European Parliament resolution of 3 April 2025 on Parliament’s estimates of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 2026 (2024/2111(BUI))

P10_TA(2025)0060 A10-0048/2025

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027(1) and to the joint declaration agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission in this context(2) and the related unilateral declarations(3),

–  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2022/2496 of 15 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(4),

–  having regard to the Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(5) (”MFF revision”),

–  having regard to its legislative resolution of 16 December 2020 on the draft Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(6),

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on upscaling the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework: a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges(7),

–  having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2023 on the proposal for a mid-term revision of the multiannual financial framework 2021-2027(8),

–  having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(9),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)(10) (the “Financial Regulation”),

–  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(11),

–  having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2025(12) and the joint statements agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission annexed hereto,

–  having regard to the Secretary-General’s report to the Bureau on drawing up Parliament’s preliminary draft estimates for the financial year 2026,

–  having regard to the preliminary draft estimates drawn up by the Bureau on 10 March 2025 pursuant to Rules 25(7) and 104(1) of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the draft estimates drawn up by the Committee on Budgets pursuant to Rule 104(2) of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to Rule 104 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0048/2025),

A.  whereas the budget proposed on 10 February 2025 by the Secretary-General for the Parliament’s preliminary draft estimates for 2026 amounts to EUR 2 641 609 620 and represents an increase of 4,30 % or EUR 108 914 512 compared to 2025 budget;

B.  whereas the Union annual inflation was 2,8 % in January 2025 according to Eurostat, up from 2,7 % in December 2024; whereas the level of expenditure in Heading 7 of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2021-2027 is based on a 2 % yearly increase;

C.  whereas the credibility of the Parliament depends on its ability to deliver on its core budgetary, legislative and scrutiny work to the highest standard, while setting an example vis-à-vis other Union institutions to plan and conduct its spending prudently and efficiently and to reflect the prevalent economic realities;

General framework

1.  Is concerned with the situation of Heading 7 in the current MFF; recalls that the constraints are the results of the cuts applied by the Council to the Commission’s already very low initial proposal when agreeing on the current MFF 2021-2027; regrets the Council’s opposition to the Commission’s proposal to increase the ceiling of Heading 7 in the MFF revision as from 2024; points out the failure to address the issue of the ceiling of Heading 7 in the MFF revision; highlights that the forecasted negative margin for 2026 presupposes the use of special instruments in Heading 7 for that purpose;

2.  Endorses the agreement reached in the Conciliation between the Bureau and the Committee on Budgets on 18 March 2025 to set the increase over the 2025 budget at 4,09 %, corresponding to an overall of estimates of EUR 2 636 241 620 for 2026, and to reduce accordingly the appropriations proposed on the following budget lines for a total of EUR 12 378 000:

1 0 0 6 — General expenditure allowance, 1 4 2 — External translation services, 2 0 0 0 — Rent, 2 0 0 7 — Construction of buildings and fitting-out of premises, 2 0 2 4 — Energy consumption, 2 1 0 1 — Business applications management, 3 2 0 — Acquisition of expertise, 3 2 4 3 — European Parliament visitors' centres, 3 2 4 8 — Expenditure on audiovisual information, 4 4 — Meetings and other activities of current and former Members;

furthermore, it was decided to increase the level of expenditure of the preliminary draft estimates approved by the Bureau on 10 March 2025 by EUR 7 010 000 and to increase accordingly the appropriations proposed on the following budget lines:

1 2 0 0 — Remuneration and allowances, 1 6 3 0 — Social welfare: welfare expenditure, 4 0 0 — Current administrative expenditure and expenditure relating to the political and information activities of the political groups and non-attached Members, and 4 0 3 — Funding of European political foundations;

finally, it was agreed to modify the budgetary remarks of item 1 6 3 0 — Social welfare: welfare expenditure to include the reference to the APA Committee;

3.  Recalls that almost two-thirds of the budget is fixed by statutory obligations; notes that out of the increase of EUR 103,5 million compared to the 2025 budget an increase of EUR 85,3 million is due to statutory financial obligations, mainly for salary updates of officials and temporary staff (EUR 52,7 million), of contract agents (EUR 9,2 million) and of accredited parliamentary assistants (EUR 15,1 million); recalls that the salary indexation, in line with the Staff Regulations and Statute for Members of the European Parliament, is currently forecasted by the Commission for April 2025, July 2025, April 2026 and July 2026 at 1,2 %, 4,6 %, 0,6 % and 3,4 % respectively;

4.  Notes that the Parliament does not request any additional posts for 2026, the third year in a row;

5.  Notes that the increase for non-statutory expenditures between 2025 and 2026 is 1,96 %;

6.  Welcomes the initiative of the Secretary-General to conduct a major screening exercise aimed at identifying opportunities for administrative simplification, eliminating inefficiencies and ensuring tangible cost reductions, thereby increasing efficiency and ensuring a smart use of resources; asks the Secretary-General to provide the Committee on Budgets with semestrial updates on the actions taken and on the Action Plan on Simplification as well as their impact in terms of budget and staff; underlines that administrative procedures and human resources management represent a heavy burden for Members, in particular when hiring local assistants, and calls for simplification in that regard;

7.  Notes that Parliament’s budget should be established on a realistic basis, in compliance with the principles of budgetary discipline and sound financial management; highlights that it is essential to ensure that financial prudence and security remain key priorities while guaranteeing that these measures do not impede the efficiency, effectiveness and operational capacity of the institution and its essential staff in carrying out their duties successfully; stresses that, given the geopolitical context and the investments that the Union will have to make for its strategic autonomy, the Parliament must set an example in the management of its budget;

8.  Highlights Parliament’s role in building European political awareness and promoting Union values and policies such as the digital and green transition; stresses that transparency, accountability, gender equality and integrity are essential principles within the Union institutions and particularly Parliament as a house of European democracy;

Strengthening Parliament’s core functions

9.  Takes note of the four new thematic Directorates-General (DGs) created in September 2024, responsible for legislative, budgetary and scrutiny activities, from the previous Directorate-General for Internal Policies, in order to improve the functioning of Parliament as a co-legislator, as one arm of the budgetary authority, and as discharge authority; requests the Secretary-General to provide the Committee on Budgets with regular updates on the evolution of work and staff in these DGs;

10.  Recognises the need for more political decision-making based on evidence and facts; takes note of the budget of EUR 16,75 million to strengthen Parliament's administrative capacity in supporting Members in their parliamentary work and reinforcing its capacity to navigate complexity and uncertainty;

