European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 October 2025 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2024/2865 as regards dates of application and transitional provisions (COM(2025)0526 – C10-0142/2025 – 2025/0526(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0526),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10-0142/2025),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 23 October 2025(1),

–  having regard to Rules 60 and 170 of its Rules of Procedure,

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 23 October 2025 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2025/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2024/2865 as regards dates of application and transitional provisions

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2025/2439.)

(1) Not yet published in the Official Journal.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 October 2025 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Soil Monitoring and Resilience (Soil Monitoring Law) (09474/1/2025 – C10-0229/2025 – 2023/0232(COD))

P10_TA(2025)0251 A10-0204/2025

(Ordinary legislative procedure: second reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Council position at first reading (09474/1/2025 – C10‑0229/2025),

–  having regard to the reasoned opinion submitted, within the framework of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, by the Netherlands Senate and the Netherlands House of Representatives asserting that the draft legislative act does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 25 October 2023(1),

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 19 June 2024(2),

–  having regard to its position at first reading(3) on the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2023)0416),

–  having regard to Article 294(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 75(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to Rule 68 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the recommendation for second reading of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (A10-0204/2025),

1.  Approves the Council position at first reading;

2.  Notes that the act is adopted in accordance with the Council position;

3.  Instructs its President to sign the act with the President of the Council, in accordance with Article 297(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

4.  Instructs its Secretary-General to sign the act, once it has been verified that all the procedures have been duly completed, and, in agreement with the Secretary-General of the Council, to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;

5.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

(1) OJ C, C/2024/887, 6.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/887/oj. (2) OJ C, C/2024/5371, 17.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5371/oj. (3) OJ C, C/2025/1312, 13.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1312/oj.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 October 2025 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing plastic pellet losses to reduce microplastic pollution (09047/1/2025 – C10-0234/2025 – 2023/0373(COD))

P10_TA(2025)0252 A10-0203/2025

(Ordinary legislative procedure: second reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Council position at first reading (09047/1/2025 – C10‑0234/2025),

–  having regard to the reasoned opinion submitted, within the framework of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, by the Italian Chamber of Deputies, asserting that the draft legislative act does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 14 February 2024(1),

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 18 April 2024(2),

–  having regard to its position at first reading(3) on the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2023)0645),

–  having regard to Article 294(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 75(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to Rule 68 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the recommendation for second reading of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (A10-0203/2025),

1.  Approves the Council position at first reading;

2.  Notes that the act is adopted in accordance with the Council position;

3.  Instructs its President to sign the act with the President of the Council, in accordance with Article 297(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

4.  Instructs its Secretary-General to sign the act, once it has been verified that all the procedures have been duly completed, and, in agreement with the Secretary-General of the Council, to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;

5.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

(1) OJ C, C/2024/2487, 23.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2487/oj. (2) OJ C, C/2024/3675, 26.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3675/oj. (3) OJ C, C/2025/3734, 17.9.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3734/oj.

European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2025 on renewing the EU-Africa partnership: building common priorities ahead of the Angola Summit (2025/2933(RSP))

P10_TA(2025)0253 RC-B10-0471/2025

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Rule 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas Africa and Europe are neighbouring continents whose futures are closely interlinked; whereas the EU should aim to be Africa’s leading partner in trade, investment, development aid, humanitarian assistance, peace and security, energy and the digital transformation; whereas African countries together constitute the EU’s fourth-largest trading partner, while the EU Member States collectively represent Africa’s largest export market; whereas both continents face common and interconnected challenges in an increasingly complex geopolitical reality;

B.  whereas Africa is an indispensable partner in addressing global challenges – from ensuring sustainable access to critical raw materials to advancing the green and digital transitions, strengthening global food security, supporting a dynamic labour market, preventing conflict and building peace; whereas democracy, human rights and the rule of law are core values of both the EU and the African Union (AU), and women and young people are key agents of change for Africa’s democratic and economic future; whereas increasing EU-Africa cooperation can unlock shared opportunities for innovation, industrial development, job creation, human development, the achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and long-term prosperity on both continents;

C.  whereas the Samoa Agreement(1) provides a renewed and modernised foundation for relations between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states, aiming to strengthen their capacity to address these global challenges together and to move decisively towards a partnership of equals grounded in mutual respect and shared interests;

D.  whereas the African Charter on democracy, elections and governance emphasises the importance of free and fair elections as well as the rights of political parties and the opposition; whereas despite progress over the past decades, recent developments show a worrying trend of democratic backsliding;

E.  whereas the AU’s Agenda 2063: ‘The Africa We Want’ represents Africa’s own long-term blueprint for inclusive growth, regional integration, gender equality and sustainable development; whereas Africa’s growing global engagement reflects its increasing political and economic influence; whereas this underlines the importance of a principled, transparent and mutually beneficial partnership that supports both African and European priorities and promotes long-term stability and prosperity;

F.  whereas peace, security and good governance are prerequisites for prosperity, yet several African regions – particularly those in fragile settings – continue to face instability, terrorism, unconstitutional changes of government and humanitarian crises; whereas external actors have expanded their footprint in Africa, in particular China and Russia, often through opaque or coercive means, including disinformation and malign influence campaigns;

G.  whereas the EU remains the largest development and humanitarian aid donor in Africa; whereas the global humanitarian system is facing an unprecedented funding crisis, with only 43 % of the UN’s USD 50 billion humanitarian aid appeal being met; whereas this situation has been exacerbated by continuous reductions in foreign aid budgets by multiple key donors;

H.  whereas Africa’s population exceeded 1,5 billion in 2024 and is projected to reach 2,5 billion by 2050, with the large majority of people being under 30 years of age; whereas this demographic dynamism presents both opportunities and challenges, requiring massive investment in education, employment, healthcare and infrastructure; whereas inequality remains one of the main barriers to achieving the SDGs;

I.  whereas Africa possesses vast potential for renewable energy, innovation and sustainable development; whereas, despite contributing minimally to global emissions, the continent is actively pursuing climate resilience and green growth; whereas joint EU-AU leadership can accelerate a just, inclusive and sustainable transition;

J.  whereas the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is a transformative project for Africa’s integration and economic sovereignty, yet Africa’s participation in global trade and investment remains limited; whereas EU support should focus on capacity building for customs harmonisation and private-sector readiness so as to maximise the benefits of the AfCFTA;

K.  whereas migration and mobility between Africa and Europe are long-standing realities that generate major challenges for both continents and that can only offer opportunities if properly and responsibly addressed; whereas the EU and Africa have a shared interest in establishing long-term and mutually beneficial partnerships that contribute to economic development and stability in Africa while addressing Europe’s concerns regarding irregular migration, security, border management and the fight against terrorism; whereas such partnerships, whether focused exclusively on migration or broader in scope with migration at their core, must include clear responsibilities and commitments, step up cooperation on preventing irregular migration, dismantling smuggling networks, improving returns and reinforcing border management, and address the root causes of irregular migration in countries of origin and transit;

L.  whereas 2025 marks the 25th anniversary of the formal Africa-EU partnership, providing a historic opportunity to renew and elevate relations, putting the partners on an equal footing for the next generation;

M.  whereas the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the AU’s Agenda 2063 provide a shared compass for the partnership and should guide programming under the current Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe and the Global Gateway strategy, with a focus on transparency, inclusive participation and measurable results;

N.  whereas all forms of development cooperation should be founded on the principles of aid effectiveness; whereas the implementation of the Samoa Agreement and the Global Gateway must align with the AU’s Agenda 2063 and uphold the principles of equality, mutual accountability and African ownership across all strands of cooperation;

O.  whereas Africa’s ongoing sovereign debt crisis has intensified over the past decade; whereas, in a climate of geopolitical turmoil and rising interest rates, Africa’s public debt ratio doubled between 2010 and 2022, rising from 32,7 % to 65 %;

P.  whereas the EU has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to the promotion and protection of religious freedom globally, and has taken steps to combat religious persecution and intolerance in various parts of the world;

Q.  whereas Parliament has consistently called for the strengthening of international efforts to combat religious persecution and to hold accountable those responsible for attacks on minority communities;

New strategic partnership of equals

1.  Calls for a renewed and forward-looking EU-Africa partnership built on mutual respect, shared interests and the understanding that both continents need each other and are stronger together; notes that in a time of shifting geopolitical dynamics and growing global insecurity, including rising extremism and cuts in development and humanitarian spending, closer cooperation between the EU and Africa is more essential than ever; underlines that genuine partnership based on joint multilateral action is the most effective way to eradicate poverty and promote peace, prosperity, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, sustainable trade and human development; reaffirms that the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda and the SDGs must serve as the common compass of the renewed EU-Africa partnership;

2.  Calls for the EU to step up its concrete actions and strategic communication and visibility across Africa, clearly demonstrating the tangible benefits of the EU-AU partnership, which is grounded in mutual respect, transparency and sustainability; stresses the importance of transparent, values-based engagement, in contrast with the influence of external powers, including China and Russia, whose opaque financial, security and disinformation activities risk undermining sovereignty, stability and democratic governance in Africa; stresses that the EU must ‘show its flag’ more effectively through coherent diplomacy, visible investment and closer coordination between the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), Parliament and the Member States to project a united European voice;

3.  Underlines the importance of institutionalising the parliamentary dimension of future EU-AU summits as an integral component of their framework, in order to ensure citizen representation, public oversight and a democratic contribution to the deliberations and outcomes of the partnership; supports efforts to revitalise joint parliamentary dialogue between the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament as a forum for democratic dialogue and oversight; encourages regular thematic meetings between parliamentary committees from both continents to ensure accountability within the partnership;

4.  Calls on the 22 EU Member States and the 66 African partners who have not yet ratified the Samoa Agreement to do so without delay, to move it from provisional application to full entry into force;

5.  Urges the Commission to conduct, without exception, thorough impact assessments and stakeholder consultations, including with African counterparts directly impacted by EU legislation, and to base its proposals on the full evidence available; commits to consult African counterparts on upcoming EU legislation;

Peace, security and good governance

6.  Reaffirms that sustainable peace is a prerequisite for development and prosperity; supports African-led peace efforts under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and commends EU support through the European Peace Facility; calls for predictable funding for AU-mandated operations, including through UN-assessed contributions; stresses that cooperation must respect international law, protect civilians and promote governance reform; expresses deep concern about the spread of conflicts, jihadist terrorism, military coups and state collapses, democratic backsliding and violent extremism in several parts of Africa; calls for a comprehensive approach that combines defence, peacebuilding, security measures, prevention, deradicalisation and socio-economic development;

7.  Expresses profound concern about the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation across the Sahel region, in particular Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, where large areas remain under the control of armed groups and civilians face widespread displacement and food insecurity; stresses that the crisis is spilling over into West Africa’s coastal democracies and generating dangerous power vacuums following the withdrawal of international missions; condemns Russia’s destabilising strategy in the region, including its decision to absorb the Wagner Group into the government-controlled Africa Corps, its disinformation operations and its predatory resource acquisition practices; notes that reliance on such support by military juntas has failed to stabilise the situation and has enabled terrorist groups to regain ground; regrets that the EU Training Mission in Mali, the EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger and the EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger and other international deployments have not delivered lasting peace; calls for an evidence-based, in-depth assessment of mandates, roles and policies and for a profoundly revised, integrated EU common security and defence policy strategy for the Sahel region that is coherent with development policy and supported by the European Peace Facility; prioritises humanitarian access and the protection of civilians and conditions EU security assistance on full respect for international humanitarian and human rights law; calls for coordinated, principled EU-AU action grounded in democracy, human rights and the rule of law, including measures to counter foreign information manipulation and interference, disrupt illicit resource economies and criminal activities that finance armed groups, and invest in governance, service delivery and local economic opportunities to address structural drivers of instability;

8.  Expresses deep concern about the ongoing violence, political instability and humanitarian crises in several parts of Africa; recalls in particular the devastating conflict in Sudan, where fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has resulted in mass civilian casualties, displacement and widespread human rights violations; strongly condemns all atrocities, including the deliberate targeting of civilians and the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, and calls for full accountability and unhindered humanitarian access; welcomes regional and UN-led diplomatic efforts and encourages the EU to intensify coordination with the AU and neighbouring states to support ceasefire negotiations and inclusive peacebuilding; notes, with concern, the persistent fragility and lack of national reconciliation in Libya, whose instability continues to affect both African and European security; urges renewed EU engagement, in close cooperation with the UN, to promote a unified political process, transparent elections and the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries; welcomes the contribution of the EU Military Assistance Mission Mozambique to restoring security in Cabo Delgado, while stressing the need to embed human rights, community resilience and principles of good governance to ensure lasting stability and local trust; underlines the role of the EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia in reinforcing the capacities of the Somali police, as well as maritime security and the rule of law; calls for closer coordination with international partners and for the integration of the mission’s work within broader EU efforts to strengthen governance, justice and counterterrorism resilience in the Horn of Africa; remains alarmed by the situation in Ethiopia, including in the Tigray region, where serious human rights abuses have been reported; calls on the Ethiopian authorities to guarantee unrestricted humanitarian access, pursue genuine national dialogue and uphold the rule of law and fundamental freedoms; underlines that all EU engagement in conflict-affected and transitional contexts must promote democracy, accountability and African ownership, ensuring coordination with the AU and regional initiatives to foster reconciliation, stability and sustainable development across the continent;

9.  Calls for the EU to step up its efforts to promote peace, security and stability across the African continent; calls for predictable, long-term financing of AU-mandated peace operations, including through UN-assessed contributions in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023); stresses the need for permanent African representation on the UN Security Council; supports African-led peace operations and mediation efforts under the APSA;

10.  Calls on the Council and the Commission to strengthen EU-Africa security and defence cooperation, including by establishing effective joint capacity to counter terrorism, violent extremism and external interference, particularly in fragile states; underlines that such cooperation must complement and reinforce African-led efforts under the APSA and fully respect international law, democratic oversight and the principles of a partnership of equals; emphasises that counterterrorism operations must fully respect international humanitarian and human rights law; supports EU programmes for community resilience, women’s and youth engagement and post-conflict reconstruction; urges both the EU and the AU to implement the UN Women, Peace and Security agenda and the UN Youth, Peace and Security agenda, ensuring equal participation in decision-making;

11.  Welcomes the recent peace agreement between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but remains deeply concerned by continuing violence and insecurity in eastern DRC, particularly in North Kivu and Ituri; calls for the EU to play an active and coordinated role in supporting the implementation of the peace process, focusing on enhancing inclusivity and women’s participation, humanitarian access and protection of civilians; stresses that in order to achieve lasting stability, the economic dimensions of the conflict must be addressed, including the illegal exploitation of natural resources and raw materials, and justice for victims of war crimes, including conflict-related sexual violence, must be ensured; urges the Commission and the Council to immediately suspend the EU-Rwanda Memorandum of Understanding on sustainable raw materials value chains until Rwanda proves that it is ceasing its interference in and its exportation of minerals mined from areas controlled by the paramilitary group M23; calls on all actors to increase transparency and to effectively ban the entry of all blood minerals into the EU; calls for the EU to promote responsible sourcing, transparency in supply chains and investment in value addition in the DRC and the Great Lakes region;

12.  Underlines the vital importance of democracy and free and fair elections, as they are the only way to ensure true accountability and true representation of the people’s interests and priorities; calls for enhanced cooperation on electoral observation and democracy-building, in partnership with the AU and regional organisations; calls for dedicated funding for local women mediators and peacebuilders, young peacebuilders and civil society organisations; reaffirms the essential role of women and young people in peacebuilding and governance;

13.  Recalls that Christians are the most persecuted religious community in the world; notes with particular concern the situation of Christians in the Sahel region;

14.  Underlines that churches are vital providers of essential social services in Africa; calls on the Commission to involve these partners in the implementation of EU programmes; calls on the Commission and the EEAS in this context to promote dialogue with churches in partner countries;

15.  Is concerned about China’s growing political influence in Africa and the expansion of its global initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative; notes that while these projects have mobilised significant investment, they often lack transparency and can create economic dependencies; calls for the EU to step up its efforts to offer a sustainable, values-based and transparent alternative grounded in local ownership, fair competition and mutual benefit; calls for the EU to enhance its strategic communication and visibility, promote joint AU-EU projects in infrastructure, digitalisation and innovation, and support independent media and education initiatives to demonstrate the long-term advantages of the joint EU-AU model of partnership; recognises the strategic importance of critical raw materials for both Africa and Europe and stresses that cooperation in this field must be founded on mutual benefit, transparency and sustainability; calls for Europe’s resilience to be strengthened by diversifying away from excessive dependencies through partnerships that promote responsible mining, local value addition and skills development; underlines that initiatives under the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package should foster resilient, fair and environmentally responsible supply chains, ensuring that resource cooperation contributes to sustainable and inclusive growth and economic diversification in African countries;

Sustainable development and growth, trade and infrastructure

16.  Supports the full implementation of the AfCFTA as a driver of continental integration and calls for the EU to provide technical and financial assistance for its institutions, customs harmonisation and private-sector readiness;

17.  Underlines the central role of the NDICI – Global Europe as the EU’s main external financing framework for supporting cooperation with Africa; stresses that the effective use of NDICI – Global Europe and its successor instrument is essential to ensure coherence between policy priorities, Global Gateway investments and Team Europe initiatives, as well as to guarantee transparency, accountability and measurable results in EU development action, and to fulfil EU treaty obligations, including promoting poverty eradication, sustainable development, human rights, international cooperation and gender equality;

18.  Calls on the Member States to undertake a thorough assessment of shortcomings in their previous approaches to development cooperation with and external assistance for Africa, and to revise and readjust their Africa strategies with a view to fostering sustainable prosperity on the continent and achieving genuinely mutually beneficial partnerships; stresses the importance of ensuring policy coherence for development (PCD) across all EU external policies, taking into account trade, migration, climate and security concerns; highlights the importance of Parliament’s PCD Network in achieving better alignment of the EU’s external policies; underlines that official development assistance (ODA) remains indispensable in least-developed countries, low-income countries and fragile states; calls on the Member States to sustain and step up progress towards the long-standing UN target of allocating 0,7 % of gross national income to ODA and to increase the share directed to least-developed countries, in line with EU and international commitments; encourages the exploration of innovative and legally sound financing tools, including voluntary reallocation of the International Monetary Fund’s special drawing rights where feasible, and the use of structured and transparent debt-for-climate or debt-for-development swaps to strengthen funding for climate adaptation and resilience; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take into account the interests of the outermost regions when signing agreements with African countries;

