European Parliament decision of 10 June 2021 on a draft regulation of the European Parliament laying down the regulations and general conditions governing the performance of the Ombudsman’s duties (Statute of the European Ombudsman) and repealing Decision 94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom (2021/2053(INL) – 2019/0900(APP)) (1) Draft Regulation of the European Parliament laying down the regulations and general conditions governing the performance of the Ombudsman’s duties (Statute of the European Ombudsman) and repealing Decision 94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom (2021/2053(INL)–2019/0900(APP))

P9_TA(2021)0280 A9-0174/2021

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 228(4) thereof,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and in particular Article 106a(1) thereof,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the consent of the Council of the European Union(2),

Having regard to the opinion of the European Commission(3),

Acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1)  The regulations and general conditions governing the performance of the Ombudsman's duties should be laid down in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and in particular point (d) of Article 20(2) and Article 228 thereof, the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the “Charter”).

(2)  Decision 94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom of the European Parliament(4) was last amended in 2008. Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, Decision 94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom should be repealed and replaced by a Regulation adopted on the basis of Article 228(4) TFEU.

(3)  Article 41 of the Charter recognises the right to good administration as a fundamental right of citizens of the Union. Article 43 of the Charter recognises the right to refer to the European Ombudsman cases of maladministration in the activities of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union. In order to ensure that those rights are effective and to enhance the capacity of the Ombudsman to conduct thorough and impartial inquiries, thereby underpinning the Ombudsman’s independence upon which they both depend, he or she should be provided with all the tools necessary to successfully perform the Ombudsman’s duties referred to in the Treaties and in this Regulation.

(4)  The establishment of the conditions under which a complaint may be lodged with the Ombudsman should comply with the principle of full, free and easy access, with due regard being given to the specific restrictions arising from legal and administrative proceedings.

(5)  The Ombudsman should act with due regard to the competences of the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies which are the subject of his or her inquiries.

(6)  It is necessary to lay down the procedures to be followed where the Ombudsman's inquiries reveal cases of maladministration. The Ombudsman should submit a comprehensive report to the European Parliament at the end of each annual session. The Ombudsman should also be entitled to include in that annual report an assessment of compliance with recommendations made.

(7)  In order to strengthen the Ombudsman’s role and to promote administrative best practices within the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, it is desirable to allow the Ombudsman, without prejudice to his or her primary duty, which is to handle complaints, to conduct own-initiative inquiries whenever he or she finds grounds, and in particular in repeated, systemic or particularly serious instances of maladministration.

(8)  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5), as complemented by Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), should apply to requests for public access to documents of the Ombudsman, with the exception of those obtained in the course of an inquiry, in which case requests should be dealt with by the originating Union institution, body, office or agency.

(9)  The Ombudsman should have access to all elements required for the performance of his or her duties. To that end, Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies should provide the Ombudsman with any information that he or she requests for the purposes of an inquiry. Where the exercise of the Ombudsman’s duties would require the Ombudsman to be provided with classified information held by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies or by the authorities of the Member States, the Ombudsman should be able to access such information, subject to ensuring that the rules for its protection are complied with.

(10)  The Ombudsman and his or her staff should be obliged to treat in confidence any information which they have acquired in the course of their duties, without prejudice to the Ombudsman's obligation to inform the authorities of the Member States of facts which might relate to criminal offences and have come to his or her attention in the course of an inquiry. The Ombudsman should also be able to inform the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned of the facts that call into question the conduct of a member of their staff. The obligation of the Ombudsman to treat in confidence any information acquired in the course of his or her duties should be without prejudice to the Ombudsman’s obligation to conduct his or her work as openly as possible pursuant to Article 15(1) TFEU. In particular, in order to duly carry out his or her duties and to support his or her findings, the Ombudsman should be able to refer in his or her reports to any information accessible to the public.

(11)  Where necessary for the effective performance of his or her duties, the Ombudsman should be given the possibility to cooperate and exchange information with the authorities of the Member States, in compliance with the applicable national and Union law, and with other Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, in compliance with applicable Union law.

(12)  The Ombudsman should be elected by the European Parliament at the beginning of the parliamentary term and for the duration thereof, chosen from among persons who are citizens of the Union and who offer all requisite guarantees of independence and competence. General conditions should also be laid down inter alia concerning the cessation of the Ombudsman's duties, the replacement of the Ombudsman, incompatibilities, the remuneration of the Ombudsman and the privileges and immunities of the Ombudsman.

(13)  It should be specified that the seat of the Ombudsman is that of the European Parliament as determined by point (a) of the sole Article of Protocol No 6 on the location of the seats of the institutions and of certain bodies, offices, agencies and departments of the European Union, annexed to the Treaty on European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Protocol No 6").

(14)  The Ombudsman should achieve gender parity within the composition of his or her secretariat, paying due regard to Article 1d(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the Union, laid down in Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68(7) (the “Staff Regulations”).

(15)  It is for the Ombudsman to adopt the implementing provisions for this Regulation after consultation of the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission. In the absence of an opinion from these institutions within the timeframe reasonably set by the Ombudsman in advance, he or she may adopt the implementing provisions concerned. In order to guarantee legal certainty and the highest standards in performing the Ombudsman’s duties, the minimum content of the implementing provisions to be adopted should be established in this Regulation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Subject matter and principles

1.  This Regulation lays down the regulations and general conditions governing the performance of the Ombudsman's duties (Statute of the European Ombudsman).

2.  The Ombudsman shall be completely independent in the performance of his or her duties and shall act without any prior authorisation.

3.  The Ombudsman shall help to uncover maladministration in the activities of the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, with the exception of the Court of Justice of the European Union acting in its judicial role, paying due regard to point (d) of Article 20(2) and Article 228 TFEU and Article 41 of the Charter on the right to good administration.

No action by any other authority or person may be the subject of a complaint to the Ombudsman.

4.  Where appropriate, the Ombudsman shall make recommendations, proposals for solutions and suggestions for improvement to address the issue.

5.  In the performance of his or her duties, the Ombudsman may not question the soundness of a court's ruling or a court’s competence to issue a ruling.

Article 2

Complaints

1.  Any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State may, directly or through a member of the European Parliament, lodge a complaint with the Ombudsman in respect of an instance of maladministration.

2.  A complaint shall make clear reference to its object and to the identity of the complainant. A complainant may request that the complaint, or parts of it, remains confidential.

3.  A complaint shall be lodged within two years of the date on which the facts on which it is based came to the attention of the complainant. Before the complaint is lodged, the complainant shall make the appropriate administrative approaches to the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned.

4.  The Ombudsman shall dismiss a complaint as inadmissible if it is outside the scope of the Ombudsman's mandate or if the procedural requirements laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 are not fulfilled. Where a complaint is outside the scope of the Ombudsman's mandate, he or she may advise the complainant to address it to another authority.

5.  If the Ombudsman finds that the complaint is manifestly unfounded, he or she shall close the file and inform the complainant of that finding. In cases where the complainant has informed the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned about the complaint, the Ombudsman shall also inform the authority concerned.

6.  Complaints concerning employment relations between the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies and their staff shall be admissible only if the person concerned has exhausted all internal administrative procedures, in particular those referred to in Article 90 of the Staff Regulations, and the competent authority of the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned has taken a decision or the time limits for its reply have expired. The Ombudsman shall also be entitled to verify the measures adopted by the competent authority of the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned to ensure the protection of alleged victims of harassment and to restore a healthy and safe working environment respecting the dignity of the persons concerned while an administrative inquiry is ongoing, provided that the persons concerned have exhausted the internal administrative procedures in relation to these measures.

7.  The Ombudsman shall inform the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned of a registered complaint, as soon as that complaint has been declared admissible and the decision has been taken to open an inquiry.

8.  Complaints lodged with the Ombudsman shall not affect time limits for appeals in administrative or judicial proceedings.

9.  Where, because of legal proceedings in progress or concluded concerning the facts which have been put forward, the Ombudsman declares a complaint inadmissible or decides to terminate consideration of it, the outcome of any inquiries that the Ombudsman has carried out up to that point shall be put on file and that file shall be closed.

10.  The Ombudsman shall as soon as possible inform the complainant of the action taken on the complaint and, as far as possible, seek a solution with the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned to eliminate the instance of maladministration. The Ombudsman shall inform the complainant of the solution proposed along with the comments, if any, of the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned. The complainant may submit comments or provide, at any stage, additional information that was not known at the time of the submission of the complaint.

Where a solution accepted by the complainant and the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned has been found, the Ombudsman may close the file without pursuing the procedure provided for in Article 4.

Article 3

Inquiries

1.  In accordance with his or her duties, the Ombudsman shall conduct inquiries for which he or she finds grounds, on his or her own initiative or following a complaint.

2.  The Ombudsman shall inform the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned of such inquiries without undue delay. Without prejudice to Article 5, the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned may, on its own initiative or at the Ombudsman’s request, submit any useful comment or evidence.

3.  The Ombudsman may conduct own-initiative inquiries whenever he or she finds grounds, and in particular in repeated, systemic or particularly serious instances of maladministration, in order to address those instances as an issue of public interest. In the context of such inquiries, he or she may also make proposals and initiatives to promote administrative best practices within Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.

Article 4

Interaction between the Ombudsman and the institutions

1.  Where, following an inquiry, instances of maladministration are found, the Ombudsman shall inform, without undue delay, the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned of the findings of the inquiry and, where appropriate, shall make recommendations.

2.  The Union institution, body, office or agency concerned shall send the Ombudsman a detailed opinion within three months. The Ombudsman may, upon a reasoned request of the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned, grant an extension of that deadline. That extension shall not exceed two months. Where no opinion is delivered by the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned within the original three-month deadline or within the extended deadline, the Ombudsman may close the inquiry without such an opinion.

3.  Upon the closure of an inquiry, the Ombudsman shall forward a report to the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned and, where the nature or the scale of the instance of maladministration uncovered so requires, to the European Parliament. The Ombudsman may make recommendations in the report. The Ombudsman shall inform the complainant of the outcome of the inquiry, of the opinion delivered by the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned and of any recommendations made in the report.

4.  Where appropriate in relation to an inquiry into the activities of a Union institution, body, office or agency, the Ombudsman may be heard before the European Parliament, at the appropriate level, on his or her own initiative or at the request of the European Parliament.

5.  At the end of each annual session, the Ombudsman shall submit to the European Parliament a report on the outcome of the inquiries that he or she carried out. The report shall include an assessment of compliance with the Ombudsman’s recommendations, proposals for solutions and suggestions for improvement. The report shall also include, where relevant, the outcome of the Ombudsman's inquiries related to harassment, whistleblowing and conflicts of interest within the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies.

Article 5

Provision of information to the Ombudsman

1.  For the purposes of this Article, "provision of information" includes all physical and electronic means by which the Ombudsman and his or her secretariat are given access to information, including documents, independently of its form.

2.  "EU classified information" means any information or material designated by EU security classification, the unauthorised disclosure of which could cause varying degrees of prejudice to the interests of the Union or to those of one or more of the Member States.

3.  Subject to the conditions laid down in this Article, the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and the competent authorities of the Member States shall, at the request of the Ombudsman or on their own initiative, and without undue delay, provide the Ombudsman with any information he or she has requested for the purposes of an inquiry.

4.  The Ombudsman shall be provided with EU classified information subject to the following principles and conditions:

(a)  the Union institution, body, office or agency providing the EU classified information must have completed its relevant internal procedures and, where the originator is a third party, the latter must have given its prior written consent;

(b)  the Ombudsman’s ‘need to know’ must have been established;

(c)  it must be ensured that access to information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or above is granted only to persons holding a security clearance to the relevant security level in accordance with national law and authorised by the competent security authority.

5.  For the provision of EU classified information, the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned shall assess whether the Ombudsman has effectively put in place internal security rules as well as physical and procedural measures to protect EU classified information. To this effect, the Ombudsman and a Union institution, body, office or agency may also enter into an arrangement establishing a general framework governing the provision of EU classified information.

6.  In accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5, access to EU classified information shall be provided in the premises of the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned, unless otherwise agreed with the Ombudsman.

7.  Without prejudice to paragraph 3, the competent authorities of the Member States may refuse to provide the Ombudsman with information covered by national law on protection of classified information or by provisions preventing its communication.

Nonetheless, the Member State concerned may provide such information to the Ombudsman subject to conditions set out by its competent authority.

8.  Where the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies and the authorities of the Member States intend to provide the Ombudsman with EU classified information or any other information which is not accessible to the public, they shall give the Ombudsman advance notice thereof.

The Ombudsman shall ensure that such information is adequately protected and in particular shall not disclose it to the complainant or to the public without the prior consent of the Union institution, body, office or agency or the competent authority of the Member State concerned. As regards EU classified information, the consent shall be given in writing.

9.  The Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies refusing access to EU classified information shall provide the Ombudsman with a justification in writing, indicating, as a minimum, the grounds for refusal.

10.  The Ombudsman shall retain possession of information referred to in paragraph 8 only until the inquiry is definitively closed.

The Ombudsman may request a Union institution, body, office or agency, or a Member State, to retain such information for a period of at least five years.

11.  If the requested assistance is not forthcoming, the Ombudsman may inform the European Parliament, which shall act accordingly.

Article 6

Public access to documents of the Ombudsman

The Ombudsman shall deal with requests for public access to documents, with the exception of those obtained in the course of an inquiry and held by the Ombudsman for the duration of that inquiry or after its closure, in accordance with the conditions and limits provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, as complemented by Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006.

Article 7

Hearing of officials and other servants

1.  Officials and other servants of Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall be heard, at the request of the Ombudsman, with regard to facts which relate to an ongoing inquiry by the Ombudsman.

2.  Those officials and other servants shall speak on behalf of their institution, body, office or agency. They shall continue to be bound by the obligations arising from the rules to which they are subject.

Article 8

Inquiries in the context of whistleblowing

1.  The Ombudsman may conduct an inquiry to uncover instances of maladministration in the treatment of information as defined in Article 22a of the Staff Regulations which have been disclosed to him or her by an official or other servant in accordance with the relevant rules laid down in the Staff Regulations.

2.  In such cases, the official or other servant shall benefit from the protection offered by the Staff Regulations against any prejudicial effects on the part of the Union institution, body, office or agency as a result of having communicated the information.

3.  The Ombudsman may also inquire whether there was an instance of maladministration in the handling of such case by the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned, including as regards the protection of the official or other servant concerned.

