The European Parliament,

–   having regard to the Commission Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of an information and communication strategy on the euro and Economic and Monetary Union (COM(2004)0552),

–   having regard to the Commission Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Central Bank - First report on the practical preparations for the future enlargement of the euro area (COM(2004)0748),

–   having regard to its positions of 16 June 2000(1) on provisions relating to the introduction of the euro,

–   having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2000(2) on the strategy of communication and information on economic and monetary union (EMU) and the euro up to 2002,

–   having regard to its resolution of 4 July 2001 on means to assist economic actors in switching to the euro(3),

–   having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,

–   having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A6-0197/2005),

A.   whereas, after six years of existence, the project of achieving EMU and introducing the euro is generally considered as having been very successful,

B.   whereas this is reinforced by the high standing of the euro in international financial markets, the ever-increasing trade invoicing in euros and the fact that central bank reserves world-wide are increasingly switching from dollars to euros,

C.   whereas the benefits of a single currency and its accompanying instruments - a single monetary policy and enhanced co-ordination of economic policies - cannot be seriously questioned at this stage, with cheaper finance available due to historically low interest rates increased price transparency leading in the medium term to lower prices, elimination of exchange rate risks within the euro zone, facilitation of intra-EU trade and travel, and pressure on Member States to implement stability-oriented fiscal policies,

D.   whereas, nevertheless, a certain section of the European public purports to have a negative perception of the euro, particularly in Member States whose national currency has been locked into a high exchange rate against the euro; whereas Eurobarometer polls show that this tendency is on the rise, with support for the currency in the euro zone being 68% just before the changeover, 75% just after, and 66% in the first half of 2004; whereas the negative results of the referenda in Sweden and Denmark are also proof of the existence of public opposition to the single currency in Europe; whereas polls in new Member States also reflect some scepticism as regards adoption of the euro, caused primarily by a lack of relevant information,

E..   whereas these perceptions have, to a large extent, been compounded by some errors made during the changeover, despite the fact that it was politically and technically a useful and very successful operation, only having a mere 0.2% effect on inflation; whereas not enough attention was paid to the consequences of the changeover for the average consumer, who saw prices of everyday items and services rise, and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which were inadequately informed and not supplied with enough cash; whereas with hindsight it clearly was a mistake to terminate communication campaigns on the euro so early after its physical introduction,

F.   whereas it is important to have, in addition to the Eurobarometer quantitative surveys, qualitative surveys on the deeper-seated reasons for citizens" attitudes to the euro; whereas it is only through in-depth interviews that the real reasons why certain groups of people reject the euro and are sceptical about EMU can be ascertained and used as the basis for targeted information strategies, in which the selection of (euro-sceptical) social groups should be a matter for decision by the Member State concerned and its national communications officers,

G.   whereas experience in industry and the media studies insights as regards 'after-sales marketing' can be applied to confirm the importance of a message even after the introduction of the euro; whereas it is also important not only to gain people's confidence before and up to the introduction of the euro, but also to confirm that confidence in those who have been convinced of the rightness of their decision, and shape their opinions by communicative messages and events even after the euro's introduction,

H.   whereas a coherent, ambitious and long-lasting communication strategy on the euro and EMU is needed in order to support the single currency, avoid past mistakes and prepare the new entrants for a smooth transition; whereas the Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB), under the democratic surveillance of the European Parliament, and together with Member States" financial authorities, are the main bodies responsible for this strategy's success,

I.   whereas somewhat higher inflation in the new Member States than in the euro zone is inevitable over the medium to long term, irrespective of euro introduction, due to significant and persistent differences in the level of prices and the complex phenomenon of catching-up,

J.   whereas in the context of the European democratic process, any information and communication policy on a Europe-related topic must – if it is to be effective – form part of the EU's general information and communication strategy, which will enable such a policy to demonstrate consistently to the general public the benefits of the EU in their everyday lives,

1.  Welcomes the benefits of the EMU, such as price stability, reduced transaction costs, greater price transparency within the euro zone, reduced volatility on the international currency markets and protection against external shocks, historically low interest rates, low mortgage rates and easier travel; supports the euro as a powerful symbol of European integration and as a means of bringing European citizens closer to the ideals that underpin the Union;

