The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Title V thereof on EU external action,

–  having regard to Articles 3 and 21 TEU, and Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to its resolution of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2024(1),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2023 on Policy Coherence for Development(3),

–  having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in September 2015,

–  having regard to its resolutions on Venezuela, in particular that of 21 January 2025 on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025(4), and that of 19 September 2024 on the situation in Venezuela(5), on Cuba, in particular that of 12 July 2023 on the state of the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) in the light of the recent visit of the High Representative to the island(6), and that of 19 September 2024 on the case of José Daniel Ferrer García in Cuba(7), and on Nicaragua, in particular that of 13 February 2025 on repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular(8),

–  having regard to the thirty-two resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly in the period 1992 to 2024, including Resolution A/RES/79/7 of 1 November 2024, entitled ‘Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba’,

–  having regard to the UN General Assembly resolutions on the situation in Haiti, notably Human Rights Council Resolution 58/32 of 4 April 2025 entitled ‘Technical assistance and capacity-building to improve the situation of human rights in Haiti, in connection with a request from the authorities of Haiti for coordinated and targeted international action’,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 26 May 2025 entitled ‘Pathways to progress: maximising impact for sustainable development and global prosperity’, approved at its 4099th meeting held ahead of the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development in Seville from 30 June to 3 July 2025,

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 7 June 2023 entitled ‘A New Agenda for Relations between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean’ (JOIN(2023)0017),

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

–  having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 of 2 March 2022 entitled ‘Aggression against Ukraine’,

–  having regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 September 2007,

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 25 November 2020 entitled ‘EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III – An ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU external action’ (JOIN(2020)0017),

–  having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, adopted on 20 December 1993,

–  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention of 11 May 2011 on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), to which the EU is a signatory,

–  having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement, adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC on 12 December 2015,

–  having regard to the Pact for the Future, adopted at the UN Summit of the Future on 22 September 2024,

–  having regard to the Declaration of the EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit 2023 held in Brussels on 17 and 18 July 2023,

–  having regard to the EU-LAC Global Gateway Investment Agenda announced during the EU-CELAC summit in Brussels in July 2023,

–  having regard to the Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Interior and/or Security of the Member States of the European Union and the Ministers with responsibility for security matters of the Member States of the Latin American Committee on Internal Security adopted on 5 March 2025,

–  having regard to the joint statement of 30 June 2017 by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission entitled ‘The New European Consensus on Development – “Our world, our dignity, our future”’(9),

–  having regard to the European Drug Report 2025 published by the European Union Drugs Agency on 5 June 2025,

–  having regard to the Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean (Escazú Agreement) of 4 March 2018,

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Development,

–  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0171/2025),

A.  whereas the EU and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) share long-standing historical, religious, cultural and economic connections, forming a natural alliance grounded in democracy, human rights and multilateral cooperation; whereas these relations are strengthened by deep human bonds, as many LAC citizens also hold EU citizenship and vice versa; whereas the alliance between the countries of the region and the EU should be grounded in democracy, human rights and multilateral cooperation;

B.  whereas the international order is undergoing a profound transformation, in which the cooperative logic that for decades underpinned global relations is being replaced by fierce strategic competition, in which the law of the strongest threatens to replace international law as a guiding principle; whereas in just a few years, the international system that had guaranteed a certain stability after World War II has been shaken by growing tensions, nationalist impulses and confrontational dynamics that threaten to fracture global equilibrium; whereas the EU, which has been one of the staunchest architects and defenders of a rules-based multilateral system, today faces a hostile and challenging environment; whereas structural tensions between the United States and China, the questioning of democratic values across various regions and the temptation to move towards a bipolarity that reduces the world’s complexity to a standoff between powers, demand a firm and strategic response from Europe; whereas few regional relationships offer as much potential and as many opportunities for Europe as those with LAC, particularly for addressing shared challenges such as securing raw materials and advancing the energy transition, managing migration, and combating organised crime and drug trafficking to shape a future of freedom, security and prosperity;

C.  whereas the EU and LAC partners are committed to building their cooperation on stability, reliability, co-ownership, co-responsibility and a bi-regional dialogue that reflects the diversity and asymmetries of both regions, placing people, social cohesion and inclusive development at its core;

D.  whereas engagement between the two regions is further strengthened through firm bilateral relations and deeper interactions with bi-regional and sub-regional entities such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Organisation of American States (OAS), Mercosur, the Andean Community, CARICOM/CARIFORUM and the Pacific Alliance; whereas the EU-LAC strategic partnership dates back to 1999, when the first bi-regional EU-LAC Summit was held in Rio de Janeiro;

E.  whereas the combined population of both regions exceeds 1 billion; whereas, according to 2023 data, bilateral trade in goods and services amounts to EUR 395 billion – a 45 % increase since 2013 – and EU direct investment in Latin America totalled over EUR 741 billion by 2022; whereas the EU and Latin American countries share a commitment to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by promoting social justice, equality and sustainable development; whereas both regions continue to face major challenges, including social and gender inequality, unemployment and poverty; whereas United Nations Development Programme data highlights the urgent need for greater investment in social inclusion, as Latin America remains one of the most unequal regions globally, with 58 % of rural inhabitants, particularly indigenous peoples, living below the poverty line, compared to 26 % in urban areas; whereas, in 2023, 41 million people in Latin America suffered from hunger and 187,6 million experienced moderate to severe food insecurity; whereas rising social and economic inequality in both Europe and Latin America has fuelled public discontent, social fragmentation and the erosion of trust in democratic institutions, creating a fertile ground for populist and authoritarian movements that exploit grievances, polarise societies and undermine the rule of law, democratic norms and pluralistic debate;

F.  whereas the EU and LAC countries together account for a third of the total population of the members of the United Nations, and for around 21 % of global GDP;

G.  whereas high levels of public debt, combined with increasing service costs, particularly interest payments, and a high level of informal employment in the region in 2024, continue to pose challenges to workers’ social protection and contribute to further fiscal constraints, which are among the key obstacles to sustainable development in the region, with enduring impacts on growth, investment, poverty and inequality;

H.  whereas such inequalities must be urgently addressed in order to promote fairer and more stable democracies, marginalise populism and extremism, and lay the groundwork for sustainable economic recovery, quality job creation, and shared prosperity, tackling the root causes of migration and forced displacement in the region, worsened by an unprecedented increase in violence, insecurity, impunity and human rights violations; whereas it is crucial to allow the development of a healthy civic space that protects human rights organisations and defenders of the environment;

