European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Asylum and Migration Fund (COM(2011)0751 – C7-0443/2011 – 2011/0366(COD))

P7_TA(2014)0237 A7-0022/2014

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2011)0751),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 78(2) and 79(2) and (4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C7‑0443/2011),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 11 July 2012(1)

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 18 July 2012(2),

–  having regard to its decision of 17 January 2013 on the opening of, and the mandate for, interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal(3),

–  having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 20 December 2013 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development and the Committee on Budgets (A7-0022/2014),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Approves its statements annexed to this resolution;

3.  Takes note of the Council statement and the Commission statements annexed to this resolution;

4.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it intends to amend its proposal substantially or replace it with another text;

5.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission, the European Asylum Support Office and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 13 March 2014 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) No .../2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, amending Council Decision 2008/381/EC and repealing Decisions No 573/2007/EC and No 575/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Decision 2007/435/EC

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) No 516/2014.)

ANNEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

Statements by the European Parliament

Article 80 TFEU:

The European Parliament, in the light of the need to adopt this Regulation in time for implementation of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund ('the Fund') from the beginning of 2014, in the interests of finding an agreement to that end, and in the light of the intransigence of the Council, has accepted the text of the Regulation as agreed above. Nevertheless, the European Parliament reiterates its view – which it has maintained throughout negotiations on this Regulation – that the correct legal basis for the Fund includes Article 80, second sentence, TFEU as a joint legal basis. This legal basis is designed to give effect to the principle of solidarity as expressed in Article 80, first sentence, TFEU. In particular, the Fund implements the principle of solidarity in its provisions on the transfer of applicants for and beneficiaries of international protection (Articles 7 and 18) and in its provisions on resettlement (Article 17). The European Parliament underlines the fact that the adoption of this Regulation is strictly without prejudice to the range of legal bases available to the co-legislator in the future, in particular with regard to Article 80 TFEU.

Relocation:

With the aim of promoting relocation as a solidarity tool and improving the conditions pertaining to relocation, the European Parliament calls the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), in cooperation with the European Commission (EC), to develop a handbook and a methodology on relocation, following a mapping of relocation best practices in Member States, including internal organization systems and reception and integration conditions. In order to create an incentive for relocation and facilitate relocation operations for the participating Member States, the European Parliament calls also the EASO to provide expertise on relocation and coordinate, in cooperation with the EC, an expert network on relocation, which could regularly meet for technical meetings on specific practical and legislative issues, as well as provide support on the use of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund for relocation. The European Parliament calls the EC to monitor and regularly report on the evolution and improvement of the asylum system in Member States beneficiating from relocation.

Statement by the Council

Article 80 TFEU:

The Council underlines the importance of the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility which, in accordance with Article 80 TFEU, is to be given effect in Union acts adopted pursuant to the Chapter of the TFEU on policies on border checks, asylum and immigration. The Regulation establishing the Asylum and Migration Fund contains appropriate measures to give effect to the above principle. However, the Council reiterates its view that Article 80 TFEU does not constitute a legal basis within the meaning of EU law. Within the said Chapter, only Article 77(2) and (3), Article 78(2) and (3) and Article 79(2), (3) and (4) TFEU contain legal bases enabling the relevant EU institutions to adopt EU legal acts.

Statements by the Commission

Article 80 TFEU:

The Commission, in a spirit of compromise and in order to ensure the immediate adoption of the proposal, supports the final text; however it notes that this is without prejudice to its right of initiative with regard to the choice of legal bases, in particular in reference to the future use of Article 80 TFEU.

European Migration Network (EMN):

The Commission, in a spirit of compromise, supports the final text on Article 23 which ensures continued funding support to the activities of the European Migration Network while maintaining its current structure, objectives and governance, as set out in Council Decision 2008/381/EC of 14 May 2008. However the Commission notes that this is without prejudice to its right of initiative with regard to a future more comprehensive revision of the set up and functioning of this network, as envisaged in the Commission's initial proposal for Article 23.

(1) OJ C 299, 4.10.2012, p. 108. (2) OJ C 277, 13.9.2012, p. 23. (3) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0020.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 March 2014 on the draft Council decision concerning the ratification of, or the accession to, the Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, 2009, by the Member States in the interests of the European Union (15902/2013 – C7-0485/2013 – 2012/0056(NLE))

P7_TA(2014)0238 A7-0166/2014

(Consent)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the draft Council decision (15902/2013),

–  having regard to the Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, 2009,

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1257/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on ship recycling and amending Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 and Directive 2009/16/EC(1),

–  having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 192(1) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v), and paragraph 8, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C7‑0485/2013),

–  having regard to Rule 81(1), first and third subparagraphs, Rule 81(2), and Rule 90(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A7-0166/2014),

1.  Gives its consent to the draft Council Decision;

2.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 330, 10.12.2013, p. 1.

European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2014 on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries (2013/2277(INI))

P7_TA(2014)0239 A7-0149/2014

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 7, Article 136 in combination with Article 121 , and Article 174 thereof,

–  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

–  having regard to the Treaty on European Union and in particular Article 3 thereof,

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability(1),

–  having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 June 2010 on EU 2020(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2013 on the European Semester for economic policy coordination: implementation of 2013 priorities(3),

–  having regard to its resolution of 4 July 2013 on the European Parliament’s priorities for the Commission Work Programme 2014(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 12 June 2013 on strengthening European democracy in the future EMU(5),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 November 2012 with recommendations to the Commission on the report of the Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup, ‘Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union’(6),

–  having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2011 on the financial, economic and social crisis: recommendations concerning the measures and initiatives to be taken(7),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2010 on the financial, economic and social crisis: recommendations concerning measures and initiatives to be taken (mid-term report)(8),

–  having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A7-0149/2014),

A.  whereas the Troika, consisting of the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), originated in the decision of 25 March 2010 by euro area Heads of State and Government to establish a joint programme and to provide conditional bilateral loans to Greece, thereby also building on recommendations from the Ecofin Council, and has since also been operational in Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus; whereas there exists significant involvement of euro area finance ministers in the decisions concerning the detail of the bilateral loans;

B.  whereas the Troika and its role have been defined in Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 and mentioned in the Treaty on the ESM;

C.  whereas the European Court of Justice (ECJ) confirmed in its ruling in the Pringle v Ireland case (Case C-370/12) that the Commission and the ECB can be entrusted with the tasks conferred on them in the ESM Treaty;

D.  whereas, within the Troika, the Commission, acting as an agent of the Eurogroup, is entrusted with negotiating the conditions for financial assistance for euro area Member States ‘in liaison with the ECB’, and, ‘wherever possible together with the IMF’, the financial assistance hereinafter referred to as ‘EU-IMF assistance’, but the Council is politically responsible for approving the macroeconomic adjustment programmes; whereas each member of the Troika followed its own procedural process;

E.  whereas the Troika has been to date the basic structure for negotiation between the official lenders and the governments of the recipient countries, as well as for reviewing the implementation of economic adjustment programmes; whereas for the European side, in case of European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM) support the final decisions as regards financial assistance and conditionality are taken by the Eurogroup, which therefore bears the political responsibility for the programmes;

F.  whereas there was a broad political agreement to avoid a disorderly default by Member States in the EU, and especially in the euro area, in order to avoid economic and social chaos resulting in the impossibility to pay pensions and civil servants’ salaries, as well as dire knock-down effects on the economy, the banking system and social welfare, in addition to the sovereign being completely cut off from the capital markets for a prolonged period;

G.  whereas the Troika, together with the Member State concerned, is also responsible for the preparation of formal decisions of the Eurogroup;

H.  whereas several Member States outside the euro area have already received or are receiving EU assistance under Article 143 TFEU, provided by the EU in conjunction with the IMF;

I.  whereas the EU and its Member States created several ad hoc mechanisms to provide financial assistance for euro area countries, first through bilateral loans, including from several non-euro area countries, then through the temporary emergency funds, namely the EFSF and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), created for EU Member States in distress, and finally through the ESM, which was meant to replace all the other mechanisms;

J.  whereas the ECJ, referring to Article 13(3) of the ESM Treaty, has recently confirmed (in the Pringle case) that it is the Commission’s duty, by reason of its involvement in the ESM Treaty, to ‘promote the general interest of the Union’ and to ‘ensure that the memoranda of understanding concluded by the ESM are consistent with European Union law’;

K.  whereas the ECJ has also ruled in the Pringle case that the ESM is consistent with the TFEU and has opened the door for a possible integration of that mechanism into the acquis communautaire within the current limits of the Treaties;

L.  whereas a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is, by definition, an agreement between the Member State concerned and the Troika, which results from negotiations and by which a Member State undertakes to carry out a number of precise actions in exchange for financial assistance; whereas the Commission signs the MoU on behalf of euro area finance ministers; whereas, however, it is not public knowledge how negotiations have been conducted in practice between the Troika and the relevant Member State and, furthermore, there is a lack of transparency as to the extent to which a Member State seeking assistance has been able to influence the outcome of negotiations; whereas it is stipulated in the ESM Treaty that a Member State requesting assistance from the ESM is expected to address, wherever possible, a request for assistance to the IMF;

M.  whereas the total amount of financial assistance packages in the four programmes is unprecedented, as are the duration, shape and context of the programmes, leading to an undesirable situation where the assistance has almost exclusively replaced the usual financing provided by the markets; thereby shielding the banking sector from losses by transferring large amounts of programme country sovereign debt from the balance-sheet of the private sector to that of the public sector;

N.  whereas the ECJ has stated in its Pringle ruling that the prohibition laid down in Article 125 TFEU ensures that the Member States remain subject to the logic of the market when they enter into debt, since that should prompt them to maintain budgetary discipline, and that compliance with such discipline contributes at Union level to the attainment of a higher objective, namely maintaining the financial stability of the monetary union; whereas, however, the ECJ stresses that Article 125 TFEU does not prohibit the granting of financial assistance by one or more Member States to a Member State which remains responsible for its commitments to its creditors provided that the conditions attached to such assistance are such as to prompt that Member State to implement a sound budgetary policy;

O.  whereas the financial crisis has led to an economic and social crisis; whereas this economic situation and recent developments have had serious and previously unforeseen negative impacts on the quantity and quality of employment, access to credit, income levels, social protection and health and safety standards, and as a result economic and social hardship is unmistakeable; whereas these negative impacts could have been considerably worse without the EU-IMF financial assistance and whereas the action at European level has helped prevent the situation from deteriorating even further;

P.  whereas Article 151 TFEU provides that action taken by the EU and its Member States must be consistent with the fundamental social rights laid down in the 1961 European Social Charter and the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Rights of Workers, in order to improve, inter alia, the social dialogue;

Q.  whereas Article 152 TFEU states that ‘the Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at its level, taking into account the diversity of national systems’ and that it ‘shall facilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting their autonomy’;

R.  whereas the costs of services to service users are rising in some Member States, which means that many people are no longer able to afford an adequate level of service to meet their basic needs, including access to vital treatment;

S.  whereas the Task Force for Greece was set up to strengthen the capacity of the Greek administration to design, implement and enforce structural reforms in order to improve the competitiveness and functioning of the economy, society and administration and create the conditions for sustained recovery and job creation, as well as to speed up the absorption of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds in Greece and to utilise critical resources to finance investment;

T.  whereas, in its resolution of 20 November 2012 Parliament called for high standards of democratic accountability at national and Union level to be applied to the EU institutions which are members of the Troika; whereas such accountability is imperative for the credibility of the assistance programmes, and, notably, requires a closer involvement of the national parliaments, as well as necessitating that the EU members of the Troika be heard in the European Parliament on the basis of a clear mandate before taking up their duties and to be subject to regular reporting to and democratic scrutiny by Parliament;

U.  whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium-term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not suited to comprehensively correcting macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated, in some cases over decades;

Economic situation in programme countries at the beginning of the crisis

1.  Considers that the precise triggers for the crises differed in all four Member States, even though common patterns can be observed such as the rapid increase in capital inflows and a build-up of macroeconomic imbalances across the EU during the years preceding the crisis; points out that excessive private and/or public debt, which had risen to a level which became unsustainable, and over-reaction by financial markets combined with speculation and a loss of competitiveness, played a crucial role, and that none of these could have been prevented by the existing EU economic governance framework; further notes that the sovereign debt crises in all cases have been strongly correlated to the global financial crisis caused by lax regulation and misbehaviour of the financial industry;

2.  Notes that Europe's public finances were already in a poor state before the crisis, and that since the 1970s the level of Member States' public debt has gradually crept upwards under the impact of the various economic downturns the EU has experienced; notes that the costs of recovery plans, falling tax revenues and high welfare expenditure have caused both public debt and the ratio of public debt to GDP to rise in all Member States, although not to a uniform degree across the Union ;

3.  Recalls the triangle of interlinked vulnerabilities, whereby the unbalanced fiscal policy of some Member States has amplified the pre-crisis public deficits and the financial crisis has contributed significantly to a further ballooning of those deficits, followed by tensions in sovereign debt markets in some Member States;

4.  Points out that the recent financial, economic and banking crisis is the most severe since World War II; acknowledges that without action being taken at European level, the crisis could have had even more severe consequences; notes in this respect that the former ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet has pointed out in a public hearing his concern that without swift and forceful action the sovereign debt crisis might have triggered a crisis of the scale of the Great Depression of 1929;

5.  Notes that, prior to the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme initiated in the spring of 2010, there was a dual fear associated with the 'insolvency' and 'non-sustainability' of the public finances of Greece as a result of the constantly declining competitiveness of the Greek economy and long-run fiscal derailment, resulting from low effective corporate tax collection, with the government deficit reaching 15,7 % of GDP in 2009, up from -6,5 % in 2007, and the debt-to-GDP ratio continuing on an upward trend since 2003 when it stood at 97,4 %, reaching 107,4 % in 2007, 129,7 % in 2009 and 156,9 % in 2012; is of the opinion that the problematic situation of Greece was also due to statistical fraud in the years preceding the setting-up of the programme; welcomes the decisive action by the Greek government to urgently and effectively address these problems, including by establishing the independent Hellenic Statistical Authority in March 2010; notes that the gradual uncovering of statistical fraud in Greece had an impact on the need to readjust multipliers, forecasts and proposed measures; recalls that because of the European Parliament’s insistence Eurostat (the statistical office of the European Union) is now endowed with powers and means to deliver a solid basis of reliable and objective statistics;

6.  Notes that Greece entered recession in Q4 2008; notes that the country experienced six quarters of negative GDP growth rate in the seven leading up to the assistance programme being activated; notes the close correlation between the effects of the financial crisis and the rise in government debt on the one hand, and the increase in the national debt and the economic downturn on the other, with public debt increasing from EUR 254.7 billion at the end of Q3 2008 to EUR 314,1 billion at the end of Q2 2010;

7.  Notes that following the Greek government’s request for financial assistance in April 2010, the markets started to reassess the economic fundamentals and the solvency of other euro area Member States, and subsequently tensions on Portuguese sovereign bonds quickly drove up Portugal’s refinancing costs to unsustainable levels;

8.  Notes that the economic data first used by the government during the negotiations had to be revised;

9.  Notes that, prior to the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme, the Portuguese economy had suffered from low GDP and productivity growth for a number of years, as well as large capital inflows, and that these patterns, combined with an acceleration of expenditure, particularly discretionary spending, consistently above GDP growth, and the impact of the global financial crisis, had resulted in a large fiscal deficit and high public and private debt levels together with contagion from the Greek crisis, driving up Portugal's refinancing costs in the capital markets to unsustainable levels and effectively cutting the public sector from access to those markets; stresses that in 2010, before financial assistance was sought in 7 April 2011, Portugal's growth rate had declined to 1,9 % and its fiscal deficit had reached 9,8 % (2010), its debt level 94 % (2010) and its current account deficit 10,6 % of GDP, with the unemployment rate standing at 12 %; notes in this context that the overall macroeconomic fundamentals deteriorated very rapidly, from reasonably good levels in 2007 before the crisis – when Portugal's growth rate was 2,4 %, its fiscal deficit 3,1 %, its debt level 62,7 % and its current account deficit 10,2 % of GDP, with the unemployment rate standing at 8,1% – to a deep and unprecedented recession;

10.  Notes that, before the EU-IMF assistance programme, the Irish economy had just suffered a banking and economic crisis of unprecedented dimensions that resulted largely from the exposure of the Irish financial sector to the US ‘subprime crisis’, irresponsible risk-taking by Irish banks and the widespread use of asset-backed securities, which, following the blanket guarantee and the subsequent bailout, had the effect of cutting the public sector off from access to the capital markets, causing Irish GDP to fall by 6,4 % in 2009 (1,1 % in 2010) from a positive growth level of 5 % of GDP in 2007, unemployment to increase from 4,7 % in 2007 to 13,9 % in 2010, and the General Government Fiscal Balance to experience a deficit, peaking at 30,6 % in 2010, as a result of Irish government support for the banking sector, down from a surplus of 0,2 % in 2007; notes that the banking crisis partly resulted from inadequate regulation, very low tax rates and an oversized banking sector; recognises that private losses of Irish banks were taken on to the balance of the Irish sovereign, in order to avoid a breakdown of the Irish banking system and also to minimise the risks of contagion across the euro area as a whole, and that the Irish government acted in the wider interests of the Union in responding to its banking crisis; further notes that in the decade prior to the assistance programme the Irish economy experienced a prolonged period of negative real interest rates;

11.  Points out the non-existence of fiscal imbalances prior to the crisis in Ireland and to the extremely low level of public debt; also stresses the extended level of flexibility of the labour market prior to the crisis; notes that the troika initially requested the lowering of wages; draws attention to a non-sustainable banking model and a tax system which was overly dependent on the income from taxing a housing and asset bubble, depriving the state of income when those bubbles burst;

12.  Notes that around 40 % of Irish GDP was injected into the banking sector by the taxpayer at a time when bail-in was not available as it had given rise to considerable debate within the troika;

13.  Calls for the full implementation of the June 2012 commitment by EU leaders to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns and to further examine the situation of the Irish financial sector in a manner that substantially alleviates Ireland's heavy burden of bank debt;

14.  Notes that when it came to PSI in Greece, the knock-on effects on the Cyprus banking system, which was already on the verge of collapse because of a failing banking model, were not sufficiently considered and it is also suggested that assets relating to some larger Member States were again protected;

15.  Notes that in May 2011, Cyprus lost access to international markets due to the significant deterioration in public finances as well as the heavy exposure of the Cypriot banking sector to the Greek economy and the restructuring of public debt in Greece, which led to sizeable losses in Cyprus; recalls that years before the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme in 2013, serious concerns regarding systemic instability in the Cypriot economy had been raised, owing inter alia to its overleveraged and risk-seeking banking sector and its exposure to highly indebted local property companies, the Greek debt crisis, the downgrading of Cypriot government bonds by international rating agencies, the inability to refund public expenditure from the international markets, and the reluctance of the Cypriot public authorities to restructure the troubled financial sector, opting instead to rely on a massive injection of capital by Russia; recalls also that the situation has been made more complex by the over-reliance on savings coming from Russian citizens and by the recourse to a loan from the Russian authorities; further notes that in 2007, the Cypriot public debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 58,8 %, rising to 86,6 % in 2012, while in 2007 there was a general government surplus of 3,5 % of GDP which nonetheless became a deficit of -6,4 % by 2012;

EU-IMF financial assistance, content of the MoUs and policies implemented

16.  Notes that the initial request for financial assistance was made by Greece on 23 April 2010 and that the agreement between the Greek authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 2 May 2010, in the relevant MoUs containing the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that, following five reviews and the insufficient success of the first programme, a second programme had to be adopted in March 2012, which has been reviewed three times since; notes that the IMF did not take effectively into account the objections of one third of its board members in regard to the distribution of benefits and burdens resulting from the first Greek programme;

17.  Notes that the first agreement of May 2010 could not contain provisions for a restructuring of the Greek debt, despite it being first proposed by the IMF, which, in line with its usual practice, would have preferred an early debt restructuring; recalls the ECB's reluctance to consider any form of debt restructuring in 2010 and 2011 on the grounds that it would have led to the crisis having a contagion effect on other Member States, as well as its refusal to participate in the restructuring agreed in February 2012; notes that the Central Bank of Greece contributed in November 2010 to intensifying market turmoil by publicly warning investors that ECB liquidity operations could no longer be taken for granted in the case of Greek sovereign debt; further notes that there was a commitment by Member States that their banks would retain their exposure to the Greek bond markets, which they were unable to maintain;

18.  Notes that Portugal’s initial request for financial assistance was made on 7 April 2011 and that the agreement between the Portuguese authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 17 May 2011 in the relevant MoUs containing the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that the Portuguese programme has since been reviewed regularly to adjust the targets and objectives, given the unattainable initial goals, leading to the successful tenth review of Portugal's economic adjustment programme, with good prospects for completion of the programme soon;

19.  Recalls the bilateral pressure reportedly exerted by the ECB on the Irish authorities prior to the initial agreement between the latter and the EU and IMF being adopted on 7 December 2010 and 16 December 2010, respectively in the relevant MoUs containing the policy conditionality for EU-IMF assistance; notes that the programme was largely based on the Irish Government's own National Recovery Plan 2011-2014 published on 24 November 2010; further notes that the Irish programme has since been reviewed regularly, leading to a twelfth and final review on 9 December 2013, and that this programme was completed on 15 December 2013;

20.  Notes that the European Council decided on 29 June 2012 to allow the ESM the option of recapitalising banks directly, following a regular decision and provided an effective single supervisory mechanism is established; further notes that the operational framework for a direct recapitalisation instrument, subject to conditionality, was defined by the Eurogroup on 20 June 2013;

21.  Notes that thinking on bail-in has evolved over time; in the case of Ireland in 2010, the bail-in of senior bondholders was not an option available to the Irish authorities, while in Cyprus in 2013, the bail-in of insured depositors was put forward as a policy measure, which increased the disparity between the instruments used to alleviate the banking and sovereign debt crises;

22.  Notes that Cyprus made its initial request for financial assistance on 25 June 2012, but that differences of positions as regards the conditionality, as well as the rejection by the Cypriot Parliament on 19 March 2013 of an initial draft programme which included bail-in of insured depositors on the grounds that it was contrary to the spirit of European law since it envisaged haircut of small deposits of less than EUR 100 000, delayed the final agreement on the EU-IMF assistance programme until 24 April (EU) and 15 May 2013 (IMF) respectively, with the Cypriot House of Representatives finally endorsing the agreement on 30 April 2013; notes that there were initial competing programme proposals in the case of Cyprus between different members of the Troika, and highlights the lack of sufficient explanation as to how the inclusion of insured depositors was signed off by the European Commission and EU finance ministers; furthermore, regrets the fact that the Cypriot authorities referred to difficulties in convincing the Troika representatives of their concerns during the negotiation process, as also the fact that the Cypriot Government was reportedly obliged to accept the bail-in instrument on bank deposits in view of the exceptionally high level of private debt in relation to GDP; points out that while the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) and a ministerial committee were heavily involved in the negotiation and design of the financial assistance programme and finally the Governor of the CBC co-signed the MoU with the Minister of Finance, it must be noted that there was extremely limited time for any further negotiation in detail of aspects of the MoU;

23.  Notes the serious side-effects of the application of the bail-in, which include the imposition of capital controls; stresses that the Cypriot real economy continues to face major challenges as the severing of credit lines is bearing down on the productive sectors of the economy;

24.  Notes that the IMF is the global institution tasked with providing states experiencing balance of payments problems with conditional financial assistance; points out that all the Member States are members of the IMF and therefore have the right to request its assistance, in cooperation with the EU institutions, in the light of assessment of the interests of the EU and the Member State in question; notes that in view of the magnitude of the crisis, sole reliance on the financial means of the IMF would not have been sufficient to tackle the problems of the countries in need of financial assistance;

25.  Notes that the IMF has clearly pointed out the risks of the Greek programme, in particular with respect to debt sustainability; observes that in addition to accepting that the programme be devised and negotiated by the troika, the IMF decided to modify its Exceptional Access Policy (EAP) criterion on debt sustainability in order to make it possible to lend to Greece, Ireland and Portugal;

26.  Draws attention to the concerns expressed with regard to oversight by the ECB of emergency liquidity assistance (ELA); considers the solvency concept employed by the ECB to be lacking in transparency and predictability;

27.  Notes the unpreparedness of the EU and the international institutions for a sovereign debt crisis of large magnitude, as well as its differentiated origins and consequences within the euro area, stemming from, among other factors, what is the most serious financial crisis since 1929; regrets the absence of a viable legal basis to deal with a crisis of this nature; acknowledges the efforts made to respond quickly and resolutely, but regrets the fact that the Council has consistently refused to develop a long-term, comprehensive and systemic approach; deplores the fact that the EU Structural Funds and EU policies aiming at long- term economic convergence within the Union have not effectively delivered;

28.  Points out that the cofinancing rates for the EU Structural Funds were topped up to 95 % for some of the Member States which have been most affected by the crisis and which have received financial assistance under an adjustment programme; stresses that local and national administrations need to be strengthened in order to cope with the implementation of EU legislation and programmes, thus speeding up the absorption of Structural Fund monies;

29.  Acknowledges, despite the above, that the immense challenge which the Troika faced in the lead-up to the crisis was unique as a result of, inter alia, the poor state of public finances, the need for structural reforms in some Member States, insufficient regulation of financial services at European and national level, and large macroeconomic imbalances built up over many years, as well as policy and institutional failures and the fact that most traditional macroeconomic instruments such as budgetary policy or external devaluation were not available due to the constraints of monetary union and the incomplete nature of the euro area; notes, moreover, the considerable time pressure arising due partly to the fact that requests for financial assistance were generally made at a time when countries were already close to default and had already lost access to the markets, while legal obstacles had to be cleared, fear of a meltdown of the euro area was palpable, there was a patent need to reach political agreements and take decisions on reforms, the world economy was in a severe downturn, and a number of countries that were to contribute financial support had seen their own public and private debt increase in alarming ways;

30.  Denounces the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations; notes the need to evaluate whether formal documents were clearly communicated to and considered in due time by the national parliaments and the European Parliament and adequately discussed with the social partners; further notes the possible negative impact of such practices, which involve keeping information behind closed doors on citizens’ rights, on the stability of political situation in the countries concerned and the trust of citizens in democracy and the European project;

31.  Notes that the recommendations contained in the MoUs are at odds with the modernisation policy drawn up in the form of the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategy; further notes the fact that Member States with MoUs are exempt from all European Semester reporting processes, including reporting under the anti-poverty and social inclusion targets, and do not receive Country Specific Recommendations aside from implementation of their MoUs; recalls that the MoUs need to be adapted in order to take into account the practice and institutions for wage formation and the national reform programme of the Member State concerned in the context of the Union’s strategy for growth and jobs as set out in Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 (Article7(1)); urges that this be done where it is not yet the case; points out, however, that this can be partly explained, even if not fully justified, by the fact that programmes had to be implemented under considerable time pressure in a difficult political, economic and financial environment;

32.  Regrets the inclusion in the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal of a number of detailed prescriptions for health systems reform and expenditure cuts; regrets the fact that the programmes are not bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or by the provisions of the Treaties, notably Article 168(7) TFEU;

33.  Points out that the EU finance ministers approved the macroeconomic adjustment programmes;

The current economic and social situation

34.  Regrets that the measures implemented have led in the short term to a rise in income distribution inequality; notes that there has been an above-average rise in such inequalities in the four countries; notes that cuts in social benefits and services and rising unemployment resulting from measures contained in the programmes intended to address the macroeconomic situation, as well as wage reductions, are raising poverty levels;

35.  Points to the unacceptable level of unemployment, long-term unemployment and youth unemployment in particular in the four Member States under assistance programmes; stresses that the high youth unemployment rate imperils the opportunities for future economic development, as demonstrated by the flow of young migrants from southern Europe as well as from Ireland, which risks causing a brain drain; recalls that education, training and a strong scientific and technological background have been systematically identified as the critical path for the structural catching up of these economies; therefore welcomes the recent initiatives at EU level regarding youth education and employment, the Erasmus+ programme, the Youth Employment Initiative, and the 6 billion EUR for the EU Youth Guarantee Scheme, but calls for an even stronger political and economic focus on addressing these issues; stresses that competences related to employment remain primarily with the Member States; therefore encourages the Member States to further modernise their national education systems and to engage in addressing youth unemployment;

36.  Welcomes the end of the programme in Ireland, in so far as the Troika missions have stopped and the country was able to successfully access bond markets on 7 January 2014, as well as the expected end for Portugal; recognises the unprecedented fiscal adjustment in Greece, yet regrets the uneven results in Greece despite unprecedented reforms having been undertaken; acknowledges the very demanding efforts that have been requested from individuals, families, enterprises and other institutions of the civil societies of the countries under adjustment programmes; notes the first signs of partial economic improvements in certain programme countries; points out, however, that the persistently high unemployment rates weigh on economic recovery, and that continued and ambitious efforts are still needed both at national and at EU level;

The Troika: the economic dimension and the theoretical basis and impact of decisions

37.  Stresses that adequate country-specific as well as eurozone-wide economic models, built on prudent assumptions, independent data, involvement of stakeholders and transparency, are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes, while acknowledging that economic forecasts usually contain a degree of uncertainty and unpredictability; deplores the fact that adequate statistics and information have not always been available;

38.  Welcomes the fact that financial assistance achieved in the short run the objective of avoiding a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences which would have arguably been worse than the current ones, as well as spillover effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; notes, however, that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece has not prevented either an orderly default or a contagion effect of the crisis on other Member States, and that market confidence was restored and spreads on sovereign debt started to come down only when the ECB supplemented actions already taken with the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme in August 2012; deplores the economic and social downturn which became evident when the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections were put in place; notes that the economic and social consequences would have been worse without the EU-IMF financial and technical assistance;

39.  Notes that from the onset the Troika published comprehensive documents on the diagnosis, the strategy for overcoming the unprecedented problems, a set of policy measures drawn up together with the national government concerned, and economic forecasts, all of which are updated on a regular basis; notes that these documents did not permit the public to form an overall view of the negotiations and thus that this does not constitute sufficient means of accountability;

40.  Deplores the sometimes overoptimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth and unemployment are concerned, deriving inter alia from the insufficient recognition of cross border spillovers (as recognised by the Commission in its report ‘Fiscal consolidations and spillovers in the Euro area periphery and core’), political resistance to change in some Member States, and the economic and social impact of adjustment; deplores the fact that this also affected the Troika’s analysis of the interplay between fiscal consolidation and growth; notes that as a result fiscal targets could not be fulfilled within the timeframe foreseen;

41.  Understands from the hearings that a strict relationship exists between the length of the adjustment programme and the help made available through the dedicated funds such as the ESM, meaning that a longer adjustment period would inevitably have meant substantially larger amounts to be made available and guaranteed by the other euro area countries and the IMF, something which was not considered politically feasible in view of the already very high amounts involved; points out that the length of the adjustment programmes and the reimbursement periods are distinctly longer than in usual IMF financial assistance programmes;

42.  Welcomes the reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes; regrets that these have not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP; notes that the ratio of public debt to GDP has instead sharply increased in all programme countries, as the receipt of conditional loans naturally leads to an increase of public debt and as policy implemented has a recessive impact in the short term; further believes that the accurate estimation of fiscal multipliers is of crucial importance for fiscal adjustment to be successful in reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio; notes that progression towards more sustainable levels of private debt is also necessary for long-term stability; acknowledges that it typically takes several years before structural reforms can make a significant contribution to raising output and employment;

43.  Considers that fiscal multipliers are difficult to assess with certainty; recalls in this respect that the IMF admitted to underestimating the fiscal multiplier in its growth forecasts prior to October 2012; notes that this period encompasses the conclusions of all but one of the initial memoranda of understanding under enquiry in this report; recalls that the European Commission stated in November 2012 that forecast errors were not due to the underestimation of fiscal multipliers; points out however that the Commission stated in its reply to the questionnaire that "fiscal multipliers tend to be larger at the current juncture than in normal times"; understands that fiscal multipliers are partly endogenous and evolve in changing macroeconomic conditions; points out that this expression of public disagreement between the European Commission and the IMF on the size of the fiscal multiplier was not followed up with a joint stance being taken by the troika;

44.  Points out that while the IMF's stated objective in its assistance operations within the frame of the Troika is internal devaluation, including through wage and pension cuts, the Commission has never explicitly endorsed this objective; notes that the objective emphasised by the Commission in all four programme countries under enquiry has rather been fiscal consolidation; recognises these priority differences between the IMF and the Commission and takes note of this preliminary inconsistency of goals between the two institutions; notes that it was commonly decided to rely on a mix of both instruments as well as structural reforms, with other measures complementing this approach; notes that the combination of fiscal consolidation and restrictive wage policy has depressed both public and private demand; notes that the objective of reforming both the industrial base and the institutional structures in programme countries, rendering them more sustainable and effective, has received less attention than the above-mentioned objectives;

45.  Considers that too little attention has been paid to alleviating the negative economic and social impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries; recalls the origins of the crises; deplores the fact that too often the one-size-fits-all approach to crisis management has not fully considered the balance in the economic and social impact of the prescribed policy measures;

46.  Stresses that national-level ownership is crucial, and that failure to implement agreed measures has consequences in terms of the expected results, inducing additional hardship over an even longer period for the country concerned; takes note of the IMF's experience that country ownership could be seen as the single most important factor in the success of any financial assistance programme; stresses however that national-level ownership cannot be achieved without proper democratic legitimacy and accountability at both national and EU level; highlights in this regard the fact that deliberation by national parliaments of the budgets and laws for implementing economic adjustment programmes is crucial for providing accountability and transparency at national level;

47.  Stresses that enhanced gender equality is an important key to building stronger economies and that this factor should never be overlooked in economic analyses or recommendations;

The Troika: the institutional dimension and democratic legitimacy

48.  Notes that because of the evolving nature of the EU’s response to the crisis, the unclear role of the ECB in the Troika and the nature of the Troika decision-making process, the Troika’s mandate has been perceived as being unclear and lacking in transparency and democratic oversight;