11.  Stresses the crucial role of political groups in providing expertise and political support to Members in their legislative and parliamentary work; underlines the need to ensure the important objective of strengthening Parliament's capacity to support the work of Members;

Digital transition

12.  Underlines that Parliament's cybersecurity is a key priority; notes that the overall IT budget represents 7,40 % of the total budget in the 2026 estimates; stresses the importance of a sound cybersecurity infrastructure in geopolitically turbulent times and welcomes the increase in the appropriations dedicated to cybersecurity; supports the planned gradual increase of the cybersecurity financial appropriations to 10 % of Parliament’s ICT budget by 2027;

13.  Welcomes the adoption by the Bureau on 10 February 2025 of the Framework on an internal cybersecurity risk management, governance and control framework; recalls that investments in cybersecurity are key to protect the democratic voice of the Parliament and the Union;

14.  Welcomes investments in Artificial Intelligence (AI) amounting to EUR 1 million; calls for the use of AI to be increased in order to gain efficiencies, while keeping in mind the related risks, including ethics and data protection; highlights the potential of AI to streamline administrative processes; stresses that AI deployment must balance innovation with necessary safeguards; notes that the development of AI will be closely monitored in line with the principles established by the Bureau, which include among others a thorough risk assessment with the use of new technologies; calls the Secretariat to provide solutions, such as applications and tools, to be made available to Members and staff as soon as possible;

Green transition

15.  Welcomes Parliament's environmental management system (EMAS) targets for 2025-2029; recalls that energy efficiency investments are a good method of achieving value for money; takes note of the budget of EUR 8,45 million for investments on energy efficiency and environment in the 2026 estimates to further improve the environmental performance of its buildings; notes that this corresponds to an increase of 74 % compared to 2025 budget; acknowledges however, that these environmental actions are part of the 2007 ‘Construction of building and fitting out of premises’ budget line whose grand total has decreased by EUR 3,7 million in 2026 vs 2025;

16.  Recalls that nearly two-thirds of Parliament's carbon footprint originate from the transportation of people; calls for a reasonable decrease of travel for meetings that can be effectively conducted remotely or in hybrid mode and to promote a shift to low carbon alternatives for all remaining travel, in so far as this does not affect the quality of legislative and political work;

17.  Takes note of the projected increase in carbon credits prices, that with the current emissions levels would need an estimated EUR 900 000 for 2026; calls the administration to continue decreasing, in line with sound financial management, Parliament’s emissions over buying carbon credits; welcomes the introduction of an enhanced train offer for missions to Strasbourg as of July 2025, as a positive step towards reducing CO2 emissions;

18.  Notes that Parliament has installed and is continuing to install photovoltaic solar panels to further increase the share of renewable energy produced on-site to reach the target of 25 %; takes note of the answers provided by the Secretary-General to Parliament’s estimates of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 2024 pointing out that a study on the use of photovoltaic panels for Strasbourg buildings was carried out in 2022 and was completed in 2023 and that further studies were to be conducted in 2024 for viable solutions, in particular for the WEISS building;

Multilingualism, communication and disinformation

19.  Highlights that multilingualism is a key principle on which Parliament’s work is based; takes note of the revision of the Code of Conduct on Multilingualism planned for spring 2025; asks that, where appropriate, Parliament capitalise on major technological evolutions in multilingualism-related services, including the development and use of AI; asks the Secretary-General to timely inform the Committee on Budgets on any budgetary impacts following this revision;

20.  Highlights the role played by European Parliament Liaison Offices (EPLOs) in countering foreign interference and disinformation; takes note in that regard of the work of EPLOs proactively promoting the work of Parliament in their local languages across multiple channels; highlights EPLOs’ role in the UK as the main contact point for Union nationals resident in the UK, providing them with information about the Parliament and encouraging them to vote in the European elections; requests the Bureau to expand the production and dissemination of communication materials in an accessible and inclusive manner;

21.  Highlights the low participation rate of young people in the recent European elections in some regions of the Union and Parliament’s role in strengthening EU citizenship education;

22.  Recalls the importance of the European Parliament Ambassador School programme to promote active engagement among young Europeans and of the training programme for young journalists named in honour of David Sassoli to strengthen the understanding of the Union and its functioning amongst journalists, as the best antidote against disinformation, in light of recent trends demonstrating a worrying decline in media freedom and independence across the Union;

23.  Recognises the importance of visitors groups as an important tool to connect citizens with the work of Members; welcomes in that regard the increase of the ceilings and cost factors for the calculation of the financial contribution to sponsored visitors as from 1 January 2025; requests the Bureau to assess the impact of the revised rules related to visitors groups in relation to travel costs taking into account market fluctuation and to avoid indirect geographical discrimination for visitors; notes that about 15 % of the quota for visitors is historically not being used by Members; calls the Secretary-General to propose to the Bureau to make the unused quota available to interested Members; notes that the budget for visitors groups represents 22 % of the overall budget of the Directorate-General for Communication;

24.  Notes with concern the internal rules governing Members’ visitor groups, which result in 30 % of the up-front costs having to be incurred by Accredited Parliamentary Assistants (APAs) in some circumstances; stresses the impracticability of these rules and the financial burden this places on APAs; takes note of the answers provided by the Secretary-General to Parliament’s estimates of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 2024 in regard to the rationale of the two-step approach; understands the rationale but emphasises the growing challenges this presents for APAs, particularly with the continuous shift towards more stringent rules;

25.  Stresses the increasingly challenging communication landscape and the multiple ways in which political communication should be performed, including through engaging in various social media platforms and other media; underlines the need for the political groups to convey and communicate their message across all Member States as a key principle of a well-functioning European democracy;

Infrastructure

26.  Acknowledges the new approach related to buildings, where, after a period of acquisition, Parliament has entered an era of consolidation of buildings, taking into account sustainability, accessibility and mobility of Members and staff;

27.  Takes note that EUR 4 million are included in the 2026 estimates for studies and the contractor's preparatory works related to the SPAAK building renovation while the overall costs are estimated at EUR 36 million; notes therefore that EUR 32 million of costs related to the SPAAK building renovation are not included in the 2026 estimates; notes that the Secretary-General intends to cover these costs by a mopping-up transfer or the use of a loan; requests the Secretary-General to provide the Committee on Budgets with detailed information on a possible loan to cover these costs, in accordance with Article 272 (6) of the Financial Regulation, as soon as possible as well as the full planning of the works including the planning of the costs; insists that costs not directly linked to the renovation works should also be clearly listed and budgeted; notes that as of December 2024, the direct costs of the SPAAK project amount to EUR 14,12 million;

