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Procedure : 2018/2017(INI)
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PV 29/05/2018 - 17
CRE 29/05/2018 - 17

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PV 30/05/2018 - 13.11
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Wednesday, 30 May 2018 - Strasbourg

European Parliament recommendation of 30 May 2018 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Libya (2018/2017(INI))

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to UN Security Council resolution 2259 (2015) and subsequent resolutions,

–  having regard to the Libyan Political Agreement,

–  having regard to the report of the Secretary-General on the UN Support Mission in Libya, of 22 August 2017,

–  having regard to UN Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) and all subsequent UNSC resolutions concerning Libya, including 2380 (2017),

–  having regard to the report of the UN Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2312 (2016),

–  having regard to the statement of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 14 November 2017 on the suffering of migrants in Libya which is an outrage to conscience of humanity,

–  having regard to the Report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of April 2018 entitled ‘Abuse Behind Bars: Arbitrary and unlawful detention in Libya’,

–  having regard to its resolutions of 18 September 2014(1), 15 January 2015(2) and 4 February 2016(3) on the situation in Libya,

–  having regard to the Declaration of the Co-Presidents of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on the situation of migrants in Libya, of 20 December 2017,

–  having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,

–  having regard to the EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility,

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 25 January 2017 entitled ‘Migration on the Central Mediterranean route – Managing flows, saving lives’ (JOIN(2017)0004),

–  having regard to the Malta Declaration of 3 February 2017,

–  having regard to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its action plan,

–  having regard to the Joint Statement on the Migrant Situation in Libya, agreed at the African Union - European Union Summit 2017 and the establishment of the high-level trilateral AU-EU-UN Task Force,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions on Libya of 17 July 2017,

–  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 19 October 2017,

–  having regard to Rule 113 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0159/2018),

A.  whereas the situation in Libya is highly fragile and the country is facing a number of complex, interrelated challenges regarding political stability, economic development, and security;

B.  whereas the crisis in Libya has an enormous impact on the people of Libya and also affects the whole surrounding region and the EU, and it is therefore crucial, for the sake of the Libyan population as well as neighbouring countries and the Sub-Saharan and Mediterranean regions, to ensure political stability in Libya, as a fundamental prerequisite for improving the country’s economic and social situation;

C.  whereas stability in the south of Libya is a particular concern given the fragile state of its neighbouring countries, with a potential jihadist insurgency threatening weakened governments in the Sahel-Sahara region;

D.  whereas the EU should communicate more proactively on its diplomatic efforts and its large financial contribution towards consolidating the security and socio-economic situation in Libya;

E.  whereas the conflict in Libya can only be solved through a coherent, comprehensive and inclusive approach involving all international actors and stakeholders, including representatives of the various local communities, the tribal chiefs and civil society activists, and by ensuring Libyan ownership of and inclusiveness in the peace process;

F.  whereas the Libyan Political Agreement and the UN Action Plan for Libya currently constitute the only viable framework for a solution to the crisis;

G.  whereas, through diplomatic action and concrete support, the EU is assisting Libya’s political transition towards a stable, functioning country and is supporting the UN-led mediation efforts in this regard;

H.  whereas it is of the utmost importance that all Member States speak with one voice, strengthening EU mediation efforts and emphasising the central role of the UN and of the UN action plan; whereas individual initiatives by Member States are in all cases to be welcomed only if they are taken within the European framework and are fully in line with EU foreign policy;

I.  whereas EU action is showing results on the migration front, given that the figures fell by one third at the end of 2017 compared to 2016 and for the early months of 2018 the figures are 50 % down on those for the same period last year;

J.  whereas Libya is a key point of transit and departure for migrants attempting to reach Europe, particularly from sub-Saharan Africa; whereas thousands of migrants and refugees fleeing the violence in Libya have lost their lives in attempting to cross the Mediterranean in order to reach Europe;

K.  whereas migrants are among those suffering the most as a result of the security problems in Libya, as they are often the victims of arbitrary violence, arrest and detention by non-state operators, and experience extortion, kidnapping with the aim of obtaining a ransom, and exploitation;

L.  whereas many migrants, particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa, have been subjected to arbitrary detention by various armed groups in the country;

M.  whereas the forced return to Libya by Niger of at least 132 Sudanese who were receiving assistance from the UNHCR is a source of great concern;