49.  Points out, however, that the adoption of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 on 21 May 2013, constitutes a first – even though insufficient – step in codifying the surveillance procedures to be employed in the euro area for countries experiencing financial difficulties, and that it confers a mandate on the Troika; welcomes inter alia: the provisions regarding the evaluation of the sustainability of the government debt; the more transparent procedures regarding the adoption of macroeconomic adjustment programmes, including the need to integrate adverse spillover effects as well as macroeconomic and financial shocks and the scrutiny rights devolved to the European Parliament; the provisions regarding the involvement of social partners; the requirements to take explicit account of national practices and institutions for wage formation; the need to ensure sufficient means for fundamental policies, such as education and healthcare; and the exemptions granted to Member States under assistance from the relevant requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact;

50.  Takes note of the Eurogroup President’s statement that the Eurogroup gives a mandate to the Commission to negotiate on its behalf the details of the conditions attached to the assistance, while taking into account Member States' views on key elements of the conditionality and, in view of their own financial constraints, on the extent of financial assistance; notes that the above-mentioned procedure whereby the Eurogroup confers a mandate on the Commission is not specified in EU law, as the Eurogroup is not an official institution of the European Union; stresses that despite the Commission acting on behalf of the Member States, the ultimate political responsibility for the design and approval of the macroeconomic adjustment programmes lies with EU finance ministers and their governments; deplores the absence of EU-level democratic legitimacy and accountability of the Eurogroup when it assumes EU-level executive powers;

51.  Points out that the rescue mechanisms and the Troika were of an ad hoc nature, and regrets that there was no appropriate legal basis available for setting up the Troika on the basis of Union primary law, which led to the establishment of intergovernmental mechanisms in the form of the EFSF, and eventually the ESM; calls for any future solution shall be based on Union primary law; acknowledges that this might lead to the need for a Treaty change;

52.  Is alarmed by the admission by the former President of the Eurogroup before the European Parliament that the Eurogroup endorsed the recommendations of the Troika without extensive consideration of their specific policy implications; stresses that, if accurate, this does not discharge euro area finance ministers from their political responsibility for the macroeconomic adjustment programmes and the MoUs; points out that this admission sheds a worrying light on the blurred scope of the 'technical advising' and 'Eurogroup agency' roles devolved to both the Commission and the ECB in the framework of the design, implementation and assessment of assistance programmes; deplores, from that perspective, the lack of any clear and accountable case-by-case mandates from the Council and the Eurogroup to the Commission;

53.  Questions the dual role of the Commission in the Troika as both an agent of Member States and an EU institution; asserts that there is a potential conflict of interest within the Commission between its role in the Troika and its responsibility as guardian of the Treaties and the acquis communautaire, especially in policy areas such as competition and state aid policy and social cohesion, and with regard to Member States’ wage and social policy, an area in which the Commission has no competence, as well as respect for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; points out that such a situation contrasts with the Commission’s normal role, which is to act as an independent principal protecting the EU interest and ensuring the implementation of EU rules within the limits established by the Treaties;

54.  Points equally to the potential conflict of interest between the current role of the ECB in the Troika as ‘technical advisor’ and its position as creditor of the four Member States, as well as its mandate under the Treaty as it has made its own actions conditional on decisions it is itself part of; nonetheless, welcomes its contribution in addressing the crisis but requests that potential ECB conflicts of interest, especially as regards crucial liquidity policy, are carefully scrutinised; notes that throughout the crisis the ECB has had crucial information on the health of the banking sector and financial stability in general, and that with this in mind it has subsequently exerted policy leverage on decision-makers, at least in the cases of the Greek debt restructuring, where the ECB insisted that CACs were to be removed from government bonds it held, the Cypriot ELA operations, and the Irish non-inclusion of senior-bondholders in the bail-in; calls on the ECB to publish the letter of 19 November 2010 from Jean-Claude Trichet to the then Irish Finance Minister, as requested by the European Ombudsman;

55.  Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in the ESM Treaty and Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB to an advisory role; notes that the Eurogroup asked for the involvement of the ECB as a provider of expertise to complement the views of the other Troika partners, and that the ECJ has ruled in the Pringle case that the tasks allocated to the ECB by the ESM Treaty are in line with the various tasks which the TFEU and the Statute of the ESCB [and the ECB] confer on the ECB provided that a certain number of conditions are permanently fulfilled; points to the responsibility of the Eurogroup in allowing the ECB to act within the Troika, but recalls that the ECB’s mandate is circumscribed by the TFEU to the areas of monetary policy and financial stability and that involvement of the ECB in the decision-making process related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies is not foreseen by the Treaties; recalls that Article 127 TFEU provides that, without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 TEU;

56.  Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level; notes, however, that this democratic accountability varies between countries, depending on the will of national executives and the effective scrutiny capacity of national parliaments, as demonstrated in the case of the refusal of the original MoU by the Cypriot parliament; notes, however, that when consulted, national parliaments were faced with the choice between eventually defaulting on their debt or accepting Memoranda of Understanding negotiated between the Troika and national authorities; points out that the MoU was not ratified by the national parliament in Portugal; notes with concern that the fact that the Troika is made up of three independent institutions with an uneven distribution of responsibility between them, coupled with differing mandates, as well as negotiation and decision-making structures with different levels of accountability, has resulted in a lack of appropriate scrutiny and democratic accountability of the Troika as a whole;

57.  Regrets the fact that by reason of its statutes the IMF cannot appear formally before or report in writing to national or European parliaments; notes that the IMF’s governance structure foresees accountability towards the 188 member countries via the IMF Board; stresses that the IMF’s involvement as lender of last resort providing up to one third of the funding places the institution in a minority role;

58.  Notes that, following preparatory work by the Troika, formal decisions are made, separately and in accordance with their respective legal statutes and roles, by the Eurogroup and the IMF, who thus respectively acquire political responsibility for Troika actions; further notes that a crucial role is now accorded to the ESM as the organisation responsible for deciding on financial assistance granted by eurozone member states, thus putting national executives of member states of the euro area, including the governments of those directly concerned, at the centre of any decisions taken;

59.  Notes that the democratic legitimacy of the troika at national level derives from the political responsibility of Eurogroup and ECOFIN members before their respective national parliaments; regrets that the troika lacks means of democratic legitimacy at EU level because of its structure;

60.  Deplores the way EU institutions are being portrayed as the scapegoat for adverse effects in Member States' macroeconomic adjustment, when it is the Member States' finance ministers who bear the political responsibility for the Troika and its operations; stresses that this may lead to increased Euroscepticism although responsibility lies with the national and not the European level;

61.  Calls on the Eurogroup, the Council and the European Council to assume full responsibility for the operations of the Troika;

62.  Points out that the ESM is an intergovernmental body which is not part of the European Union legal structure and is bound by the unanimity rule in the regular procedure; believes that for this reason a spirit of mutual commitment and solidarity is required; notes that the ESM Treaty has introduced the principle of loan conditionality, in the form of a macroeconomic adjustment programme; points out that the ESM treaty does not define further the content of conditionality or adjustment programmes, thus allowing great leeway in recommending such conditionality;

63.  Expects the national courts of auditors to fully assume their legal responsibilities with regard to certifying the legality and regularity of financial transactions and the effectiveness of supervisory and control systems; calls on the supreme audit institutions, in this connection, to reinforce their cooperation, in particular by exchanging best practices;

Proposals and recommendations

64.  Welcomes the willingness of the Commission, the ECB, the President of the Eurogroup, the IMF, the national governments and central banks of Cyprus, Ireland, Greece and Portugal, as well as the social partners and representatives of civil society, to cooperate and participate in the evaluation by Parliament of the role and operations of the Troika, including by answering the detailed questionnaire and/or participating in formal and informal hearings;

65.  Deplores the fact that the European Council did not sufficiently take into account the proposals contained in its resolution of 6 July 2011 on the financial, economic and social crisis; emphasises that implementing them would have fostered economic and social convergence in the Economic and Monetary Union and would have afforded measures to coordinate economic and budgetary policy full democratic legitimacy;

The short to medium term

66.  Calls, as a first step, for the establishment of clear, transparent and binding rules of procedure for the interaction between the institutions within the Troika and the allocation of tasks and responsibility therein; strongly believes that a clear definition and division of tasks is needed in order to enhance transparency and to enable a stronger democratic control over and underpin the credibility of the work of the Troika;

67.  Calls for the development of an improved communication strategy for ongoing and future financial assistance programmes; urges that this concern be given the utmost priority, as inaction on this front will ultimately damage the image of the Union;

68.  Calls for a transparent evaluation of the awarding of contracts to external consultants, the lack of public tenders, the very high fees paid and the potential conflicts of interests;

Economic and social impact

69.  Recalls that the Parliament’s position on Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 entailed introducing provisions requiring the macroeconomic adjustment programmes to include contingency plans in case baseline forecast scenarios should not materialize and in case of slippage due to circumstances outside the control of the Member State under assistance, such as unexpected international economic shocks; stresses that such plans are a prerequisite for prudent policymaking, given the fragility and poor reliability of economic models underpinning programme forecasts as illustrated in all Member States under assistance programmes;

70.  Urges the EU to closely monitor the financial, fiscal and economic evolution in the Member States and to create an institutionalised system of positive incentives to duly reward those who meet best practices in this regard and those who fully comply with their adjustment programmes;

71.  Demands that the Troika take stock of the current debate on fiscal multipliers and consider revision of the MoUs on the basis of the latest empirical results;

72.  Asks the Troika to proceed to new debt sustainability assessments and, as a matter of urgency, to address the need to reduce the Greek public debt burden as well as the severe capital outflows from Greece, which are contributing significantly to the vicious circle characterising the current economic depression in the country; recalls that a number of possibilities exist for a debt restructuring, besides a haircut on bond principals, including bond swapping, extending bond maturities and reducing coupons; believes the different possibilities for debt restructuring should be carefully weighed;

73.  Insists that the MoUs must be made to respect, where this is not the case, the objectives of the European Union, i.e. the promotion of employment and improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, as well as proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion, as stated in Article 151 TFEU; supports the cautious prolongation of fiscal adjustment timeframes that have already been fulfilled in the memoranda as fears of general meltdown receded; supports considering further adjustments in light of further macroeconomic developments;

74.  Regrets that the burden has not been shared among all who acted irresponsibly and that the protection of bondholders was seen as an EU necessity in the interests of financial stability; asks the Council to activate the framework it decided on the treatment of legacy assets so as to breakdown the vicious circle between sovereigns and the banks and alleviate the public debt burden in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus; urges the Eurogroup to deliver on its commitment to examine the situation of the Irish financial sector with a view to further improving the sustainability of the adjustment in Ireland, and, having regard to all of the above, urges the Eurogroup to make good on the commitment to Ireland to deal with this bank debt burden; believes special consideration should be given to the application of the Stability and Growth Pact to relevant legacy debt, since the latter is perceived in Ireland as unfair and as burdening the country under the flexibility provisions of the reformed pact; considers that in the longer term the distribution of the costs should reflect distribution of the protected bondholders; takes note of the Irish authorities' demand for a transfer of a share of public debt corresponding to the cost of the bailout of the financial sector to the ESM;

75.  Recommends that the Commission, the Eurogroup and the IMF should explore further the concept of 'contingent convertible bonds', where the returns of newly issued sovereign debt in Member States under assistance are linked to economic growth;

76.  Recalls the need for measures to safeguard tax revenues, in particular for programme countries, as enshrined in Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (the Gauzès report), by taking ‘measures in close cooperation with the Commission and in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, with the IMF, aiming to reinforce the efficiency and effectiveness of revenue collection capacity and the fight against tax fraud and evasion, with a view to increasing its fiscal revenue’; recalls that effective steps to fight and prevent fiscal fraud both within and outside the EU should be taken rapidly; recommends implementing measures that would make all parties contribute fairly to tax revenues;

77.  Calls for the publication of the use made of bail-out funds; stresses that the quantity of funds channelled to finance the deficits, fund the government and repay private creditors should be clarified;

78.  Calls for an effective involvement of social partners in the design and implementation of adjustment programmes, current and future; believes that agreements reached by social partners in the framework of the programmes should be respected insofar as they are compatible with the programmes; emphasises that Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 provides that assistance programmes shall respect national practices and institutions for wage formation;

79.  Calls for the involvement of the EIB in the design and implementation of investment- related measures in order to contribute to economic and social recovery;

80.  Regrets that the programmes are not bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the European Convention of Human Rights and the European Social Charter, due to the fact that they are not based on Union primary law;

81.  Stresses that the European institutions need to respect Union law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, under all circumstances;

82.  Stresses that pursuing economic and financial stability in the Member States and the Union as a whole must not undermine social stability, the European social model or the social rights of EU citizens; stresses that involvement of the social partners in the economic dialogue at European level, as provided for in the Treaties, must be on the political agenda; calls for the necessary involvement of the social partners in the design and implementation of current and future adjustment programmes;

The Commission

83.  Calls for full implementation and full ownership of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013; calls on the Commission to start interinstitutional negotiations with Parliament in order to define a common procedure for informing the competent committee of Parliament on the conclusions drawn from the monitoring of the macroeconomic adjustment programme, as well as the progress made in the preparation of the draft macroeconomic adjustment programme provided for in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013; reminds the Commission to conduct and publish ex-post evaluations of its recommendations and its participation in the Troika; asks the Commission to include such assessments in the review report foreseen in Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013; reminds the Council and the Commission that Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 provides that Member States in receipt of financial assistance on 30 May 2013 shall be subject to that Regulation as from that date; calls on the Council and the Commission, in conformity with Article 265 TFEU, to act in order to streamline and align the ad hoc financial assistance programmes with the procedures and acts referred to in Regulation (EU) No 472/2013; calls on the Commission and the co-legislators to draw the relevant lessons from the troika experience when designing and implementing the next steps of the EMU. including when revising Regulation (EU) No 472/2013;

84.  Reminds the Commission and the Council of its position adopted in plenary regarding Regulation (EU) No 472/2013; emphasises in particular that it has laid down provisions in this position which increase further the transparency and accountability of the decision-making process leading to the adoption of macroeconomic adjustment programmes, providing for a clearer and well-delimitated mandate and overall role for the Commission; asks the Commission to reassess such provisions and integrate them into the framework in case of a future proposal to amend Regulation (EU) No 472/2013; recalls, from that perspective, that the preparation of future assistance programmes shall be placed under the responsibility of the Commission, which should seek advice, where appropriate, from third parties such as the ECB, the IMF or other bodies;

85.  Requests full accountability of the Commission in line with and beyond Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 when it acts in its capacity as a member of the EU assistance mechanism; requests that the Commission representatives in that mechanism be heard by Parliament before taking up their duties; demands that they be subjected to regular reporting to Parliament;

86.  Proposes that for each programme country the Commission should sets up a ‘growth task force’ consisting inter alia of experts from (inter alia) the Member States and the EIB, in association with representatives of the private sector and civil society in order to allow ownership, to suggest options to promote growth which would complement fiscal consolidation and structural reforms; this task force would have the objective of restoring confidence and therefore enabling investments; the Commission should build on the experience of the ‘twinning’ instrument for cooperation between public administrations of Member States and of beneficiary countries;

87.  Is of the opinion that the situation of the euro area as a whole (including spillover effects on other Member States resulting from national policies) should be better taken into account when looking at the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) or when the Commission is drafting the AGS;

88.  Believes that the MIP should also clearly assess any Member State's overreliance on a particular sector of activity;

89.  Asks the Commission to proceed to a thorough examination in the light of state aid rules of the liquidity provisions of the ESCB;

90.  Instructs the Commission, in its capacity of ‘guardian of the Treaties’, to present by the end of 2015, a detailed study of the economic and social consequences of the adjustment programmes in the four countries, in order to provide a precise understanding of both the short-term and long-term impact of the programmes, thus enabling the resulting information to be used for future assistance measures; asks the Commission to use all relevant consultative bodies, including the Economic and Financial Committee, the Employment Committee and the Social Protection Committee, when drafting this study, and to fully cooperate with Parliament; believes the report of the Commission should also reflect the assessment of the European Agency of Fundamental Rights;

91.  Calls on the Commission and Council to ensure the involvement of all relevant Directorate -Generals (DGs) of the Commission and national ministries in the MoU discussions and decisions; highlights in particular the role DG Employment has to play alongside DG ECFIN and DG MARKT in ensuring that the social dimension is a key consideration in the negotiations and that the social impact is also taken into account;

The ECB

92.  Requests that in any reform of the Troika framework the ECB’s role is carefully analysed, in order to align it with the ECB mandate; requests especially that the ECB be given the status of a silent observer with a transparent and clearly defined advisory role while, not allowing it to be a full negotiation partner and discontinuing the practice of the ECB co-signing mission statements;

93.  Asks the ECB to conduct and publish ex-post evaluations of the impact of its recommendations and its participation in the Troika;

94.  Recommends that the ECB update its guidelines on Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) and its collateral framework regulations, in order to enhance the transparency of liquidity provisions in Member States under assistance and increase the legal certainty surrounding the solvency concept used by the ESCB;

95.  Calls on the ECB and the national central banks (NCBs) to publish comprehensive information on ELAs in a timely fashion, including on the conditions for support such as solvability, the way the ELAs are financed by the NCBs, the legal framework and their practical functioning;

The IMF

96.  Believes that after years of experience in designing and implementing financial programmes, the European institutions have acquired the necessary know-how to design and implement them by themselves, with the IMF’s involvement being redefined along the lines proposed in this report;

97.  Calls for any future involvement of the IMF in the euro area to remain optional;

98.  Calls on the IMF to redefine the scope of any future involvement on its part in EU-related assistance programmes, such that it becomes a catalytic lender providing minimum financing and expertise to the borrowing country and the EU institutions while retaining the option of exit in case of disagreement;

99.  Asks the Commission, in accordance with Article 138 TFEU, to propose appropriate measures to ensure unified representation of the euro area within the international financial institutions and conferences and particularly in the IMF, in order to replace the current system of individual Member State representation at the international level; notes that this requires a change in the statutes of the IMF;

100.  Calls for the consultation of Parliament on the involvement of the IMF in the euro area on an ad hoc basis;

The Council and the Eurogroup

101.  Calls for a reassessment of the decision-making process of the Eurogroup so as to include appropriate democratic accountability at both national and European levels; calls for European guidelines to be established in order to ensure appropriate democratic control over the implementation of measures at national level which take into account the quality of employment, social protection, health and education and ensure access for all to social systems; proposes that being the permanent chair of the Eurogroup should be a full-time responsibility; suggests that the chair be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission, to be accountable to Parliament; calls, in the short run, for the establishment of a regular dialogue between the Troika and Parliament;

102.  Calls on the Eurogroup, the Council and the European Council to assume full responsibility for the operations of the Troika; is concerned, in particular, to improve the accountability of decisions of the Eurogroup with regard to financial assistance, as finance ministers bear the ultimate political responsibility for macroeconomic adjustment programmes and their implementation while often neither being directly accountable to their national parliament nor the European Parliament for specific decisions; believes that before financial assistance is granted the President of the Eurogroup should be heard before the European Parliament and the EU finance ministers in their respective parliament; stresses that the President of the Eurogroup and the finance ministers should both be required to regularly report to the European Parliament and national parliaments;

103.  Urges all Member States to increase their national ownership in the European Semester's workings and decisions and to carry out all measures and reforms they have agreed to in the context of the country-specific recommendations (CSRs); recalls that the Commission has identified a significant degree of progress in comparison with previous years in only 15 % of the approximately 400 CSRs;

The ESM

104.  Stresses that with the phasing-out of the Troika, an institution will need to take over the scrutiny of ongoing reforms;

105.  Emphasises that the creation of the EFSF and the ESM outside the institutions of the Union represents a setback in the development of the Union, essentially at the expense of Parliament, the Court of Auditors and the Court of Justice;

106.  Demands that the ESM be integrated in the Union's legal framework and evolve towards a Community-based mechanism, as provided for in the ESM Treaty; demands that it be made accountable to the European Parliament and the European Council, including with respect to decisions to grant financial assistance as well as decisions to grant new loan tranches; acknowledges that as long as Member States make direct contributions from their national budget to the ESM, they should approve financial assistance; calls for the ESM to be further developed, with adequate lending and borrowing capacities, and for the establishment of a dialogue between the ESM board and the European social partners and the integration of the ESM into the EU budget; calls on the members of the ESM, until the above becomes reality, to abstain from the unanimity requirement in the short run in order to allow standard decisions to be taken by a qualified majority rather than by unanimity, and to allow for precautionary assistance to be given;

107.  Asks the Council and the Eurogroup to respect the commitment made by the President of the European Council to negotiate an interinstitutional arrangement with the European Parliament in order to establish an appropriate interim mechanism for increasing the accountability of the ESM; calls also in that context for greater transparency in the proceedings of the ESM Governing Council;

108.  Underlines that the ECJ 'Pringle' case-law and jurisprudence opens up the possibility of bringing the ESM within the Community framework, with a constant Treaty on the basis of Article 352 TFEU; calls, therefore, on the Commission to put forward, by the end of 2014, a legislative proposal with that objective;

The medium to long term

109.  Calls for the memoranda to be placed within the framework of Community legislation so as to promote a credible and sustainable consolidation strategy, thus also serving the objectives of the Union’s growth strategy and the declared social cohesion and employment objectives; recommends that for assistance programmes to be vested with appropriate democratic legitimacy, the negotiation mandates should be submitted to a vote in the European Parliament, and that Parliament should be consulted on the resulting MoUs;

110.  Reiterates its call for decisions related to the strengthening of the EMU to be taken on the basis of the Treaty on European Union; takes the view that departure from the Community method with increased use of intergovernmental agreements (such as contractual agreements) divides, weakens and challenges the credibility of the Union, including the euro area; is aware that full respect of the Community method in further reforms of the Union assistance mechanism might require treaty change, and stresses that any such changes must fully involve the EP and be subject to a convention;

111.  Is of the opinion that the option of a Treaty change allowing for the extension of the scope of the present Article 143 TFEU to all Member States, instead of being restricted to non-euro Member States, should be explored;

112.  Calls for the creation of a European Monetary Fund (EMF) on the basis of Union law, which would be subject to the Community method; believes that such an EMF should combine the financial means of the ESM geared to supporting countries experiencing balance of payments problems or facing state insolvency with the resources and experience that the Commission has acquired over the last few years in this field; points out that such a framework would avoid the possible conflicts of interest inherent to the Commission's current role as an Eurogroup agent and its much more encompassing role of 'guardian of the treaty'; believes that the EMF should be subjected to the highest democratic standards of accountability and legitimacy; believes that such a framework would ensure transparency in the decision-making process and that all institutions involved are made fully responsible and accountable for their actions;

113.  Is of the opinion that a treaty revision will be required in order to fully anchor the EU crisis prevention and resolution framework on the basis of legally sound and economically sustainable grounds;

114.  Is of the opinion that the option of developing a mechanism with clear procedural steps for countries which are in danger of insolvency should be explored, following the rules of the 6-pack and the 2-pack; in this context, encourages the IMF, and asks the Commission and the Council to bring the IMF to a common position in order to reignite the debate around an international sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) with a view to adopting a fair and sustainable multilateral approach in this domain;

115.  Summarises its recommendation that the respective roles and tasks of each participant in the Troika should be clarified in the following ways:

116.  Considers that the work started with this report should be followed up; calls on the next Parliament to pursue the work of this report and to develop further its key findings and to investigate further;

o
o   o

117.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Eurogroup, the Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF.

(1) OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 1. (2) OJ C 236 E, 12.8.2011, p. 57. (3) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0447. (4) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0332. (5) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0269. (6) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0430. (7) OJ C 33 E, 5.2.2013, p. 140. (8) OJ C 70 E, 8.3.2012, p. 19.

European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2014 on Employment and social aspects of the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to euro area programme countries (2014/2007(INI))

P7_TA(2014)0240 A7-0135/2014

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 9, 151, 152 and 153 thereof,

–  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, in particular to its Title IV (Solidarity),

–  having regard to the revised European Social Charter, in particular its Article 30 on the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion,

–  having regard to the public hearing held by the Employment and Social Affairs Committee on 9 January 2014 on “the employment and social aspects of the role and operations of the Troika with regard to euro area programme countries”,

–  having regard to the four draft policy notes with evaluations of the social and employment aspects and challenges in Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus, respectively, prepared in January 2014 by DG IPOL’s Economic and Scientific Policies Economic Governance Support Unit,

–  having regard to the economic dialogue and exchange of views with the Greek Minister of Finance and the Greek Minister of Labour, Social Security and Welfare organised jointly by the EMPL and ECON committees on 13 November 2012,

–  having regard to the five decisions of the Council of Europe’s European Committee on Social Rights of 22 April 2013 concerning pension schemes in Greece(1),

–  having regard to the 365th Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association of the International Labour Organisation (ILO),

–  having regard to its resolution of 8 October 2013 on the effects of budgetary constraints for regional and local authorities regarding the EU’s Structural Funds expenditure in the Member States(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 4 July 2013 on the impact of the crisis on access to care for vulnerable groups(3),

–  having regard to its resolution of 11 June 2013 on social housing in the European Union(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 February 2012 on employment and social aspects in the Annual Growth Survey 2012(5),

–  having regard to the Commission Communication of 13 November 2013 entitled “Annual Growth Survey 2014” (COM(2013)0800) and to the draft Joint Employment Report annexed thereto,

–  having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2013 on the European Semester for economic policy coordination: implementation of 2013 priorities(6),

–  having regard to the Commission Communication of 2 October 2013 entitled ‘Strengthening the social dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union’ (COM(2013)0690),

–  having regard to question O-000122/2013 – B7-0524/2013 to the Commission, and to Parliament’s related resolution of 21 November 2013 on the Commission Communication entitled ‘Strengthening the social dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)’(7),

–  having regard to the EMPL opinion with a view to its resolution of 20 November 2012 on the report of the Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup “Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union”(8),

–  having regard to the Commission Communication of 16 December 2010 entitled ‘The European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion: A European framework for social and territorial cohesion’ (COM(2010)0758), and to its resolution of 15 November 2011 thereon(9),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 November 2012 on Social Investment Pact – as a response to the crisis(10),

–  having regard to the Eurofound report of 12 December 2013 entitled “Industrial relations and working conditions in Europe 2012”,

–  having regard to the Commission Communication of 20 February 2013 entitled ‘Towards Social Investment for Growth and Cohesion – including implementing the European Social Fund 2014-2020’ (COM(2013)0083),

–  having regard to question O-000057/2013 – B7-0207/2013 to the Commission, and to Parliament’s related resolution of 12 June 2013 on the Commission Communication ‘Towards Social Investment for Growth and Cohesion – including implementing the European Social Fund 2014-2020’(11),

–  having regard to the Committee of Regions’ fourth Monitoring Report on Europe 2020 of October 2013,

–  having regard to the ILO’s Working Paper Nr 49 of 30 April 2013 entitled “The impact of the eurozone crisis on Irish social partnership: A political economy analysis”,

–  having regard to the ILO’s Working Paper Nr 38 of 8 March 2012 entitled “Social dialogue and collective bargaining in times of crisis: The case of Greece”,

–  having regard to the ILO’s report of 30 October 2013 entitled “Tackling the job crisis in Portugal”,

–  having regard to the Bruegel report of 17 June 2013 entitled “EU-IMF assistance to euro-area countries: an early assessment” (Bruegel Blueprint 19),

–  having regard to the Eurostat news releases on euro indicators of 12 February 2010 (22/2010) and of 29 November 2013 (179/2013),

–  having regard to OECD Economics Policy Paper No. 1 of 12 April 2012 entitled ‘Fiscal consolidation: How much, how fast and by what means? – An Economic Outlook Report’,

–  having regard to the Commission Communication of 3 March 2010 entitled “Europe 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” (COM(2010)2020),

–  having regard to the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) Working Paper of May 2013 entitled “The Euro crisis and its impact on national and European social policies”,

–  having regard to the Commission report of June 2013 entitled “Labour Market Developments in Europe 2013” (European Economy series 6/2013),

–  having regard to the Caritas Europe document of February 2013 entitled “the impact of the European Crisis: a study of the impact of the crisis and austerity on the people, with a special focus on Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain”,

–  having regard to the Oxfam Policy Brief of September 2013 entitled “A cautionary tale: the true cost of austerity and inequality in Europe”,

–  having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A7-0135/2014),

A.  whereas the unprecedented economic and financial crisis that has highlighted the fragility of public finances in some Member States, and the economic adjustment programme measures adopted in response to the situation experienced by Greece (May 2010 and March 2012), Ireland (December 2010), Portugal (May 2011) and Cyprus (June 2013), have had a direct and indirect impact on employment levels and on the living conditions of many people; whereas all the programmes, although formally signed by the Commission, were designed, and their conditionality determined, jointly by the IMF, the Eurogroup, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Commission and the Member States to be bailed-out;

B.  whereas once the economic and budgetary sustainability of these four countries can be guaranteed, efforts should be focused on social aspects, with special attention paid to job creation;

C.  whereas Article 9 TFEU prescribes: ‘In implementing and defining its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health’;

D.  whereas Article 151 TFEU provides that action taken by the EU and its Member States must be consistent with the fundamental social rights laid down in the 1961 European Social Charter, and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, in order to improve, inter alia, the social dialogue; whereas Article 152 TFEU states: ‘The Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at its level, taking into account the diversity of national systems. It shall facilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting their autonomy’;

E.  whereas Article 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union commits the Union to recognising and respecting “access to services of general economic interest as provided for in national laws and practices, in accordance with the Treaties, in order to promote the social and territorial cohesion of the Union”; whereas Article 14 TFEU establishes that “given the place occupied by services of general economic interest in the shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting social and territorial cohesion, the Union and the Member States, each within their respective powers and with the scope of application of the Treaties, shall take care that such services operate on the basis of principles and condition, particularly economic and financial conditions, which enable them to fulfil their missions”; whereas Article 345 TFEU provides that the Treaties “shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership”; and whereas Protocol No. 26 on services of general interest elaborates on the shared values of the Union with respect to services of general economic interest;

F.  whereas Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states: ‘The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000 (...), which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties’, and whereas paragraphs 2 and 3 of that article provide for accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and stipulate that these rights shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law;

G.  whereas the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides for, inter alia, the right of collective bargaining and action (Article 28), protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (Article 30), fair and just working conditions (Article 31), recognition of and respect for the entitlement to social security benefits and social services and, in order to ‘combat social exclusion and poverty’, the right to ‘a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources’ (Article 34), the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment (Article 35), and recognition and respect for the right to access services of general economic interest (Article 36);

H.  whereas the Europe 2020 strategy proposed by the Commission on 3 March 2010 and agreed by the European Council of 17 June 2010 includes, among its five headline targets to be achieved by 2020: 75 % of men and women aged 20-64 years to be employed; early school-leaving to be reduced to below 10 % and at least 40 % of 30-34 year-olds to have completed tertiary or equivalent education; and poverty to be reduced by means of lifting at least 20 million people out of the risk of poverty or social exclusion;

I.  whereas, according to the Commission’s Quarterly Review of October 2013 entitled “EU Employment and Social Situation”, the severe fall in the GDP of Greece, Portugal and Ireland was mostly translated in employment decline;

J.  whereas in its resolution of 21 November 2013, Parliament welcomed the Commission Communication of 2 October 2013 entitled ‘Strengthening the social dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union’ and its proposal to establish a scoreboard of key employment and social indicators, complementary to the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) and the Joint Employment Report (JER), as a step towards a social dimension of EMU; stresses that those indicators should be sufficient to ensure comprehensive and transparent coverage of the Member States’ employment and social situations; whereas the resolution stressed the need to ensure that this monitoring aims to reduce social divergences between Member States and to promote upward social convergence and social progress;

K.  whereas the available data shows that in the four countries there is a regression towards achieving the social targets of the Europe 2020 (see Annex 1), with the exception of the targets related to early leavers from education and to training and tertiary education attainment;

L.  whereas long-term economic prospects in these countries are improving; whereas this should begin to aid the creation of new jobs in these economies and reverse the trend of declining employment;

1.  Notes that the EU institutions (the ECB, the Commission and the Eurogroup) are also responsible for the conditions of the economic adjustment programmes; notes also that there is a need to guarantee the sustainability of public finances and to ensure that citizens have proper social protection;

2.  Deplores the fact that Parliament has been completely marginalised in all phases of the programmes: the preparatory phase, the development of mandates and the monitoring of the impact of the results achieved by the programmes and related measures; notes that, even though this association with the European Parliament was not compulsory due to the lack of legal basis, the absence of the European institutions as well as that of European financial mechanisms meant that the programmes had to be improvised, leading to financial and institutional agreements outside the community method; notes, in the same vein, that the ECB has taken decisions that fall outside its mandate; recalls the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties and that this role should always have been respected; considers that only genuinely democratically accountable institutions should steer the political process of designing and implementing the adjustment programmes for countries in severe financial difficulties;

3.  Regrets the fact that the programmes in question were designed without sufficient means to assess their consequences using impact studies or through coordination with the Employment Committee, the Social Protection Committee, the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) or the Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs; regrets, too, the fact that the ILO was not consulted and that, despite the important social implications, the consultative bodies established by Treaty, in particular the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Committee of the Regions (CoR), were not consulted;

4.  Regrets that the conditionality imposed in return for the financial assistance has threatened the EU’s social objectives for several reasons:

Employment

5.  Notes that the extremely difficult economic and financial crisis and the adjustment policies in the four countries have led to increased unemployment and job loss rates, and in the numbers of long-term unemployed, and have in some cases led to worsened working conditions; points out that employment rates play an outstanding role in the sustainability of social protection and pension systems, as well as in the achievement of the Europa 2020 social and employment targets;

6.  Notes that expectations of a return to growth and job creation through internal devaluation, in order to regain competitiveness, have not been fulfilled; highlights the fact that these failed expectations reflect a tendency to underestimate the structural character of the crisis as well as the importance of maintaining domestic demand, investment and credit support to the real economy; stresses the procyclical character of the austerity measures and the fact that they haven’t been accompanied by structural changes and reforms on a case-by-case basis, in which special attention is given to vulnerable sections of society with a view to achieving growth, accompanied by social cohesion and employment;

7.  Notes that the high rates of unemployment and underemployment, combined with public and private sector pay cuts and, in some cases, a lack of effective action to combat tax evasion while lowering the contribution rates, are undermining the sustainability and adequacy of public social security systems as a result of social security funding shortfall;

8.  Notes that the worsening conditions and the loss of SMEs is one of the main causes of job losses and the biggest threat to future recovery; notes that the adjustment policies did not take into account strategic sectors which should have been considered in order to preserve future growth and social cohesion; notes that this has led to significant job losses in strategic sectors such as industry and R&D&I; points out that the four countries must make an effort to create the favourable conditions needed for companies, and SMEs in particular, to be able to develop their business sustainability in the long term; points out that many public sector jobs have been shed in basic public sectors such as health, education and social public services;