28.  Welcomes the pilot project of DG INLO aimed at removing legionella from the pipeline sanitary system of the Parliament and highlights that the only effective way to fight the further spreading of legionella is to bring the water temperature inside the pipelines to 55 degrees Celsius for a limited time;

29.  Notes that it is planned to invest EUR 11,45 million in Europa Experiences in 2026; takes note of the decision by the Bureau in November 2024 to revise the concept of Europa Experience and expects the revised concept to be more cost-efficient and more attractive to visitors; regrets that there are still no Europa Experiences in Bucharest, Riga, Madrid, Lisbon, Nicosia, Valletta or Vilnius; calls for the establishment of Europa Experiences in all Member States as soon as a revised concept has been established; recalls that Europa Experiences should allow citizens to have a better understanding of the functioning of the Union and learn about our shared values; reiterates therefore that Europa Experiences are an integral part of Parliament’s ongoing engagement with Union citizens;

30.  Takes note that no additional financing is needed for the opening of Parliament offices in Moldova and the Western Balkans, as these would be set up within EEAS premises; stresses the importance of Parliament’s presence in these countries as a sign of European solidarity and a sign of Parliament’s commitment to the accession process;

31.  Takes note of the early termination of the contract with the previous provider of the Crèche Wayenberg after a number of serious allegations against the contractor; welcomes the agreement with a new provider that foresees better working conditions of the nursery staff and better quality of the service for the children; acknowledges, however, that this results in an increase of the budget necessary for this purpose, but emphasises that decent working conditions for external staff should, where relevant, be a priority consideration in public procurement of Parliament as a matter of principle;

32.  Reiterates the need for high quality nursing rooms in Parliament's premises and calls on the competent services to upgrade the current facilities in terms of equipment, space and accessibility in order to make them child-friendly; calls for an impact assessment on the need for a family room within the premises of the Brussels seat of the Parliament, for children of Members without permanent residence in Brussels, mirroring the arrangements in Strasbourg;

Others

33.  Reiterates its request, adopted at Plenary level at several occasions, for the relevant bodies to reflect on a solution enabling Members to exercise their right to vote remotely, during benefiting from maternity or paternity leave, during a certified long-term illness, taking advantage of the lessons learnt during the pandemic on the technical aspects of this voting method;

34.  Reaffirms its call for the Secretary-General to emphasise the fundamental principle that all recruitment should be based on competency while also ensuring geographical balance among all Member States at every staff level; calls on Parliament to build its own outreach capacity, with the goal of attracting to competitions quality candidates that Parliament needs, in terms of profile, age, gender and nationality and especially from under-represented countries; underscores that achieving fair geographical representation is essential to fostering a genuinely European public service; notes that Parliament has consistently taken measures to support this objective, including the organisation of nationality-specific competitions while maintaining a strict merit-based selection approach;

35.  Believes that Parliament should lead by example concerning the rights of persons with disabilities, both as an employer and as a public institution; welcomes Parliament’s policy aiming to ensure the fully independent use of Parliament buildings by persons with disabilities and supports further measures and adaptations that will be necessary in this regard; notes that the budget foresees EUR 3,7 million for this purpose;

36.  Stresses the fact that Parliament having a single seat could reduce the financial and environmental costs; recalls that, according to the Treaty on European Union, Parliament is to have its seat in Strasbourg; notes that permanent changes would require a Treaty change for which unanimity is needed;

37.  Notes that mission expenses of Members and staff amount to EUR 116 million in Parliament’s budget; calls for Parliament’s bodies to reflect on mission practices and a revision of mission rules and practices with the overall aim of continuing to improve the nature of missions and further diminishing the associated financial and environmental costs; encourages Members to use low-carbon transport alternatives and advocates for responsible and measured use of best-value flights options, and the preference for train travel where it is a viable option;

38.  Takes note that Article 46(2) of the Implementing Measures for the Statute for Members of the European Parliament provides for the possibility to finance extra costs linked to the parliamentary assistance budgets with appropriations from their General Expenditure Allowance (GEA); calls on Parliament's administration to take the necessary measures to enable Members who wish to do so to use their GEA to cover the cost of APA missions; highlights that such a measure would address increasing costs in Members' offices while being budgetary neutral;

39.  Calls on the Bureau not to index the GEA and not to grant GEA to former Members, thus allowing for significant savings in the statutory costs;

40.  Calls on the Bureau to revise the rules and to introduce a cooling-off period for former Members during which they cannot engage in lobbying or representational activities with the Parliament equal to the time during which Members receive a transitional allowance;

41.  Recalls that Parliament has consistently voted in Plenary since 2018 to consider lifting the overall ban on APAs participating in official delegations and missions; regrets that the Conference of Presidents’ decisions of March 2025 on the Implementing provisions governing the missions outside the three places of work of the European Parliament did not align with Plenary's call; maintains its position that APAs should be allowed, under certain conditions, to accompany Members on official delegations and missions; calls on its relevant bodies to amend the relevant articles of its internal rules to allow the participation of APAs in official missions and delegations outside Parliament’s three places of work without further delay;

42.  Welcomes the work of the APA Committee which represents around 2 000 APAs, whose work is crucial to the smooth operation of the MEP’s daily activities; notes the earmarking of EUR 10 000 in order for the APA Committee to fulfil its role and ensure sufficient resources to effectively support and properly represent the APAs;

43.  Welcomes the exceptional 10 % increase in scholarships for each trainee in 2026, budgeted for EUR 1 million in 2026 to help them cope with growing housing costs in Brussels and Luxembourg;

44.  Expects that requests voted by the Plenary should be treated by the responsible bodies as a matter of high priority;

o
o   o

45.  Adopts the estimates for the financial year 2026;

46.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the estimates to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 11, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj. (2) OJ C 444 I, 22.12.2020, p. 4. (3) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 252. (4) OJ L 325, 20.12.2022, p. 11, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2496/oj. (5) OJ L, 2024/765, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/765/oj. (6) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 240. (7) OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p. 115. (8) OJ C, C/2024/1195, 23.02.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1195/oj. (9) OJ C, C/2024/6751, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6751/oj. (10) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj. (11) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2020/1222/oj. (12) OJ L, 2025/31, 27.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/budget/2025/31/oj.