N.  whereas the problem of internally displaced persons remains a topical one; whereas such persons find themselves facing critical threats such as crossing conflict zones, the presence of landmines and unexploded devices, and the violence of the various militias;

O.  whereas Libya has become a transit country for human trafficking; whereas Libya continues to host hundreds of thousands of migrants and asylum seekers of different nationalities, many of whom are living in tragic conditions and thus constitute a target for smugglers; whereas there have been allegations of slavery in Libya;

P.  whereas the daily life of ordinary Libyans is characterised by ever more difficult living circumstances, further complicated by a cash crisis, water cuts and frequent power outages, and the generally catastrophic state of the country’s healthcare system;

Q.  whereas the political climate in Libya is characterised by deep mistrust between the main political and military actors from different regions;

R.  whereas the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) increasingly relies on several militias for its own security; whereas these militias have acquired an unprecedented degree of influence over state institutions in Tripoli, thus threatening the UN’s ongoing attempts to create a more viable political framework in the country;

S.  whereas countries such as Turkey, Qatar, Egypt and the UAE have a significant influence on various groups of the warring factions;

T.  whereas the subnational identities of the various Libyan communities, tribes and ethnic groups have always constituted the underlying socio-cultural fabric of Libya and play a key role in the social and political dynamics and security issues of the country; whereas Libyan society has strong traditions of informal dispute resolution processes between cities, tribes and ethnic communities;

U.  whereas currently the country does not have a clear and widely accepted legislative framework with regard to the electoral system; whereas no constitution has been adopted, thus leaving the country without the necessary legal framework to hold new elections; whereas the prevalence of the current climate of impunity, widespread unlawfulness, corruption and the role of the armed groups and tribal and regional tensions in Libya are contributing to a further decrease in trust in the already weak public and government institutions;

V.  whereas Libya has seen a continued increase in extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary detention and indiscriminate attacks on residential areas and infrastructure, as well as an increase in hate speech and incitement to violence;

W.  whereas the Madkhalist Salafist extremist group is becoming stronger and more relevant in the east as well as in the west of Libya; whereas Madkhalists oppose elections, are eager to maintain the status quo, completely reject any model of democracy and are heavily armed, and thus represent a concrete risk of further extremism and violence in the country;

X.  whereas the collapse of the criminal justice system enhances impunity in the country, narrowing avenues for victims to seek protection and remedy; whereas in several regions, even in cases where police reports have been filed after a crime, little action has followed to open prompt, thorough, effective, impartial and independent investigations and to bring perpetrators to justice; whereas no perpetrator of a crime who belongs to an armed group has been convicted in Libya since 2011;

Y.  whereas the cycle of violence in Libya has been continuously fed by overarching impunity for serious human rights violations; whereas, unless this is properly addressed, the continued absence of the rule of law will make the narrative of peaceful coexistence and fighting violent extremism meaningless for the population;

Z.  whereas dozens of political and human rights activists, media professionals and other public figures have been abducted or threatened; whereas the UN has received reports of arbitrary detention and torture and ill-treatment by both sides;

AA.  whereas escalating attacks on members of the judiciary, local civil society organisations, human rights defenders and media workers – as well as refugees and migrants – have been accelerating the deterioration of the human rights situation for all civilians on Libyan territory; whereas the absence of the rule of law and impunity for grave human rights violations, including torture, arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killings and indiscriminate attacks on civilians and infrastructure, continue to fuel the cycle of violence in the country;

AB.  whereas the porosity of Libya’s borders encourages unlawful cross-border traffic; whereas the proliferation of armed groups in the border areas has recently exacerbated the conflict between rival traffickers for control of and access to cross-border resources; whereas the so-called foreign fighters who arrive in the country and the various criminal networks are continuing to benefit from the unchecked proliferation of arms;

AC.  whereas political insecurity and instability have made Libya a fertile ground for the activities of extremist groups; whereas the Fezzan region is structurally unstable and has historically been a place of transit to Europe for refugees and migrants, and for the smuggling of oil, gold, arms, drugs and for human trafficking; whereas the region has been suffering from increased ethnic and tribal tensions since the fall of Colonel Gaddafi and the struggle for control of the country’s resources; whereas stabilising Fezzan is key in stabilising the country as a whole;

AD.  whereas local Libyan authorities play a key role in preventing conflicts and providing essential public services to residents;