19.  Expresses deep concern about the mounting debt burden facing many African countries; calls for the EU and other relevant partners to support comprehensive debt restructuring and reform of the global financial architecture to ensure fairer terms and transparency;

20.  Recognises efforts to make EU external action more coherent through the Global Europe instrument and the Global Gateway strategy, while stressing that flexibility must be matched by predictability, accountability, transparency and parliamentary oversight; calls on the Commission, the EEAS, the Council and the Member States to ensure that the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package delivers tangible results by aligning projects with African priorities, preventing unsustainable debt, supporting poverty eradication and promoting human development in line with the SDGs and treaty obligations; recognises that large-scale investment initiatives alone cannot address the complex realities of fragile and conflict-affected settings, nor the vulnerabilities of least-developed and heavily indebted countries; calls therefore for a dedicated EU strategy for engagement in fragile contexts under the future Global Europe instrument, integrating political dialogue, peacebuilding, humanitarian aid and development action, while stressing the need for ring-fenced humanitarian aid in the next multiannual financial framework; underlines the need to improve the visibility and coordination of EU-funded projects through stronger EU delegations and genuine partnerships with African stakeholders;

21.  Notes, with grave concern, the widespread evidence of illegal mining and mineral smuggling, and the resulting impact on the stability and development of resource-rich regions; recalls the links between mining and human rights violations, environmental degradation, land grabbing and violent conflicts;

22.  Calls for the creation of a dedicated EU-Africa industrialisation pact under the joint auspices of the AU, the EU and regional development banks, to mobilise public and private capital, which would ensure that Africa is not just a source of raw materials, but a hub for processing, manufacturing and innovation; stresses that this initiative would be a tangible expression of a partnership of equals, fostering long-term growth and sustainable value chains on both continents; voices its concerns about the withdrawal of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the scaling down of its programmes, which has created significant financing gaps in essential services; calls on the Commission and the Member States to realign NDICI – Global Europe and Team Europe programming with the officially agreed objectives and minimum spending targets for sub-Saharan Africa and thematic programmes, and to use these instruments to swiftly bridge financing gaps where appropriate, prioritising poverty eradication, health, gender equality, education, food security and climate adaptation in the most vulnerable African countries; emphasises that the needs-based nature of humanitarian aid requires ring-fenced funding, distinct from other external action financing; highlights the importance of close dialogue between the United States, the EU and the AU on an equal footing in order to realise the joint objectives of fostering democracy, development and prosperity in Africa and a review of the policy on ‘peace for resources’;

Investing in women, young people, human development and mobility

23.  Stresses that African young people must be at the heart of a renewed EU-Africa partnership; stresses that the EU-AU partnership serves as an opportunity for African governments to provide possibilities, including job creation, for their citizens, and that the EU can assist and support such African-driven efforts; underlines that bringing young people from both continents closer together, through greater mutual understanding and stronger bonds, is essential for a lasting and equal partnership; calls for the strengthening of student and research exchange programmes; supports the increased participation of European students in exchange programmes with African universities; calls, moreover, for increased support for African universities, vocational institutes and youth-led initiatives to strengthen skills, innovation and exchange;

24.  Calls for a dedicated Africa-EU youth innovation fund to finance start-ups and community projects led by young entrepreneurs;

25.  Recognises that migration is a shared reality that generates major challenges for both continents and that can only offer opportunities if properly and responsibly addressed; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue developing and implementing strategic and tailor-made partnerships with African countries, whether dedicated to migration or broader in scope with migration at their core, built on shared interests and measurable commitments in the fields of border management, return and readmission, and the fight against illegal migration, migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings and terrorism; calls in particular for strengthened cooperation with countries of origin and transit to prevent irregular migration, dismantle smuggling networks and improve returns, as well as to deepen security and counterterrorism cooperation; underlines that such cooperation must contribute to long-term stability and mutually beneficial outcomes for both continents;

26.  Calls for the EU and the AU to uphold and promote women’s rights and gender equality, ensure access to education and the fulfilment of sexual and reproductive health and rights, promote women’s full, equal and meaningful participation in decision-making and on the labour market and combat gender-based violence and harmful practices; reiterates that gender equality and women’s empowerment are prerequisites for inclusive growth and sustainable development; calls for the EU to ensure dedicated funding for gender equality programmes in line with its Gender Action Plan III; calls for ambitious funding targets to advance SDG 5 on gender equality and empower women-led responses;

27.  Highlights the importance of combating violations of women’s rights in Africa, especially female genital mutilation;

28.  Emphasises that health security is a shared global challenge and expresses concern that significant budget cuts in the sector threaten to undo decades of progress in global health, putting millions of lives at risk; welcomes EU support for the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, for vaccine manufacturing hubs and for the African Medicines Agency; stresses the EU’s vital role in funding life-saving health programmes, including HIV and AIDS prevention and treatment, and sexual and reproductive health programmes; calls for continued cooperation on pandemic preparedness, local pharmaceutical production and universal health coverage;

Climate, the environment and multilateral cooperation

29.  Calls for joint progress on the African single electricity market, cross-border interconnections and sustainable urbanisation; calls for the EU to provide its fair share of climate finance for African climate adaptation and mitigation, supporting initiatives such as the Great Green Wall and NaturAfrica that combine environmental protection with jobs and rural development; recognises climate change as a shared challenge and an opportunity for Africa-EU cooperation; welcomes the Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative to deliver 50 GW of renewable capacity and electricity access for 100 million people by 2030;

30.  Calls for stronger AU-EU action and joint advocacy at Conference of the Parties meetings to secure fair climate finance, technology transfer and funding for the loss and damage fund; stresses that all major greenhouse gas emitters, including G20 members, must lead on implementing the Paris Agreement; welcomes Africa’s permanent G20 membership and supports greater African representation in global governance; proposes that the AU and the EU establish an annual high-level dialogue on climate and sustainability in order to monitor progress and align policies on energy, biodiversity and environmental protection;

Way forward

31.  Welcomes the holding of the seventh EU-AU Summit in Luanda as a significant opportunity for African and European leaders to reaffirm their commitment to the EU-AU partnership; calls on participants to seize this occasion to announce measurable commitments for the next five years, notably through the adoption of a joint action plan for 2025-2030, a roadmap to double Africa-EU trade and investment by 2030, and a renewed joint framework on digital transformation and green energy partnerships;

32.  Urges the Commission and the EEAS to establish annual high-level dialogues with the AU Commission and Regional Economic Communities in four priority areas: peace and security, trade and economic cooperation, migration and mobility, and sustainability and climate action, in order to evaluate partnership priorities, monitor implementation and feed into both the AU-EU summit process and the EU’s multiannual financial framework; proposes that AU-EU consultations be institutionalised at ministerial and senior official level each year, ensuring continuous coordination, accountability and adaptive policy design;

33.  Stresses the importance of strengthening the parliamentary dimension of the Africa-Europe partnership; calls for the organisation of a pre-summit meeting between Members of the European Parliament and members of the Pan-African Parliament to ensure that the voices of elected representatives from both continents help shape the agenda, priorities and outcomes of the upcoming EU-AU summit; underlines that such dialogue would enhance democratic legitimacy, foster mutual understanding and ensure that the summit’s conclusions reflect the concerns and aspirations of citizens across Africa and Europe; stresses also the importance of the meaningful engagement of civil society in the partnership and at summits; commends the European Parliament’s decision to open an office in Addis Ababa in order to follow closely the activities and decision-making processes of the AU and its Pan-African Parliament;

34.  Calls on its President to invite African heads of state to address Parliament on a more regular basis, ensuring balanced geographical representation and fostering deeper political dialogue between the two continents;

o
o   o

35.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the African Union Commission, the Pan-African Parliament, the governments and parliaments of the EU Member States and the African Union member states, and to the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States.

(1) OJ L, 2023/2862, 28.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2023/2862/oj.

European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2025 on the UN Climate Change Conference 2025 in Belém, Brazil (COP30) (2025/2666(RSP))

P10_TA(2025)0254 B10-0445/2025

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol thereto,

–  having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

–  having regard to the 29th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP29), the 19th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 19), the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 6), and the Glasgow Climate Pact adopted at the 26th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP26) in Glasgow on 13 November 2021,

–  having regard to the agreement made at the 27th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP27) to create a specific fund for loss and damage, the establishment of a transitional committee on the operationalisation of the new funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage at the 28th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP28), and to the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage,

–  having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2024 on the UN Climate Change Conference 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29)(1),

–  having regard to the agreement made at COP29 on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance and the objective to triple financing for developing countries to USD 300 billion annually by 2035 and secure efforts from all actors to work together to scale up financing for developing countries, from public and private sources, to USD 1,3 trillion per year by 2035,

–  having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals,

–  having regard to its resolution of 9 July 2025 on implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals in view of the 2025 High-Level Political Forum(2),

–  having regard to the 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report on the impacts of global warming of 1,5 ºC above pre-industrial levels, its special report on climate change and land, its special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate and its sixth assessment report (AR6),

–  having regard to the UNFCCC synthesis report of 28 October 2024 on nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement,

–  having regard to the report of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘State of the Global Climate 2024’,

–  having regard to the report of 15 April 2025 compiled by the Copernicus Climate Change Service and the WMO, entitled ‘European State of the Climate – Report 2024’,

–  having regard to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap Report 2024, published on 24 October 2024,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

–  having regard to the EU legislation translating the EU’s targets of reducing net emissions by at least 55 % by 2030 compared to 1990 levels and towards reaching the binding EU climate neutrality target by 2050 (‘Fit for 55’ package) into concrete policies across various sectors,

–  having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/591 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030(3), as well as to the report of 20 February 2025 by the European Environment Agency monitoring progress towards the 8th Environment Action Programme (EAP) objectives, and to the Commission report of 13 March 2024 on the 8th EAP mid-term review (COM(2024)0123),

–  having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency(4),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 February 2024 entitled ‘Securing our future – Europe’s 2040 climate target and path to climate neutrality by 2050 building a sustainable, just and prosperous society’ (COM(2024)0063),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 12 March 2024 entitled ‘Managing climate risks - protecting people and prosperity’ (COM(2024)0091),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 27 May 2025 entitled ‘EU-wide assessment of the final updated national energy and climate plans – Delivering the Union’s 2030 energy and climate objectives’ (COM(2025)0274),

–  having regard to the report of 11 March 2024 by the European Environment Agency entitled ‘European Climate Risk Assessment’,

–  having regard to the report of 15 June 2023 by the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change entitled ‘Scientific advice for the determination of an EU-wide 2040 climate target and a greenhouse gas budget for 2030-2050’,

–  having regard to the report of 2 June 2025 by the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change entitled ‘Scientific advice for amending the European Climate Law - Setting climate goals to strengthen EU strategic priorities’,

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 28 June 2023 entitled ‘A new outlook on the climate and security nexus: Addressing the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on peace, security and defence’ (JOIN(2023)0019), and to the joint staff working document from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 17 February 2025 entitled ‘Progress Report on the implementation of the Joint Communication - “A New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus“’ (SWD(2025)0049),

–  having regard to the Global Framework on Chemicals – For a Planet Free of Harm from Chemicals and Waste, adopted at the fifth International Conference on Chemicals Management, organised by UNEP in September 2023,

–  having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, adopted at the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD COP15) in December 2022, and to the 16th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD COP16), which concluded in February 2025,

–  having regard to the Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement or High Seas Treaty), adopted on 19 June 2023,

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869(5) (Nature Restoration Law),

–  having regard to its position of 10 April 2024 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Soil Monitoring and Resilience(6),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 establishing a Union certification framework for carbon removals, carbon farming and carbon storage in products(7),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942(8),

–  having regard to the resolution adopted by the UN Human Rights Council of 12 July 2019 on human rights and climate change (A/HRC/RES/41/21),

–  having regard to the declaration entitled ‘Supporting the Conditions for a Just Transition Internationally’ of 4 November 2021, adopted at COP26,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions on climate finance of 10 October 2025 in view of the 30th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP30) in Belém,

–  having regard to the questions to the Commission and to the Council on the UN Climate Change Conference 2025 in Belém, Brazil (COP30) (O-000028/2025 – B10‑0011/2025 and O-000029/2025 – B10‑0012/2025),

–  having regard to Rules 142(5) and 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety,

A.  whereas it has declared a climate and environmental emergency and has committed to urgently fight and contain this threat; whereas recent scientific studies(9) indicate that human-induced global warming and increases of sea-levels are accelerating at an even faster pace than previously anticipated;

B.  whereas the Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016; whereas 2025 marks the ten-year anniversary of the adoption of the Paris Agreement;

C.  whereas according to the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2024(10), fully implementing unconditional NDCs made under the Paris Agreement for 2030 would put the world on course for limiting temperature rise to 2,8 °C this century, and fully implementing conditional NDCs would lower this temperature rise to 2,6 °C;

D.  whereas the 2024 NDC synthesis report(11) states that the total global greenhouse gas (GHG) emission level in 2030 is projected to be 2,6 % below the 2019 level; whereas the IPCC concludes that in scenarios limiting warming to 1,5 °C, GHG emissions need to be 43 % below the 2019 level by 2030;

E.  whereas the EU should remain a leader in international climate negotiations; whereas a collective effort is needed by all parties to achieve global climate targets; whereas decarbonisation in the EU alone will not be enough; whereas the United States accounts for 23,8 % of global cumulative CO2 emissions, the EU Member States account for 16,5 %, China for 15 %, Russia for 6,7 % and the UK for 4,4 %; whereas the EU is currently the world’s fourth largest annual emitter of CO2, representing around 6 % of worldwide emissions, after China, the United States and India; whereas the EU represents 5,7 % of the global population and 14,7 % of global GDP(12);

F.  whereas pathways limiting global warming to 1,5 °C require reaching net-negative emissions post-2050;

G.  whereas most climate change mitigation actions featured in the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, published in 2023, include carbon capture and storage, and carbon removal;

H.  whereas the IPCC estimates that the global carbon budget for a 67 % likelihood of limiting global warming to 1,5 °C is approximately 400 gigatonnes of CO₂ from 2020 onwards(13); whereas, at current global emission levels, this global carbon budget is expected to be exhausted by 2030;

I.  whereas methane has been responsible for around 30 % of the rise in global temperatures since the industrial revolution; whereas the EU co-launched the Global Methane Pledge (GMP) at COP26 to reduce methane emissions, by 2030, to 30 % of 2020 levels; whereas the report by the International Energy Agency of May 2025 entitled ‘Global Methane Tracker 2025’ shows that methane emissions are still on the rise and that the implementation of the Global Methane Pledge remains weak;

J.  whereas the IPCC’s finding state that land and ocean sinks have absorbed 56 % of human-induced CO₂ emissions over the past six decades(14);

K.  whereas six out of nine planetary boundaries analysed by the Stockholm Resilience Centre have been exceeded(15), including the planetary boundary for climate;

L.  whereas UNEP describes the interconnected environmental emergencies of climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss as ‘the triple planetary crisis’, given that climate change worsens biodiversity loss, pollution accelerates both climate change and ecosystem collapse, and biodiversity loss weakens climate resilience;

M.  whereas protecting, conserving and restoring biodiversity and ecosystems, including through greater efforts to halt and reverse deforestation and forest degradation, are necessary actions for achieving the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement;

N.  whereas the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) contains concrete measures to halt and reverse nature loss, including targets to restore 30 % of all degraded ecosystems by 2030 and a target to conserve 30 % of land, waters and seas;

O.  whereas 2024 was the hottest year ever recorded and the first time global temperatures exceeded 1,5 °C above pre-industrial levels; whereas Copernicus data for the first half of 2025 shows some of the highest temperatures on record, with only 2024 being hotter for the month of May(16); whereas each of the past ten years also ranks among the top ten hottest years on record; whereas Europe is the fastest warming continent in the world, warming at roughly twice the global average rate since the 1980s, according to Copernicus data(17);

P.  whereas the UN General Assembly has recognised the right to access a clean, healthy and sustainable environment as a universal human right(18) and Article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union enshrines the principle that environmental protection must be integrated into the policies of the Union;

Q.  whereas air pollution is a major environmental and public health threat and is inextricably linked with the climate crisis, both in terms of shared energy sources such as fossil fuel combustion and the need for integrated policy solutions; whereas short-lived climate pollutants, such as methane and black carbon, are responsible for nearly half of current global warming levels and cause severe health impacts, particularly among vulnerable populations(19);

R.  whereas the United States has decided for the second time to unilaterally withdraw from the Paris Agreement; whereas the US retreat from multilateralism and from providing development assistance, humanitarian aid and international climate finance will leave a significant gap; whereas the EU has a responsibility and strategic interest in helping to fill that gap;

S.  whereas making global financial flows consistent with a pathway towards a net zero and climate-resilient economy is an essential goal for the green transition, in accordance with Article 2 of the Paris Agreement;

T.  whereas the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance’s report of 2021, entitled ‘First report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties’, states that national reports submitted by developing country Parties to the UNFCCC demonstrate that the costs for meeting their needs until 2030, in relation to implementing the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, cumulatively amount to USD 5,8-5,9 trillion(20); whereas the UNFCCC’s NCQG on climate finance includes a commitment to scale up finance to the amount of at least USD 1,3 trillion per year by 2035;

U.  whereas the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative is inspired by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls for a binding international treaty to stop fossil fuel expansion, to phase out existing production and to support a just global transition; whereas only 17 countries have so far endorsed the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty, and none of these is an EU Member State(21);

V.  whereas the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change recommends the urgent and full phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies in the EU, in line with existing commitments; whereas the 8th EAP requires the establishment of a clear deadline for ending such subsidies, in line with this climate ambition;