European Parliament resolution of 3 April 2025 on the prosecution of journalists in Cameroon, notably the cases of Amadou Vamoulké, Kingsley Fomunyuy Njoka, Mancho Bibixy, Thomas Awah Junior and Tsi Conrad (2025/2627(RSP))

P10_TA(2025)0061 RC-B10-0230/2025

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas press freedom in Cameroon is deteriorating; whereas the Cameroonian Constitution recognises freedom of expression and fundamental rights; whereas journalists are routinely detained, attacked, censored, and imprisoned on anti-state, criminal defamation, ‘fake news’, and retaliatory charges while reporting on the crisis in Cameroon’s English-speaking regions;

B.  whereas Cameroon uses lengthy pre-trial and arbitrary detention; whereas journalists have been held incommunicado and convictions are handed down by military courts, among other serious violations of fair trial and due process rights;

C.  whereas the UN Committee against Torture, Freedom House and the Committee to Protect Journalists recently reported that Cameroon’s police, gendarmes and other government agents have arrested, detained, physically attacked and intimidated journalists and that, once detained, journalists are often ill-treated, tortured and killed;

D.  whereas Tsi Conrad, Mancho Bibixy, Kingsley Fomunyuy Njoka and Thomas Awah Junior are journalists who reported on the situation in Cameroon’s English-speaking regions, including on abuses perpetrated during the armed conflict and ongoing civil unrest; whereas Amadou Vamoulké, a journalist in poor health, was sentenced to 32 years in prison for his independent management of the state broadcaster;

E.  whereas the journalists Martinez Zogo, Jean-Jacques Ola Bebe, Samuel Wazizi and Anye Nde Nsoh were killed between August 2019 and May 2023, and serious questions about accountability remain unanswered;

F.  whereas the EU is Cameroon’s leading trade partner;

1.  Condemns the structural violations of journalists’ human rights by the Cameroonian authorities, calls on those authorities to ensure that press freedom is respected, particularly in the run-up to Cameroon’s 2025 presidential elections, and urges them to immediately and unconditionally release Amadou Vamoulké, Kingsley Fomunyuy Njoka, Mancho Bibixy, Thomas Awah Junior and Tsi Conrad and ensure, in the meantime, that their basic rights are upheld and that they have access to medical treatment;

2.  Calls for the EU and the Member States to raise cases of detained journalists with the Cameroonian authorities; calls for the EU to use its diplomatic and economic leverage to achieve tangible improvements in human rights in Cameroon;

3.  Urges the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States’ diplomatic missions to actively respond to restrictions against journalists, including by ensuring comprehensive observation of trials, visiting journalists in detention and maintaining active contact with marginalised or at-risk journalists and with their families and colleagues;

4.  Urges the Cameroonian authorities to end their practice of trying civilians in military courts, which does not comply with international law, and to stop abusively invoking terrorism, anti-state and ‘fake news’ charges in cases against journalists;

5.  Reiterates its call on the Member States to support a UN Human Rights Council fact-finding mission to Cameroon, particularly in light of the conflict in the North-West and South-West Regions;

6.  Calls on the Member States to facilitate humanitarian visa applications for Cameroonian journalists at risk of persecution;

7.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the VP/HR and the President, Government and Parliament of Cameroon.

European Parliament resolution of 3 April 2025 on the execution spree in Iran and confirmation of the death sentences of activists Behrouz Ehsani and Mehdi Hassani (2025/2628(RSP))

P10_TA(2025)0062 RC-B10-0220/2025

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Iran,

–  having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas Iran has the highest death sentence rate per capita in the world; whereas since the Women, Life, Freedom uprising in 2022, the Iranian authorities have embarked on an execution spree, including against dissidents, women, journalists and minorities;

B.  whereas the human rights situation in Iran is worsening, including the systemic targeting of women, children and ethnic and religious minorities, such as Christians, Baha’is, Kurds and Baluchis;

C.  whereas following the death of Jina Mahsa Amini in custody, the Iranian authorities have intensified efforts to suppress the Women, Life, Freedom movement;

D.  whereas according to Iran Human Rights, at least 975 people were executed in Iran in 2024, the highest number in more than two decades; whereas this includes individuals arrested as minors, as well as European citizens;

E.  whereas the regime in Tehran targets its vocal critics by orchestrating assassinations of politicians, journalists and dissidents abroad, including on European and North American soil, such as the attempted killing of former Vice-President of the European Parliament Alejo Vidal-Quadras;

F.  whereas political prisoners Behrouz Ehsani and Mehdi Hassani were arrested in November 2022 and subjected to torture and prolonged solitary confinement, denied their basic rights during their incarceration and sentenced to death on charges of ‘armed rebellion against the state’, ‘enmity against God’ and ‘corruption on earth’;

G.  whereas several human rights defenders, including Pakhshan Azizi, Wirishe Moradi, Mahvash Sabet and Sharifeh Mohammadi, face severe persecution in Iran, with some sentenced to death and others imprisoned;

1.  Reiterates its strong opposition to the death penalty; urges the Iranian Government to introduce an immediate moratorium leading to its abolition;

2.  Condemns the decision by Iran’s Supreme Court to uphold the death sentence against Behrouz Ehsani and Mehdi Hassani, detained under inhumane conditions and subjected to unfair trials;

3.  Calls for their release, together with all prisoners currently on death row for political activism; recalls, in particular, the urgent cases of Pakhshan Azizi, Wirishe Moradi, Sharifeh Mohammadi and Mahvash Sabet;

4.  Condemns the unprecedented rise in executions and the systematic targeting of human rights activists and minorities through the death penalty and persecutions, in particular Christians, Baha’is, Kurds and Baluchis; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of individuals detained on account of their religion or belief;

5.  Demands the immediate release and repatriation of and dropping of all charges against condemned EU nationals, including Cécile Kohler, Jacques Paris and Ahmadreza Djalali; condemns Iran’s use of hostage diplomacy;

6.  Calls on the Council and Member States to make the abolition of the death sentence and the release of political prisoners and EU nationals a condition for improving relations with Iran;

7.  Reiterates its call on Iran to give the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran and the UN Fact-Finding Mission unimpeded access to the country;

8.  Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation and continue identifying and sanctioning Iranian officials responsible for human rights violations; calls on the international community to fiercely respond to Tehran’s orchestrated assassination attempts worldwide targeting critics and opponents of the Mullah regime;

9.  Encourages the Commission and Member States to expand technical and financial assistance for Iranian civil society;

10.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the VP/HR, the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

European Parliament resolution of 3 April 2025 on the immediate risk of further repression by Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus – threats from the Investigative Committee (2025/2629(RSP))

P10_TA(2025)0063 RC-B10-0219/2025

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus,

–  having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the Lukashenka regime has been escalating internal and transnational repression to dismantle the structures representing the democratic forces of Belarus;

B.  whereas UN experts recently confirmed arbitrary arrests and detentions, accompanied by torture or ill treatment and even reported evidence for crimes against humanity; whereas more than 1 200 political prisoners, including Viktoryia Kulsha, Volha Mayorava, Alena Hnauk and Andrzej Poczobut, are still jailed;