9.  Deplores the fact that it is young people who are suffering the highest levels of unemployment, with the situation in countries such as Greece (where the rate is over 50 %), Portugal and Ireland (where it was in excess of 30 % in 2012) and Cyprus (where it is about 26,4 %) being particularly serious; notes that these figures persist five years into the crisis; regrets the fact that even when young people do find a job, many of them – on average 43 %, as compared to 13 % of adult workers – often find themselves working under precarious conditions or on part-time contracts, making it difficult for them to live independently from their families, and resulting in a loss of innovation and expert resources affecting production and growth;

10.  Notes that the most vulnerable groups on the labour market – the long-term unemployed, women, migrant workers and persons with disabilities – have suffered most and are experiencing higher unemployment rates than the national averages; notes the severe rise in the long-term unemployment rate of women and senior workers, and the additional difficulties these workers will face when seeking to re-enter the labour market once the economy eventually recovers; stresses that these workers need targeted measures;

11.  Warns that, if not remedied, these huge divergences, especially in the case of the younger generation, may in the long run result in structural damage to the labour market of the four countries, limit their capacity for recovery, provoke involuntary migration that further exacerbates the effects of an ongoing brain-drain, and increase the persistent divergences between Member States supplying employment and those supplying a low-cost workforce; regrets that negative social and economic developments are amongst the main motivations for young people to migrate and to exercise their right to freedom of movement;

12.  Is concerned about the fact that, in some cases and sectors, there is, along with job losses, a decline in job quality, an increase in precarious forms of employment and a deterioration of basic labour standards; stresses that Member States need to make dedicated efforts to address the increase in involuntary part-time employment and temporary contracts, payless internships and apprenticeships, and bogus self-employment, as well as the activities of the black economy; notes, furthermore, that even though the setting of wages does not fall within the competences of the EU the programmes have had an impact on minimum wages: in Ireland it became necessary to reduce the minimum wage by nearly 12 % (a decision which, however, was later changed), and in Greece a radical cut of 22 % was decreed;

13.  Recalls that the Europe 2020 strategy accurately states that the figure to watch is the employment rate, which indicates the availability of human and financial resources to ensure the sustainability of our economic and social model; asks that the slowdown in the unemployment rate not be confused with a recovery of jobs lost as no account is taken of the increase in emigration; observes that the decline in industrial employment was a problem already before the programmes were launched; stresses that there is a need for more and better jobs; recalls that in the last four years job losses have reached 2 million in the four countries, or 15 % of the jobs that existed in 2009; welcomes the fact that recent data shows a small increase in employment figures for Ireland, Cyprus and Portugal;

Poverty and social exclusion

14.  Is concerned that, among the conditions for financial assistance, the programmes include recommendations for specific cuts in real social spending in fundamental areas, such as pensions, basic services, health care and, in some cases, pharmaceutical products for the basic protection of the most vulnerable, as well as in environmental protection, rather than recommendations allowing national governments more flexibility to decide where savings could be made; fears that the main impact of these measures is on the fight against poverty, especially child poverty; restates that fighting poverty, especially child poverty, should continue to be an objective to be achieved by the Member States and that fiscal and budgetary consolidation policies should not undermine this;

15.  Expresses its concern that, in the preparation and implementation of the economic adjustment plans, insufficient attention was given to the impact of economic policy on employment or to its social implications and that, in the case of Greece, the working hypothesis turned out to be based on a mistaken assumption regarding the economic multiplier effect, resulting in failure to act in time to protect the most vulnerable against poverty, in-work poverty and social exclusion; calls on the Commission to take account of social indicators also for the purpose of renegotiating the economic adjustment programmes and replacing the measures recommended for each Member State, with a view to ensuring the necessary conditions for growth and full compliance with the EU’s basic social principles and values;

16.  Notes that despite the fact that the Commission, in its Quarterly Review of October 2013 (“EU Employment and Social Situation”), emphasises the importance of social protection expenditure as a safeguard against social risks, since 2010 Greece, Ireland and Portugal have had the largest decreases in social spending in EU;

17.  Highlights that new forms of poverty touching the middle and working class are arising in some cases where difficulties in paying mortgages and high energy prices are creating energy poverty and increasing evictions and foreclosures; is concerned by evidence that levels of homelessness and housing exclusion are increasing; recalls that this represents a violation of fundamental rights; recommends that the Member States and their local authorities introduce neutral housing policies that favour social and affordable housing, tackle the issue of housing vacancy and implement effective prevention policies to reduce the number of evictions;

18.  Expresses concern that the (micro and macro) social and economic situation in these countries is aggravating regional and territorial disparities, thereby undermining the stated EU objective of strengthening internal regional cohesion;

19.  Notes that international and social organisations have warned that the new pay-scale, grading and dismissals system in the public sector will have a gender gap impact; notes that the ILO has expressed concern over the disproportionate impact of new flexible forms of employment on women’s pay; notes, furthermore, that the ILO has asked governments to monitor the impact of austerity on remuneration of men and women in the private sector; notes with concern that the gender pay gap has ceased to narrow in countries undergoing adjustment, where the disparities are wider than the EU average; maintains that wage inequalities and the falling female employment rate need to receive greater attention in the Member States undergoing adjustment;

20.  Notes that Eurostat and Commission figures, along with various other studies, show that, in some cases, income distribution inequality grew between 2008 and 2012, and that cuts in social and unemployment benefits, as well as wage reductions owing to structural reforms, are raising poverty levels; notes, furthermore, that the Commission report found relatively high levels of in-work poverty due to low minimum wages being cut or frozen;

21.  Regrets the fact that in most cases the level of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion has increased; notes, moreover, that these statistics hide a much harsher reality, which is that when GDP per capita falls, the poverty threshold also falls, meaning that people who until recently were considered to be in poverty are now considered to be out of poverty; points out that, in the countries undergoing adjustment and budgetary crisis, the fall in GDP, the slump in public and private investment and the drop in R&D investment are leading to a reduction of the potential GDP and creating long-term poverty;

22.  Welcomes the fact that in the aforementioned studies the Commission recognises that only a strong reversal of current trends will make it possible for the entire EU to meet the Europe 2020 targets;

23.  Regrets the fact that, for Greece, Ireland and Portugal at least, the programmes included a number of detailed prescriptions on health system reform and expenditure cuts that have had an impact on the quality and universal accessibility of social services, especially in health and social care, despite the fact that Article 168(7) TFEU establishes that the EU will respect the competences of the Member States; is concerned about the fact that this has in some cases led to a number of people being denied health insurance coverage or access to social protection , thereby increasing the risk of extreme poverty and social exclusion, as reflected in the growing number of destitute and homeless people and their lack of access to basic goods and services;

24.  Regrets that no targeted effort has been made to identify inefficiencies in health systems and in decisions to make across-the-board cuts in health budgets; warns that implementing co-payments could cause patients to delay seeking care, thereby placing the financial burden on households; cautions that salary reductions for healthcare professionals could have a negative effect on patient safety and cause migration of healthcare professionals;

25.  Reiterates that Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) provides for the right of everyone to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; notes that all four countries are signatories to the Covenant and thus have recognised the right to health for everyone;

26.  Recalls that the Council of Europe has already condemned the cuts in the Greek public pension system, considering them to be a violation of Article 12 of the 1961 European Social Charter and of Article 4 of the Protocol thereto, stating that ‘the fact that the contested provisions of domestic law seek to fulfil the requirements of other legal obligations does not remove them from the ambit of the Charter’(12); notes that this doctrine of maintaining the pension system at a satisfactory level to allow pensioners a decent life is generally applicable in all four countries and should have been taken into consideration;

27.  Deplores cuts to resources for independent living for persons with disabilities;

28.  Points out that when the ILO’s Expert Committee evaluated the application of Convention No 102 in the case of the Greek reforms, it strongly criticised the radical reforms of the pension system, and that this same critical observation was included in its 29th annual report 2011; recalls that Convention No 102 is generally applicable in all four countries and should have been taken into consideration;

29.  Stresses that the increasing social poverty in the four countries is also producing an increase in solidarity among the most vulnerable groups, thanks to private efforts, family networks and aid organisations; stresses that this type of intervention should not become the structural solution to the problem, even if it alleviates the situation for the most deprived and shows the qualities of the European citizenship;

30.  Notes with concern the steady rise in the Gini coefficient against the general downward trend in the Eurozone, which means that there has been a significant increase in wealth distribution inequalities in the adjustment countries;

Early school-leaving

31.  Welcomes the fact that the levels of early school-leavers are falling in the four countries; notes, that this may be partially explained by the difficulties young people are facing in finding employment; recalls the urgent need to recover quality vocational training systems, since this is one of the best ways to improve young people’s employability;

32.  Welcomes the fact that tertiary education attainment levels have been rising in all four countries; notes that this may partially be explained by the need for young people to improve their future labour market chances;

33.  Regrets that, mainly due to the cuts in public funding, the quality of the education systems is not following this positive path, exacerbating the problems faced by young persons not in education, employment or training (‘NEETs’) and by children with special needs; notes that these measures could have practical implications for the quality of education as well as on the material and human resources available, class sizes, curricula and school concentration;

Social dialogue

34.  Stresses that the social partners at national level should have been consulted or involved in the initial design of programmes; regrets the fact that the programmes designed for the four countries in some cases allow firms to opt out of collective bargaining agreements and to review sectorial wage agreements, which has direct consequences for the structure and values of collective bargaining arrangements set out in the respective national constitutions; notes that the ILO Expert Committee has requested that the social dialogue be re-established; condemns the undermining of the principle of collective representation, which puts into question the automatic renewal of bargaining agreements that, in some countries, is important, as a consequence of which the number of collective agreements in force has fallen substantially; condemns the cut in minimum wages and the freezing of nominal minimum wages; stresses that this situation is the consequence of having limited structural reforms involving only the deregulation of labour relations and wage cuts, which runs counter to the EU’s general objectives and the policies of the Europe 2020 strategy;

35.  Points out that there is no single solution that can be applied across all the Member States;

Recommendations

36.  Calls on the Commission to carry out a detailed study of the social and economic consequences of the economic and financial crisis, and the adjustment programmes carried out in response to it in the four countries, in order to provide a precise understanding of both the short-term and long-term effects on employment and social protection systems, and on the European social acquis, with particular regard to the fight against poverty, the maintenance of good social dialogue and the balance between flexibility and security in labour relations; calls on the Commission to use its consultative bodies when drafting this study, as well as the Employment Committee and the Social Protection Committee; suggests that the EESC be asked to draft a specific report;

37.  Invites the Commission to ask the ILO and the Council of Europe to draft reports on possible corrective measures and incentives needed to improve the social situation in these countries, their funding and the sustainability of public finances, and to ensure full compliance with the European Social Charter, with the Protocol thereto and with the ILO’s Core Conventions and its Convention 94, since the obligations deriving from these instruments have been affected by the economic and financial crisis and by the budgetary adjustment measures and the structural reforms requested by the Troika;

38.  Calls on the EU, taking into account the sacrifices that these countries have made, to provide support, after the assessment and with sufficient financial resources where appropriate, for the recovery of social protection standards, the fight against poverty reduction, the support of education services, in particular those targeting children with special needs and persons with disabilities, and the renewal of social dialogue through a social recovery plan; calls on the Commission, the ECB and the Eurogroup to review and revise, where appropriate and as soon as possible, the exceptional measures that have been put in place;

39.  Calls for compliance with aforementioned legal obligations laid down in the Treaties, and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as failure to comply constitutes an infringement of EU primary law; calls on the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights to assess thoroughly the impact of the measures on human rights and to issue recommendations in case of breaches of the Charter;

40.  Calls on the Troika and the Member States concerned to end the programmes as soon as possible and to put in place crisis management mechanisms enabling all EU institutions, including Parliament, to achieve the social goals and policies – also those relating to the individual and collective rights of those at greatest risk of social exclusion – set out in the Treaties, in European social partner agreements and in other international obligations (ILO Conventions, the European Social Charter and the European Convention of Human Rights); calls for increased transparency and political ownership in the design and implementation of the adjustment programmes;

41.  Calls on the Commission and the Council to give the same attention to social imbalances, and to correcting them, as it does to macroeconomic imbalances, and to see to it that adjustment measures seek to ensure social justice and enable a balance between economic growth and employment, the implementation of structural reforms and budget consolidation; calls, furthermore, on both institutions to prioritise employment creation and entrepreneurship support, and, to that end, to pay as much attention to EPSCO and its priorities as to ECOFIN and the Eurogroup and, whenever necessary, to hold a Eurogroup employment and social affairs ministers’ meeting prior to euro summits;

42.  Recommends that the Commission and the Member States consider public health and education spending not as a spending exposed to cuts but as a public investment in the future of the country, to be respected and increased so as to improve its economic and social recovery;

43.  Recommends that once the hardest moment of the financial crisis has passed, the programme countries should, together with the EU institutions, put in place job recovery plans to restore their economies sufficiently to recover the social situation of the pre-programme period, since this is necessary if their macroeconomic adjustment is to be consolidated and the imbalances of their public sectors, such as the debt and the deficit, to be equilibrated; stresses that job recovery plans must be put in place that take into account:

44.  Calls on the Commission to present a report on the progress made towards the Europa 2020 targets, with specific attention to the lack of progress in programme countries, and to come forward with proposals to put these countries on a credible path towards all Europa 2020 targets;

45.  Recommends that future Member States’ labour reforms take into account the flexicurity criteria for boosting companies’ competitiveness spelled out in the Europa 2020 Strategy, taking into account other elements such as energy costs, unfair competition, social dumping, a fair and efficient financial system, fiscal policies in favour of growth and employment, and, in general, everything which helps the real economy and entrepreneurship to develop; calls on the Commission to carry out social impact assessments prior to imposing major reforms in the programme countries and to consider the spill-over effects of these measures, such as the effect on poverty, social exclusion, crime rates and xenophobia;

46.  Calls for urgent measures to prevent the increase of homelessness in programme countries, and calls on the Commission to support this through policy analysis and the promotion of good practices;

47.  Notes that according to Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 the Commission shall issue a report to Parliament before 1 January 2014 on the application of this regulation; calls on the Commission to present this report without delay and to include the implications of this regulation for the economic adjustment programmes in place;

48.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to consult with civil society, patient organisations and professional bodies for future measures related to health in adjustment programmes, and to make use of the Social Protection Committee, so as to ensure that the reforms increase the efficiency of the systems and the resources without endangering the most vulnerable groups and the most important social protection, including the acquisition and the use of medicines, the most basic needs and the consideration of the health staff;

o
o   o

49.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) http://www.coe.int/T/DGHL/Monitoring/SocialCharter/NewsCOEPortal/CC76-80Merits_en.asp (2) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0401. (3) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0328. (4) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0246. (5) OJ C 249 E, 30.8.2013, p. 4. (6) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0447. (7) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0515. (8) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0430. (9) OJ C 153 E, 31.5.2013, p. 57. (10) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0419. (11) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0266. (12) European Committee of Social Rights, Decision of Merits, 7 December 2012, Complaint No 78/2012, p. 10.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down general provisions on the Asylum and Migration Fund and on the instrument for financial support for police cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and crisis management (COM(2011)0752 – C7-0444/2011 – 2011/0367(COD))

P7_TA(2014)0241 A7-0021/2014

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2011)0752),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 78(2), 79(2) and (4), 82(1), 84 and 87(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C7‑0444/2011),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 11 July 2012(1),

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 18 July 2012(2),

–  having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 20 December 2013 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Budgets (A7-0021/2014),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Takes note of the Commission statements annexed to this resolution;

3.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it intends to amend its proposal substantially or replace it with another text;

4.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 13 March 2014 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) No .../2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down general provisions on the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and on the instrument for financial support for police cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and crisis management

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) No 514/2014.)

ANNEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

Statement by the Commission on the adoption of national programmes

The Commission will use its best efforts to inform the European Parliament in advance of the adoption of the national programmes.

Statement by the Commission on Article 5 § 4, subparagraph 2, point b of Regulation 182/2011

The Commission underlines that it is contrary to the letter and to the spirit of Regulation 182/2011 (OJ L 55 of 28.2.2011, p. 13) to invoke Article 5 § 4, subparagraph 2, point b) in a systematic manner. Recourse to this provision must respond to a specific need to depart from the rule of principle which is that the Commission may adopt a draft implementing act when no opinion is delivered. Given that it is an exception to the general rule established by Article 5 § 4 recourse to subparagraph 2, point b), cannot be simply seen as a "discretionary power" of the Legislator, but must be interpreted in a restrictive manner and thus must be justified.

(1) OJ C 299, 4.10.2012, p. 108. (2) OJ C 277, 13.9.2012, p. 23.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing, as part of the Internal Security Fund, the instrument for financial support for police cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and crisis management (COM(2011)0753 – C7-0445/2011 – 2011/0368(COD))

P7_TA(2014)0242 A7-0026/2014

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2011)0753),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 82(1), 84 and 87(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C7-0445/2011),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 11 July 2012(1)

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 18 July 2012(2),

–  having regard to its decision of 17 January 2013 on the opening of, and the mandate for, interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal(3),

–  having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 11 December 2013 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Budgets (A7-0026/2014),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it intends to amend its proposal substantially or replace it with another text;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 13 March 2014 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) No .../2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing, as part of the Internal Security Fund, the instrument for financial support for police cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and crisis management and repealing Council Decision 2007/125/JHA

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) No 513/2014.)

(1) OJ C 299, 4.10.2012, p. 108. (2) OJ C 277, 13.9.2012, p. 23. (3) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0021.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing, as part of the Internal Security Fund, the instrument for financial support for external borders and visa (COM(2011)0750 – C7-0441/2011 – 2011/0365(COD))

P7_TA(2014)0243 A7-0025/2014

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2011)0750),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 77(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C7‑0441/2011),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 11 July 2012(1),

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 18 July 2012(2),

–  having regard to its decision of 17 January 2013 on the opening of, and the mandate for, interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal(3),

–  having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 4 December 2013 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Budgets (A7-0025/2014),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it intends to amend its proposal substantially or replace it with another text;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 13 March 2014 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) No .../2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing, as part of the Internal Security Fund, the instrument for financial support for external borders and visa and repealing Decision No 574/2007/EC

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) No 515/2014.)

(1) OJ C 299, 4.10.2012, p. 108. (2) OJ C 277, 13.9.2012, p. 23. (3) Texts adopted P7_TA(2013)0019.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 March 2014 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to ensure a high common level of network and information security across the Union (COM(2013)0048 – C7-0035/2013 – 2013/0027(COD))

P7_TA(2014)0244 A7-0103/2014

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2013)0048),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C7‑0035/2013),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the reasoned opinion submitted, within the framework of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, by the Swedish Parliament, asserting that the draft legislative act does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 22 May 2013(1),

–  having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2013 on a Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace(2),

–  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection and the opinions of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A7-0103/2014),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it intends to amend its proposal substantially or replace it with another text;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 13 March 2014 with a view to the adoption of Directive 2014/.../EU of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to ensure a high common level of network and information security across the Union

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee(3),

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure(4),

Whereas:

(1)  Network and information systems and services play a vital role in society. Their reliability and security are essential to the freedom and overall security of Union citizens as well as to economic activities and social welfare, and in particular to the functioning of the internal market. [Am.  1]

(2)  The magnitude and, frequency and impact of deliberate or accidental security incidents is increasing and represents a major threat to the functioning of networks and information systems. Those systems may also become an easy target for deliberate harmful actions intended to damage or interrupt the operation of the systems. Such incidents can impede the pursuit of economic activities, generate substantial financial losses, undermine user and investor confidence and cause major damage to the economy of the Union and, ultimately, endanger the wellbeing of Union citizens and the ability of Member States to protect themselves and ensure the security of critical infrastructures. [Am.  2]

(3)  As a communication instrument without frontiers, digital information systems, and primarily the Internet, play an essential role in facilitating the cross-border movement of goods, services and people. Due to that transnational nature, substantial disruption of those systems in one Member State can also affect other Member States and the Union as a whole. The resilience and stability of network and information systems is therefore essential to the smooth functioning of the internal market.

(3a)  Since common causes of system failure continue to be unintentional ones, such as natural causes or human error, infrastructure should be resilient both to intentional and unintentional disruptions, and operators of critical infrastructure should design resilience-based systems. [Am.  3]

(4)  A cooperation mechanism should be established at Union level to allow for information exchange and coordinated prevention, detection and response regarding network and information security (‘NIS’). For that mechanism to be effective and inclusive, it is essential that all Member States have minimum capabilities and a strategy ensuring a high level of NIS in their territory. Minimum security requirements should also apply to public administrations and at least certain market operators of critical information infrastructure to promote a culture of risk management and ensure that the most serious incidents are reported. Companies listed on the stock markets should be encouraged to make incidents public in their financial reports on a voluntary basis. The legal framework should be based upon the need to safeguard the privacy and integrity of citizens. The Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN) should be expanded to the market operators covered by this Directive. [Am.  4]

(4a)  While public administrations, because of their public mission, should exercise due diligence in the management and the protection of their own network and information systems, this Directive should focus on critical infrastructure essential for the maintenance of vital economic and societal activities in the fields of energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructures and health. Software developers and hardware manufacturers should be excluded from the scope of this Directive. [Am.  5]

(4b)  Cooperation and coordination between the relevant Union authorities with the High Representative/Vice President, with the responsibility for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy, as well as the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator should be ensured where incidents having a significant impact are perceived to be of an external and terrorist nature. [Am.  6]

(5)  To cover all relevant incidents and risks, this Directive should apply to all network and information systems. The obligations on public administrations and market operators should, however, not apply to undertakings providing public communication networks or publicly available electronic communication services within the meaning of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(5), which are subject to the specific security and integrity requirements laid down in Article 13a of that Directive nor should they apply to trust service providers.

(6)  The existing capabilities are not sufficient enough to ensure a high level of NIS within the Union. Member States have very different levels of preparedness leading to fragmented approaches across the Union. This leads to an unequal level of protection of consumers and businesses, and undermines the overall level of NIS within the Union. Lack of common minimum requirements on public administrations and market operators in turn makes it impossible to set up a global and effective mechanism for cooperation at Union level. Universities and research centres have a decisive role in spurring research, development and innovation in those areas and should be provided with adequate funding. [Am.  7]

(7)  Responding effectively to the challenges of the security of network and information systems therefore requires a global approach at Union level covering common minimum capacity building and planning requirements, developing sufficient cyber security skills, exchange of information and coordination of actions, and common minimum security requirements for all market operators concerned and public administrations. Minimum common standards should be applied in accordance with appropriate recommendations by the Cyber Security Coordination Groups (CSGCs). [Am.  8]

(8)  The provisions of this Directive should be without prejudice to the possibility for each Member State to take the necessary measures to ensure the protection of its essential security interests, to safeguard public policy and public security, and to permit the investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences. In accordance with Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), no Member State is to be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security. No Member State is obliged to disclose EU classified information as defined in Council Decision 2011/292/EU(6), information subject to non-disclosure agreements or informal non-disclosure agreements, such as the Traffic Light Protocol. [Am.  9]

(9)  To achieve and maintain a common high level of security of network and information systems, each Member State should have a national NIS strategy defining the strategic objectives and concrete policy actions to be implemented. NIS cooperation plans complying with essential requirements need to be developed at national level, on the basis of minimum requirements set out in this Directive, in order to reach capacity response levels allowing for effective and efficient cooperation at national and Union level in case of incidents, respecting and protecting private life and personal data. Each Member State should therefore be obliged to meet common standards regarding data format and the exchangeability of data to be shared and evaluated. Member States should be able to ask for the assistance of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) in developing their national NIS strategies, based on a common minimum NIS strategy blueprint. [Am.  10]

(10)  To allow for the effective implementation of the provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive, a body responsible for coordinating NIS issues and acting as a focal point for cross-border cooperation at Union level should be established or identified in each Member State. Those bodies should be given the adequate technical, financial and human resources to ensure that they can carry out in an effective and efficient manner the tasks assigned to them and thus achieve the objectives of this Directive.

(10a)  In view of the differences in national governance structures and in order to safeguard pre-existing sectoral arrangements or Union supervisory and regulatory bodies, and to avoid duplication, Member States should be able to designate more than one national competent authority in charge of fulfilling the tasks linked to the security of the networks and information systems of market operators under this Directive. However, in order to ensure smooth cross-border cooperation and communication, it is necessary for each Member State, without prejudice to sectoral regulatory arrangements, to designate only one national single point of contact in charge of cross-border cooperation at Union level. Where its constitutional structure or other arrangements so require, a Member State should be able to designate only one authority to carry out the tasks of the competent authority and the single point of contact. The competent authorities and the single points of contact should be civilian bodies, subject to full democratic oversight and should not fulfil any tasks in the field of intelligence, law enforcement or defence or be organisationally linked in any form to bodies active in those fields. [Am.  11]

(11)  All Member States and market operators should be adequately equipped, both in terms of technical and organisational capabilities, to prevent, detect, respond to and mitigate network and information systems' incidents and risks at any time. The security systems of public administrations should be safe and subject to democratic control and scrutiny. Commonly required equipment and capabilities should comply with commonly agreed technical standards as well as standards procedures of operation (SPO). Well-functioning Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) complying with essential requirements should therefore be established in all Member States to guarantee effective and compatible capabilities to deal with incidents and risks and ensure efficient cooperation at Union level. Those CERTs should be enabled to interact on the basis of common technical standards and SPO. In view of the different characteristics of existing CERTs, which respond to different subject needs and actors, Member States should guarantee that each of the sectors referred to in the list of market operators set out in this Directive is provided services by at least one CERT. Regarding cross-border CERT cooperation, Member States should ensure that CERTs have sufficient means to participate in the existing international and Union cooperation networks already in place. [Am.  12]

(12)  Building upon the significant progress within the European Forum of Member States (‘EFMS’) in fostering discussions and exchanges on good policy practices including the development of principles for European cyber crisis cooperation, the Member States and the Commission should form a network to bring them into permanent communication and support their cooperation. This secure and effective cooperation mechanism, including the participation of market operators, where appropriate, should enable structured and coordinated information exchange, detection and response at Union level. [Am.  13]

(13)  The European Network and Information Security Agency (‘ENISA’) should assist the Member States and the Commission by providing its expertise and advice and by facilitating exchange of best practices. In particular, in the application of this Directive, the Commission and Member States should consult ENISA. To ensure effective and timely information to the Member States and the Commission, early warnings on incidents and risks should be notified within the cooperation network. To build capacity and knowledge among Member States, the cooperation network should also serve as an instrument for the exchange of best practices, assisting its members in building capacity, steering the organisation of peer reviews and NIS exercises. [Am.  14]

(13a)  Where appropriate, Member States should be able to use or adapt existing organisational structures or strategies when applying the provisions of this Directive. [Am.  15]

(14)  A secure information-sharing infrastructure should be put in place to allow for the exchange of sensitive and confidential information within the cooperation network. Existing structures within the Union should be fully used for that purpose. Without prejudice to their obligation to notify incidents and risks of Union dimension to the cooperation network, access to confidential information from other Member States should only be granted to Members States upon demonstration that their technical, financial and human resources and processes, as well as their communication infrastructure, guarantee their effective, efficient and secure participation in the network, using transparent methods. [Am.  16]

(15)  As most network and information systems are privately operated, cooperation between the public and private sector is essential. Market operators should be encouraged to pursue their own informal cooperation mechanisms to ensure NIS. They should also cooperate with the public sector and mutually share information and best practices in including the reciprocal exchange of relevant information and operational support and strategically analysed information, in case of incidents. To effectively encourage the sharing of information and of best practices, it is essential to ensure that market operators who participate in such exchanges are not disadvantaged as a result of their cooperation. Adequate safeguards are needed to ensure that such cooperation will not expose those operators to higher compliance risk or new liabilities under, inter alia, competition, intellectual property, data protection or cybercrime law, nor expose them to increased operational or security risks. [Am.  17]

(16)  To ensure transparency and properly inform Union citizens and market operators, the competent authorities single points of contact should set up a common Union-wide website to publish non confidential information on the incidents and, risks and means of risk mitigation, and where necessary advise on appropriate maintenance measures. The information on the website should be accessible irrespective of the device used. Any personal data published on that website should be limited only to what is necessary and should be as anonymous as possible. [Am.  18]

(17)  Where information is considered confidential in accordance with Union and national rules on business confidentiality, such confidentiality shall be ensured when carrying out the activities and fulfilling the objectives set by this Directive.

(18)  On the basis in particular of national crisis management experiences and in cooperation with ENISA, the Commission and the Member States should develop a Union NIS cooperation plan defining cooperation mechanisms, best practices and operation patterns to prevent, detect, report, and counter risks and incidents. That plan should be duly taken into account in the operation of early warnings within the cooperation network. [Am.  19]

(19)  Notification of an early warning within the network should be required only where the scale and severity of the incident or risk concerned are or may become so significant that information or coordination of the response at Union level is necessary. Early warnings should therefore be limited to actual or potential incidents or risks that grow rapidly, exceed national response capacity or affect more than one Member State. To allow for a proper evaluation, all information relevant for the assessment of the risk or incident should be communicated to the cooperation network. [Am.  20]

(20)  Upon receipt of an early warning and its assessment, the competent authorities single points of contact should agree on a coordinated response under the Union NIS cooperation plan. Competent authorities The single points of contact, ENISA and the Commission should be informed about the measures adopted at national level as a result of the coordinated response. [Am.  21]

(21)  Given the global nature of NIS problems, there is a need for closer international cooperation to improve security standards and information exchange, and promote a common global approach to NIS issues. Any framework for such international cooperation should be subject to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(7) and Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8). [Am.  22]

(22)  Responsibility for ensuring NIS lies to a great extent with public administrations and market operators. A culture of risk management, close cooperation and trust, involving risk assessment and the implementation of security measures appropriate to the risks faced and incidents, whether deliberate or accidental, should be promoted and developed through appropriate regulatory requirements and voluntary industry practices. Establishing a trustworthy level playing field is also essential to the effective functioning of the cooperation network to ensure effective cooperation from all Member States. [Am.  23]

(23)  Directive 2002/21/EC requires that undertakings providing public electronic communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services take appropriate measures to safeguard their integrity and security and introduces security breach and integrity loss notification requirements. Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(9) requires a provider of a publicly available electronic communications service to take appropriate technical and organisational measures to safeguard the security of its services.

(24)  Those obligations should be extended beyond the electronic communications sector to operators of infrastructure which rely heavily on information and communications technology and are essential to the maintenance of vital economic or societal functions such as electricity and gas, transport, credit institutions, financial market infrastructures and health. Disruption of those network and information systems would affect the internal market. While the obligations set out in this Directive should not extend to key providers of information society services, as defined in Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(10), which underpin downstream information society services or on-line activities, such as e-commerce platforms, Internet payment gateways, social networks, search engines, cloud computing services, in general or application stores. Disruption of these enabling information society services prevents the provision of other information society services which rely on them as key inputs. Software developers and hardware manufacturers are not providers of information society services and are therefore excluded. Those obligations should also be extended to public administrations, and operators of critical infrastructure which rely heavily on information and communications technology and are essential to the maintenance of vital economical or societal functions such as electricity and gas, transport, credit institutions, stock exchange and health. Disruption of those network and information systems would affect the internal market., those providers might, on a voluntary basis, inform the competent authority or single point of contact of those network security incidents they deem appropriate. The competent authority or the single point of contact should, if possible, present the market operators that informed it of the incident with strategically analysed information that will help to overcome the security threat. [Am.  24]

(24a)  While hardware and software providers are not market operators comparable to those covered in this Directive, their products facilitate the security of network and information systems. They therefore have an important role in enabling market operators to secure their network and information infrastructures. Given that hardware and software products are already subject to existing rules on product liability, Member States should ensure that those rules are enforced. [Am.  25]

(25)  Technical and organisational measures imposed on public administrations and market operators should not require that a particular commercial information and communications technology product be designed, developed or manufactured in a particular manner. [Am.  26]

(26)  The public administrations and market operators should ensure security of the networks and systems which are under their control. These would be primarily private networks and systems managed either by their internal IT staff or the security of which has been outsourced. The security and notification obligations should apply to the relevant market operators and public administrations regardless of whether they perform the maintenance of their network and information systems internally or outsource it. [Am.  27]

(27)  To avoid imposing a disproportionate financial and administrative burden on small operators and users, the requirements should be proportionate to the risk presented by the network or information system concerned, taking into account the state of the art of such measures. Those requirements should not apply to micro enterprises.