W.  whereas children are especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, including by way of deadly diseases, pollution, food and water insecurity, and extreme weather events; whereas nearly 1 billion children live in 33 countries classified as ‘extremely high-risk’ due to a combination of exposure to climate and environmental hazards and high levels of vulnerability(22);

X.  whereas ambitious multilateral climate frameworks, and the actions aligned with them, serve the strategic interests of the EU and present opportunities for the EU as a global frontrunner in the green transition;

Global stocktake, NDCs and the COP30 in Belém

1.  Highlights the fact that the outcome of the first global stocktake (GST) at COP28 recognises that pathways limiting global warming to 1,5 °C with no or limited overshoot and to 2 °C require a peaking of global GHG emissions by 2025, and that limiting global warming to 1,5 °C with no or limited overshoot requires deep, rapid and sustained reductions in global GHG emissions of 43 % by 2030 and 60 % by 2035 relative to the 2019 level, reaching net zero GHG emissions by 2050;

2.  Takes note of the relative progress made in some areas at COP29 in Baku, especially as regards the NCQG on climate finance, the progress on making the loss and damage fund operational, and the carbon market agreement; regrets, however, the lack of sufficient progress on mitigation;

3.  Notes with concern that the aggregated emissions reductions from the submitted NDCs fall significantly short of the emission pathways required to respect the Paris Agreement target and the conclusions of the first GST; urges COP30 to reaffirm the commitment to the 1,5 °C target and to agree on the need to continue to strengthen ambition, and to take concrete decisions to support the implementation of the NDCs; considers that GSTs should take place more frequently and calls for all parties that are not on track to achieving the Paris Agreement goal to update and strengthen their NDCs every second year, in addition to the five-yearly review cycle;

4.  Stresses that a collective effort and further action by all parties is required to close the emissions gap and implement the actions included in the first GST through concrete targets, and to scale up nationally determined action; underlines the particular responsibility of all major emitters, including emerging economies and the G20 countries, to demonstrate leadership, in this regard; calls for the EU and like-minded partners to spearhead a coalition of high ambition and work collaboratively with all parties to secure a successful outcome at COP30;

5.  Strongly regrets the decision by the US Government to withdraw, for the second time, from the Paris Agreement; calls for the United States to re-consider its withdrawal, and to contribute its fair share to the global effort to tackle climate change and to global climate finance in line with the Paris Agreement, especially in regard to its responsibility, based on its cumulative past emissions; encourages US states and non-governmental actors to continue to engage in international climate cooperation, including at UN climate change conferences; notes that no other country has followed the United States in withdrawing from the Paris Agreement; underlines the particular responsibility and strategic interest of the EU to provide leadership and restore trust in global climate action, including through measures to prevent any further withdrawals from the Paris Agreement; considers that all aspects of the EU’s external action, including trade policy and development policy, can contribute to these aims;

6.  Reiterates the principle of policy coherence for development, to which the EU and its Member States have committed, and which aims to minimise contradictions and build synergies between different EU policies; insists on a coherent approach to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in both internal and external policies;

7.  Recalls that in the first GST, the Parties to the UNFCCC recognised the need for deep, rapid and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in line with 1,5 °C pathways and committed themselves to contributing to the global effort to triple renewable energy capacity globally and to double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030; remains concerned about the insufficient progress towards these targets; underlines that it is essential that COP30 build on these targets, take concrete decisions on their implementation and undertake additional measures should an ambition gap remain; reaffirms its commitment to deliver on the consensus reached in the COP28 Declaration on Climate and Health; takes note of the commitment to contribute to accelerating the development of zero- and low-emission technologies; recalls in this regards point (e) of paragraph 28 of the first GST as adopted at COP28;

8.  Recalls that in the first GST, countries committed themselves to accelerating efforts towards the phase-down of unabated coal power and the phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, and to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner, with a view to accelerating action in this critical decade so as to achieve net zero by 2050, in keeping with the science; calls on all Parties to step up efforts in this direction and to engage in the development of a fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty; expects COP30 to strengthen the commitment to the transition away from fossil fuels and insists on the urgent need for ambitious and time-bound plans to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and fossil fuel production;

9.  Notes that 2025 is the deadline for countries to submit their NDCs for 2035, which are essential for raising climate ambition, tracking progress and enhancing resilience; considers it essential that the EU lead by example and calls for the EU and all Parties that have not yet done so to respond to the COP28 GST and submit economy-wide absolute, as opposed to relative, emissions reduction targets covering all greenhouse gases, sectors and categories and aligned with the 1,5 °C goal, as soon as possible and well before COP30; regrets that most parties failed to meet the deadline for submitting their updated NDCs, stresses the importance of respecting all UNFCCC processes and submission deadlines for the good functioning of multilateralism in climate politics;

10.  Stresses the importance of granular and transparent reporting to assess progress on the NDCs;

11.  Acknowledges progress on the implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and emphasises that the use of Article 6 should always result in a guaranteed net benefit for the climate and thus calls on all Parties to ensure that projects accounted towards Article 6 do not deter domestic emission reductions; urges the Supervisory Body and all Parties to stand by the Glasgow Agreement, and hence ensure that all approved Clean Development Mechanism activities comply with Article 6.4 methodologies by the end of 2025 at the latest; calls on the Commission to advocate and support the development of a robust international governance framework for internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) at international level that includes binding standards on international carbon credits to guarantee environmental, climate and social integrity, fair sharing of the mitigation benefits, clear implementation rules to ensure transparency, additionality and permanence, strict reporting obligations, and effective oversight mechanisms for all Article 6 projects, in order to eliminate the risk of double-counting and safeguard the environmental integrity of the system; calls for clear rules on liability sharing for monitoring and reversal risks, to avoid undue burdens on host Parties; highlights the need for private carbon market initiatives to implement the highest standards of integrity;

12.  Calls on all Parties to make meaningful progress at COP30 to ensure that the second GST, beginning in 2026, is guided by the best available science and integrates cross-cutting issues such as gender equity, human rights and ecosystem protection;

International climate finance and sustainable finance

13.  Emphasises that the provision of adequate climate finance is crucial for achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement; recalls that many developing countries’ NDCs are conditional on international climate finance; stresses that, according to various UN reports, the global climate finance gap between what is needed and what is currently provided is large and growing, and that this growing gap stems from a number of factors, all of which should be adequately addressed;

14.  Stresses that delayed mobilisation of climate finance will lead to increased costs, rising opportunity costs and diminishing climate returns; notes, in this regard, that the IEA estimates that, for every US dollar not invested in clean energy before 2030, four or five dollars may be needed subsequently to compensate;

15.  Stresses that adaptation is underfunded, and that the NCQG does not respond sufficiently to adaptation finance needs; highlights the fact that, while all sources of finance – public and private – are needed, international public finance is needed in particular for responding to adaptation needs and addressing loss and damage;

16.  Notes that the EU and its Member States provide roughly one third of global public climate finance, making them the largest providers globally, with  EUR 28,6 billion provided from public sources in 2023 and EUR 7,2 billion in private finance also mobilised; reiterates that EU and national budgets should be adapted to meet the agreed NCQG, so that the EU delivers its fair share of international climate finance, including by mobilising private climate finance; considers that the NCQG represents the lower end/boundary for climate finance mobilisation;

17.  Recognises that the EU played a significant role in brokering a deal to achieve agreement on the NCQG; calls on all Parties to contribute their fair share towards meeting the NCQG, which should include subgoals for finance for mitigation and adaptation and for loss and damage; calls for the EU and its Member States to scale up new and additional climate finance, through a dedicated and predictable EU public finance mechanism, to be in line with the agreed NCQG; recalls that, in order to achieve the necessary global climate finance levels, a broader contributor base reflecting Parties’ evolving financial capabilities is needed; expects upper-middle income countries with high emissions to contribute their fair share and increase their contributions more than currently is the case; calls on all parties to identify new and innovative sources of public and private finance; calls for Parties, when financing the NCQG, to prioritise instruments and measures that are grant-based and non-debt inducing in order to ensure that the recipient countries are able to implement necessary mitigation and adaptation measures without increasing their debt burden; expresses its concern about the NCQG being met by re-categorising other funds; points also to concerns about the ambiguity around the kinds of funding that contribute to the NCQG, in particular the issue of double-counting;

18.  Calls on all actors to ensure that the Baku-to-Belém roadmap provides a clear and actionable plan for mobilising the relevant resources; urges all Parties to foster strong public-private cooperation and mobilise private investment at scale by strengthening regulatory frameworks for accountable and sustainable investment; notes that private investment will have to cover the largest share of the required investment in the global climate transition; stresses the need for the roadmap to include a robust and independent accountability mechanism to ensure transparency and track progress effectively;

19.  Notes that many climate-vulnerable countries, including several least-developed countries, are in debt distress or at significant risk of debt distress and that climate finance should therefore be allocated in way that does not exacerbate their debt burden, giving priority to grant-based finance; calls on the Commission and the Member States to assess their options for contributing to alleviating this debt distress and to take relevant action without delay;

20.  Stresses that there is consensus across UN bodies that climate finance cannot be scaled up equitably unless the debt crisis is addressed; highlights the importance, in this context, of debt relief instruments;

21.  Calls on the Commission, the Member States and international partners to integrate climate microfinance as a core component of climate adaptation and mitigation strategies, by supporting local microfinance institutions to develop and scale up financial products for vulnerable populations, including microcredit for green technologies, micro-insurance against climate risks, and micro-savings for community resilience, with a particular focus on women, young people and rural communities;

22.  Stresses the urgent need to simplify, accelerate and adapt climate finance procedures to the realities of developing countries, notably by establishing single-window access points, harmonising application criteria and providing technical assistance for project preparation, to ensure that climate finance is accessible, rapid and effective for local organisations and communities that are most affected by climate change;

23.  Considers it essential to make progress at COP30 on the operationalisation of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement and to make this a standing point on the COP agendas; calls for the EU to engage in international initiatives such as the Bridgetown Initiative 3.0; calls for swifter reform of the international financial architecture, and calls on all the major international financial institutions and multilateral development banks to assume their role as climate banks and to align their portfolios and lending policies with the Paris Agreement in a way that is financially sustainable in the long term; calls also on domestic and international financial systems to better address the challenges of climate change by removing barriers to accessing climate finance for clean technologies and shifting public and private finance flows away from emission-intensive activities;

24.  Considers that the European Investment Bank (EIB) should serve as the Union’s climate bank and takes note therefore of its climate bank roadmap and updated energy lending policy, as well as the additional efforts of the European Investment Fund, as important steps in spearheading climate investment;

Adaptation, loss and damage, and a just transition

25.  Underlines the need to step up climate adaptation, resilience and preparedness within the EU and globally to minimise the negative effects of climate change and biodiversity loss and to address this comprehensively at the COPs while emphasising the important role of local and regional authorities in designing and implementing these actions; recognises the importance of global cooperation and the exchange of know-how and of the best available science and of best practices in climate adaptation; stresses that the costs of adaptation will increase with inaction and delayed action, in terms of both mitigation and adaptation;

26.  Reiterates its deep concern about the increasing intensity and frequency of extreme weather events in the EU and globally, including wildfires, droughts, heatwaves and floods, and their impact on human health and the increasing loss of lives; notes that sea levels are expected to rise more quickly throughout this century in all the IPCC scenarios, incurring financial costs and causing the loss of coastal areas all around the world;

27.  Highlights the need, at COP30, to operationalise the framework for the global goal on adaptation, including through adopting impactful and manageable indicators and robust, comprehensive tracking systems and addressing means of implementation in order to enable effective monitoring of progress towards the adaptation targets set at COP28; points out that, while mitigation finance and implementation have progressed, adaptation efforts continue to lag behind, with a widening gap in both funding and concrete action;

28.  Highlights the importance of national adaptation plans and stresses the need to align them with the Baku-to-Belém roadmap; calls on Parties that have not yet done so to put in place their national adaptation plans as soon as possible, and on all Parties to have progressed in implementing them by 2030, and to include a focus on nature-based solutions; calls on all Parties to integrate cross-cutting elements such as gender equality and human rights into their plans;

29.  Calls for increased investment in early warning systems and risk management systems in vulnerable regions, highlighting their essential role in protecting lives, safeguarding livelihoods and strengthening resilience to climate risks;

30.  Encourages greater support for the collection, sharing and analysis of climate and disaster risk data, as well as the deployment of appropriate technologies for these activities, in order to enhance the availability and quality of information for at-risk populations; recommends that all EU-supported early warning initiatives allocate dedicated resources to ongoing system maintenance and updates, especially in the light of global challenges to science-based observation and procedures;

31.  Welcomes the decision at COP28 to establish the loss and damage fund and expects further progress on its implementation and financing; calls on all Parties to ensure transparent rules in this regard; stresses the importance of acknowledging the distinct character of loss and damage by treating it separately from adaptation, including in the GST framework;

32.  Calls on all Parties to secure transparent pledges and predictable delivery mechanisms for loss and damage finance, including early disbursements from the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage; calls on all Parties to ensure that resources directed to the fund are in addition to existing contributions to climate finance; strongly believes that loss and damage funding should prioritise grants and be supplementary to, and distinct from, official development assistance;

33.  Reiterates its call for loss and damage to be a standing agenda item at COP meetings;

34.  Calls on all Parties to advance the Just Transition Work Programme by promoting concrete actions that address inequalities exacerbated by climate change; considers that the work programme should encompass the objectives of decent work creation and a just transition for all, and calls on all Parties to promote social dialogue with employers’ and workers’ organisations and stakeholder engagement as a basis for forging strong social consensus; calls on all Parties to work constructively to reach agreement on further implementation of the work programme, recognising that the means of implementation must be delivered urgently;

35.  Stresses that climate change is threatening the fundamental rights and well-being of children and young people; highlights the need to integrate child rights and intergenerational equity into all aspects of climate policy, including adaptation, mitigation, loss and damage, and climate finance;

EU climate policy aligned with the Paris Agreement

36.  Highlights the fact that the EU’s current climate legislation, if fully implemented, will reduce the EU’s net GHG emissions by around 57 % by 2030 compared to 1990 levels; notes that the EU is currently on course to reduce net GHG emissions by only around 54 % by 2030, compared to 1990 levels, if the Member States fully implement existing and planned national measures and EU policies(23); calls on the Member States to take the necessary measures to address this gap, and on the Commission to take additional measures to support Member States in that effort; stresses the need for EU climate policy to continue to set ambitious goals, in line with the agreed targets, and to prioritise in its actions cost-effectiveness, the competitiveness of the European economy, social inclusion and a high level of environmental protection;

37.  Stresses the importance of respecting the submission deadlines for updates to National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) to allow the Commission to conduct a proper review process; welcomes the Commission’s assessment of the final 2030 NECPs of the Member States that have submitted them; urges the Commission and the Member States to act decisively to close the gap between the NECPs and the EU’s binding targets, including through implementation plans;

38.  Underlines the need to adopt a science-based EU climate target for 2040 in accordance with the European Climate Law(24), considering all the criteria of Article 4(5) thereof, and in keeping with the conclusions of the first GST; recalls the recommendations of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change and notes the Commission’s proposal of a 2040 climate target accompanied by enabling policies; regrets, furthermore, that the Council was not able to agree on an NDC for 2035 before the deadline of 23 September 2025; urges the Council to agree on an NDC that is at the upper end of the indicated range as soon as possible;

39.  Recalls the need for the EU to remain a leader in international climate negotiations and climate action to contribute to a global level playing field and avoid the risk of carbon leakage for European companies, as well as to maintain public support for climate action and avoid carbon leakage;

40.  Underlines the role of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change (ESABCC), as established by the European Climate Law; calls on the Commission to provide justification, in impact assessment reports or other publicly accessible documents, of deviations from the ESABCC’s advice and to address the policy trade-offs; calls on the Commission, moreover, to safeguard sufficient funding for the ESABCC in upcoming budgetary proposals to enable it to fulfil its legal mandate;

41.  Reiterates the need to integrate climate ambition into all EU policies and the measures transposing them and underlines that Article 6(2) and 6(4) of the European Climate Law obliges the Commission to assess whether all current measures, draft measures and legislative proposals, including budgetary proposals, are consistent with the EU’s climate targets; recalls that, according to the European Climate Law, the EU’s and the Member States’ actions should be guided by the precautionary and the ‘polluter pays’ principles established in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and should also take into account the ‘energy efficiency first’ principle of the Energy union and the ‘do no harm’ principle;

42.  Underlines that effective access to justice in environmental matters, in line with the Aarhus Convention, is critical to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement; believes that the EU and the Member States should lead by example and apply the findings and recommendations of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, while respecting their own international commitments under the Aarhus Convention and the rule of law;

43.  Calls on the Member States and the Commission to ensure that the national energy and climate plans and long-term strategies of the Member States include sufficient action and financial means to achieve EU targets for 2030 and beyond; calls on the Member States to increase their efforts to ensure that the EU meets its 2030 targets;

44.  Points out that, at a time of rising geopolitical instability and volatile energy markets, decarbonisation is a powerful driver of strategic autonomy and economic competitiveness for the EU; recalls that this is acknowledged in the Clean Industrial Deal and its objective to bring climate action and competitiveness together in one overarching strategy;

45.  Notes with concern that fossil fuel subsidies rose in recent years, with fossil fuel consumption subsidies totalling USD 620 billion globally in 2023 and a substantial share of subsidies observed in emerging and developing economies; regrets that fossil energy subsidies in the EU remained high, at EUR 111 billion in 2023, despite a decrease from 2022 levels; recalls that subsidies for imported fossil energy place a burden on European economies and distort incentives for clean energy transitions; underlines the importance of reducing subsidies for the most polluting fuels at international level and of transparent reporting of those subsidies; reiterates the need for the Commission and the Member States to implement the requirement in the 8th EAP to ‘set a deadline for the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies consistent with the ambition of limiting global warming to 1,5 °C’; regrets the lack of progress since the programme’s adoption in 2022, and calls on the Commission to put forward its roadmap to further reduce and phase out fossil fuel subsidies, in line with the EU’s climate commitments;