Article 9

Professional secrecy

1.  The Ombudsman and his or her staff shall not divulge information or documents which they obtain in the course of an inquiry. Without prejudice to paragraph 2, they shall, in particular, not divulge any EU classified information or internal documents of the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies supplied to the Ombudsman or documents falling within the scope of Union law regarding the protection of personal data. They shall also not divulge any information which could harm the rights of the complainant or of any other person involved.

2.  Without prejudice to the general reporting obligation of all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), in accordance with Article 8 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8), if facts learnt in the course of an Ombudsman inquiry might constitute or relate to a criminal offence, the Ombudsman shall report to the competent authorities of the Member States and, in so far as the case falls within their respective competences, to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, in accordance with Article 24 of Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939(9) and to OLAF.

3.  If appropriate, and with the agreement of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office or OLAF, the Ombudsman shall also notify the Union institution, body, office or agency with authority over the official or other servant concerned, which may initiate the appropriate procedures.

Article 10

Cooperation with the authorities of the Member States and with Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies

1.  Where necessary for the performance of his or her duties, the Ombudsman may cooperate with the authorities of the Member States, in compliance with the applicable national and Union law.

2.  Within the scope of his or her duties, the Ombudsman may also cooperate with other Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, in particular with those in charge of the promotion and protection of fundamental rights. The Ombudsman shall avoid any overlap or duplication with the activities of those Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies.

3.  Communication addressed to the authorities of the Member States for the purposes of applying this Regulation shall be made through their permanent representations to the Union, except where the permanent representation concerned agrees that the Ombudsman's secretariat may directly contact the authorities of the Member State concerned.

Article 11

Election of the Ombudsman

1.  The Ombudsman shall be elected, and eligible for reappointment, in accordance with Article 228(2) TFEU from candidates selected following a transparent procedure.

2.  Following the publication of the call for nominations in the Official Journal of the European Union, the Ombudsman shall be chosen from persons who :

—  are citizens of the Union,

—  have full civil and political rights,

—  offer every guarantee of independence,

—  meet the conditions required for the exercise of the highest judicial office in their country or have the acknowledged competence and qualifications to undertake the duties of the Ombudsman, and

—  have not been members of national governments or members of the European Parliament, the European Council or the European Commission within the two years preceding the date of publication of the call for nominations.

Article 12

Cessation of the Ombudsman's duties

1.  The Ombudsman shall cease to exercise his or her duties either at the end of his or her term of office or upon resignation or dismissal.

2.  Save in the event of dismissal, the Ombudsman shall remain in office until a new Ombudsman has been elected.

3.  In the event of early cessation of duties, a new Ombudsman shall within three months of the office falling vacant be elected for the remainder of the term of office of the European Parliament. Until a new Ombudsman has been elected, the principal officer referred to in Article 16(2) shall be responsible for urgent matters falling within the Ombudsman’s duties.

Article 13

Dismissal

Where the European Parliament intends to request the dismissal of the Ombudsman in accordance with Article 228(2) TFEU, it shall hear the Ombudsman before making such a request.

Article 14

Exercise of the Ombudsman´s duties

1.  In the performance of his or her duties, the Ombudsman shall act in accordance with Article 228(3) TFEU. The Ombudsman shall refrain from any act incompatible with the nature of those duties.

2.  When taking up office, the Ombudsman shall give a solemn undertaking before the Court of Justice that he or she will perform the duties referred to in the Treaties and in this Regulation with complete independence and impartiality and will respect the obligations arising therefrom during and after his or her term of office. The solemn undertaking shall in particular include the duty to behave with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits after the end of the term of office.

3.  During the Ombudsman’s term of office, he or she may not engage in any other political or administrative duties, or any other occupation, whether gainful or not.

Article 15

Remuneration, privileges and immunities

1.  The Ombudsman shall have the same rank in terms of remuneration, allowances and pension as a judge at the Court of Justice.

2.  Articles 11 to 14 and Article 17 of Protocol No 7 on the privileges and immunities of the European Union, annexed to the Treaty on European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community shall apply to the Ombudsman and to the officials and other servants of the Ombudsman’s secretariat.

Article 16

Secretariat of the Ombudsman

1.  The Ombudsman shall be awarded an adequate budget, sufficient to ensure the Ombudsman’s independence and the performance of his or her duties.

2.  The Ombudsman shall be assisted by a secretariat. The Ombudsman shall appoint the principal officer of the secretariat.

3.  The officials and other servants of the Ombudsman's secretariat shall be subject to the Staff Regulations. The number of members of staff of the secretariat shall be adopted each year as part of the budgetary procedure.

4.  Where officials of the Union are seconded to the Ombudsman's secretariat, that secondment shall be considered as a secondment in the interests of the service in accordance with point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 37 and Article 38 of the Staff Regulations.

Article 17

Seat of the Ombudsman

The seat of the Ombudsman shall be that of the European Parliament as determined by point (a) of the sole Article of Protocol No 6.

Article 18

Implementing provisions

The Ombudsman shall adopt the implementing provisions for this Regulation, after consultation of the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission. Those shall be in accordance with this Regulation and shall, as a minimum, include provisions on:

(a)  procedural rights of the complainant and the Union institution, body, office or agency concerned;

(b)  receipt, processing and closure of complaints;

(c)  own-initiative inquiries; and

(d)  follow-up inquiries.

Article 19

Final provisions

1.  Decision 94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom is repealed.

2.  This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

3.  This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

(1) Pursuant to Rule 46, third paragraph, of the Rules of Procedure, Parliament decided to postpone the vote on the motion for a resolution until the Council and the Commission have stated their position on the draft Regulation set out below in accordance with Article 228(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (A9-0174/2021). (2) Consent of ... (not yet published in the Official Journal). (3) Opinion of ... (not yet published in the Official Journal). (4) Decision 94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom of the European Parliament of 9 March 1994 on the regulations and general conditions governing the performance of the Ombudsman's duties (OJ L 113, 4.5.1994, p. 15). (5) Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43). (6) Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies(OJ L 264, 25.9.2006, p. 13). (7) OJ L 56, 4.3.1968, p. 1. (8) Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1). (9) Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1).

European Parliament legislative resolution of 10 June 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1628 as regards the transitional provisions of certain machinery fitted with engines in the power range between 56kW and 130kW, and above 300kW in order to address the impact of COVID-19 crisis (COM(2021)0254 – C9-0185/2021 – 2021/0129(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0254),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0185/2021),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 9 June 2021(1),

–  having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 2 June 2021 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure,

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 10 June 2021 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2021/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1628 as regards its transitional provisions for certain machinery fitted with engines in the power ranges greater than or equal to 56 kW and less than 130 kW, and greater than or equal to 300 kW, in order to address the impact of the COVID-19 crisis

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2021/1068.)

(1) Not yet published in the Official Journal.

European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on the conflict of interest of the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic (2021/2671(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0282 B9-0303/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Articles 310(6) and 325(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Article 61 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(1) (the Financial Regulation),

–  having regard to the Commission Notice Guidance on the avoidance and management of conflicts of interest under the Financial Regulation(2),

–  having regard to its previous decisions and resolutions on discharge to the Commission for the years 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019,

–  having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2018 on conflicts of interest and the protection of the EU budget in the Czech Republic(3) and its resolution of 19 June 2020 on the reopening of the investigation against the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic on the misuse of EU funds and potential conflicts of interest(4),

–  having regard to the fact-finding missions to the Czech Republic undertaken by the Committee on Budgetary Control from 26 to 27 March 2014 and from 26 to 28 February 2020,

–  having regard to the final report of November 2019 on the audit of the functioning of the management and control systems in place to avoid conflict of interest in Czechia, carried out by the Commission’s Directorate-Generals for Regional and Urban Policy (REGIO) and for Employment, Inclusion and Social Affairs (EMPL), which was published on 23 April 2021,

–  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(5),

–  having regard to the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law report, and in particular the Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Czechia (SWD(2020)0302),

–  having regard to the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) Fourth Evaluation Round Interim Compliance Report on the Czech Republic, adopted by GRECO at its 84th plenary meeting in December 2019,

–  having regard to the Country Report Czechia 2020 of 26 February 2020 (SWD(2020)0502) accompanying the Commission communication on the 2020 European Semester: Assessment of progress on structural reforms, prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, and results of in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 (COM(2020)0150),

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Budgetary Control,

A.  whereas Articles 61 and 63 of the Financial Regulation, Article 24 of Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement rules on avoiding conflicts of interest, Articles 144 and 145 of the Common Provisions Regulation for shared management funds, Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013, the case-law of the Court of Justice and Czech Act No 159/2006 on conflicts of interest as amended on 29 November 2016 set specific obligations and provide tools to effectively address situations of conflict of interest;

B.  whereas Agrofert is a conglomerate founded and established by the Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and consisting of over 230 companies; whereas Prime Minister Babiš has been revealed to be one of the beneficial owners of Agrofert, the controlling company of the Agrofert group, including among others a number of important Czech media outlets, through trust funds AB Private Trust I and AB Private Trust II, of which he is also the beneficial owner;

C.  whereas in January and February 2019 a coordinated, comprehensive audit was carried out by several Commission services (DG REGIO/DG EMPL, DG AGRI (associated DG)) on the application of EU and national law; whereas an ongoing AGRI audit is examining alleged conflicts of interest in the implementation of the common agricultural policy in Czechia;

D.  whereas in April 2021 the Commission published a duly redacted version of the final audit report on the legal implementation of ESI Funds as verified by DG EMPL and DG REGIO; whereas the second audit report by DG AGRI has still not been published;

E.  whereas the published audit report highlights serious shortcomings in the management and control system(6) in the Czech Republic and deficiencies to be addressed by financial corrections;

F.  whereas the DG REGIO audit report identified three grants under the European Regional Development Fund that breached Czech law and the EU’s Common Provisions Regulation;

G.  whereas the criminal investigation into Prime Minister Babiš, originated by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) report on the irregular use of EU subsidies intended for small businesses, which was initially closed and then re-opened and which was the subject of Parliament’s resolution of 19 June 2020, is still ongoing;

H.  whereas after one year the Commission has still not provided a comprehensive reply to Parliament’s request to quantify the total amount of subsidies received by entities of the Agrofert group;

I.  whereas after Parliament’s resolutions of December 2018 and June 2020 on Prime Minister Babiš’s conflict of interest and more than two years after the start of the Commission’s audits, the situation around the conflict of interest of Prime Minister Babiš remains unresolved;

J.  whereas sound financial management can only be ensured by Member States if public authorities act in accordance with the law, both national and EU, and if criminal misconduct originated by improperly handled cases of conflict of interest is effectively pursued by investigative and prosecution services;

K.  whereas under Article 3(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 failure to ensure the absence of conflicts of interest may be indicative of breaches of the principles of the rule of law;

L.  whereas having in place detailed policies and rules on avoiding and managing conflicts and perceived conflicts of interest is an essential part of good governance and sound financial management;

M.  whereas the mission of the Committee on Budgetary Control in February 2020 revealed concerning limitations in the legal framework that impede an efficient and effective working of the national Supreme Audit Office by preventing it from checking the regularity and performance of public spending at regional and local level or performing on-the-spot checks of final beneficiaries;

1.  Welcomes the publication of the final audit report by DG REGIO and DG EMPL on the functioning of the management and control systems in place to avoid conflicts of interest in Czechia, following the repeated calls by Parliament, which confirms the current and ongoing conflict of interest of Prime Minister Babiš in relation to the Agrofert conglomerate, thereby confirming Parliament’s position as expressed in previous resolutions and discharge reports;

2.  Welcomes the fact that DG REGIO and DG EMPL acknowledge the important public interest in transparency and information on this exceptional situation as reasonable grounds for publication; regrets nonetheless that findings were only published in April 2021 despite the final audit report having been sent to the Czech authorities in November 2019 and the Commission having received replies in May 2020; urges DG AGRI to accelerate its audit procedure and follow-up, and to publish its final audit report without undue delay; requests that particular attention be given to payments made to companies directly and indirectly owned by Prime Minister Babiš or other members of the Czech Government;

3.  Considers it regrettable that audit and contradictory procedures, as well as procedures on the application of financial correction, currently stretch out over several years; urges the Commission to revise the rules of audit and financial correction procedures to allow for more timely conclusions and recovery of unduly paid out EU funds; reiterates its call on the Commission to publish all documents related to the case of the Czech Prime Minister’s conflict of interest;

4.  Is deeply concerned by the findings of the audit report showing that:

5.  Notes that as of 1 June 2021 Czech Act No. 37/2021 SB. on Registration of Ultimate Beneficial Owners finally transposed into national law the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, which requires the setting-up of publicly available registers for companies, trusts and other legal arrangements; recalls that the deadline to transpose this directive had lapsed on 10 January 2020; deeply criticises the fact that Czechia transposed the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive with such a massive delay; notes that Prime Minister Babiš has been listed in the Czech registry of owners as an ‘indirect real owner’ of Agrofert since 1 June 2021; strongly criticises the statement released by the Czech Ministry of Justice, which states that subsidies may continue to be paid to Agrofert in spite of the fact that Andrej Babiš is listed as the beneficial owner of Agrofert in Czechia;

6.  Insists that a conflict of interest at the highest level of government of a Member State, now confirmed with the publication on 23 April 2021 of the final Commission report on the audit of the functioning of the management and control systems in place to avoid conflict of interest in the Czech Republic, cannot be tolerated and must be fully addressed by:

7.  Welcomes the announcement that the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) will conduct an impartial and fact-based investigation into the conflict of interest; acknowledges the statement released by the prosecutor’s office responsible according to which the case ‘meets the conditions of compulsory jurisdiction of the newly established European Public Prosecutor’s Office under the relevant Regulation of the European Union, to which it must be transmitted without delay’;

8.  Regrets that the audit findings confirm the existence of serious systemic deficiencies in the functioning of the management and control system and in particular in the detection of conflicts of interest; deplores that the ineffectiveness of cross-checks and opaque processes and structures hamper the reliability of any prevention and detection of conflicts of interest in the Czech Republic;

9.  Is deeply concerned that even after the entry into force of Articles 61 and 63 of the Financial Regulation in 2018, the deficiency of the management and control systems – as regards the avoidance of conflict of interest – continues to exist and that little and insufficient action is taken by the Czech authorities to ensure compliance;

10.  Deplores the reported attempts by the Czech Government to legalise Prime Minister Babiš’s conflict of interest via a law, proposed at the beginning of the COVID crisis in March 2020 rather than resolving the conflict of interest itself;