I.  whereas 74 % of LAC countries are highly exposed to extreme weather events and major climate-related challenges, such as the impact of El Niño on the food supply; whereas it is the second most disaster-prone region in the world, with more than 190 million people affected by natural disasters in the past three decades, particularly women and the most vulnerable populations; whereas climate change affects Caribbean Small Island Developing States in particular;

J.  whereas LAC countries contain almost 35 % of the world’s total forest areas, 40 % of the world’s biodiversity and around 50 % of terrestrial species, which are essential in the fight against climate change; whereas the traditional knowledge of indigenous communities could play a pivotal role in the protection of these forests and species;

K.  whereas both the EU and LAC are committed to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement; whereas primary commodities (agricultural products and natural resources) account for approximately 50 % of all exports of goods from LAC countries; whereas LAC has large reserves of raw materials needed to ensure the green and energy transformation of our economies; whereas the need for these raw materials and the related cooperation within the framework of Global Gateway projects should be based on mutually beneficial partnerships that, among other things, generate employment and investment, thereby adding value to the region, while addressing the challenge of increasing pressure on diversity and food security; whereas the LAC region is facing a significant gap in the investments it needs to carry out its just green and digital transition;

L.  whereas demographic and epidemiological trends and the effects of climate change in the EU and LAC countries are increasing demand for care, including long-term care, and thus have an impact on equal rights and opportunities for women, who are predominantly assigned paid and unpaid domestic and care work in the absence of sufficient care policies and services that ensure gender co-responsibility between men and women;

M.  whereas the multilateral rules-based order on which peace and prosperity, respect for the rule of law, international law and human rights have been based for the last 80 years is increasingly being challenged by autocratic tendencies and autocracies across the globe; whereas both regions combined hold a third of the voting rights at the UN;

N.  whereas Russia’s illegal, unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine constitutes a flagrant breach of international law and threatens global security, requiring a firm, coordinated and unequivocal stance on the part of democratic partners, including those in Latin America and the Caribbean; whereas most Latin American and Caribbean countries have supported the UN resolutions against Russian aggression against Ukraine;

O.  whereas external actors, notably China, Russia and Iran, have expanded their footprint in LAC, with Beijing increasing investments in infrastructure and raw materials projects, Moscow reinforcing its diplomatic, political, propaganda, military and security presence, and Tehran increasing intelligence activities in the region; whereas these external actors are supporting local anti-democratic forces and contributing to democratic backsliding; whereas Russia leverages economic dependencies, including on fertilisers and diesel, and spreads disinformation campaigns to destabilise democratic systems; whereas China’s presence is also creating economic dependencies that influence foreign policy in the region;

P.  whereas freedom of expression and assembly are crucial components and enablers of democratic, free and participative societies; whereas violence against political opponents poses a direct threat to the foundations of democracy, as exemplified by the assassination of Colombian Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay and the alarming rise of violence in Colombia;

Q.  whereas the EU and Parliament have been very supportive of the agreement on the peace process in Colombia concluded in 2016, and continue to monitor its implementation; whereas this peace accord ended five decades of armed conflict; whereas continued EU support for the full implementation of the peace agreement should take into account the recent escalation of violence;

R.  whereas the overall democratic backsliding in autocratic and illiberal regimes enables these regimes’ legitimisation strategies, including by removing effective checks on the enforcement of repressive laws;

S.  whereas Parliament has recently and unequivocally expressed its position through numerous resolutions concerning non-compliance with the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Cuba; whereas there are currently 1 155 political prisoners in Cuba, and systematic human rights violations are being perpetrated by the Cuban regime;

T.  whereas Parliament denounced the usurpation of the presidency in Venezuela by Nicolás Maduro on 10 January 2025 and recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela, and María Corina Machado as the leader of Venezuela’s democratic forces; whereas Parliament awarded them the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, symbolising support for the fight for freedom and democracy in Venezuela; whereas sympathy should be expressed for the more than 7 million Venezuelans who have been forced to flee their country since 2015, with around 6 million resettling in LAC; whereas considerable strain has been placed on neighbouring countries; whereas the solidarity and great efforts of host communities, especially Colombia, in providing access to healthcare, education and employment opportunities for Venezuelan refugees should be commended, as this is contributing to regional stability and the protection of fundamental rights;

U.  whereas since 2018, the Nicaraguan regime has systematically, repeatedly and arbitrarily persecuted human rights defenders, and opposition and religious representatives, among others; whereas over 5 600 NGOs, including religious groups –mainly Catholic – have been dissolved, and their assets confiscated; whereas Parliament has repeatedly condemned the regime imposed in Nicaragua by Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo;

V.  whereas the actions taken by the Trump administration in the United States have introduced geopolitical uncertainty, undermined multilateralism and hindered bi-regional cooperation, thereby reinforcing the need for a strong and autonomous EU-LAC alliance; whereas the EU-LAC strategic alliance is key to pushing forward shared values and interests, such as multilateralism and democracy;

W.   whereas the LAC region remains under-represented in key international organisations and forums, including the G20 and international financial organisations; whereas Mexico and Brazil occupy a special place in bi-regional relations, being the two largest economies in LAC, wielding significant geopolitical influence and being officially designated as strategic partners of the EU;

X.  whereas drug trafficking poses a serious threat to security in both regions; whereas since 2020 the Union has become the world’s largest market for cocaine; whereas this cocaine comes largely from LAC and enters the EU primarily through Europe’s Atlantic ports;

Y.  whereas civic space is shrinking in many LAC countries, which are seeing an unprecedented increase in attacks against human rights organisations, activists and defenders, leading to displacement, violence and impunity;

Z.  whereas both the EU and LAC countries share a strategic interest in reinforcing their respective strategic autonomy and in diversifying their supply chains; whereas Latin America is a global leader in the production of sustainable energy, with approximately 69 % of its electricity generated from renewable and clean sources, demonstrating the region’s strategic importance and potential in the global green transition;

AA.  whereas since the creation of CELAC in 2010, three EU-CELAC summits have been held, in 2013, 2015 and 2023; whereas the EU and CELAC have a long-standing strategic partnership and put in place a network of association and trade agreements; whereas the November 2025 EU-CELAC summit in Colombia will be a key opportunity to reaffirm the EU’s commitment to LAC and demonstrate that Europe is a key, reliable and strategic partner that offers a credible alternative development model rooted in democratic cooperation and shared prosperity, and to show that both regions are firmly committed to bi-regional cooperation and a rules-based international order;

1.  Highlights the deep human, historical, cultural and economic, as well as religious, ties between the EU and LAC, which form the foundation of a natural alliance and the basis for developing a strong and enduring European-Latin American transatlantic area of peace, democracy and prosperity;

