views this action as further escalation of repression by the regime, misuse of the judicial system and accelerated democratic backsliding;

17.  Condemns the broader campaign of attacks by the Georgian authorities vilifying civil society organisations and reputable international donors that support democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights in Georgia;

18.  Denounces the termination by Georgian Dream of the mandates of 49 opposition members of parliament as a sign of further democratic backsliding, and considers this the latest move in Georgian Dream’s attack on political pluralism in the country;

19.   Welcomes PACE’s decision to challenge the credentials of Georgia’s parliamentary delegation due to democratic backsliding and human rights abuses; supports PACE’s call for Georgia to immediately initiate an inclusive process involving all political and social actors, including the ruling party, the opposition and civil society, to urgently address the deficiencies and shortcomings noted during the recent parliamentary elections and to create an electoral environment conducive to new, genuinely democratic elections to be announced in the coming months;

20.  Notes that Georgia, once a front runner for Euro-Atlantic integration, is undergoing an accelerated process of democratic backsliding, in a seemingly deliberate attempt to demonstrate that the will of the Georgian people no longer determines the country’s future, which could result in the country taking the Belarussian path of political development, transitioning from the current authoritarian state to a dictatorial regime;

21.  Deplores the decision of Irakli Kobakhidze to suspend accession talks and reject EU funding until the end of 2028; recalls that all polls consistently show the overwhelming support of the Georgian population for a Euro-Atlantic future; expresses strong support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Georgian people;

22.  Calls for an immediate and comprehensive audit of EU policy towards Georgia due to the democratic backsliding; calls on the Commission to review the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the self-declared Georgian authorities’ breach of the general principles, as laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms; points out that non-fulfilment of obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and privileges afforded by the Agreement;

23.  Welcomes the Commission’s decision to cease all budgetary support to the Georgian authorities and to suspend the initiation of any future investment projects; encourages the Commission to terminate all financial support for ongoing projects; calls for a moratorium on all investment projects in the field of connectivity; calls on the Commission to start identifying economic sectors of relevance to the oligarchic interests that support and sustain the current authoritarian rule, with a view to a potential future decision about restrictive measures or economic sanctions; calls on the Commission to start identifying connectivity projects that support and sustain the current authoritarian rule and to consider their suspension until a rerun of the parliamentary elections;

24.  Condemns the climate of intimidation and polarisation fuelled by statements by Georgian Government representatives and political leaders, as well as by attacks against political pluralism, including through disturbing cases of intimidation and violence against the Georgian democratic political forces and repeated threats to ban opposition parties, to arrest their leaders and even ordinary supporters, and to silence dissent; underlines that anything but the full restoration of Georgia’s democratic standards will entail a further deterioration of EU-Georgia relations, make any move towards EU accession impossible and result in additional sanctions;

25.  Calls on the Commission to swiftly redirect the frozen EUR 120 million originally intended as support for the Georgian authorities to enhance the EU’s support for Georgia’s civil society, in particular the non-governmental sector and independent media, which are increasingly coming under undue pressure from the ruling political party and the authorities, as well as to support programmes supporting democratic resilience and electoral integrity; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment; highlights the urgency of the need to support civil society in the light of growing repression and the suspension of activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore urges the Commission to ramp up support without delay;

26.  Expresses deep concern about the increasing Russian influence in the country and about the Georgian Dream government’s actions in pursuing a policy of rapprochement and collaboration with Russia, in spite of its creeping occupation of Georgian territory; deplores, in this regard, the growing anti-Western and hostile rhetoric of the Georgian Dream party’s representatives towards Georgia’s strategic Western partners, including the EU, and its MEPs and officials, and Georgian Dream’s promotion of Russian disinformation and manipulation;

27.  Strongly reiterates its urgent demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds, specifically for the purpose of seeking medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the self-appointed authorities bear full and undeniable responsibility for the life, health, safety and well-being of former President Mikheil Saakashvili and must be held fully accountable for any harm that befalls him; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian Dream authorities to ensure that Members of the European Parliament are granted unhindered access to Mikheil Saakashvili;

28.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

(1) Texts adopted, P10_TA(2024)0054. (2) OJ L 261, 30.8.2014, p. 4.