C.  whereas the Belarusian Investigative Committee has opened ‘special proceedings’ against hundreds of Belarusians who joined rallies in various European cities or ran in the Coordination Council’s elections; whereas the families of the Belarusian diaspora were threatened with imprisonment and asset confiscation if they participated in Freedom Day protests;

D.  whereas Lukashenka’s regime is exploiting the expiry of many Belarusian passports to force the diaspora to return to Belarus;

E.  whereas the Belarusian regime’s increasing cooperation with Russian security services heightens the risk of coordinated repression, surveillance and hybrid threats in EU territory;

F.  whereas Belarusian state media dominates the information landscape;

1.  Demands that Lukashenka’s regime immediately cease its repression, including the surveillance of exiles and demonstrators, and release and rehabilitate all political prisoners;

2.  Strongly condemns the continued expansion of repression by the Lukashenka regime, which now targets Belarusians abroad with criminal prosecution, asset seizures and other measures designed to silence dissent;

3.  Calls for EU-wide legal support and protection for exiled Belarusians by simplifying procedures for obtaining visas, resident permits and provisional IDs for individuals made stateless by extraterritorial persecution;

4.  Reiterates its non-recognition of Lukashenka and considers the persecution of Belarusian citizens for peaceful democratic activities abroad via Investigative Committee ‘special proceedings’ to be a direct violation of the Member States’ territorial sovereignty; urges, therefore, the countries concerned to disregard Interpol arrest warrants for the extradition of Lukashenka’s political opponents;

5.  Welcomes the sanctions on the President Property Management Directorate and the Central Election Commission, which issued politically motivated judgments; urges the immediate imposition of personal sanctions on all members of the Belarusian Investigative Committee and officials from other state institutions complicit in the transnational persecution and intimidation of Belarusian citizens;

6.  Strongly advocates the swift development and enforcement of a legal mechanism to identify, freeze and confiscate all assets and property outside Belarus owned by Lukashenka and his inner circle, with a view to reallocating them to a fund supporting victims of repression;

7.  Urges the Member States to impose further sanctions equal to those imposed on Russia, particularly on officials responsible for transnational repression;

8.  Urges the EU and its Member States to increase political, financial and technical support for the independent media, human rights defenders, trade unions and civil society initiatives operating within and outside Belarus, including monitoring trials and increasing the visibility of political prisoners;

9.  Calls on the VP/HR to use INTCEN and EDMO to counteract Belarusian intelligence operations and disinformation;

10.  Urges the International Criminal Court to expedite proceedings on crimes against humanity by Lukashenka’s regime and demands that Member States pursue accountability through national proceedings, based on the principle of universal jurisdiction;

11.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the VP/HR, the Council, the representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces and the Belarusian de facto authorities.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 3 April 2025 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 as regards the dates from which Member States are to apply certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements (COM(2025)0080 – C10-0038/2025 – 2025/0044(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0080),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 50 and 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10-0038/2025),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 26 March 2025(1),

–  having regard to Rules 60 and 170 of its Rules of Procedure,

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 3 April 2025 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2025/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 as regards the dates from which Member States are to apply certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Directive (EU) 2025/794.)

(1) Not yet published in the Official Journal.

European Parliament resolution of 3 April 2025 on energy-intensive industries (2025/2536(RSP))

P10_TA(2025)0065 B10-0209/2025

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘On the future of European competitiveness’,

–  having regard to the report of April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy’ (COM(2025)0079),

–  having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy,

A.  whereas energy-intensive industries (EIIs) account for a significant share of the EU’s economy and play a key role in job creation, especially in areas and regions where they are concentrated; whereas EIIs are crucial for the EU’s strategic autonomy and competitiveness, as well as for decarbonisation, taking into account their energy footprint;

B.  whereas the transition to a decarbonised economy and a clean energy system must lead to reducing energy prices and must take into account all available technologies that contribute to reaching the EU’s net zero goal for 2050 in the most cost-efficient way, avoiding lock-in effects and taking into account the different energy mix across Member States, including with regard to renewables and nuclear;

C.  whereas technological neutrality is crucial for European industry as it ensures fair competition, fosters innovation and supports the clean transition without favouring specific technologies; whereas maintaining a neutral regulatory framework allows companies to choose the most efficient and sustainable solutions based on market needs rather than top-down preferences set by policymakers; whereas this approach encourages investment, boosts competitiveness and allows industry to adapt to new technologies;

D.  whereas electrification is at the centre of the decarbonisation of EIIs; whereas EIIs include sectors that use fossil resources to meet temperature, pressure or reaction requirements, such as chemicals, steel, paper, plastics, mining, refineries, cement, lime, non-ferrous metals, glass, ceramics and fertilisers, for which greenhouse gas emissions are hard to reduce because they are intrinsic to the process or because of high capital or operating expenditure costs or low technological maturity;

E.  whereas the energy price gap between the EU and the US and China undermines the competitiveness of the EU’s industries; whereas elevated and volatile fossil fuel prices heavily affect electricity prices and the affordable cost of renewable energy sources is not transferred to energy bills;

F.  whereas an insufficiently integrated energy union poses further challenges to EIIs, in particular in relation to the lack of cross-border interconnections and the limited availability of clean energy, owing to lengthy permitting procedures or high capital or operating expenditures, as well as grid congestion;

G.  whereas the emissions trading system (ETS) provided long-term investment signals and helped bring down the emissions of ETS sectors by 47 %; whereas the energy market has profoundly changed since the introduction of the ETS, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the shift from pipeline gas to liquid natural gas (LNG); whereas a lack of carbon market transparency risks hampering EIIs’ competitiveness; whereas ETS revenues are used unevenly across Member States, failing to adequately support EIIs’ decarbonisation;

H.  whereas unnecessary regulatory burdens and lengthy permitting procedures undermine the business case for investing in decarbonisation in Europe; whereas the concept of overriding public interest is provided for in EU legislation; whereas complex and fragmented EU funding impedes timely investment in net-zero technologies and digitalisation, in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);

I.  whereas the lack of necessary private investment risks hindering EIIs’ decarbonisation; whereas relying excessively on State aid can have the unwanted consequences of exacerbating disparities and distorting competition across the EU;

J.  whereas the EU’s dependencies and limited access, both in quantity and quality, to primary and secondary raw materials pose significant challenges to EIIs; whereas circularity and efficiency can help reduce the annual investment needs in industry and in energy supply; whereas currently, ferrous metals exported to non-EU countries account for more than half of all EU waste exports, raising concerns about their sound treatment;