(28)  Competent authorities and single points of contact should pay due attention to preserving informal and trusted channels of information-sharing between market operators and between the public and the private sectors. Competent authorities and single points of contact should inform manufacturers and service providers of affected ICT products and services about incidents having a significant impact notified to them. Publicity of incidents reported to the competent authorities and single points of contact should duly balance the interest of the public in being informed about threats with possible reputational and commercial damages for the public administrations and market operators reporting incidents. In the implementation of the notification obligations, competent authorities and single points of contact should pay particular attention to the need to maintain information about product vulnerabilities strictly confidential prior to the release deployment of appropriate security fixes. As a general rule, single points of contact should not disclose the personal data of individuals involved in incidents. Single points of contact should only disclose personal data where the disclosure of such data is necessary and proportionate in view of the objective pursued. [Am.  28]

(29)  Competent authorities should have the necessary means to perform their duties, including powers to obtain sufficient information from market operators and public administrations in order to assess the level of security of network and information systems, measure the number, scale and scope of incidents, as well as reliable and comprehensive data about actual incidents that have had an impact on the operation of network and information systems. [Am.  29]

(30)  Criminal activities are in many cases underlying an incident. The criminal nature of incidents can be suspected even if the evidence to support it may not be sufficiently clear from the start. In this context, appropriate co-operation between competent authorities, single points of contact and law enforcement authorities as well as cooperation with the EC3 (Europol Cybercrime Centre) and ENISA should form part of an effective and comprehensive response to the threat of security incidents. In particular, promoting a safe, secure and more resilient environment requires a systematic reporting of incidents of a suspected serious criminal nature to law enforcement authorities. The serious criminal nature of incidents should be assessed in the light of Union laws on cybercrime. [Am.  30]

(31)  Personal data are in many cases compromised as a result of incidents. Member States and market operators should protect personal data stored, processed or transmitted against accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alteration, and unauthorised or unlawful storage, access, disclosure or dissemination; and ensure the implementation of a security policy with respect to the processing of personal data. In this context, competent authorities, single points of contact and data protection authorities should cooperate and exchange information on all relevant matters including, where appropriate, with market operators, in order to tackle the personal data breaches resulting from incidents in accordance with applicable data protection rules. Member states shall implement The obligation to notify security incidents should be carried out in a way that minimises the administrative burden in case the security incident is also a personal data breach in line with the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data(11). Liaising with the competent authorities and the data protection authorities, that has to be notified in accordance with Union data protection law. ENISA could should assist by developing information exchange mechanisms and templates avoiding the need for two notification templates. This a single notification template that would facilitate the reporting of incidents compromising personal data, thereby easing the administrative burden on businesses and public administrations. [Am.  31]

(32)  Standardisation of security requirements is a market-driven process of a voluntary nature that should allow market operators to use alternative means to achieve at least similar outcomes. To ensure a convergent application of security standards, Member States should encourage compliance or conformity with specified interoperable standards to ensure a high level of security at Union level. To this end, it the application of open international standards on network information security or the design of such tools need to be considered. Another necessary step forward might be necessary to draft harmonised standards, which should be done in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council(12). In particular, ETSI, CEN and CENELEC should be mandated to suggest effective and efficient Union open security standards, where technological preferences are avoided as much as possible, and which should be made easily manageable by small and medium-sized market operators. International standards pertaining to cybersecurity should be carefully vetted in order to ensure that they have not been compromised and that they provide adequate levels of security, thus making sure that the mandated compliance with cybersecurity standards enhances the overall level of cybersecurity of the Union and not the contrary. [Am.  32]

(33)  The Commission should periodically review this Directive, in consultation with all interested stakeholders, in particular with a view to determining the need for modification in the light of changing societal, political, technological or market conditions. [Am.  33]

(34)  In order to allow for the proper functioning of the cooperation network, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the definition of the criteria to be fulfilled for a Member State to be authorized to participate to common set of interconnection and security standards for the secure information-sharing system, of the infrastructure and the further specification of the triggering events for early warning, and of the definition of the circumstances in which market operators and public administrations are required to notify incidents. [Am.  34]

(35)  It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level. The Commission, when preparing and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure a simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of relevant documents to the European Parliament and to the Council.

(36)  In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Directive, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission as regards the cooperation between competent authorities single points of contact and the Commission within the cooperation network, the access to the secure information-sharing infrastructure without prejudice to existing cooperation mechanisms at national level, the Union NIS cooperation plan, and the formats and procedures applicable to informing the public about the notification of incidents, and the standards and/or technical specifications relevant to NIS having a significant impact. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council(13). [Am.  35]

(37)  In the application of this Directive, the Commission should liaise as appropriate with relevant sectoral committees and relevant bodies set up at Union level in particular in the fields of e-government, energy, transport and, health and defence. [Am.  36]

(38)  Information that is considered confidential by a competent authority or a single point of contact, in accordance with Union and national rules on business confidentiality, should be exchanged with the Commission, its relevant agencies, single points of contact and/or other national competent authorities only where such exchange is strictly necessary for the application of this Directive. The information exchanged should be limited to that which is relevant, necessary and proportionate to the purpose of such exchange, and should respect pre-defined criteria for confidentiality and security, in accordance with Decision 2011/292/EU, information subject to non-disclosure agreements and informal non-disclosure agreements, such as the Traffic Light Protocol. [Am.  37]

(39)  The sharing of information on risks and incidents within the cooperation network and compliance with the requirements to notify incidents to the national competent authorities or single points of contact may require the processing of personal data. Such a processing of personal data is necessary to meet the objectives of public interest pursued by this Directive and is thus legitimate under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC. It does not constitute, in relation to those legitimate aims, a disproportionate and intolerable interference impairing the very substance of the right to the protection of personal data guaranteed by Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In the application of this Directive, Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council(14) should apply as appropriate. When data are processed by Union institutions and bodies, such processing for the purpose of implementing this Directive should comply with Regulation (EC) No 45/2001. [Am.  38]

(40)  Since the objective of this Directive, namely to ensure a high level of NIS in the Union, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States alone but can rather, by reason of the effects of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

(41)  This Directive respects the fundamental rights, and observes the principles, recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular the right to respect for private life and communications, the protection for personal data, the freedom to conduct a business, the right to property, the right to an effective remedy before a court and the right to be heard. This Directive must be implemented in accordance with those rights and principles.

(41a)  In accordance with the Joint Political Declaration of Member States and the Commission on explanatory documents of 28 September 2011, Member States have undertaken to accompany, in justified cases, the notification of their transposition measures with one or more documents explaining the relationship between the components of a directive and the corresponding parts of national transposition instruments. With regard to this Directive, the legislator considers the transmission of such documents to be justified. [Am.  39]

(41b)  The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 28(2) of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and delivered an opinion on 14 June 2013(15),

HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1

Subject matter and scope

1.  This Directive lays down measures to ensure a high common level of network and information security ("NIS") within the Union.

2.  To that end, this Directive:

(a)  lays down obligations for all Member States concerning the prevention, the handling of and the response to risks and incidents affecting networks and information systems;

(b)  creates a cooperation mechanism between Member States in order to ensure a uniform application of this Directive within the Union and, where necessary, a coordinated and, efficient and effective handling of and response to risks and incidents affecting network and information systems with the participation of relevant stakeholders; [Am.  40]

(c)  establishes security requirements for market operators and public administrations. [Am.  41]

3.  The security requirements provided for in Article 14 of this Directive shall apply neither to undertakings providing public communication networks or publicly available electronic communication services within the meaning of Directive 2002/21/EC, which shall comply with the specific security and integrity requirements laid down in Articles 13a and 13b of that Directive, nor to trust service providers.

4.  This Directive shall be without prejudice to Union laws on cybercrime and Council Directive 2008/114/EC(16).

5.  This Directive shall also be without prejudice to Directive 95/46/EC, to Directive 2002/58/EC and to Regulation (EC) No 45/2001. Any use of the personal data shall be limited to what is strictly necessary for the purposes of this Directive, and those data shall be as anonymous as possible, if not completely anonymous. [Am.  42]

6.  The sharing of information within the cooperation network under Chapter III and the notifications of NIS incidents under Article 14 may require the processing of personal data. Such processing, which is necessary to meet the objectives of public interest pursued by this Directive, shall be authorised by the Member State pursuant to Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC and Directive 2002/58/EC, as implemented in national law.

Article 1a

Protection and processing of personal data

1.  Any processing of personal data in the Member States pursuant to this Directive shall be carried out in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC and Directive 2002/58/EC.

2.  Any processing of personal data by the Commission and ENISA pursuant to this Regulation shall be carried out in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 45/2001.

3.  Any processing of personal data by the European Cybercrime Centre within Europol for the purposes of this Directive shall be carried out pursuant to Council Decision 2009/371/JHA(17).

4.  The processing of personal data shall be fair and lawful and strictly limited to the minimum data needed for the purposes for which they are processed. They shall be kept in a form which permits the identification of data subjects for no longer than necessary for the purpose for which the personal data are processed.

5.  Incident notifications referred to in Article 14 of this Directive shall be without prejudice to the provisions and obligations regarding personal data breach notifications set out in Article 4 of Directive 2002/58/EC and in Commission Regulation (EU) No 611/2013(18). [Am.  43]

Article 2

Minimum harmonisation

Member States shall not be prevented from adopting or maintaining provisions ensuring a higher level of security, without prejudice to their obligations under Union law.

Article 3

Definitions

For the purpose of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply:

(1)  "network and information system" means:

(a)  an electronic communications network within the meaning of Directive 2002/21/EC, and

(b)  any device or group of inter-connected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a program, perform automatic processing of computer digital data, as well as [Am.  44]

(c)  computer digital data stored, processed, retrieved or transmitted by elements covered under points (a) and (b) for the purposes of their operation, use, protection and maintenance; [Am.  45]

(2)  "security" means the ability of a network and information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accident or malicious action that compromises the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted data or the related services offered by or accessible via that network and information system; "security" includes appropriate technical devices, solutions and operating procedures ensuring the security requirements set out in this Directive; [Am.  46]

(3)  "risk" means any reasonably identifiable circumstance or event having a potential adverse effect on security; [Am.  47]

(4)  "incident" means any circumstance or event having an actual adverse effect on security; [Am.  48]

(5)  "information society service" mean service within the meaning of point (2) of Article 1 of Directive 98/34/EC; [Am.  49]

(6)  "NIS cooperation plan" means a plan establishing the framework for organisational roles, responsibilities and procedures to maintain or restore the operation of networks and information systems, in the event of a risk or an incident affecting them;

(7)  "incident handling" means all procedures supporting the detection, prevention, analysis, containment and response to an incident; [Am.  50]

(8)  "market operator" means:

(a)  provider of information society services which enable the provision of other information society services, a non exhaustive list of which is set out in Annex II; [Am.  51]

(b)  operator of critical infrastructure that are essential for the maintenance of vital economic and societal activities in the fields of energy, transport, banking, stock exchanges financial market infrastructures, internet exchange points, food supply chain and health, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions, a non-exhaustive list of which is set out in Annex II, insofar as the network and information systems concerned are related to its core services; [Am.  52]

(8a)  "incident having a significant impact" means an incident affecting the security and continuity of an information network or system that leads to the major disruption of vital economic or societal functions; [Am.  53]

(9)  "standard" means a standard referred to in Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012;

(10)  "specification" means a specification referred to in Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012;

(11)  "Trust service provider" means a natural or legal person who provides any electronic service consisting in the creation, verification, validation, handling and preservation of electronic signatures, electronic seals, electronic time stamps, electronic documents, electronic delivery services, website authentication, and electronic certificates, including certificates for electronic signature and for electronic seals;

(11a)  "regulated market" means regulated market as defined in point 14 of Article 4 of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(19); [Am.  54]

(11b)  "multilateral trading facility (MTF)" means multilateral trading facility as defined in point 15 of Article 4 of Directive 2004/39/EC; [Am.  55]

(11c)  "organised trading facility" means a multilateral system or facility, which is not a regulated market, a multilateral trading facility or a central counterparty, operated by an investment firm or a market operator, in which multiple third-party buying and selling interests in bonds, structured finance products, emission allowances or derivatives are able to interact in the system in such a way as to result in a contract in accordance with Title II of Directive 2004/39/EC. [Am.  56]

CHAPTER II

NATIONAL FRAMEWORKS ON NETWORK AND INFORMATION SECURITY

Article 4

Principle

Member States shall ensure a high level of security of the network and information systems in their territories in accordance with this Directive.

Article 5

National NIS strategy and national NIS cooperation plan

1.  Each Member State shall adopt a national NIS strategy defining the strategic objectives and concrete policy and regulatory measures to achieve and maintain a high level of network and information security. The national NIS strategy shall address in particular the following issues:

(a)  The definition of the objectives and priorities of the strategy based on an up-to-date risk and incident analysis;

(b)  A governance framework to achieve the strategy objectives and priorities, including a clear definition of the roles and responsibilities of the government bodies and the other relevant actors;

(c)  The identification of the general measures on preparedness, response and recovery, including cooperation mechanisms between the public and private sectors;

(d)  An indication of the education, awareness raising and training programmes;

(e)  Research and development plans and a description of how these plans reflect the identified priorities;

(ea)  Member States may request the assistance of ENISA in developing their national NIS strategies and national NIS cooperation plans, based on a common minimum NIS strategy. [Am.  57]

2.  The national NIS strategy shall include a national NIS cooperation plan complying at least with the following requirements:

(a)  A risk management framework to establish a methodology for the identification, prioritisation, evaluation and treatment of risks, the assessment plan to identify risks and assess of the impacts of potential incidents, prevention and control options, and to define criteria for the choice of possible countermeasures; [Am.  58]

(b)  The definition of the roles and responsibilities of the various authorities and other actors involved in the implementation of the plan framework; [Am.  59]

(c)  The definition of cooperation and communication processes ensuring prevention, detection, response, repair and recovery, and modulated in accordance with the alert level;

(d)  A roadmap for NIS exercises and training to reinforce, validate, and test the plan. Lessons learned to be documented and incorporated into updates to the plan.

3.  The national NIS strategy and the national NIS cooperation plan shall be communicated to the Commission within one month three months from their adoption. [Am.  60]

Article 6

National competent authority authorities and single points of contact on the security of network and information systems [Am.  61]

1.  Each Member State shall designate a one or more civilian national competent authority authorities on the security of network and information systems (the ‘competent authority/ies’). [Am.  62]

2.  The competent authorities shall monitor the application of this Directive at national level and contribute to its consistent application throughout the Union.

2a.  Where a Member State designates more than one competent authority, it shall designate a civilian national authority, for instance a competent authority, as national single point of contact on the security of network and information systems (‘single point of contact’). Where a Member State designates only one competent authority, that competent authority shall also be the single point of contact. [Am.  63]

2b.  The competent authorities and the single point of contact of the same Member State shall cooperate closely with regard to the obligations laid down in this Directive. [Am.  64]

2c.  The single point of contact shall ensure cross-border cooperation with other single points of contact. [Am.  65]

3.  Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities and the single points of contact have adequate technical, financial and human resources to carry out in an effective and efficient manner the tasks assigned to them and thereby to fulfil the objectives of this Directive. Member States shall ensure the effective, efficient and secure cooperation of the competent authorities single points of contact via the network referred to in Article 8. [Am.  66]

4.  Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities and single points of contact, where applicable in accordance with paragraph 2a of this Article, receive the notifications of incidents from public administrations and market operators as specified in Article 14(2) and are granted the implementation and enforcement powers referred to in Article 15. [Am.  67]

4a.  Where Union law provides for a sector-specific Union supervisory or regulatory body, inter alia on the security of network and information systems, that body shall receive the notifications of incidents in accordance with Article 14(2) from the market operators concerned in that sector and shall be granted the implementation and enforcement powers referred to in Article 15. That Union body shall cooperate closely with the competent authorities and the single point of contact of the host Member State with regard to those obligations. The single point of contact of the host Member State shall represent the Union body with regard to the obligations laid down in Chapter III. [Am.  68]

5.  The competent authorities and single points of contact shall consult and cooperate, whenever appropriate, with the relevant law enforcement national authorities and data protection authorities. [Am.  69]

6.  Each Member State shall notify to the Commission without delay the designation of the competent authority authorities and the single point of contact, its tasks, and any subsequent change thereto. Each Member State shall make public its designation of the competent authority authorities. [Am.  70]

Article 7

Computer Emergency Response Team

1.  Each Member State shall set up a at least one Computer Emergency Response Team ("CERT") for each of the sectors listed in Annex II, responsible for handling incidents and risks according to a well-defined process, which shall comply with the requirements set out in point (1) of Annex I. A CERT may be established within the competent authority. [Am.  71]

2.  Member States shall ensure that CERTs have adequate technical, financial and human resources to effectively carry out their tasks set out in point (2) of Annex I.

3.  Member States shall ensure that CERTs rely on a secure and resilient communication and information infrastructure at national level, which shall be compatible and interoperable with the secure information-sharing system referred to in Article 9.

4.  Member States shall inform the Commission about the resources and mandate as well as the incident handling process of the CERTs.

5.  The CERT CERTs shall act under the supervision of the competent authority or the single point of contact, which shall regularly review the adequacy of its their resources, its mandate mandates and the effectiveness of its their incident-handling process. [Am.  72]

5a.  Member States shall ensure that CERTs have adequate human and financial resources to participate actively in international, and in particular Union, cooperation networks. [Am.  73]

5b.  The CERTs shall be enabled and encouraged to initiate and to participate in joint exercises with other CERTs, with all the CERTs of the Member States, and with appropriate institutions of non-Member States as well as with CERTs of multinational and international institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the United Nations. [Am.  74]

5c.  Member States may ask for the assistance of ENISA or of other Member States in developing their national CERTs. [Am.  75]

CHAPTER III

COOPERATION BETWEEN COMPETENT AUTHORITIES

Article 8

Cooperation network

1.  The competent authorities single points of contact and the Commission and ENISA shall form a network (‘cooperation network’) to cooperate against risks and incidents affecting network and information systems. [Am.  76]

2.  The cooperation network shall bring into permanent communication the Commission and the competent authorities single points of contact. When requested, the European Network and Information Security Agency (‘ENISA’) shall assist the cooperation network by providing its expertise and advice. Where appropriate, market operators and suppliers of cyber security solutions may also be invited to participate in the activities of the cooperation network referred to in points (g) and (i) of paragraph 3.

Where relevant, the cooperation network shall cooperate with the data protection authorities.

The Commission shall regularly inform the cooperation network of security research and other relevant programmes of Horizon 2020. [Am.  77]

3.  Within the cooperation network the competent authorities single points of contact shall:

(a)  circulate early warnings on risks and incidents in accordance with Article 10;

(b)  ensure a coordinated response in accordance with Article 11;

(c)  publish on a regular basis non-confidential information on on-going early warnings and coordinated response on a common website;

(d)  jointly discuss and assess , at the request of one Member State or of the Commission, one or more national NIS strategies and national NIS cooperation plans referred to in Article 5, within the scope of this Directive;

(e)  jointly discuss and assess , at the request of a Member State or the Commission, the effectiveness of the CERTs, in particular when NIS exercises are performed at Union level;

(f)  cooperate and exchange information on all expertise on relevant matters with the European Cybercrime Centre within Europol, and with other relevant European bodies on network and information security, in particular in the fields of data protection, energy, transport, banking, stock exchanges financial markets and health with the European Cybercrime Centre within Europol, and with other relevant European bodies;

(fa)  where appropriate, inform the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator, by means of reporting, and may ask for assistance for analysis, preparatory works and actions of the cooperation network;

(g)  exchange information and best practices between themselves and the Commission, and assist each other in building capacity on NIS;

(h)  organise regular peer reviews on capabilities and preparedness;

(i)  organise NIS exercises at Union level and participate, as appropriate, in international NIS exercises;

(ia)  involve, consult and exchange, where appropriate, information with market operators with respect to the risks and incidents affecting their network and information systems;

(ib)  develop, in cooperation with ENISA, guidelines for sector-specific criteria for the notification of significant incidents, in addition to the parameters laid down in Article 14(2), for a common interpretation, consistent application and coherent implementation within the Union. [Am.  78]

3a.  The cooperation network shall publish a report once a year, based on the activities of the network and on the summary report submitted in accordance with Article 14(4) of this Directive, for the preceding 12 months. [Am.  79]

4.  The Commission shall establish, by means of implementing acts, the necessary modalities to facilitate the cooperation between competent authorities and single points of contact, the Commission and ENISA referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the consultation examination procedure referred to in Article 19(23). [Am.  80]

Article 9

Secure information-sharing system

1.  The exchange of sensitive and confidential information within the cooperation network shall take place through a secure infrastructure.

1a.  Participants to the secure infrastructure shall comply with, inter alia, appropriate confidentiality and security measures in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC and Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 at all steps of the processing. [Am.  81]

2.  The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 18 concerning the definition of the criteria to be fulfilled for a Member State to be authorized to participate to the secure information-sharing system, regarding:

(a)  the availability of a secure and resilient communication and information infrastructure at national level, compatible and interoperable with the secure infrastructure of the cooperation network in compliance with Article 7(3), and

(b)  the existence of adequate technical, financial and human resources and processes for their competent authority and CERT allowing an effective, efficient and secure participation in the secure information-sharing system under Article 6(3), Article 7(2) and Article 7(3). [Am.  82]

3.  The Commission shall adopt, by means of implementing delegated acts in accordance with Article 18, decisions on the access of the Member States to this secure infrastructure, pursuant to the criteria referred to in paragraph 2 and 3. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 19(3) a common set of interconnection and security standards that single points of contact are to meet before exchanging sensitive and confidential information across the cooperation network. [Am.  83]

Article 10

Early warnings

1.  The competent authorities single points of contact or the Commission shall provide early warnings within the cooperation network on those risks and incidents that fulfil at least one of the following conditions:

(a)  they grow rapidly or may grow rapidly in scale;

(b)  they exceed or may exceed the single point of contact assesses that the risk or incident potentially exceeds national response capacity;

(c)  they affect or may affect the single points of contact or the Commission assess that the risk or incident affects more than one Member State. [Am.  84]

2.  In the early warnings, the competent authorities single points of contact and the Commission shall communicate without undue delay any relevant information in their possession that may be useful for assessing the risk or incident. [Am.  85]

3.  At the request of a Member State, or on its own initiative, the Commission may request a Member State to provide any relevant information on a specific risk or incident. [Am.  86]

4.  Where the risk or incident subject to an early warning is of a suspected criminal nature, the competent authorities or the Commission and where the concerned market operator has reported incidents of a suspected serious criminal nature as referred to in Article 15(4), the Member States shall inform ensure that the European Cybercrime Centre within Europol is informed, where appropriate. [Am.  87]

4a.  Members of the cooperation network shall not make public any information received on risks and incidents referred to in paragraph 1 without having received the prior approval of the notifying single point of contact.

Furthermore, prior to sharing information in the cooperation network, the notifying single point of contact shall inform the market operator to which the information relates of its intention and, where it considers this appropriate, it shall make the information concerned anonymous. [Am.  88]

4b.  Where the risk or incident subject to an early warning is of a suspected severe cross-border technical nature, the single points of contact or the Commission shall inform ENISA. [Am.  89]

5.  The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 18, concerning the further specification of the risks and incidents triggering early warning referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article 11

Coordinated response

1.  Following an early warning referred to in Article 10 the competent authorities single points of contact shall, after assessing the relevant information, agree without undue delay on a coordinated response in accordance with the Union NIS cooperation plan referred to in Article 12. [Am.  90]

2.  The various measures adopted at national level as a result of the coordinated response shall be communicated to the cooperation network.

Article 12

Union NIS cooperation plan

1.  The Commission shall be empowered to adopt, by means of implementing acts, a Union NIS cooperation plan. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 19(3).

2.  The Union NIS cooperation plan shall provide for:

(a)  for the purposes of Article 10:

–  a definition of the format and procedures for the collection and sharing of compatible and comparable information on risks and incidents by the competent authorities single points of contact, [Am.  91]

–  a definition of the procedures and the criteria for the assessment of the risks and incidents by the cooperation network;

(b)  the processes to be followed for the coordinated responses under Article 11, including identification of roles and responsibilities and cooperation procedures;

(c)  a roadmap for NIS exercises and training to reinforce, validate, and test the plan;

(d)  a programme for transfer of knowledge between the Member States in relation to capacity building and peer learning;

(e)  a programme for awareness raising and training between the Member States.

3.  The Union NIS cooperation plan shall be adopted no later than one year following the entry into force of this Directive and shall be revised regularly. The results of each revision shall be reported to the European Parliament. [Am.  92]

3a.  Coherence between the Union NIS cooperation plan and national NIS strategies and cooperation plans, as provided for in Article 5, shall be ensured. [Am.  93]

Article 13

International cooperation

Without prejudice to the possibility for the cooperation network to have informal international cooperation, the Union may conclude international agreements with third countries or international organisations allowing and organizing their participation in some activities of the cooperation network. Such agreement shall take into account the need to ensure adequate protection of the personal data circulating on the cooperation network and shall set out the monitoring procedure that must be followed to guarantee the protection of such personal data. The European Parliament shall be informed about the negotiation of the agreements. Any transfer of personal data to recipients located in countries outside the Union shall be conducted in accordance with Articles 25 and 26 of Directive 95/46/EC and Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001. [Am.  94]

Article 13a

Level of criticality of market operators

Member States may determine the level of criticality of market operators, taking into account the specificities of sectors, parameters including the importance of the particular market operator for maintaining a sufficient level of the sectoral service, the number of parties supplied by the market operator, and the time period until the discontinuity of the core services of the market operator has a negative impact on the maintenance of vital economic and societal activities. [Am.  95]

CHAPTER IV

SECURITY OF THE NETWORKS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS AND MARKET OPERATORS

Article 14

Security requirements and incident notification

1.  Member States shall ensure that public administrations and market operators take appropriate and proportionate technical and organisational measures to detect and effectively manage the risks posed to the security of the networks and information systems which they control and use in their operations. Having regard to the state of the art, these those measures shall guarantee ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk presented. In particular, measures shall be taken to prevent and minimise the impact of incidents affecting the security of their network and information system systems on the core services they provide and thus ensure the continuity of the services underpinned by those networks and information systems. [Am.  96]

2.  Member States shall ensure that public administrations and market operators notify without undue delay to the competent authority or to the single point of contact incidents having a significant impact on the security continuity of the core services they provide. Notification shall not expose the notifying party to increased liability.

To determine the significance of the impact of an incident, the following parameters shall inter alia be taken into account: [Am.  97]

(a)  the number of users whose core service is affected; [Am.  98]

(b)  the duration of the incident; [Am.  99]

(c)  geographic spread with regard to the area affected by the incident. [Am.  100]

Those parameters shall be further specified in accordance with point (ib) of Article 8(3). [Am.  101]

2a.  Market operators shall notify the incidents referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 to the competent authority or the single point of contact in the Member State where the core service is affected. Where core services in more than one Member State are affected, the single point of contact which has received the notification shall, based on the information provided by the market operator, alert the other single points of contact concerned. The market operator shall be informed, as soon as possible, which other single points of contact have been informed of the incident, as well as of any undertaken steps, results and any other information with relevance to the incident. [Am.  102]

2b.  Where the notification contains personal data, it shall be only disclosed to recipients within the notified competent authority or single point of contact who need to process those data for the performance of their tasks in accordance with data protection rules. The disclosed data shall be limited to what is necessary for the performance of their tasks. [Am.  103]

2c.  Market operators not covered by Annex II may report incidents as specified in Article 14(2) on a voluntary basis. [Am.  104]

3.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall apply to all market operators providing services within the European Union.

4.  The After consultation with the notified competent authority and the market operator concerned, the single point of contact may inform the public, or require the public administrations and about individual incidents, where it determines that public awareness is necessary to prevent an incident or deal with an ongoing incident, or where that market operators to do so, where it determines that operator, subject to an incident, has refused to address a serious structural vulnerability related to that incident without undue delay.

Before any public disclosure of the incident is in the public interest, the notified competent authority shall ensure that the market operator concerned has the possibility to be heard and that the decision for public disclosure is duly balanced with the public interest.

Where information about individual incidents is made public, the notified competent authority or the single point of contact shall ensure that it is made as anonymous as possible.

The competent authority or the single point of contact shall, if reasonably possible, provide the market operator concerned with information that supports the effective handling of the notified incident.

Once a year, the competent authority single point of contact shall submit a summary report to the cooperation network on the notifications received, including the number of notifications, and regarding the incident parameters listed in paragraph 2 of this Article, and the action taken in accordance with this paragraph. [Am.  105]

4a.  Member States shall encourage market operators to make public incidents involving their business in their financial reports on a voluntary basis. [Am.  106]

5.  The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 18 concerning the definition of circumstances in which public administrations and market operators are required to notify incidents. [Am.  107]

6.  Subject to any delegated act adopted under paragraph 5, the competent authorities The competent authorities or the single points of contact may adopt guidelines and, where necessary, issue instructions concerning the circumstances in which public administrations and market operators are required to notify incidents. [Am.  108]

7.  The Commission shall be empowered to define, by means of implementing acts, the formats and procedures applicable for the purpose of paragraph 2. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 19(3).

8.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to microenterprises as defined in Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC(20), unless the microenterprise acts as subsidiary for a market operator as defined in point (b) of Article 3(8). [Am.  109]

8a.  Member States may decide to apply this Article and Article 15 to public administrations mutatis mutandis. [Am.  110]

Article 15

Implementation and enforcement

1.  Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities have all and the single points of contact have the powers necessary to investigate cases of non-compliance of public administrations or ensure compliance of market operators with their obligations under Article 14 and the effects thereof on the security of networks and information systems. [Am.  111]

2.  Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities and the single points of contact have the power to require market operators and public administrations to: [Am.  112]

(a)  provide information needed to assess the security of their networks and information systems, including documented security policies;

(b)  undergo provide evidence of effective implementation of security policies, such as the results of a security audit carried out by a qualified independent body or national authority, and make the results thereof evidence available to the competent authority or to the single point of contact. [Am.  113]

When sending that request, the competent authorities and the single points of contact shall state the purpose of the request and sufficiently specify what information is required. [Am.  114]

3.  Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities and the single points of contact have the power to issue binding instructions to market operators and public administrations. [Am.  115]

3a.  By way of derogation from point (b) of paragraph 2 of this Article, Member States may decide that the competent authorities or the single points of contact, as applicable, are to apply a different procedure to particular market operators, based on their level of criticality determined in accordance with Article 13a. In the event that Member States so decide:

(a)  competent authorities or the single points of contact, as applicable, shall have the power to submit a sufficiently specific request to market operators requiring them to provide evidence of effective implementation of security policies, such as the results of a security audit carried out by a qualified internal auditor, and make the evidence available to the competent authority or to the single point of contact;

(b)  where necessary, following the submission by the market operator of the request referred to in point (a), the competent authority or the single point of contact may require additional evidence or an additional audit to be carried out by a qualified independent body or national authority.

3b.  Member States may decide to reduce the number and intensity of audits for a market operator concerned, where its security audit has indicated compliance with Chapter IV in a consistent manner. [Am.  116]

4.  The competent authorities and the single points of contact shall notify inform the market operators concerned about the possibility of reporting incidents of a suspected serious criminal nature to the law enforcement authorities. [Am.  117]

5.  Without prejudice to applicable data protection rules the competent authorities and the single points of contact shall work in close cooperation with personal data protection authorities when addressing incidents resulting in personal data breaches. The single points of contact and the data protection authorities shall develop, in cooperation with ENISA, information exchange mechanisms and a single template to be used both for notifications under Article 14(2) of this Directive and other Union law on data protection. [Am.  118]

6.  Member States shall ensure that any obligations imposed on public administrations and market operators under this Chapter may be subject to judicial review. [Am.  119]

6a.   Member States may decide to apply Article 14 and this Article to public administrations mutatis mutandis. [Am.  120]

Article 16

Standardisation

1.  To ensure convergent implementation of Article 14(1), Member States, without prescribing the use of any particular technology, shall encourage the use of European or international interoperable standards and/or specifications relevant to networks and information security. [Am.  121]

2.  The Commission shall give a mandate to a relevant European standardisation body to draw up, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, , by means of implementing acts a list of the standards and/or specifications referred to in paragraph 1. The list shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. [Am.  122]

CHAPTER V

FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 17

Penalties

1.  Member States shall lay down rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The Member States shall notify those provisions to the Commission by the date of transposition of this Directive at the latest and shall notify it without delay of any subsequent amendment affecting them.

1a.  Member States shall ensure that the penalties referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article only apply where the market operator has failed to fulfil its obligations under Chapter IV with intent or as a result of gross negligence. [Am.  123]

2.  Member States shall ensure that when a security incident involves personal data, the penalties provided for are consistent with the penalties provided by the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data(21).

Article 18

Exercise of the delegation

1.  The power to adopt the delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article.

2.  The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Article 9(3) and Article 10(5) shall be conferred on the Commission. The Commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation of power not later than nine months before the end of the five‑year period. The delegation of power shall be tacitly extended for periods of an identical duration, unless the European Parliament or the Council opposes such extension not later than three months before the end of each period.

3.  The delegation of powers power referred to in Articles Article 9(3) and Article 10(5) and 14(5) may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the powers specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated act already in force. [Am.  124]

4.  As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council.

5.  A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles Article 9(3) and Article 10(5) and 14(5) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or the Council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council. [Am.  125]

Article 19

Committee procedure

1.  The Commission shall be assisted by a committee (the Network and Information Security Committee). That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

2.  Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

3.  Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

Article 20

Review

The Commission shall periodically review the functioning of this Directive, in particular the list set out in Annex II, and shall report to the European Parliament and the Council. The first report shall be submitted no later than three years after the date of transposition referred to in Article 21. For that purpose, the Commission may request Member States to provide information without undue delay. [Am.  126]

Article 21

Transposition

1.  Member States shall adopt and publish, by [one year and a half after adoption] at the latest, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of such measures.

They shall apply those measures from [one year and a half after adoption].

When Member States adopt those measures, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made.

2.  Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.

Article 22

Entry into force

This Directive shall enter into force on the [twentieth] day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 23

Addressees

This Directive is addressed to the Member States.

Done at

For the European Parliament For the Council

The President The President

ANNEX I

Requirements and tasks of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) Teams (CERTs) [Am.  127]

The requirements and tasks of the CERT shall be adequately and clearly defined and supported by national policy and/or regulation. They shall include the following elements:

(1)  Requirements for the CERT

(a)  The CERT CERTs shall ensure high availability of its communications services by avoiding single points of failure and have several means for being contacted and for contacting others at all times. Furthermore, the communication channels shall be clearly specified and well known to the constituency and cooperative partners. [Am.  128]

(b)  The CERT shall implement and manage security measures to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, availability and authenticity of information it receives and treats.

(c)  The offices of the CERT CERTs and the supporting information systems shall be located in secure sites with secured network information systems. [Am.  129]

(d)  A service management quality system shall be created to follow-up on the performance of the CERT and ensure a steady process of improvement. It shall be based on clearly defined metrics that include formal service levels and key performance indicators.

(e)  Business continuity:

–  The CERT shall be equipped with an appropriate system for managing and routing requests, in order to facilitate handovers,

–  The CERT shall be adequately staffed to ensure availability at all times,

–  The CERT shall rely on an infrastructure whose continuity is ensured. To this end, redundant systems and backup working space shall be set up for the CERT to ensure permanent access to the means of communication.

(2)  Tasks of the CERT

(a)  Tasks of the CERT shall include at least the following:

–  Detecting and monitoring incidents at a national level, [Am.  130]

–  Providing early warning, alerts, announcements and dissemination of information to relevant stakeholders about risks and incidents,

–  Responding to incidents,

–  Providing dynamic risk and incident analysis and situational awareness,

–  Building broad public awareness of the risks associated with online activities,

–  Actively participating in Union and international CERT cooperation networks, [Am.  131]

–  Organising campaigns on NIS.

(b)  The CERT shall establish cooperative relationships with private sector.