European Parliament resolution of 13 February 2025 on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (2025/2553(RSP))

P10_TA(2025)0020 RC-B10-0102/2025

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

–  having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU of 25 January 2025 on the latest escalation in eastern DRC,

–  having regard to the statement by G7 foreign ministers of 2 February 2025 on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,

–  having regard to the press statement of the UN Security Council of 26 January 2025 on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

–  having regard to the special session of the UN Human Rights Council of 7 February 2025 on the human rights situation in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

–  having regard to the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 28 January 2025 on the recent developments in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,

–  having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,

–  having regard to the Partnership Agreement of 15 November 2023 between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part(1),

–  having regard to Rule 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas in January 2025, the armed rebel group M23, backed by Rwandan forces, further advanced in the eastern DRC and seized the regional capital city of Goma; whereas violence between rebel groups and the Congolese army increased sharply, causing a high number of civilian casualties; whereas an estimated 3 000 deaths occurred during the offensive on Goma; whereas approximately 800 000 internally displaced people were sheltering at that time in densely populated displacement sites around the city;

B.  whereas M23 announced a unilateral ceasefire to begin on 4 February 2025; whereas fighting has nonetheless continued, Goma airport remains closed, air traffic management equipment is damaged and humanitarian access is still limited; whereas there are reports that the mining town of Nyabibwe in South Kivu has been captured by M23; whereas M23 leaders have declared their intention to continue advancing in the DRC; whereas the latest advances of M23 mark an alarming escalation of the devastating conflict in the eastern DRC, a violation of territorial integrity and an escalation in violence, leading to a dire humanitarian crisis, human rights violations and the further destabilisation of the country;

C.  whereas the region has been plagued by decades of cyclical violence, causing a security and humanitarian crisis; whereas after a ceasefire that lasted several years, the M23 fighters took up arms again at the end of 2021; whereas martial law has been in force since 2021 in the eastern DRC and the civilian government has been replaced by the military; whereas the M23 forces have been expanding their presence in the eastern DRC, setting up new governance administrations and taxation systems, establishing military training camps and exporting minerals directly to Rwanda; whereas the long-term consequences of the terrible 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi are still fuelling violence, hatred and forced displacements today;

D.  whereas on 23 and 24 January 2025, M23 fired on positions of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), which resulted in the deaths of 13 peacekeepers deployed with MONUSCO and the peacekeeping mission led by the Southern African Development Community (SADC);

E.  whereas the UN Group of Experts concluded in its June 2024 report that the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) ‘violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ and that the RDF’s ‘de facto control and direction over M23 operations also renders Rwanda liable for the actions of M23’;

F.  whereas the seizing of Goma has led to significant displacement of civilians; whereas over 500 000 people are estimated to have been displaced since early January 2025; whereas thousands of Congolese people had previously fled to the city to escape violence and have been further driven from camps for internally displaced people into makeshift tents or forced to sleep out in the open; whereas the safety of internally displaced people is now seriously threatened, with women and girls suffering disproportionately;

G.  whereas the deputy head of the UN peacekeeping force based in Goma has reported on the mass rape and killing of women inmates inside Goma’s Munzenze prison, and it is estimated that hundreds of women were raped and many burned alive in the prison;

H.  whereas women and girls in the DRC face increased levels of sexual and gender-based violence, resulting in there being one victim of rape every four minutes; whereas the staff of Panzi Hospital in Bukavu, which receives many survivors of sexual violence, is alarmed about the deteriorating security situation in the area and about the security of the staff and patients in Panzi Hospital itself;

I.  whereas the seizure of Goma triggered violent protests in Kinshasa, with dozens of protesters attacking embassies and calling on the international community to halt the advance of M23;

J.  whereas the conflict in the DRC is at risk of regional spillover; whereas a peacekeeping deployment from the East African Community Regional Forces withdrew in 2023; whereas the SADC deployed a peacekeeping mission to the DRC in December 2023 with troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi; whereas at least 20 peacekeepers were killed during the M23 advance on Goma; whereas on 6 February 2025, Malawi announced the withdrawal of its troops from this mission;

K.  whereas it is widely acknowledged that Rwanda is active in the conflict in the eastern DRC, including through its de facto control of M23, to which it supplies weapons, logistical support and troops; whereas UN experts estimate that there are between 3 000 and 4 000 Rwandan troops operating with M23;