2.  Promotes a policy aimed at encouraging regional cooperation and greater regional integration in LAC; underlines that the new global geopolitical context calls for a qualitative leap in the EU-LAC partnership to further develop a strategic alliance in defence of multilateralism and its founding principles, including dialogue, inclusion, international solidarity and respect for the UN Charter, human rights, humanitarian law and the promotion of sustainable development;

3.  Considers that the EU and LAC, as natural strategic partners, have a historic opportunity to strengthen their alliance in the current international context marked by strategic competition; considers that their partnership can represent an important buffer against increasing geopolitical tensions, by building joint policies that foster their strategic autonomy, cooperation and mutual respect;

4.  Highlights the fact that the relations between Europe and LAC are also based on deep human connections; recalls that, in an increasingly disconnected world, human capital, which includes shared languages, heritage and cultural ties, is a strategic asset that needs to be preserved;

5.  Highlights the EU’s renewed and growing engagement in the region, exemplified by the pivotal EU-CELAC Summit in 2023, which marked a clear turning point after years of limited involvement; underscores the need for a sustained commitment to advancing the EU’s interests and values; notes that the EU’s engagement has dwindled in recent decades, thus creating a vacuum for the growing influence of China, Russia and Iran; deplores the fact that this greater closeness with authoritarian regimes ultimately undermines democracy in the region;

6.  Recognises the urgent need to continue to upgrade and develop the EU-LAC relationship in response to the emerging geopolitical shifts, climate change, technological advancements and growing inequalities and security challenges facing both regions, and to increase both regions’ strategic autonomy;

The geopolitical importance of the EU-LAC strategic alliance, strengthened dialogue and cooperation

7.  Calls for the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to step up diplomatic efforts in the region to promote increased convergence between the EU and LAC on crucial foreign policy issues, and in particular to adopt a firmer stance on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and on international efforts to achieve a permanent ceasefire in Gaza, the flow of humanitarian aid and the unconditional release of all hostages; underlines that, given the current international context, the EU-LAC partnership should be built on a logic of shared strategic autonomy, reduced external dependencies and the defence of the multilateral rules-based order as its guiding principles;

8.  Encourages deeper EU-LAC collaboration in international forums to promote and defend the multilateral global order, international law and respect for democracy and human rights, humanitarian law and principles, social justice and sustainable development; stresses, in this regard, that the EU must show its partners in LAC that it can offer better conditions for partnership than authoritarian regimes;

9.  Stresses, therefore, the importance of ensuring that EU efforts focus on strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law and political accountability, and calls for progress on reforms and peacebuilding measures aimed at strengthening security and stability across both regions; recalls that the defence of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and gender equality must be a cross-cutting condition for all EU-LAC agreements and funding, including under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI-Global Europe); calls for transparency and accountability, particularly in trade and investment frameworks;

10.  Is concerned by the democratic backsliding that has taken place in LAC since 2019 and condemns the violations of human rights and restrictions on fundamental freedoms in the region, particularly by regimes in Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela, which are among the world’s most authoritarian; expresses deep concern over the growing trend of authoritarian and populist governance in LAC, and the cumulative erosion of democratic institutions, multilateralism, the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms, civic space and essential social protections; stresses the need to strengthen support for democratic actors and civil society, and urges the immediate release of all political prisoners;

11.  Condemns, in particular, the Cuban regime’s systematic human rights abuses against protesters, political dissidents, religious leaders and human rights activists and its obstructing the establishment of independent civil society organisations; notes that reliable sources state that the regime holds over a thousand political prisoners, including minors, and urges the Cuban regime to release them without delay; calls for the use of all necessary available instruments, without exclusion of any, to ensure compliance with the democratic and human rights clauses of the EU-Cuba PDCA; reiterates its call for the Council to adopt sanctions against those responsible for persistent violations; condemns the participation of Cuban mercenaries in Russia’s military campaign on the front lines in Ukraine;

12.   Strongly condemns and fully rejects the electoral fraud orchestrated by the regime in Venezuela in the 2024 presidential elections, and the sham parliamentary elections held in May 2025; demands that the Maduro government cease its policy of repression and attacks on civil society and the opposition; recalls that on 19 September 2024, Parliament recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela and María Corina Machado as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela; highlights that various democratic states in the region and worldwide have recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as president-elect; expresses satisfaction that on 17 December 2024, Parliament awarded the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, who represent all Venezuelans fighting for the restoration of freedom and democracy; commends the Venezuelan people’s commitment to democracy and the democratic opposition’s continued resilience despite increasingly repressive policies by the Maduro regime;

13.  Recalls that the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua passed a constitutional reform in January 2025 eliminating the separation of powers and political pluralism, establishing a co-presidency that controls all branches of government and the media and ignores adherence to international human rights conventions; moreover, stresses that the regime in Nicaragua maintains strong ties with other autocracies, such as those in Iran, Venezuela and Cuba, and strongly condemns it for its systematic human rights abuses, persecution of the democratic opposition, repression of the Catholic Church and civil society, and destruction of the free media and all manifestations of independence from government; urges the Nicaraguan authorities to restore the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and the rights of all Nicaraguans in exile, including the right to safe return without delay; reiterates its demand that the democratic clause of the EU Association Agreement be triggered, rejects any prospect of dialogue with members of Nicaragua’s regime-controlled National Assembly, and calls for increased sanctions against Ortega, Rosario Murillo and their inner circle; calls for the immediate lifting of the ban on international human rights monitoring mechanisms and for restoration of the legal status of over 3 000 NGOs, which was revoked in 2018 by the Nicaraguan government;

14.  Expresses deep concern over the erosion of democratic principles and the deliberate circumvention of constitutional safeguards in other LAC countries, most notably in El Salvador; voices alarm over the lack of independence of the judiciary and lack of transparency in government actions, the excessive use of force, undue militarisation, and the growing restrictions on the freedoms of assembly and the press; is gravely concerned by reports of widespread detentions without due cause, torture, forced disappearances of civilians, and the alarming overcrowding in prisons; condemns the authorities for failing to hold security forces accountable for their actions and for their persistent rejection of international requests for oversight and investigation;

15.  Firmly condemns the Russian Federation’s use of hybrid tactics, encompassing military, cyber, information and economic operations, particularly in the energy sector, including the evasion of sanctions, non-transparent practices and corruption, as tools for expansion, which undermines regional security, promotes internal destabilisation and leads to the formation of a bloc that poses a threat to democracy, peace and international law; is deeply concerned about the strategic partnership between Venezuela and the Russian Federation, which poses risks to regional and international security; calls for the EU to step up its fight against Russian propaganda in the region; recalls the need for the EU to ensure that EU delegations have the necessary means to counter disinformation;