K.  whereas unfair competition from non-EU countries, including subsidised overcapacity, poses a great challenge to EU companies; whereas many regions around the world do not currently have ambitious decarbonisation targets, thus increasing the risk of carbon leakage;

L.  whereas a profound transformation of EIIs cannot succeed without the involvement of local and regional communities, workers and social partners, which are heavily affected by the transition;

1.  Reiterates its commitment to the EU’s decarbonisation objectives and to stable and predictable climate and industrial policies;

2.  Calls on the Member States to accelerate permitting and licensing processes for clean energy projects, ensuring administrative capacity, and to facilitate grid connections to enable clean, on-site energy generation, especially in remote areas; stresses that the growth of renewables and electrification will require massive investment in grids and in flexibility, storage and distribution networks; calls on the Commission to develop, beyond the concept of overriding public interest, solutions for speeding up decarbonisation projects;

3.  Believes that further action is needed to implement the electricity market design (EMD) rules, especially to promote power purchase agreements (PPAs) and two-way contracts for difference (CfDs) to reduce volatility and energy costs for EIIs; calls on the Commission to propose urgent measures to address current barriers to the signing of long-term agreements, especially for SMEs, using risk reduction instruments and guarantees, including public guarantee such as by the European Investment Bank (EIB); suggests that additional ways to decouple fossil fuel prices from electricity prices be explored, in the framework of the EMD, including with the aim of boosting long-term contracts in line with the affordable energy action plan, and by advancing the analysis of short-term markets to 2025 with a view to considering alternative market design options;

4.  Calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of scaling up best practice for EIIs from Member States, such as Italy’s energy release; calls on the Commission to develop recommendations for reducing the exposure of consumers, and especially EIIs, to rising energy costs, such as by reducing taxes and levies and harmonising network charges, while ensuring public investment in grids;

5.  Calls for the enhancement of energy system integration, in particular in relation to cross-border interconnections, to ensure clean and resilient energy supply; asks for increased investment in flexibility, such as storage, including pumped storage hydropower and heat and waste heat storage, and demand response, to optimise grid stability; recalls the importance of energy efficiency in bringing costs down;

6.  Underlines the need to phase out natural gas as soon as possible; stresses that some sectors cannot rely substantially on electrification in the short to medium term; underlines that carbon capture, utilisation and storage plays a key role in the decarbonisation of hard-to-abate sectors and the production of low-carbon products, including low-carbon hydrogen; calls on the Member States – over the same time span and for these limited sectors – to develop measures to address gas price spikes in duly justified cases; calls on the Commission to develop tools to ensure gas supply at a mitigated cost, by enabling demand aggregation, building on AggregateEU, and joint gas purchasing, while keeping decarbonisation objectives; highlights the importance of encouraging stable contracts with gas suppliers, diversifying supply routes and improving market transparency and stability, in line with current legislation; calls for an impact assessment in the upcoming ETS review to analyse the relationship between the gas market and CO2 prices and the role of the market stability reserve and its parameters;

7.  Calls on the Commission to support EIIs in adopting clean and net-zero technologies, including carbon capture and storage and low-carbon hydrogen, and energy-efficient production methods by strengthening funding mechanisms and ensuring that ETS revenue is used effectively by Member States; calls for EU-level support to be complemented by State aid that allows for targeted technology neutral support to EIIs, while preserving a level playing field within the single market;

8.  Calls for InvestEU to be topped up before the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) and for leftover Resilience and Recovery Facility loans to support investment in EII decarbonisation; notes that the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform already allows for flexibility within current programmes but that this is insufficient; insists that the upcoming MFF increase funding to support EIIs, building on the Innovation Fund and the Connecting Europe Facility – Energy or through the competitiveness fund; stresses that the European Hydrogen Bank and the carbon contracts for difference programme need to be scaled up; calls on the Commission to build on the Net-Zero Industry Act(1) in the upcoming decarbonisation accelerator act, to streamline the processes for granting permits and strategic project status;

9.  Stresses the need to simplify bureaucratic procedures to enhance the attractiveness of private investment and support EIIs’ transition; believes that both InvestEU and the EIB are pivotal in catalysing private financing, especially through de-risking measures;

10.  Emphasises the need to secure access to critical raw materials; stresses that the upcoming circular economy act should improve resource efficiency, including through better waste management of products containing critical raw materials, as well as fostering the demand and availability of secondary raw materials; stresses the need to define those secondary raw materials that are strategic and that should be subject to export monitoring, such as steel and metal scrap, and to tackle any imbalance in their supply and demand, including by exploring export restrictions; insists on the effective enforcement of the Waste Shipment Regulation(2);

11.  Calls on the Commission to make full and efficient use of trade defence instruments; calls on the Commission to find a permanent solution to address unfair competition and structural overcapacity, before the expiry of current steel safeguard measures in 2026; calls on the Commission to engage with the US in relation to the announced tariffs on EU imports and avoid any harmful escalation;

12.  Stresses that an effective implementation of the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) is essential to ensure a level playing field for EU industries and prevent carbon leakage, taking into account the impact of the parallel phasing out of the ETS free allowances and the risk of increased production costs; calls on the Commission to address the risks of resource shuffling and circumvention of the CBAM; asks, furthermore, for the implementation of an effective solution for EU exporters and an analysis of the possible extension to further sectors and downstream products, preceded by an impact assessment;

13.  Calls for the creation of lead markets for clean and circular European products, via non-price criteria in EU public procurement, such as sustainability and resilience and a European preference for strategic sectors, as well as by creating voluntary labelling schemes and minimum EU content requirements in a cost-effective way;

14.  Highlights the importance of a just transition to assist areas heavily reliant on EIIs, by keeping and creating quality jobs through upskilling and reskilling programmes for workers and through the effective use of regional support mechanisms, such as the Just Transition Fund and the Cohesion Fund; stresses that public support will be pivotal for the transition of EIIs and that this support should be tied to their commitment to safeguarding employment and working conditions and preventing off-shoring; welcomes the Union of Skills initiative to ensure a good match between skills and labour market demands;

15.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 (OJ L, 2024/1735, 28.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1735/oj). (2) Regulation (EU) 2024/1157 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on shipments of waste, amending Regulations (EU) No 1257/2013 and (EU) 2020/1056 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 (OJ L, 2024/1157, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1157/oj).