L.  whereas North Kivu is a resource-rich region, with vast supplies of critical raw materials including cobalt, gold and tin, which are necessary for the global digital and energy transition; whereas Goma is a major transport and trading hub for the export of minerals; whereas the UN estimates that around 120 tonnes of coltan are being moved by M23 to Rwanda each month; whereas UN experts further estimate that M23 is financed by around EUR 288 000 per month generated through its control of the mineral trade in the DRC; whereas the rebel groups often recruit child soldiers in a blatant violation of international law and humanity;

M.  whereas the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations in the DRC have focused on alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed mainly in the eastern DRC, in the Ituri region and the North and South Kivu Provinces, since 1 July 2002; whereas the DRC made a second referral to the ICC in May 2023 concerning alleged crimes committed in North Kivu since 1 January 2022;

N.  whereas on 8 February 2025 at a joint summit in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the regional blocs of southern Africa, the SADC, and eastern Africa, the East African Community (EAC), called for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, demanded the withdrawal of uninvited foreign armed forces from the DRC territory, urged all warring parties to hold peace talks within five days, and demanded the reopening of Goma airport and other key routes to facilitate humanitarian aid; whereas the African Union is set to address the matter at a meeting in Addis Ababa on 14 February 2025; whereas other mediation efforts are ongoing, notably by France, which aims to bring all actors to the negotiation table;

O.  whereas the Foreign Affairs Council of the Council of the EU is expected to exchange views on the situation in the DRC on 24 February 2025;

P.  whereas between 2021 and 2024, the EU provided EUR 260 million in funding to Rwanda, with an additional EUR 900 million pledged under the Global Gateway strategy; whereas following the latest developments in the eastern DRC, the EU declared that it stood ready to boost emergency assistance, particularly for the newly displaced populations in and around Goma, and on 28 January 2025, the Commission announced new humanitarian support for the DRC with an initial amount of EUR 60 million for 2025; whereas the EU is trying to intensify its presence in the region, including through its recent support for the ‘Green Corridor Kivu-Kinshasa’ programme via a Global Gateway initiative, which aims to help establish a sustainable 2 600 km corridor connecting the eastern DRC to Kinshasa and the Atlantic Coast, covering 540 000 km2;

Q.  whereas the EU has formed raw materials partnerships with several countries, including the DRC, Rwanda and other countries in the region; whereas these partnerships are focused on, among other things, advancing due diligence and traceability, cooperation in fighting against the illegal trafficking of raw materials, and alignment with international environmental, social and governance standards; whereas Parliament, unlike the Council, was not given the opportunity by the Commission to share its political assessment of the decision to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Rwanda or to provide technical feedback on the draft MoU;

R.  whereas the DRC Foreign Affairs Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner and Nobel Prize laureate Denis Mukwage briefed Parliament on 5 February 2025, at an extraordinary meeting of the Delegation to the Africa-EU Parliamentary Assembly (DAFR) and the Committee on Development, on the occupation of the eastern DRC and the dire humanitarian impact on the local population and internally displaced people;

S.  whereas the Council appointed Johan Borgstam as the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region on 1 September 2024; whereas on 30 January 2025, DAFR organised an extraordinary hearing with the EU Special Representative and Bintou Keita, Head of MONUSCO;

T.  whereas prior to recent developments, the DRC faced one of the largest displacement crises in Africa, with 6,7 million internally displaced persons, including 4,6 million in South and North Kivu; whereas the DRC also hosts over 520 000 refugees and asylum seekers from neighbouring countries, while 1,1 million refugees from the DRC are being hosted in neighbouring countries in the region, more than half of them in Uganda; whereas the recent surge in violence has internally displaced over half a million people since the beginning of the year; whereas given the severe overcrowding in the displacement sites where people remain and the lack of water, sanitation and hygiene infrastructure, the risk of a cholera outbreak is extremely high, along with that of a rapid spread of the Mpox epidemic;

1.  Strongly condemns the occupation of Goma and other territories in the eastern DRC by M23 and the RDF as an unacceptable breach of the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Rwandan Government to withdraw its troops from DRC territory, as they are in clear violation of international law and the UN Charter, and to cease cooperation with the M23 rebels; demands that Rwanda and all other potential state actors in the region cease their support for M23;

2.  Strongly condemns the indiscriminate attacks with explosive weapons in populated areas of North Kivu by all parties, including on displacement camps and other densely populated areas near Goma, as well as the unlawful killings, rapes and other apparent war crimes, forced labour, forced recruitment and other abusive practices committed by M23 with the support of the RDF and by the armed forces of the DRC, the FARDC;