16.  Notes that, since 2005, China has granted loans totalling more than USD 120 billion to the LAC region, with the aim of increasing its geopolitical influence and making LAC countries dependent upon Chinese financing by providing investment capital in exchange for the supply of crude oil, or by funding energy and infrastructure projects; regrets that these energy and infrastructure projects often result in lower environmental and labour standards being applied; recalls that, unlike other global powers, the EU does not seek an extractive or unbalanced relationship, but rather partnerships based on reciprocity, sustainability and the generation of added value; highlights that it is precisely this model of cooperation, prioritising respect for sovereignty, transparency and the rule of law, that makes the EU a preferred partner for the region;

17.  Supports the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of all LAC countries and rejects global powers’ ambitions to impose relations of political and economic dependence; emphasises that respect for states’ territorial integrity is a fundamental principle of international law, the UN Charter and the rules-based international order;

Economic cooperation for sustainable growth

18.  Welcomes the strong economic and trade partnership between the EU and LAC, which is based on a shared interest in promoting sustainable growth and human development, strengthening economic resilience and reducing excessive dependencies through diversified trade relations;

19.  Highlights the EU’s ambition to lead the global green transition and its recognition of Latin America as a key partner in this effort; supports LAC in combating illegal deforestation and devising reforestation projects;

20.  Stresses the need to address growing inequalities, promote peace and strengthen democratic processes and institutions in both regions, and highlights the importance of economic cooperation that promotes gender equality and women’s economic empowerment; expresses concern about backsliding on women’s rights, particularly with regard to their sexual and reproductive health; calls for closing the gender pay gap and supports actions to enhance female representation in political leadership and legislatures, and emphasises the need to align EU-LAC economic relations with the UN 2030 Agenda and ensure stronger coherence between economic and social-environmental objectives;

21.  Highlights the fact that the EU is the largest investor in the LAC region and the third-largest trading partner; notes that LAC is the EU’s fifth-largest trading partner; underlines that this strong economic cooperation should not only serve the interests of large financial entities, but also ensure that all benefit, especially SMEs, workers, vulnerable people, and populations from rural and remote areas;

22.  Underlines that both the Letta Report on the future of the single market and the Draghi Report on the future of European competitiveness emphasise the need to intensify efforts to secure the EU’s supply of critical raw materials and stresses the potential of LAC to be a key partner in diversifying supply chains; welcomes the signing of memorandums of understanding with partners on critical raw materials and highlights that these are crucial to achieving more diversification in the EU’s supply chains; believes that these agreements, together with deepening economic and political cooperation through bilateral agreements, should lead to increased investment in this sector that will benefit both regions;

23.  Calls for greater regulation and transparency in key economic areas, such as the mining sector, where weak regulation can lead to conflicts and exploitation; calls on all partners to strengthen labour rights and promote cooperatives and other initiatives that foster worker participation and empowerment in the economy; highlights the importance of ensuring that the extraction, trade in and processing of critical raw materials adhere to high standards of environmental protection, social responsibility and human rights, and supports the development of alternative, resilient, sustainable and transparent value chains that contribute to the prosperity of all the societies involved;

24.  Calls on the Commission to intensify the dialogue with the LAC countries on the implications of EU legislation for their local economies;

Strategic partnerships and international agreements

25.  Acknowledges the dense network of agreements between the two regions and stresses the fundamental geopolitical importance of enacting new and more ambitious agreements and partnerships that are inclusive, sustainable and mutually beneficial, grounded in shared values and firmly rooted in respect for human rights; emphasises the role of those agreements in contributing to further economic integration to achieve an area of shared prosperity and increased economic security; emphasises the importance of bi-regional trade between the EU and LAC in diversifying food systems and strengthening food security;

26.  Recalls the special role that Mexico and Brazil play in bi-regional relations, bearing the status of strategic partners of the EU; strongly encourages both parties to make better use of the potential of these strategic partnerships; highlights the need to fulfil the commitment to hold bilateral summits with both countries every two years;

27.  Welcomes the full ratification of the EU-Central America Association Agreement, and the entry into force of its three pillars of political dialogue, cooperation and trade in May 2024; calls for the adoption of robust and inclusive mechanisms for civil society participation in the implementation and monitoring of the EU-Central America Association Agreement, upholding democratic principles, transparency and social cohesion; calls for the EU and the Central American countries to pursue active policies and ensure appropriate funding to optimise the agreement’s positive impact on SDGs in both regions;

28.  Welcomes the signing of the EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement and calls for its swift and full ratification; welcomes, too, the conclusion of negotiations on the EU-Mexico Global Agreement, which will reinforce political cooperation, open new trade opportunities and strengthen ties in strategic sectors such as digitalisation, innovation, and security, and calls for its swift signing and ratification; recognises Mexico’s pivotal role in LAC and its ambition to diversify trade and political partnerships; underlines that the EU-Mexico agreement will reinforce the EU’s role as a strategic partner in the region and its capacity to respond to global challenges;

29.  Underlines the importance of meeting the targets set by the Paris Climate Agreement and welcomes the inclusion of a binding clause in the EU-Mercosur Agreement on upholding its commitments; underscores that the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement will provide an opportunity to significantly strengthen EU-Mercosur bi-regional cooperation on addressing common challenges, while serving to counteract the growing influence of authoritarian actors in the region and to help the EU diversify its supply of critical raw materials;

Multilateral cooperation

30.  Recalls that the Euro-Latin American alliance represents a bridge designed not only to prevent a dangerous drift toward closed and ideologically polarised blocs, but above all to open a space for international dialogue that reduces tensions and fosters shared solutions;

31.  Stresses the significant contribution of LAC countries to multilateral organisations and their active role in addressing global challenges, such as climate change, peace and security, including the promotion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, and sustainable development; highlights the commitment of both regions to defending the UN Charter, human rights, representative democracy and strong multilateral governance; urges both regions to continue defending multilateralism, in particular the UN system, and to jointly lead a reform of global governance institutions, including international financial institutions, to achieve a more inclusive and representative multilateralism;

32.  Calls for progress on the conclusion of visa liberalisation agreements with the countries with which discussions are most advanced;

EU-LAC development cooperation, humanitarian aid and sustainable investments through the Global Gateway initiative