AE.  whereas the city of Derna has been subject to escalating ground, air and artillery assault since 7 May 2018; whereas numerous civilians have been killed, while aid and medical access have been severely limited and the humanitarian situation is dramatic;

AF.  whereas an official Parliament delegation carried out a mission to Libya on 20-23 May 2018;

1.  Recommends the following to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:

   (a) to ensure the strongest support for the UN Action Plan for Libya presented in September 2017 by the UN Special Representative Ghassan Salamé, for the stabilisation of Libya and for a political and inclusive national reconciliation process that will enable all Libyan actors, including all tribal entities, to reach a stable and long-lasting political agreement while paying due attention to the involvement of women and minorities; to take into account the results of the inclusive consultative processes presented to the UNSC on 21 May 2018; to strongly condemn any attempt at undermining the UN-led peace process; to continue to cooperate closely with the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL);
   (b) to intensify their diplomatic efforts to support the UN plan and help consolidate a Libyan Government in its efforts to create political consent, guarantee security and extend its authority to the whole territory of Libya, beyond the narrow territorial control of the internationally recognised GNA, as the necessary precondition for an inclusive political solution that promotes the stabilisation, reconstruction and reconciliation of the country, for state building and for any peacekeeping operation based on democracy, the rule of law and human rights; to ensure Libyan ownership of the stabilisation process and the decision about the future form of the state; to support the strengthening of local mechanisms and capacities in the country with regard to mediation, dispute resolution and ceasefires and to connect them to the UN Action Plan as part of a coherent and integrated approach that will lead to concrete and lasting results;
   (c) to support the so-called ‘town hall meetings’ taking place in several municipalities under the UN umbrella, as an effective bottom-up reconciliation initiative which aims to encourage dialogue among different communities, thus concretely contributing to the development of a sustainable and viable solution to the Libyan crisis and helping to create a national culture of civic sense;
   (d) to work on means of fostering institution building, building up a true civil society and jump-starting the economy, and to move away from an overly stretched public service to foster sustainable private sector development, which are necessary to ensure the long-term stability and prosperity of the country;
   (e) to support Libyan efforts to work on a new constitutional order which should include a formula for the just distribution of oil wealth, as well as a clear division of tasks and obligations for the historic regions on the one side and any national government on the other; to recall that such a new constitution, which could be inspired by elements of the amended 1963 constitution, would help efforts to organise country-wide elections to be held only once the new constitution is adopted and the necessary conditions are properly met in order to ensure a high turnout as well as public acceptance and legitimacy;
   (f) to further prioritise work within the EU institutions on how better to address all aspects of the Libyan crisis, and which instruments and sectors to engage, including by devoting greater attention to local dynamics, in order to put in place an effective comprehensive approach towards the country and show unity of purpose and initiative among all institutions and the Member States in order to ensure coherence of the measures by all actors involved, as part of a broader regional strategy;
   (g) to enhance its presence, visibility and understanding of the complexity of the situation in the country by re-establishing the EU delegation in Tripoli and by returning permanent EU staff to the delegation;
   (h) to continue to emphasise that there can be no military solution to the Libyan crisis and to reaffirm the need for all parties and armed groups in Libya to commit to Article 42 of the Libyan Political Agreement, respect the principles of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and refrain from violent rhetoric and from the use of violence, and to demobilise and commit to a peaceful solution to the conflict, thus avoiding further damage and loss of life; considers that negotiations should serve to unify the Libyan security forces from all regions in order to build a civilian-controlled national security architecture, under the inclusive internationally recognised Libyan government, with guarantees of transparency and accountability and respecting Libya’s international human rights obligations, and should also lead to the signing of a protocol that commits all armed groups to renouncing the use of force and violence, within the framework of a coherent and comprehensive disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process aimed at reintegrating members of armed groups into society and security system reform (SSR) process guided by the Skhirat principles of non-discrimination and transparency; believes that the signing of such a protocol should allow for implementation of the peace agreement, paving the way to holding free and fair elections, and should bring about economic and financial incentives and prompt the signatories to work towards building the new state’s institutions;
   (i) to bear in mind the need to develop tailor-made programmes to reintegrate individuals, not groups, from militias into the regular security apparatus, thus limiting divided loyalties;