11.  Expects the national authorises to implement all recommendations requested, aiming, among other things, at improving the management and control system and verifying all grants awarded after 9 February 2017 that may violate the Conflict of Interest Act;

12.  Asks the Commission to inform Parliament about the implementation of the audit’s recommendations by the Czech Government, in particular concerning the scrutiny of all funds awarded to the Agrofert group that were not part of the audit sample;

13.  Is deeply concerned by the weaknesses of the overall regulatory framework, which make it difficult to identify systematically the beneficial owners of entities that receive EU funds; recalls that the Commission has confirmed having made payments under the CAP to companies belonging to the Agrofert group, and also to other companies whose beneficial owner is Prime Minister Babiš in several other Member States, but is unable to exhaustively identify all economic operators who benefited; insists that the Commission is expected to provide the discharge authority with a complete and reliable overview of all payments made to companies of the Agrofert group and to companies with the same beneficial owner in all Member States for the financial years 2018 and 2019; calls on the Commission to also include information for the year 2020; considers that this shows the urgent need for the Commission, in cooperation with national agencies, to come up with a standardised and publicly accessible format to disclose the end beneficiaries of CAP disbursements;

14.  Notes the recent correction in the records of the beneficial ownership register of companies (Transparenzregister), which now lists Prime Minister Babiš as a beneficiary and shareholder of an Agrofert subsidiary in Germany; reiterates that Prime Minister Babiš is listed as one of six active persons with significant influence or control over the trustees of a trust related to the Agrofert subsidiary named GreenChem Solutions Ltd. in the UK; calls on all Member States in which subsidiaries of Agrofert are active to review the beneficial ownership register in this regard;

15.  Regrets that entities of the Agrofert group continue to receive payments under the first pillar of the CAP; recalls that the Czech Conflict of Interest Act prohibits providing any subsidy, including CAP direct payments, to a company in which a public official or an entity controlled by a public official owns a 25 % or greater share; stresses the serious doubts about the independence of the Czech authorities that decide on the eligibility and control of direct agricultural payments; identifies risk indicators in the fact that the companies which are a part of the Agrofert group continue to receive these funds in violation of the Czech Conflict of Interest Act;

16.  Notes that the existing Czech legislation on conflicts of interest in place since 2006 had severe gaps and significant lacks in the implementation, which allowed the establishment and growth of deep oligarchic structures; regrets that the mission by Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control in February 2020 discovered severe deficiencies in the systems for avoiding, detecting and resolving conflicts of interest in Czechia;

17.  Is astonished by the seemingly different approaches to similar violations of the Czech Conflict of Interest Act and Article 61 of the Financial Regulation by DGs REGIO and EMPL and DG AGRI; while DGs REGIO and EMPL consider that a breach of the Czech Conflict of Interest Act constitutes a violation of Article 61(2) of the Financial Regulation, DG AGRI does not seem to apply the same logic; points out, furthermore, that eligibility checks of entitlement-based payments (direct payments) also include an element of decision-making in the verification; emphasises that this verification decision may be influenced by a conflict of interest; calls on the Commission to provide Parliament with a detailed legal explanation of the different impact of violations of national conflict of interest legislation and Article 61 of the Financial Regulation, and to include a detailed explanation on how the Commission ensures that the verification decisions for entitlement-based payment were not impacted by a conflict of interest;

18.  Is astonished by the Commission’s evaluation that the Czech Minister of Agriculture is not in a conflict of interest situation despite his family members receiving substantial amounts of agriculture subsidies while he is in charge of the programming and implementation of agricultural programmes under the CAP; asks the Commission to share this evaluation with Parliament; calls on the Commission to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of Article 61 of the Financial Regulation;

19.  Asks the Commission to assess the effectiveness of Article 61 of the Financial Regulation in successfully preventing or revealing and resolving cases of conflict of interest when they occur, and, as appropriate, make proposals in the context of the next revision of the Financial Regulation to further strengthen the rules governing conflicts of interest, paying special regard to definitions, scope (who is covered), the identification of sensitive functions or activities at risk, the ‘situations which may objectively be perceived as a conflict of interest’ and the obligations in cases of conflict of interest; recalls that Article 61 of the Financial Regulation does not differentiate between different types of payments from the EU budget and that the mere possibility of using a position stemming from the conflict of interest is a sufficient indicator;

20.  Is concerned about the narrow interpretation of Article 61 of the Financial Regulation by the Czech Agriculture Paying Agency (the State Agricultural Intervention Fund), which considers it non-applicable for members of the government; reiterates Parliament’s concerns regarding a number of shortcomings identified in the management of the Czech Agriculture Paying Agency, especially the Supervisory Board’s lack of independence, as stressed in Parliament’s report on its mission to the Czech Republic in February 2020(7); asks the Commission to open an audit procedure to ensure the agency’s sound management;

21.  Considers the Commission’s guidance on the avoidance and management of conflicts of interest under the Financial Regulation an important tool to further strengthen the measures to protect the EU budget against fraud and irregularities; asks the Commission to raise awareness and promote a uniform interpretation and application of the rules on avoidance of conflicts of interest, including direct payments under the first pillar of the CAP, and to monitor the independent functioning of Paying Agencies and audit structures in this regard; calls on the Commission to provide concerned Member States’ authorities with further practical examples, suggestions and recommendations to assist them in the avoidance of conflicts of interest;

22.  Reiterates that Czech citizens and taxpayers should not pay or suffer any consequences deriving from the conflict of interest of Prime Minister Babiš, and that companies belonging to the Agrofert group should repay all subsidies unlawfully received from either the EU or Czech national budget; urges the Czech authorities to reclaim all subsidies that were unduly paid to any entity of the Agrofert group;

23.  Insists that further disbursement of funds, either from the EU or Czech national budget, to the companies ultimately controlled by Prime Minister Babiš or members of the Czech Government must be halted until the cases of conflict of interest are fully resolved;

24.  Urges the Czech Government to improve the overall fairness of EU subsidies distribution and set up a system that will guarantee full and complete transparency in the distribution of EU funds; notes with concern that according to information available to the Commission, there have been no decisions changing the Czech direct payments system since it was set up in 2014 and to create an effective mechanism against conflicts of interest;

25.  Recalls that as part of the ‘Stork Nest’ project Agrofert artificially created a medium-sized company, which remained under Agrofert’s control, in order to obtain funds intended for small and medium-sized businesses, amounting to a total of around EUR 2 million; finds it unacceptable that after serious irregularities were concluded in the ‘Stork Nest’ investigations, Czech authorities withdrew the project from EU funding with the goal of financing it from the national budget, shifting the financial burden to Czech taxpayers; considers this to be a confirmation that the Czech authorities failed to convince the Commission of the legality and regularity of these payments; regrets that this means that OLAF no longer has the right to investigate and only the national prosecutor is able to press charges; is seriously concerned that the Czech prosecutor temporarily closed the proceedings and later reopened the case; calls on the Czech authorities to inform the EU institutions of the outcome of the ‘Stork Nest’ investigation as soon as possible;

26.  Notes that the Czech police recommended for the second time that Prime Minister Babiš be indicted over alleged fraud amounting to around EUR 2 million in relation to the ‘Stork Nest’ investigations; notes that supervising prosecutor Jaroslav Šaroch, who in September 2019 had initially decided to dismiss the case, is responsible for deciding on the motion for charges; recalls that the now resigned Prosecutor General Pavel Zeman had on 4 December 2019 ordered that the case be reopened, citing shortcomings in the legal assessment of prosecutor Šaroch;

27.  Is deeply concerned by the political pressure against independent media and independent institutions in the Czech Republic, which was recently highlighted by the resignation of the Prosecutor General, who stated pressure from the Minister of Justice as the reason for his resignation;

28.  Asks the Commission to look into vulnerabilities of the Czech judicial system and to launch the necessary actions; asks the Commission to carefully examine and analyse whether any other cases involving members of the Czech Government have been withdrawn or prematurely closed potentially following pressure; calls on the Commission to keep Parliament informed without undue delay about its findings and conclusions;

29.  Is concerned by reports that the Czech Government already paid over CZK 150 million to Agrofert from the Czech national budget during the audited period(8); as this may constitute illegal State aid and compromise fair competition in the EU single market, as well as its integrity, asks the Commission to fully investigate these cases of funding from the national budget and to inform Parliament about the investigation’s conclusions and the measures taken;

30.  Condemns the practice of withdrawing projects from EU funding in order to finance them from the national budget following the detection of irregularities by the Commission or the European Court of Auditors; asks the Commission to closely monitor and conduct a careful legal analysis in these cases, paying particular attention to potential violations of State aid rules;

31.  Deplores the public comments made by Prime Minister Babiš in reaction to the publication of the final audit report of DGs REGIO and EMPL(9); considers it unacceptable that Commission auditors are called ‘mafia’ by a member of the European Council;

32.  Condemns Prime Minister Babiš’s defamatory remarks against news organisations reporting on his conflict of interest and the operations of his businesses; points in this regard to his negative comments on the Denik Referendum in the Czech Parliament in November 2020;

33.  Is deeply concerned by the low level of compliance with the GRECO recommendations contained in the Fourth Round Evaluation Report – only one of the fourteen recommendations has been implemented satisfactorily, seven recommendations have been partly implemented and the remaining six recommendations have not been implemented at all;

34.  Urges all Member States to prohibit cases of three-digit million euro payments of subsidies to individual natural persons under the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) and to move towards Parliament’s position of guaranteeing full transparency and the possibility to aggregate payments as well as digital monitoring and audit procedures across Member States’ borders in programmes under shared management;

35.  Calls on the Council in the ongoing negotiations on the CAP Regulation to pay due consideration to budgetary effectiveness and fairer and more transparent distribution of direct payments, to move towards Parliament’s position of establishing specific caps per natural person for both pillars of the CAP, as well as degressivity, mandatory capping and redistributive payments to ensure a positive perception of the CAP overall by EU citizens; emphasises that negotiations in the Council must not be impacted by conflicts of interest and that no minister, member or representative of a national government must participate in negotiations while affected by a conflict of interest; finds it unacceptable that Prime Minister Babiš, while being the beneficial owner of the Agrofert group, took part in the negotiations on the CAP and fought against the capping of subsidies; strongly underlines that the caps per natural person for the first and second pillar of the CAP must be uniformly applicable, including to members of national governments in order to prevent them from negotiating in the Council to their own benefit;

36.  Strongly disapproves of oligarchic structures drawing on EU agricultural and cohesion funds, whereby a small minority of beneficiaries receive the vast majority of EU funds, and calls on the Commission, the Council and the European Council to prevent the fostering of such structures, which are decreasing the competitiveness of small and medium-sized farmers and family farms, which should be the core beneficiaries of the CAP;

37.  Stresses its grave concern over the fact that Prime Minister Babiš is in a conflict of interest while participating in decision-making on the alignment of the CAP with the overall European climate policy goals, as the business interests of the Agrofert group might override the public interest in supporting more sustainable agriculture and limiting the negative impacts of climate change;

38.  Considers that the lack of action by the Czech Government in tackling the conflicts of interest of Prime Minister Babiš has a negative impact on the functioning of the Czech State authorities, including the law-enforcement authorities and management and control systems, and on compliance with EU legislation;

39.  Calls on the Commission to assess the above situation, together with Prime Minister Babiš’s influence on Czech media and on the judicial system, with a view to identifying breaches of rule of law and, if confirmed and on the ground of its findings, activate in due time the conditionality mechanism for the protection of the Union’s budget;

40.  Is still concerned about the increasing concentration of media ownership in the hands of a few oligarchs(10);

41.  Notes that there are ongoing investigations and audits at both national and European level into potential conflicts of interest and the use of EU funds; is worried about concerns expressed in the Commission’s 2020 rule of law report that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently and some gaps have been identified in the integrity frameworks applicable to members of parliament;

42.  Calls on the Council and the European Council to take all necessary and appropriate measures to prevent conflicts of interest in line with Article 61(1) of the Financial Regulation; expresses concerns that the Czech Prime Minister has been, and is still, actively part of negotiations on the EU budget and EU programmes while being in a conflict of interest; asks the Council and the European Council to explain to Parliament how they plan to take into account and act with respect to Prime Minister Babiš’s participation in CAP- and EU budget-related decision-making upon the conclusion in the Commission’s audit reports;

43.  Considers that the case of the conflict of interest of Prime Minister Babiš also confirms an urgent need to establish an interoperable digital reporting and monitoring system for EU finances; deeply regrets that the co-legislators did not reach a satisfactory agreement on provisions establishing the interoperability of the IT systems, which would allow standardised and uniform reporting and foster cooperation; calls for an effort from all the relevant actors to strive for equally effective solutions for the sake of improved accountability;

44.  Calls on the Commission to ensure that the provisions of the Financial Regulation on conflict of interest, including in the case of the conflict of interest of Prime Minister Babiš, are fully applied in the implementation of the 2021-2027 MFF and Next Generation EU so that no payments are being made to companies directly or indirectly owned by Prime Minister Babiš(11); calls for further scrutiny of any potential conflict of interest as well as other rule of law elements in the national recovery plans;

45.  Strongly emphasises that Members of the European Parliament must be able to conduct their work free from threats and that national governments are responsible for ensuring their protection in their home countries;

46.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council and the Government and both chambers of the Parliament of the Czech Republic.

(1) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1. (2) OJ C 121, 9.4.2021, p. 1. (3) OJ C 388, 13.11.2020, p. 157. (4) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0164. (5) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 1. (6) The final audit report found serious deficiencies in the design of the control system to avoid conflict of interest, as evidenced by the seven breaches of Article 4c of the Czech law on conflicts of interest and the high error rate of 96,7 % in the sample audited. (7) Report on the fact-finding mission of the Budgetary Control Committee (CONT) to the Czech Republic, 26-28 February 2020. (8) iROZHLAS, Penam, Lovochemie, Cerea. Česko vyplatilo Agrofertu podle Bruselu na dotacích neoprávněně 155 milionů, 27 April 2021. (9) Euractiv, Czech PM slams EU Commission auditors as ‘mafia’, 26 April 2021. (10) Reporters Without Borders, Czech Republic, https://rsf.org/en/czech-republic [accessed 2.6.2021]. (11) List of companies and projects approved by the Czech Government to put forward for funding from the Just Transition Fund, includes more than CZK 6 billion for Lovochemie, a company that is a part of the Agrofert group, previously run by the current Czech Minister for the Environment, Richard Brabec.