33.  Recalls that the primary objective of EU development cooperation policy is the reduction and, in the long term, eradication of poverty; stresses that eradicating poverty, particularly among the most vulnerable groups – such as women, girls and persons with disabilities, among others – is essential to addressing growing inequalities that undermine social cohesion and limit economic potential; recalls that the debt burden faced by LAC countries generates severe economic and social costs, with long-lasting effects on poverty and inequality; supports debt restructuring; stresses that the SDGs and the Paris Agreement must remain central to cooperation between LAC and the EU; recalls that access to development aid and finance is particularly crucial for fragile countries, including those more vulnerable to the effects of climate change, in particular Caribbean Small Island Developing States, and for countries transitioning to a higher level of income;

34.  Highlights the fact that the EU is the leading contributor to development cooperation in LAC; reiterates the importance of strengthening the EU’s development policies and humanitarian aid in LAC, and calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen the Union’s other external priorities, including those regarding security, sustainable development and trade, migration, fisheries, agriculture, climate change and energy; calls for the establishment of effective synergies with EU humanitarian assistance, with full respect for the principle of co-ownership, taking account of the LAC region’s development priorities; calls for regular bilateral dialogues and, where relevant, for consultations with local governments and civil society representatives of both regions, including on support for the sustainable development objectives in the EU-LAC association agreements, in particular as a response to the global decline in official development assistance (ODA) and humanitarian aid;

35.  Is concerned by the global cuts in funding for development and humanitarian aid, in particular the reduction in ODA and the suspension of the majority of the programmes of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) (up to 83 %), and by the global aid cuts made by several EU Member States, as this funding has been instrumental in supporting the significant social, economic and political transformations in the region; reiterates that these cuts will have long-term implications for the development agenda and the achievement of the SDGs in the LAC region; expresses serious concern about the impact of the recent cuts on the effective participation of civil society and NGOs and their capacity to carry out their activities to promote human rights, democracy and social development in the region, and fight authoritarian regimes; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to provide adequate development and humanitarian assistance to the LAC region;

36.  Stresses that traditional forms of ODA have proven to be essential and effective in reducing poverty, addressing growing inequalities, improving health and education outcomes and fostering social cohesion in the LAC region, in particular as regards the inclusion of under-represented and marginalised groups, such as girls, women, young people, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and people of African descent;

37.  Calls for full civil society participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of EU programmes to ensure policy coherence for sustainable development;

38.   Highlights the strategic potential of triangular cooperation between the EU, the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and LAC partners to enhance the impact of development, mutual learning and policy innovation; stresses that such partnerships, when aligned with local priorities and focused on capacity building, can foster inclusive solutions to global challenges; calls for the EU to scale up support for triangular cooperation initiatives within the NDICI-Global Europe framework and to systematically integrate them into the EU-LAC strategic agenda;

39.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to leverage major initiatives such as the Global Gateway to increase investment in LAC, ensuring that the EU remains a strong and competitive partner for LAC countries, given the growing Chinese and Russian presence in the region, as clearly shown by China’s commitments during the China-CELAC forum held on 13 May 2025; stresses that increasing EU investment in Latin America is all the more important because of the intensification of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Latin America, with Colombia signing up to the BRI at the China-CELAC forum of 13 May 2025; calls on the Commission to deliver on the projects and strategies planned under the Global Gateway framework, in order to, among other objectives, build sustainable and high-quality infrastructure that effectively creates local value, strengthens bi-regional value chains and enhances economic security for both regions; insists that the Global Gateway should always adhere to fundamental EU values, including respect for human rights, good governance, democracy and transparency, and environmental sustainability in line with the EU’s development effectiveness principles; urges the EU and its Member States to ensure that investments made under the Global Gateway framework include stringent due diligence processes;

40.  Calls for the effective implementation of the EU-LAC Global Gateway Investment Agenda by fostering partnerships between the public and private sectors, with a view to supporting sustainable development, inclusive growth and employment, as well as a just green and digital transformation; calls on the Commission to ensure, from inception to delivery, that these investments are aligned with the objectives of the SDGs and the sustainable development priorities identified by LAC partners, including through regular consultations with local authorities and civil society representatives and through impact assessments and evaluations, and that they are responsive to local and regional needs, are gender-sensitive and generate meaningful development outcomes;

41.  Stresses the importance of creating the right conditions for mobilising both public and private investment to support sustainable development; stresses, in this regard, the need to address the USD 99 billion annual financing gap in the region for SDG-aligned infrastructure and climate projects to drive the just green and digital transition; highlights the key role of the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) in mobilising investments to achieve these goals, and the role played by the European Investment Bank (EIB), in particular EIB Global, within the EFSD+ framework, in addressing the persistent lack of long-term financing and technical expertise for green investments in the region, as shown by the 2024 survey by the EIB and the Latin American Association of Development Financing Institutions; supports deeper cooperation with local financial institutions and regional development banks, and calls for increased use of EFSD+ guarantees to support small-scale, high-impact projects involving civil society and local communities, in line with the Global Gateway and the EU’s development effectiveness principles;

42.  Underlines that cooperation between the EU and LAC on both critical raw materials and technology is essential to achieving fair, green and digital transformations and to strengthening strategic autonomy in both regions based on mutually beneficial partnerships; underlines that such cooperation helps to overcome LAC economies’ dependence on primary commodities (agricultural products and natural resources) and plays an important role in strengthening value chains through sustainable reindustrialisation policies that create decent jobs, promote environmental sustainability and foster an environment conducive to technological innovation; recommends enhanced cooperation on digital education and research between EU and LAC universities and innovation hubs;

43.  Stresses the need for Global Gateway investments in the LAC region to prioritise closing infrastructure and inequality gaps, including digital and energy poverty, particularly in rural and peripheral areas, to ensure that the benefits of enhanced connectivity reach underserved populations; emphasises that this includes young people and the informal sector, and that affordable access to the internet and enhanced digital literacy should be ensured across all segments of the population, particularly in marginalised communities, with a view to actively bridging the digital divide;

44.  Stresses that young people, who are essential agents of structural change, continue to face major barriers in accessing decent employment, and underlines that Global Gateway priorities must support investments in education, vocational training and employment policies that are aligned with the needs of the future labour market;

45.  Recalls, furthermore, the importance of prioritising programmes already identified by international and civil society organisations as effective, such as investment in health and care systems; calls, particularly in light of the region’s vulnerability, for the effective inclusion of persons with disabilities to ensure an inclusive, accessible and effective approach to health and care;

46.  Recalls that trade and association agreements allow both regions to exchange and invest in a broad range of different sectors, and highlights the fact that reducing inequalities, promoting access to health, education and water, and upholding human dignity and fundamental rights must remain central to the EU-LAC partnership, in line with TFEU Article 208 and NDICI-Global Europe;