46.  Stresses that the current geopolitical context underscores the urgent need to end the EU’s fossil fuel dependence and accelerate the energy transition; welcomes progress under REPowerEU and calls for the EU and the Member States to act faster;

47.  Looks forward to the upcoming EU climate adaptation plan, including legislative action, as appropriate, to ensure coordinated the EU’s preparedness to confront increasing climate risks;

48.  Calls for the EU to further investigate and address ways it contributes to climate change beyond its borders;

The triple planetary crisis: climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss

49.  Underscores that the crises of climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and that the responses to these crises need to be aligned; emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring biodiversity and ecosystems, including existing carbon-rich ecosystems, and of managing natural resources sustainably to enhance nature-based climate change mitigation and adaptation;

50.  Recalls the importance of the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector in meeting the EU’s climate and biodiversity targets; recalls that the Nature Restoration Law is one of the EU’s tools for meeting its targets under the LULUCF Regulation(25) and its international biodiversity obligations, notably the Kunming-Montreal GBF;

51.  Recalls the importance of environmental policies being designed and implemented in full alignment with the One Health approach, which aims to sustainably balance and optimise the health of people, animals and ecosystems;

52.  Stresses the need to support and protect environmental defenders and to hold accountable those who threaten them;

53.  Emphasises that soil is the largest terrestrial carbon store and plays an indispensable role in the global climate cycle; welcomes all efforts by governments and non-governmental organisations to maximise the potential of soils to mitigate climate change and improve water availability; underlines, in this regard, the agreement reached at EU level on the Soil Monitoring Law, which serves to improve capacities of the Member States and help the EU meet its international commitments;

54.  Stresses the important role of forests in climate action and in climate change mitigation; stresses, in this regard, the importance of global efforts to combat deforestation, as forests provide one of the largest carbon sinks in the world and are essential reservoirs in terms of biodiversity; highlights the urgent need to protect the world’s most vital forest territories, such as the Amazon rainforest, including in the EU’s outermost regions; reaffirms the EU’s commitment to the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests and Land Use (COP26); calls on all Parties to set targets to increase net removals of CO2 equivalent through LULUCF activities;

55.  Underscores the critical importance of wetlands – including peatlands, mangroves and other coastal and inland wetland ecosystems – as some of the planet’s most effective natural carbon sinks; calls on all Parties to urgently scale up efforts to conserve, sustainably manage and restore wetlands as a central strategy for climate mitigation, adaptation, biodiversity protection and the sustainability of related social and economic activities;

56.  Highlights the importance of identifying and maximising potential synergies between biodiversity and climate actions, including by prioritising the protection, restoration and management of ecosystems and species important in carbon cycles, as agreed at COP16 in Cali, Colombia; stresses the importance of implementing the Kunming-Montreal GBF; welcomes, in this regard, the submission of national biodiversity strategies and action plans by 55 Parties and of national targets by 139 Parties and urges all other Parties to swiftly follow suit;

57.  Emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring water and water-related ecosystems; calls for more action on sustainable water usage, including through the use of innovative water technologies, especially in places that are severely impacted by droughts or water scarcity; highlights the devastating environmental, social and economic impacts of desertification, drought, floods and water pollution; welcomes the European water resilience strategy and calls on the Commission and the Member States to swiftly implement it; calls for further action to tackle pollution from per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances; calls for the Commission and the Member States to step up the enforcement of existing laws and ensure compliance with the Water Framework Directive(26);

58.  Welcomes the adoption of the High Seas Treaty and calls for its swift ratification and implementation by the parties thereto; calls on the Parties to continue working on the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue; stresses that the global climate system depends on the health of the ocean and marine ecosystems, which is losing its regulatory capacity as a result of global warming, pollution, overexploitation of marine biodiversity, acidification, eutrophication, deoxygenation and coastal erosion;

59.  Stresses the importance of global efforts to combat the degradation of marine ecosystems, as the ocean absorbs 30 % of all carbon emissions, captures 90 % of excess heat and supplies over 50 % of the world’s oxygen, and is an essential reservoir in terms of biodiversity; welcomes the outcome of the Nice Ocean Week on increased financing commitments for ocean conservation; calls for urgent action to restore marine ecosystems and to ensure the effective protection of marine protected areas; recalls target 3 of the Kunming-Montreal GBF to protect 30 % of seas by 2030;

60.  Stresses the need to address the linkages between climate change, air pollution and public health in a comprehensive manner, including at the COP; welcomes the COP28 Declaration on Climate and Health, signed by over 150 governments; calls for air quality improvements to be integrated into climate policies and considered in NDCs; calls on all Parties to accelerate meaningful action contributing to air quality; urges the Parties to ensure that climate finance prioritises clean air solutions with measurable benefits for health, equity and climate;

61.  Stresses that climate change will contribute to increased antibiotic resistance; reiterates, in this regard, the need for urgent action to tackle antimicrobial resistance and calls for further efforts by all Parties to achieve a reduction in and more prudent use of antimicrobials to combat the risk of resistance; calls, in this regard, for binding commitments in relevant international treaties; regrets the lack of action taken so far;

62.  Stresses the need to combat the environmental impact of plastics over their life cycle, including their impact on the climate; stresses the need for adequate carbon pricing of raw materials to significantly reduce fossil fuels in the plastics sector; notes that work on the global plastics treaty is still ongoing and regrets that the parties were again unable to conclude the treaty in Geneva in August 2025 owing to disagreements over its scope; calls for the adoption of an ambitious agreement that addresses all stages of plastic production, consumption and waste management;

63.  Regrets the high costs of worldwide chemical pollution, which is worsening the climate and biodiversity crises; calls on the Parties to implement measures to meet the strategic objectives and targets adopted under the UN Global Framework on Chemicals; underlines the need for the EU and its Member States to spearhead global efforts to tackle chemical pollution, including by revising its policies on chemicals, where necessary;

The rights of indigenous peoples

64.  Stresses the need to protect the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and local communities as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; stresses the need to ensure the right to free, prior and informed consent; stresses that all projects under Article 6 affecting indigenous lands or communities must involve these indigenous peoples and respect their rights;

65.  Underlines that indigenous peoples are not just stakeholders or vulnerable groups, but are rights holders recognised under the Preamble to the Paris Agreement; stresses the need for the political participation of indigenous peoples at the COPs and in other UNFCCC processes to promote meaningful engagement in all decision-making bodies; acknowledges the need to fund and facilitate the presence of indigenous peoples at the COPs and subsidiary body technical meetings;

66.  Recognises that indigenous lands are biodiversity hotspots and that indigenous peoples play a vital role in conservation and sustainable management of resources; recalls that, according to the fifth assessment report of the IPCC, indigenous, local and traditional forms of knowledge are a major resource for adapting to climate change; regrets that indigenous knowledge is not being effectively used; underlines in particular the role of this knowledge in avoiding maladaptation;

67.  Stresses the need for indigenous peoples to have direct access to climate finance through international climate funds such as the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund and the Loss and Damage Fund;

Climate, peace and security

68.  Recognises that increased focus has been given to the Climate, Peace and Security agenda at COP meetings, particularly evident at COP29 with the launch of the Baku Call on Climate Action for Peace, Relief and Recovery, and with the previous COP27 Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace Initiative and the COP28 Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace;

69.  Notes that the Commission’s progress report on the joint communication entitled ‘A New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus’, published in February 2025, recognises the links between climate change, environmental degradation and issues of peace, security and defence, underscoring their significance for foreign policy;

70.  Stresses that climate change and environmental degradation are threat multipliers that can lead to food shortages and scarcities of natural resources, increase tensions in international relations and conflicts over natural resources, and cause natural catastrophes, all of which are major drivers of human displacement and migratory flows;

71.  Stresses the need for increased international attention to the environmental impacts of conflicts; highlights the environmental devastation caused by military assaults and operations around the world and urges the cessation of these activities in line with international law; stresses that beyond the immediate destruction and loss of human lives, ongoing conflicts disrupt ecosystems, deplete natural resources, pollute the environment, and jeopardise the health of our planet for generations to come, while undermining climate mitigation and adaptation efforts; underlines in particular the latest UNEP reports on the frightening extent of environmental damage caused by the conflicts in both Ukraine(27) and Gaza(28); recalls, furthermore, the Joint Research Centre report on the environmental damage caused by Russia’s ongoing war of aggression in Ukraine(29), showing sharp spikes in toxic pollution, soil degradation and disruptions to monitoring systems; believes that entities recognised as being responsible for conflicts by the International Court of Justice must also be held accountable for the climate and environmental costs of war and occupation and post-conflict reconstruction;

72.  Stresses that strengthened climate diplomacy under the UNFCCC is key to contributing to reaffirming multilateralism, especially amid rising geopolitical tensions and declining trust in global cooperation; highlights the symbolic significance of COP30 as the 10th anniversary of the Paris Agreement; calls for the EU and its Member States to support the COP30 Presidency in its commitment to multilateralism; highlights that with its presidency of both the BRICS and COP30, Brazil can leverage the opportunity to drive a stronger, more coordinated agenda to deliver progress on economic, political and environmental issues;

73.  Stresses that climate goals cannot be achieved without the support and involvement of the public; calls on all Parties to raise awareness and public understanding of climate change and related issues and to work with public representatives to gain public support for mitigation and adaptation measures; is concerned by the increasing spread of climate misinformation and disinformation, including by state actors, and urges all governments to address this as a matter of urgency in view of the threat it poses to both meaningful climate action and democracy; highlights the importance of access to science-based information and of safeguarding independent media; stresses the importance of the work conducted by the IPCC to provide sound scientific advice and data; calls on the UNFCCC to intensify efforts to combat climate disinformation; calls on the Commission to join the Global Initiative for Information Integrity on Climate Change to fight climate disinformation;

Efforts across all sectors

74.  Stresses that all sectors must contribute to reducing emissions and to achieving climate neutrality in line with the Paris Agreement;

75.  Welcomes the fact that almost 160 countries have become signatories to the Global Methane Pledge; urges those EU Member States that have not yet joined the Pledge to do so before COP30; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take further action to meet the Methane Pledge target; calls on all Parties to adopt specific methane reduction targets and to include these in their NDCs; calls for a quantified, science-based assessment of the progress made since its adoption at COP26;

76.  Recalls that methane has over 80 times the warming power of carbon dioxide during its first 20 years in the atmosphere and stresses therefore the importance of accelerating the reduction in methane; notes with concern the findings of the 2025 IEA report, highlighting the continued rise in methane emissions, the weak implementation of the Global Methane Pledge and the fact that countries are considerably underestimating their energy sector methane pollution, with the IEA estimating that emissions are around 80 % higher than the total reported by governments; recalls that methane emissions from the energy sector remain one of the easiest and most economically beneficial emission categories to abate globally; calls for the EU’s support in establishing a methane reduction buyers’ club together with other major importers of fossil fuels, inspired by the First Movers Coalition, adopting a common maximum methane intensity value, in line with Regulation (EU) 2024/1787, and thus accelerating the global reduction in methane;

77.  Recalls the adopted Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector, which will also apply from 1 January 2027 to EU importers of crude oil, natural gas and coal; stresses the critical role of this regulation and its implementation in driving upstream methane abatement, securing investor confidence and setting global standards;

78.  Notes with concern that the transport sector is the only sector in which emissions have risen at EU level since 1990 and that a more substantial reduction will be needed to meet the EU’s climate goals; stresses the importance of further measures to support the electrification of road transport as a way of reducing road transport emissions, in conjunction with further measures supporting the modal shift, intermodal transport and public transport in general; calls on the Commission to include emissions from international transport in NDCs; is concerned by the fact that the Commission’s 2025 NECP assessment report showed that some Member States still have support schemes for fossil-fuel powered vehicles and calls on those Member States to phase them out;

79.  Reiterates its call on the Commission to ensure the social fairness of transport decarbonisation measures, including by incorporating emissions from superyachts, private jets and business planes into EU climate policies; reiterates, furthermore, its call on all Parties, including the EU Member States, to take measures to discourage the use of private jets; highlights the disproportionate climate impact of private jets, which are up to 14 times more polluting per passenger than commercial flights; underlines the importance of leading by example and urges all participants attending COP30, including those from the EU institutions, to refrain from using private jets and to choose the least polluting transport option possible to reach their destination(30);

80.  Welcomes the progress made at international level to impose carbon levies on international shipping; considers nevertheless that there is still a gap between the agreement reached by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the long-term objectives set by the IMO; highlights the EU emissions trading system (ETS) in this regard, which applies to maritime traffic progressively from 2025 onwards;

81.  Calls on the Commission to submit a report to Parliament, once the decarbonisation measures adopted by the IMO at the 83rd session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 83) are formally adopted, assessing their overall environmental integrity and their contribution to the objectives of the Paris Agreement, as well as a comparison with the level of environmental integrity provided by the EU ETS provisions;

82.  Welcomes the analysis(31) published by the Commission on 18 March 2025 showing that there is no evidence pointing to an increase in the use of smaller ships outside the scope of the EU ETS or ship-to-ship transfers as a way of circumventing the recent extension of the EU ETS to maritime transport; recalls the EU ETS 2026 review clause providing for the possibility of extending the scope to smaller ships, including offshore ships with a gross tonnage of between 400 and 5 000;

83.  Notes that the agricultural sector accounted for 10-12 % of global anthropogenic emissions and 11 % of total EU emissions in 2020; acknowledges the significant potential for GHG emissions reduction in the agricultural sector; stresses that farmers and the agricultural sector are particularly vulnerable to climate change, with climate change posing a significant threat to food security worldwide; stresses that policies to achieve emission reductions in the agricultural sector should do the utmost to guarantee food security; stresses the need to implement a policy framework that incentivises sustainable farming methods and supports farmers, particularly small-scale farmers, in the shift to resilient practices and that rewards farmers who support mitigation efforts and protect biodiversity; highlights the environmental benefits of rewetting drained peatlands, and other measures that promote on-farm biodiversity, soil health and water quality while contributing to climate mitigation and adaptation;

84.  Welcomes the fact that according to the World Bank, 28 % of global emissions are now covered by carbon pricing(32); regrets, nevertheless, that both the coverage and the average pricing levels remain far too low to meet the goals set in the Paris Agreement; highlights that carbon pricing raises revenues, which should be used for climate action and a just transition;

85.  Welcomes the fact that Brazil is introducing an ETS, and that several EU trading partners have introduced or are planning to introduce carbon trading or other carbon pricing mechanisms, including in response to the introduction of CBAM; invites the Commission to further encourage and support other Parties in introducing or improving carbon pricing mechanisms, and to explore links and other forms of cooperation with existing carbon pricing mechanisms outside the EU; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to ensure that any links with the EU ETS will continue to deliver additional and permanent mitigation contributions and will not undermine the EU’s domestic GHG emissions commitments;

86.  Stresses that the GST highlights the importance of transitioning to sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production, including through a more circular economy; stresses the need to intensify efforts to develop and improve the EU’s circular economy; urges the Commission to propose a 2030 target as soon as possible, following an impact assessment, for the EU’s material and consumption footprints, as per the 8th EAP commitment;

87.  Stresses the need to address the climate and environmental impacts of the textile sector, which is responsible for around 8-10 % of global GHG emissions and substantial consumption of resources, particularly water and energy; reiterates that the textile industry needs to play an important role in the shift to a circular economy and that it needs to tackle challenges related to waste prevention, waste management, microplastic shedding, water usage, overproduction, ultra-fast and fast-fashion practices, the overall durability and non-toxicity of the production process, and recyclability in the textile sector; highlights, in this regard, the importance of the recent amendment to the EU Waste Framework Directive; stresses the need to urgently improve human rights standards throughout the textile value chain;

88.  Stresses the impact of climate change on the tourism sector, as both a contributor and a vulnerable sector, and the need for destinations to adapt to climate risks and to develop climate-resilient tourism; calls for the promotion of a shift to more sustainable tourism, with environmentally responsible and low-carbon practices;

89.  Notes that there is growing scientific and political interest in solar radiation modification (SRM), a proposed set of climate engineering approaches, such as stratospheric aerosol injection, to artificially reflect sunlight and cool the planet; stresses that SRM does nothing to address the root cause of climate change, that there is no scientific certainty regarding its effects and that it endangers climactic and geopolitical stability, potentially in a catastrophic fashion; recalls that a UN resolution on global governance has been blocked; emphasises that, in the absence of robust scientific evidence regarding safety, effectiveness and governance, any pursuit of climate engineering must be guided by the precautionary principle;

90.  Recalls the recommendations of the Group of Chief Scientific Advisors of the Commission published in December 2024 and accordingly calls on the Commission to take a proactive role in negotiating a global governance framework for SRM based on a firm stance of non-deployment, and to strengthen the capability to detect and quantify any undeclared deployment of SRM; further calls on the Commission and the Member States to agree on an EU-wide moratorium on the use of SRM, and to ensure that any potential public funding for responsible scientific research and comprehensive international assessments of the risks, potential effects and impacts of this technology, does not replace public funding for research on adaptation and mitigation;

Climate change and gender

91.  Underscores the importance of gender perspectives and inclusive approaches in the UNFCCC process, including the Just Transition Work Programme; calls for all Parties, including the EU and its Member States, to increase efforts to integrate gender equality into their revised NDCs and national adaptation plans and into their climate and environmental policies, in particular those related to mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage; emphasises the need for more concrete actions by all Parties, including the EU and its Member States, to deliver on the commitments under the renewed Gender Action Plan agreed at COP25; urges the Member States and the Commission to increase efforts to achieve the goals set out in the EU Gender Action Plan III;

92.  Calls for the development of a new ambitious gender action plan ahead of COP30 that is intersectional, inclusive, measurable, human rights-based and cohesive across all areas of climate action; calls on the Parties to ensure that climate funding becomes gender-responsive and that the gender action plan includes an adequate and dedicated plan for funding; calls on all Parties to support the adoption of a new gender action plan during COP30;

93.  Reiterates that adaptive capacity and vulnerability differ across gender, age, ability, racial and occupational lines; calls, therefore, on all Parties to assess, respond to and prioritise the needs of vulnerable populations in their national adaptation plans, adaptation communications and NDCs;