(c)  To facilitate cooperation, the CERT shall promote the adoption and use of common or standardised practises for:

–  incident and risk handling procedures,

–  incident, risk and information classification schemes,

–  taxonomies for metrics,

–  information exchange formats on risks, incidents, and system naming conventions.

ANNEX II

List of market operators

Referred to in Article 3(8) a):

1.  e-commerce platforms

2.  Internet payment gateways

3.  Social networks

4.  Search engines

5.  Cloud computing services

6.  Application stores

Referred to in Article (3(8) b): [Am.  132]

1.  Energy

(a)  Electricity

–  Electricity and gas Suppliers

–  Electricity and/or gas Distribution system operators and retailers for final consumers

–  Natural gas transmission system operators, storage operators and LNG operators

–  Transmission system operators in electricity

(b)  Oil

–  Oil transmission pipelines and oil storage

–  Operators of oil production, refining and treatment facilities, storage and transmission

(c)  Gas

–  Electricity and gas market operators

–  Suppliers

–  Distribution system operators and retailers for final consumers

–  Natural gas transmission system operators, storage system operators and Liquefied Natural Gas system operators

–  Operators of oil and natural gas production, refining and, treatment facilities, storage facilities and transmission

–  Gas market operators [Am.  133]

2.  Transport

–  Air carriers (freight and passenger air transport)

–  Maritime carriers (sea and coastal passenger water transport companies and sea and coastal freight water transport companies)

–  Railways (infrastructure managers, integrated companies and railway transport operators)

–  Airports

–  Ports

–  Traffic management control operators

–  Auxiliary logistics services (a) warehousing and storage, b) cargo handling and c) other transportation support activities)

(a)  Road transport

(i)  Traffic management control operators

(ii)  Auxiliary logistics services:

–  warehousing and storage,

–  cargo handling, and

–  other transportation support activities

(b)  Rail transport

(i)  Railways (infrastructure managers, integrated companies and railway transport operators)

(ii)  Traffic management control operators

(iii)  Auxiliary logistics services:

–  warehousing and storage,

–  cargo handling, and

–  other transportation support activities

(c)  Air transport

(i)  Air carriers (freight and passenger air transport)

(ii)  Airports

(iii)  Traffic management control operators

(iv)  Auxiliary logistics services:

–  warehousing,

–  cargo handling, and

–  other transportation support activities

(d)  Maritime transport

(i)  Maritime carriers (inland, sea and coastal passenger water transport companies and inland, sea and coastal freight water transport companies) [Am.  134]

3.  Banking: credit institutions in accordance with point 1 of Article 4 of Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(22)

4.  Financial market infrastructures: stock exchanges regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities, organised trading facilities and central counterparty clearing houses [Am.  135]

5.  Health sector: health care settings (including hospitals and private clinics) and other entities involved in health care provisions

5a.  Water production and supply [Am.  136]

5b.  Food supply chain [Am.  137]

5c.  Internet exchange points [Am.  138]

(1) OJ C 271, 19.9.2013, p. 133. (2) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0376. (3) OJ C 271, 19.9.2013, p. 133. (4) Position of the European Parliament of 13 March 2014. (5) Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33). (6) Council Decision 2011/292/EU of 31 March 2011 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (OJ L 141, 27.5.2011, p. 17). (7) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31). (8) Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1). (9) Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37). (10) Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services (OJ L 204, 21.7.1998, p. 37). (11) SEC(2012) 72 final. (12) Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 316, 14.11.2012, p. 12). (13) Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13). (14) Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43). (15) OJ C 32, 4.2.2014, p. 19. (16) Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection (OJ L 345, 23.12.2008, p. 75). (17) Council Decision 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol) (OJ L 121, 15.5.2009, p. 37). (18) Commission Regulation (EU) No 611/2013 of 24 June 2013 on the measures applicable to the notification of personal data breaches under Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on privacy and electronic communications (OJ L 173, 26.6.2013, p. 2). (19) Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments (OJ L 45, 16.2.2005, p. 18). (20) Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36). (21) SEC(2012) 72 final. (22) Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1)

European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a Union programme to support specific activities in the field of financial reporting and auditing for the period of 2014-2020 (COM(2012)0782 – C7-0417/2012 – 2012/0364(COD))

P7_TA(2014)0245 A7-0315/2013

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2012)0782),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C7‑0417/2012),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 20 March 2013(1),

–  having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 11 December 2013 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs (A7-0315/2013),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it intends to amend its proposal substantially or replace it with another text;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 13 March 2014 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) No .../2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Union programme to support specific activities in the field of financial reporting and auditing for the period of 2014-2020 and repealing Decision No 716/2009/EC

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) No 258/2014.)

(1) OJ C 161, 6.6.2013, p. 64.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 March 2014 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment (COM(2012)0584 – C7-0333/2012 – 2012/0283(COD))

P7_TA(2014)0246 A7-0316/2013

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2012)0584),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C7‑0333/2012),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 13 February 2013(1),

–  having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 17 January 2014 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A7-0316/2013),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Approves its statement annexed hereto, which will be published in the L series of the Official Journal of the European Union together with the final legislative act;

3.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it intends to amend its proposal substantially or replace it with another text;

4.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 13 March 2014 with a view to the adoption of Directive 2014/.../EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment and repealing Directive 1999/5/EC

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Directive 2014/53/EU.)

ANNEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

STATEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The European Parliament considers that only when and insofar as implementing acts in the sense of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 are discussed in meetings of committees, can the latter be considered as "comitology committees" within the meaning of Annex I to the Framework Agreement on the relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission. Meetings of committees thus fall within the scope of point 15 of the Framework Agreement when and insofar as other issues are discussed.

(1) OJ C 133, 9.5.2013, p. 58.

European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2014 on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2015 budget, Section III – Commission (2014/2004(BUD))

P7_TA(2014)0247 A7-0159/2014

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Articles 312 and 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

–  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013 of 2 December 2013 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020(1),

–  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 2 December 2013 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management(2),

–  having regard to the European Union’s general budget for the financial year 2014 (3) and to the four related joint statements agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission, as well as the joint statement by Parliament and the Commission on payment appropriations,

–  having regard to Title II, Chapter 7 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A7-0159/2014),

The EU budget – endowing citizens with the tools to find a way out of the crisis

1.  Believes that despite some remaining headwinds the European economy is showing some signs of recovery, and considers that, while acknowledging the persistent economic and budgetary constraints at national level and the fiscal consolidation efforts being made by the Member States, the European budget must encourage this tendency by reinforcing strategic investment in actions with European added value in order to help put the European economy back on track, generating sustainable growth and employment while aiming to foster competitiveness and increase economic and social cohesion throughout the EU;

2.  Highlights in particular the importance of the European Structural and Investment Funds, which form one of the biggest blocks of expenditure in the EU budget; underlines the fact that EU cohesion policy has been instrumental in sustaining public investment in vital economic areas and has achieved tangible results on the ground that can empower Member States and regions to overcome the current crisis and achieve the Europe 2020 targets; stresses the need to endow citizens with the tools to find a way out of the crisis; stresses in this regard the special need to invest in areas such as education and mobility, research and innovation, SMEs and entrepreneurship, in order to boost EU competitiveness and contribute to the creation of employment – in particular youth and 50 + employment;

3.  Considers it also important to invest in other areas such as renewable energy, the digital agenda, infrastructures, information and communication technologies and cross-border connectivity, and stronger and enhanced use of ‘innovative financial instruments’, particularly in respect of long-term investments; emphasises the need to strengthen EU industry as a central driver of job creation and growth; urges that, with a view to making EU industry strong, competitive and independent, the main focus should be on investment in innovation;

4.  Underlines the importance of ensuring that sufficient resources are made available for EU external actions; recalls the international commitment made by the EU and its Member States to increase their official development assistance (ODA) spending to 0,7 % of GNI and to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015;

5.  Stresses the importance of ensuring the best possible coordination between the various EU funds, on the one hand, and between EU funds and national expenditure, on the other, so as to make optimum use of public money;

6.  Recalls the recent agreement on the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF), which defines the main parameters for the annual budgets until 2020; underlines the fact that each annual budget must be in line with the MFF Regulation and the Interinstitutional Agreement and should not be considered an excuse to re-negotiate the MFF; expects that the Council will not attempt to impose restricted interpretations of specific provisions, especially as regards the nature and scope of special instruments; reiterates its intention to make full use of all means available to the budgetary authority within the framework of the annual budget procedure in order to provide the EU budget with the necessary flexibility;

7.  Emphasises that, as the second year of the new MFF, 2015 will be important for the successful implementation of the new 2014-2020 multiannual programmes; underlines the fact that, in order not to hamper the implementation of key EU policies, all programmes need to be up and running and in full swing as soon as possible; notes that the 2015 budget will be lower in real terms than the 2013 budget; urges, in this context, the Commission and the Member States to do their utmost to ensure the swift adoption of all partnership agreements and operational programmes in 2014, so as not to lose any additional time in implementing the new investment programmes; stresses the importance of the Commission’s full support for national administrations at all stages of the process;

8.  Recalls the agreement within the MFF, which is being implemented for the first time in the 2014 budget, to frontload commitments for specified policy objectives relating to youth employment, research, Erasmus+ (in particular for apprenticeships) and SMEs; emphasises that, as part of the MFF agreement, a similar approach needs to be taken for the 2015 budget through the frontloading of the Youth Employment Initiative (EUR 871,4 million in 2011 prices) as well as of Erasmus+ and COSME (EUR 20 million each in 2011 prices); is particularly concerned about the funding of the Youth Employment Initiative after 2015 and requests that all funding possibilities, including the global MFF margin for commitments, be considered for this purpose;

9.  Expresses, however, its concern about the possible adverse effects of additional backloading of the Connecting Europe Facility energy programme in 2015 and calls on the Commission to provide adequate information on how such a decision would affect the successful launch of this new programme;

10.  Emphasises the added value of bringing forward investments in these programmes, in order to help EU citizens to exit the crisis; invites the Commission, furthermore, to identify other possible programmes which could benefit from frontloading, are able to contribute to this aim and would be able to fully absorb such frontloading;

11.  Stresses that, once again, the latest European Council conclusions (19 and 20 December 2013) on the Common Security and Defence Policy and migration flows will have an impact on the EU budget; reiterates its position that any additional projects agreed by the European Council need to be financed with additional resources and not through cuts in existing programmes and instruments, nor by conferring additional tasks on institutions or other EU bodies which are already at the limit of their capacities;

12.  Underlines the importance of decentralised agencies, which are vital for the implementation of EU policies and programmes; notes that they enable economies of scale to be made through the pooling of expenditure that would otherwise be outlaid by each Member State to achieve exactly the same result; underlines the need to assess all agencies on a case-by-case basis in terms of budget and human resources and to provide them, in the 2015 budget and in the following years, with the appropriate financial means and staff to enable them to fulfil properly the tasks assigned to them by the legislative authority; emphasises, therefore, that the Commission communication entitled ‘Programming of human and financial resources for decentralised agencies 2014-2020’ (COM(2013)0519) must not form the basis for the draft budget with regard to agencies; stresses, furthermore, the important role of the new Interinstitutional Working Group on decentralised agencies, which should undertake closer and more permanent scrutiny of the development of agencies with a view to ensuring a coherent approach; expects this working group to deliver its first outcome in due time for Parliament’s reading of the budget;

13.  Recalls the joint statement on EU Special Representatives, in which Parliament and the Council agreed to examine the transfer of appropriations for the EU Special Representatives from the Commission’s budget (Section III) to the budget of the European External Action Service (Section X) in the context of the 2015 budgetary procedure;

Payment appropriations – the EU must fulfil its legal and political commitments

14.  Recalls that the overall level of payment appropriations agreed for the 2014 budget remains below the level considered necessary and proposed by the Commission in its original draft budget; notes that, as provided for in the new MFF Regulation and the new global margin for payments, the Commission should adjust the payment ceiling for the year 2015 upwards by the amount equivalent to the difference between the executed 2014 payments and the MFF payment ceiling for 2014; is deeply concerned that the unprecedented level of outstanding bills at the end of 2013, amounting to EUR 23,4 billion under Heading 1b alone, cannot be covered within the 2014 ceilings; calls for the mobilisation of the appropriate flexibility mechanisms for payments in 2014 and stresses that even this is not expected to be sufficient to avoid a large implementation deficit at the end of 2014; underlines the fact that the recurrent shortages in payment appropriations have been the main cause of the unprecedentedly high level of outstanding commitments (RALs), especially in the last few years;

15.  Recalls that according to the Treaty(4) ‘the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission shall ensure that the financial means are made available to allow the Union to fulfil its legal obligations in respect of third parties’; expects the Commission in its draft budget to propose an adequate level of payment appropriations, based on real forecasts and not driven by political considerations;

16.  Insists on the use of all means available under the MFF Regulation, including recourse to the contingency margin and, if still proven to be necessary and only as a last resort, revision of the payment ceiling, in order to meet the Union’s legal obligations and avoid jeopardising or delaying payments to all stakeholders, such as researchers, universities, humanitarian aid organisations, local authorities and SMEs, and at the same time to decrease the amount of the outstanding year-end payments;

17.  Insists that the use of all special instruments for payments (the Flexibility Instrument, the contingency margin, the EU Solidarity Fund, the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund and the Emergency Aid Reserve) must be entered in the budget over and above the MFF payment ceiling;

18.  Calls for the Commission, in view of the alarming situation with regard to payment appropriations in the area of humanitarian aid at the very beginning of 2014, in particular the EUR 160 million backlog in payment appropriations for humanitarian aid carried over from 2013 to 2014, to take all necessary measures and to react as quickly as possible in order to ensure the proper delivery of EU humanitarian aid in 2014; stresses that the level of payment appropriations for humanitarian aid should keep up with the probable growth of commitment appropriations, which should be taken into consideration in the draft budget for 2015;

19.  Recalls the joint statement on payment appropriations and the bilateral statement by Parliament and the Commission in the framework of the agreement on the 2014 budget; calls on the Commission to keep the budgetary authority fully informed of the development of payments and the evolution of RALs throughout the current year and insists that regular interinstitutional meetings should be held to monitor the payments situation;

o
o   o

20.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors.

(1) OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 884. (2) OJ C 373, 20.12.2013, p. 1. (3) OJ L 51, 20.2.2014. (4) Article 323 TFEU.

European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2014 on the invasion of Ukraine by Russia (2014/2627(RSP))

P7_TA(2014)0248 RC-B7-0263/2014

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on the European Neighbourhood Policy, on the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and on Ukraine, and with particular reference to that of 27 February 2014 on the situation in Ukraine(1),

–  having regard to its resolution of 12 December 2013 on the outcome of the Vilnius Summit and the future of the Eastern Partnership, in particular as regards Ukraine(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 6 February 2014 on the EU-Russia Summit(3),

–  having regard to the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council extraordinary meeting of 3 March 2014 on Ukraine,

–  having regard to the North Atlantic Council’s statement of 4 March 2014,

–  having regard to the statement of the Heads of State or Government on Ukraine following the European Council’s extraordinary meeting on Ukraine of 6 March 2014,

–  having regard to Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations,

–  having regard to Rule 110(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas Russia’s act of aggression in invading Crimea is a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and is against international law and in breach of Russia’s obligations as a signatory to the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances for Ukraine, whereby it guaranteed to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine;

B.  whereas pro-Russian gunmen and Russian soldiers have seized key buildings in the Crimean capital of Simferopol, as well as important Ukrainian installations and strategic objectives in Crimea, including at least three airports; whereas most of the Ukrainian military units on the peninsula have been surrounded but have refused to give up their arms; whereas since the beginning of the crisis substantial numbers of additional Russian troops have been deployed in Ukraine;

C.  whereas the arguments presented by the Russian leadership to support this aggression are utterly unfounded and out of touch with the realities on the ground, as there have been no instances whatsoever of attacks on or intimidation of Russian or ethnic Russian citizens in Crimea;

D.  whereas the self-proclaimed and illegitimate authorities of Crimea decided on 6 March 2014 to ask Russia to incorporate Crimea into the Russian Federation and called a referendum for 16 March 2014 on Crimea’s secession from Ukraine, thus violating the constitutions of both Ukraine and Crimea;

E.  whereas the Russian Prime Minister has announced plans to apply swiftly procedures for Russian-speakers in foreign countries to gain Russian citizenship;

F.  whereas on 1 March 2014 the Federal Council of the Russian Federation authorised the deployment of Russian Federation armed forces in Ukraine in order to protect the interests of Russia and of Russian-speakers in Crimea and in the entire country;

G.  whereas strong international diplomatic action at all levels and a negotiated process are needed in order to de-escalate the situation, ease tensions, prevent the crisis from spiralling out of control and secure a peaceful outcome; whereas the EU must respond effectively so as to allow Ukraine to fully exercise its sovereignty and territorial integrity free from external pressure;

H.  whereas the 28 EU prime ministers and heads of state have issued a strong warning of the implications of Russia’s actions and taken the decision to suspend bilateral talks with Russia on visa matters and the negotiations for a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, and to suspend the participation of EU institutions in the preparations for the G8 Summit due to take place in Sochi in June 2014;

1.  Firmly condemns Russia’s act of aggression in invading Crimea, which is an inseparable part of Ukraine and recognised as such by the Russian Federation and by the international community; calls for the immediate de-escalation of the crisis, with the immediate withdrawal of all military forces present illegally on Ukrainian territory, and urges full respect for international law and existing conventional obligations;

2.  Recalls that these actions are in clear breach of the UN Charter, the OSCE Helsinki Final Act, the Statute of the Council of Europe, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, the 1997 Bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, the 1997 Agreement on the Status and Conditions of the Presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the Territory of Ukraine, and Russia’s international obligations; considers the acts undertaken by Russia as posing a threat to the security of the EU; regrets the decision of the Russian Federation not to attend the meeting on Ukraine’s security called by the signatories to the memorandum and scheduled for 5 March 2014 in Paris;

3.  Highlights the fact that the territorial integrity of Ukraine was guaranteed by Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom in the Budapest Memorandum signed with Ukraine, and points out that, according to the Ukrainian constitution, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea can only organise referendums on local matters and not on modifying the internationally recognised borders of Ukraine; stresses that a referendum on the issue of accession to the Russian Federation will therefore be considered illegitimate and illegal, as would any other referendum that contravened the Ukrainian constitution and international law; takes the same view of the decision of the illegitimate and self-proclaimed authorities of Crimea to declare independence on 11 March 2014;

4.  Emphasises the need for the EU and its Member States to speak to Russia with one united voice and to support the right of a united Ukraine to determine its future freely; welcomes, therefore, and strongly supports, the joint statement of the extraordinary European Council of 6 March 2014 that condemned the Russian acts of aggression and supported the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine; calls for close transatlantic cooperation on steps towards a resolution of the crisis;

5.  Condemns as contrary to international law and codes of conduct the official Russian doctrine under which the Kremlin claims the right to intervene by force in the neighbouring sovereign states to ‘protect’ the safety of Russian compatriots living there; points out that such a doctrine is tantamount to usurping unilaterally the position of the highest arbiter of international law and has been used as justification for manifold acts of political, economic and military intervention;

6.  Recalls that in the nationwide independence referendum held in Ukraine in 1991, the majority of the Crimean population voted in support of independence;

7.  Stresses its conviction that the establishment of a constructive dialogue is the best way forward for resolving any conflict and for long-term stability in Ukraine; praises the Ukraine Government’s responsible, measured and restrained handling of this severe crisis, in which the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country is at stake; calls on the international community to stand firmly by and support Ukraine;

8.  Rejects Russia’s stated objective of protecting the Russian-speaking population in Crimea as completely unfounded, as it has not faced – and does not face – any discrimination whatsoever; strongly rejects the defamation of protesters against Yanukovych’s policy as fascists by Russian propaganda;

9.  Calls for a peaceful solution to the current crisis and full respect for the principles of, and obligations laid down under, international law; takes the view that the situation must be contained and further de-escalated with a view to avoiding a military confrontation in Crimea;

10.  Underlines the utmost importance of international observation and mediation; calls on the EU institutions and Member States to be ready to exhaust every possible diplomatic and political avenue and work tirelessly with all relevant international organisations, such as the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, to secure a peaceful solution, which must be based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine; calls, therefore, for the deployment of a fully fledged OSCE monitoring mission in Crimea;

11.  Welcomes the initiative taken to establish a Contact Group under the auspices of the OSCE, but regrets the fact that armed groups hindered the entry into Crimea of the OSCE observer mission on 6 March 2014; criticises the Russian authorities and the self-proclaimed Crimean authorities for not cooperating with the OSCE observer mission or granting its members full and safe access to the region;

12.  Deplores the fact that the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to Crimea was forced to cut his mission short following violent threats against him;

13.  Takes the view that certain aspects of the agreement of 21 February 2014, which was negotiated by three foreign affairs ministers on behalf of the EU but broken by Yanukovych, who failed to honour it by signing the new constitutional law, could still be helpful with a view to exiting the current impasse; takes the view, however, that nobody can negotiate and/or accept solutions that undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and reaffirms the fundamental right of the Ukrainian people to determine their country's future freely;

14.  Notes with great concern the reports that armed people are marking the houses of Ukrainian Tatars in areas of Crimea where Tatars and Russians live together; notes that Crimean Tatars, who returned to their homeland following Ukraine’s independence after being deported by Stalin, have been calling on the international community to support the territorial integrity of Ukraine and a comprehensive legal and political agreement on the restoration of their rights as indigenous people of Crimea; calls on the international community, the Commission, the Council, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to protect the rights of this, and any other, minority community on the Crimean peninsula; demands a full investigation into the intimidation of Jews and attacks on Jewish religious sites following the invasion of Crimea;

15.  Welcomes the commitment of the Ukrainian Government to an ambitious reform agenda comprising political, economic and social change; welcomes, therefore, the Commission’s decision to provide Ukraine with a short- and medium-term financial aid and support package worth EUR 11 billion in order to help stabilise the country’s economic and financial situation; expects the Council and the Commission to come forward as swiftly as possible, together with the IMF, the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank and other countries, with a long-term package of robust financial support to help Ukraine tackle its worsening economic and social situation and provide economic support to launch the necessary deep and comprehensive reforms of the Ukrainian economy; recalls the need to organise and coordinate an international donor conference, which should be convened by the Commission and take place as soon as possible; calls on the IMF to avoid imposing unbearable austerity measures, such as cutting the level of subsidies for energy, that will further aggravate the country’s already difficult socioeconomic situation;

16.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States, together with the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission, to provide, in addition to financial assistance, technical assistance as regards constitutional reform, the strengthening of the rule of law and the fight against corruption in Ukraine; looks forward to a positive track record in this respect, and stresses that the Maidan and all Ukrainians are expecting radical change and a proper system of governance;

17.  Calls for free, fair, transparent and nationwide elections with OSCE-ODIHR observation and reiterates its readiness to set up its own mission for this same purpose; invites the Ukrainian authorities to do their utmost to encourage high levels of voter participation in the presidential elections, including in the eastern and southern parts of the country; reiterates its call on the Ukrainian authorities to conduct parliamentary elections in accordance with the Venice Commission recommendations and supports the adoption of a proportional voting system that would facilitate proper representation of the local circumstances in the country; stresses the importance of the parliament and its members, at both central and local level, abiding by the rule of law;

18.  Invites Ukraine not to give in to pressure to postpone the presidential elections scheduled for 25 May 2014;

19.  Calls for a Government of Ukraine that is broad-based and as inclusive as possible in order to minimise the risk of renewed violence and territorial fragmentation; strongly warns Russia against actions that might contribute to heightened polarisation along ethnic or language lines; stresses the need to ensure that the rights of people belonging to national minorities, in accordance with international standards, including the rights of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, are fully protected and respected, working in close cooperation with the OSCE and the Council of Europe; reiterates its call for a new wide-ranging language regime supporting all minority languages;

20.  Welcomes the decision of the Acting President to veto the bill aimed at repealing the Language Policy Law of 3 July 2012; recalls that in any case this law would not apply to Crimea; calls on the Verkhovna Rada to eventually reform the existing legislation, bringing it into line with Ukraine’s obligations under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages;

21.  Welcomes the readiness of the 28 EU heads of state or government to sign the political chapters of the Association Agreement (AA) as soon as possible and before the presidential elections on 25 May 2014, and to adopt unilateral measures, such as tariff cuts for Ukrainian exports to the EU, which allow Ukraine to benefit from the provisions of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), as proposed by the Commission on 11 March 2014; points out that the EU stands ready to sign the full AA/DCFTA as soon as possible, and as soon as the Ukrainian Government is ready to take this step; insists on clear signals demonstrating to Russia that nothing in this agreement endangers or harms future cooperative bilateral political and economic relations between Ukraine and Russia; points out, furthermore, that, pursuant to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, Ukraine – like any other European state – has a European perspective and may apply to become a member of the Union, provided that it adheres to the principles of democracy, respects fundamental freedoms and human and minority rights, and ensures the rule of law;

22.  Recalls, in this respect, that the export of arms and military technology can endanger the stability and peace of the entire region and should be immediately stopped; deeply deplores the fact that EU Member States have extensively exported arms and military technology to Russia, including major strategic conventional capacities;

23.  Welcomes the European Council’s decision of 6 March 2014 on a first wave of targeted measures towards Russia, such as the suspension of bilateral talks on visa matters and the New Agreement, as well as the decision by the Member States and EU institutions to suspend their participation in the G8 Summit in Sochi; warns, however, that in the absence of de-escalation or in the event of further escalation with the annexation of Crimea, the EU should quickly take appropriate measures, which should include an arms and dual-use technology embargo, restrictions on visas, the freezing of assets, the application of money laundering legislation against individuals involved in the decision-making process with respect to the invasion of Ukraine, and measures against Russian companies and their subsidiaries, particularly in the energy sector, to fully comply with EU law, and have consequences for existing political and economic ties with Russia;

24.  Stresses that the parliamentary cooperation established between the European Parliament and the Russian State Duma and the Federation Council cannot be conducted along the lines of business as usual;

25.  Welcomes the Council’s decision to adopt sanctions focused on the freezing and recovery of misappropriated Ukrainian funds, targeting 18 individuals, including Yanukovych;

26.  Calls, in this regard, on the Commission to support projects in the Southern Corridor that effectively diversify energy supplies, and urges Member States not to engage their public companies in projects with Russian companies that increase European vulnerability;

27.  Stresses the importance of secure, diversified and affordable energy supply for Ukraine: underlines, in this connection, the strategic role of the Energy Community, of which Ukraine holds the presidency in 2014, and of building up Ukraine’s resistance against energy threats coming from Russia; recalls the need to increase EU storage capacities and provide reverse flow of gas from EU Member States for Ukraine; welcomes the Commission’s proposal to modernise Ukraine’s Gas Transit System and to assist in its payment of debts to Gazprom; stresses the urgent need to make further progress towards achieving a common energy security policy, with a robust internal market and diversified energy supply, and to work for the full implementation of the Third Energy Package, thus making the EU less dependent on Russian oil and gas;

28.  Calls on the Council to immediately authorise the Commission to speed up visa liberalisation with Ukraine, so as to advance along the path of introducing a visa-free regime, following the example of Moldova; calls, in the meantime, for the immediate introduction of temporary, very simple, low-cost visa procedures at EU and Member State level;

29.  Strongly believes that events in Ukraine highlight the need for the EU to redouble its commitment to and support for the European choice and territorial integrity of Moldova and Georgia as they prepare to sign the Association and DCFTA Agreements with the EU later this year;

30.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments of the Member States, the acting President and the Government and Parliament of Ukraine, the Council of Europe, and the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation.

(1) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2014)0170. (2) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0595. (3) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2014)0101.

European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2014 on the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon with respect to the European Parliament (2013/2130(INI))

P7_TA(2014)0249 A7-0120/2014

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to its decision of 20 October 2010 on the revision of the framework agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission(1),

–  having regard to its resolutions of 22 November 2012 on the elections to the European Parliament in 2014(2), and of 4 July 2013 on improving the practical arrangements for the holding of the European elections in 2014(3),

–  having regard to the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission(4),

–  having regard to the ongoing negotiations on the revision of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 November 2002 between the European Parliament and the Council concerning access by the European Parliament to sensitive information in the field of security and defence policy(5);

–  having regard to its resolution of 7 May 2009 on Parliament’s new role and responsibilities in implementing the Treaty of Lisbon(6),

–  having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on International Trade, the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A7-0120/2014),

A.  whereas the Treaty of Lisbon deepens the European Union’s democratic legitimacy by strengthening the role of the European Parliament in the procedure leading to the election of the President of the European Commission and to the investiture of the European Commission;

B.  whereas, according to the new procedure for the election of the President of the European Commission provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon, Parliament elects the President of the European Commission by a majority of its component members;

C.  whereas the Treaty of Lisbon lays down that the European Council should take into account the result of the elections to the European Parliament and should consult the new Parliament before it proposes a candidate for President of the European Commission;

D.  whereas each of the major European political parties is in the process of nominating its own candidate for the Presidency of the Commission;

E.  whereas the elected President of the new Commission should make full use of the prerogatives conferred on him by the Treaty of Lisbon and take all appropriate steps to ensure the efficient functioning of the next Commission despite its size, which, due to the decisions of the European Council, will not diminish as envisaged in the Treaty of Lisbon;

F.  whereas the Commission’s accountability to Parliament should be strengthened through the Union’s annual and multiannual programming as well as by creating symmetry between the majorities required for the election of the President of the Commission and for the motion of censure;

G.  whereas Parliament’s role as an agenda setter in legislative matters needs to be strengthened and the principle that in legislative matters Parliament and Council act on an equal footing, which is enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon, has to be fully implemented;

H.  whereas, on the occasion of the investiture of the new Commission, the existing interinstitutional agreements should be reviewed and improved;

I.   whereas Article 36 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides that the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (High Representative) is to regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy, and inform it of how these policies evolve; the High Representative is to ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration;

J.  whereas the Declaration by the High Representative on Political Accountability(7), made upon the adoption of the EEAS Council Decision, states that the High Representative will review and where necessary propose to adjust the existing provisions(8) on access for Members of the European Parliament to classified documents and information in the field of security and defence policy;

K.   whereas Article 218(10) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that the European Parliament is to be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure for negotiating and concluding international agreements and whereas that provision also applies to agreements relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy;

Legitimacy and political accountability of the Commission

(Investiture and removal of the Commission)

1.  Stresses the need to strengthen the Commission’s democratic legitimacy, independence and political role; states that the new procedure whereby the Commission President is elected by Parliament will strengthen the Commission’s legitimacy and political role and will make the European elections more important, by linking the voters’ choice in the elections to the European Parliament more directly to the election of the Commission President;

2.  Stresses that the potentialities for the strengthening of the European Union’s democratic legitimacy provided by the Treaty of Lisbon should be fully implemented, inter alia through the designation of candidates for the office of Commission President by the European political parties, thus conferring a new political dimension on the European elections and further connecting the citizens’ vote to the election of the Commission President by the European Parliament;

3.  Urges the next Convention to consider the way in which the Commission is formed with a view to reinforcing the Commission’s democratic legitimacy; urges the next Commission President to consider in what way the Commission’s composition, construction and political priorities will strengthen a policy of closeness to the citizens;

4.  Reaffirms that all European political parties should appoint their candidates for President of the Commission sufficiently in advance of the scheduled date for the European elections;

5.  Expects candidates for President of the Commission to play a significant role in the campaign for the European elections, by distributing and promoting in all Member States the political programme of their European political party;

6.  Reiterates its invitation to the European Council to clarify, in a timely manner and before the elections, how it will take account of the elections to the European Parliament and honour the citizens’ choice when putting forward a candidate for President of the Commission, in the framework of consultations to be conducted between Parliament and the European Council under Declaration 11 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon; in this context, renews its call on the European Council to agree with the European Parliament the arrangements for the consultations referred to in Article 17(7) TEU and to guarantee the smooth functioning of the process leading to the election of the President of the European Commission, as provided for in Declaration 11 on Article 17(6) and 17(7) of the Treaty on European Union;

7.  Requests that as many Members of the next Commission as possible be chosen from among elected Members of the European Parliament;

8.  Is of the opinion that the President-elect of the Commission should act more autonomously in the process of selecting the other Members of the Commission; calls upon the governments of the Member States to make gender-balanced proposals for candidates; urges the President-elect of the Commission to insist with the governments of the Member States that the candidates for the office of Commissioner must enable him/her to compose a gender-balanced college, and allow him/her to reject any proposed candidate who fails to demonstrate general competence, European commitment or unquestionable independence;

9.  Takes the view, further to the political understanding reached at the meeting of the European Council on 11 and 12 December 2008 and following the decision of the European Council on 22 May 2013 concerning the number of Members of the European Commission, that additional measures, such as the appointment of Commissioners without portfolio or the establishment of a system of Vice-Presidents of the Commission with responsibilities over major thematic clusters and with competences to coordinate the work of the Commission in the corresponding areas, should be envisaged for the more effective functioning of the Commission, without prejudice to the right to appoint one Commissioner per Member State and to the voting right of all Commissioners;

10.  Calls on the next Convention to revisit the question of the size of the Commission, as well as that of its organisation and functioning;

11.  Considers that the composition of the European Commission must ensure stability in the number and content of portfolios and at the same time guarantee a balanced decision‑making process;

12.  Stresses that, as mentioned in paragraph 2 of the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the Commission, the candidate for President of the Commission should be requested to present to the European Parliament, after his or her designation by the European Council, the political guidelines for his or her mandate, followed by a comprehensive exchange of views, before Parliament elects the proposed candidate for President of the Commission;

13.  Urges the future President-designate of the Commission to take due account of the proposals and recommendations for European Union legislation previously made by Parliament on the basis of own-initiative reports or resolutions which received the support of a wide majority of the Members of the European Parliament and which the former Commission had not satisfactorily followed up by the end of its mandate;

14.  Considers that, in a future revision of the Treaties, the majority currently required under Article 234 TFEU for a motion of censure against the Commission should be lowered so as to require only a majority of the component Members of the European Parliament, without putting the functioning of the institutions at risk;

15.  Considers that, notwithstanding the collective responsibility of the college for the actions of the Commission, individual Commissioners may be held accountable for the actions of their Directorates-General;

Legislative initiative and activity

(Parliamentary competence and scrutiny)