3.  Is appalled by the shocking use of sexual violence against women and girls as a tool of repression and weapon of war in the eastern DRC as well as the unacceptable recruitment of child soldiers by the various rebel groups; demands that these matters be addressed by the international community without delay; strongly reiterates that any attack against UN-mandated forces is inexcusable and might be considered a war crime;

4.  Calls for an immediate end to the violence, particularly the mass killings and the use of rape as a strategic weapon of war; calls on the DRC and Rwanda to investigate and appropriately prosecute those responsible for war crimes, including sexual violence, under the principle of command responsibility;

5.  Is extremely concerned by the critical humanitarian situation in the country; calls for the immediate reopening of Goma airport to re-establish humanitarian operations and bring in supplies via the airport and the land border; calls for the creation and immediate opening of humanitarian corridors and for all parties, including armed groups operating in the eastern DRC, to allow and facilitate full humanitarian access based on needs and humanitarian principles, including ensuring that civilians and displaced people are not denied access to items essential for their survival;

6.  Emphasises that humanitarian workers must be able to operate safely to deliver life-saving assistance to Congolese civilians, and that the safety of medical facilities must be preserved; stresses that this is a central obligation under international humanitarian law, and that perpetrators violating these obligations should be held to account; underlines that Rwanda and the neighbouring countries have a special responsibility to facilitate humanitarian access to the region;

7.  Strongly condemns the attack on diplomatic institutions of the EU, its Member States and civil society organisations, such as political foundations in Kinshasa; underlines that the protection of civilians and diplomatic staff must be guaranteed;

8.  Expresses concern over the lack of coherence in the EU response to the Great Lakes region’s crises and calls on the Council to reassess the implementation of its renewed EU Great Lakes strategy; recalls that the EU and its special representative for the region are ready to assist all mediation efforts;

9.  Welcomes the increased humanitarian support pledged by the EU, notes that this still falls far short of meeting the basic needs for food, water, medical assistance and shelter in the eastern DRC, especially in the light of the recent termination of support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); calls on the Commission and the international community to significantly step up financial support for urgent and life-saving assistance;

10.  Regrets that the EU has not taken appropriate measures to sufficiently address the crisis and effectively press Rwanda to end its support for M23, and that it has instead taken steps – including the signing in February 2024 of an MoU on sustainable raw materials value chains without sufficiently discussing the conflict, and the decision to top up support for Rwanda’s deployment in Mozambique under the European Peace Facility (EPF) – that have failed to demonstrate sufficient safeguards and that have contributed to sending an inconsistent message to the Rwandan authorities;

11.  Urges the Commission and the Council to immediately suspend the EU-Rwanda MoU on sustainable raw materials value chains until Rwanda proves that it is ceasing its interference and its exportation of minerals mined from M23-controlled areas; calls on all actors to increase transparency and to effectively ban the entry of all blood minerals into the EU;

12.  Calls on the Commission to render the future re-activation of cooperation on critical raw materials conditional upon Rwanda joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which the DRC is already part of;

13.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that the current Conflict Minerals Regulation(2) is strongly enforced and on the Commission to propose a revision of the EU rules, with the aim of ensuring the highest standards of traceability and transparency;

14.  Notes that parliamentary oversight and civil society involvement in the preparation, signing and implementation of raw material MoUs and roadmaps are essential for an inclusive process with adequate scrutiny, and must become part of the MoU;

15.  Calls on the Commission, the Member States and the international financial institutions to freeze direct budget support to Rwanda subject to it meeting conditions on, among other things, humanitarian access and the breaking of all links with M23; urges the Commission and the Member States to freeze their military and security assistance to the Rwandan armed forces to ensure that they do not contribute directly or indirectly to abusive military operations in the eastern DRC; calls strongly, in particular, for a review of the EU’s renewed support under the EPF to ensure that troops deployed in northern Mozambique and benefiting from EPF support, as well as their commanders, have been properly vetted and have not been involved in the eastern DRC or in other human rights violations, with a view to suspending the support if it is found to contribute directly or indirectly to abusive military operations in the eastern DRC;

16.  Urges the Commission and all Member States to ban the transfer of weapons to the Rwandan forces and M23 and to ensure greater transparency of trade in EU weapons;