European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on meeting the global COVID-19 challenge: effects of the waiver of the WTO TRIPS Agreement on COVID-19 vaccines, treatment, equipment and increasing production and manufacturing capacity in developing countries (2021/2692(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0283 RC-B9-0306/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), notably Article 31bis thereof,

–  having regard to the Doha Declaration of 14 November 2001 on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,

–  having regard to the decision of the WTO’s Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of 6 November 2015 on the extension of the exemption for least developed country (LDC) WTO members to implement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement related to pharmaceutical products,

–  having regard to the communication from India and South Africa of 2 October 2020 requesting a waiver from certain provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the prevention, containment and treatment of COVID-19, co-sponsored by Eswatini, Kenya, Mozambique and Pakistan, and supported by 100 other countries,

–  having regard to the revised proposal for a waiver of the TRIPS provisions as communicated on 21 May 2021 by 62 WTO Members,

–  having regard to the open letter from 243 civil society organisations to the WTO Director-General of 13 April 2021 on addressing the global challenges of inadequate supply and inequitable access to COVID-19 medical products, especially vaccines,

–  having regard to the statement of US Trade Representative of 5 May 2021 affirming support for a temporary TRIPS waiver,

–  having regard to the open letter of the President of the Republic of Costa Rica and the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) of 27 May 2021, to call once again on all WHO Member States to actively support the COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP),

–  having regard to the Rome Declaration adopted at the Global Health Summit on 21 May 2021,

–  having regard to the letter of 31 May 2021 by the Director-General of the WHO, the Director-General of the WTO, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the President of the World Bank Group calling for a new commitment for vaccine equity and defeating the pandemic,

–  having regard to the joint statement of 20 April 2020 by the Directors-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and World Health Organization to support efforts to ensure the normal cross-border flow of vital medical supplies and other goods and services,

–  having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas there have been approximately 172 000 000 cases of COVID-19, resulting in over 3 700 000 deaths worldwide, bringing unprecedented suffering, distress and the destruction of their livelihoods to millions of people; whereas the consequences of long COVID affect 10 % of patients globally, resulting in job loss, poverty and stark socioeconomic vulnerabilities;

B.  whereas the current global COVID-19 pandemic requires a global strategy for vaccines, diagnostics, treatments, and equipment production and distribution; whereas a holistic, scientific and fact-based approach is required to address the health challenges related to the pandemic; whereas a gender-sensitive and intersectional approach is crucial to achieving equality and at every stage of the vaccination process, from development through to roll-out;

C.  whereas vaccines are a textbook case where huge positive externalities require them to be treated as global public goods and to be provided for free; whereas in developed countries, all citizens are getting free vaccines; whereas it would be ethically unconscionable if that principle did not apply to much poorer people in developing countries;

D.  whereas the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted in Doha on 14 November 2001, states that the TRIPS Agreement should be implemented and interpreted in a way that is good for public health – encouraging both access to existing medicines and the development of new ones; whereas the WTO TRIPS Council decided on 6 November 2015 to extend the drug patent exemption for the least developed countries (LDCs) until January 2033;

E.  whereas it is essential to ensure vaccinations for the most vulnerable populations in low- and middle-income countries at an affordable cost; whereas mRNA-based vaccines have proven to be the most effective, but also the most expensive vaccines on the market;

F.  whereas as of June 2021, approximately 1,6 billion vaccine doses have been administered worldwide, the vast majority of which have been in industrialised and vaccine-producing countries; whereas only 0,3 % of the vaccine doses administered globally have been given in the 29 poorest countries, home to about 9 % of the world’s population; whereas the IMF estimates that if vaccine distribution is accelerated, more than EUR 7 trillion could be added to global GDP if the virus is kept under control; whereas the EU has distributed over 260 million vaccines to its Member States and exported more than 226 million vaccines to third countries, of which only 10 % goes to least developed countries (LDCs);

G.  whereas worrying new COVID-19 variants are emerging, which are more transmissible, more deadly and less susceptible to vaccines, and may require additional vaccine shots, pushing demand far beyond the 11 billion necessary doses originally estimated; whereas ramping up production is essential to achieving global vaccination; whereas increasing vaccine manufacturing is a global priority; whereas global supply chains for raw materials must not be hindered by protectionist measures or non-tariff barriers to trade; whereas most countries where vaccines are manufactured have regrettably placed export bans on vaccines and their ingredients, preventing an increase in global production and causing bottlenecks in supply chains;

H.  whereas huge amounts of private and public funds and resources have been invested in research and development, clinical trials and procurement in order to develop vaccines and COVID-19 treatments in an open and accessible way; whereas private and public sector research, health institutions, frontline workers, scientists, researchers and patients have all gathered information on the virus, which pharmaceutical companies have utilised;

I.  whereas voluntary licences should be the most effective means to facilitate the expansion of production and the sharing of know-how; whereas no private companies have participated in the COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) initiative, which calls on pharmaceutical companies to commit to transparent, non-exclusive global voluntary licensing; whereas, according to the WHO, 19 manufacturers from more than a dozen countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have expressed their willingness to increase mRNA vaccine production; whereas at present only 40 % of the world production capacities have been used for the production of vaccines against COVID-19;

J.  whereas many developing countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity still face significant political pressure and legal difficulties preventing their use of TRIPS flexibilities, notably Article 31bis and the cumbersome and lengthy process for the import and export of pharmaceutical products;

K.  whereas patent and other intellectual property protections ensure safeguards for entrepreneurial risk-taking, and a multilateral intellectual property rights (IPR) legal framework provides incentives which are critical for preparedness against future pandemics; whereas global equitable access to affordable vaccines, diagnostics and treatments is the only way to mitigate the global public health and economic impact of the pandemic, and the temporary waiving of international intellectual property protection obligations for COVID-19 related medicinal products, medical devices and other health technologies is one of the important contributions to this goal;

L.  whereas due to the unprecedented and alarming epidemiological situation in India, the Indian Government imposed an export ban on vaccines, leading to disruptions in global supply and the COVAX mechanism; whereas the EU is a lead contributor to COVAX; whereas the EU under Team Europe has committed to donate a further 100 million doses for use in lower- and middle-income countries by the end of 2021;

M.  whereas the polio vaccine was brought onto the markets patent-free and the disease has now been eradicated in many regions of the world; whereas the South African Government led by Nelson Mandela was forced to use the availability of compulsory licensing to push for affordable and quality generic equivalents in order to avoid paying exorbitant prices to multinational drug companies using patents for HIV treatment;

N.  whereas supply chains in developing countries must be improved; whereas the expansion of local production, awareness among the population and increased assistance for distribution in developing countries could increase the global number of persons vaccinated; whereas a worrying funding shortfall of USD 18,5 billion remains for the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator;

O.  whereas EU priorities should be to ensure equitable global access to vaccines, diagnostics, therapeutics and other medical supplies solutions, keeping supply chains open using all available tools;

P.  whereas LDCs already enjoy a waiver, granted until 1 January 2033, regarding the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement provisions on pharmaceuticals, as well as a waiver, granted until 1 July 2021 and the extension of which is currently being discussed, exempting LDCs from all the TRIPS Agreement obligations except for Articles 3, 4 and 5;

1.  Expresses its strong concern about the development of the pandemic, in particular in low- and middle-income countries; recalls that the COVID-19 pandemic is not yet over and that new vaccines will need to be developed to combat mutations; underlines that the international community must do whatever it takes to get the COVID-19 pandemic under control and that exceptional circumstances require exceptional solutions; stresses therefore that a holistic approach is required, prioritising the availability and affordability of COVID-19 related health products, the scaling-up of COVID-19 vaccine production and the global geographical distribution of manufacturing capacity; emphasises that international trade policy must play a proactive role in this endeavour by facilitating trade in raw materials, health and medical products, alleviating shortages of qualified and experienced personnel, solving supply chain problems and revisiting the global framework for intellectual property rights for future pandemics; calls for support for proactive, constructive and text-based negotiations for a temporary waiver of the WTO TRIPS Agreement, aiming to enhance global access to affordable COVID-19-related medical products and to address global production constraints and supply shortages;

2.  Recalls that the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health affirms that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health;

3.  Points out that 11 billion doses are needed to vaccinate 70 % of the world’s population and that only a fraction of that amount has been produced; points out that an approach based on pledges of excess doses is insufficient; recalls that COVAX is facing a shortfall of 190 million doses due to the current COVID-19 situation in India and will not meet its supply objectives for the foreseeable future; notes that the EU is a major donor to the COVAX Facility in terms of financing and vaccine-sharing, both via COVAX and bilaterally; calls for the EU and its partners, however, to significantly increase financial and non-financial contributions to COVAX; welcomes in this respect the pledge by certain manufacturers to supply 1,3 billion vaccine doses at production or low cost, and the Team Europe commitment to donate 100 million doses to low- and middle-income countries by the end of the year, recalling that EU Member States are estimated to receive a surplus of at least 400 million vaccine doses in 2021; welcomes also the support made available for the delivery of the vaccines and ancillary material by the EU Civil Protection Mechanism; underlines the need to prioritise supplying COVAX; regrets moves by the UK and the US in developing a secondary re-sale market to sell surplus vaccines to other industrialised countries;

4.  Stresses that the global response to health emergencies should encompass, on the one hand, a needs-oriented ‘demand-side’ approach providing joint financing and globally coordinated advance purchases and, on the other hand, an integrated ‘supply side’ strategy for scaling-up production capacity across the whole value chain; considers that increased global vaccine production, better coordination of supplies and strengthened, diversified and resilient value chains for vaccines are necessary for vaccines to be distributed globally; urges the Commission to engage with vaccine-producing countries to rapidly eliminate export barriers and to replace its own export authorisation mechanism with export transparency requirements, and insists on receiving timely and comprehensive access to such data; calls on the US and the UK to immediately abolish their export ban on vaccines and raw materials that are required for vaccine production; calls for an urgent increase of international investment and coordination for the scaling up of production of critical vaccine inputs such as disposables and active pharmaceutical ingredients in order to solve bottlenecks across vaccine value chains;

5.  Underlines that, in the long term, global production of vaccines must urgently be expanded to meet global demand, and that investment in the production capabilities of developing countries is therefore needed to make them more self-sufficient; points out the need for effective transfer of technology and know-how to make this happen; recognises that incentivising voluntary licensing agreements and voluntary technology and know-how transfer to countries with pre-existing vaccine-producing industries should be the most important way to achieve this; is, however, open to discussing all effective and pragmatic solutions to further boost global vaccine production and calls on the Commission, in particular, to engage with the US and other like-minded countries in this respect;

6.  Stresses that intellectual property protection is a key incentive for innovation and research across the globe; notes that such protection is the basis for voluntary licensing agreements and know-how transfer and is therefore an enabler of rather than a barrier to vaccine availability; cautions that under a paradigm of unenforceability for patents, companies would have to resort to secrecy or exclusivity to protect their innovations; underlines the threat that an indefinite TRIPS Agreement waiver would pose to research finance, in particular for researchers, investors, developers and clinical trials; emphasises that the protection of property rights, including intellectual property rights, is a constitutional obligation of the European Union and its Member States;

7.  Takes note of the Commission’s announcement that it is open to the possibility of facilitating the use of compulsory licensing where necessary in order to ensure swift global access to vaccine production; calls on the Commission to provide objective criteria regarding if, when and in which cases it will resort to compulsory licensing; stresses that the TRIPS Agreement does not specify the reasons that might be used to justify compulsory licensing; emphasises that the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health confirms that countries are free to determine the grounds for granting compulsory licences and to determine what constitutes a national emergency; stresses that compulsory licensing requires an effective legal framework, and that this could lead to legal difficulties in developing countries; calls on the Commission to explore if and how it will provide legal support for compulsory licensing in least developed countries; welcomes the Commission’s assessment that cooperation and voluntary licensing are the most effective tools to facilitate the expansion of production;

8.  Underlines that the health systems connector pillar of the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator must be reinforced to increase processing, storage, distribution and delivery capacities worldwide, particularly in vulnerable countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase engagement at the WHO, prioritising the ACT Accelerator as part of the EU’s global response in all of its pillars of diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccine and the strengthening of health systems; underlines the need to support manufacturing capacities on the African continent and strongly welcomes the Team Europe announcement of a EUR 1 billion initiative aimed at improving manufacturing and access to vaccines, medicines and health technologies; stresses also the importance of an adequate regulatory framework for pharmaceutical products; underlines that the EU now has a responsibility to invest in regional distribution centres, in particular in Africa, and to support the establishment of an African Medicines Agency; calls in this respect for support for local approval authorities, for training qualified medical and technical personnel to administer vaccinations, and for supporting vaccine distribution chains and helping to overcome limitations such as cooling infrastructure, geographical and socioeconomic outreach and vaccine hesitancy;

9.  Reaffirms its support for the WHO COVID-19 C-TAP initiative and the mRNA vaccine technology transfer hub; regrets that so far pharmaceutical companies have decided not to engage in the C-TAP initiative; urges the Commission to incentivise pharmaceutical companies to share their technologies and know-how through C-TAP and include commitments on technology transfer partnerships with third parties, particularly developing countries, in the EU’s future advance purchase agreements; urges the Commission to make full use of its leverage during negotiations for the contracts for the next generation of COVID vaccines to ensure developers transfer their technology at low cost to low- and middle-income countries; calls for the active mapping of companies, including sub-contractors, with the necessary know-how to transfer technology and to pair them with companies with idle production facilities;

10.  Calls for the EU to ensure that future advance purchase agreements are fully disclosed, particularly for next generation vaccines; calls for the EU to integrate commitments with regard to non-exclusive global licensing, trade secrets, proprietary data and technology transfers and to include transparency requirements for suppliers, including a cost-profit analysis per product; stresses that these transparency requirements should not prevent the Commission from acting as a competitive bidder if necessary; reiterates the need for the utmost transparency in the negotiation of COVID-19 vaccine contracts, including through directly involving Members of the European Parliament through the vaccine contact group in the contractual decision-making processes; expects the European Parliament to regularly receive a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the production, imports, exports and forecasts of vaccines, including information on the country of destination of EU exports, as well as the origin of vaccine and vaccine component imports;

11.  Recognises that trade facilitation and disciplines on export restrictions, the expansion of production, including through pledges by vaccine producers and developers, and the facilitation of TRIPS Agreement flexibilities relating to compulsory licences all play a role in increasing global vaccination; welcomes efforts made by the Director-General of the WTO in bringing members towards a dialogue-based solution; notes the communications from the European Union to the WTO General Council and TRIPS Council on the urgent trade policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis, which present three complementary pillars, including trade facilitation and disciplines on export restrictions, and the expansion of production; expects the Commission to increase its engagement to conclude the WTO Trade and Health initiative by the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference in November 2021; calls, furthermore, for the establishment of a Trade and Health Committee at the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference in order to draw lessons from the pandemic, make proposals to increase the effectiveness of the WTO response during international health crises and to prepare a trade pillar for an international pandemic treaty in order to address supply chain disruptions, increase production capacities, take action against price speculation and revisit the WTO law framework in light of lessons learned;

12.  Underlines that the EU should show leadership and continue to engage in multilateral and global efforts in vaccine distribution, coordination and multiannual planning at the upcoming TRIPS Council meetings of 8 June and 14 October 2021, the G7 Summit of 11 to 13 June 2021, the 2021 G20 Summit, the 2021 EU-US summit, the 2021 UN General Assembly, the 2021 World Health Assembly, and at the WTO 12th Ministerial Conference and beyond;

13.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the European External Action Service, the Director-General of the World Health Organization, the Director-General of the World Trade Organization, the governments of the G20 countries, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the members of the UN General Assembly.