   (j) to support UN efforts aimed at holding elections in Libya by the end of 2018 and only once a new constitution is adopted; to support particularly efforts to register voters as currently only around 50 % of eligible voters have been registered; to make sure that an agreement on a transitional arrangement is adopted before the elections in order to rebuild trust and thus strengthen the new government’s international and national legitimacy; to support, including by technical means, the process for the establishment of a sound constitutional framework and the electoral process as a whole, linking European financial contributions to the adoption of an electoral law that complies, as much as possible, with the international principles laid down by the Venice Commission;
   (k) to put pressure on those obstructing the political peace talks and to effectively enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya; to consider introducing new sanctions on those supporting illegal oil deals;
   (l) to intensify cooperation with all international organisations and other actors on the ground in order to strengthen the coherence and convergence of international action; to step up diplomatic efforts with all regional actors and neighbouring countries, to ensure they contribute to a positive solution to the crisis in Libya in line with the UN Action Plan – currently the only possible framework for a solution to the crisis; to support the ongoing process of the National Conference inside Libya with the objective of achieving an agreement between the different Libyan parties on the next steps to complete the transition; to discourage regional actors from considering any unilateral or multilateral military intervention lacking any legal base or the political consent of the Libyan government;
   (m) to support the deployment of lawmakers, judges and specialised prosecutors in Libya who can assist in the revision of Libya’s counter-terrorism laws and ensure they are properly equipped to preside over and carry out counter-terrorism cases in compliance with the rule of law;
   (n) to reflect on the crisis in Libya in a wider, regional and pan-African context, bearing in mind that Libya is key to the stability of North Africa, the Sahel, and the Mediterranean; to promote and facilitate Libyan cooperation with its Sahel neighbours; to consider, as part of this reflection, the impact of the situation in Libya on the dynamics and challenges with which the EU is confronted; to develop a comprehensive policy towards Libya which takes into account the regional and pan-African perspective covering broader development, security and migration policies and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, countering terrorism and the fight against slavery and exploitation; to ensure that this policy is backed by adequate and sufficient funding for its implementation, including the next Multiannual Financial Framework, in order to yield concrete results; to continue and intensify where possible the cooperation between NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian and the EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia;
   (o) to ensure permanent and active involvement in counter-terrorism and counter-trafficking efforts, not only through intelligence integration, financial cooperation and tactical support, but also with social and educational programmes for healthcare and education that support the training and deployment of social actors and key opinion-formers to counter violent extremism and promote a message of coexistence and peaceful cooperation;
   (p) to bear in mind that, while Daesh/IS might have been significantly weakened in Libya, there are new forms of extremism on the rise in the country, such as that represented by Madkhalists; to recall that the most effective answer to the radical militant presence in the country lies ultimately in the establishment of inclusive domestic institutions that can uphold the rule of law, provide public services and local security, and effectively fight the groups that are threatening the stability of the country and the wider region;
   (q) to ensure, in line with the Paris Declaration of 25 July 2017, that EU funds are effectively deployed in order to guarantee intergovernmental coordination in restoring public infrastructure through the EU stabilisation facilities; to prioritise funding for projects and initiatives that support actors promoting accountability and democratic change, and that foster locally embedded dialogue, reconciliation and conflict-resolution mechanisms, involving women and working with young people to prevent them from engaging in criminal activities such as joining militias involved in smuggling and trafficking; to continue strengthening civil society, notably human rights defenders, and to support the political process, security and mediation activities, notably through the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP); to promote the implementation of representative governance at local and national levels to better respond to the challenges linked to reconciliation, stabilisation and the re-establishment of security; to ensure the money under the EU Emergency Trust Fund is only granted when it abides by its original objectives and is accompanied by a sound analysis of local authorities and recipients and subsequent evaluation;
   (r) to support municipalities in their delivery of essential services and in building local governance; to ensure basic standards of living for the population, bearing in mind that a closer understanding of the local political and economic system is critical in taking the reconciliation process to the people and in counteracting illegal trafficking; to ensure that the EU funds are effectively deployed in projects that help the Libyan population and civil society; to promote communication between civil society organisations and local government authorities;
   (s) to support initiatives such as that fostered by the Misrata-Tawergha Reconciliation Committee, in which the two cities of Misrata and Tawergha reached an agreement based on a doctrine of peaceful coexistence, opening the way for the return of Tawergha’s displaced population to their city;