17.  Urges the Council to expand sanctions against senior M23 commanders, leaders of other armed groups and senior officials from the DRC and Rwanda – including Major-General Eugene Nkubito, the commander of the RDF’s 3rd Division, and Major-General Ruki Karusisi, RDF Special Force Commander, identified in the June 2024 report of the UN Group of Experts, and Major-General Emmy K. Ruvusha, Commander of the Rwanda Security Forces, identified in the June 2023 report of the UN Group of Experts – and from other countries across the region, as being responsible for or complicit in recent serious abuses by their forces or those for which they have command responsibility;

18.  Urges the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Member States and the Government of the DRC to take immediate action to prevent sexual violence and improve care for survivors, including by adapting the national legal framework to guarantee access to medical abortion care; draws attention to the health needs of pregnant women, notably those who are displaced and out of reach of medical support; calls on the EEAS and the Member States to further prioritise the disbursement of humanitarian support for women and girls in the region;

19.  Calls on the Commission to continue supporting anti-corruption efforts and the strengthening of governance in the DRC;

20.  Commends the Prosecutor of the ICC’s announcement that the ICC will continue to investigate alleged crimes committed by any person, irrespective of affiliation or nationality; reiterates the EU’s unwavering support for the ICC and calls on the Council and Commission to fulfil their obligations to ensure the functioning and effectiveness of the ICC;

21.  Reiterates its full support for MONUSCO in protecting civilians and stabilising the region; urges the EU to cooperate with all actors on the ground, in particular MONUSCO, to ensure the protection of civilians in the eastern DRC; calls on the UN to work towards a stronger mandate for MONUSCO in order to enable peacemaking; calls on the UN to ensure the protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law, particularly given the increased risk of gender-based violence, and to preserve the safety of humanitarian staff, health workers and medical facilities;

22.  Calls on the UN to take immediate and specific measures to protect Panzi Hospital and its patients and staff;

23.  Welcomes the special session of the UN Human Rights Council of 7 February 2025 on the human rights situation in the east of the DRC; supports the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry into serious violations committed since January 2022;

24.  Reiterates its condemnation of hate speech and xenophobia, as well as ethnic-based politics; underlines that all those responsible for sustaining armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC must be held accountable;

25.  Is concerned about the consequences of Russian interference in the conflict and more widely in the region, and about the increasing presence of disinformation campaigns; condemns, in particular, efforts by Russia to foster anti-Western sentiment through the dissemination of fake news on social media about Western players;

26.  Expresses its concern about the increasing presence of Chinese actors in the mining sector of the DRC and the region acting without respect for economic and social responsibilities, and recalls that European industries and companies in the region will only have long-term security of supply if a long-lasting and peaceful solution to the conflict is found;

27.  Recalls that only an inclusive and regional approach will be able to address and tackle the multifaceted, long-standing problems in the region; strongly welcomes the joint SADC and EAC peace summit in Dar es Salaam on 8 February 2025; reiterates, in this regard, its full support for the Luanda and Nairobi processes and calls upon all Great Lake countries, in particular the DRC and Rwanda, to urgently pursue negotiations within these frameworks; emphasises that any solution must also address the root causes of the conflict, including, but not limited to, the illicit trafficking of natural resources; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully support national and regional initiatives, such as the initiative of the Congolese Catholic and Protestant leaders, and the Luanda Process; underlines that regional organisations, such as the African Union, the SADC and the EAC, must play a central role in all of these efforts; underlines also that a lasting solution requires a reform of the DRC security sector, with a better organised DRC army and administration;

28.  Calls on the international community and all actors involved to use the Addis Ababa framework agreement and to organise an international conference for peace in the eastern DRC and the Great Lakes region; stresses that this ‘Business for Peace’ conference will have the unique feature of having the private sector around the peace negotiation table, since the war is about strategic minerals; underlines that business people can have significant leverage to push their countries to act for peace; believes that the business for peace approach can help us move forward in finding a solution;

29.  Calls for the cancellation of the 2025 International Cycling Union (UCI) Road World Championships in Kigali if Rwanda does not change course;

30.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and Parliament of Rwanda and of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the African Union, the secretariats of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Southern African Development Community and the East African Community, and other relevant international bodies.

(1) OJ L, 2023/2862, 28.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2023/2862/oj. (2) Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (OJ L 130, 19.5.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/821/oj).