94.  Recognises the disproportionate impact of climate change on women and girls, exacerbating existing gender inequalities and posing unique threats to their livelihoods, health and safety; reiterates the need to accelerate action for gender-responsive disaster risk reduction and, therefore, for gender-responsive implementation of the Sendai Framework; calls for further efforts to be made to prioritise and account for gender in disaster preparedness, particularly through the use of disaggregated disaster risk reduction datasets;

95.  Considers that women’s access to inclusive climate finance must be increased and facilitated, noting that women receive disproportionately less access to financial resources for climate adaptation and mitigation projects; urges the EU and its Member States to report on the gender responsiveness of their climate finance contributions and to enhance the consistency between gender and climate support through external action instruments and the European Investment Bank;

96.  Reiterates the importance of increasing women’s participation in decision-making in the climate diplomacy context, including in COP delegations and in leadership at all levels of climate action; calls on all Parties to aim for gender parity in their delegations and at all levels of climate change decision-making and negotiations; urges all Parties to nominate a national gender and climate change focal point and to increase the associated resources, training and support, including within the EU;

Participation of stakeholders at COP30

97.  Recalls the importance of the full involvement of all Parties in the UNFCCC decision-making processes in the spirit of sincere collaboration, and recognises that protecting space for civil society and local- and regional-level actors to operate and participate in climate governance is fundamental to accountability and transparency; acknowledges that there are many barriers to the participation of civil society organisations at COPs; stresses that civil society and local- and regional-level actors play a vital role in advancing the implementation of NDCs by ensuring actions are effective, locally tailored and responsive to community needs;

98.  Calls on the COP30 presidency and future presidencies to better enable the participation of developing countries and delegates from the least developed countries and to allocate additional resources to this end; encourages Parties to include young people in their delegations to ensure that future generations have an active role in shaping decisions that affect their future; welcomes the creation of the Youth Climate Champion role at COP28 as a step towards the stronger inclusion of young people in the UNFCCC process; calls for COP30 to institutionalise the meaningful participation of children and young people, including through structured dialogue mechanisms and official representation; calls for the increased use of virtual platforms at COPs to enhance global inclusiveness and participation of delegates and civil society representatives;

99.  Demands that the organisers of the COPs ensure that human rights, fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of expression, full and unrestricted participation for citizens and civil society organisations, including the right to peaceful assembly and association, and equitable access to this and future COPs are fully enshrined and guaranteed in the Host Country Agreement, which should be made public as soon as possible after signing; calls on the UNFCCC secretariat to monitor compliance and to take action in the event of breaches of such human rights criteria;

100.  Believes that the selection of the host city for any future COP meetings should take into account a set of predefined conditions including logistical and organisational capacity, safety and security as well as the environmental, economic and social impacts of the organisation of the event; stresses the importance of the sustainable organisation of COP30; regrets any negative impact that COP30 might have on the local ecosystem and local community of Belém; calls for precautionary measures in order to mitigate those risks;

Conflicts of interest, transparency and integrity

101.  Expresses concern that more than 1 770 fossil fuel lobbyists were accredited attendees at COP29; calls for the UNFCCC and the Parties to ensure that the decision-making process is protected from interests that run counter to the goals of the Paris Agreement; urges the UNFCCC to take the lead in proposing an ambitious accountability framework that would protect the UNFCCC’s work from undue influence, based on the model contained in the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control with regard to the tobacco industry; urges all Parties to agree, within the framework of this agreement, on a definition of ‘conflicts of interest’ for the purposes of strengthening disclosure requirements;

102.  Calls for accreditation for observers to be made conditional on the submission of a formal declaration of represented interests to a UNFCCC registry, accessible to the public, in order to increase transparency over influence at the COP;

103.  Welcomes the fact that the Commission did not provide accreditation for fossil fuel lobbyists to attend COP29 and calls for the continuation of this practice; regrets that 113 fossil fuel lobbyists were accredited by EU Member States at COP29 and calls for all Member States to refrain from providing accreditation to any fossil fuel lobbyists to attend COP30 or any future COP;

Industry, SMEs and competitiveness

104.  Views the COP30 as a key milestone 10 years on from the Paris Agreement and underlines that the fight against climate change should be a powerful driver of growth, reduce energy poverty and boost resilience, sustainability and competitiveness of industries and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); calls on policymakers across all Parties to the Convention to implement ambitious, timely and targeted responses within a stable, predictable and supportive transition framework, in accordance with the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR);

105.  Stresses that well-designed and implementable enabling policies can ensure that decarbonisation and climate goals go hand in hand with industrial growth, job creation and innovation; recalls that investing in sustainable and clean technologies contributes to environmental and economic and social objectives;

106.  Deems it to be of the utmost importance for the EU to ensure a fair transition to climate neutrality by 2050, to maintain public support for climate action and to lead by example, which should ensure a first-mover advantage in clean technologies and sustainable industries; calls for strong and targeted measures to shield EU industry from the risk of carbon leakage and from unfair global competition, ensuring a global level playing field; stresses the urgency of tackling the persistently high energy prices that undermine the EU industry’s competitiveness, including through investments in clean and renewable energy, energy efficiency, grids and flexibility;

107.  Recognises that the EU’s objective of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 while enhancing its competitiveness implies a deep industrial transformation, which requires massive and targeted public and private investments tailored to Member States’ and industries’ varying circumstances and scaling up support for clean technologies, innovation, skills and infrastructure; underlines that investing in industrial value chains for clean technologies is also key to reindustrialising the EU and boosting strategic autonomy;

108.  Urges support for EU industrial companies, including SMEs and small mid-caps (SMCs), to preserve their global leadership, while they decarbonise and transition towards a net-zero economy; underlines the need to provide effective solutions to support them in this transition phase in order to foster their innovation capacity and ensure competitiveness, to provide them with predictable and simplified administrative procedures, for example online permitting processes and access to finance, and to facilitate their participation in public procurement;

109.  Calls for accelerated decarbonisation alongside strengthened competitiveness; welcomes the Net-Zero Industry Act(33), the Clean Industrial Deal(34) and the Action Plan for Affordable Energy(35) as key steps towards a resilient and climate-neutral economy, and the forthcoming Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act; welcomes the expanded EU Innovation Fund that supports the scaling up of new innovations and technologies in Europe aimed at decarbonisation and supply chain development;

110.  Supports carbon management as part of industrial emission mitigation measures and underlines the key role played by carbon capture, utilisation and storage in the decarbonisation of hard-to-abate industrial emissions, and the production of low-carbon products including low-carbon hydrogen; recalls the industrial carbon management strategy(36) to expand CO₂ capture, storage, use and removal; welcomes advancements to establish a global carbon market, which should help the decarbonisation of industries globally and ensure a level playing field for companies worldwide; recalls, in this regard, its position on the EU ETS and the CBAM(37), welcoming the proposed simplification of the CBAM in the first omnibus package as an important step to further enhance its effectiveness in addressing carbon leakage and calling for a workable export solution to address the risk of carbon leakage for CBAM goods exported from the EU to non-EU countries;

111.  Urges improved access to finance for European industrial companies to decarbonise in line with the Paris Agreement; highlights the need for adequate financial resources to support decarbonisation under the next multiannual financial framework, including through specific funding instruments that effectively address the financing needs of European industries;

112.  Recognises the essential role of SMEs and SMCs, in particular microenterprises and start-ups, in driving and delivering on innovation, job creation and economic growth as well as in leading the way in the digital and green transitions through innovation and cutting-edge technological solutions; stresses the need for predictable rules and better access to finance in this regard;

113.  Emphasises the need for all Parties to continuously have secure and competitive access to critical raw materials, including secondary ones; welcomes the Critical Raw Materials Act(38) and the Commission’s intention to propose a new Circular Economy Act and calls for diversified supply chains with EU-equivalent standards; believes that a predictable regulatory framework is needed that unlocks circular business models, particularly those based on waste prevention, reuse and high-quality recycling to ensure access to critical raw materials;

114.  Highlights the urgency of re/upskilling the workforce, with investments in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and net-zero skills academies, to close labour shortage and skills gaps in decarbonising the European industry; calls for collaboration with social partners to address skills gaps and future labour demands in clean technologies;

Energy policy

115.  Stresses the importance of phasing out fossil fuels as soon as possible while reiterating the need to develop measures to ensure gas supply at a mitigated cost for sectors that cannot rely substantially on electrification in the short to medium term; notes that, while putting effort into achieving a global consensus on such a phase-out at COP30, the EU should continue to reduce its dependency on fossil fuels, increase the diversity of its energy suppliers, and develop an energy efficient and decarbonised economy, in order to boost its energy security and industrial competitiveness, and provide access to affordable energy for households and businesses; calls for the EU to urgently end imports of Russian fossil fuels, including natural gas, which subsidise Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes, in this regard, the recent REPowerEU roadmap on ending Russian energy imports(39); calls on the G7 countries to lead by example in the energy transition, and calls on all COP Parties to decarbonise their energy systems and halt all new investments in fossil fuel extraction;

116.  Highlights the untapped potential of geothermal energy in achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement and the EU’s energy policy, in particular for heating and industrial process heat; urges the sharing of best practice, innovations and technologies;

117.  Recalls the key outcomes of the first global stocktake under the UAE Consensus at COP28, including a tripling of renewables and doubling energy efficiency by 2030 as well as accelerating clean energy investments; welcomes the fact that 2023 was a record year for renewable electricity capacity growth(40) and calls for continuous progress monitoring and tracking, at both EU and global level; notes, with concern, that current investment trends are not aligned with the levels necessary for the world to achieve those goals(41) and stresses that closing this gap requires policy action and stronger public-private coordination;

118.  Highlights the importance of a global reduction in methane emissions in fossil fuel supply chains during the transition to clean energy systems in order to reach a global reduction of 75 % in methane emissions by 2030 as reflected in the IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 scenario; calls on the Global Methane Pledge signatories to step up their efforts, as current reduction rates remain insufficient(42) and global emissions continue to exceed 120 million metric tonnes annually; welcomes the Methane Abatement Partnership Roadmap, launched by the Commission at COP29, and urges its swift implementation, including by showcasing successful examples at COP30;

119.  Supports a global goal to increase energy storage capacity sixfold to 1 500 GW by 2030 and more broadly to increase system flexibility in line with G7 targets; stresses the need for innovation in GHG-reducing technologies; warns that climate change disrupts energy systems, including hydropower and thermal plant efficiency; underlines the need for non-fossil flexibility and storage development to better integrate and manage renewables;

120.  Highlights the in-depth revision of the EU’s energy legislation under the ‘Fit for 55’ package, which has aligned it with the EU’s increased GHG emission reduction target of at least 55 % by 2030 in order to reach climate neutrality at the latest by 2050 and which must now be effectively implemented; believes that other Parties should follow similar and relevant efforts;

121.  Emphasises the role of clean energy and renewables, energy efficiency and system diversification in achieving climate neutrality; welcomes, in this regard, the recent reform of the EU’s Electricity Market Design(43), which aims to boost renewables generation and empower and protect consumers; believes that further action is needed to implement the electricity market design rules; underlines the necessity of adopting pragmatic, clear and enabling conditions for the ramp up of low-carbon and renewable hydrogen so as to advance the energy transition, particularly in hard-to-abate sectors;

122.  Recalls the EU’s commitment to the energy efficiency first principle, which takes into account cost efficiency, system efficiency, storage capacity, demand-side flexibility and security of supply; stresses its role in reducing emissions, lowering energy bills, improving energy security and protecting vulnerable consumers;

123.  Emphasises the need for large-scale public and private investments in the EU’s energy grid and related infrastructure to allow for their modernisation, including digitalisation and expansion, including cross-border interconnection, and the further flexible integration of clean and renewable energy sources, efficiency measures and storage solutions to provide clean, sufficient, secure and affordable energy to EU citizens and industry; underlines, in particular, the need for an upgrade to the EU’s electricity grid as part of the upcoming European Grids Package;

124.  Stresses the need for global coordination with and support to developing countries and least developed countries to reach net-zero emissions and build capacity through cross-border cooperation in the fields of policymaking and science and technology transfer;

125.  Stresses that partnerships with reliable non-EU countries on the external dimensions of energy policies must be fostered; notes the EU’s efforts to build energy alliances through a sustainable development perspective, including by taking into account the interests of their populations and local communities;

126.  Notes the Declaration(44) to triple global nuclear energy capacity by 2050, which was launched at COP28 and has been signed as of COP29 by 31 countries, including 12 EU Member States and Ukraine; recalls, in this regard, the launch of the nuclear alliance put forward by several EU Member States and the European Industrial Alliance on Small Modular Reactors;

127.  Highlights the central role of local communities and citizens in a just and inclusive energy transition; highlights the EU legal framework enabling energy communities and its potential as a model for international partners;

Research, innovation, digital technologies and space policy

128.  Recognises the importance of the Copernicus programme and the EU Knowledge Centre on Earth Observation in climate action and observation; emphasises the importance of satellite monitoring for climate policy, including tracking methane emissions, forests and carbon sinks; calls for joint research on space and climate technologies, stronger public-private partnerships, and increased investment in the EU space economy for strategic autonomy;

129.  Stresses the critical role of research and innovation (R&I) in achieving the Paris Agreement and Green Deal goals; regrets the EU’s continued shortfall in meeting its 3 % GDP research and development (R&D) investment target and calls for strategies to boost industrial R&D;

130.  Welcomes the role of the Horizon Europe programme and its partnerships, such as the Joint Undertakings and the Knowledge and Innovation Communities of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology, in driving public-private collaboration towards climate neutrality, ensuring sustainable, accessible and affordable innovation;

131.  Stresses that the EU must collaborate on research focusing on technology, industry and innovative science, which helps make important contributions to the Paris Agreement and calls for the quick delivery of the new Strategy for European Life Sciences and the review of the Bioeconomy Strategy; welcomes the ‘Choose Europe for Science’ initiative, which improves funding opportunities for research in the EU; calls on the Commission to foster strategic research partnerships to enable a level playing field in Europe; supports further action to secure long-term accessibility to climate-related data for the international research community;

132.  Underlines the key role of digitalisation in energy integration, market connectivity and emissions reduction; emphasises the importance of digital technologies and AI-based tools in achieving the clean industrial transformation as they offer opportunities in, inter alia, electrification, flexibility and energy efficiency; looks forward to the EU’s strategic roadmap for digitalisation and AI in the energy sector; is concerned by the information and communications technology sector’s carbon footprint and calls for sustainable practices in data centres; recalls the objective of the EU’s digital strategy to deliver climate-neutral and highly energy efficient data centres and electronic communication networks and services by 2030;

Role of the European Parliament at COP30

133.  Believes that Parliament should be an integral part of the EU delegation at COP30, given that it must give its consent to international agreements and plays a central role in the domestic implementation of the Paris Agreement as one of the EU’s co-legislators; expects, therefore, to be allowed to attend EU coordination meetings at COP30 in Belém and to be guaranteed access to all preparatory documents in good time; commits to act independently and free from conflicts of interest;

o
o   o

134.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, with the request that it be circulated to all non-EU Parties to that convention.

(1) OJ C, C/2025/808, 11.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/808/oj. (2) Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0159. (3) OJ L 114, 12.4.2022, p. 22, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2022/591/oj. (4) OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 28. (5) OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1991/oj. (6) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0204. (7) OJ L, 2024/3012, 6.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3012/oj. (8) OJ L, 2024/1787, 15.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1787/oj. (9) Forster, P. M., Smith, C., Walsh, T., Lamb, W. F., Lamboll, R. et al., ‘Indicators of Global Climate Change 2024: annual update of key indicators of the state of the climate system and human influence’, Earth System Science Data, Vol. 17, Issue 6, 19 June 2025. (10) United Nations Environment Programme, Emissions Gap Report 2024, 24 October 2024. (11) UNFCCC Secretariat, 2024 NDC Synthesis Report, 28 October 2024. (12) Eurostat, Key figures on the EU in the world – 2025 edition, 2025. (13) IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in Climate Change 2021 – The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2021. (14) IPCC, ‘Sections’ in Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups 1, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2023. (15) Richardson, K., Steffen, W., Lucht, W., Bendtsen, J., Cornell, S. et al., ‘Earth beyond six of nine planetary boundaries’, Science Advances, Vol. 9, Issue 37, 13 September 2023. (16) Copernicus, ‘Copernicus: Exceptionally dry spring in parts of north-western Europe - Second-warmest May globally’, Copernicus website, 10 June 2025. (17) Copernicus, Copernicus Global Climate Report 2024, Copernicus website, 10 January 2025. (18) UN General Assembly Resolution 76/300 of 28 July 2022 entitled ‘The human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment’. (19) Szopa, S., Naik, V., Adhikary, B., Artaxo, P., Berntsen, T., ‘Short-Lived Climate Forcers’ in Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, June 2023. (20) UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance, ‘First report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement’, UN Climate Change website, 2021. (21) Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative, ‘Governments participating in discussions on a fossil fuel treaty’, Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative website. (22) UNICEF, ‘The climate crisis is a child rights crisis – Introducing the Children’s Climate Risk Index’, August 2021. (23) Commission communication of 27 May 2025 entitled ‘EU-wide assessment of the final updated national energy and climate plans – Delivering the Union’s 2030 energy and climate objectives’ (COM(2025)0274). (24) Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’) (OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1119/oj). (25) Regulation (EU) 2018/841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry in the 2030 climate and energy framework, and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 and Decision No 529/2013/EU (OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/841/oj). (26) Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy (OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/60/oj). (27) UN Environment Programme, The Environmental Impact of the Conflict in Ukraine: A Preliminary Review, 14 October 2022. (28) UN Environment Programme, Environmental Impact of the Conflict in Gaza: Preliminary Assessment of Environmental Impacts, 18 June 2024. (29) Joint Research Centre, Status of Environment and Climate in Ukraine, 2025. (30) European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2024 on the UN Climate Change Conference 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29), (OJ C, C/2025/808, 11.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/808/oj). (31) COM(2025)0110. (32) World Bank, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2025, World Bank, Washington DC, May 2025. (33) Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085). (34) Ibid. (35) Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy’ (COM(2025)0079). (36) Commission communication of 6 February 2024 entitled ‘Towards an ambitious Industrial Carbon Management for the EU’ (COM(2024)0062). (37) European Parliament resolution of 3 April 2025 on energy-intensive industries (OJ C, C/2025/4369, 9.9.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/4369/oj); European Parliament resolution of 19 June 2025 on the Clean Industrial Deal, Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0137. (38) Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (OJ L, 2024/1252, 3.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj). (39) Communication from the Commission of 12 May 2025 entitled ‘Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports’ (COM(2025)0440). (40) IEA, ‘Renewables’, https://www.iea.org/energy-system/renewables#tracking. (41) IEA, World Energy Investment 2024: Overview and key findings, 2024. (42) IEA, ‘Tracking pledges, targets and action’, https://www.iea.org/reports/global-methane-tracker-2024/tracking-pledges-targets-and-action. (43) Directive (EU) 2024/1711 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design, (OJ L, 2024/1711, 26.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1711/oj). (44) Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy, December 2023.