European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/621 of 15 April 2021 amending Regulation (EU) No 37/2010 to classify the substance imidacloprid as regards its maximum residue limit in foodstuffs of animal origin (2021/2705(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0284 B9-0313/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/621 of 15 April 2021 amending Regulation (EU) No 37/2010 to classify the substance imidacloprid as regards its maximum residue limit in foodstuffs of animal origin(1),

–  having regard to Regulation (EC) No 470/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 laying down Community procedures for the establishment of residue limits of pharmacologically active substances in foodstuffs of animal origin, repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 2377/90 and amending Directive 2001/82/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and the Council(2), and in particular Articles 14 and 17 thereof,

–  having regard to the opinion delivered on 20 April 2021 by the Standing Committee on Veterinary Medicinal Products,

–  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

–  having regard to Articles 13 and 191 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to Articles 11 and 13 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers(3),

–  having regard to Rule 112(2) and (3) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the motion for a resolution by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety,

A.  whereas Regulation (EU) 2019/6 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4) provides that no veterinary medicinal product should be allowed to be placed on the market in the Union unless it has been authorised, and its quality, safety and efficacy have been demonstrated and recognises that improved access to information gives the public the opportunity to express its observations and enables authorities to take due account of those observations;

B.  whereas Regulation (EU) 2019/1381 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5) provides that information should be provided on how risk management decisions were reached and on the factors, other than the results of the risk assessment, as well as how those factors were weighed up against each other and that risk communication should contribute to a participatory and open dialogue between all interested parties in order to ensure that the prevalence of the public interest, and accuracy, comprehensiveness, transparency, consistency and accountability are taken into account in the risk analysis process;

C.  whereas the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) assessment report of 18 February 2011 entitled ‘Imidacloprid, Product-type 18 (Insecticides, Acaricides and Products to control other Arthropods)’(6) categorises significant toxicity data for aquatic and non-target species;

D.  whereas Directive 2013/39/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council(7) provides that ‘The contamination of water and soil with pharmaceutical residues is an emerging environmental concern. In evaluating and controlling the risk to, or via, the aquatic environment from medicinal products, adequate attention should be paid to Union environmental objectives. In order to address that concern, the Commission should study the risks of environmental effects from medicinal products and provide an analysis of the relevance and effectiveness of the current legislative framework in protecting the aquatic environment and human health via the aquatic environment.’;

E.  whereas Commission Regulation (EU) No 283/2013(8) set out the minimum requirements including information on potentially harmful effects of the active substance, its metabolites and impurities on human and animal health or on groundwater, the environment and non-target species (flora and fauna);

F.  whereas Commission Regulation (EU) No 284/2013(9) provides ‘Any information on potentially unacceptable effects of the plant protection product on the environment, on plants and plant products shall be included as well as known and expected cumulative and synergistic effects.’;

G.  whereas Directive 2001/82/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(10) notes that ‘The particulars and documents which must accompany an application for marketing authorization must demonstrate that potential hazards are outweighed by the benefits due to efficacy. Failing such demonstration, the application must be rejected.’;

H.  whereas an application for the establishment of a maximum residue limit (MRL) for imidacloprid in Salmonidae was submitted to the European Medicines Agency (the ‘Agency’);

I.  whereas the Agency, based on the opinion of 9 September 2020 by the Committee for Medicinal Products for Veterinary Use(11), has recommended the establishment of an MRL for imidacloprid at 0,6mg/kg (600 µg/kg) in all fin fish as appropriate;

J.  whereas an MRL for aquatic use has not been established by the Codex Alimentarius(12); whereas the Joint Food and Agriculture Organization and World Health Organization meeting on pesticide residues of 2008 recommended a maximum acceptable daily intake of 0,06 mg/kg from agricultural crop residues(13);

K.  whereas the opinion of the Committee for Medicinal Products for Veterinary Use, underlying the Agency’s recommendation has only been made available in summary, and according to the Commission will only be made available in full after the adoption of the MRL;

L.  whereas an opinion with regard to the establishment of an MRL under Union law should be made publicly available and should be easily accessible;

M.  whereas ensuring that the risk assessment process is transparent promotes public understanding, contributes to giving the Agency greater legitimacy in the eyes of consumers and the general public, and provides greater accountability to Union citizens in a democratic system(14);

N.  whereas imidacloprid is a neonicotinoid (NN) biocidal active substance that was commercialised for widespread use to treat crops and livestock due to its toxicity for a broad range of pests; whereas the mode of action of imidacloprid is that it acts as an antagonist of the nicotinic acetylcholine receptors (nAChR) in the central nervous system, thus disturbing synaptic signal transmissions and leading to a lethal hyperactivity of nerves and muscles of animals, vertebrates and invertebrates alike, irreversibly blocking nAChR and leading to paralysis and death(15);

O.  whereas Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/783(16) bans the use of imidacloprid on all crops grown outdoors, because of its adverse effects on pollinators;

P.  whereas hazardous chemicals that are applied under veterinary prescription and used to treat infections of sea lice are ultimately released into the aquatic environment; their effects not only have the potential to negatively impact sensitive non-target organisms, the release of those compounds has been identified as a major environmental concern(17) due to the high mobility of imidacloprid in soil and the resulting contamination of ground and surface water(18);

Q.  whereas there is increasing evidence that the use of imidacloprid has a devastating impact on biodiversity in particular that of rivers and waterways(19), not only affecting crustaceans(20), molluscs(21) and non-target (insect) species but also soil organisms(22), as well as bringing declines in bird populations(23);whereas there is increasing concern about the residence and accumulation of pesticide residues and their metabolites in soils and their potential to lead to soil acidification; notes with concern that imidacloprid use in Japan led to a dramatic collapse of fish stocks, which have not recovered(24);

R.  whereas the harmonised classification and labelling referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council(25), categorised imidacloprid as ‘harmful if swallowed’, ‘dangerous for the environment’ and ‘very toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects’(26);

S.  whereas a study on imidacloprid exposure in the common carp fish (Cyprinua carpio L.) found degeneration in the brain, gills and eyes(27) in addition to histopathological changes (lesions), activation of biomarkers and alternation of gene expression levels; that study concluded that inflammation and oxidative stress are induced by imidacloprid exposure;

T.  whereas bioaccumulation of NN metabolite may occur in humans through the repeated intake of contaminated food, given that bioaccumulation of imidacloprid by low dose exposure was observed in an animal study(28);

U.  whereas various scientific studies have, in animal tests, concluded that imidacloprid acts as a reproductive toxicant and endocrine disruptor that may adversely affect the heart, kidney, thyroid and brain and can cause neurological symptoms including respiratory failure and death(29);

V.  whereas experimental evidence demonstrates that the toxicity of imidacloprid increases with exposure time as much as with dosage, described as ‘time-cumulative toxicity’, the toxicity of imidacloprid should therefore not only be understood in terms of acute lethality but should also be considered within a chronic framework(30);

W.  whereas Regulation (EU) No 283/2013 requires studies on long-term toxicity to be carried out;

X.  whereas Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 provides that ‘known cumulative and synergistic effects’ must be considered ‘when the methods to assess such effects are available’;

Y.  whereas Regulation (EU) No 284/2013 currently requires toxicological studies on operator, bystander, resident and worker exposure, several long-term and chronic toxicity studies for animals, and studies on fate and behaviour in soil, water and air;

Z.  whereas knowledge is lacking of the pollutant effects in the environment of many individual chemicals and chemical mixtures; not all chemicals have been assessed, and ecotoxicity assessments focus on very few species and ecosystems;

AA.  whereas Regulation (EU) 2019/6 recognises that a risk management decision should take into account: ‘other relevant factors, including societal, economical, ethical, environmental and welfare factors and the feasibility of controls’;

AB.  whereas contrary to the case of studies submitted to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), studies submitted to the Agency do not need to be published; regrets the lack of access to scientific studies in full, scientific opinions and raw data, as well as the lack of information on the feasibility of controls on and risk management of waste water discharge into the aquatic environment;

AC.  whereas Regulation (EC) No 470/2009 states that maximum residue limits must be established in accordance with generally accepted principles of safety assessment, taking into account any other scientific assessment of the safety of the substance concerned, which may have been undertaken by international organisations, in particular the Codex Alimentarius or, where such substances are used for other purposes, by scientific committees established in the Community;

AD.  whereas the Codex Alimentarius does not recommend imidacloprid for use in the aquatic environment, and ECHA suggests why this might be the case: ‘According to the harmonised classification and labelling (ATP01) approved by the European Union, this substance is very toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects and is harmful if swallowed’(31);

AE.  whereas Article 37 of Regulation (EU) 2019/6 provides that marketing authorisation is to be refused if risks to public or animal health or to the environment are not sufficiently addressed; considers this a justification for not establishing the MRL;

AF.  whereas the four major salmon-producing nations: Norway, Chile, the United Kingdom and Canada are not Member States and the Commission would therefore not be able to conduct appropriate audits of competent authorities in those countries, or to assess the adequacy of controls;

1.  Considers that Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/621 exceeds the implementing powers provided for in Regulation (EC) No 470/2009;

2.  Considers that Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/621 is not consistent with Union law, in that it violates the freedom of information and the fundamental principles of transparency, democratic scrutiny, and accountability, in so far as the underlying opinion by the Committee for Medicinal Products for Veterinary Use has only been made available in summary;

3.  Calls on the Commission to repeal Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/621 and to submit a new draft to the committee including imidacloprid in the list set out in Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of pharmacologically active substances for which no maximum levels can be fixed for aquatic use;

4.  Considers that all veterinary medicines, pesticides and pharmacological and chemical residues should go through standard tests and peer-reviewed evaluations because of their risk of causing further and permanent damage;

5.  Considers that the Agency should make publicly available the full opinion of the Committee for Medicinal Products for Veterinary Use consisting of the scientific risk assessment and risk management recommendations and the scientific evidence on which they are based; considers the risk assessment of imidacloprid is deficient as regards the consideration of acute endpoint values and that it ignores delayed, cumulative and chronic effects; recalls that research in aquatic invertebrates revealed a delayed effect on mortality, especially among aquatic insect species that could not be detected in standard acute tests demonstrating that risk assessments for neonicotinoids have been inadequate in relation to protection of the environment(32);

6.  Considers it essential to evaluate pharmacologically active substances and their classification regarding MRLs in foodstuffs of animal origin in conjunction with the rules laid down by Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council(33), Regulation (EC) No 396/2005, Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council(34), and Regulations (EU) 2019/6 and (EU) 2019/1381;

7.  Considers that Directive 2001/82/EC is in urgent need of revision vis-à-vis protecting biodiversity, the aquatic and terrestrial environment and taking account of animal welfare and non-target organisms and microorganisms;

8.  Considers that Regulation (EC) No 470/2009 does not provide adequate consideration of the need to involve the European Parliament and citizens so that they may fully exercise their democratic right of scrutiny;

9.  Reiterates the need to reinforce scientific cooperation, coordination and coherence between the Union agencies with competence in this field, namely the Agency, EFSA and ECHA together with national and international agencies, by developing a common framework for risk assessment for biocidal and phyto-pharmaceutical products used in food chains, so as to avoid inconsistencies and limit the potential for environmental damage and ecocide;

10.  Calls on the Commission, in its role as risk manager, to duly apply the precautionary principle when following an assessment of available information, so that the risk of harmful effects on the environment, biodiversity, animal welfare and human health is quantified;

11.  Urges the Commission to communicate systematically on how the precautionary principle and the principle of informed consent have been taken into account and how the conclusions of the opinion of the Committee for Medicinal Products for Veterinary Use were derived;

12.  Calls on the Commission to uphold the democratic principle of informed consent and to undertake a fitness check of the risk assessment process to establish MRLs for veterinary medicinal products in foodstuffs of animal origin; considers it essential that it should be fully consistent as regards the aims referred to in the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’, the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ and the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030;

13.  Calls on the Commission to ensure that time-cumulative, up-to-date, peer-reviewed, eco-toxicological tests for non-target species in the soil and aquatic environment are included in the risk assessment, and that it also covers environmental residues in the air, soil and water, including the long-term, cumulative toxic effects, and that it specifies the independent, peer-reviewed scientific studies and scientific opinions that were considered; stresses that this information should be publically accessible;

14.  Calls on the Commission to submit and the Member States to support a legislative proposal to ensure that there is consistency with and coherence as regards Regulations (EU) 2019/6 and (EU) 2019/1381 and all food-related legislation in the event that the risk assessment to establish MRLs is undertaken by agencies other than EFSA; and calls on the Commission to ensure also that such assessment is transparent and serves to better protect biodiversity and aquatic ecosystems, insects, earthworms and soil microorganisms;