European Parliament resolution of 3 April 2025 on the targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: defending religious freedom and security (2025/2612(RSP))

P10_TA(2025)0066 RC-B10-0211/2025

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

–  having regard to the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which guarantees the right to freedom of conscience and the free exercise of religious worship for all citizens,

–  having regard to the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 November 1981,

–  having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

–  having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the eastern DRC has endured decades of widespread violence and instability; whereas the situation continues to deteriorate significantly, with persistent human rights violations by armed groups, mass displacement, attacks on civilians and alarming humanitarian conditions further exacerbated by armed conflicts, such as the conflict between the DRC Government, the Rwanda-backed armed rebel group March 23 Movement (M23) and other militias, which has already resulted in the forceful internal displacement of 4,6 million people in the eastern DRC; whereas around 100 separate armed groups are estimated to be operating in the eastern DRC; whereas a series of overlapping issues are driving destabilisation in the country;

B.  whereas M23 has intensified attacks in North Kivu and on 19 March 2025, it seized the mineral-rich town of Walikale, defying the ceasefire;

C.  whereas the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) is one of the most prominent extremist groups with explicitly religious objectives, especially since its leader pledged allegiance to the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2019, becoming its Central Africa Province branch (ISCAP); whereas the ADF’s attacks need to be seen in the wider African context of a rise in the number of Islamist groups, in particular those affiliated to ISIS, in the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, Mozambique, Nigeria and the DRC; whereas the ADF has been designated a terrorist group by Uganda and the United States;

D.  whereas in May 2024, the UN Group of Experts on the DRC warned that the ‘armed group established strong networks in prisons, particularly in Kinshasa where ADF detainees were active in recruiting and mobilising combatants and collaborators’, using not only ideological means, but also coercion, deception, abduction and financial incentives to attract members and collaborators;

E.  whereas the ADF has a long history of committing terrorist attacks in the eastern DRC, particularly in North Kivu and Ituri provinces; whereas North Kivu is a resource-rich region, with vast supplies of critical raw materials including cobalt, gold and tin, which are necessary for the global digital and energy transitions; whereas it is known that the ADF and other armed groups, including M23, have been relying on, among other sources of financing, the illegal exploitation of these resources to fund their activities; whereas the Congolese Catholic Church claims that the ADF is responsible for the deaths of around 6 000 civilians in Beni between 2013 and 2021 and more than 2 000 in Bunia in 2020 alone; whereas in 2024, a large number of Christians were killed in the DRC by jihadists; whereas civilians in the DRC’s eastern provinces are facing an increasing number of attacks, killings and abductions, as well as church bombings and the destruction of (religious) property, perpetrated by armed groups with extremist and jihadist ideologies; whereas most victims of ADF attacks have been Christian; whereas these attacks undermine religious freedom and exacerbate intercommunal tensions; whereas the Catholic bishops of the DRC spoke out in an April 2021 statement about the threat of the ‘Islamization of the region [North Kivu] as a sort of deeper strategy for a long-term negative influence on the general political situation of the country’;

F.  whereas in 2021, a prominent local Muslim leader received death threats from the ADF, and he was later gunned down; whereas in 2023, the ADF bombed services at a Pentecostal church in Kasindi, killing 14 people; whereas the ADF has been linked to an attack on the village of Mukondi in 2023, in which at least 44 civilians were killed, according to local authorities; whereas the group claimed 48 attacks in December 2024 alone, killing over 200 people; whereas in January 2024, the ADF killed eight people in Beni during an attack on a Pentecostal church and, in May 2024, ADF assailants reportedly killed 14 Catholics in the North Kivu province for refusing to convert to Islam; whereas the ADF also reportedly executed 11 Christians in the village of Ndimo in Ituri province and kidnapped several others;

G.  whereas local and international human rights organisations have documented numerous instances of religious violence in the DRC, while stressing the urgent need for the state to provide adequate protection; whereas, while the DRC Government has demonstrated a strong intention to address the impacts of armed group violence in the eastern DRC, other recent developments call into question the government’s commitment to safeguarding religious freedom specifically; whereas women and children are particularly vulnerable to rape as weapon of war, human trafficking and sexual slavery;

H.  whereas the Armed Forces of the DRC have been conducting a joint military offensive, Operation Shujaa, with the Ugandan People’s Defence Force against the ADF and other insurgent forces in the eastern DRC since November 2021; whereas the conflict between the DRC Government and the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels has led to a decrease in the funds, personnel and equipment being allocated to this counterterrorism operation;

I.  whereas the right to freedom of religion and belief is a fundamental human right and must be protected given the high level of violence and persecution; whereas the Constitution of the DRC provides for freedom of religion and prohibits discrimination based on religious belief;

J.  whereas over 7 million people in the DRC are currently displaced because of the wider ongoing conflicts, with limited access to food, water, healthcare and essential services; whereas state authorities and rebel groups have obligations to civilians under international humanitarian law, including protecting and facilitating access to humanitarian assistance, and permitting freedom of movement;

K.  whereas women and children in the DRC face increased levels of sexual and gender-based violence, including rape as a weapon of war, resulting in there being one victim of rape every four minutes;

L.  whereas the illegal exploitation of mineral resources continues to fuel conflict in the region, necessitating stronger international oversight and responsible sourcing policies;

M.  whereas in March 2025, President Félix Tshisekedi of the DRC and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda issued a joint statement announcing a ceasefire; whereas despite this, the violence perpetrated by the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels continues;

N.  whereas the DRC has one of the highest rates of internal displacement in the world; whereas many women and children live in precarious conditions and are being exposed to the risk of harassment, assault, sexual exploitation and forced military recruitment; whereas displaced populations often receive no basic life-saving services and are at risk of malnutrition and disease; whereas cities that host internally displaced people in precarious circumstances are also targets of attacks by different militias, causing great distress to the displaced communities and to the local population;

O.  whereas the EU has committed to supporting stability in the DRC through diplomatic engagement, financial assistance and targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for violence and human rights abuses; whereas on 17 March 2025, the EU imposed sanctions on nine individuals and one entity responsible for acts that constitute serious human rights violations and abuses or that sustain the conflict in the DRC, including through the illegal exploitation of resources, but further diplomatic and economic measures may be necessary;

P.  whereas the Council has renewed the EU’s financial support for the deployment of Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) troops in Mozambique under the European Peace Facility (EPF); whereas the head of these forces was previously deployed in the eastern DRC to support abuses committed by the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels, giving rise to serious doubt as to whether there are sufficient safeguards attached to EPF support, including effective vetting and other human rights requirements;

Q.  whereas the EU has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to the promotion and protection of religious freedom globally, and has taken steps to combat religious persecution and intolerance in various parts of the world; whereas Christians are the largest persecuted religious group in the world;

R.  whereas Parliament has consistently called for the strengthening of international efforts to combat religious persecution and to hold accountable those responsible for attacks on minority communities;