European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2025 on the EU strategic objectives for the 20th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), to be held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, from 24 November to 5 December 2025 (2025/2618(RSP))

P10_TA(2025)0255 B10-0450/2025

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the report of 4 May 2019 by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) entitled ‘Global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services’(1),

–  having regard to the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) Red List of Threatened Species,

–  having regard to the precautionary principle, as enshrined in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the report published in 2024 by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations entitled ‘The State of the World’s Forests – Forest-sector innovations towards a more sustainable future’,

–  having regard to the forthcoming 20th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), to be held from 24 November to 5 December 2025 in Uzbekistan,

–  having regard to UN General Assembly resolutions on illicit trafficking of wildlife, most recently Resolution 77/325, adopted on 25 August 2023,

–  having regard to the report of May 2024 by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime entitled ‘World Wildlife Crime Report – Trafficking in Protected Species’,

–  having regard to the 2025 publication of Europol entitled ‘The changing DNA of serious and organised crime – European Union Serious and Organise Crime Threat Assessment’ (EU-SOCTA report),

–  having regard to CITES Resolution Conf. 12.3 (Rev. CoP19) entitled ‘Permits and certificates’,

–  having regard to CITES Decision 19.66 entitled ‘Review of Resolution Conf. 11.3 (Rev. CoP19) on Compliance and enforcement’,

–  having regard to CITES Resolution Conf. 17.6 (Rev. CoP19) entitled ‘Prohibiting, preventing, detecting and countering corruption, which facilitates activities conducted in violation of the Convention’,

–  having regard to CITES Decisions 19.81 to 19.83 entitled ‘Wildlife crime linked to the Internet’,

–  having regard to CITES Resolution Conf. 12.10 (Rev.CoP15) entitled ‘Registration of operations that breed Appendix-I animal species in captivity for commercial purposes’,

–  having regard to CITES Decision 14.69 entitled ‘Captive-bred and ranched specimens’,

–  having regard to CITES Resolutions Conf. 12.5 (Rev. CoP19) entitled ‘Conservation of and trade in tigers and other Appendix-I Asian big cat species’ and Conf. 9.14 (Rev. CoP17) entitled ‘Conservation of and trade in African and Asian rhinoceroses’,

–  having regard to CITES Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP19) entitled ‘Trade in elephant specimens’,

–  having regard to CITES Decisions 18.226 (Rev. CoP19), 19.107 and 19.108 entitled ‘Trade in Asian elephants (Elephas maximus)’,

–  having regard to CITES Decisions 19.275 to 19.277 entitled ‘Taxonomy and nomenclature of African elephants (Loxodonta spp.)’, 18.117 (Rev. CoP19), 18.118 and 18.119 (Rev. CoP19) entitled ‘Closure of domestic ivory markets’, and 19.156, 19.157, 18.184 (Rev. CoP19), 18.185 (Rev. CoP19), entitled ‘Stocks and stockpiles (elephant ivory)’,

–  having regard to CITES Decisions 19.68 to 19.70 entitled ‘Review of the National Ivory Action Plan Process’,

–  having regard to the CITES Resolution Conf. 17.9 entitled ‘Trade in hunting trophies of species listed in Appendix I or II’,

–  having regard to CITES Decisions 19.218 to 19.221 entitled ‘Eels (Anguilla spp.)’,

–  having regard to IUCN Resolution 132 entitled ‘Controlling and monitoring trade in croaker swim bladders to protect target croakers and reduce incidental catches of threatened marine megafauna’, adopted at the 2021 IUCN World Conservation Congress,

–  having regard to the report of the Scientific Committee (SC69B) of the International Whaling Commission, adopted on 3 May 2024(2),

–  having regard to CITES Decisions 19.169 to 19.174 entitled ‘Disposal of confiscated specimens’ and CITES Resolution Conf. 17.8 (Rev. CoP19) entitled ‘Disposal of illegally traded and confiscated specimens of CITES-listed species’,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 November 2022 entitled ‘Revision of the EU action plan against wildlife trafficking’ (COM(2022)0581),

–  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directives 2008/99/EC and 2009/123/EC(3) (revised Environmental Crime Directive),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act)(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives(5),

–  having regard to its resolution of 5 October 2022 on the EU strategic objectives for the19th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), held in Panama from 14 to 25 November 2022(6),

–  having regard to Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora(7), which aims to promote the maintenance of biodiversity and which forms the cornerstone of Europe’s nature conservation policy, and Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds(8),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health (‘Animal Health Law’)(9),

–  having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), adopted under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and, in particular, to Target 4: Halt Species Extinction, Protect Genetic Diversity, and Manage Human-Wildlife Conflicts and to Target 5: Ensure Sustainable, Safe and Legal Harvesting and Trade of Wild Species,

–  having regard to the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and in particular, to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14 on conservation of seas and marine resources and SDG 15 on protection, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems,

–  having regard to the questions to the Council and to the Commission on the key objectives for the CITES CoP20 meeting in Uzbekistan (O-000035/2025 – B10‑0013 and O-000036/2025 – B10‑0014/2025),

–  having regard to Rules 142(5) and 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas CITES is the largest global wildlife conservation agreement, with Turkmenistan having recently become the 185th Party to CITES;

B.  whereas Appendix I of CITES lists species threatened with extinction that are or may be affected by trade; whereas Appendix II lists species that may become threatened with extinction unless trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation to avoid utilisation incompatible with their survival and unless trade in these species is brought under effective control;

C.  whereas the vast majority of species subject to trade are not protected by CITES; whereas international trade in such species remains unregulated and undocumented;

D.  whereas it is important to protect terrestrial, freshwater, marine and coastal biodiversity and tackle the threats posed to it by the unregulated, poorly regulated and illegal use of living terrestrial, marine and other aquatic resources;

E.  whereas, according to the IPBES global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services, it is necessary to halt and reverse current trends in biodiversity loss; whereas the report recognises that direct exploitation has been identified as one of the major drivers of the global biodiversity decline; whereas the loss of biodiversity compounds the effects of climate change, increasing vulnerability to extreme weather events and drought and making healthy food and clean water less readily available;

F.  whereas the global IUCN Red List assessment for several shark species listed in Appendix II of CITES continues to show a marked decline in the global population in the wild of greater than 80 %, and indicates that species such as the oceanic whitetip shark are still declining, thereby exceeding the Appendix I listing criteria; whereas several endangered shark species remain heavily exploited, which highlights the need to improve enforcement and/or list such species in Appendix I;

G.  whereas one third of sharks, rays and chimaeras are threatened with extinction(10), and one of the primary drivers of these declines is the international trade in their parts and related products; whereas increased restrictions are urgently needed as the potential for most sharks to recover from such declines is limited due to their slow development and reproduction(11);

H.  whereas the critically endangered European eel (Anguilla anguilla) is currently the only eel listed in CITES Appendix II; whereas in a recent case, European glass eels were declared as African longfin eels to which controls on international trade do not apply; whereas the CITES ‘look-alike’ principle provides that taxa that look similar are listed within the same CITES Appendix if one or more of the taxa are threatened through international trade; whereas the inclusion of all the Anguilla species in Appendix II would be justified on conservation and enforcement grounds;

I.  whereas the International Whaling Commission, at its 69th meeting in 2024, expressed serious concern about the escalating by-catch mortality linked to the growing international trade in swim bladders from fish such as totoaba; whereas vaquita face the threat of extinction and are now critically endangered due to entanglement in gill nets set to catch the totoaba, itself a critically endangered species; whereas the situation of totoaba and vaquita has already been described as ‘dual extinction’(12);

J.  whereas source code R(13) has been increasingly used for export permits for taxa included in CITES Appendix II without an assessment of the suitability of its application(14); whereas marine and aquatic species are among the taxa for which source code R may have been used inappropriately, among them some sturgeon species and European eels;

K.  whereas in 2021 the IUCN raised the threat level of the African savannah elephant (Loxodonta africana) from Vulnerable to Endangered and listed African forest elephants (Loxodonta cyclotis) separately as Critically Endangered, following population declines across Africa of more than 60 % for African savannah elephants and 86 % for African forest elephants within three generations(15);

L.  whereas CITES Decision 14.69 on captive-bred and ranched specimens opposes the commercial breeding and trade in tigers for their parts; whereas EU Member States continue to import and export live tigers and tiger parts registered under the CITES code of commercial trade;

M.  whereas the peregrine falcon is a valuable species, in high demand for international trade with various media reports documenting illegal offtake, including in European countries, and illegal trade in this species;

N.  whereas illegal wildlife trade is driven by a growing demand for products derived from wildlife and for domestic animals; whereas there is an urgent need to address the root causes of overexploitation by reducing the use of natural resources, as well as by changing consumption patterns and reducing global demand for wild species;

O.  whereas the EU is a major hub, transit point and destination for legally and illegally sourced specimens of wild fauna and flora, with European glass eel trafficking being one of the most devastating crimes against wildlife worldwide(16) and one of the most lucrative(17);

P.  whereas wildlife trafficking is rising sharply and is the fourth largest organised crime in the world(18); whereas wildlife trafficking offences are often not prioritised by governments or enforcement authorities and perpetrators are rarely prosecuted; whereas wildlife crime has been seen to be building on existing criminal structures, money-laundering, corruption and drug trafficking; whereas case studies show that wildlife traffickers may move between different wildlife commodities and source countries depending on the level of enforcement and market pressure(19); whereas international cooperation is essential in combating wildlife crime;

Q.  whereas the latest EU-SOCTA report(20) on serious and organised crime highlights that wildlife crime remains a persistent threat, with trafficking activities sustained by continuous demand and supply in both EU and non-EU consumer markets, and traffickers increasingly resorting to trading non-CITES-listed species to avoid detection by law enforcement authorities;

R.  whereas the revised Environmental Crime Directive provides a harmonised framework enabling detection, investigation and prosecution or adjudication of environmental offences and sets dissuasive level of penalties, including for legal persons;

S.  whereas there are rising concerns in the EU and its Member States regarding trade in captive bred animals, including the legality of the founding stock and the laundering of wild-caught specimens;

T.  whereas, in compliance with CITES Resolution Conf. 17.8 (and CoP20 Docs. 64.1–64.3), and with Objective 14 of the revised EU action plan against wildlife trafficking, the EU should foster structured cooperation and EU-level information-sharing among specialised rescue and rehabilitation centres, including sanctuaries, to ensure long-term, species-appropriate care and placement solutions for confiscated wild animals;

U.  whereas the illegal supply and demand for wildlife have risen with the development of digital technology and social media; whereas the internet plays a key role in facilitating wildlife trafficking and unsustainable trade;

V.  whereas species misidentification impacts the accurate estimation of viable harvest levels for wildlife resources, as well as the detection of illegal trade;

W.  whereas between 2014 and 2023, the European Union was the second-largest importer of hunting trophies from species listed under the CITES appendices; whereas an increasing number of European countries have adopted or are considering national measures to restrict or ban the import of such trophies in response to ethical, conservation, and biodiversity concerns;

X.  whereas sustainable hunting could generate financial benefits that support species conservation and habitat and biodiversity protection, provided that hunting activities are carried out under scienced-based national and international conservation frameworks and tightly controlled and verified population management plans, in order to ensure that there is no threat to species conservation, animal populations and habitat and biodiversity protection, and that revenues are allocated to local communities and conservation projects; whereas an assessments of the impact of hunting on animal populations must be based on robust scientific data evaluated by the Scientific Review Group; whereas an increase in contributions to conservation projects and sustainable community development is recommended;

Y.  whereas recent research results suggest that despite new EU rules in force since 2022, trafficking in ivory continues in the EU; whereas the Commission must monitor the implementation of the new rules by the Member States, transform these rules into fully legally binding legislation and close any remaining loopholes;

Z.  whereas poaching for the ivory trade is the main driver of population declines in African elephants; whereas illegal ivory trade harms economic development, fosters organised crime, promotes corruption and fuels conflicts;

AA.  whereas CITES plays a significant role in reducing the risk of future zoonotic disease emergence associated with international wildlife trade and markets, which poses serious risks to the health of both animals and humans, in line with the ‘One Health’ approach;

AB.  whereas the trade in and use of wildlife, if not strictly regulated, present a threat to biodiversity, contribute to the destruction of natural habitats and the exploitation of wildlife and undermine global efforts to combat climate change;

AC.  whereas it is estimated that more than 70 % of emerging infectious diseases originate from wildlife(21); whereas keeping wild animals as pets increases the risk of zoonotic spillover due to their close proximity to human owners; whereas expert advice on limiting zoonotic risks by addressing wildlife markets and by developing ‘positive’ or ‘permitted lists’ of animal species that may be traded, bred and kept as pets(22) is needed, and should take into account other considerations, such as animal welfare, conservation status and population trends;

AD.  whereas increased efforts are needed to improve transparency and the effective participation of economic and social stakeholders in decision-making;

Introduction

1.   Recalls that that the Parties to CITES recognise that wild fauna and flora in their many beautiful and varied forms are an irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the earth and must be protected for this generation and those to come;

2.  Recognises, following the 50th anniversary of CITES, the continued importance of the convention in ensuring that international trade in specimens of wild fauna and flora is regulated so that it does not threaten the survival of species; notes, while acknowledging the progress made in this regard, the need to adapt the convention to new and evolving challenges;

3.  Notes that there are new and evolving challenges, including increased demand for wildlife products, cybercrime, biodiversity loss, climate change and the need for greater traceability and enforcement; calls on the Parties to CITES to address these challenges, with enhanced cooperation, stronger enforcement, and more effective mechanisms for ensuring sustainable trade;

4.  Underlines the need for a precautionary, science-based approach when implementing CITES to ensure the effective protection of wildlife against the increasing threat posed by international trade to individual animals, species and biodiversity and to the health of humans and animals;

5.  Stresses the need for increased synergies between CITES and other relevant treaties and agreements, including, inter alia, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), ensuring that conservation objectives are met efficiently and effectively;

Implementation, compliance and enforcement

6.  Calls on all Parties to CITES to step up their implementation and enforcement of the convention, making full use of the available legal framework;

7.  Calls on all the Parties to consistently, transparently and impartially apply the instruments provided for in CITES and the decisions taken under it to promote compliance with the convention, including the Compliance Assistance Programme;

8.  Deplores the use of negative economic impact as a reason to lift trade suspension(23) and insists that an affirmative response to such calls would threaten and undermine the whole process, as economic pressure is the intended outcome of trade suspensions;

9.  Calls on all Parties to ensure that compliance processes under CITES are applied equally to transit, consumer and range states, to promote consistent enforcement and to ensure that all Parties fulfil their obligations under the convention;

10.  Calls for the traceability of the harvest and trade of CITES-listed species to be strengthened by enhancing monitoring mechanisms and ensuring transparency throughout the supply chain and stronger collaboration between source, transit and destination countries;

11.  Regrets that current definitions and guidance are insufficient as a growing number of CITES-listed species need traceability systems; calls on all Parties to adopt a resolution establishing clearer and more consistent traceability standards for CITES-listed species and specific taxonomic groups included in the appendices, such as sharks and rays;

12.  Recognises the essential contribution of whistle-blowers, journalists, wildlife and forest rangers and environmental rights defenders in supporting CITES implementation; calls on all Parties to increase efforts to ensure their protection and provide them with institutional and legal support;

13.  Recalls the constructive and determining role played by civil society in the creation, evolution and implementation of CITES and highlights the importance of ensuring continuous participation of civil society in CITES processes;

14.  Underlines the key law enforcement role played by police, customs and the judiciary with regard to the international wildlife trade, which is often associated with other crimes; encourages cooperation between the EU Member States and through other international bodies, including Europol, Eurojust, Interpol, the World Customs Organization and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, as well as other relevant bodies; calls for law enforcement authorities to be provided with adequate financial resources to enable them to fully carry out their duties;

15.  Regrets that the tools offered by legal frameworks on the protection of wildlife by means of criminal law are underexploited; calls on all parties to identify and close the gaps in their legal frameworks on the protection of wildlife by means of criminal law; encourages the recognition of liability of legal persons in wildlife crime;

16.  Underlines the importance of the first meeting of the open-ended intergovernmental expert group on crimes that affect the environment, convened under UNTOC Resolution 12/4, to take stock of experiences and consider possible responses to the gaps identified, including the possibility, feasibility and merits of any additional protocol to UNTOC; highlights, in this context, the need to continue supporting the development of a new UNTOC protocol on wildlife trafficking, as set out in the EU strategy to tackle organised crime 2021-2025, and as also expressed in the revision of the EU action plan against wildlife trafficking;

17.  Emphasises the need for the increased engagement of financial intelligence units, anti-corruption agencies and financial institutions in supporting the implementation of CITES;

18.  Calls on all Parties to address the role of corruption in facilitating crime involving fauna and flora, including by establishing a collaborative relationship mechanism between CITES authorities and anti-corruption bodies to facilitate swift and effective action where corrupt activities are detected in connection with illegal wildlife trade; strongly supports the amendments to paragraph 4 of Resolution Conf. 17.6 (Rev. CoP19) submitted to CoP20 encouraging the Parties to ensure that such mechanisms are in place;