   (t) to further encourage the Libyan institutions to work more effectively and transparently towards improving the living conditions of all Libyans by, among other things, reinstating priority public services and rebuilding public infrastructure, to enhance the economic governance of the country, to resolve the liquidity crisis, and to implement the necessary financial and economic reforms requested by the international financial institutions to help economic recovery and stabilisation; to assist the country in establishing a market-based economy capable of delivering to all Libyans; to urge the Libyan authorities to make sure that revenues from natural resources and deriving benefits are used for the benefit of the whole population, including at local level; to call on the Libyan authorities to commit to high standards of transparency in the domestic extractive sector, and in particular to sign up to the requirements of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as rapidly as possible; to help the Libyan authorities to fight against any illegal activity that hampers the national economy, as recently reported in the interim report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya;
   (u) to continue to resolutely condemn human rights abuses and the violations of international humanitarian law and to intensify efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to the population in need and to all parts of the country, in particular regarding healthcare and energy facilities; to increase the effectiveness of humanitarian financial assistance and to enhance support for and cooperation with humanitarian organisations on the ground; to condemn the numerous, ever-increasing attempts to shrink the space for civil society, notably through a repressive legal framework and attacks on human rights defenders and the judiciary; to call for the AU, UN and EU to continue working together and to take strong measures for an immediate end of these human rights violations; to strengthen civil society and support the development and independence of local media;
   (v) to accelerate efforts regarding the UNHCR emergency evacuation mechanism funded by the EU that has allowed around 1 000 of the most vulnerable refugees in need of protection to be evacuated from Libya; to encourage the Libyan counterparts to expand the current number of nationalities which Libya currently allows UNHCR to work with;
   (w) to address the issue of irregular migration through and from Libya, bearing in mind the need for long-term, effective and viable solutions that should address the root causes of migration in Africa in the countries of origin and transit and define the legal basis for international migration processes, currently based on resettlements through the Emergency Transit Mechanism or direct resettlements; to focus the EU’s efforts on protecting migrants in Libya; to assist the Libyan authorities in ensuring the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their own homes and to support local communities in coping with the challenges, while ensuring that the return of IDPs does not amount merely to an exchange between monetary compensation that favours the various militias and the right of return; to alert the international community to the need for measures to tackle development, human rights and security challenges in Libya and the Sahelo-Saharan region, including means to counter the trafficking of human beings and smuggling of migrants; to ensure that measures to counter smuggling and the trafficking of human beings are not hindering freedom of movement in view of the region’s economic development;
   (x) to step up the joint efforts carried out by the EU, the African Union and the UN to improve the protection of migrants and refugees in Libya, paying particular attention to vulnerable individuals; to investigate thoroughly and immediately the allegations about abuses and inhuman treatment of migrants and refugees in Libya by criminal groups, as well as allegations of slavery; to devise initiatives to prevent any such incidents from occurring in the future; to improve the conditions of refugees and migrants held in detention centres and to urge the Libyan authorities to close as soon as possible those facilities which are found not to be in line with international standards; to continue and step up assisted voluntary returns and resettlement efforts carried out in cooperation with the UN and the African Union, underlining in this context the importance of abolishing the Libyan requirement for ‘exit visas’; to encourage the Libyan authorities to stop arbitrary detentions and to avoid the detention of vulnerable persons, in particular children; to ensure that migrants are treated with full respect for international human rights standards and to allocate the necessary funding from the EU budget for this purpose; to call on Libya to sign and ratify the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; to ensure that the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya, EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia and the Frontex Operation Themis jointly focus on how to disrupt illicit activities, including the smuggling of migrants, human trafficking and terrorism in the Central Mediterranean; to ensure that EUBAM, in line with its mandate, remains actively engaged with and assists the Libyan authorities in priority areas related to border management, law enforcement and the broader criminal justice system;
   (y) to further develop its efforts against all acts of people smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya which undermine the process of stabilisation of Libya and endanger the lives of thousands of people; to ensure in that sense the continuity of the EU’s contribution to countering these problems by assisting Libyan counterparts in building the long-needed capacity to secure the country’s land and sea borders and engaging with the Libyan authorities to put in place a comprehensive border management strategy;
   (z) to support a durable solution for the more than 180 000 internally displaced persons in Libya, including an estimated 40 000 former residents of Tawargha, through resettlement possibilities or the facilitation of safe returns to their homes and through increased support to UNHCR and IOM to this end;