47.  Stresses the importance of enhanced transparency, accountability and local relevance, and welcomes the creation of a Commission webpage with information on existing Global Gateway initiatives; calls on the Commission to publish further details, including the results of consultations with local authorities and civil society from both regions, as well as information on compliance with the SDGs and the priorities of both the EU and the partner countries, with benchmarks and indicators; urges the broadest application of the Commission’s inequality marker (I-Marker), in particular with regard to the Global Gateway, which should at all times comply with a rights-based approach and be linked to human development indicators; highlights, in addition, the importance of social and environmental protection in the EU-CELAC dialogue;

48.  Emphasises that there must be a continuous evaluation of the Global Gateway to assess its effectiveness and strategic direction; calls, in this regard, for a stronger role for Parliament in the oversight of the Global Gateway initiative and in steering it strategically, particularly with regard to its implementation in LAC, in order to ensure transparency, democratic accountability, alignment with EU values and the effective use of resources;

49.  Calls on the Commission to ensure the full participation of civil society in the design, implementation and monitoring of EU programmes to ensure policy coherence for sustainable development, establishing effective synergies with all projects related to the Global Gateway and EU humanitarian assistance;

50.  Stresses that, alongside the Global Gateway initiative, traditional cooperation channels in LAC countries must be preserved; calls on the EU to increase funding for human rights, democracy and civil society programmes in the region, and to ensure that allocations to the Americas and Caribbean geographical programme under NDICI Global Europe – currently the lowest among all regions – are at least maintained;

51.  Urges the Commission and the LAC countries to increase efforts to address the underlying causes of human and natural disasters, by strengthening prevention, preparedness, resilience and response policies and cooperation; welcomes the bi-regional memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the area of integrated disaster risk management, signed in Barbados on 15 May 2024, and invites partners who have not yet signed it to do so as soon as possible;

52.  Points out that European cooperation and investment not only promote economic development in the region but also contribute to peace by generating economic alternatives for young people in the Latin American region; stresses that the latter is an essential element in combating organised crime; underlines the importance of strengthening bi-regional cooperation on security in its broadest sense, including in areas such as the climate, food, health and social security, of implementing joint preparedness, prevention and response mechanisms, and of fully integrating human rights and humanitarian principles into EU-LAC security cooperation, in order to break the cycles of violence and exclusion in the LAC region;

53.  Welcomes the EU’s ambition to lead the global green transition and acknowledges its recognition of Latin America as a key partner in this effort; underlines the need to jointly drive global green initiatives that respond to global climate change mitigation and adaptation goals; stresses the need to promote a just and inclusive ecological transition in both regions, including through enhanced EU-LAC cooperation on climate change adaptation and mitigation, and to respond to extreme climate events, with a particular focus on critical areas, such as the protection of biodiversity, the restoration of ecosystems, decarbonisation and sustainable agriculture, and the most vulnerable people and communities;

54.  Stresses that climate change is disrupting food systems in Latin America and highlights the value of agroecology, which has been recognised as a key climate change-resilient farming system;

55.  Recalls the importance of the EU-Amazon Basin cooperation programme in improving the capacity of the Amazon Basin countries to fight deforestation and forest degradation;

56.  Calls for stronger commitments to uphold the rights of indigenous peoples and to integrate these rights into the dialogue and all dimensions of cooperation with LAC countries, as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

57.  Recalls the importance of promoting sustainable and responsible mining, which protects the rights and livelihoods of local communities and indigenous peoples, prevents severe negative social and environmental impacts and helps overcome dependency on commodity exports, thereby supporting sustainable reindustrialisation policies that create decent jobs and promote environmental sustainability through effective mineral resource governance;

58.  Underlines the need to support gender-responsive development cooperation and proposes the implementation of targeted measures to address and reduce inequalities between men and women, including, but not limited to, the promotion of women’s access to decent work, financial inclusion, and leadership and entrepreneurial roles, particularly in rural and informal sectors; highlights that in many regions of the world micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are often the driving force of local economies, with a growing number of women leading them; underlines that MSMEs account for 90 % of businesses, 60-70 % of employment and 50 % of GDP worldwide; stresses the crucial role of MSMEs in contributing to the 2030 Agenda and achieving the SDGs, particularly those related to poverty eradication and decent work for all;

59.  Welcomes the Bi-regional Pact for Care initiative, which has the objective of promoting cooperation on comprehensive care systems and public policies among the countries of both regions, including by drawing up cooperation and financing mechanisms to achieve a fairer and more inclusive economy;

60.  Calls for enhanced cooperation between the EU and LAC countries to combat gender-based violence through comprehensive education, awareness-raising campaigns and the strengthening of legal protections; supports initiatives under NDICI-Global Europe and the Gender Action Plan III that promote youth employment, education and the political participation of women;

61.  Highlights the vital role of civil society in shaping and monitoring inclusive social policies, promoting equitable access to quality education and fostering sustainable and inclusive economic growth in LAC; expresses serious concern about the shrinking of civic space in many Latin American countries; calls, in this regard, for increased EU support for civil society organisations, human rights defenders, environmental activists and journalists, who are facing increasing threats and violence, to ensure that they can carry out their work safely and independently; calls for prioritising their safety, access to justice and freedom of expression and for strengthening the EU’s partnership with civil society actors, whose role is essential in addressing key concerns and facilitating a constructive dialogue on human rights and the democratic transition, and who are heavily reliant on aid assistance programmes for their operations;

62.  Underlines the importance of EU support for strengthening social protection systems in LAC, including integrated social registries, better coordination of schemes and joint pilot projects, particularly with civil society and local authorities, as key drivers of inclusion and poverty reduction in the EU-LAC partnership;

Cooperation on security and combating drug trafficking

63.  Is mindful of the increase in organised crime and drug trafficking in both the EU and LAC and the unprecedented quantities of illicit drugs trafficked to the EU from the region primarily through its ports; is particularly concerned about the rising challenge to security in both regions posed by the transnational coordination of criminal organisations based in LAC and the EU; highlights the need to strengthen cooperation not only with drug-producing countries but also with transit countries in LAC, and to enhance multilateral cooperation to combat these threats; calls for strengthening the EU-LAC Partnership on Justice and Security, EL PAcCTO 2.0, COPOLAD, EUROFRONT, the Global Illicit Flows Programme (GIFP) and the European Ports Alliance;