19.  Encourages all Parties to explore, where applicable, options to prosecute those organising or enabling wildlife trafficking under laws directly addressing corruption, as these may provide stronger investigative powers and the potential for higher penalties than applicable under environmental legislation;

20.  Remarks that illicit financial flows linked to illegal wildlife trade undermine the implementation of CITES and its conservation goals; highlights the importance of asset recovery for removing financial incentives for illegal wildlife trade; calls on the Parties to put in place measures to enable the tracing, identification, freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds from wildlife crime, including through strengthened implementation of Resolution Conf. 11.3 (Rev. CoP19) on compliance and enforcement;

21.  Calls on the Parties to fully comply with Resolution Conf. 11.3 (Rev. CoP19) on compliance and enforcement and Resolution Conf. 17.6 (Rev. CoP19) on prohibiting, preventing, detecting and countering corruption; supports the proposed amendment to the Resolution Conf. 11.3 (Rev. CoP19) to integrate financial crime investigations into the investigation of crimes involving wildlife, and to increase the use of financial investigation techniques to identify criminals involved in wildlife crime and their networks and address the illicit financial flows associated with these crimes;

22.  Highlights that the sharing of relevant data between the appropriate authorities and bodies, for example, on the issuance and verification of documents such as import applications, supports CITES implementation and enforcement by building expertise, improving transparency and traceability, allowing for real-time monitoring, accelerating the administrative processes and avoiding duplication of effort, for example, through better data sharing among EU Member States, including on rejected import applications;

23.  Calls for increased and more systematic digitalisation that will promote and facilitate data sharing, improve traceability of CITES-listed species, support enforcement, and foster a predictable and efficient business environment, while minimising unnecessary burdens on legal trade;

24.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to support action at the EU and CITES level to ensure that restrictions for specimens of species for which commercial trade is prohibited, are not circumvented by selling these species for allegedly non-commercial purposes, such as in case of sale of Namibia’s white rhino specimens to the United States(24);

25.  Calls for the integration of emerging technologies, such as AI-based tracking systems and drone surveillance, to enhance detection and enforcement efforts;

Decision-making, transparency and reporting

26.  Welcomes the annual illegal trade reports as a significant step towards developing a better understanding of wildlife trafficking;

27.  Welcomes the amendments to Commission Regulation (EC) No 865/2006(25) and the revised guidance document on the EU regime governing trade in ivory and urges the Commission to strictly monitor their implementation by the Member States;

28.  Stresses that decisions adopted by the Parties to and governing bodies of CITES should be based on scientific criteria aimed at the conservation of species, guided by the best available, robust scientific information and the precautionary principle, as well as on equitable consultation with the affected range states;

29.  Encourages all Parties to develop scientific tools to provide robust scientific data to inform decisions regarding species protection and trade regulations under CITES, including monitoring systems, population modelling and species-specific research;

30.  Calls on the CITES committees to fully consider the legitimacy, accuracy and relevance of data and evidence when making decisions regarding species protection and trade regulations and, in particular, when deliberating on the legitimacy of legal acquisition findings, non-detriment findings, quotas and catch limits provided by Parties, and to impose trade suspensions when there are substantiated concerns;

31.  Notes the requests to downlist species from Appendix I to Appendix II owing to successful conservation and anti-poaching measures of range states, such as in the case of Namibia’s white rhino; stresses that any downlisting of species should be science-based, benefit the local population and ecosystems and lead to an increase in the species’ range within its historical range, and should not be used to circumvent CITES export restrictions;

32.  Calls on the Parties to develop clear guidelines on the application of ‘ranching’ for aquatic species, noting that the implementation of CITES for aquatic species poses specific challenges and that misuse of this term may undermine the convention’s objectives; supports the amended draft resolution on trade, conservation and management of eel species, which states that source code R may not be appropriate for use for the genus;

33.  Recognises the dependence of some communities on CITES-listed species to support their livelihoods, including through income from sustainable, legal wildlife trade; recalls the importance of the meaningful involvement of Indigenous peoples and local communities in CITES decision-making processes, including in the listing of species, and in the implementation of the convention; acknowledges that local communities and states are, and should be, essential protectors of their own wild fauna and flora;

34.  Expresses concern over the lack of transparency and oversight of operations of the CITES Secretariat; calls on the Parties to consider mechanisms to enhance transparency and increase oversight of how the work plan priorities are established; calls for regular reporting by the Secretariat on all outstanding commitments under existing decisions, for budgetary and staffing needs to be considered in any proposals for new tasks, and for the relevant committee to adopt terms of reference before hiring external consultants;

35.  Underlines the importance of interinstitutional transparency in the EU’s position for CITES meetings; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that all Council decisions relating to the EU position for CITES meetings are publicly available to all EU institutions ahead of these meetings; underlines the importance of transparency in the development of the EU’s positions for CITES meetings to facilitate stakeholders engagement and contributions before and during the CoPs;

Funding and other resources

36.  Calls on the Commission and all Parties to guarantee sufficient financial, human, technical and technological resources for the proper implementation and enforcement of the Convention, while optimising the use of current resources and mechanisms;

37.  Expresses concern about the increasing workload of the CITES Secretariat, the Conference of the Parties and the committees in relation to their available resources;

38.  Regrets that an increasing number of decisions mandated by the CITES Parties remain partially or wholly unfulfilled due to both insufficient resources and the failure to appropriately prioritise the allocation of the resources available for their implementation; calls on the Secretariat and the Parties to prioritise issues relating to the core mandate of CITES and to redirect resources to these issues;

39.  Calls for the next EU multiannual financial framework to allocate dedicated funding to combating illegal wildlife trade and supporting the sustainable use of natural resources; underlines the importance of integrating environmental crime, including wildlife crime, into future EU budgetary priorities, through a comprehensive approach that combines security, prevention, enforcement and international cooperation aspects;

CITES strategic vision: 2021-2030

40.  Supports the vision statement(26) that by 2030, ‘all international trade in wild fauna and flora is legal and sustainable, consistent with the long-term conservation of species, and thereby contributing to halting biodiversity loss, to ensuring its sustainable use, and to achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’;

41.  Welcomes the recognition of the interlinkages between CITES, the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, the SDGs and the Convention on Biological Diversity; also points out the need to promote synergies with the UNTOC review mechanism;

42.  Recalls the important contribution that CITES can make to implementing the goals and targets of the Kunming-Montreal GBF, in particular when the decisions taken under CITES should correctly reflect the conservation status and needs of species; believes that the review of the CITES strategic vision: 2021-2030 should be addressed at CoP20, in order to align it with the Kunming-Montreal GBF goals and targets and its monitoring framework;

43.  Supports the emphasis placed by the Strategic Vision on cooperation and on ensuring that Parties have the necessary financial means and capacities to implement the Convention; notes that the focus should align with and contribute to Goal D and Targets 20 and 21 of the Kunming-Montreal GBF on adequate financial resources, strengthened capacity-building, technical and scientific cooperation, as well as the best available data, information and knowledge;

One Health approach and role of CITES in reducing the risk of zoonotic disease emergence

44.  Emphasises the crucial role of CITES in reducing the risks of pathogen spillover and the emergence of zoonotic diseases that are associated with international wildlife trade and that pose both ecological and public health risks; stresses the importance of a precautionary approach, in line with the One Health approach, that recognises the interconnectedness of animal, human and environmental health when assessing and strengthening the prevention of these risks;

45.  Calls for the EU and all Parties to urgently adopt a resolution encouraging the application of a One Health approach to international wildlife trade under CITES; urges all Parties to apply the operational definition of One Health, as developed by the High-Level Expert Panel, in their national laws and in implementing the Convention;

46.  Calls for CITES collaboration with national and international animal and public health authorities to develop strategies and action plans for safe, legal and traceable trade, disease risk identification, and secure transport of biological samples; welcomes the joint programme with the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) addressing knowledge gaps and identifying practical solutions for reducing pathogen spillover risks in wildlife supply chains;

47.  Recalls the World Health Organization, OIE and UN Environment Programme guidance calling on national authorities to suspend trade in live wild mammals for food or breeding purposes at traditional markets unless effective regulations and adequate risk assessments are in place; recalls the IPBES recommendations to remove species identified as posing a high risk of disease emergence from wildlife trade;

48.  Notes with concern that significant quantities of domestic and wild animal meat continue to be smuggled into the EU, posing risks to animal and human health as well as to biodiversity; calls on the Commission and the Member States develop a coordinated EU response to this issue, including by establishing data collection systems on meat from domestic and wild animals;

49.  Urges the EU and all other Parties to secure the welfare of live animals in breeding facilities and along the trade chain, recognising the scientific evidence indicating that inadequate welfare conditions in the holding, transport and trade of wildlife are linked to the emergence and transmission of diseases, and threaten both animal and human health;

50.  Recognises the intensified interactions between humans, livestock and wildlife, driven in particular by land-use change, habitat loss and ecosystem fragmentation; emphasises that the challenges arising from these interactions can lead to conflict and increased transmission of zoonotic and livestock diseases, while negatively impacting biodiversity and animal welfare; calls on the Commission and the Member States to address these risks through integrated coexistence strategies, including habitat preservation, science-based wildlife conservation measures, preventive measures and awareness-raising, and to ensure that CITES implementation takes into account coexistence dynamics as part of broader conservation and public health efforts;

Strengthening the EU’s role in the global fight against wildlife trafficking

51.  Reiterates its call on the Commission and the Member States to lead global efforts to end the commercial trade in endangered species and their parts;

52.  Emphasises that concerns related to illegal wildlife trade should be systematically included in EU trade policy, including through bilateral agreements;

53.  Expresses concern that ivory continues to be trafficked within the EU(27), despite amendments to Commission Regulation (EC) No 865/2006(28) and the revised guidance document on the EU regime governing trade in ivory(29); calls on the Commission and the Member States to replace this guidance document with legally binding legislation on this matter;

54.  Emphasises that the absence of a common EU framework for welfare provisions on the breeding, keeping and placing on the market of pet animal species other than dogs and cats, along with divergent national rules, leads to inconsistencies, gaps in enforcement, confusion for consumers and, often, serious animal welfare consequences for species that are unsuitable to be kept as pets, as well as risks to biodiversity, human health and safety, and nature conservation; calls on the Commission to swiftly propose an EU-wide positive list of animals allowed to be kept or traded as pets, based on recommendations from the study on the necessity, added value and feasibility of such a list, while taking into account scientific risk assessments and ecological criteria;

55.  Urges the Commission, in view of the future implementation of an EU-wide positive list of pets, to provide technical assistance and expertise to support non-EU countries in developing science-based positive lists for pet ownership, including guidance on species risk assessments, enforcement mechanisms and legislative frameworks;

56.  Welcomes Commission Regulation (EU) 2025/130 of 28 January 2025 amending Regulation (EC) No 865/2006(30) to implement the requirements of CITES Resolution Conf. 12.10 (Rev. CoP15) regarding the registration of operations that breed specimens of animal species listed in Appendix I to the Convention in captivity for commercial purposes; urges the Commission to strictly monitor implementation and enforcement by Member States and calls for a timely transmission of registration of operations to the CITES Secretariat;

57.  Urges the Commission and the Member States, in line with the EU action plan against wildlife trafficking, to apply increased scrutiny to the import of hunting trophies derived from CITES-listed species; calls for extending the requirements for import permits across hunting trophies listed in Annex B to Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97(31), unless scientifically proven otherwise;

58.  Highlights the critical importance of establishing a detailed EU information system to tackle the issue of illicit wildlife trade; urges the Commission to expand existing regulations and tools, including TRACES (Trade Control and Expert System), in order to record and make publicly available data on the species, volume and origin of all imports to the EU of both CITES-listed and non-CITES-listed species to allow for better monitoring of trade, to identify trends and risks, and to inform future policies and decision-making;

59.  Stresses that CITES CoP 20 could serve as an opportunity to identify the main countries and regions exporting wild animals, with a view to introducing tighter controls and encouraging them to adopt strict preventive measures against illegal export;

60.  Welcomes the EU’s contribution to supporting efforts to combat wildlife trafficking globally; calls for the EU and its Member States to support the inclusion of a new paragraph in the 2025 UN General Assembly Resolution A/79/L.96 on tackling illicit trafficking in wildlife through the criminalisation of imports of any wildlife or wildlife produce acquired in contravention of national laws and to assist partner countries that are sources of wildlife and wildlife products, transit points and/or destinations for sellers and buyers;

EU action plan against wildlife trafficking

61.  Acknowledges the progress made by the Member States, the Commission and other stakeholders; highlights the importance of the continued implementation of the action plan and the need to allocate adequate human and financial resources for its implementation; calls on the Member States to collect and provide data to measure and evaluate their progress;

62.  Calls for the Member States to enhance the capacities of the competent national authorities, including prosecution and judiciary, to swiftly and effectively investigate and prosecute cases of wildlife trafficking, and to facilitate cooperation between relevant national authorities;

63.  Stresses the importance of key EU agencies, Europol, Eurojust and the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) in tackling illegal wildlife trafficking; calls for adequate support in the next multiannual financial framework and the annual budgetary procedure to ensure appropriate resources and staff for these entities;

64.  Recommends that the EU and its Member States criminalise the trade and keeping of illegally sourced wildlife, regardless of their listing status in the CITES Appendices; urges the Commission to use the results of the feasibility study on criminalisation of illegally sourced wildlife trade(32) to present, as a matter of priority, relevant legislative proposals;

65.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the growing demand for live wildlife, as well as wildlife products, by implementing and supporting evidence-based demand reduction initiatives in EU Member States;

66.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to extend actions beyond the current scope of Objective 14 of the EU action plan against wildlife trafficking, to increase the capacity for wildlife rescue and rehabilitation for wildlife rescued from trafficking, through resources, funding and training, alongside national action plans to improve the management of confiscated live animals;

Organised crime, cybersecurity and confiscated animals

67.  Insists that transnational wildlife crime be recognised by all Parties as a form of serious, organised and predicate crime(33), which in its gravest form should be recognised as ecocide; calls on all EU Member States to align their national legislation with the UNTOC definition of serious crime by ensuring that wildlife offences are treated as predicate offences appropriately punishable under their criminal codes;

68.  Encourages the Member States to put in place dissuasive criminal measures against illegal activities of purchasing, trafficking and selling wild animals;

69.  Acknowledges ongoing efforts to assess the need for the development of a protocol on environmental crime under the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; stresses the importance of continued dialogue on this matter, with an emphasis on wildlife crime; recalls the need for the protocol to include a provision requiring Parties to criminalise the import and trade of wildlife taken illegally from their countries of origin;

70.  Urges the Member States to establish cross-border cooperation, intelligence sharing and coordination with various relevant international authorities and institutions in order to combat the involvement of organised criminal groups in the illegal trade of wildlife species; highlights the necessity of investing in monitoring and analysing new developments in illegal wildlife markets and associated criminality;

71.  Calls on the Commission to ensure coordination in the implementation of the Environmental Crime Directive, the Wildlife Trade Regulation(34) and the revised EU action plan against wildlife trafficking and other relevant EU policies such as the Digital Services Act(35); calls on the Member States to transpose the Environmental Crime Directive and to bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the directive by 21 May 2026;

72.  Calls on the Member States to ensure and promote the consistent and transparent reporting of all seized or confiscated live animals to CITES, Europol and the countries of origin; calls on the Member States to enable seized and confiscated proceeds from offenders to be used to strengthen wildlife rescue and sanctuary capacities;

73.  Expresses its concern over unresolved issues in the implementation of CITES Resolution Conf. 17.8 (Rev. CoP19) on the disposal of confiscated CITES-listed specimens; highlights the need for improved guidance on immediate handling, enforcer decision-making and appropriate placement options to prevent the re-entry of specimens into trade;

74.  Expresses its concern about the surge in wildlife cybercrime; calls on the Commission and the Member States to step up efforts to combat it, including through the robust implementation and full enforcement of the Digital Services Act as well as strengthened international cooperation in order to identify and implement best practices and develop measures to tackle illegal online trade; urges the Commission to develop specific EU guidelines to address wildlife cybercrime in line with the provisions of the Digital Services Act, ensuring coordinated policies across Member States and fostering collaboration among all relevant stakeholders;

Amendments to the CITES Appendices

75.  Expresses its strong support for the listing proposals submitted by the EU and its Member States to amend the Appendices to CITES;

76.  Calls on the Member States to promote the upgrading of threatened genera and species from Appendix II to Appendix I of CITES following scientific assessment, in particular sharks (Selachii), seahorses (Hippocampus), tree-kangaroo (Dendrolagus), and mico marmoset (Mico); urges the EU and its Member States to support proposals to list additional relevant shark species in Appendix II of CITES, in particular biologically vulnerable deep sea sharks such as the gulper shark;

77.  Takes note of the notifications to the Parties to consult range states on a proposal to transfer the following species from Appendix II to Appendix I: Mobula spp. (manta and devil rays)(36), Rhincodon typus (whale shark) (37) and Carcharhinus longimanus (Oceanic whitetip shark)(38) and calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to support these transfers;

78.  Calls on the Member States to promote the full inclusion of threatened species, irrespective of their geographical distribution, in CITES Appendix I following scientific assessment, in particular elephants (Elephantidae), lions (Panthera leo) and rhinos (Rhinocerotidae);

79.  Calls on the Member States to promote the inclusion of threatened species in the CITES Appendices following scientific assessment, in particular but not exclusively, the European hamster (Cricetus cricetus), the house sparrow (Passer domesticus), the northern lapwing (Vanellus vanellus) and the Eurasian skylark (Alauda arvensis);

80.  Calls for the EU and all Parties to improve the regulation of international trade in amphibian species and to include in the CITES Appendices three Pelophylax species (Pelophylax epeiroticus, P. shqipericus and P. ridibundus);

81.  Calls on the Member States to promote the inclusion, or upgrading, in the CITES Appendices of threatened genera and species of corals as well as species linked to rainforest deforestation or processing into tropical timber, following scientific assessment, in particular teak (Tectona grandis), ebony (Diospyros) and mahogany;

82.  Urges the EU to assess the suitability of any proposal to downlist the peregrine falcon from Appendix I to Appendix II, in line with the criteria defined in Resolution Conf. 9.24 (Rev. CoP17), and to oppose such a proposal if these criteria are not met;