2.  Notes the apparent unpopularity of the euro among certain citizens; considers this to be in contradiction with the fact that the euro is possibly the most successful European project ever launched; considers that the single currency remains a communication priority for the EU; believes that the benefits of the euro and of EMU - price stability, low mortgage rates, easier travel, protection against exchange rate fluctuations and external shocks - must continue to be sold and explained to the public in detail; believes that particular emphasis should be placed on informing and keeping up to date European citizens, consumers and SMEs, which do not have sufficient capacity to adjust immediately to transactions in euro;

3.  Believes that the campaign for the euro and EMU should focus on small towns and remote regions where even today the opportunities for informing the public remain limited; considers that, in so far as each Member State so wishes, dual pricing (in the national currency and euro) should be maintained until citizens - particularly those in such regions - are fully familiar with the system;

4.  Considers it essential for key policy-makers to take full political responsibility for the further development of common monetary policy and enhanced economic coordination, as the long-lasting health of the euro will contribute to the overall advancement of the Union and the popularity of the euro also plays an important role as regards possible ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe;

5.  Supports tighter economic policy co-ordination between Member States and fiscal prudence within the bounds of a reformed but robust Stability and Growth Pact; believes that the revised Stability and Growth Pact, as adopted in principle by the Brussels European Council of 22 and 23 March 2005, and the relevant Community regulations on specific matters should, through their uniform implementation in the Member States, contribute to the long-term economic stability of the Member States and their adjustment to the Lisbon Strategy objectives; stresses that low economic growth after the introduction of the euro was not caused by the currency changeover but by a lack of proper implementation of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and by the fact that the Lisbon agreement has not been fulfilled and structural reforms have not been implemented;

6.  Welcomes the Commission's latest report on its communication strategy on the euro but notes that its tone is too optimistic in the face of the prevailing popularity deficit; calls on the Commission to follow its key communication targets and to detail the steps needed to achieve them; stresses the value of applying, more intensively, modern marketing techniques when promoting EMU to the public and striving to sell the advantages of EMU and the euro as an attractive "package";

7.  Agrees with the Commission that the information campaign must be adapted to the culture, language, prevailing public opinion and concerns of citizens of the various Member States as well as to the question whether the country is inside the euro zone already or will come into it in the short or medium term, or wishes to stay out;

8.  Continues to support the PRINCE programme and calls for an increase of funds available for it; believes that interinstitutional dialogue on the euro can be improved through the Interinstitutional Group on Information; warns that the principle of co-financing that underlies the PRINCE programme may lead to significant problems and delays in the introduction of the euro in the new Member States, who lack the necessary budgetary means;

9.  Believes it important to consider the concerns of citizens from the three old Member States that do not belong to the euro zone, Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and calls upon the Commission to help the governments of those Member States in their quest to win over a sceptical public, if those governments so wish;

10.  Believes that the recent EU enlargement will pose important challenges for EMU and the single currency; considers that the Commission must concentrate its efforts on helping the new Member States to prepare their citizens for adoption of the euro by undertaking an intensive information campaign, to supervise its implementation where such a campaign has already started and to make regular reports on the implementation of the National Action Plans for the adoption of the Euro;

11.  Notes that the requirement of dual pricing, say at least 3 months before the euro's introduction and up to 12 months afterwards can, firstly, reduce people's fears of euro-induced price rises and, secondly, put some pressure on businesses and service providers not to use conversion to the euro as a pretext for price rises; considers that dual pricing as a national legal requirement, or through voluntary chamber of commerce codes of conduct or agreement between the economic and social partners, proved its worth when the euro was introduced in many of the first 12 countries of the euro zone;

12.  Calls on the Commission to take into account the fear of price increases expressed by the public in the new Member States; believes that experience with malpractices and instances of excessive rounding-up observed in Member States currently belonging to the euro zone should be used in the future euro zone entrants in such a way as to prevent similar behaviour; considers that the difference between annual inflation and price increases caused by introduction of the euro should be explained to citizens in all Member States;

13.  Notes that, as compared to the old Member States, in the new Member States more financial transactions take the form of cash rather than electronic means of payment; urges the Commission, Member States and national central banks to take this into account when preparing the changeover in the new Member States; encourages them to use the changeover to increase the number of electronic and card payments; believes that a short period of dual circulation is the best option for a successful changeover in the new Member States;