15.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 131, 16.4.2021, p. 120. (2) OJ L 152, 16.6.2009, p. 11. (3) OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13. (4) Regulation (EU) 2019/6 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on veterinary medicinal products and repealing Directive 2001/82/EC (OJ L 4, 7.1.2019, p. 43). (5) Regulation (EU) 2019/1381 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on the transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment in the food chain and amending Regulations (EC) No 178/2002, (EC) No 1829/2003, (EC) No 1831/2003, (EC) No 2065/2003, (EC) No 1935/2004, (EC) No 1331/2008, (EC) No 1107/2009, (EU) No 2015/2283 and Directive 2001/18/EC (OJ L 231, 6.9.2019, p. 1). (6) https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/225b9c58-e24c-6491-cc8d-7d85564f3912 (7) Directive 2013/39/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 amending Directives 2000/60/EC and 2008/105/EC as regards priority substances in the field of water policy (OJ L 226, 24.8.2013, p. 1). (8) Commission Regulation (EU) No 283/2013 of 1 March 2013 setting out the data requirements for active substances, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market (OJ L 93, 3.4.2013, p. 1). (9) Commission Regulation (EU) No 284/2013 of 1 March 2013 setting out the data requirements for plant protection products, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market (OJ L 93, 3.4.2013, p. 85). (10) Directive 2001/82/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community Code relating to veterinary medicinal products (OJ L 311, 28.11.2001, p. 1). (11) https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/mrl-summary/imidacloprid-fin-fish-summary-opinion-cvmp-establishment-maximum-residue-limits_en.pdf (12) http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/codex-texts/dbs/pestres/pesticide-detail/en/?p_id=206 (13) http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/agphome/documents/Pests_Pesticides/JMPR/JMPRReport08.pdf (14) See judgments of the Court of Justice in Case T-235/15, Pari Pharma GmbH v European Medicines Agency, ECLI:EU:T:2018:65; see also Case T-718/15, PTC Therapeutics International Ltd v European Medicines Agency, ECLI:EU:T:2018:66 and T-729/15, MSD Animal Health Innovation GmbH and Intervet International BV v European Medicines Agency, ECLI:EU:T:2018:67. (15) Sánchez-Bayo, F., Tennekes, H.A., ‘Time-Cumulative Toxicity of Neonicotinoids: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Environmental Risk Assessments’, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2020,17(5),1629, https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/17/5/1629 (16) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/783 of 29 May 2018 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the conditions of approval of the active substance imidacloprid (OJ L 132, 30.5.2018, p. 31). (17) Burridge, L., Weis, J.S., Cabello, F., Pizarro, J., Bostick, K., ‘Chemical use in salmon aquaculture: A review of current practices and possible environmental effects’, Aquaculture, 2010, volume 306, 1-4, pp. 7-23, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0044848610003297. (18) Sánchez-Bayo, F., Tennekes, H.A., ‘Time-Cumulative Toxicity of Neonicotinoids: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Environmental Risk Assessments’, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2020,17(5),1629, https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/17/5/1629 (19) Butcherine, P., Kelaher, B.P., Taylor, M.D., Barkla, B.J., Benkendorff, K, ’Impact of imidacloprid on the nutritional quality of adult black tiger shrimp (Penaeus monodon)’, Ecotoxicology and Environmental Safety, 2020, volume 198, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0147651320305212?via%3Dihub (20) Butcherine, P., Kelaher, B.P., Taylor, M.D., Barkla, B.J., Benkendorff, K,’Impact of imidacloprid on the nutritional quality of adult black tiger shrimp (Penaeus monodon)’, Ecotoxicology and Environmental Safety, 2020, volume 198, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0147651320305212?via%3Dihub (21) Ewere, E.E., Reichelt-Brushett, A., Benkendorff, K., ‘The neonicotinoid insecticide imidacloprid, but not salinity, impacts the immune system of Sydney rock oyster, Saccostrea glomerata’, Science of the Total Environment, 2020, volume 742, The neonicotinoid insecticide imidacloprid, but not salinity, impacts the immune system of Sydney rock oyster, Saccostrea glomerata - ScienceDirect (22) de Lima e Silva, C., Brennan, N., Brouwer, J.M., Commandeur, D., Verweij, R.A., van Gestel, C.A.M., ‘Comparative toxicity of imidacloprid and thiacloprid to different species of soil invertebrates’ Ecotoxicology, 2017, 26, pp. 555–564, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10646-017-1790-7 (23) https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/soer-2020 (24) https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/article/neonicotinoid-insecticides-cause-fish-declines-japan (25) Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (OJ L 353, 31.12.2008, p. 1). (26) ECHA assessment report, ‘Imidacloprid, Product-type 18 (Insecticides, Acaracides and Products to control other Arthropods), https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/225b9c58-e24c-6491-cc8d-7d85564f3912 (27) Tyor, A.K., Harkrishan, Bhardwaj, J.K., Saraf, P., ‘Effect of Imidacloprid on Histopathological Alterations of Brain, Gills and Eyes in hatchling carp (Cyprinus carpio L.)’ , Toxicology International, 2020, 27, pp. 70-78. (28) Kavvalakis, M.P., Tzatzarakis, M.N.,Theodoropoulou, E.P., Barbounis, E.G., Tsakalof, A.K., Tsatsakis, A.M., ‘Development and application of LC-APCI-MS method for biomonitoring of animal and human exposure to imidacloprid’, Chemosphere 2013, volume 93, 10, pp. 2612-2620, Development and application of LC–APCI–MS method for biomonitoring of animal and human exposure to imidacloprid - ScienceDirect (29) Katić, A., Karačonji, I.B., ‘Imidacloprid as reproductive toxicant and endocrine disruptor: Investigations in laboratory animals’, Archives of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology, 2018, 69(2), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326247351_Imidacloprid_as_reproductive_toxicant_and_endocrine_disruptor_Investigations_in_laboratory_animals (30) Sánchez-Bayo, F., Tennekes, H.A., ‘Time-Cumulative Toxicity of Neonicotinoids: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Environmental Risk Assessments’, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 2020, 17(5),1629. https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/17/5/1629 (31) https://echa.europa.eu/substance-information/-/substanceinfo/100.102.643 (32) Sánchez-Bayo F., Tennekes, H.A., ‘Time-Cumulative Toxicity of Neonicotinoids: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Environmental Risk Assessments’, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2020,17(5),1629, https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/17/5/1629 (33) Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1). (34) Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (OJ L 264, 25.9.2006, p. 13).

European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/745 of 6 May 2021 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances aluminium ammonium sulphate, aluminium silicate, beflubutamid, benthiavalicarb, bifenazate, boscalid, calcium carbonate, captan, carbon dioxide, cymoxanil, dimethomorph, ethephon, extract from tea tree, famoxadone, fat distillation residues, fatty acids C7 to C20, flumioxazine, fluoxastrobin, flurochloridone, folpet, formetanate, gibberellic acid, gibberellins, heptamaloxyloglucan, hydrolysed proteins, iron sulphate, metazachlor, metribuzin, milbemectin, Paecilomyces lilacinus strain 251, phenmedipham, phosmet, pirimiphos-methyl, plant oils/rape seed oil, potassium hydrogen carbonate, propamocarb, prothioconazole, quartz sand, fish oil, repellents by smell of animal or plant origin/sheep fat, S-metolachlor, Straight Chain Lepidopteran Pheromones, tebuconazole and urea (2021/2706(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0285 B9-0312/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/745 of 6 May 2021 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances aluminium ammonium sulphate, aluminium silicate, beflubutamid, benthiavalicarb, bifenazate, boscalid, calcium carbonate, captan, carbon dioxide, cymoxanil, dimethomorph, ethephon, extract from tea tree, famoxadone, fat distillation residues, fatty acids C7 to C20, flumioxazine, fluoxastrobin, flurochloridone, folpet, formetanate, gibberellic acid, gibberellins, heptamaloxyloglucan, hydrolysed proteins, iron sulphate, metazachlor, metribuzin, milbemectin, Paecilomyces lilacinus strain 251, phenmedipham, phosmet, pirimiphos-methyl, plant oils/rape seed oil, potassium hydrogen carbonate, propamocarb, prothioconazole, quartz sand, fish oil, repellents by smell of animal or plant origin/sheep fat, S-metolachlor, Straight Chain Lepidopteran Pheromones, tebuconazole and urea(1),

–  having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC(2), and in particular the first paragraph of Article 17 and Article 21 thereof,

–  having regard to the opinion delivered on 30 March 2021 by the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,

–  having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/408 of 11 March 2015 on implementing Article 80(7) of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and establishing a list of candidates for substitution(3),

–  having regard to Articles 11 and 13 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 13 September 2018 on the implementation of the Plant Protection Products Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009(5),

–  having regard to Rule 112(2) and (3) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety,

A.  whereas flumioxazine was included in Annex I to Council Directive 91/414/EEC(6) on 1 January 2003 by Commission Directive 2002/81/EC(7) and has been deemed to be approved under Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009;

B.  whereas a procedure to renew the approval of flumioxazine under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 844/2012(8) has been ongoing since 2010(9) and the respective application has been submitted in accordance with Article 4 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1141/2010(10) on 29 February 2012;

C.  whereas the approval period for the active substance flumioxazine has already been extended by five years by Commission Directive 2010/77/EU(11) and subsequently by one year every year since 2015 by Commission Implementing Regulations (EU) 2015/1885(12), (EU) 2016/549(13), (EU) 2017/841(14), (EU) 2018/917(15), (EU) 2019/707(16) and (EU) 2020/869(17), and now again by one year by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/745 which extends the approval period until 30 June 2022;

D.  whereas the Commission has failed in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/745 to explain the reasons for the extension, other than by stating: ‘Due to the fact that the assessment of those active substances has been delayed for reasons beyond the control of the applicants, the approvals of those active substances are likely to expire before a decision has been taken on their renewal’;

E.  whereas Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 aims to ensure a high level of protection of both human and animal health and the environment, and at the same time to safeguard the competitiveness of Union agriculture; whereas particular attention should be paid to the protection of vulnerable groups of the population, including pregnant women, infants and children;

F.  whereas the precautionary principle should apply, and Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 provides that substances should only be included in plant protection products where it has been demonstrated that they present a clear benefit for plant production and that they are not expected to have any harmful effect on human or animal health or any unacceptable effects on the environment;

G.  whereas Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 provides that in the interest of safety the approval period for active substances should be limited in time; whereas the approval period should be proportionate to the possible risks inherent in the use of such substances, but, in the case of flumioxazine, it is clear that no such proportionality exists;

H.  whereas in the 18 years since its approval as an active substance, flumioxazine has been identified and classified as toxic for reproduction category 1B and as a probable endocrine disruptor;

I.  whereas the Commission and Member States have the possibility and responsibility to act in accordance with the precautionary principle, when the risk of harmful effects on health has been identified but scientific uncertainty persists, by adopting provisional risk management measures that are necessary to ensure a high level of protection of human health;

J.  whereas, more specifically, Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 provides that the Commission may review the approval of an active substance at any time, especially where, in the light of new scientific and technical knowledge, it considers that there are indications that the substance no longer satisfies the approval criteria provided for in Article 4 of that Regulation, and whereas this review may lead to the withdrawal or amendment of the approval of the substance;

Toxic for reproduction category 1B and endocrine-disrupting properties

K.  whereas, according to Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council(18), flumioxazine has a harmonised classification of toxic for reproduction category 1B, very toxic to aquatic life and very toxic to aquatic life with long-lasting effects;

L.  whereas the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) concluded already in 2014, and subsequently in 2017 and 2018, that there were critical areas of concern as flumioxazine is classified under reproductive toxicity category 1B and also that the potential endocrine disruption of flumioxazine was an issue that could not be finalised and a critical area of concern;

M.  whereas in 2015 flumioxazine was placed on the list of ‘candidates for substitution’ by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/408 because it is or is to be classified, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008, as toxic for reproduction category 1A or 1B;

N.  whereas, according to point 3.6.4 of Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, active substances cannot be approved when they fall into toxic for reproduction category 1B, except in cases where, on the basis of documented evidence included in the application, an active substance is necessary to control a serious danger to plant health which cannot be contained by other available means, including non-chemical methods, in which case risk mitigation measures must be taken to ensure that exposure of humans and the environment to the substance is minimised;

O.  whereas on 1 February 2018, the Rapporteur Member State, in light of new scientific data, submitted to the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) a proposal for harmonised classification and labelling of flumioxazine under Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008; whereas on 15 March 2019, the Risk Assessment Committee (RAC) of ECHA adopted an opinion modifying the classification of flumioxazine from toxic for reproduction category 1B to toxic for reproduction category 2; whereas this is likely to lead to a reclassification of flumioxazine in Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 but this has not happened yet; whereas until then, flumioxazine remains classified as toxic for reproduction category 1B;

P.  whereas, according to point 3.6.5 of Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, an active substance cannot be approved when it is considered to have endocrine-disrupting properties that may cause adverse effects in humans, unless the exposure of humans to that active substance in a plant protection product, under realistic proposed conditions of use, is negligible, that is, the product is used in closed systems or in other conditions excluding contact with humans and where residues of the active substance concerned on food and feed do not exceed the default value set in accordance with point (b) of Article 18(1) of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council(19);

Q.  whereas flumioxazine has been suspected of having endocrine-disrupting properties since 2014(20); whereas criteria to determine whether a substance is an endocrine disrupter in the context of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, as set out in Commission Regulation (EU) 2018/605(21), have been applicable since 20 October 2018(22); whereas the corresponding guidance was adopted on 5 June 2018(23); whereas, however, the Commission mandated EFSA only on 4 December 2019 to assess the endocrine-disrupting potential of flumioxazine according to the new criteria;

R.  whereas EFSA published in September 2020 its updated peer review of the pesticide risk assessment of the active substance flumioxazine(24), in which it was not able to rule out endocrine-disrupting properties as several data gaps were identified, also on other safety aspects, leading to critical areas of concern;

S.  whereas more specifically EFSA identified in the area of mammalian toxicology several data gaps, issues that could not be finalised and critical area of concerns; whereas EFSA also identified data gaps in the area of residues and consumer safety, EFSA was not able to finalise the ground water exposure assessment due to data gaps, and the assessment of the endocrine-disrupting properties of flumioxazine for humans and non-target organisms could not be finalised due to the incomplete data sets, which meant that EFSA was not able to reach a conclusion on whether the criteria for endocrine disruption for both humans and non-target organisms through EATS-modalities as set in point 3.6.5 and point 3.8.2 of Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, as amended by Regulation (EU) 2018/605, are met;

T.  whereas flumioxazine has a high risk of bioconcentration, is highly toxic to algae and aquatic plants, and is moderately toxic to earthworms, honeybees, fish and aquatic invertebrates;

U.  whereas it is unacceptable that a substance which currently meets the cut-off criteria for active substances that are mutagenic, carcinogenic and/or toxic for reproduction, and which cannot be ruled out to meet the cut-off criteria due to its endocrine-disrupting properties, which are established to protect human health and the environment, continues to be allowed for use in the Union, putting human health and the environmental at risk;

