The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Articles 2, 3 and 8 and Title V, notably Articles 21, 22, 36 and 37, of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and to Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions on Belarus of 15 February 2016,

–  having regard to the launch of the Eastern Partnership in Prague on 7 May 2009 as a common endeavour of the EU and its six Eastern European Partners, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine,

–  having regard to the Joint Declarations of the Eastern Partnership Summits of 2009 in Prague, 2011 in Warsaw, 2013 in Vilnius, 2015 in Riga and 2017 in Brussels, and to the Eastern Partnership leaders' videoconference held in 2020,

–  having regard to the agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Belarus on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation, which entered into force on 1 July 2020(1),

–  having regard to the agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Belarus on the facilitation of the issuance of visas(2) , which entered into force on 1 July 2020,

–  having regard to the 6th round of the bilateral Human Rights Dialogue between the EU and Belarus held on 18 June 2019 in Brussels,

–  having regard to the Joint Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell and Neighbourhood and Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi of 10 August 2020, as well as the declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the presidential elections in Belarus of 11 August 2020,

–  having regard to the statement by the EEAS Spokesperson on recent developments in Belarus of 19 June 2020 and to the statements by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell related to the elections in Belarus of 14 July 2020, 7 August 2020, and 17 August 2020,

–  having regard to the statements by the EEAS Spokesperson on the application of the death penalty in Belarus, notably of 30 July 2019, 28 October 2019, 20 December 2019, 11 January 2020, and 7 March 2020,

–  having regard to its recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the June 2020 Summit,

–  having regard to the UN Human Rights Council’s Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus of 10 July 2020,

–  having regard to the UN statements on the situation in Belarus, in particular those of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 12 August 2020, the UN Special Rapporteurs on human rights of 13 August 2020, and the Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 21 August 2020,

–  having regard to the statement of the President of the European Parliament calling for a stop to the violence in Belarus of 13 August 2020,

–  having regard to the joint statement on Belarus of political leaders from the EPP, S&D, Renew Europe, Greens/EFA and ECR groups in the European Parliament of 17 August 2020,

–  having regard to the main outcomes of the extraordinary meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council on 14 August 2020, to the conclusions of the European Council of 19 August 2020 on the situation in Belarus following the presidential elections of 9 August 2020, and to the conclusions of the European Council of 1 October 2020 and the Foreign Affairs Council of 12 October 2020 on imposing restrictive measures against individuals identified as responsible for repression and intimidation against peaceful demonstrators, opposition members and journalists in the wake of the 2020 presidential election in Belarus, as well as for electoral misconduct,

–  having regard to the open letter on Diplomatic Watch activities during the 2020 presidential elections in Belarus (Minsk, 13 August 2020),

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

–  having regard to the EU Global Strategy and the revised European Neighbourhood Policy,

–  having regard to its resolutions on Belarus, in particular those of 24 November 2016 on the situation in Belarus(3), of 6 April 2017 on the situation in Belarus(4), of 19 April 2018 on Belarus(5), of 4 October 2018 on the deterioration of media freedom in Belarus, notably the case of Charter 97(6), and of 17 September 2020 on the situation in Belarus(7),

–  having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0167/2020),

A.  whereas the actions of the Lukashenka regime are criminal and are against European values, the principles of democracy, and the will of the Belarusian people; whereas despite the fundamental restrictions on basic freedoms and human rights that remain in Belarus, the EU’s policy of critical engagement with Belarus has produced some results in the form of signed agreements and increased cooperation in areas such as environment and connectivity, cross-border cooperation and border management, but insufficient results in the regime’s adherence to the fundamental values of the Eastern Partnership; whereas the unlawful actions of the Belarusian regime jeopardise these results and EU-Belarus relations must be subject to a thorough review in view of the regime's lack of adherence to its own commitments under international law and its agreements with the EU; whereas future relations between the EU and Belarus will be defined in the Partnership Priorities to be agreed by the EU and new legitimate, democratically elected authorities in Belarus, and should be based on the common values on which the EU is built, namely democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;

B.  whereas the people of Belarus share a common European heritage and culture in a country directly neighbouring on three EU Member States; whereas the situation in Belarus may have a direct impact on the EU;

C.  whereas none of the parliamentary or presidential elections held in Belarus from 1994 to date have been free and fair, but despite these harsh undemocratic conditions the people of Belarus clearly voted for a change, after more than two decades of oppression; whereas the recent presidential elections were neither free nor fair and even more than the previous ones were marred by disregard for the fundamental freedoms of assembly, association and expression, and took place after a limited space for election campaigning and within an extremely restrictive environment characterised by repression that did not provide for a meaningful or competitive political contest overall;

D.  whereas the Belarusian authorities did not comply with minimum international standards for a credible, transparent, free and fair presidential election process;