   (aa) to address the cross-over between the activities of international criminal groups and terrorist groups by carrying out thorough investigations, particularly into human trafficking and sexual violence perpetrated in time of conflict;
   (ab) to support engagement with the Libyan Coast Guard which allowed almost 19 000 migrants to be rescued in Libyan territorial waters between January and the end of October 2017; to assist the Libyan authorities in formally notifying their Search and Rescue (SAR) area, to put in place a set of clear standard operating procedures for disembarkation and to ensure a functioning monitoring system for the Libyan Coast Guard in order to set up a clear and transparent register of all persons disembarked on the Libyan shores, ensuring that they are properly taken care of in accordance with international humanitarian standards; to further engage with the Libyan authorities to step up preparatory work on a maritime rescue coordination centre in Libya with the aim of enhancing their search and rescue capacity; to ensure the continuation of specialised training provided by IOM and UNHCR to the Libyan Coast Guard on international protection, refugee law and human rights;
   (ac) to step up their humanitarian and civilian aid in order to alleviate the plight of the Libyan population and meet the most urgent needs of those seriously affected by the conflict in Libya, particularly in the most affected areas, and to be ready to respond to any deterioration in the situation; urges the EU to support the empowerment of civil society organisations, in particular women’s groups, which seek non-violent solutions to the multiple crises in the country;
   (ad) to release all the financial and human resources required to help refugees and to provide appropriate humanitarian aid to those who have been displaced, in order to address the humanitarian crisis in Libya, which has forced thousands of people to flee the country;
   (ae) to step up international efforts to dismantle migrant smuggling and human trafficking networks and to intensify efforts to combat this crime and bring the perpetrators to justice; to continue and intensify the work of EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia to disrupt the business model of traffickers and smugglers, develop the capacity of the Libyan Coast Guard and support the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions on the arms embargo and illegal oil trafficking; to continue to provide support to Libya through the civilian CSDP missions; to increase capacities related to the search and rescue of people in distress and capacities to be deployed by all states, and to acknowledge the support provided by private actors and NGOs in carrying out rescue operations at sea and on land, bearing in mind the existing international legal framework and security concerns;
   (af) to reaffirm its full support for the International Criminal Court’s mandate on ongoing human rights violations in Libya, recalling that international accountability mechanisms such as the ICC and universal jurisdiction play an important role in the implementation of the peace plan within a framework that sets out steps toward accountability and the respect of human rights in Libya; to support the International Criminal Court in its efforts to bring perpetrators of atrocity crimes to justice; to support the UN Special Representative for Libya in his call of November 2017 to the international community to assist Libya in combatting impunity for war crimes and to consider options for joint tribunals; to call on the EU and Member States to support international mechanisms in providing the national justice system with all necessary means to start investigating previous and ongoing grave violations and to support the future legitimate Libyan authorities in fulfilling this mission by themselves; to consider that fair trials would bring justice for all victims of human rights violations on Libyan territory which will pave the way to sustainable reconciliation and peace;
   (ag) to express concern about the growing presence of Daesh and other terrorist groups in Libya, which is destabilising the country and threatening its neighbouring countries, as well as the EU;
   (ah) to call in particular on the Libyan authorities and militias to ensure external access to detention facilities, particularly those for migrants;
   (ai) to clarify the situation with regard to the payment of stock dividends, bond income and interest payments on the frozen assets in the EU of the Libyan Investment Authority; to provide a detailed report on the total amount of interest drawn from the Gaddafi assets since they were frozen in 2011 and a list of the individuals or entities that have benefited from these interest payments; to address the concerns about a possible loophole in the EU sanctions regime related to this issue as a matter of priority;
   (aj) to promote projects intended to bring about the economic development of the Fezzan region and the legal economy through close cooperation with the various municipalities, particularly those situated along migration routes, in order to combat the illegal activities of criminal networks and the violent extremism of terrorist groups through the creation of alternative sources of income, particularly for young people;
   (ak) to continue the embargo on the export of arms to Libya, thus stopping these falling into the hands of extremists and armed groups, a factor which further feeds into the insecurity and instability of Libya as a whole;
   (al) to take urgent diplomatic action in order to protect civilians and address the humanitarian situation in Derna;

2.  Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and, for information, to the Libyan Government of National Accord.

(1) OJ C 234, 28.6.2016, p. 30.
(2) OJ C 300, 18.8.2016, p. 21.
(3) OJ C 35, 31.1.2018, p. 66.

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