16.  Emphasises that the Lisbon Treaty was intended as a step forward in ensuring that decision-making procedures were more transparent and democratic, reflecting the Treaty commitment to a closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen, by strengthening the role of the European Parliament and of the national parliaments, thus providing more democratic and transparent procedures for the adoption of Union acts, which are essential in the light of the impact these acts have on citizens and businesses; points out, however, that the achievement of this democratic aim is undermined if EU institutions do not respect one another’s competences, the procedures laid down in the Treaties and the principle of loyal cooperation;

17.  Stresses the need for sincere cooperation between the institutions involved in the legislative procedure in relation to the exchange of documents, such as legal opinions, so as to allow a constructive, frank and legally valid dialogue between institutions;

18.  Notes that since the TFEU entered into force, Parliament has proved to be a committed and responsible co-legislator and that interaction between Parliament and the Commission has, overall, been positive and based on fluid communication and a cooperative approach;

19.  Takes the view that, while the overall assessment of interinstitutional relations between Parliament and the Commission is positive, there are still a number of issues and shortcomings, which call for closer attention and action;

20.  Stresses that the drive for efficiency must not mean poorer quality of legislation or giving up Parliament’s own objectives; takes the view that, alongside this drive for efficiency, Parliament must maintain appropriate legislative standards and continue to pursue its own objectives, while ensuring that legislation is well designed, responds to clearly identified needs and complies with the principle of subsidiarity;

21.  Stresses that the challenge of transparency is ever-present and common to all institutions, especially in first-reading agreements; notes that Parliament responded properly to this challenge by adopting the new Rules 70 and 70a of its Rules of Procedure;

22.  Is concerned about the problems that still exist in applying the ordinary legislative procedure, especially in the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice ("Stockholm Programme") as well as in aligning the acts of the former Third Pillar with the hierarchy of norms of the Lisbon Treaty, and in general with regard to the continuing ‘asymmetry’ regarding the transparency of the Commission’s involvement in the preparatory work of the two branches of the legislative authority; in this regard, underlines the importance of the Council’s working methods being adapted so as to make it possible for Parliament representatives to participate in some of its meetings when this is duly justified under the principle of mutual sincere cooperation between the institutions;

23.  Points out that the choice of correct legal basis, as confirmed by the Court of Justice, is a question of a constitutional nature, as it determines the existence and extent of EU competence, the procedures to be followed and the respective competences of the institutional actors involved in the adoption of an act; regrets, therefore, the fact that Parliament has repeatedly had to bring actions before the Court of Justice for annulment of acts adopted by the Council because of the choice of legal basis, including against two acts adopted under the obsolete ‘third pillar’ long after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty(9);

24.  Warns against circumventing Parliament's right to legislate by including provisions which should be subject to the ordinary legislative procedure in proposals for Council acts, by using mere Commission guidelines or non-applicable implementing or delegated acts or by failing to propose the legislation necessary for the implementation of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) or international trade and investment agreements;

25.  Asks the Commission to make better use of the pre-legislative phase, in particular of the valuable input collected on the basis of Green and White Papers, and routinely inform the European Parliament of preparatory work carried out by its services, on an equal footing with the Council;

26.  Takes the view that Parliament ought to further develop and make full use of its autonomous structure for assessing the impact of any substantial changes or modifications to the original proposal submitted by the Commission;

27.  Emphasises that the European Parliament should also strengthen its autonomous assessment of the impact on fundamental rights of legislative proposals and amendments under consideration as part of the legislative process and establish mechanisms to monitor human rights violations;

28.  Deplores the fact that while the Commission is formally fulfilling its responsibilities by replying within three months to Parliament’s requests for legislative initiatives, it has not always proposed a real and substantial follow-up;

29.  Requests that, at the next revision of the Treaties, Parliament’s right of legislative initiative be fully recognised by making it mandatory for the Commission to follow up all requests submitted by Parliament under Article 225 TFEU by presenting a legislative proposal within an appropriate time limit;

30.  Considers that, at the next revision of the Treaties, the Commission’s power to withdraw legislative proposals should be limited to those cases where, after the adoption of Parliament’s position at first reading, Parliament agrees that the proposal is no longer justified due to altered circumstances;

31.  Points out that Parliament welcomed, in principle, the introduction of delegated acts in Article 290 TFEU as providing greater scope for oversight, but stresses that the conferral of such delegated powers or implementing powers under Article 291 is never an obligation; recognises that the use of delegated acts should be considered where flexibility and efficiency are needed and cannot be delivered by means of the ordinary legislative procedure, provided that the objective, content, scope and the duration of that delegation are explicitly defined and the conditions to which the delegation is subject are clearly laid down in the basic act; expresses concern at the Council’s tendency to insist on using implementing acts for provisions where only the basic act or delegated acts should be used; stresses that the legislator may decide to allow implementing acts to be used only for the adoption of elements which do not amount to further political orientation; recognises that Article 290 explicitly limits the scope of delegated acts to non-essential elements of a legislative act and that delegated acts may not therefore be used in relation to rules essential to the subject matter of the relevant legislation;

32.  Draws attention to the need to distinguish properly between the essential elements of a legislative act, which can only be decided upon by the legislative authority in the legislative act itself, and non-essential elements, which can be supplemented or amended by means of delegated acts;

33.  Understands that delegated acts can be a flexible and effective tool; stresses the importance of the choice between delegated acts and implementing acts from the point of view of the respect of the Treaty requirements while safeguarding the rule-making prerogatives of Parliament, and reiterates its request to the Commission and the Council to agree with Parliament on the application of criteria for the use of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, so that implementing acts are not used as a substitute for delegated acts;

34.  Urges the Commission to involve Parliament adequately in the preparatory phase of the delegated acts and to provide its Members with all relevant information, pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission;

35.  Asks the Commission to comply with the Framework Agreement concerning access for Parliament’s experts to the Commission’s expert meetings by preventing them from being regarded as ‘comitology’ committees provided that they are dealing with issues other than implementing measures within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011;

36.  Emphasises the particular significance and consequence of the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Lisbon Treaty; points out that the Charter has become legally binding upon the EU institutions and upon the Member States when implementing Union law, thereby transforming basic values into specific rights;

37.  Recalls that the Treaty of Lisbon introduced the new right to launch a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI); stresses the need to remove all the technical and bureaucratic barriers still hindering the effective use of the ECI, and encourages active participation by citizens in shaping EU policies;

38.  Highlights the greater role given to national parliaments in the Lisbon Treaty and stresses that, alongside the role which they play in monitoring respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, they can and do make positive contributions in the framework of the Political Dialogue; considers that the active role which the national parliaments can play in guiding the members of the Council of Ministers, together with good cooperation between the European Parliament and the national parliaments, can help to establish a healthy parliamentary counterbalance to the exercise of executive power in the functioning of the EU; refers also to the reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments under Article 7(2) of Protocol No 2, which states that the broad scope of delegation under Article 290 TFEU in a proposed act does not make it possible to assess whether or not the concrete legislative reality would be in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity;

International relations

(Parliamentary competence and scrutiny)

39.  Recalls that the Lisbon Treaty increased the role and powers of the European Parliament in the field of international agreements, and points out that international agreements now increasingly cover areas which concern the everyday lives of citizens and which traditionally, and under EU primary law, fall within the scope of ordinary legislative procedures; considers that it is imperative that the provision in Article 218(10) TFEU, which stipulates that Parliament must be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure for concluding international agreements, is applied in a way which is compatible with Article 10 TEU, pursuant to which the functioning of the Union is based on representative democracy, which requires transparency and democratic debate on the issues to be decided;

40.  Notes that the rejection of the SWIFT and ACTA agreements were demonstrations of Parliament using its newly acquired prerogatives;

41.  Underlines, on the basis of Article 18 TEU, the HR/VP’s responsibility for ensuring consistency of the EU’s external action; underlines, furthermore, that the HR/VP, under Articles 17 and 36 TEU, is accountable to, and has Treaty obligations towards, Parliament;

42.  Recalls, with regard to international agreements, Parliament’s prerogative to ask the Council not to authorise the opening of negotiations until Parliament has stated its position on a proposed negotiating mandate, and believes that consideration should be given to a Framework Agreement with the Council;

43.  Emphasises the need to ensure that Parliament is informed in advance by the Commission of its intention to launch an international negotiation, that it has a genuine opportunity to express an informed opinion on the negotiating mandates, and that its opinion is taken into account; insists that international agreements should include the appropriate conditionalities to comply with Article 21 TEU;

44.  Attaches great importance to the inclusion of human rights clauses in international agreements and of sustainable development chapters in trade and investment agreements, and expresses satisfaction with Parliament’s initiatives with a view to the adoption of roadmaps regarding key conditionalities; reminds the Commission of the need to take into account Parliament’s views and resolutions and to provide feedback on how they have been incorporated into the negotiations on international agreements and into draft legislation; expresses its hope that the instruments needed to develop the EU's investment policy will become operative in due time;

45.  Demands, in line with Article 218(10) TFEU, that Parliament be immediately, fully and accurately informed at all stages of the procedures for concluding international agreements, including agreements concluded in the area of CFSP, and be given access to the Union’s negotiation texts subject to the appropriate procedures and conditions, so as to ensure that Parliament can take its final decision with an exhaustive knowledge of the subject matter; emphasises that for this provision to be meaningful, the committee members concerned should have access to negotiation mandates and other relevant negotiating documents;

46.  Points out, while respecting the principle that Parliament’s consent to international agreements cannot be conditional, that it is entitled to make recommendations as to the application in practice of the agreements; asks, to this end, that the Commission present regular reports to Parliament on the implementation of international agreements, including the human rights and other conditions of the agreements.

47.  Recalls the need to avoid the provisional application of international agreements before Parliament´s consent has been given, unless Parliament agrees to make an exception; stresses that the rules needed for the internal application of international agreements cannot be adopted by the Council alone in its decision on the conclusion of the agreement and that the appropriate legislative procedures under the Treaties must be fully complied with;

48.  Reaffirms the need for the Parliament to adopt the necessary measures in order to monitor the implementation of international agreements;

49.  Insists that Parliament should have a say in decisions regarding the suspension or termination of international agreements whose conclusion needed the consent of Parliament;

50.  Calls upon the HR/VP to enhance, in line with the Declaration on Political Accountability, a systematic ex-ante consultation with Parliament on new strategic documents, policy papers and mandates;

51.  Calls, in line with the commitment made by the HR/VP in the Declaration on Political Accountability, for the urgent conclusion of the negotiations on an Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning access by the European Parliament to classified information held by the Council and the European External Action Service in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy;

52.  Reiterates its call for political reporting by Union delegations to key Parliament office‑holders under regulated access;

53.  Calls for the adoption of a Quadripartite Memorandum of Understanding between the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the coherent and effective provision of information in the area of external relations;

54.  Recalls that the European Parliament is now a fully fledged institutional actor in the field of security policies, and is therefore entitled to participate actively in determining the features and priorities of those policies and in evaluating instruments in this field, a process to be conducted jointly by the European Parliament, national parliaments and the Council; believes that the European Parliament should play a crucial role in the evaluation and definition of internal security policies, as they have a profound impact on the fundamental rights of all those living in the EU; emphasises, therefore, the need to ensure that such policies fall within the remit of the only directly elected European institution as regards scrutiny and democratic oversight;

55.  Points out that the TFEU has expanded the scope of the Union’s exclusive competences in the field of the CCP, which now embraces not only all aspects of trade, but also foreign direct investment; highlights the fact that Parliament is now fully competent to decide, together with the Council, on law-making and on the approval of trade and investment agreements;

56.  Highlights the importance of the EU institutions’ cooperating in a loyal and effective manner, within their respective competences, when considering legislation and international agreements with a view to anticipating trade and economic trends, identifying priorities and options, establishing mid- and long-term strategies, determining mandates for international agreements, analysing/drafting and adopting legislation and monitoring the implementation of trade and investment agreements, as well as long-term initiatives in the field of CCP;

57.  Underlines the importance of continuing the process of developing effective capacities, including the allocation of the necessary staff and financial resources, in order to actively define and achieve political objectives in the field of trade and investment, while ensuring legal certainty, the effectiveness of the EU’s external action and respect for the principles and objectives enshrined in the Treaties;

58.  Stresses the need to ensure a continuous flow of timely, accurate, comprehensive and impartial information for the purpose of enabling the high-quality analysis needed to enhance the capabilities of Parliament’s policymakers and their sense of ownership, leading to greater interinstitutional synergy in respect of the CCP, and at the same time to ensure that Parliament is fully and accurately informed at all stages, including by means of access to the Union's negotiation texts under appropriate procedures and conditions, with the Commission being proactive and doing its utmost to guarantee such an information flow; underlines, furthermore, the importance of information being provided to Parliament with a view to preventing undesirable situations from arising that could potentially lead to misunderstandings between the institutions, and welcomes in this regard the regular technical briefing sessions organised by the Commission on a number of topics; regrets the fact that on a number of occasions relevant information has reached Parliament through alternative channels rather than from the Commission;

59.  Reiterates the need for the institutions to work together in the implementation of the Treaties, secondary legislation and the Framework Agreement and the need for the Commission to work in an independent and transparent manner throughout the preparation, adoption and implementation of legislation in the field of CCP, and considers that its role is key throughout the process;

Constitutional dynamic

(Interinstitutional relations and interinstitutional agreements)

60.  Stresses that, under Article 17(1) TEU, the Commission is to take initiatives with a view to achieving interinstitutional agreements on the Union’s annual and multiannual programming; draws attention to the need to involve at an earlier stage not only Parliament but also the Council in the preparation of the Commission’s annual work programme, and stresses the importance of ensuring there is realistic and reliable programming that can be effectively implemented and provide the basis for interinstitutional planning; takes the view that, in order to increase the political accountability of the Commission to Parliament, a mid-term review to assess the overall fulfilment by the Commission of the announced mandate could be envisaged;

61.  Points out that Article 17(8) TEU expressly enshrines the principle that the Commission is politically accountable to the European Parliament, which is crucial to the proper functioning of the EU’s political system;

62.  Stresses that, under Article 48(2) TEU, Parliament has the competence to initiate Treaty changes and will make use of this right to present new ideas for the future of Europe and the institutional framework of the EU;

63.  Considers that the Framework Agreement concluded between Parliament and the Commission, and its regular updates, are essential with a view to strengthening and developing structured cooperation between the two institutions;

64.  Welcomes the fact that the Framework Agreement adopted in 2010 considerably strengthened the political accountability of the Commission vis-à-vis Parliament;

65.  Underlines the fact that the rules on dialogue and access to information allow for more comprehensive parliamentary scrutiny of the activities of the Commission, thereby contributing to the equal treatment of Parliament and the Council by the Commission;

66.  Notes that certain provisions of the current Framework Agreement still need to be implemented and developed; suggests that the outgoing Parliament adopt the general lines of this improvement so that appropriate proposals can be considered by the incoming Parliament;

67.  Invites the Commission to reflect constructively with Parliament on the existing Framework Agreement and its implementation, paying particular attention to the negotiation, adoption and implementation of international agreements;

68.  Takes the view that this mandate should fully explore the possibilities under the current Treaties to strengthen the political accountability of the executive and to streamline the existing provisions on legislative and political cooperation;

69.  Recalls that a number of issues, such as delegated acts, implementing measures, impact assessments, the treatment of legislative initiatives, and parliamentary questions, need an update in the light of the experience gained during this legislative term;

70.  Regrets that its repeated calls for the 2003 Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking to be renegotiated in order to take account of the new legislative environment created by the Treaty of Lisbon, consolidate current best practice and bring the agreement up to date in line with the smart regulation agenda remain unanswered;

71.  Invites the Council of Ministers to express its position on the possibility of participating in a trilateral agreement with Parliament and the Commission with the aim of making further progress on the issues set out so far in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking;

72.  Considers that matters solely connected to the relations between Parliament and the Commission should continue to be the subject of a bilateral framework agreement; stresses that Parliament will not settle for less than what has been achieved under the existing Framework Agreement;

73.  Considers that one of the major challenges to the Lisbon Treaty’s constitutional framework is the risk of intergovernmentalism jeopardising the ‘community method’, thus weakening the role of Parliament and the Commission to the benefit of the institutions representing the Member States’ governments;

74.  Points out that Article 2 TEU contains a list of the common values on which the Union is founded; believes that respect for those values should be properly ensured by both the Union and the Member States; points out that a proper legislative and institutional system should be established in order to protect the values of the Union;

75.  Calls on all the EU institutions and the Member States’ governments and parliaments to build on the new institutional and legal framework created by the Treaty of Lisbon in such a way as to devise a comprehensive internal human rights policy for the Union which ensures effective accountability mechanisms at national and EU level with which to address human rights violations;

o
o   o

76.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ C 70 E, 8.3.2012, p. 98. (2) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0462. (3) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0323. (4) OJ L 304, 20.11.2010, p. 47. (5) OJ C 298, 30.11.2002, p. 1. (6) OJ C 212 E, 5.8.2010, p. 37. (7) OJ C 210, 3.8.2010, p. 1. (8) Interinstitutional agreement of 20 November 2002 between the European Parliament and the Council concerning access by the European Parliament to sensitive information of the Council in the field of security and defence policy (OJ C 298, 30.11.2002, p. 1). (9) See Council Decision 2013/129/EU of 7 March 2013 on subjecting 4-methylamphetamine to control measures, and Council Implementing Decision 2013/496/EU of 7 October 2013 on subjecting 5-(2-aminopropyl) indole to control measures.

European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2014 on the role of property rights, property ownership and wealth creation in eradicating poverty and fostering sustainable development in developing countries (2013/2026(INI))

P7_TA(2014)0250 A7-0118/2014

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Article 17 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights concerning the right to property,

–  having regard to the Millennium Declaration of 8 September 2000 setting out the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), in particular goals 1, 3 and 7,

–  having regard to the Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’ signed on 20 December 2005, in particular paragraphs 11 and 92 thereof,

–  having regard to the Commission Communication of 19 October 2004 entitled ‘EU Guidelines to support land policy design and reform processes in developing countries’ (COM(2004)0686),

–  having regard to the Commission Communication of 31 March 2010 on ‘An EU policy framework to assist developing countries in addressing food security challenges’ (COM(2010)0127),

–  having regard to the Commission Communication of 13 October 2011 entitled ‘Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: An agenda for change’ (COM(2011)0637),

–  having regard to the Commission Communication of 27 February 2013 entitled ‘A decent life for all: Ending poverty and giving the world a sustainable future’ (COM(2013)0092),

–  having regard to the ‘EU Land Policy Guidelines: Guidelines for support to land policy design and land policy reform processes in developing countries’ adopted by the Commission in November 2004,

–  having regard to the 2008 United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) study entitled ‘Secure Land Rights for All’ and the UN-Habitat guide on ‘How to Develop a Pro-Poor Land Policy: Process, Guide and Lessons’,

–  having regard to the report of 11 June 2009 by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, entitled ‘Large-scale land acquisitions and leases: a set of core principles and measures to address the human rights challenge’,

–  having regard to the declaration on ‘Urbanisation Challenges and Poverty Reduction in ACP States’ adopted in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2009,

–  having regard to the declaration of the World Summit on Food Security, adopted in Rome in 2010,

–  having regard to the declaration on ‘Making Slums History: A worldwide challenge for 2020’ adopted at the international conference held in Rabat, Morocco, from 26 to 28 November 2012,

–  having regard to the declaration on ‘Sustainable Urbanisation as Response to Urban Poverty Eradication’ adopted at the 2nd Tripartite ACP-European Commission-UN‑Habitat Conference held in Kigali, Rwanda, from 3 to 6 September 2013,

–  having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), and to the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No 169) of 1989 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO),

–  having regard to the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (PRAI), to the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, and to the African Union’s Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa (ALPFG),

–  having regard to the recommendations of the High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda to include a goal on governance of land tenure for women and men, and to recognise that women and girls must have, inter alia ‘the equal right to own land and other assets’,

–  having regard to its resolution of 27 September 2011 on an EU policy framework to assist developing countries in addressing food security challenges(1),

–  having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Development and the opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (A7-0118/2014),

A.  whereas property rights can be defined as the rules that regulate the terms by which individual stakeholders, communities, and public and private actors acquire and maintain access to tangible and intangible assets through formal law or customary provisions; whereas according to UN-Habitat, land tenure specifically can be formal (freehold, leasehold, public and private rental), customary or religious in origin; whereas the EU Land Policy Guidelines state that land rights are not always limited to private ownership in the strict sense, but can resort to a balance between individual rights and duties, and collective regulations at different levels;

B.  whereas 1,2 billion people worldwide inhabit property for which they do not hold formal rights and live without permanent homes or access to land; whereas, in particular, more than 90 % of the rural population in sub-Saharan Africa (of which 370 million people are considered to be poor) access land and natural resources via legally insecure customary and informal tenure systems;

C.  whereas total extra-legal and unregistered wealth is estimated at over USD 9,3 trillion, which is 93 times larger than the total amount of foreign aid given to developing countries over the past 30 years;

D.  whereas although MDG7 (Target 11) –aimed at improving the lives of 100 million slum inhabitants by 2020 – has been attained, the number of such inhabitants (estimated at 863 million in 2012), in absolute terms, continues to grow; whereas UN-Habitat estimates that as many as one billion people live in slums, and it is thought that an estimated three billion people will be residing in slums by 2050; whereas Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognises a universal right to housing and to continuous improvement of living conditions;

E.  whereas in rural areas, some 200 million people (almost 20 % of the world’s poor) have no access to sufficient land to make a living; whereas rural land is coming under multiple pressures, such as population growth, land-use conversion, commercial investments, environmental degradation due to drought, soil erosion and nutrient depletion, as well as natural disasters and conflicts; and whereas securing land rights is necessary to promote social stability by reducing uncertainty and conflicts over land;

F.  whereas private investors and governments have shown a growing interest in the acquisition or long-term lease of large portions of arable land, mostly in developing countries in Africa and Latin America;

G.  whereas arbitrary land allocation by political authorities breeds corruption, insecurity, poverty and violence;

H.  whereas land governance issues are closely linked with the key challenges of the 21st century, namely food security, energy scarcity, urban and population growth, environmental degradation, climate change, natural disasters and conflict resolution, reinforcing the need to prioritise comprehensive land reform;

I.  whereas an estimated 1,4 billion hectares worldwide are governed by customary norms; whereas existing land tenure structures in Africa, Asia and Latin America are considerably different from each other and the local, customary arrangements that have developed – whether they be freehold or communal – cannot be disregarded when formalisation of land is undertaken;

J.  whereas the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) states that women and spouses shall have equal rights in respect of the ownership and acquisition of property; whereas, however, many land tenure and property rights regimes discriminate against women either formally or in practice;

K.  whereas, in many developing countries, women’s property rights, secured access to land and access to savings and credit are not socially recognised; whereas, starting from such a discriminatory basis, it is particularly difficult for women to assert their property rights, and especially rights to inheritance, by legal means;

L.  whereas in particular women’s land rights in developing countries are being violated through the increasing incidence of large-scale land acquisition by developed countries for commercial or strategic purposes, such as agricultural production, food security and energy and biofuel production; whereas women often lack the opportunity to harness legal aid and representation to successfully challenge violations of property rights in developing countries;

M.  whereas providing secure land rights for women is important for poverty reduction, in view of women’s roles as food producers in rural and peri-urban areas, their responsibilities for feeding family members; whereas women, who represent 70 % of Africa’s farmers, formally own as little as 2 % of the land; whereas recent programmes throughout India, Kenya, Honduras, Ghana, Nicaragua and Nepal have found that female‑headed households have greater food security, better health care and a stronger focus on education rather than male-headed households;

N.  whereas more than 60 % of chronically hungry people are women and girls and, in the developing countries, 60-80 % of food is produced by women(2);

O.  whereas an estimated 370 million indigenous peoples worldwide have a strong spiritual, cultural, social and economic relationship with their traditional lands, the management of which is usually community-based;

P.  whereas Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises the rights of everyone to own property either alone or in association with others, and that no one should be arbitrarily deprived of his or her property;

Q.  whereas access to land for indigenous people has been afforded specific forms of protection under Convention no 169 of the ILO and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

R.  whereas Article 10 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People guarantees the right not to be forcibly removed from one’s lands or territories, and that no relocation can take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous people, and following agreement on just and fair compensation as well as wherever possible, the option of return;

Land rights, including property rights, and wealth creation

1.  Considers registered property rights and secure land rights to be a catalyst for economic growth, while also promoting social cohesion and peace;

2.  Emphasises that securing land rights and greater equity in land access provide a secure foundation for livelihoods, economic opportunities, and in rural areas, for household food production;

3.  Underlines the fact that besides individual land titling, a variety of alternative tenure options, including building on customary tenure systems to legally secure rights to house plots, farmland and natural resources, should be recognised, as advocated by UN-Habitat;

4.  Stresses that land tenure security for smallholders, who constitute 95 % of potential landowners in developing countries, stimulates local economies, increases food security, decreases migration and slows down slum urbanisation; points out that, in Ethiopia for example, where property rights have been introduced, productivity increased by up to 40 % per acre over three years, on account of this change alone(3);

5.  Notes with concern that cultural traditions often leave women dependent on male relatives for tenure security and without legal protection; stresses the international obligations of States to ensure minimum economic social and cultural rights, which include the obligation of governments to ensure that land management is not discriminatory, in particular with regard to women and the poor, and that it does not violate other human rights;

6.  Highlights the fact that empowering people to make decisions about their own resources, combined with formal inheritance provisions, strongly encourages smallholders to invest sustainably in their land, practise terracing and irrigation, and mitigate the effects of climate change; notes, in this connection, that studies have shown that a household with fully secure and transferable land is estimated to be 59,8 % more likely to invest in terracing than a household that expects to be redistributed within the village during the next five years;

7.  Notes that with title deeds to land, a person may borrow money at reasonable rates of interest, which can be used to establish and develop a business; emphasises that the protection of property rights may promote a competitive business environment where the entrepreneurial and innovative spirit can grow;

8.  Recognises that the challenge is to overcome the dissonance between legality, legitimacy and practices by building land tenure mechanisms based on shared norms, starting from a recognition of existing rights, while making sure that men and women, as well as vulnerable communities in developing countries, have secure rights over land and assets, and are fully protected against vested interests that could seize their property;

9.  Strongly condemns the practice of land-grabbing which, in particular, illegally dispossesses the rural poor and traditional Nomad populations of land without adequate compensation; highlights the fact that at least 32 million hectares worldwide have been part of at least 886 transnational large‑scale land deals of this kind between 2000 and 2013(4); highlights the fact that this figure is likely to represent a significant underestimation of the accurate number of large land deals concluded;

10.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States, in their development assistance policies, to take account of large-scale land acquisition processes by developed countries’ investors in developing countries, and on the African continent in particular, which are affecting local farmers and which have a devastating impact on women and children, with a view to protecting them from impoverishment, famine and forcible eviction from their villages and land;

11.  Stresses that the removal of public incentives for the production of crop-based biofuels and subsidies is one way to combat land-grabbing;

12.  Recalls that when land rights are not secure and governance is weak, high risks are brought about for local communities, in terms of food insecurity, risk of displacement, and the eviction of farmers and herders; urges the Member States, in this connection, to support the national capacity of developing countries to strengthen their governance systems;

13.  Highlights the fact that both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognise the right to self-determination, which is defined as the right of all people to dispose freely of their natural wealth and resources, and that both stipulate that no person may be deprived of his or her own means of subsistence; stresses, in this connection, that the negotiation of large-scale leases and the acquisition of lands must entail transparency, adequate and informed participation on the part of the local communities concerned by land leases or purchases, and accountability in the use of revenues that should benefit the local population;

14.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to examine, via the UN, the impact that such acquisitions have on the desertification of farmland, on the loss of women’s rights of residence and access to land, with particular reference to single women and those who are the head of the family, on food security and on their livelihood and that of their children and dependent persons;

15.  Stresses that investment agreements on large-scale land acquisitions or leases should duly take into account the right of current land-users, as well as the rights of workers employed on farms; takes the view that the obligations of investors should be clearly defined and should be enforceable, for instance by means of the inclusion of sanction mechanisms in cases of non-compliance with human rights; considers that all land deals should also include a legal obligation whereby a certain minimum percentage of crops produced should be sold on the local market;

Roadmap to secure land rights, including property rights, and sustainable land governance in the developing world

16.  Highlights the fact that land reform requires flexibility, tailored to local, social and cultural conditions, such as traditional forms of tribal ownership, and should be focused on empowering the most vulnerable;

17.  Highlights the fact that the co-existence of customary land regimes and imposed colonial models represent one of the main causes of endemic land insecurity in developing countries; stresses, in this connection, the imperative to recognise the legitimacy of customary tenure arrangements that provide statutory rights to individuals and communities, and prevent dispossession and abuses of land rights, which are especially prevalent among African communities and the large indigenous populations of Latin America;

18.  Emphasises that regularising tenure security for urban squatters has a significant effect on residential investment, with studies showing that the rate of housing renovation increases by more than 66 %;

19.  Congratulates Rwanda on the progress it has made with regard to land data, which has made it possible to register all land in the country within a remarkably short period;

20.  Warns against applying a one-size-fits-all approach in order to achieve land security; underlines the fact that formal land administration services are most effective when provided at local level; takes the view that the effective delivery of secure land rights may therefore depend on the reform of centralised state land agencies with a view to devolving responsibilities to local and customary institutions; considers that land registration can then be improved by means of the computerisation of land records and cadastral systems;

21.  Recalls that agriculture remains a fundamental source of livelihood, subsistence and food security for rural communities; notes, however, that rural land is coming under multiple pressures, because of population growth, land-use conversion, commercial investments, and environmental degradation due to drought, soil erosion and nutrient depletion, as well as natural disasters and conflicts; believes, in this connection, that securing land tenure for rural communities is essential to achieve the millennium development goals (MDGs); takes the view that a range of policy instruments can help address these challenges, and they must be adapted to meet local conditions;

22.  Believes that government officials should first identify those land management and tenure systems that already exist and that they should, secondly, build on these systems for the benefit of the poor and vulnerable groups;

23.  Trusts that the decentralisation of land administration empowers local communities and individuals, and draws attention to the need to eliminate corrupt practices imposed by local chiefs through deals struck with foreign investors and any claims to unregistered individual plots of land;

24.  Stresses that any shift in land use should only take place with the free, prior and informed consent of the local communities concerned; recalls that indigenous people have been granted specific forms of protection of their rights on land under international law; insists, in line with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, that states shall provide effective mechanisms for the prevention of, and redress for, any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing indigenous peoples of their lands, territories or resources;

25.  Notes that the limited proportion of land which is registered in Africa (10 %) is recorded via outdated erroneous systems; underlines the fact that, according to World Bank estimates(5), the 27 economies that modernised their registries in the past seven years cut the average time for transferring property ownership by half, thereby increasing transparency, reducing corruption and simplifying revenue collection; emphasises that a high priority for development policy should be to establish and improve land registries in developing countries;

26.  Recalls that tenure security can be safeguarded under various forms, provided that the rights of land users and owners are clear: recalls that in addition to formal titles, security can be achieved through clear, long-term rental contracts, or formal recognition of customary rights and informal settlements, with accessible and effective dispute settlement mechanisms; calls for the EU to channel support towards capacity development and training programmes in land management with the aim of securing land rights for the poor and vulnerable groups, including through cadastral surveying, registration, and efforts to equip educational institutions in developing countries;

27.  Calls for the EU to strengthen the capacity of courts in developing countries to enforce property law effectively, to resolve land disputes and manage expropriations as part of a holistic approach aimed at consolidating judicial systems and the rule of law;

28.  Calls for the EU to help developing countries to implement their land reforms in order, to promote, in particular, the participation of all stakeholders, and in combination with awareness-raising programmes, so that the rights of all parties involved, especially the poor and vulnerable, are fully respected; cites the example of Madagascar and the local land offices, where simple local initiatives have greatly facilitated the registration of land titles;

29.  Highlights the fact that building sound fiscal policies in developing countries by strengthening land registration and delineating valuation functions significantly increases annual land transaction revenue, such as in Thailand where it increased six‑fold over a period of 10 years;

30.  Points out that the formal recognition of land rights for women does not automatically entail the effective implementation of those rights; calls for the EU to pay particular attention in its land reform programmes to women’s vulnerability to changes in family structure and the degree to which women can enforce their rights, as well as to ensure that in practice, household deeds have both spouses’ names on the land title;

31.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States, in their development and humanitarian policies, to ensure that developing countries introduce legislative measures to promote gender equality and prevent discrimination with regard to property rights based on ethnicity, race and civil status, and address the means of removing the significant social, political and cultural constraints on land rights acquisition;

32.  Calls for the EU delegations in developing countries to monitor women’s property rights to ensure they are not being breached, thereby protecting women from the risk of falling into poverty and social exclusion;

33.  Calls for the EU to support the efforts of developing countries in reforming land rental markets to provide land access to the poor and promote growth, while avoiding excessive restrictions on lease markets;

Placing land rights, including property rights, at the heart of EU development policy

34.  Highlights the fact that large-scale land acquisitions are, inter alia, a direct consequence of weak land governance in developing countries; underlines that EU aid should contribute to building the institutional capability required for the granting of secure land rights, so as to tackle rent-seeking and bureaucratic inertia, as well as corrupt and unaccountable practices;

35.  Commends the EU’s participation in global land initiatives; highlights the fact that, as the world’s leading development actor, the EU has the capacity to enhance its currently limited approach in terms of both scope and visibility with a view to addressing land tenure;

36.  Notes that along with improving property rights systems in developing countries, the EU must aim to ensure that people have access to social protection and insurance schemes in order to protect their livelihoods and protect their assets in the case of a disaster or shock;

37.  Calls for the implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests;

38.  Urges the Commission to set a clearly defined budget line, shifting from a small-scale perspective to long-term land governance reform, with a view to streamlining land tenure;

39.  Stresses that the challenge of providing secure land rights for displaced people and refugees is likely to increase under the pressures climate change; urges the EU, in this connection, to enhance its assistance with respect to the inclusion of land rights in humanitarian and development responses to disasters or civil conflicts, whereby land policies must guarantee secure land rights for different ethnic, social or generational groups in an equitable manner;

40.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to empower women in their rights and access to land, inheritance, access to credit and savings in post-conflict situations, especially in countries where women’s rights are not legally enforceable and socially recognised, and where gender‑biased laws, traditional attitudes toward women and male-dominated social hierarchies pose obstacles to women attaining equal and fair rights; calls on the EU to promote the involvement of the newly created UN Women’s Organisation in this issue;

41.  Welcomes the Land Transparency Initiative, launched by the G8 in June 2013, on the basis of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the recognition of the fact that transparency as regards the ownership of companies and land, combined with secure property rights and strong institutions, is crucial for poverty alleviation; stresses, however, that efforts need to be increased in order to facilitate the implementation of efficient land reform;

42.  Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to reduce poverty worldwide in the context of sustainable development, and reiterates that the EU should include a strong gender component in all of its policies and practices in its relations with developing countries(6);

43.  Emphasises the fact that the strengthening of policies to place women’s access to property in developing countries on an equal footing with that of men is necessary; takes the view that this must be taken into consideration in the country programmes and must be accompanied by the requisite financial support mechanisms (such as savings, credit, grants, micro-credits and insurance); believes that these strengthened policies will result in the empowerment of women and NGOs and promote women’s entrepreneurship; considers that they will improve women’s legal and financial literacy, support girls’ education, increase the dissemination and accessibility of information, and establish legal aid services and gender-sensitivity training for financial services providers;

44.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States, in their development work, actively to promote female entrepreneurship and property rights, as part of the process of enhancing women’s independence from their husbands and strengthening their countries’ economies;

45.  Recalls that 15 October is the International Day of Rural Women and calls on the European Union and the Member States to promote awareness‑raising campaigns in developing countries;

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46.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and the parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of the United Nations, the President of the World Bank, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly and the Africa Caribbean Pacific-European Union Joint Parliamentary Assembly.