1.  Strongly condemns the occupation of Goma and other territories in the eastern DRC by M23 and the RDF as an unacceptable breach of the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Rwandan Government to withdraw its troops from DRC territory, the presence of whom is a clear violation of international law and the UN Charter, and cease cooperation with the M23 rebels; demands that Rwanda and all other potential state actors in the region cease their support for M23;

2.  Expresses deep concern at the alarming continuation of violence; deplores the loss of life and the attacks, both indiscriminate and targeted, against civilians; expresses deep concern over the worsening security and humanitarian crises in the eastern DRC as a whole; calls for the immediate cessation of all forms of violence and for the commitment of all parties involved in the ongoing conflict in the eastern DRC to respect international humanitarian law;

3.  Strongly condemns the targeted terrorist attacks carried out by the ADF against Christian communities in the eastern DRC, including killings, abductions and the destruction of religious property, and calls for an immediate halt to such acts of violence; expresses its solidarity with the families of the victims and with Christian communities;

4.  Strongly condemns the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group and the ADF, as well as other rebel groups, and their egregious human rights abuses that amount to crimes against humanity in accordance with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC); underlines that there must be no impunity for the perpetrators of these acts and that those responsible should be referred to the ICC; encourages the establishment of an international commission of inquiry to examine the human rights violations committed in the DRC, renewed investigations in North Kivu by the ICC Prosecutors Office and the creation of a special tribunal for atrocity crimes in the DRC, including crimes committed against Christian communities; backs the efforts by the National Episcopal Conference of Congo and the Church of Christ in Congo, which launched the ‘Social pact for peace and coexistence in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes Region’, with the aim of restoring peace in the country’s eastern provinces;

5.  Supports the international efforts against the ADF, including the Shujaa counterterrorism operation carried out jointly by the DRC and Ugandan armed forces; encourages the EU Member States to consider ways of contributing to these efforts, including increased efforts to trace and interdict ISIS secret funds held overseas and to trace any raw materials stemming from their illegal exploitation by the ADF; calls for the EU to support the necessary capacity-building and expertise to combat ADF ideology and rhetoric, particularly within the Muslim communities of both Uganda and the DRC, to prevent recruitment among those communities; requests the application of the EU global human rights sanctions regime to those responsible for planning, ordering or participating in the killing of Christians in the DRC;

6.  Calls for an immediate and effective ceasefire, and for the full implementation of diplomatic agreements, including the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes; underlines the urgent need for the stabilisation of the country and reiterates its call on M23 to halt its territorial advances and withdraw from the territory of the DRC;

7.  Reiterates its full support for the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in protecting civilians and stabilising the region; urges the EU to cooperate with all actors on the ground, in particular MONUSCO, to ensure the protection of civilians in the eastern DRC; calls on the UN to work towards a stronger mandate for MONUSCO in order to enable peacemaking; calls on the UN to ensure the protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law;

8.  Urges the international community to increase support for services in the eastern DRC so that civilians who have been targeted can have access to legal services and psychological support; calls on the DRC Government to counter extremist propaganda; calls for the establishment of early warning mechanisms to more effectively prevent and respond to attacks by the ADF and other armed groups against civilians;

9.  Reiterates its call for all parties, including armed groups operating in the eastern DRC, to allow and facilitate humanitarian access to address the urgent need for essential services in the eastern DRC and neighbouring countries, notably Burundi; emphasises that humanitarian workers must be able to operate safely to deliver life-saving assistance to Congolese civilians; stresses that this is a central obligation under international humanitarian law, and that perpetrators violating these obligations should be held to account; calls on all parties to provide a safe environment for civil society organisations;

10.  Is appalled by the shocking use of sexual violence against women and children as a tool of repression and weapon of war in the eastern DRC, and by the unacceptable recruitment of child soldiers by the various rebel groups; demands that these matters be addressed by the international community without delay;

11.  Calls for stricter enforcement of the EU regulation on conflict minerals(1) to prevent illicit trade from fuelling armed groups in the DRC; reiterates its previous call on the Commission to suspend the EU’s Memorandum of Understanding with Rwanda; requests that the Commission share detailed mapping of current projects with Rwandan authorities and its assessment of whether they may contribute to addressing or may fail to address human rights violations either inside Rwanda or in the DRC;

12.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to support the DRC in implementing the recommendations of the 2010 mapping report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), including reforming the security sector, strengthening its efforts to prevent further atrocities against civilians, and ending support for or collaboration with abusive armed groups; urges the DRC Government to ensure accountability for human rights violations and prosecute those responsible for attacks; calls for the EU and its Member States to support the DRC in fighting corruption, strengthening governance and the rule of law, improving security and ensuring the lasting protection of communities at risk, including religious communities, and to ensure that perpetrators of attacks are brought to justice;

13.  Underlines the role of communities, including religious communities and faith-based organisations in the DRC, in promoting peace, social cohesion and the well-being of local communities;

14.  Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to intensify diplomatic efforts by working closely with regional partners, including the African Union, the East African Community and the United Nations, in order to step up diplomatic efforts to achieve a sustainable resolution to the conflict and prevent extremist groups from using religion as a tool for violence and division;

15.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase humanitarian aid to address the urgent needs of displaced persons and vulnerable communities in the DRC, ensuring safe access to food, medical care and shelter;

16.  Supports the imposition of further targeted EU sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for financing or engaging in violence, human rights abuses and resource exploitation; calls for the implementation of the sanctions outlined in the OHCHR mapping report;

17.  Confirms its commitment to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as a fundamental human right guaranteed by international legal instruments recognised as holding universal value, and to which most countries in the world have committed, and which is enshrined in the Constitution of the DRC;

18.  Echoes the calls for international solidarity in defending religious freedom and the protection of religious minorities in conflict zones, particularly in the DRC, while addressing the root causes of violent extremism in the DRC and its neighbourhood;

19.  Urges the EU to uphold its commitment to the promotion of religious freedom and the protection of communities, including religious communities, ensuring that the rights of these groups are prioritised in the EU’s external policies;

20.  Notes, with concern, the growing influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Africa, which is a staunch supporter of the Putin regime and its violent, unlawful war in Ukraine; underlines that this development raises significant questions regarding the broader geopolitical and ideological objectives of the Russian Federation in Africa;

21.  Deplores the fact that Rwanda announced the termination of its diplomatic relations with Belgium, and expresses its solidarity with Belgium;

22.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Governments and Parliaments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, the African Union, the secretariats of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Southern African Development Community and the East African Community, and other relevant international bodies.

(1) Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (OJ L 130, 19.5.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/821/oj).