83.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to support the inclusion, or uplisting, of species that are threatened by the exotic pet trade and to support listing proposals of threatened endemic species, as well as the prohibition of the export of live specimens if the capture or export of these species is prohibited by the national laws of the respective Party;

84.  Regrets the increasing demand for swim bladders of Sciaenidae species; calls for actions to ensure that international trade does not jeopardise species survival or exacerbate risks to protected species caught incidentally; calls on the Parties to propose species of concern for inclusion in the Appendices where CITES criteria are met, and to ensure legal, traceable and biologically sustainable trade;

Species-specific matters

Aquatic species

85.  Calls on the Member States, as well as all transit countries and countries raising and fattening eels in aquaculture, to strengthen cooperation and measures aimed at effectively combating illegal trade in eels and at dismantling criminal networks, and to dedicate sufficient resources to this end; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that a resolution on trade in specimens of Anguilla spp. is adopted at CoP20 as well as a listing of all remaining species of the genus in Appendix II alongside the European eel;

86.  Stresses the vital role that sharks and rays play in maintaining the health of ocean ecosystems; warns that serious trade-related threats continue to put sharks and rays at risk of extinction, in particular deepwater sharks; calls for the EU and its Member States to support and co-sponsor CITES proposals and resolutions aimed at providing stronger protection for shark and ray species from unsustainable and illegal trade, as well as habitat degradation and pollution;

87.  Encourages Parties to share non-detriment findings developed for shark and ray species; calls on Parties to take immediate action to address discrepancies in data on trade in products of CITES-listed sharks recorded in the CITES Trade Database and to improve compliance;

88.  Highlights the persistent difficulties in identifying and documenting trade in live corals and coral rock; calls on Parties to support further work on species identification and traceability in coral trade; asks for a potential review of relevant provisions under Resolution Conf. 12.3 (Rev. CoP19) to address identification gaps;

89.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that a resolution on improving the conservation status of, and regulation of international trade in, croaker (Sciaenidae) species is adopted at CoP20;

90.  Calls for the EU, one of the largest importers of marine ornamental fishes in terms of value(39), and all Parties to support measures to improve the conservation status of, and regulation of international trade in, marine ornamental fishes;

Big cats 

91.  Recognises that some big cat species are among the most endangered CITES-listed species, and that the conservation of, and regulation of trade in, CITES-listed big cat species faces multiple challenges; calls for adequate financial resources commensurate with these challenges; calls for the implementation of time-bound, country-specific conservation recommendations and for concrete financial conservation commitments for big cats;

92.  Notes that Resolution Conf. 12.5 (Rev. CoP19) mandates Parties to provide information on Asian big cats to the CITES Secretariat; regrets the persistent lack of response from range states; calls for the EU and all Parties to adopt strong decisions related to Asian big cats in captivity at CoP20;

93.  Is strongly concerned about the trade in live tigers and their body parts; deeply regrets the fact that EU wildlife trade regulations fail to prevent the trade in captive-bred tigers and their body parts;

94.  Regrets the proposal to delete Decision 18.105 on Asian leopards despite ongoing illegal trade concerns; calls on the CITES Secretariat to undertake a detailed review of illegal trade in, and the conservation status of, Asian leopards and to present updated findings at CoP20; calls for a review of Resolution Conf. 10.14 (Rev. CoP19) to prevent overexploitation of the species;

Elephants

95.  Calls for support for the proposed nomenclature change to list African elephants under the genus Loxodonta spp. and for the development of a simple and unified legal framework on trade in live wild-caught African elephants, limiting exports to in-situ conservation programmes or secure areas in the wild within the species’ natural and historical range in Africa;

96.  Is concerned by the growing illegal trade in Asian elephant parts and derivatives, particularly online; highlights the importance of maintaining and renewing Decision 18.226 (Rev. CoP19) at CoP20; encourages increased collaboration between stakeholders and range states, urging them to engage more proactively in the discussions and work towards strengthening the accompanying Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP19);

97.  Is concerned by the limited progress in implementing Decisions 19.68 to 19.70 on the review of the national ivory action plan (NIAP) process; highlights the need for an independent review of the NIAP process and for the provision of capacity support to countries that have been identified as sources of significant concern in the global ivory trade;

98.  Calls for the EU to ensure that the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) remains a robust mechanism and information source on trends in illegal ivory trade; welcomes the new tool launched on the ETIS online platform to make ETIS seizure data publicly available at country level;

99.  Calls for the EU and all Parties to take all necessary legislative, regulatory and enforcement measures to close their domestic markets for commercial trade in raw and worked ivory as a matter of urgency;

100.  Urges the closure of remaining legal domestic ivory markets, as a matter of urgency, and calls for the EU and all Parties to oppose any proposals seeking to remove restrictions on trade in ivory;

101.  Calls for the EU and all Parties to support the non-commercial disposal of ivory stockpiles as well as the non-commercial disposal of other stockpiles from CITES-listed species, including pangolins and rhino horns; calls for the EU and all Parties to support the renewal of Decisions 18.184 and 18.185 on ivory stockpiles;

Other species

102.  Expresses concern over the reasons behind the delay in convening the meeting of the CITES Rhinoceros Enforcement Task Force; stresses the importance of adhering to the demand-reduction provisions in CITES Resolution Conf. 9.14 (Rev. CoP19) on the conservation of, and trade in, African and Asian rhinoceroses; strongly urges Parties to uphold their commitment to closing rhino horn markets and to strengthen intelligence sharing and joint operations to address rhino horn trafficking, including by boosting international cooperation, conducting joint operations and tracking financial flows;

103.  Regrets China’s lack of transparency regarding its pangolin stockpiles; calls on the Parties to continue submitting annual reports on pangolin stockpiles, as outlined in CITES Resolution Conf. 17.10 (Rev. CoP19) on the conservation of, and trade in, pangolins; encourages the development of time-bound and measurable recommendations aimed at closing legal domestic markets that contribute to illegal trade and poaching;

104.  Expresses strong concern over the continued decline in the vaquita and totoaba populations; calls on Mexico to immediately and fully implement its compliance action plan on totoaba fish; calls on the CITES Secretariat to suspend trade with the range state for failing to fully implement its compliance action plan on totoaba fish; calls for the EU and its Member States, as well as all countries of transit and destination, to strengthen measures aimed at effectively combating illegal and unsustainable trade in totoaba and to dedicate sufficient resources to this end;

105.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to close loopholes in EU legislation that facilitate illegal trade in wild birds, to improve enforcement of existing legislation banning wild-caught bird imports and to support measures aimed at increasing the regulation of international trade in birds;

106.  Calls for the EU and all Parties to support measures to improve the conservation status of, and regulation of international trade in, invertebrates;

107.  Notes the ongoing work on the conservation of, and regulation of trade in, amphibians in accordance with Decisions 19.197 to 19.199 on the conservation of amphibians (Amphibia spp.); calls on Parties to continue addressing the impact of international trade in frogs on wild populations, and to support further work on amphibian conservation and trade regulation at CoP20;

108.  Calls on the Member States to advocate for stronger protection of the polar bear (Ursus maritimus) and to tackle the threats posed to it by exploitation for trade in trophies and hides;

o
o   o

109.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Parties to and the Secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.

(1) Brondizio, E. S., Settele, J., Díaz, S. and Ngo, H. T. (eds), ‘Global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services’, Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, Bonn, 2019. (2) International Whaling Commission, ‘Report of the Scientific Committee (SC69B)’, 2024, https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?search=%21collection73&k=&modal=&display=listℴ_by=title&offset=0&per_page=240&archive=&sort=DESC&restypes=&recentdaylimit=&foredit=&noreload=true∾cess=&ref=22181. (3) OJ L, 2024/1203, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1203/oj. (4) OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj. (5) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 25. (6) OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 41. (7) OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1992/43/oj. (8) OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, p. 7, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/147/oj. (9) OJ L 84, 31.3.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/429/oj. (10) IUCN, ‘The global status of sharks, rays and chimaeras’, 2024. (11) Finucci, B., Pacoureau, N., Rigby, C. L., Matsushiba, J. H., Faure-Beaulieu, N. et al., ‘Fishing for oil and meat drives irreversible defaunation of deepwater sharks and rays’, Science, Vol. 383, Issue 6687, 2024, pp. 1135-1141, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.ade9121. (12) Environmental Investigation Agency, ‘Dual Extinction: The illegal trade in the endangered totoaba and its impact on the critically endangered vaquita’, Briefing to the 66th Standing Committee of CITES, 2016. (13) ‘Each system should have an associated source code to be used on CITES permits and certificates.’, page 3: CITES, ‘Guide to the application of CITES source codes’, 2024. (14) CITES, ‘Considerations and recommendations for ranching of marine species’, 2023, https://cites.org/sites/default/files/documents/E-AC32-25-02.pdf. (15) IUCN, ‘African elephant species now Endangered and Critically Endangered - IUCN Red List’, 2021, https://iucn.org/news/species/202103/african-elephant-species-now-endangered-and-critically-endangered-iucn-red-list. (16) Europol, ‘Law enforcement casts net over 256 eel smugglers’, 2023. https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/law-enforcement-casts-net-over-256-eel-smugglers. (17) Europol, ‘The changing DNA of serious and organised crime – European Union Serious and Organise Crime Threat Assessment’ (EU-SOCTA report), 2025, https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf. (18) US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ‘Wildlife Trafficking’, https://www.ice.gov/about-ice/hsi/investigate/wildlife-trafficking. (19) UN Office on Drugs and Crime, World Wildlife Crime Report 2024 – Trafficking in Protected Species, 2024. (20) Europol, ‘The changing DNA of serious and organised crime – European Union Serious and Organise Crime Threat Assessment’ (EU-SOCTA report), 2025, https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf. (21) CITES, ‘One health and CITES: Reducing human and animal health risks from wildlife trade, 2022, https://cites.org/sites/default/files/documents/E-CoP19-23-02_0.pdf. (22) Toland, E., Bando, M., Hamers, M., Cadenas, V., Laidlaw, R. et al, ‘Turning Negatives into Positives for Pet Trading and Keeping: A Review of Positive Lists’, Animals, Vol. 10, Issue 12, 2371, 2020, ‘https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7763047/pdf/animals-10-02371.pdf. (23) ‘Several parties called for Oman’s trade suspension to be lifted, pointing to its detrimental economic impacts.’: International Institute for Sustainable Development, Summary report, 3-8 February 2025 – 78th Meeting of the CITES Standing Committee, 2025, https://enb.iisd.org/cites-standing-committee-78-summary. (24) Tench, T., ‘Surprise Sale of 40 White Rhinos from Namibia to American Buyers in Texas Raises Questions about CITES Compliance’, Environmental Investigation Agency, 2024, https://eia.org/blog/surprise-sale-of-40-white-rhinos-from-namibia-to-american-buyers-in-texas-raises-questions-about-cites-compliance/. (25) Commission Regulation (EC) No 865/2006 of 4 May 2006 laying down detailed rules concerning the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (OJ L 166, 19.6.2006, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/865/oj). (26) Resolution Conf. 18.3 on CITES Strategic Vision: 2021-2030. (27) Recent research by IFAW (https://www.ifaw.org/international/resources/elephant-in-the-net) shows that significant amounts of ivory are still traded online in the EU and that verifiable proof of legality (certificate) was provided for only 9,9 % of worked ivory and only 3,1 % of raw ivory. (28) Commission Regulation (EC) No 865/2006 of 4 May 2006 laying down detailed rules concerning the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (OJ L 166, 19.6.2006, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/865/oj). (29) OJ C 528, 30.12.2021, p. 19. (30) Commission Regulation (EU) 2025/130 of 28 January 2025 amending Regulation (EC) No 865/2006 as regards developments in the framework of CITES and the possibility to issue retrospective permits (OJ L, 2025/130, 29.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/130/oj). (31) Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 of 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (OJ L 61, 3.3.1997, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1997/338/oj). (32) The Society for Conservation Biology, ‘Resolving Uncertainties in the Legality of Wildlife Trade to Support Better Outcomes for Wildlife and People’, https://conbio.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/conl.13110. (33) UN General Assembly Resolution RES/77/325 calls on member states to ‘make illicit trafficking in protected species of wild fauna and flora a serious crime’ (operative para 6), and to ‘review and amend national legislation, as necessary and appropriate, so that offences connected to the illegal trade in wildlife are treated as predicate offence’ (operative para 9) https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4020317?v=pdf. (34) Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 of 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (OJ L 61, 3.3.1997, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1997/338/oj). (35) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj). (36) CITES, Notification To The Parties, https://cites.org/sites/default/files/notifications/E-Notif-2024-133.pdf. (37) CITES, Notification To The Parties, https://cites.org/sites/default/files/notifications/E-Notif-2024-118.pdf. (38) CITES, Notification To The Parties, https://cites.org/sites/default/files/notifications/E-Notif-2024-134.pdf. (39) Biondo, M. et al, ‘An Updated Review of the Marine Ornamental Fish Trade in the European Union’, (2024), https://www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/14/12/1761.

European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2025 on Audiovisual Media Services Directive obligations in the transatlantic dialogue (2025/2776(RSP))

P10_TA(2025)0256 B10-0446/2025

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the competences of the Member States in developing ambitious cultural policies in the audiovisual field, in line with Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 6 and 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing realities(1),

–  having regard to the UNESCO convention of 20 October 2005 on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 2 May 2025 on the assessment of the legal framework for audiovisual media services and video-sharing platform services(2),

–  having regard to the question to the Commission on Audiovisual Media Services Directive(3) obligations in the transatlantic dialogue (O-000026/2025 – B10‑0010/2025),

–  having regard to Rules 142(5) and 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Culture and Education,

A.  whereas the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) is the cornerstone of the EU’s audiovisual policy, aiming to create a single market for audiovisual media services in the EU while promoting cultural diversity;

B.  whereas the AVMSD aims to ensure fair conditions for all in the audiovisual sector, including TV broadcasters, on-demand services and video-sharing platforms; whereas the AVMSD includes provisions to protect minors and consumers and to prevent violence, hate speech and terrorist content; whereas the AVMSD supports European works, improves accessibility and aims to ensure the independence of national regulatory authorities;

C.  whereas the exclusion of audiovisual media services from the scope of trade negotiations is crucial for the EU and its Member States to preserve and strengthen their capacity to design and implement cultural and audiovisual policies aimed at promoting and protecting cultural diversity;

D.  whereas the AVMSD requires the Member States to ensure that on-demand audiovisual media service providers under their jurisdiction broadcast at least a 30 % share of European works and give these works appropriate prominence; whereas the AVMSD also allows the Member States to require foreign audiovisual media service providers targeting audiences in their territory to contribute financially to the production of European works;

E.  whereas the Digital Services Act and the e-Commerce Directive set out general rules for online intermediaries, while the AVMSD lays down specific rules for audiovisual content; whereas the AVMSD should remain the key legal framework for supporting a diverse, fair, safe and competitive audiovisual media market in the EU and promoting independent and culturally rich European content;

F.  whereas US President Donald Trump’s memorandum of 21 February 2025 entitled ‘Defending American Companies and Innovators From Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties’ aims to list practices considered discriminatory to US companies, including obligations targeting streaming services; whereas the United States Trade Representative has listed the AVMSD as a foreign trade barrier in the 2025 US National Trade Estimate Report;

G.  whereas the US administration’s designation of the AVMSD as a trade barrier is based on a flawed assessment, given that the directive’s provisions apply in a neutral and non-discriminatory manner to all operators, both domestic and foreign, thereby ensuring fair competition and a level playing field;

H.  whereas President Trump has also stated his intention to impose a 100 % tax on films made outside the United States;

I.  whereas US films accounted for 69 % of cinema admissions in Europe in 2023; whereas 9 of the 10 leading television and video on-demand groups operating in Europe are owned by US companies; whereas 85 % of the time spent by Europeans on subscription video on-demand platforms is concentrated on three US streaming services;

J.  whereas the EU concluded a trade agreement with the United States on 27 July 2025, which does not include any clauses relating to EU digital or audiovisual regulation; whereas, nevertheless, subsequent statements by President Trump seem to indicate that he wishes to further his attempts to oppose the regulation of US companies by the EU;

1.  Calls on the Council and the Member States to support the Commission in defending the AVMSD and the EU’s cultural exception in the context of international trade negotiations, ensuring that audiovisual media services remain excluded from commitments under trade agreements, in order to preserve and develop the capacity of the EU and its Member States to define and implement cultural and audiovisual policies aimed at promoting and protecting cultural diversity;

2.  Stresses that the measures laid down under the AVMSD constitute a legitimate regulation in the public interest, aimed at safeguarding cultural diversity by encouraging the production and dissemination of European works and at protecting freedom of expression, media pluralism and democratic values; considers that any backtracking on the principles of the AVMSD would seriously undermine the European cultural model, particularly in the context of intense international competition in the audiovisual media sector;

3.  Recalls that, under Article 167 TFEU, cultural policy is primarily a competence of the Member States; underlines that the principle of subsidiarity constitutes not only a rule on the allocation of competences but also an essential safeguard for protecting cultural diversity within the Union and countering the concentration of economic and technological power by external actors, in particular American companies;

4.  Welcomes the Council conclusions of 2 May 2025 on the assessment of the legal framework for audiovisual media services and video-sharing platform services, in which the Council underscores the crucial role of the AVMSD in providing the legal basis for safeguarding and promoting a diverse, fair, safe, trustworthy and competitive audiovisual media market in the EU, while also ensuring the availability of independent, reliable and culturally diverse European content;

5.  Urges the Commission to firmly reject any attempt to consider the AVMSD a trade distortion, and to defend it as a legitimate regulatory instrument that is essential for ensuring the protection of the EU’s cultural diversity, sovereignty and soft power, both in the negotiation and implementation of trade agreements with the United States and in the framework of the evaluation and potential revision of the AVSMD in 2026;

6.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 303, 28.11.2018, p. 69, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1808/oj. (2) OJ C, C/2025/2954, 26.5.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/2954/oj. (3) Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/13/oj).