(1) OJ C 56 E, 26.2.2013, p. 75. (2) Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), Policy Brief No 5 – Economic and Social Perspectives, August 2009. (3) USAID Ethiopia, http://ethiopia.usaid.gov/programs/feed-future-initiative/projects/land-administration-nurture-development-land (4) http://www.landmatrix.org/get-the-idea/global-map-investments/ (5) 2012b.Doing Business 2012: Doing Business in a More Transparent World. Washington, DC: World Bank. (6) OJ C 46, 24.2.2006.

European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2014 on the EU 2013 Report on Policy Coherence for Development (2013/2058(INI))

P7_TA(2014)0251 A7-0161/2014

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to paragraphs 9 and 35 of the joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’(1),

–  having regard to Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which reaffirms that the Union must take account of the objective of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries,

–  having regard to the successive conclusions of the Council, the biennial reports by the Commission and the resolutions of the European Parliament on policy coherence for development (PCD), particularly its resolution of 25 October 2012 on the EU 2011 Report on Policy Coherence for Development(2),

–  having regard to the Commission Staff Working Document on the EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development 2010-2015 (SEC(2010)0265) and to the Council Conclusions of 14 June 2010 on the Millennium Development Goals in which the respective EU Plan of Action is endorsed,

–  having regard to the Commission Working Document on Policy Coherence for Development in 2013 (SWD(2013)0456),

–  having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Development (A7-0161/2014),

A.  whereas the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy adopted in 2012 states that the EU will work in favour of human rights in all areas of its external action without exception;

B.  whereas only a European vision based on solidarity – which does not assume there to be any incompatibility between the objectives of tackling poverty inside and outside the European Union – can overcome conflicts of interest among the various policies of the Union and reconcile them with the imperatives of development;

C.  whereas PCD is now recognised as an obligation and regarded as a tool of a comprehensive policy and a process which seeks to incorporate the multiple dimensions of development at all stages of policy formulation;

D.  whereas, since all policies of the Union have an external impact, they must be designed to meet the long-term needs of developing countries in relation to combating poverty, providing social security and a decent income, and safeguarding fundamental human rights and economic and environmental rights;

E.  whereas PCD must be based on recognition of the right of a country or region to determine democratically its own policies, priorities and strategies in order to provide its people with means of subsistence;

F.  whereas the Union must take on a strong leadership role in promoting PCD;

G.  whereas the current European framework for development lacks effective machinery to prevent or remedy incoherence arising from the policies pursued by the Union;

H.  whereas, although the European Parliament has made progress in monitoring the policies which have a major impact on development, it still has some way to go with a view to achieving optimal coherence and avoiding certain inconsistencies so as to fully perform the institutional role assigned to it;

I.  whereas, in the ‘post-2015’ framework, PCD must be based on action geared to shared but differentiated responsibilities favourable to inclusive political dialogue;

J.  having regard to the lessons learned from the experience of the OECD countries, particularly the work of the PCD Unit in the OECD’s Secretariat;

K.  whereas coordination of EU Member States’ development policies and aid programmes is an important part of the PCD agenda; whereas it is estimated that as much as EUR 800 million could be saved annually from cutting transaction costs if the EU and its Member States concentrated their aid efforts on fewer countries and activities;

L.  whereas the effectiveness of EU development policy is hindered by fragmentation and duplication of aid policies and programmes across Member States; whereas a more coordinated EU-wide approach would reduce the administrative burden and reduce the related costs;

M.  whereas the UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund) report ‘ICPD Beyond 2014 Global Report’ launched on 12 February 2014 emphasises that the protection of women and adolescents affected by violence must be a priority on the international agenda of development;

Attainment of PCD

1.  Proposes that an arbitration system be established, to be operated by the President of the Commission, to bring about PCD, and that in the event of divergences among the various policies of the Union, the President of the Commission should fully shoulder his political responsibility for the overall approach and have the task of deciding among them on the basis of the commitments accepted by the Union with regard to PCD; takes the view that, once the problems have been identified, consideration could be given to a reform of the decision-making procedures within the Commission and in interdepartmental cooperation;

2.  Calls on the European Union, the Member States and their partner institutions to ensure that the new ‘post-2015’ framework includes a PCD objective which makes it possible to develop reliable indicators to measure the progress of donors and partner countries and to assess the impact of the various policies on development, in particular by applying a ‘PCD lens’ to key issues such as population growth, global food security, illicit financial flows, migration, climate and green growth;

3.  Points out the importance of the role of the European External Action Service in implementing PCD, in particular the role of the EU Delegations in monitoring, observing and facilitating consultations and dialogue with stakeholders and partner countries on EU policy impacts in developing countries; stresses that a wider discussion with all relevant stakeholders, such as NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs), is needed;

4.  Regrets the status of Document SWD(2013)0456 presented by the Commission – a mere working document – which, unlike the communication originally planned after the 2011 working document, does not require the approval of the college of Commissioners, which is paradoxical for a document concerning a field as political as PCD;

5.  Calls on the Commission to maintain its commitment to the field of development and human rights, and recalls the role of the latter in imparting impetus to the Union’s policies and coordinating them; considers that the Commission should actively promote a coherent and modern vision of human development in order to attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and honour the commitments given;

6.  Asks the Commission to contract regular independent ex-post assessments of the development impact of key policies, as requested by the Council; emphasises the need to improve the Commission’s impact assessment system by featuring PCD explicitly and ensuring that development becomes a fourth central element of the analysis, alongside the economic, social and environmental impacts;

7.  Stresses the need to make proper arrangements for teaching about how to incorporate PCD into the various fields of political action, teaching being the key element to increase the awareness of European citizens in connection with ‘2015 – European Year for Development’; asks the Commission and the EEAS to provide specific training on PCD and development impact to staff in non-development services;

8.  Confirms the need to appoint a permanent rapporteur on the development agenda for the period after 2015, who should also ensure that due account is taken of PCD;

9.  Stresses the important role which the European Parliament could play in the process of promoting PCD by assigning it priority in Parliament’s agendas, by increasing the number of meetings between committees and between parliaments relating to PCD, by promoting dialogue on PCD with partner countries and by fostering exchanges of views with civil society; recalls that structured annual meetings between the Member States’ national parliaments and the European Parliament is an important way of strengthening PCD and coordination;

10.  Stresses the need to establish an independent system within the Union to receive and formally process complaints by members of the public or communities affected by the Union’s policies;

11.  Stresses the need for PCD to ensure the active participation of civil society, including women’s groups, the empowerment of women in decision-making processes as well as the full involvement of gender experts;

Priority areas of action

12.  Calls for migration flow management to be consistent with the development policies of the EU and the partner countries; considers that this requires a strategy which addresses the political, socioeconomic and cultural circumstances and aims at revitalising the Union’s overall relations with its immediate neighbours; stresses, furthermore, the importance of dealing with issues related to the social and professional integration of migrants and to citizenship by working jointly with the countries of origin and transit;

13.  Stresses that trade and development do not always accord perfectly; considers that developing countries should selectively open up their markets; stresses the importance of social and environmental responsibility on the part of the private sector, and considers that, when liberalising trade, it is important not to forget social and environmental conditions such as ILO standards; recalls the need to include references to them in WTO agreements in order to avoid social and environmental dumping;

14.  Recalls, in this context, that the cost of incorporating such standards is far less than the impact of failure to comply with them on social welfare, human health and life expectancy;

15.  Welcomes the fact that the relevance of smallholder farming in combating hunger is recognised by the EU and calls for systematic assessment of the impact of European agricultural, trade and energy policies, including EU biofuel policy, which are likely to have adverse effects on developing countries;

16.  Reiterates that more attention needs to be focused on maximising the synergies between EU climate change policies and the EU development objectives, especially in terms of tools and instruments used and the collateral development and/or climate change adaptation benefits;

17.  Considers that the challenge of climate change must be tackled by means of structural reforms, and calls for systematic assessment of the risks associated with climate change in all aspects of political planning and the decision-making process, including in fields relating to trade, agriculture and food security; calls for the results of such assessments to be used in the context of the development cooperation instrument 2014-2020 to formulate clear and coherent national and regional strategy documents;

18.  Considers that, while recognising the attention paid to several aspects of PCD, the EU should take concrete steps to combat tax evasion and tackle tax havens; calls upon the Commission to also include in the annual report on the implementation of the Raw Materials Initiative information on the impact of new agreements, programmes and initiatives on resource-rich developing countries;

19.  Recognises the high level of responsibility borne by the EU in ensuring that its fisheries are based on the same standards in terms of ecological and social sustainability and transparency both inside and outside Union waters; notes that such coherence requires coordination both within the Commission itself and between the Commission and the governments of the individual Member States;

20.  Recalls in particular its commitment to preventing the financing of large-scale energy infrastructure with adverse social and environmental repercussions;

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21.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ C 46, 24.2.2006, p. 1. (2) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0399.

European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2014 on EU priorities for the 25th session of the UN Human Rights Council (2014/2612(RSP))

P7_TA(2014)0252 RC-B7-0234/2014

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the UN human rights conventions and optional protocols thereto,

–  having regard to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/251 establishing the Human Rights Council (UNHRC),

–  having regard to the United Nations Millennium Declaration of 8 September 2000 and to the UN General Assembly resolutions thereon,

–  having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,

–  having regard to the EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy and the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, as adopted at the 3179th Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 25 June 2012,

–  having regard to its recommendation to the Council of 13 June 2012 on the EU Special Representative for Human Rights(1),

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), including Parliament’s priorities in this context, and in particular that of 7 February 2013(2),

–  having regard to its urgent resolutions on human rights issues,

–  having regard to its resolution of 11 December 2013 on the Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2012 and the European Union’s policy on the matter(3),

–  having regard to the EU Foreign Affairs Council’s conclusions on the EU’s priorities in the UN human rights fora, adopted on 10 February 2014,

–  having regard to Articles 2, 3(5), 18, 21, 27 and 47 of the Treaty on European Union,

–  having regard to the forthcoming sessions of the UNHRC in 2014, in particular the 25th regular session, to be held from 3 to 28 March 2014,

–  having regard to Rule 110(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas respect for, and the promotion and safeguarding of, the universality of human rights is part of the European Union’s ethical and legal acquis and one of the cornerstones of European unity and integrity;

B.  whereas the EU’s credibility in the UNHRC will be bolstered by increasing consistency between its internal and external policies relating to human rights;

C.  whereas the EU and its Member States should strive to speak out with one voice against human rights violations in order to achieve the best possible results, and should in this context continue to strengthen cooperation and enhance organisational arrangements and coordination among the Member States and among the EU institutions;

D.  whereas the EU Foreign Affairs Council of 10 February 2014 set out its priorities ahead of the 25th regular session of the UN Human Rights Council and the forthcoming UN General Assembly Third Committee, which included the situation in Syria, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Sri Lanka, Myanmar/Burma, Belarus, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Mali and Sudan; whereas the thematic priorities outlined by the Foreign Affairs Council included the death penalty, freedom of religion or belief, the rights of the child, women’s rights, the post-2015 global agenda, freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of association and assembly, NGO cooperation with UN human rights bodies, torture, LGBTI issues, racism, indigenous peoples, economic, social and cultural rights, business and human rights, and support for UN human rights bodies and mechanisms;

E.  whereas an EU Special Representative for Human Rights (EUSR) was appointed on 25 July 2012, whose role it is to enhance the effectiveness and visibility of EU human rights policy and to contribute to the implementation of the Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy;

F.  whereas 14 new members were elected to the UNHRC in October 2013 and took up their membership on 1 January 2014, namely Algeria, China, Cuba, France, the Maldives, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Vietnam, Russia and the United Kingdom; whereas nine EU Member States are now UNHRC members;

G.  whereas the priority theme of the 58th session of the Commission on the Status of Women will be the challenges and achievements in the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals for women and girls;

H.  whereas corruption in the public and private sectors perpetrates and aggravates inequalities and discrimination when it comes to equal enjoyment of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and whereas it is proven that acts of corruption and human rights violations involve the misuse of power, lack of accountability and various forms of discrimination;

I.  whereas the ratification of both of the Kampala amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by states and the activation of the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression will further contribute to ending impunity for perpetrators of this crime;

1.  Welcomes the priorities set out by the Council with a view to the 25th regular session of the UNHRC; urges the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Member States to take into account its recommendations when promoting the EU’s priorities in the UNHRC;

The work of the UN Human Rights Council

2.  Reiterates its belief that elections to the UNHRC need to be competitive, and expresses its opposition to the arranging of uncontested elections by regional groups; reiterates the importance of standards for UNHRC membership as regards commitment and performance in the human rights field, and urges the Member States to insist on such standards when defining the candidates they will vote for; emphasises that UNHRC members are required to uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights; reiterates the importance of strong and transparent criteria for reinstating suspended members;

3.  Expresses its concern about human rights abuses in a number of newly elected members of the UNHRC, including Algeria, China, Cuba, Morocco, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Vietnam;

4.  Notes that Kazakhstan is currently one of the 47 members of the HRC; points out that the human rights situation in that country has deteriorated further since the brutal police repression of peaceful demonstrators and oil workers, their families and supporters in Zhanaozen on 16 December 2011, which, according to official figures, left 15 people dead and over 100 injured; calls on the HRC to implement without delay the call made by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, for an independent international investigation into the killing of oil workers in Kazakhstan; calls on Kazakhstan, as a member of the HRC, to guarantee human rights, repeal Article 164 of its penal code on ‘inciting social discord’, end the repression of, and lift the administrative obstacles placed in the way of, independent media, release political prisoners – including Vadim Kuramshin, a lawyer for human rights defenders, Roza Tuletaeva, a union activist, and Vladimir Kozlow, an opposition politician – and drop all requests for the extradition of opposition politicians;

5.  Continues to oppose ‘bloc voting’ in the UNHRC; urges the countries that are members of the UNHRC to remain transparent in their voting;

6.  Regrets the fact that the space for interaction between civil society and the UNHRC is shrinking and that NGOs are being offered fewer opportunities to speak at these sessions; urges the EU and the UNHRC to ensure that civil society is allowed to contribute as fully as possible to the 25th session of the UNHRC, as well as to the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process and other UN human rights mechanisms, without fear of reprisals upon return to their home country; condemns reports of such reprisals, and urges the EEAS and the Member States to ensure that such cases are followed up in a systematic manner;

7.  Commends the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, for her continued efforts in the treaty body strengthening processes; strongly reiterates the multi-stakeholder nature of the treaty bodies and stresses that civil society needs to be included on a permanent basis in these processes; emphasises, furthermore, that the independence and effectiveness of the treaty bodies must be preserved and enhanced;

Country-specific issues

Syria

8.  Reiterates its strong condemnation of the widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Syrian regime, including all acts of violence, systematic torture and executions of prisoners; condemns all human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by armed groups opposing the regime; expresses serious concern about the severe impact of the three-year conflict on the civilian population, and the continued deterioration of the humanitarian situation within the country and in the region; calls on all armed actors to put an immediate end to the violence in Syria; fully supports the recent round of talks initiated on the basis of the Geneva communiqué, which should be the first step in a process that will lead to a political and democratic solution to the conflict, so as to facilitate a Syrian-led democratic transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people;

9.  Urges all parties to the conflict, and in particular the Syrian regime, to ensure comprehensive and secure cross-border access for international humanitarian aid efforts, and to fulfil their promise of allowing women and children to escape besieged cities such as Homs and the Yarmouk camp; welcomes UN Security Council Resolution 2139 of 22 February 2014, calling for humanitarian aid convoys to be allowed access throughout the country in order to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population, and calls for its rapid implementation; calls for the release of peaceful activists in government detention and civilian hostages being held by armed groups;

10.  Stresses that, in view of the unprecedented scale of the crisis, alleviating the suffering of millions of Syrians in need of basic goods and services must be a priority for the EU and the international community at large; reminds the EU Member States of their humanitarian responsibility towards the Syrian refugees, and notes that tragedies such as that in Lampedusa should not happen again; urges the Commission and the Member States to aid the refugees fleeing the conflict; notes that in its resolution of 9 October 2013, Parliament encouraged the Member States to address acute needs by providing safe entry into the EU to allow temporary admission of Syrians and through resettlement over and above existing national quotas, as well as humanitarian admission;

11.  Reiterates its call on the EEAS and the Member States to ensure that the situation in Syria continues to be treated as a matter of the highest priority within the UN framework, notably in the UNHRC;

12.  Highlights the fact that deliberate starvation of civilians and attacks on health facilities are prohibited under international law and will be regarded as war crimes; reiterates the importance of ensuring accountability at all levels; commends in this context the work of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Syria, including its latest report, to be discussed at the UNHRC, and calls on the Commission of Inquiry to investigate the recent report, which includes thousands of photographs of cases of torture reportedly perpetrated by the Syrian military; reiterates its call for the UN Security Council (UNSC) to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court for a formal investigation; asks the Vice-President / High Representative to take demonstrable action in this direction;

Egypt

13.  Condemns the human rights abuses perpetrated in Egypt, including the harassment and detention of journalists, civil society and political opposition activists and the excessive use of force resulting in the deaths of a large number of civilians, for instance during the three‑year anniversary of the revolution and the days around the referendum in January 2013; urges the Egyptian authorities to ensure that full, transparent and independent investigations are carried out into the deaths of civilians, in order to hold all perpetrators accountable; condemns the fact that tens of thousands of Egyptians are being held in prison and repressed, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which is described as a terrorist organisation, hindering the possibility of the inclusive reconciliation process that is necessary for the country’s stability and development; calls on the UNHRC to condemn these human rights violations, to monitor any investigations that are held and to consider launching its own investigation in the absence of progress by the Egyptian authorities; stresses the importance of the swift opening of a regional OHCHR office in Cairo, as agreed by the Egyptian authorities;

14.  Takes note of the new Egyptian constitution; notes the reference to the independence of Christian and Jewish religious affairs, and recognises progress with regard to freedom of religion; welcomes the constitution’s reference to a civilian government and the equality of all citizens, including the improvement in women’s rights, the provision on children’s rights, the ban on torture in all its forms and manifestations, the prohibition and criminalisation of all forms of slavery and the commitment to abide by international human rights treaties signed by Egypt; strongly deplores the level of power the constitution places in the hands of the army and the military courts;

15.  Is concerned about the fact that thousands of people, mainly refugees from Eritrea and Somalia, including many women and children, are losing their lives, disappearing or being kidnapped and held hostage for ransom, tortured, sexually exploited or killed for the organ trade by human traffickers in Sinai; recalls, in this context, that Article 89 of the new constitution declares that all forms of slavery, oppression, forced exploitation of human beings, the sex trade and other forms of human trafficking are prohibited and criminalised by law in Egypt;

Libya

16.  Calls for the adoption of a resolution during the forthcoming UNHRC session, building upon the OHCHR report and strengthening the OHCHR’s mandate to monitor and report to the UNHRC on the human rights situation and challenges faced in Libya; is concerned about the illegal conflict-related detentions and the practice of torture and extra-judicial killings, and welcomes in this context the recommendations of the UN Support Mission report on torture; voices its concern about the targeting of media workers and calls for the protection of media pluralism and freedom of expression; urges that support be provided for conflict resolution and national reconciliation;

Tunisia

17.  Welcomes the adoption of a new constitution by Tunisia on 26 January 2014, which could serve as a source of inspiration for the countries in the region and beyond; encourages the Tunisian authorities to conduct inclusive, transparent and credible elections later this year;

Morocco

18.  Calls on Morocco, as a new member of the UNHRC, to continue negotiations for a peaceful and long-lasting solution to the Western Sahara conflict, and reaffirms the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination, which should be decided through a democratic referendum, in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions;

Palestine

19.  Welcomes the participation of Palestine as a UN non-member observer state since November 2012; reiterates its support for this endeavour; notes the support expressed by the EU for Palestine’s becoming a full member of the UN as part of a political solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict; reaffirms that the EU will not accept any changes to the pre‑1967 borders, including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties; shares, in this regard, the EU Council’s conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process of 16 December 2013 that deplored Israel’s continuous expansion of settlements, which are illegal under international law and constitute an obstacle to peace; deplores human rights abuses by the Palestinian authorities as well as the continued firing of rockets from Gaza into Israel;

Israel

20.  Welcomes Israel’s re-engagement with the UNHRC, and the upcoming adoption of the second-cycle UPR report on the country; calls on the Israeli authorities to cooperate with all Special Procedures, including the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the occupied territories; supports the conclusions of the reports of the UN Secretary‑General and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in relation to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, and calls on Israel to implement the recommendations of the independent international fact-finding mission on the implications of Israeli settlements for the human rights of the Palestinian people; expresses its deep concern over the reported cases of political detention of children in Israeli places of detention;

Bahrain

21.  Expresses concern about the situation of human rights defenders and political opposition activists in Bahrain; welcomes the statement of September 2013 on Bahrain in the UNHRC, signed by all EU Member States; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of conscience, political activists, journalists, human rights defenders and peaceful protesters; calls for the EU Member States to work towards the adoption during the next session of the UNHRC of a resolution on the human rights situation in Bahrain, focused on the implementation of Bahrain’s commitments made during the UPR process and the recommendations, including those concerning human rights defenders, of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, welcomed by the King of Bahrain;

Saudi Arabia

22.  Calls on Saudi Arabia, as a newly elected member of the UNHRC, to heed the recommendations of the 17th Universal Periodic Review Working Group session to put an end to all forms of discrimination against women in legislation and in practice and to allow women to participate fully and equally in society; to take all necessary measures to combat domestic violence and ensure victims have access to mechanisms of protection and redress; to enact a law prohibiting all early and forced child marriages, and establish the minimum legal age of marriage at 18 years; to adopt laws to protect the freedoms of association, expression, peaceful assembly and religion; to impose a moratorium on the death penalty with a view to its eventual abolition; to allow for the registration of NGOs active in the area of human rights; and to ratify key human rights instruments;

Iran

23.  Welcomes the resolution adopted by the UNHRC in March 2013 on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the extension of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Iran; reaffirms its support for the continuation of the mandate, and calls on Iran to allow the UN Special Rapporteur entry into the country as a crucial step towards opening up a dialogue to assess the human rights situation in Iran; reiterates its condemnation of the death penalty in Iran and the significant increase in executions, with 40 people hanged in the first two weeks of 2014, and the continued violation of the right to freedom of belief; notes the early signs of progress that the Iranian Government has shown with regard to human rights, including the release of political prisoners; calls on the EU and the UNHRC to continue to monitor closely the human rights situation, and to ensure that human rights remain a key priority in all dealings with the Iranian Government;

Russia

24.  Strongly condemns the ‘Foreign Agent’ laws in Russia, which are being used to harass NGOs through the use of office raids, fines and other intimidating methods; calls on the EU and its Member States to maintain pressure on Russia, both at the UNHRC and outside, to end these clear violations of the freedoms of expression and of association; expresses strong concern at other continued human rights abuses in Russia, such as repression of the media, discriminatory laws towards sexual minorities, violation of the right of assembly and lack of judicial independence;

Belarus

25.  Reiterates its support for the UNHRC’s Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Belarus; calls for the mandate of the Special Rapporteur to be extended for another year when it comes to an end in June 2014; welcomes the resolution adopted on Belarus in June 2013 and the continued acknowledgement of, and attention paid to, the significant human rights abuses in the country; urges the EEAS and the Member States to maintain pressure on Belarus on the subject of human rights;

Uzbekistan

26.  Welcomes the outcome of the UPR of Uzbekistan; views as regrettable the continued refusal by the Government of Uzbekistan to respond favourably to visit requests by UNHRC Special Procedures; urges the EU Member States to strive for the creation of a dedicated monitoring mechanism at the UNHRC on the situation of human rights in Uzbekistan;

Central African Republic

27.  Reiterates its profound concern at the situation in the Central African Republic; calls on the international community to support as a matter of urgency the UN humanitarian appeal, which is severely underfunded, and calls for an improved security situation with a view to ensuring access to humanitarian assistance for the population; hopes that the rapid deployment of the EU CSDP mission will contribute to an improvement in the situation on the ground; welcomes UNSC Resolution 2136 (2014), the UN Human Rights Council resolution, its Special session on the situation in the Central African Republic of 20 January 2014, and the appointment of an Independent Expert on the human rights situation in the country; urges new interim President Samba-Panza to do all that she can to end the violence and calm sectarian tensions in the country;

Democratic Republic of the Congo

28.  Highlights the UN’s call for continued support for the conflict-torn eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), so as to ensure that it does not become a forgotten crisis; is seriously concerned about the recent massive displacement of population in the Katanga region; strongly condemns the attacks by rebel forces in the east of the country on the civilian population, including women and children; strongly condemns the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war; expresses deep concern about the ongoing use of children as soldiers and calls for their disarmament, rehabilitation and reintegration; considers that the UN Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region remains a key framework for the achievement of sustainable peace; welcomes UNSC Resolution 2136 of 30 January 2014, which renews the arms embargo imposed on the DRC;

Eritrea

29.  Urges continued attention and vigilance on the part of the EU and the UNHRC with regard to the human rights situation in Eritrea, as serious human rights violations are creating high numbers of refugees and migrants; welcomes the UNHRC resolution on the human rights situation in Eritrea adopted unanimously in June 2013; commends the first report by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the country; calls for the renewal of the mandate of this Special Rapporteur during the 26th UNHRC session;

Mali

30.  Welcomes the appointment of an Independent Expert on the human rights situation in Mali, the continued monitoring of the human rights situation post-conflict, and the strong leadership role played by other African states in improving the human rights situation in the country; calls for the renewal of the mandate of the Independent Expert;

South Sudan

31.  Expresses its deep concern about the situation in South Sudan, including the political fight for leadership of the country, which has provoked increasing ethnic clashes and the displacement of more than 650 000 people; calls on the EU Member States to raise this matter in the UNHRC, in order to keep the issue of the situation in South Sudan high on the international agenda; welcomes the agreement on cessation of hostilities signed on 23 January 2014, but underlines the fact that this is only a first step towards peace and reconciliation; condemns the widespread human rights violations and abuses committed, and underlines that those responsible must be held accountable; welcomes the engagement of the African Union in creating a Commission of Inquiry to serve as a basis for justice and accountability and future reconciliation;

Sri Lanka

32.   Condemns the ongoing attacks on religious minorities, and the harassment and intimidation of human rights defenders, lawyers and journalists; acknowledges the progress made in reconstruction and the implementation of some of the recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission, but regrets the fact that the Government of Sri Lanka continues to fail to provide for independent, credible investigations into past violations of international human rights and humanitarian law; strongly supports the recommendation by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to establish an independent international inquiry mechanism which would contribute to establishing the truth if domestic inquiry mechanisms fail;

Burma/Myanmar

33.  Welcomes the resolution adopted by the UNHRC on Burma/Myanmar and the continued work of the Special Rapporteur; calls on the UNHRC not to discontinue or modify the mandate of the Special Rapporteur as long as an OHCHR country office with a full mandate is not established inside the country, and calls on Burma/Myanmar to ensure that the prisoner review committee continues its work on resolving all pending cases and repealing the controversial law affecting freedom of expression and of association (in particular the 2011 Peaceful Assembly and Processions Law); condemns the continued violence and abuses perpetrated against the Rohingya minority in Rakhine State and attacks against Muslim and other religious minorities, and calls for a full, transparent and independent investigation into such violations;

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

34.  Welcomes the planned extension of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the resolution adopted by consensus in March 2013, and the presentation of the report by the Commission of Inquiry on human rights in that country; reaffirms its call for the Government of the DPRK to cooperate fully with the Special Rapporteur and to facilitate his visit to the country; urges the UNHRC to heed the recommendations of the International Commission of Inquiry, with a particular focus on the need to condemn international crimes committed in the DPRK, to step up the UN’s capacity to document human rights violations in the country, and to set up appropriate international mechanisms to ensure accountability for international crimes committed in the DPRK;

Cambodia, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Somalia and Sudan

35.  Welcomes the extension of the mandates of the independent experts on Cambodia, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Somalia, and Sudan; urges the authorities of these countries to cooperate fully with mandate-holders;

Thematic issues

Rights of the child

36.  Welcomes the work of the UNHRC on the rights of the child, such as the resolution of September 2013 on preventable mortality and morbidity of children under five years of age as a human rights concern, and the work of the Committee on the Rights of the Child; calls on states to ratify the 3rd Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which will allow children to submit their complaints to the Committee; commends the upcoming UNHRC resolution on the rights of the child as an excellent example of cooperation between the EU and the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries in the United Nations (GRULAC); expresses its deep concern over the cases of torture and detention of children reported by organisations such as UNICEF and Amnesty International; calls on the UN to further explore such cases and to formulate recommendations for actions;

Women and girls

37.  Calls for the EU to participate actively in the 58th session of the Commission on the Status of Women in order not to undermine the ‘acquis’ of the UN Beijing Platform for Action, such as access to education and health as a basic human right, including sexual and reproductive rights; strongly condemns the use of sexual violence against women as a tactic of war, including crimes such as mass rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, gender-based forms of persecution including female genital mutilation, trafficking, early and forced marriages, honour killings and all other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity; calls again on the EU and all the Member States to sign and ratify the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence;

Torture

38.  Reiterates the importance of fighting torture and other forms of ill-treatment and the priority that the EU gives this issue, especially with regard to children; calls on the UNHRC to use the annual resolution on torture to renew the Special Rapporteur’s mandate for another three years, and to ensure effective follow-up to past resolutions on torture; urges the EEAS, the Commission and the EU Member States to demonstrate their shared commitment to eradicating torture and to supporting victims, notably by continuing or, where applicable, starting to contribute to the UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture and the Special Fund established by the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture;

Death penalty

39.  Reaffirms its strong condemnation of the use of the death penalty, and strongly supports the moratorium as a step towards abolition; calls on the EU, its Member States and the UNHRC to continue to push for abolition worldwide; strongly urges countries still carrying out capital punishment to publish clear and accurate figures on the number of sentences and executions;

Freedom of religion or belief

40.  Condemns the continued violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief worldwide; reiterates the importance which the EU places on this issue; calls on the Member States to continue working on this; welcomes the renewal of the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief; restates once again that freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom to change or abandon one’s religion or belief, is a fundamental human right; stresses therefore the need to effectively combat all forms of discrimination against religious minorities around the world;

LGBTI rights

41.  Expresses concern about the recent increase in discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation and gender identity; encourages close monitoring of the situation in Nigeria and Uganda, where new laws seriously threaten the freedom of sexual minorities; condemns the introduction of discriminatory laws and repression of free speech in Russia; reaffirms its support for the continued work by the High Commissioner on Human Rights to combat these discriminatory laws and practices, and the work of the UN more generally on this issue; recommends active participation by the EU Member States, the Council and the EEAS in combating the attempts to undermine these rights;

Caste-based discrimination

42.  Condemns caste-based discrimination; expresses deep concern about the continued widespread human rights violations on the basis of caste and the acts of violence, including sexual violence against women belonging to the communities concerned; welcomes the work of the OHCHR and UN Special Procedures mandate-holders on combating this form of discrimination; urges the EU Member States to promote the endorsement of the draft UN Principles and Guidelines for the Effective Elimination of Discrimination based on Work, and calls on the UNHRC to adopt this framework;

Right to peaceful assembly

43.  Calls on the EU to support the follow-up of the OHCHR report on effective measures and best practices to ensure the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests, notably by supporting efforts to develop the international legal framework relating to the right of peaceful assembly;

Housing

44.  Restates its welcome for the importance placed by the UNHRC on the right to housing; reiterates also its call on the Union and its Member States to promote access to adequate housing as a fundamental right;

Water and sanitation

45.  Welcomes the resolution adopted in September 2013 by the UNHRC on the right to safe drinking water and sanitation, and the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on this issue, specifically through the development of a handbook on how to implement the right to safe drinking water and sanitation; calls on the EEAS, the EU Member States and the UNHRC to maintain focus on this often neglected but vitally important human right to water and sanitation;

Business and human rights

46.  Strongly supports the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; calls on the EU and its Member States to take an active role in the 7th session of the UN Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises and to support efforts to align their policies with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human rights; reiterates its request to the European Commission to report by the end of 2014 on implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights by the EU Member States; notes the emerging initiative to call for a legally binding international instrument on business and human rights to be concluded within the UN system;

Corruption and human rights

47.  Calls on the EU and its Member States to support the establishment of a UN Special Rapporteur on financial crime, corruption and human rights;

Sport

48.  Welcomes the resolution adopted in September 2013 on promoting human rights through sport and the Olympic ideal; expresses concern about the situation of migrant workers in Qatar, particularly in the build-up to the 2022 World Cup; takes note of Qatar’s initiative to address this concern; calls on the Qatari authorities to reform their labour law, to abolish the sponsorship law (‘kafala system’) in place throughout the region and to ratify relevant international conventions; urges the EU to ensure that EU companies working in the construction industry in Qatar are not contributing to the human rights abuses faced by migrant workers; emphasises the importance of scrutinising all major sporting events and their interaction with human rights, such as the February 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics in Russia and the continued suppression of freedom of assembly and the rights of sexual minorities, and the forthcoming World Cup in Brazil, where there are reports of house evictions and population displacements throughout the country;