V.  whereas applicants can take advantage of the automatic system built into Commission working methods, which immediately extends the approval periods of active substances if the risk reassessment has not been finalised, by deliberately prolonging the reassessment process, by providing incomplete data and by asking for more derogations and special conditions, which leads to unacceptable risks for human health and the environment since, during this time, exposure to the hazardous substance continues;

W.  whereas following an initial proposal for non-renewal of the approval by the Commission in 2014, based on the fact that flumioxazine met the cut-off criteria of toxic for reproduction category 1B, the applicant requested a derogation from the application of these cut-off criteria; such a derogation, however, required the development of the relevant assessment methodologies which did not yet exist, despite the fact that Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 had been applying for three years, resulting in the non-renewal process being stalled for several years;

X.  whereas in its resolution of 13 September 2018 on the implementation of the Plant Protection Products Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, Parliament called on the Commission and Member States ‘to ensure that the procedural extension of the approval period for the duration of the procedure, pursuant to Article 17 of the Regulation, will not be used for active substances that are mutagenic, carcinogenic, toxic for reproduction and therefore in category 1A or 1B, or active substances that have endocrine disrupting characteristics and are damaging to humans or animals, as is currently the case for substances such as flumioxazine, thiacloprid, chlorotoluron and dimoxystrobin’;

Y.  whereas Parliament has already objected to two previous extensions of the approval period of flumioxazine in its resolutions of 10 October 2019(25) and of 10 July 2020(26), and the Commission has failed to give a convincing response to those resolutions and has also failed to properly demonstrate that another extension would not exceed its implementing powers;

Z.  whereas following the previous extension in 2020 of the approval periods of 26 active substances, including flumioxazine, under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/869, the approvals of only four of the 26 substances covered by that Implementing Regulation have been either renewed or non-renewed, while under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/745, the approval periods of 44 active substances have been extended, many of them for a third or fourth time;

1.  Considers that Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/745 exceeds the implementing powers provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009;

2.  Considers that Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/745 is not consistent with Union law in that it does not respect the precautionary principle;

3.  Strongly denounces the serious delays in the reauthorisation process and in the identification of endocrine-disrupting substances;

4.  Considers that the decision to extend the approval period for flumioxazine again is not in line with the safety criteria laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, and is based neither on evidence that that substance can be used safely, nor on a proven urgent need for that substance in food production in the Union;

5.  Calls on the Commission to repeal Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/745 and to submit a new draft to the committee, which takes into account the scientific evidence on the harmful properties of all the substances concerned, especially those of flumioxazine;

6.  Calls on the Commission to present a proposal for non-renewal of the approval of flumioxazine in the next meeting of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed;

7.  Calls on the Commission to communicate to Parliament the specific reasons why the assessment of the substances has been delayed for reasons beyond the control of the applicants, which specific endpoints are still under assessment, and why that assessment requires so much time to be conducted;

8.  Reiterates its call on the Commission to present draft implementing regulations to extend the approval periods only of substances for which the current state of science is not expected to lead to a Commission proposal for non-renewal of the approval of the active substance concerned;

9.  Reiterates its call on the Commission to withdraw the approvals for substances, if proof or reasonable doubt exists that they will not meet the safety criteria laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009;

10.  Reiterates its call on the Member States to ensure the proper and timely reassessment of the approvals of the active substances for which they are the reporting Member States, and to ensure that the current delays are solved effectively as soon as possible;

11.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 160, 7.5.2021, p. 89. (2) OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 1. (3) OJ L 67, 12.3.2015, p. 18. (4) OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13. (5) OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 183. (6) Council Directive 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market (OJ L 230, 19.8.1991, p. 1). (7) Commission Directive 2002/81/EC of 10 October 2002 amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC to include flumioxazine as active substance (OJ L 276, 12.10.2002, p. 28). (8) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 844/2012 of 18 September 2012 setting out the provisions necessary for the implementation of the renewal procedure for active substances, as provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market (OJ L 252, 19.9.2012, p. 26). (9) Commission Directive 2010/77/EU of 10 November 2010 amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC as regards the expiry dates for inclusion in Annex I of certain active substances (OJ L 293, 11.11.2010, p. 48). (10) Commission Regulation (EU) No 1141/2010 of 7 December 2010 laying down the procedure for the renewal of the inclusion of a second group of active substances in Annex I to Council Directive 91/414/EEC and establishing the list of those substances (OJ L 322, 8.12.2010, p. 10). (11) Commission Directive 2010/77/EU of 10 November 2010 amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC as regards the expiry dates for inclusion in Annex I of certain active substances (OJ L 293, 11.11.2010, p. 48). (12) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1885 of 20 October 2015 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances 2,4-D, acibenzolar-s-methyl, amitrole, bentazone, cyhalofop butyl, diquat, esfenvalerate, famoxadone, flumioxazine, DPX KE 459 (flupyrsulfuron-methyl), glyphosate, iprovalicarb, isoproturon, lambda-cyhalothrin, metalaxyl-M, metsulfuron methyl, picolinafen, prosulfuron, pymetrozine, pyraflufen-ethyl, thiabendazole, thifensulfuron, methyl and triasulfuron (OJ L 276, 21.10.2015, p. 48). (13) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/549 of 8 April 2016 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances bentazone, cyhalofop butyl, diquat, famoxadone, flumioxazine, DPX KE 459 (flupyrsulfuron-methyl), metalaxyl-M, picolinafen, prosulfuron, pymetrozine, thiabendazole and thifensulfuron-methyl (OJ L 95, 9.4.2016, p. 4). (14) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/841 of 17 May 2017 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances alpha-cypermethrin, Ampelomyces quisqualis strain: aq 10, benalaxyl, bentazone, bifenazate, bromoxynil, carfentrazone ethyl, chlorpropham, cyazofamid, desmedipham, diquat, DPX KE 459 (flupyrsulfuron-methyl), etoxazole, famoxadone, fenamidone, flumioxazine, foramsulfuron, Gliocladium catenulatum strain: j1446, imazamox, imazosulfuron, isoxaflutole, laminarin, metalaxyl-m, methoxyfenozide, milbemectin, oxasulfuron, pendimethalin, phenmedipham, pymetrozine, s-metolachlor, and trifloxystrobin (OJ L 125, 18.5.2017, p. 12). (15) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/917 of 27 June 2018 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances alpha-cypermethrin, beflubutamid, benalaxyl, benthiavalicarb, bifenazate, boscalid, bromoxynil, captan, carvone, chlorpropham, cyazofamid, desmedipham, dimethoate, dimethomorph, diquat, ethephon, ethoprophos, etoxazole, famoxadone, fenamidone, fenamiphos, flumioxazine, fluoxastrobin, folpet, foramsulfuron, formetanate, Gliocladium catenulatum strain: J1446, isoxaflutole, metalaxyl-m, methiocarb, methoxyfenozide, metribuzin, milbemectin, oxasulfuron, Paecilomyces lilacinus strain 251, phenmedipham, phosmet, pirimiphos-methyl, propamocarb, prothioconazole, pymetrozine and s-metolachlor (OJ L 163, 28.6.2018, p. 13). (16) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/707 of 7 May 2019 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances alpha-cypermethrin, beflubutamid, benalaxyl, benthiavalicarb, bifenazate, boscalid, bromoxynil, captan, cyazofamid, desmedipham, dimethoate, dimethomorph, diuron, ethephon, etoxazole, famoxadone, fenamiphos, flumioxazine, fluoxastrobin, folpet, foramsulfuron, formetanate, metalaxyl-m, methiocarb, metribuzin, milbemectin, Paecilomyces lilacinus strain 251, phenmedipham, phosmet, pirimiphos-methyl, propamocarb, prothioconazole, s-metolachlor and tebuconazole (OJ L 120, 8.5.2019, p. 16). (17) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/869 of 24 June 2020 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances beflubutamid, benalaxyl, benthiavalicarb, bifenazate, boscalid, bromoxynil, captan, cyazofamid, dimethomorph, ethephon, etoxazole, famoxadone, fenamiphos, flumioxazine, fluoxastrobin, folpet, formetanate, metribuzin, milbemectin, Paecilomyces lilacinus strain 251, phenmedipham, phosmet, pirimiphos-methyl, propamocarb, prothioconazole and S-metolachlor (OJ L 201, 25.6.2020, p. 7). (18) Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (OJ L 353, 31.12.2008, p. 1). (19) Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 February 2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed of plant and animal origin and amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC (OJ L 70, 16.3.2005, p. 1). (20) EFSA conclusion on pesticide peer review, ‘Conclusion on the peer review of the pesticide risk assessment of the active substance flumioxazin’, EFSA Journal 2014;12(6):3736, https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/3736 (21) Commission Regulation (EU) 2018/605 of 19 April 2018 amending Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 by setting out scientific criteria for the determination of endocrine disrupting properties (OJ L 101, 20.4.2018, p. 33). (22) Commission Regulation (EU) 2018/605 of 19 April 2018 amending Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 by setting out scientific criteria for the determination of endocrine disrupting properties (OJ L 101, 20.4.2018, p. 33). (23) European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) with support from the Joint Research Centre (JRC), ‘Guidance for the identification of endocrine disruptors in the context of Regulations (EU) No 528/2012 and (EC) No 1107/2009’, EFSA Journal 2018;16(6):5311, https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/5311 (24) EFSA conclusion on pesticide peer review, ‘Updated peer review of the pesticide risk assessment of the active substance flumioxazin’, EFSA Journal 2020;18(9):6246, https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/6246 (25) European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/707 of 7 May 2019 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances alphacypermethrin, beflubutamid, benalaxyl, benthiavalicarb, bifenazate, boscalid, bromoxynil, captan, cyazofamid, desmedipham, dimethoate, dimethomorph, diuron, ethephon, etoxazole, famoxadone, fenamiphos, flumioxazine, fluoxastrobin, folpet, foramsulfuron, formetanate, metalaxyl-m, methiocarb, metribuzin, milbemectin, Paecilomyces lilacinus strain 251, phenmedipham, phosmet, pirimiphos-methyl, propamocarb, prothioconazole, s-metolachlor and tebuconazole (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0026). (26) European Parliament resolution of 10 July 2020 on the draft Commission implementing regulation amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances beflubutamid, benalaxyl, benthiavalicarb, bifenazate, boscalid, bromoxynil, captan, cyazofamid, dimethomorph, ethephon, etoxazole, famoxadone, fenamiphos, flumioxazine, fluoxastrobin, folpet, formetanate, metribuzin, milbemectin, Paecilomyces lilacinus strain 251, phenmedipham, phosmet, pirimiphos-methyl, propamocarb, prothioconazole and S-metolachlor (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0197).

European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on the EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade (2021/2568(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0286 B9-0305/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018),

–  having regard to the Commission proposal of 16 December 2020 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (COM(2020)0823),

–  having regard to the Commission proposal of 24 September 2020 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on digital operational resilience for the financial sector and amending Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014 and (EU) No 909/2014 (COM(2020)0595),

–  having regard to the Commission proposal of 12 September 2018 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centres (COM(2018)0630),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2020 entitled ‘Shaping Europe’s Digital Future’ (COM(2020)0067),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act)(1),

–  having regard to Directive 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment and repealing Directive 1999/5/EC(2),

–  having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code(3),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1290/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 laying down the rules for participation and dissemination in ‘Horizon 2020 – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020)’ and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1906/2006(4),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing Horizon 2020 – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020) and repealing Decision No 1982/2006/EC(5),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240(6),

–  having regard to Directive 2010/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the framework for the deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems in the field of road transport and for interfaces with other modes of transport(7),

–  having regard to the Budapest convention on cybercrime of 23 November 2001 (ETS No. 185),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 December 2020 on a new strategy for European SMEs(8),

–  having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on a European strategy for data(9),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on shaping the digital future of Europe: removing barriers to the functioning of the digital single market and improving the use of AI for European consumers(10),

–  having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on closing the digital gender gap: women’s participation in the digital economy(11),

–  having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2019 on security threats connected with the rising Chinese technological presence in the EU and possible action on the EU level to reduce them(12),

–  having regard to the question to the Commission on the EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade (O-000037/2021 – B9‑0024/2021),

–  having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the digital transformation is a key strategic priority of the Union that inevitably is associated with more exposure to cyber threats;

B.  whereas connected devices, including machines, sensors, industrial components and networks that make up the Internet of Things (IoT), continue to increase in number, with 22.3 billion devices expected to be linked to the IoT worldwide by 2024, thereby increasing the exposure to cyber-attacks;

C.  whereas technological progress – such as quantum computing – and asymmetries in access thereto could represent a challenge for the cybersecurity landscape;

D.  whereas the COVID-19 crisis has further exposed cyber-vulnerabilities in some critical sectors, particularly in healthcare, and the associated measures of teleworking and social distancing have increased our dependency on digital technologies and connectivity, while cyber-attacks and cyber-crime, including espionage and sabotage, as well as the entering and manipulation of ICT systems, structures and networks by means of malicious and unlawful installation, are increasing in number and sophistication across Europe;

E.  whereas the number of cyber-attacks is increasing significantly, as seen in the recent series of malicious and organised cyber-attacks on healthcare systems such as in Ireland, Finland and France; whereas these cyber-attacks cause significant damage to healthcare systems and patient care, as well as to other sensitive public and private institutions;

F.  whereas hybrid threats are increasing, including the use of disinformation campaigns and cyber-attacks on infrastructure, economic processes and democratic institutions, and are becoming a serious issue in both the cyber- and physical world, and risk affecting democratic processes such as elections, legislative procedures, law enforcement and justice;

G.  whereas there is an increasing reliance on the core function of the internet and essential internet services for communication and hosting, applications and data, for which the market share is progressively being concentrated in ever fewer companies;

H.  whereas distributed denial-of-service attack capabilities are growing and, therefore, the resilience of the core of the internet should be increased in parallel;

I.  whereas cyber-security readiness and awareness among businesses, in particular SMEs and individuals, remain low and there is a shortage of skilled workers (the workforce gap has widened by 20 % since 2015), with traditional recruitment channels not meeting demand, including for managerial and interdisciplinary positions; whereas ‘nearly 90 % of the global cybersecurity workforce is male’ and ‘the persistent lack of gender diversity restricts the talent pool further’(13);

J.  whereas cyber-security capabilities are heterogeneous among the Member States and incident reporting and information sharing among them is neither systematic nor comprehensive, while the use of Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISACs) for the exchange of information between the public and private sectors is not realising its potential;