64.  Recognises the importance of the Latin American Committee for Internal Security (CLASI) in building a common and shared security framework in LAC; stresses that CLASI is a key instrument in achieving greater integration and effectiveness in the fight against crime in the region; welcomes the continued strategic engagement between interior and/or security ministers of the EU Member States and the ministers with responsibility for security matters in the member states of CLASI, as well as at the technical level, to strengthen operational law enforcement cooperation between the EU and LAC; welcomes the adoption of a Joint Declaration and a Roadmap on Operational Cooperation Priorities in 2025-2026; calls for establishing similar cooperation in the areas of justice and border management;

65.  Invites the Commission to strengthen and expand support for cooperation between LAC partner countries and relevant EU agencies, including EUROPOL, EUROJUST and EUDA, and strengthen their working arrangements; applauds the idea of establishing a partnership between LAC ports and the European Ports Alliance; underlines the importance of progressing with AI technologies and strengthening cooperation between ports and authorities in combating drug trafficking; calls for joint enforcement initiatives, operational partnerships and intelligence sharing; welcomes Members States’ concrete contributions in this regard;

66.  Welcomes efforts to strengthen regional security cooperation through the expansion of CLASI and the establishment of AMERIPOL as a formalised law enforcement body, facilitating cross-border coordination; stresses the need for the ratification of the Treaty establishing AMERIPOL in order for it to become fully effective, and calls on the signatory countries to initiate their constitutional ratification procedures;

67.  Highlights the need to address the root causes of organised crime, including corruption, weak governance and social inequality, and advocates for an approach that combines law enforcement with long-term social policies and other cross-sector strategies, with a view to ensuring a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to citizen security; points to the benefits of Association Agreements and other bilateral agreements between the EU and LAC as essential tools for collaboration with partner countries to address the root causes of organised crime and combat the trafficking of illicit drugs;

Justice, human rights and the rule of law

68.  Underlines the importance of ensuring that judicial reforms in LAC respect judicial independence and comply with international rule of law standards; calls for ensuring that such reforms contribute to strengthening democratic governance and maintaining judicial integrity; stresses the need to combat political ties to corruption and organised crime; calls on the authorities to uphold the rule of law and the right to peaceful assembly, respect due process, and guarantee the safety and integrity of members of the judiciary and detainees; commits to supporting the LAC countries in these efforts;

69.  Welcomes the continued cooperation between the EU and LAC to uphold and promote democracy, human rights and good governance, and to strengthen political stability; underlines the fact that the integrity and transparency of electoral processes are fundamental pillars of the EU-LAC partnership;

70.  Highlights the fact that the EU’s electoral observation missions play a key role in supporting fair elections and ensuring transparency, as demonstrated by recent missions in Guatemala, Paraguay and Ecuador, and as planned for upcoming missions in Bolivia, Guyana and Honduras in 2025, and Peru and Colombia in 2026;

71.  Calls for enhanced EU-LAC cooperation to counter disinformation campaigns and hybrid threats, particularly those originating from authoritarian states such as Russia, China and Iran, which aim to undermine democratic institutions, electoral integrity and public trust in both regions; emphasises the importance of strengthening digital literacy programmes in response to growing hybrid threats and misinformation, to give citizens the skills they need to critically evaluate online information;

Cooperation on human rights

72.  Stresses that growing repression, deteriorating conditions under autocratic regimes and deepening economic instability in some parts of LAC are forcing many to flee in search of protection, economic opportunities and basic rights; notes with concern the resulting large-scale displacement, particularly from Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela, and cross-border migration within the region; underlines the increasing humanitarian, social and institutional pressures this places on democratic countries hosting significant numbers of migrants and asylum seekers; stresses, therefore, the need for comprehensive cooperation and solidarity among countries of origin, transit and destination, and highlights the importance of coordinated responses to ensure the rights, dignity, and safety of all migrants and refugees; emphasises the importance of inclusive policies for integrating migrants into host communities, as well as the positive contributions that migrants from the region make to society and the economy;

73.  Stresses that cooperation on protecting human rights is fundamental to the EU–LAC relationship; highlights the need to develop strategies to strengthen the rights of Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples in LAC; recognises the alarming increase in feminicide across LAC; emphasises the urgency of combating femicide by strengthening policies to combat gender-based violence, facilitating land ownership and employment opportunities and guaranteeing access to education; highlights the need to continue cooperating on these issues;

74.  Is deeply concerned that a significant part of Haiti remains under the control of armed organised criminal groups responsible for widespread violence and serious human rights abuses; calls for a coordinated strategy between LAC partners, EU Member States and the United States to address this crisis and to support the Haitian people in restoring stability, democratic governance and the rule of law; stresses that the participation of all relevant stakeholders, including NGOs, in this process is essential; calls for the EU to urgently strengthen its political, humanitarian and economic support for Haiti within the framework of the EU-LAC partnership, acknowledging that current efforts remain insufficient to address the scale of the crisis and to support the Haitian people in restoring stability, democratic governance and the rule of law;

75.  Underlines the vital role of civil society in the EU–LAC relationship; strongly condemns the assassinations of human rights defenders and the systematic violations of press freedom; expresses deep concern over the targeted persecution, criminalisation, arbitrary detention and systematic repression of opposition members, indigenous peoples, students, NGOs and religious leaders in several countries; condemns the misuse of criminal law to silence dissent and suppress legitimate criticism;

76.  Stresses the need for human rights cooperation to also include strengthening institutions and judicial independence and ensuring universal access to justice, including protecting human rights defenders, environmental activists and journalists and safeguarding their work across both regions; condemns recent anti-NGO laws in some LAC countries that restrict the operations, funding and independence of NGOs;

77.  Calls on the EU to use the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against those responsible for human rights violations and make further use of the EU’s restrictive measures to sanction individuals who gradually and covertly undermine democracy and the rule of law; calls, furthermore, for the EU to include specific guarantees on human rights compliance when allocating EU funds, including through multilateral and financial institutions, and to ensure that these funds do not reinforce the authoritarian grip of such regimes; calls on the Commission to invoke the human rights clauses in association agreements whenever it uncovers blatant violations of human rights;

Parliamentary cooperation and people-to-people relations

78.  Welcomes the deepening of parliamentary cooperation between the EU and LAC, particularly through the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (Eurolat), as well as through bilateral assemblies, such as with Chile and Mexico, and sub-regional joint parliamentary assemblies, which promotes dialogue on key issues such as trade, security and sustainable development; recognises Eurolat as a strategic component of EU-LAC relations and its key role in strengthening this partnership; welcomes the outcome of the 16th plenary session of Eurolat held in Lima from 1 to 3 June 2025;