Use of armed drones

49.  Is concerned about the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law arising from unlawful targeted killings carried out by armed drones, which have led to unknown numbers of civilians being killed, seriously injured or traumatised outside declared conflict zones; supports the efforts under the relevant UN Special Procedures to promote transparent and accountable use of armed drones by states in line with the established international legal framework; calls on the EU, its Member States and the UNHRC to continue to support investigations into unlawful targeted killings and to follow up on the recommendations by the UN Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and on counter-terrorism and human rights;

International Criminal Court

50.   Reiterates its full support for the International Criminal Court, and remains vigilant regarding any attempts to undermine its legitimacy; requests the active development of an EU position on the crime of aggression and the Kampala amendments;

Universal Periodic Review

51.  Reaffirms the importance of universality of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), with a view to arriving at a full understanding of the human rights situation in all UN member states, and reiterates the continued importance of this second cycle of review focusing on the implementation of the recommendations accepted during the first cycle; calls again, however, for the recommendations that were not accepted by states during the first cycle to be reconsidered in the continuation of the UPR process;

52.  Calls on EU Member States participating in the UPR interactive dialogues to put forward recommendations that are specific and measurable, in order to improve the quality of the follow-up to, and implementation of, accepted recommendations; underlines the importance of the Commission and the EU Member States providing technical assistance in order to help the states under review to implement the recommendations to present mid‑term updates in order to help improve implementation;

53.  Stresses the need to include the UPR recommendations systematically in the EU’s human rights dialogues and consultations and in EU human rights country strategies; reiterates its recommendation that Parliament raise these recommendations during its own delegation visits to third countries;

54.  Welcomes all steps that allow a wide range of stakeholders, including civil society, to participate fully in the UPR process; stresses the importance of the EEAS and the Member States highlighting in the UNHRC the worrisome issue of the shrinking NGO space in a number of countries around the world;

Special Procedures

55.  Reiterates its strong support for the Special Procedures; stresses the fundamental importance of the independence of these mandates and urges all UN states to cooperate fully with the Special Procedures, including by receiving mandate-holders for country visits, replying to their urgent requests for action and in connection with allegations of violations and ensuring proper follow-up to the recommendations made by the mandate‑holders; supports the statement released on 10 December 2013 by the 72 Special Procedures experts and is concerned that states’ lack of cooperation with Special Procedures hinders their capacity to implement their mandate;

56.  Strongly condemns all forms of reprisal against human rights defenders and activists who cooperate with the UPR process and the Special Procedures, particularly in the case of China; calls on the UNHRC to investigate reports that indicate that a Chinese activist, Cao Shunli, who advocated civil society involvement in the UPR, has been detained since 14 September 2013; urges the UNHRC President actively to follow up on this and other similar cases, and for all states to provide adequate protection against such acts of intimidation; stresses that such acts undermine the whole UN human rights system;

EU involvement

57.  Reiterates the importance of the EU participating actively in all UN human rights mechanisms, including the UNHRC; encourages the EU Member States to do so by co‑sponsoring and leading on resolutions, by actively participating in debates and interactive dialogues, and by issuing statements; strongly supports the increasing practice on the part of the EU of cross-regional initiatives;

58.  Reaffirms the importance of integrating the work being done in Geneva in the context of the UNHRC into the relevant internal and external activities of the EU, including those of Parliament, such as the committee and interparliamentary delegations, and UN Special Rapporteurs’ contributions to committee meetings;

59.  Encourages the EUSR to continue to enhance the effectiveness, coherence and visibility of the EU’s human rights policy in the context of the UNHRC and in further developing close cooperation with the OHCHR and the Special Procedures, and regrets the absence of the VP/HR in the High-Level Segment of the UNHRC;

60.  Stresses again the importance of effective coordination and cooperation between the EEAS, the Commission and EU Member States on human rights issues; encourages the EEAS, in particular through the EU Delegations in Geneva and New York, to increase EU coherence by means of timely and substantive consultation and to deliver a ‘one-voice message’;

61.  Stresses the importance of the EU Member States supporting the UNHRC, by working together towards the fulfilment of the indivisibility and universality of human rights and, in particular, by ratifying all the international human rights instruments that this body has established; reiterates its regret that no EU Member State has ratified the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families; reiterates the fact that several Member States have not yet adopted and/or ratified the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, or the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; reiterates its call for all the Member States to ratify these conventions and protocols; stresses the importance of the Member States’ submitting their periodic reports to the UN monitoring bodies in a timely manner; calls on the EU to actively develop an EU position on the crime of aggression and the Kampala amendments;

62.  Reiterates the importance of continued EU support in defending the independence of the OHCHR so as to ensure it can continue to exercise its task in an effective and impartial manner; highlights that it is essential to the OHCHR’s impartiality and functioning for it to be assured of sufficient funding, especially in view of the current need to open new OHCHR regional offices as a result of emerging situations; underlines the importance of securing sufficient funding to cover the treaty bodies’ increasing workload; calls on the EU to take a leadership role in ensuring the effective functioning of the treaty body system, including with regard to adequate funding;

63.  Reaffirms that the protection of human rights defenders is a key priority within the EU’s human rights policy; values, therefore, the practical and financial support allocated to the urgent protection of, and support for, human rights defenders under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR);

o
o   o

64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice‑President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Special Representative on Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary‑General, the President of the 68th UN General Assembly, the President of the UN Human Rights Council, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the EU-UN Working Group established by the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

(1) OJ C 332 E, 15.11.2013, p. 114. (2) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0055. (3) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0575.

European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2014 on Russia: sentencing of demonstrators involved in the Bolotnaya Square events (2014/2628(RSP))

P7_TA(2014)0253 RC-B7-0245/2014

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia, in particular its resolution of 13 June 2013 on the rule of law in Russia(1),

–  having regard to the statement by the Spokesperson of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) of 24 February 2014 on the sentencing of demonstrators involved in the Bolotnaya Square events,

–  having regard to the Constitution of Russia, in particular Article 118 thereof, which states that justice in the Russian Federation is to be administered by courts alone, and Article 120 thereof, which provides that judges are independent and are subordinate only to the Russian Constitution and federal law,

–  having regard to the EU-Russia human rights consultations of 28 November 2013,

–  having regard to the report of the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) of 17 December 2013 on its periodic visit to the Russian Federation,

–  having regard to the statement by the Human Rights Ombudsman of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Lukin, of 4 March 2014 on public demonstrations in Moscow and the steps taken by the law enforcement agencies,

–  having regard to Rules 122(5) and 110(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the Russian Federation, as a full member of the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, has committed itself to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights; whereas as a result of several serious violations of the rule of law and the adoption of restrictive laws during the past months, there are increasing concerns with regard to Russia’s compliance with international and national obligations;

B.  whereas on 6 May 2012, on the eve of President Vladimir Putin’s inauguration, several dozen of the estimated tens of thousands of protesters clashed sporadically with police, leading to minor injuries, in Bolotnaya Square;

C.  whereas around 600 activists were briefly detained and criminal proceedings were started against 28 individuals; whereas the authorities opened an investigation into the actions of the protestors, deeming them ‘mass riots’, which, under Russian law, are mass actions that involve ‘violence, pogroms, destruction of property, use of firearms, or armed resistance to the authorities’; whereas the authorities have alleged that the violence was planned and was part of a conspiracy to destabilise the country and overthrow the government;

D.  whereas several trials and judicial proceedings over the past years have cast doubt on the independence and impartiality of the judicial institutions of the Russian Federation;

E.  whereas numerous Russian and international human rights organisations reported that disproportionate measures and aggressive actions by the security forces as well as excessive use of violence led to the outbreak of violence followed by arbitrary arrests of the protesters; whereas the Human Rights Ombudsman of the Russian Federation confirmed in his assessment that accusations of mass riots were ungrounded;

F.  whereas on 24 February 2014 a Russian court handed down a guilty verdict against eight of those demonstrators, ranging from a suspended sentence to four years’ imprisonment, following three more severe prison sentences in 2013, as well as the forced psychiatric treatment of the activist Mikhail Kosenko;

G.  whereas a large number of detentions where made during peaceful demonstrations in support of the defendants in the Bolotnaya Square case on 21 and 24 February 2014; whereas over 200 people who had gathered outside the Zamoskvoretsky district court on 24 February 2014 to hear the verdict were detained over several hours; whereas opposition leaders Boris Nemtsov and Aleksei Navalny were subsequently sentenced to 10-day jail terms; whereas Aleksei Navalny has been placed under house arrest for the next two months, and on 5 March 2014 was fitted with an electronic bracelet to monitor his activities;

H.  whereas the Russian authorities are expanding their mass surveillance programmes; whereas these programmes, combined with anti-LGBT laws and laws restricting the freedom of NGOs, provide the Russian authorities with a very powerful tool to monitor and oppress opposition voices;

I.  whereas the human rights situation in Russia has deteriorated in recent years and the Russian authorities have adopted a series of laws containing ambiguous provisions and which could be used to place further restrictions on opposition and civil-society actors, and hinder the freedoms of expression and assembly; whereas this crackdown has involved actions such as police raids, confiscation of property, administrative fines and other measures aimed at preventing and dissuading civil society organisations from carrying out their work;

J.  whereas leaders of the opposition parties and movements are subject to harassment by the Russian authorities, with some being detained under various allegations, such as Ilya Yashin, leader of the Solidarity movement, Gleb Fetisov, the co-chair of the Alliance of Greens and Social Democrats, and Yevgeny Vitishko, ecological activist and pre-eminent member of Yabloko;

K.  whereas numerous accounts of ill-treatment and torture of prisoners by members of law enforcement agencies and the police were recorded by the Council of Europe’s anti-torture Committee in December 2013;

1.  Expresses its deep concern over the proceedings against the Bolotnaya Square demonstrators, which were deeply flawed from the start, with politically motivated charges;

2.  Believes that the charges brought against the demonstrators and their sentences seem disproportionate in the light of the nature of the events and the offences of which they are accused; considers that the outcome of the trial, given the procedural shortcomings and long pre-trial detention, once again raises questions about the state of the rule of law;

3.  Calls on the Russian judicial authorities to reconsider the sentences in the appeal process and to release the eight demonstrators, as well as Bolotnaya prisoner Mikhail Kosenko, who was sentenced to forced psychiatric treatment;

4.  Expresses, equally, its deep concern over the detention of a large number of peaceful protesters following the Bolotnaya verdicts and calls for the dropping of all charges against the protesters; calls, furthermore, on the Russian Government to respect the rights of all citizens to exercise their fundamental freedoms and universal human rights;

5.  Recalls the importance of Russia’s full compliance with its international legal obligations, as a member of the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and with the fundamental human rights and the rule of law enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); points out that recent developments have moved in the opposite direction to the reforms necessary to improve democratic standards, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary in Russia;

6.  Expresses its concern over developments in the Russian Federation with regard to respect for and protection of human rights and respect for commonly agreed democratic principles, rules and procedures, in particular with regard to the law on foreign agents, the anti-LGBT legislation, the re-incrimination of defamation, the treason law and the legislation regulating public protests; urges Russia to abide by its international commitments as a member of the Council of Europe;

7.  Calls on the Russian Government to take concrete steps to address the deterioration of human rights, in particular by ceasing the campaign of harassment against civil-society organisations and activists; calls on the Russian executive and legislature to reconsider and eventually repeal recently adopted legislative acts and measures that are in conflict with the country’s stated commitments on human rights and fundamental freedoms as a member of the Council of Europe, and to take into account the proposals of its Human Rights Ombudsman and those of the Human Rights Council to the President of the Russian Federation;

8.  Urges the Russian judicial and law enforcement authorities to carry out their duties in an impartial and independent manner;

9.  Stresses that freedom of assembly in the Russian Federation is granted under Article 31 of the Russian Constitution and under the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Russia is a signatory, obliging the Russian authorities to respect it;

10.  Calls on the Russian Federation to bring its surveillance programmes into line with the European Convention on Human Rights;

11.  Regrets the continuous crackdown on citizens who voice criticism against the regime, and on the remaining independent media outlets, including TV Dozhd (Rain) and Ekho Moskvy radio;

12.  Calls on the High Representative and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to ensure that the cases of all persons prosecuted for political reasons are raised in EU-Russia human rights consultations, and that Russia’s representatives in these consultations are formally requested to respond in each case;

13.  Calls on the Presidents of the Council and the Commission, as well as the VP/HR to continue to follow these cases closely, to raise these issues in different formats and meetings with Russia, and to report back to Parliament on the exchanges with the Russian authorities;

14.  Urges the Council to develop a unified policy towards Russia that commits the 28 EU Member States and EU institutions to a strong common message on the role of human rights in the EU-Russia relationship and the need to end the crackdown on freedom of expression, assembly and association in Russia; calls for this common message to be articulated in EU Foreign Affairs Council conclusions;

15.  Urges the High Representative and the EEAS to ensure that the Union seeks every opportunity, within the boundaries of Russian domestic law, to continue to engage with and support Russian civil-society organisations, including those working to promote the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

16.  Urges the Commission and the EEAS, with regard to the ongoing programming phase of the EU financial instruments, to increase its financial assistance to Russian civil society through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the civil-society organisations and local authorities funds, and to include the EU‑Russia Civil Society Forum in the Partnership Instrument in order to ensure sustainable and credible long‑term support;

17.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation.

(1) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0284.

European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2014 on launching consultations to suspend Uganda and Nigeria from the Cotonou Agreement in view of recent legislation further criminalising homosexuality (2014/2634(RSP))

P7_TA(2014)0254 RC-B7-0251/2014

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to international human rights obligations and instruments, including those contained in the UN conventions on human rights and in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, guaranteeing human rights and fundamental freedoms and prohibiting discrimination,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,

–  having regard to UN Human Rights Council resolution 17/19 of 17 June 2011 on human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity,

–  having regard to the second revision of the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part (the Cotonou Agreement), and to the human rights and public health clauses and commitments contained therein, particularly Articles 8(4), 9, 31a(e) and 96,

–  having regard to Articles 2, 3(5), 21, 24, 29 and 31 of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 10 and 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which commit the EU and its Member States, in their relations with the wider world, to upholding and promoting universal human rights and the protection of individuals, and adopting restrictive measures in the event of grave human rights breaches,

–  having regard to the Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons, adopted by the Council on 24 June 2013,

–  having regard to the statement of 15 January 2014 by Catherine Ashton, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), expressing her concern about the signing into law in Nigeria of the Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill,

–  having regard to the statement of 20 December 2013 by the VP/HR on the adoption of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill in Uganda,

–  having regard to the statement made by President Obama on 16 February 2014 on the adoption of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill in Uganda and his request for President Museveni not to sign the bill into law;

–  having regard to the statement of 18 February 2014 by the VP/HR on anti-homosexuality legislation in Uganda,

–  having regard to the statement of 25 February 2014 by Ban Ki-moon urging the Ugandan authorities to revise or repeal the country’s Anti-Homosexuality Bill;

–  having regard to the declaration of 4 March 2014 by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union concerning the Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Act,

–  having regard to its resolution of 5 July 2012 on violence against lesbian women and the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons in Africa(1), to its position of 13 June 2013 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement amending for the second time the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, as first amended in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005(2), and to its resolution of 11 December 2013 on the Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2012 and the European Union’s policy on the matter(3),

–  having regard to its resolutions of 17 December 2009 on ‘Uganda: anti-homosexual draft legislation’(4), of 16 December 2010 on ‘Uganda: the so-called ‘Bahati Bill’ and discrimination against the LGBT population’(5), and of 17 February 2011 on ‘Uganda: the killing of David Kato’(6),

–  having regard to its resolutions of 15 March 2012(7) and of 4 July 2013(8) on the situation in Nigeria,

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2014 on recent moves to criminalise lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people(9),

–  having regard to its resolution of 28 September 2011 on human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity at the United Nations(10),

–  having regard to Rules 122(5) and 110(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights; whereas all states have an obligation to prevent violence, incitement to hatred and stigmatisation based on individual characteristics, including sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression;

B.  whereas the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) aims to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;

C.  whereas as many as 76 countries continue to consider homosexuality a crime, with five countries providing for the death penalty for such crimes;

D.  whereas consensual acts between people of the same sex were already punished with 14 yearsʼ imprisonment in Uganda under Section 145 of the Ugandan Penal Code and with seven yearsʼ imprisonment in Nigeria under Section 214 of the Nigerian Criminal Code (or the death penalty in the 12 states under Sharia law);

E.  whereas on 20 December 2013 the Ugandan Parliament adopted the Anti-Homosexuality Bill, which punishes support for LGBTI peopleʼs rights with up to 7 yearsʼ imprisonment, persons keeping a house, room or rooms or a place of any kind for the ‘purpose of homosexuality’ with 7 yearsʼ imprisonment, and ‘repeat offenders’ or HIV-positive offenders with life imprisonment; whereas the bill was signed into law by President Yoweri Museveni Kaguta of the Republic of Uganda on 24 February 2014;

F.  whereas the Ugandan authorities adopted the Anti-Pornography Act and the Public Order Management Act, which are further attacks on human rights and NGOs defending human rights; whereas this is indicative of the shrinking and deteriorating policy space being experienced by civil society;

G.  whereas on 17 December 2013 the Nigerian Senate adopted the Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill, which punishes people in a same-sex relationship with up to 14 years' imprisonment, and people witnessing same-sex marriages or operating or participating in LGBTI bars, organisations or societies with up to 10 yearsʼ imprisonment; whereas the bill was signed into law by President Goodluck Jonathan in January 2014;

H.  whereas a number of media outlets, of members of the public, and of political and religious leaders in these countries are increasingly seeking to intimidate LGBTI people, limit their rights and those of NGOs and human rights groups, and legitimise violence against them; whereas shortly after President Museveni signed the bill, a Ugandan tabloid newspaper published a list of names and pictures of 200 Ugandan gays and lesbians, with serious negative consequences for their security situation; whereas the media have reported an increasing number of arrests and violence against LGBTI people in Nigeria;

I.  whereas numerous heads of state and of government, United Nations leaders, government and parliamentary representatives, the EU (including the Council, Parliament, the Commission and the VP/HR) and numerous world figures have sternly condemned laws criminalising LGBTI people;

J.  whereas EU cooperation should support the efforts of ACP states to develop supportive legal and policy frameworks and remove punitive laws, policies and practices, stigma and discrimination that undermine human rights, increase vulnerability to HIV/AIDS and inhibit access to effective HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, care and support, including medicines, commodities and services, for people living with HIV/AIDS and for the populations most at risk;

K.  whereas UN Aids and the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria fear that LGBT people and 3,4 million HIV-infected citizens in Nigeria and Uganda will be denied vital health services, and are demanding that the ‘constitutionality of the laws are urgently reviewed in light of serious public health and human right applications’;

L.  whereas further criminalising consensual activities between adults of the same sex will make it even harder to achieve both the Millennium Development Goals, especially with regard to gender equality and combating disease, and any success in respect of the post-2015 development framework;

M.  whereas a number of Member States, including the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden, and other countries such as the United States of America and Norway have decided either to withhold aid directed to the Ugandan Government or to redirect aid from government support to civil society support;

N.  whereas under Article 96(1a) of the Cotonou Agreement a consultation procedure may be launched with a view to the suspension of signatories who are in breach of their human rights obligations under Articles 8(4) and 9;

1.  Deplores the adoption of new laws that constitute grave threats to the universal rights to life, freedom of expression, of association and assembly, and freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; reiterates that sexual orientation and gender identity are matters falling within the remit of individuals' right to privacy, as guaranteed by international law and national constitutions; underlines the fact that LGBTI equality is an undeniable element of fundamental human rights;

2.  Recalls statements by the African Commission and the UN Human Rights Committee that a state cannot, through its domestic law, negate its international human rights obligations;

3.  Calls on the President of Uganda to repeal the Anti-Homosexuality Act, as well as section 145 of the Ugandan Penal Code; calls on the President of Nigeria to repeal the Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill, as well as sections 214 and 217 of the Nigerian Penal Code, as they violate international human rights obligations;

4.  Notes that, by signing these laws, the Governments of Uganda and Nigeria failed to fulfil an obligation stemming from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, referred to in Article 9(2) of the Cotonou Agreement;

5.  Reiterates that these laws fall within the remit of Article 96(1a)(b) of the Cotonou Agreement as cases of special urgency, i.e. exceptional cases of particularly serious and flagrant violation of human rights and dignity, as referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 9, which therefore require an immediate reaction;

6.  Calls on the Commission, therefore, to engage in a strengthened and urgent political dialogue under Article 8 at local and ministerial level, with a request to open discussion no later than at the EU-Africa Summit;

7.  Urges the Commission and the Member States to review their development cooperation aid strategy with Uganda and Nigeria and to give priority to redirection of aid to civil society and other organisations over suspension – even on a sectoral basis – of aid;

8.  Suggests to the African Union that it take the lead and set up an internal committee to look into these laws and issues;

9.  Calls on African Union and European Union leaders to address these laws during the discussions of the 4th Africa-EU Summit, to be held on 2-3 April 2014;

10.  Calls on the Member States, or the High Representative with the support of the Commission, to consider targeted sanctions, such as travel and visa bans, for the key individuals responsible for drafting and adopting these two laws;

11.  Recalls the CJEU judgment of 7 November 2013 in X, Y, Z v Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel (cases C-199-201/12), which stresses that people of a specific sexual orientation targeted by laws criminalising their conduct or identity may constitute a particular social group for the purposes of granting asylum;

12.  Regrets the generally increasing social, economic, and political predicament of African nations threatened by religious fundamentalism, which is becoming increasingly pervasive, with dire consequences for the dignity, development and freedom of individuals;

13.  Calls on the Commission and the Council to include an explicit mention of non-discrimination based on sexual orientation in any future agreement taking the place of the Cotonou Agreement, as demanded on many occasions by Parliament;

14.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the European External Action Service, the Member States, the national governments and parliaments of Uganda, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and India, and the Presidents of Uganda and Nigeria.

(1) OJ C 349 E, 29.11.2013, p. 88. (2) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0273. (3) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0575. (4) OJ C 286 E, 22.10.2010, p. 25. (5) OJ C 169 E, 15.6.2012, p. 134. (6) OJ C 188 E, 28.6.2012, p. 62. (7) OJ C 251 E, 31.8.2013, p. 97. (8) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0335. (9) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2014)0046. (10) OJ C 56 E, 26.2.2013, p. 100.

European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2014 on security and human trafficking in Sinai (2014/2630(RSP))

P7_TA(2014)0255 RC-B7-0254/2014

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its resolutions of 15 March 2012 on human trafficking in Sinai, in particular the case of Solomon W.(1), of 16 December 2010 on Eritrean refugees held hostage in Sinai(2) and of 6 February 2014 on the situation in Egypt(3),

–  having regard to the statements by Vice-President / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton concerning the security situation in Sinai of 11 September 2013, 3 and 8 October 2013, 24 December 2013, 24 January 2014 and 17 February 2014 on the terrorist attack in Sinai,

–  having regard to the Europol publication of 3 March 2014 entitled ‘Irregular migrants from the Horn of Africa with European sponsors kidnapped for ransom and held in Sinai’,

–  having regard to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950,

–  having regard to the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement,

–  having regard to the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and the 1967 protocol thereto, and to the UNHCR’s memorandum of understanding with the Egyptian Government of 1954,

–  having regard to the Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,

–  having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984, and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings of 2005,

–  having regard to the 2000 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, especially Articles 6 and 9 thereof,

–  having regard to the Brussels Declaration on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, adopted on 20 September 2002,

–  having regard to Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking and Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims,

–  having regard to Articles 2, 6.1, 7 and 17 (‘Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks’) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

–  having regard to the EU-Egypt Association Agreement and in particular the preamble and Article 2 thereof,

–  having regard to Article 89 of the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt and to Egypt’s Law No 64 of 2010 on Combatting Human Trafficking,

–  having regard to Israel’s Law on Anti-Infiltration,

–  having regard to the UNHCR Guidelines on Eritrea,

–  having regard to Rules 122(5) and 110(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas terrorist attacks, the proliferation of weapons, the infiltration of foreign and Egyptian jihadists and the radicalisation of a part of the local population in Sinai have created increasing security challenges for Egypt, Israel and other countries in the region; whereas the security situation in Sinai has rapidly deteriorated – with several extremist groups destabilising security conditions, and more than 250 terrorist attacks, mostly against Egyptian security forces and their installations, which killed more than 100 people, the majority of them police and military personnel – since the toppling of former president Mohamed Morsi in July 2013; whereas terrorist attacks in the Suez Canal zone and against gas pipelines are also a major source of concern;

B.  whereas extremist infiltration undermines the efforts aimed at restoring security in Sinai; whereas various Al-Qaida-affiliated or -inspired terrorist groups continue to operate in the area; whereas some of these groups have extended the scope of their terrorist actions beyond Sinai; whereas other local militants operating in Sinai do not belong to any extremist group but are armed Bedouins involved in smuggling and human trafficking;

C.  whereas Egyptian armed forces have recently launched military operations in Sinai in order to combat terrorist and extremist groups and to restore security; whereas the Egyptian Government and security forces seem unable to bring the security crisis in Sinai under control; whereas the lawlessness of the region enables criminal networks, human traffickers and other criminal gangs to work unhindered and unpunished; whereas trafficking appears to continue unabated in spite of the ongoing offensive of the Egyptian security forces in Sinai; whereas Sinai has long served as a smuggling route in and out of the Gaza Strip; whereas there are concerns about a media blackout on developments in Sinai;

D.  whereas the socioeconomic marginalisation of the local Bedouin population is a major reason for security challenges in Sinai; whereas Sinai residents have long suffered from poverty, discrimination and limited access to health services and education, which has alienated them from official authorities that neglect their situation and ignore their demands;

E.  whereas thousands of asylum seekers and migrants from the Horn of Africa flee their countries of origin every month due to human rights abuses and humanitarian crises; whereas from Eritrea alone, up to 3 000 people flee every month, according to the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea; whereas it is estimated that thousands of people have been kidnapped in eastern Sudan, taken to Egypt and tortured in Sinai, more than 4 000 of whom have died since the beginning of 2008, and it is believed that around 1 000 African refugees are currently being held in captivity;

F.  whereas thousands of people lose their lives and disappear in Sinai every year while others, including many women and children, are kidnapped in refugee camps or surrounding areas, especially in the Sudanese Shagarab refugee camp or on their way to family reunions in Sudan or Ethiopia, and held hostage for ransom by human traffickers; whereas victims of human traffickers are abused in the most dehumanising and brutal manner and are subject to systemic violence and torture, rape and sexual abuse, and forced labour, or are killed for organ trade; whereas torture camps have been set up for this specific purpose, according to victims, neighbours and human rights organisations;

G.  whereas there are credible reports of some Sudanese and Egyptian security forces colluding with traffickers of asylum seekers and migrants, and an almost complete failure by both Sudan and Egypt to investigate and prosecute officials responsible, thereby engaging both countries’ obligations under the UN Convention Against Torture; whereas Egyptian authorities deny the existence of such cases;

H.  whereas trafficking in human beings in Sinai is an extremely profitable business for organised crime; whereas, according to the UNHCR, complex trafficking networks have been set up involving people-smugglers, kidnappers such as groups of Rashaida tribesmen in Eritrea and north-east Sudan, intermediaries inside refugee camps, bribed military, police and border control staff, and criminal elements within the Egyptian Bedouin communities;

I.  whereas those who are not able to collect the ransom are often killed, and even if the requested ransom is paid, there is no guarantee that the hostages will be released; whereas a new practice has arisen in the trafficking value chain in relation to hostages who are incapable of collecting the ransom;

J.  whereas Sinai survivors are in need of physical and mental support; whereas most Sinai survivors, however, are detained, denied medical assistance and social services, asked to sign papers they do not understand and receive no legal assistance in destination countries, while many of them are repatriated to their home country in violation of the principle of non-refoulement;

K.  whereas it is reported that the Egyptian authorities do not allow the UNHCR access to asylum seekers and migrants arrested in Sinai and do not attempt to identify potential trafficking victims among them; whereas reservations by Egypt regarding the UN Refugee Convention restrict refugees’ rights to education, social security and work rights;

L.  whereas many of the families of the victims live in EU Member States; whereas, according to the latest Europol publication, several EU Member States have had reports of blackmailing within the EU on behalf of Bedouin organised criminal groups in Sinai; whereas it is in the interests of the EU to know which criminal organisations are involved in the blackmailing process;

M.  whereas according to UNHCR figures, Israel is home to 53 000 African asylum-seekers who have entered the country through Egypt since 2005; whereas prior to June 2012, an average of 1 500 asylum seekers entered Israel each month through Sinai while, according to the Israeli authorities, this number significantly decreased in 2013 due to the completion of the fence along the Israeli-Egyptian border; whereas the UNHCR has raised concerns over a recent amendment to Israel’s anti-infiltration law that further limits the rights of asylum-seekers;

N.  whereas the EU has repeatedly invited Egypt and Israel to develop and improve the quality of the assistance and protection offered to asylum seekers and refugees residing on, or transiting through, their territory; whereas on 7 November 2013 Sudanese officials sought EU help on trafficking;

1.  Condemns the recent terrorist attacks against security forces and civilians in Sinai; is deeply concerned about the further deterioration of the security situation in Sinai, and calls for intensified efforts by the Egyptian interim government and security forces to restore security in line with international law and international standards on the use of force and policing, with the support of the international community; expresses concern that continuing unrest may have a destabilising effect on Egypt as a whole, in the ongoing period of transition;

2.  Expresses its deep concern regarding the reported cases of human trafficking in Sinai and condemns in the strongest terms the terrible abuses to which the victims of traffickers are subjected; expresses its strong solidarity with the victims of human trafficking in Sinai and their families, and stresses again the responsibility of the Egyptian and Israeli governments to combat human trafficking in this area; notes the efforts of the authorities and underlines that any military and law-enforcing operation by Egyptian security forces in Sinai should include actions aimed at rescuing victims of human traffickers, protecting and assisting these victims, especially women and children, to ensure they do not become victims again, as well as arresting and prosecuting the traffickers, and any security officials colluding with them, in order to hold them to account;

3.  Recalls that one of the root causes of the crises is the marginalisation of the Bedouins in Sinai; evokes that any possible solution to the crisis should include a comprehensive development programme aimed at improving the socioeconomic status and conditions of the local Bedouin population, including their access to the police and the military, as well as their participation in the political process;

4.  Calls on the Egyptian authorities to respect their own anti-trafficking laws, which guarantee trafficking victims immunity from prosecution and access to assistance and protection, as well as Article 89 of the new constitution, forbidding slavery and all forms of oppression and forced exploitation against humans, and to fully implement, through their national legislation, the principles of the conventions to which Egypt is party; notes the decree to establish a national coordinating committee for combating irregular migration, issued on 9 March 2014 by the Egyptian Prime Minister; calls on the Egyptian authorities to collect and publish statistics on the victims of trafficking;

5.  Stresses the importance of the protection of and assistance to Sinai survivors, with special regard to medical, psychological and legal support; calls on all destination countries concerned to prevent the detention of Sinai survivors, to put in place improved systems to identify victims, to provide them with access to fair and effective asylum procedures and to the UNHCR, to assess all cases on an individual basis and to avoid the deportation of Sinai survivors in violation of the principle of non-refoulement; calls for full access of UN agencies and human rights organisations to the areas affected by human smuggling and trafficking in Sinai and for full and unimpeded access to be provided to detention facilities used for holding asylum-seekers and refugees;

6.  Welcomes the decision of Israel’s Supreme Court of 16 September 2013 to repeal the provision of the Prevention of Infiltration Act that mandated automatic detention, but calls on Israel to rescind its law of 10 December 2013 which allows for indefinite detention of asylum seekers; calls on destination countries’ authorities to treat asylum-seekers in line with international refugee and human rights law;

7.  Recalls that systematic and pervasive violations of human rights in Eritrea cause thousands of Eritreans to flee their country every month; reminds the Sudanese authorities of their obligation to ensure the security of refugees and asylum seekers and the priority to immediately develop and implement sustained and adequate security measures in the Shagarab refugee camp;

8.  Underlines the importance of coordinated regional action in restoring security and combating human trafficking in Sinai, and calls for increased international support and more cooperation in this field among the governments of Egypt, Israel, Libya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan, as well as with relevant organisations, including the UN Multinational Force and Observers;

9.  Encourages the EU and its Member States to support all efforts aimed at combating the human trafficking cycle in Sinai in line with their international obligations to combat trafficking in persons; calls on the Commission to emphasis respect for human rights in its relations with the Eritrean Government; emphasises once again the EU’s offer to assist the authorities in developing and improving the quality of the assistance and protection offered to asylum seekers and refugees residing on, or transiting through, their territory; welcomes the Sudanese Government’s call for EU support;

10.  Calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to make this a high-priority topic on the agenda of political dialogue with Egypt, Israel and Sudan, as well as to actively work together with the UNHCR to set up an action group with states involved in the various stages of the trafficking chain, including sources, transit, and destination;

11.  Is very concerned about the reports of blackmailing taking place from within the EU; reminds the EU authorities, therefore, of their responsibility to act and calls on EU Foreign Ministers and Ministers of Justice to take appropriate measures; calls on the EU institution to put pressure on Israel and Egypt to take steps to tackle trafficking in Sinai and to drive forward the implementation of Europol’s forthcoming recommendations;

12.  Applauds the efforts by some Bedouin community leaders and the activities of human rights organisations in Egypt and Israel, who are providing help, assistance and medical treatment to victims of human traffickers in Sinai, and urges the international community and the EU to continue funding NGO-led projects in the region;

13.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the High Representative / Vice-President, the Council and the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Egyptian, Israeli, Eritrean and Sudanese Governments, the Egyptian Parliament, the Israeli Knesset, the Sudan National Assembly, the Eritrean National Assembly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the United Nations Human Rights Council.

(1) OJ C 251 E, 31.8.2013, p. 106. (2) OJ C 169 E, 15.6.2012, p. 136. (3) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2014)0100.