14.  Believes that best practices and know-how acquired from the previous changeover will be useful for the changeover in the new Member States and for the forthcoming enlargement and preparation of the new applicant countries;

15.  Calls on the Commission to attach greater importance to the consultation procedures with the social partners in order to take account of the needs of the public and, principally, of particular social and economic organisations;

16.  Calls for additional finance for the setting-up in each Member State of national forums for the euro, under the responsibility of the Minister of Finance and in close co-operation with the national central banks, a system which has proved its usefulness on previous occasions; considers that the EU should support "twinning" projects whereby the old Member States may help the dissemination of good practices and transfer of expertise, at the level of Ministries of Finance and in the central banks; calls on the Commission to draw up specific reports based on best practices and to encourage national, regional and local authorities to establish local reporting centres where anyone can report any abuse, such as unwarranted price increases;

17.  Calls on the Commission to recognise the importance of the active role of the European Parliament, the national parliaments and the regional and local authorities in the context of planning and implementing the communication strategy on the euro and EMU; believes that the actions of these institutions will produce a more democratic dialogue on the communication strategy which will better incorporate the issues of concern to the public;

18.  Calls on the ECB, be it in its Annual report or in a special report, to undertake an annual quantitative analysis - to be debated by the European Parliament - of the benefits the euro has brought about for ordinary citizens, with concrete examples of how the euro has had positive effects on people's daily lives;

19.  Asks the Commission to conduct specific opinion polls with SMEs throughout Europe to assess the level of acceptance of the currency within the sector; underlines the importance of involving automat operators in the communications and conversion strategies, because they play an important role in the acceptance of the new coins and notes in people's daily lives;

20.  Calls for the banking sector to have ATMs to provide customers with more low denomination categories - since most cash payments do not amount to more than EUR 15 to 20 on average- in order to reduce the cash amounts shopkeepers have in their tills and thus diminish the risk of robbery; notes, furthermore, that this reduces the risk to consumers of receiving counterfeits as change;

21.  Asks the Commission to publish an analysis, to be debated by the European Parliament, on the excess of EUR 500 notes in circulation, the issuance of which has doubled in 2005 to 190 million notes on account of increased demand from economic actors in the euro zone; understands the advantages of the EUR 500 note as a wealth depository but warns against the possible risks associated with such a high value note with regard to money laundering and crime;

22.  Notes the rise in the role of electronic trading in transactions, and therefore queries the relevance of keeping EUR 500 notes, originally justified by the need to take account of the habits of consumers in some Member States;

23.  Urges the ECB to publish the distribution of requests for EUR 500 notes from the various central banks;

24.  Deplores the still high cost of cross-border retail payments in euro, although Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001 on cross-border payments in euro (4) has brought about real reductions in the charges for standardised cross-border transfers of euro, and supports the creation of a Single European Payments Area; asks the Commission to come up with proposals for comprehensive legislation in this field and to take this opportunity to harmonise electronic payment systems in the EU in order to reduce the costs which are usually borne by consumers and SMEs; points out that the system's effectiveness relies on the confidence of consumers, which depends on recognition of their rights;

25.  Welcomes the fact that the ECB is working on a second generation of banknotes; believes that because of its scale the euro is particularly vulnerable to counterfeiting and urges the ECB to be very alert and to take current experience into account when designing the new generation of banknotes; considers it essential that Europol and the Member States" police forces treat this issue as a priority;

26.  Believes that interinstitutional dialogue on the euro can be improved through the Interinstitutional Group on Information; calls on the Commission to continue sending to the European Parliament the quarterly written update of the PRINCE programme;

27.  Reiterates the willingness it expressed in its resolution of 12 May 2005 on the implementation of the European Union's information and communication strategy(5) to deepen interinstitutional cooperation in this area by organising a major debate each year on the basis of a report submitted by the Commission - a debate in which the committees with full or partial responsibility for the matter would be involved and in which the Council would also take part;

28.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and Commission.

(1) OJ C 67, 1.3.2001, p. 324. (2) OJ C 121, 24.4.2001, p. 459. (3) OJ C 65 E, 14.3.2002, p. 162. (4) OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 13. (5) Texts Adopted of that date, P6_TA(2005)0183.