E.  whereas the presidential election campaign was marred by widespread bureaucratic interference favouring the incumbent, intimidation and repression towards other candidates and their families and supporters, denial of registration of candidates who had collected a sufficient number of signatures, multiple arrests, and attempts to silence independent journalists and bloggers and to close down dissident websites;

F.  whereas a restrictive and arbitrary registration process prevented most of the candidates from participating, the arrests of the main presidential contender Viktar Babaryka and of Siarhei Tsikhanouski, the husband of another key candidate, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, and denial of registration by the Central Election Commission (CEC) to a key opposition candidate, Valery Tsapkala, over an insufficient number of valid ballot access signatures with no possibility to appeal for reassessment of the rejection; whereas this underlines the disproportionate and unreasonable nature of the barriers to candidacy, contrary to OSCE commitments and other international standards; whereas such exclusions of candidates limited the possibility for the Belarusian people to choose their candidates;

G.  whereas according to ‘Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections’, further measures disadvantaged opposition candidates, such as restricting locations where election activities can lawfully take place, detaining members of candidates’ campaign teams, and blocking nearly all opposition nominees to the Precinct Election Commissions (PECs), resulting in 1.1 % of the total number of nominees elected being from opposition parties and 96.7 % from pro-government parties;

H.  whereas the government of Belarus failed to issue a timely invitation to OSCE/ODIHR for the observation of the 9 August 2020 presidential elections, leading to the absence of independent international observers during those elections;

I.  whereas due to restrictions imposed by the CEC amid the coronavirus pandemic, the local election observers were prevented from fully executing their duties during all phases of voting, namely early voting, voting on election day, and home voting; whereas early voting was used by the Belarusian regime to inflate the voter turnout several times over, while numerous cases of forced voting of certain categories of voters were documented, for example, of military personnel, public servants, employees of state-owned enterprises and citizens living in public housing; whereas on election day the local election observers were prevented from monitoring the count, and the numbers of voters and the election results announced by the PECs and the CEC significantly differed from their observations;

J.  whereas independent platforms established by civil society organisations of Belarus (such as Golos-Belarus2020.org) conducted independent exit polls and analysed protocols of more than 200 PECs which released genuine results that clearly point to the fact that Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya received an absolute majority of votes (between 71,1 % and 97,6 %);

K.  whereas the CEC announced Aliaksandr Lukashenka as the winner of the election, allegedly receiving 80,10 % of the vote while his main opponent Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya received 10,12 %; whereas irregularities during the polling days were reported constantly, people were often denied their right to vote, and protocols from PECs were falsified;

L.  whereas the European Union and its Member States did not recognise the results of the presidential elections due to substantial doubt about their fairness, condemned the disproportionate and unacceptable use of force against peaceful protestors, and supported the right of the people of Belarus to determine their future;

M.  whereas Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the President-elect according to the Belarusian people, was intimidated and forced into leaving Belarus two days after the presidential elections; whereas other civic and political activists and workers’ leaders also left Belarus due to threats to their or their family members’ safety;

N.  whereas the Belarusian regime refuses to enter into a national dialogue with the people and does not recognise the Coordination Council (CC), which was initiated by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya with the sole purpose of facilitating a peaceful and orderly transition of power through dialogue, and seeks to intimidate and disperse it by targeting its members and launching a criminal case against them; whereas only one Presidium member of the Coordination Council, Svetlana Alexievich, remains not detained or forcibly expelled from the country by the Belarusian authorities;

O.  whereas Belarus has seen unprecedented nationwide peaceful protests calling for free and fair new elections, following the presidential elections of 9 August 2020 and the announcement of a falsified result claiming victory for the incumbent president; whereas the protests led to a violent crackdown with thousands of Belarusians detained, hundreds hospitalised, at least six confirmed dead and dozens still missing;

P.  whereas the European Parliament expresses its support for the Belarusian people’s demands for free and fair elections and the ability to freely make decisions about their country’s future;

Q.  whereas the European Parliament welcomes and encourages the sustained peaceful organisation of nationwide protests, and commends the role and strong leadership of Belarusian women;

R.  having regard to the testimonies of Belarusian protesters concerning the inhumane conditions and treatment they were subjected to during their unlawful detention, including reports of endless beatings, acts of rape, degrading treatment, and inhumane detention conditions in overcrowded cells with no access to drinking water, food, sanitary facilities or medical assistance; whereas Belarusian opposition leader and political prisoner Paval Sieviaryniec cut his wrists in a protest against torture and inhumane detention conditions; whereas after their release many people were hospitalised and some taken into intensive care, with injuries such as broken limbs, cracked skulls, and damaged eyesight and hearing, some of which, together with the psychological traumas incurred, will have lifelong effects, including infertility;