79.  Calls for enhanced coordination between Parliament and national and regional parliaments in Latin America to jointly address transnational issues that align with bi-regional cooperation priorities and are key to sustainable development;

80.  Points out the crucial role of parliamentary diplomacy in strengthening bi-regional relations by facilitating direct dialogue with national and regional parliaments; calls for stronger parliamentary diplomacy to support democratic transition processes and strengthen the legislative capacities of LAC parliaments; welcomes, in this context, the opening of Parliament’s local office in Panama;

81.  Urges greater support for and increased investment in the vital work of civil society networks, diaspora communities in both regions, people-to-people initiatives, youth mobility and the EU-LAC Foundation in enhancing bi-regional relations;

82.  Encourages the inclusion of youth voices in the EU-LAC partnership, by promoting educational exchanges, youth-led initiatives and platforms enabling young people to contribute meaningfully to bi-regional policymaking processes;

Recommendations for the November 2025 EU-CELAC summit

83.  Welcomes the EU-CELAC meeting in 2023 and the implementation of initiatives under the EU-CELAC Roadmap 2023-2025; commends the objective of organising regular summits every two years; underlines, in this regard, the need to adopt a new and ambitious roadmap at the 2025 summit in Santa Marta, Colombia, on 9-10 November 2025 that further strengthens the partnership, is clearly aligned with the SDGs and takes into account the increasing level of bi-regional engagement;

84.  Highlights the fact that the upcoming EU-CELAC summit will be an important opportunity to project EU-LAC’s voice to the world on the basis of common values, and an opportunity to renew political commitments at the highest level and set an ambitious and operational bi-regional agenda;

85.  Expects the EU-CELAC summit to strengthen the EU-LAC alliance with a view to setting the highest sustainable development standards at the multilateral level, and to reaffirm the joint commitment to supporting the reform of multilateral institutions to make them more inclusive and effective, particularly financial institutions, which play a fundamental role in dealing with debt and designing a more sustainable international financing model, including the financing of development cooperation addressed at the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development in Seville, Spain; stresses the importance of the EU’s continued support for LAC’s regional integration and for efforts to address long-standing structural challenges to sustainable development in the region;

86.  Expects the EU-CELAC summit to move forward with the establishment of a permanent multi-stakeholder mechanism with adequate funding, so as to establish regular consultations with civil society, trade unions, local governments and other relevant stakeholders from both regions; recognises the work of the EU-LAC Foundation as an intergovernmental organisation and its potential contribution to the permanent multi-stakeholder mechanism;

87.  Stresses, in this regard, the importance of upholding the principles of the rule of law, democracy and human rights, and calls on all summit participants to abide by these principles; points out that this will not be possible without the truly transparent, comprehensive and meaningful inclusion of civil society; calls for the summit agenda to include discussion on democracy and human rights, such as the right to participate in fair and free elections, and for the summit conclusions to include a strong call in defence of human rights and the rule of law; calls on the EU to strongly defend the cause of democracy and human rights;

88.  Calls for the parties to reaffirm their joint commitment to peace, democracy, multilateralism, the rules-based global order, the territorial integrity of states, the rule of law, international justice, democracy, human rights, social justice, sustainable development and free trade at the November 2025 summit, with a view to the gradual establishment of a European-Latin-American-Transatlantic area of peace, democracy and prosperity;

89.  Calls for the parties to strongly condemn Russia’s ongoing war of aggression, in particular all of its serious violations of international law and international humanitarian law and to provide diplomatic, financial and military support to Ukraine; calls for the parties to combine efforts to rapidly achieve a permanent ceasefire, humanitarian intervention in Gaza and the release of all hostages;

90.  Calls for the EU and CELAC to make progress on tangible commitments to reducing poverty and inequality, promoting cohesion, institutional capacity and governance, and protecting workers’ rights, and to continue to support universal access to education and health; underlines the need for a bi-regional commitment to the Bi-regional Pact for Care to consolidate and finance comprehensive care systems as a pillar of social welfare, recognising care as a right, a collective responsibility and an essential precondition for gender equality, social justice and sustainable development in the EU and LAC;

91.  Calls for the EU-CELAC summit to push forward collaboration on climate resilience, biodiversity protection and the fight against deforestation, ensuring that environmental and decarbonisation policies are implemented equitably, that the local population participates and benefits from the ecological transition and that the most vulnerable communities are supported in adapting to climate change;

92.  Calls for stronger commitments to uphold the rights of indigenous peoples in all dimensions of EU and CELAC cooperation;

93.  Considers it important that the EU and LAC commit to jointly driving global and socially just green initiatives, such as negotiating an international treaty to end plastic pollution, or building on the memorandum of understanding on integrated disaster risk management, and that the EU and LAC encourage the sustainable use of natural resources; calls on the parties to reaffirm their shared commitment to the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement;

94.  Encourages continued strong cooperation on digital matters through the EU-LAC Digital Alliance with a view to fostering a human-centric digital transformation in both regions; calls for aligning regulatory frameworks in the digital domain, in particular through dialogue on data protection, platform regulation, AI ethics and cybersecurity;

95.  Reiterates its call for a substantial increase in bi-regional cooperation in the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking as part of a comprehensive approach to citizen security;

96.  Calls for a stronger commitment to cooperation on education, particularly by expanding exchange programmes under Erasmus+;

97.  Stresses the need to provide more institutional support, resources and technical expertise to the organisation of the regular EU-CELAC summits; calls for the creation of a permanent institutional space in between summits that enables greater coordination, better preparation, swifter communication and the monitoring of deliverables;

98.  Calls for regular multi-stakeholder consultations, particularly before and after each EU-CELAC summit, between local governments and civil society in the LAC region and the Commission to ensure that Global Gateway projects align with the achievement of the SDGs, and with local and regional development priorities; calls, in addition, for the establishment of a permanent multi-stakeholder follow-up mechanism to monitor EU-CELAC relations and progress in implementing commitments; underlines the importance of ensuring the meaningful involvement and consultation of both EU and LAC civil society during the summit;

o
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99.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

(1) Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0057. (2) OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj. (3) OJ C, C/2023/398, 23.11.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/398/oj. (4) OJ C, C/2025/2148, 23.4.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/2148/oj. (5) OJ C, C/2024/7215, 10.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7215/oj. (6) OJ C, C/2024/4001, 17.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4001/oj. (7) OJ C, C/2024/7213, 10.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7213/oj. (8) OJ C, C/2025/2249, 29.4.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/2249/oj. (9) OJ C 210, 30.6.2017, p. 1.