S.  whereas reprisals against regime opponents, election observers, journalists, bloggers, civil society activists, and human rights defenders, including through physical violence, abductions by unknown people without identification markers, administrative fines, threats of losing custody of a child, criminal proceedings, as well as physical and psychological torture, have become common practice in Belarus in the last months;

T.  whereas the Belarusian people are in urgent need of assistance and support from the international community;

U.  whereas the situation in Belarus requires an urgent international investigation into the human rights violations against peaceful protesters and the excessive use of force by the Belarusian regime;

V.  whereas the environment for the work of human rights defenders, representatives of the opposition, civil society and media has continuously deteriorated, with systematic subjection to intimidation and harassment and restrictions of fundamental freedoms; whereas human rights organisations along with other civil society organisations are systematically denied registration, and membership of non-registered groups and receiving foreign funds are criminalised; whereas human rights lawyers are debarred from defending detained civil and political activists, who cannot rely on receiving a fair trial;

W.  whereas the widespread impunity of law enforcement officers contributes to even more human rights violations and retaliations against human rights defenders and innocent people;

X.  whereas the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus of July 2020 notes no major improvements in the legal and regulatory protection of human rights in Belarus and, in addition to the problems highlighted above, draws attention to the continuing application of the death penalty, the prevalent discrimination against vulnerable groups, including women, persons with disabilities, ethnic and religious minorities and LGBTQI persons, the continuing practice of forced labour, torture and other forms of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment of detained persons, and discrimination against speakers of the Belarusian language;

Y.  whereas according to Belarusian human rights organisations there are around 100 persons detained for political reasons in Belarus; whereas among the imprisoned Belarusian opposition members are Mikola Statkevich, a democratic contender in the 2010 presidential elections, who was a prisoner of conscience from 2011 until 2017, another former prisoner of conscience Anatol Liabedzka, Presidium Members of the Coordination Council of Belarus Maria Kalesnikava, Liliya Ulasava and Maksim Znak, presidential contender Viktar Babaryka, and video blogger Siarhei Tsikhanouski;

Z.  whereas the European Parliament expresses its deepest condolences over the deaths of Alyaksandr Taraykouski, Alyaksandr Vikhor, Artsyom Parukou, Henadz Shutau and Kanstantsin Shyshmakou, to their families and to the whole Belarusian nation;

AA.  whereas on 14 August 2020 the Belarusian regime denied entry into the country to two Members of the European Parliament, Robert Biedroń, chair of the Delegation for relations with Belarus, and Petras Auštrevičius, Parliament’s standing rapporteur on Belarus, who were to visit the country on the invitation of Belarusian civil society;

AB.  whereas since 2014 18 000 Belarusian minors have been sentenced to disproportionately long terms of imprisonment of between 8 and 15 years, for non-violent drug-related offences under Article 328 of the Criminal Code; whereas during detention and imprisonment Belarusian minors face numerous violations of their rights, including physical violence and torture, and are exposed to working conditions that are dangerous for health;

AC.  whereas in 2016 the EU lifted most sanctions against Belarus, with the exception of an arms embargo and sanctions against four individuals, but this was done not because Belarus fulfilled all conditions, but rather in the hope that it would continue in the direction of improving the environment for political and civic participation and respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms; whereas no progress has been achieved in the areas of democratic governance and human rights, with increasing administrative, financial and physical repression against the democratic opposition, civil society organisations, journalists and bloggers, and even ordinary people;

AD.  whereas the European Council agreed in 2020 to impose sanctions against a substantial number of individuals responsible for violence, repression and the falsification of election results in Belarus, prohibiting them from entering the EU and freezing their financial assets in the EU;

AE.  whereas it is unacceptable if a Member State does not condemn unambiguously the election falsification, violence and repression and counts Lukashenka’s Belarus as a partner state, since the situation in Belarus requires adopting a firm and principled position and agreeing on common EU action;

AF.  whereas the Belarusian authorities denied that COVID-19 had spread in the country, thereby wasting precious time that could have been used to prepare and protect the country’s population and in particular medical staff, did not cancel mass events - notably the military parade on 9 May 2020 with thousands of participants and the annual community work day attended by a quarter of the Belarusian population - and instead engaged in the intimidation of journalists, bloggers, the democratic opposition, civil society organisations and ordinary people who shared crucial information about the pandemic and necessary precautionary measures, resulting in one of Europe's highest per capita COVID-19 infection rates and Belarus being a health threat to the region; whereas the government and president of Belarus failed to provide facts about and react in a timely way to the pandemic, instead actively spreading false information that jeopardised the health of their citizens;

AG.  whereas the EU stood in solidarity with the people of Belarus from the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, and allocated EUR 60 million to the country for mitigation of the immediate and direct effects of the outbreak, followed by, in reaction to the post-election situation in Belarus, an additional EUR 53 million to support the Belarusian people; whereas Belarus is exploring the possibility of seeking macrofinancial assistance from the EU;

AH.  whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has displayed the resilience, strong resolve and unprecedented self-organisation of Belarusian society, particularly in light of the authorities' lethargic response to and even denials of the pandemic and its impact;

AI.  whereas there are no independent Belarusian news agencies registered in the country, and press freedom in Belarus has significantly deteriorated since 2015, as confirmed annually by the World Press Freedom Index, and the situation has become even worse since the presidential elections in August 2020; whereas the few independent journalists, bloggers, photographers or media outlets that are able to operate in the country and denounce human rights violations are subject to systematic harassment and punitive measures, such as arrests or initiation of criminal investigations, including on charges of illegal production and distribution of information, extremism, discrediting and insulting the president or hooliganism, and the number of prosecutions for statements on the internet has increased; whereas in 2000 and in 2016, two human rights journalists were killed following their active reporting on human rights violations and criticism of the repressive policies of the authoritarian government of Belarus;

AJ.  whereas after the presidential elections the Belarusian regime further tightened its grip on media freedom and people’s right to access and share information, by blocking internet access, disrupting the printing of newspapers, as well as arresting local journalists and foreign correspondents who observed or covered demonstrations, as well as those who have criticised the state’s environmental policy or commented on the COVID-19 pandemic in Belarus and exposing them to torture and inhumane treatment; whereas journalists were specifically targeted and several were injured while covering the Belarusian regime’s authorised crackdown on peaceful protesters; whereas the state-owned TV stations do not cover ongoing protests or the atrocities committed by the Lukashenka regime and are being used for spreading disinformation, attacking and discrediting Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, political activists and peaceful protesters; whereas after the resignation of journalists at the state-owned TV stations, they were replaced by propaganda experts from Russia;

AK.  whereas independent journalists cooperating with and working for foreign media are prosecuted under Article 22.9 of the Code of Administrative Offenses, which makes it illegal to receive financial rewards from media that are not duly registered and accredited in Belarus; whereas the Belsat TV channel, which is officially registered in Poland, is not registered in Belarus and its activities are under constant pressure and attack, including brutal detentions of its journalists and fines imposed on its contributors, totalling USD 101 791 as of 18 June 2020;

AL.  whereas Belarus has been subject to unprecedented pressure from Russia to deepen their integration in the context of the Union State, to the detriment of the sovereignty of Belarus, resulting inter alia in an ongoing standoff over oil and gas imports from Russia;

AM.  whereas Lukashenka’s 26 years in power have been marked by policies of undermining the sovereignty and independence of the country and the weakening of Belarusian identity, heritage and culture;

AN.  whereas from a security point of view, Belarus is closely linked to and dependent on Russia and is engaging in actions posing a threat to the EU Member States such as the non-transparent Zapad 2017 joint military exercises, the planned Zapad 2021 joint military exercise, and the construction of unsafe nuclear installations;

AO.  whereas after the eruption of massive protests Aliaksandr Lukashenka reached out to Russia for assistance to ensure the survival of the Belarusian regime, and seeks to salvage his image and public support by creating false narratives about external threats to Belarus from foreign Western actors and using them to justify the intensification of activities and movement of Belarusian military forces in the Grodno region on the border with Poland and Lithuania, which poses a direct threat to the EU and its Member States;

AP.  whereas Belarus, in partnership with the Russian corporation ROSATOM, is building the Astravyets Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) at an unjustified location just 20 kilometres away from the EU’s external border and 45 kilometres away from the Lithuanian capital; whereas the construction of the Astravyets NPP has been followed by lack of respect for international standards for nuclear safety, serious safety violations and major incidents, including continuous construction work at the site despite the COVID-19 outbreak; whereas the first reactor of the Astravyets NPP was planned to launch before the presidential elections in August 2020 and before full implementation of the recommendations of the stress tests carried out by the EU nuclear safety authorities;

AQ.  whereas the difficult economic situation, which is to worsen due to nationwide strikes and the refusal of the Belarusian regime to enter into a national dialogue with the Belarusian people, indicates that the economic model of Belarus has reached its limits and the country could be entering a period of transition in which the EU can play a key balancing role;

AR.  whereas there has been a notable increase in engagement with Belarusian civil society, including through EU-supported activities and intensifying people-to-people contact;

1.  Recommends that the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:

2.  Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

(1) OJ L 181, 9.6.2020, p. 3. (2) OJ L 180, 9.6.2020, p. 3. (3) OJ C 224, 27.6.2018, p. 135. (4) OJ C 298, 23.8.2018, p. 60. (5) OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 100. (6) OJ C 11, 13.1.2020, p. 18. (7) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0231. (8) OJ L 134, 20.5.2006, p. 1.