K.  whereas there is a lack of agreement at EU level on cyber-intelligence collaboration and the collective response to cyber- and hybrid attacks; whereas countermeasures against cyber-threats and cyber-attacks, especially those of a hybrid nature, are technically and geopolitically very difficult for Member States to tackle alone;

L.  whereas cross-border data sharing and global data sharing are important for value creation provided that privacy and intellectual and property rights are ensured; whereas the enforcement of foreign data laws could pose a cyber-security risk to European data given that companies operating in different regions are subject to overlapping obligations regardless of the location of the data or their origin;

M.  whereas cyber-security represents a global market of EUR 600 billion, with this amount expected to increase rapidly, and the Union is a net importer of products and solutions;

N.  whereas there is a risk of fragmentation of the single market due to national regulations on cyber-security and the lack of horizontal legislation regarding essential cyber-security requirements for hardware and software, including connected products and applications;

1.  Welcomes the initiatives outlined by the Commission in the joint communication entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’;

2.  Calls for the promotion of the development of secure and reliable network and information systems, infrastructure and connectivity across the Union;

3.  Calls for the goal to be set that all internet-connected products in the Union, including for consumer and industrial use, along with the whole of the supply chains which make them available, need to be secure-by-design, resilient to cyber-incidents and quickly patched when vulnerabilities are discovered; welcomes the Commission’s plans to propose horizontal legislation on cyber-security requirements for connected products and associated services, and requests that such legislation propose the harmonisation of national laws to avoid fragmentation of the single market; requests that existing legislation (the Cybersecurity Act, the New Legislative Framework, the Regulation on Standardisation) be taken into account to avoid ambiguity and fragmentation;

4.  Calls on the Commission to assess the need for a proposal on a horizontal regulation introducing cyber-security requirements for applications, software, embedded software and operating systems by 2023, building upon the EU acquis for risk management requirements; stresses that outdated applications, software, embedded software and operating systems (i.e. no longer receiving regular patches and security updates) represent a non-negligible share of all connected devices and a cyber-security risk; calls on the Commission to include this aspect in its proposal; suggests that the proposal should include obligations for producers to communicate in advance the minimum period during which they will support security patches and updates to enable buyers to make informed choices; considers that producers must be part of the Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) programme as set out in the proposal for the NIS2 Directive;

5.  Underlines that cyber-security should be embedded in digitalisation; calls, therefore, for digitalisation projects financed by the Union to include cyber-security requirements; welcomes the support for research and innovation in the field of cyber-security, especially as regards disruptive technologies (such as quantum computing and quantum cryptography), the emergence of which could destabilise the international balance; calls, moreover, for further research on post-quantum algorithms as a cyber-security standard;

6.  Considers that digitalisation of our society means that all sectors are interconnected and the weaknesses in one sector can hamper others; insists, therefore, that cyber-security policies be incorporated into the EU digital strategy and EU funding, and that they be coherent and interoperable across sectors;

7.  Calls for a coherent use of EU funds as regards cyber-security and related infrastructure deployment; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that cyber-security-related synergies between different programmes are exploited, in particular the Horizon Europe programme, the Digital Europe programme, the EU Space Programme, the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility, InvestEU and the CEF, and to make full use of the Cybersecurity Competence Centre and Network;

8.  Recalls that communication infrastructure is the cornerstone of all digital activity and that ensuring its security is a strategic priority for the Union; supports the current development of the EU’s cyber-security certification scheme for 5G networks; welcomes the EU toolbox on 5G cyber-security and invites the Commission, the Member States and industry to continue their efforts towards secure communication networks, including measures regarding the whole supply chain; calls on the Commission to avoid vendor lock-in and to enhance network security by promoting initiatives that enhance virtualisation and cloudification of the different components of the networks; calls for the quick development of the next generations of communications technologies with cyber-security-by-design as a fundamental principle and ensuring the protection of privacy and personal data;

9.  Reiterates the importance of establishing a new, robust security framework for EU critical infrastructures in order to safeguard EU security interests and build on existing capabilities to respond appropriately to risks, threats and technology change;

10.  Calls on the Commission to prepare provisions to ensure the accessibility, availability and integrity of the public core of the internet and, therefore, the stability of cyber-space, particularly as regards the EU’s access to the global DNS root system; considers that such provisions should include measures for the diversification of suppliers to mitigate the current risk of reliance on the few companies that dominate the market; welcomes the proposal for a European Domain Name System (DNS4EU) as a tool for a more resilient internet core; asks the Commission to evaluate how this DNS4EU could use the latest technologies, security protocols and cyber-threats expertise in order to offer a fast, secure and resilient DNS for all Europeans; recalls the necessity of better protection of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) in order to prevent BGP hijacks; recalls its support for a multi-stakeholder model for internet governance, of which cyber-security should represent one of the core topics; underlines that the EU should speed up implementation of IPv6.; recognises the open source model which, as the basis for the internet’s functioning, has proven efficient and effective; encourages, therefore, its use;

11.  Recognises the need to increase cyber-security forensics to combat crime, cyber-crime and cyber-attacks, including state-sponsored attacks, but warns against disproportionate measures that jeopardise the privacy and freedom of speech of EU citizens while using the internet; recalls the need to conclude the revision of the second additional protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, which has the potential to increase preparedness against cybercrime;

12.  Calls on the Commission and the Member Stated to pool their resources to enhance the EU’s strategic resilience, to reduce its dependency on foreign technologies and to propel its leadership and competitiveness in cyber-security across the digital supply chain (including data storage and processing in clouds, processor technologies, integrated circuits (chips), ultra-secure connectivity, quantum computing and the next generation of networks);

13.  Considers the plan for an ultra-secure connectivity infrastructure to be an important instrument for the security of sensitive digital communications; welcomes the announcement of the development of an EU space-based global secure communications system, integrating quantum encryption technologies; recalls that continuous efforts should be made, in cooperation with the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA) and the European Space Agency (ESA), to secure European space activities;

14.  Regrets that the information sharing practices surrounding cyber-threats and incidents have not been well embraced by the private and public sectors; calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase trust and reduce barriers for sharing information on cyber-threats and cyber-attacks at all levels; welcomes the efforts made by some sectors and calls for cross-sector collaboration as vulnerabilities are rarely sector specific; highlights that Member States need to join forces at European level, in order to share efficiently their latest knowledge on cyber-security risks; encourages the formation of a Member States Working Group on Cyber-Intelligence, in order to foster the sharing of information in the EU and the European economic space, in particular, to prevent large-scale cyber-attacks;

15.  Welcomes the planned establishment of a Joint Cyber Unit to strengthen cooperation between EU bodies and Member States’ authorities responsible for preventing, deterring and responding to cyber-attacks; calls on the Member States and the Commission to further enhance cyber-defence cooperation and develop research in state-of-the-art cyber-defence capabilities;

16.  Recalls the importance of the human factor in the cyber-security strategy; Calls for continued efforts to spread cyber-security awareness, including cyber-hygiene and cyber-literacy;

17.  Highlights the importance of a robust and consistent security framework to protect all EU personnel, data, communication networks and information systems, and decision-making processes against cyber-threats based on comprehensive, consistent and homogeneous rules and adequate governance; calls for sufficient resources and capabilities to be made available, including in the context of the reinforcement of the mandate of CERT-EU and with regard to the ongoing discussions on the definition of common binding rules on cyber-security for all EU institutions, bodies and agencies;

18.  Calls for the wider use of voluntary certification and cyber-security standards, as they represent important tools to improve the general level of cyber-security; welcomes the establishment of the European Certification Framework and the work of the European Cyber Security Certification Group; calls on ENISA and the Commission to consider, when preparing the EU Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services, making the application of EU law mandatory as regards the ‘high’ assurance level;

19.  Highlights the need to match the cyber-security labour demand with closing the skills gap by continuing the efforts on education and training; calls for particular attention to be paid to eliminating the gender gap, which also present in this sector;

20.  Recognises the need for better support for micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises to increase their understanding of all the information security risks and opportunities to improve their cyber-security; calls on ENISA and national authorities to develop self-testing portals and best practice guides for micro-, small and medium-size enterprises; recalls the importance of training and access to dedicated funding for the security of these entities;

21.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 151, 7.6.2019, p. 15. (2) OJ L 153, 22.5.2014, p. 62. (3) OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p. 36. (4) OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 81. (5) OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 104. (6) OJ L 166, 11.5.2021, p. 1. (7) OJ L 207, 6.8.2010, p. 1. (8) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0359. (9) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0098. (10) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0261. (11) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0026. (12) OJ C 23, 21.1.2021, p. 2. (13) European Court of Auditors Challenges to effective EU cybersecurity policy, briefing paper, March 2019.

European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 (2021/2711(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0287 B9-0319/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Articles 2, 3(1), 4(3), 6, 7, 13, 14(1), 16(1), 17(1), 17(3), 17(8), 19(1) second subparagraph and 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as well as Articles 265, 310, 317 and 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

–  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(1) (‘the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation’),

–  having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092, the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism(2) and to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, the Interinstitutional Agreement, the EU Recovery Instrument and the Rule of Law Regulation(3),

–  having regard to the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report of 30 September 2020 (COM(2020)0580),

–  having regard to the conclusions of the European Council adopted on 21 July 2020 and on 11 December 2020,

–  having regard to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

–  having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(4),

–  having regard to the CJEU’s decision of 3 June 2021 in Case C-650/18 dismissing Hungary’s action against Parliament’s resolution of 12 September 2018 triggering the procedure for determining the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values on which the European Union is founded(5),

–  having regard to the Commission’s reasoned proposal of 20 December 2017 in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU regarding the rule of law in Poland: proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835),

–  having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland(6),

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the European Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

B.  whereas any clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU does not concern solely the individual Member State where the risk materialises, but also has an impact on the other Member States, on the mutual trust between them and on the very nature of the Union and its citizens’ fundamental rights under Union law;

C.  whereas Article 7(1) TEU was triggered by the Commission and Parliament in relation to Poland and Hungary, respectively, following the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach of the values on which the Union is founded; whereas the Council has so far organised three hearings of Poland and two hearings of Hungary within the framework of the General Affairs Council;

D.  whereas the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation entered into force on 1 January 2021 and has been applicable since then;

E.  whereas the applicability, purpose and scope of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation are clearly defined therein and, in accordance with Article 17(1) TEU, the Commission ‘shall ensure the application of the Treaties, and of measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them’;

F.  whereas the application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation cannot be subject to the adoption of guidelines, and recalls that any guidelines shall not undermine the intention of the co-legislators;

G.  whereas, in accordance with Article 234 TFEU, the European Parliament has the right to vote on a motion of censure of the Commission;

H.  whereas the Commission ‘shall be completely independent’ and its members ‘shall neither seek nor take instructions from any Government or other institution, body, office or entity’ (Article 17(3) TEU, Article 245 TFEU) and furthermore ‘shall be responsible to the European Parliament’ (Article 17(8) TEU) and ‘shall ensure the application of the Treaties, and of measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them’ (Article 17(3) TEU);

I.  whereas only the CJEU has the power to annul the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation or any part thereof, and whereas actions brought before the CJEU do not have suspensory effect according to Article 278 TFEU;

J.   whereas the Union’s financial interests are to be protected in accordance with the general principles embedded in the Union Treaties, in particular the values laid down in Article 2 TEU, and with the principle of sound financial management enshrined in Article 317 TFEU and in Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(7) (the Financial Regulation);

1.  Reiterates its position on the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, which entered into force on 1 January 2021 and is directly applicable in its entirety in the European Union and all its Member States for all funds of the EU budget, including resources allocated through the EU Recovery Instrument since then;

2.  Calls on the Commission and the Council to finally recognise the urgent need for action to defend the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU and to admit that a Member State cannot amend its legislation, including constitutional provisions, in such a way as to bring about a reduction in the protection of these values; believes that mutual sincere cooperation between institutions is undermined if Parliament’s concerns are not fully shared and taken into account; recalls that Parliament has the right to vote on a motion of censure of the Commission and has the possibility to react to the lack of cooperation by the Council; invites other institutions to work together rather than obstruct the efforts to resolve the current crisis;

3.  Recalls that according to Article 5 of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, ‘the Commission shall verify whether applicable law has been complied with and, where necessary, take all appropriate measures to protect the Union budget’; believes that the situation as regards respect for the principles of the rule of law in some Member States warrants immediate use of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation;

4.  Urges the Commission to react swiftly to the ongoing severe violations of the principles of the rule of law in some Member States, which are causing a serious danger in relation to the fair, legal and impartial distribution of EU funds, especially under shared management, and to conduct a thorough analysis of the need to trigger, without any undue delay, the procedure envisaged in the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; reiterates its call on the Commission to immediately fulfil its obligations under this regulation to duly inform Parliament of any written notifications to the Member States concerned, setting out the factual elements and specific grounds of the breaches of the rule of law, or of any ongoing investigations; notes that to date, Parliament has not received any such information about a notification;

5.  Stresses its concern at the increasingly clear indications and the growing risk of misuse of the Union’s budget as a means to deteriorate the rule of law in some Member States; regrets the inability of the Council to make meaningful progress in enforcing the Union’s values in ongoing Article 7 procedures in response to the threats to common European values in Poland and Hungary; points out that this failure by the Council to make effective use of Article 7 TEU continues to undermine the integrity of common European values, mutual trust, and the credibility of the Union as a whole; urges the forthcoming presidencies to organise hearings regularly; recommends that the Council address concrete recommendations to the Member States in question, as enshrined in Article 7(1) TEU, as a follow‑up to the hearings, and that it indicate deadlines for the implementation of those recommendations;

6.  Underlines that despite numerous European Parliament resolutions and reports, and several infringement proceedings and decisions of the CJEU, the rule of law situation in the European Union is continuing to deteriorate;

7.  Calls on the Commission to use all tools at its disposal, including the regulation, also to address the persistent violations of democracy and fundamental rights everywhere in the Union, including attacks against media freedom and journalists, migrants, women’s rights, LGBTIQ people’s rights, and freedom of association and assembly; welcomes the decision taken by the Grand Chamber of the CJEU to dismiss Hungary’s action against Parliament’s resolution of 12 September 2018 triggering the Article 7 procedure; regrets the Commission’s inability to respond properly to the many concerns expressed by Parliament about democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in several Member States; calls on the Commission to use all tools at its disposal, including Article 7 TEU, the Rule of Law Framework and infringement procedures under Article 19(1) TEU, as well as further instruments, such as expedited procedures, applications for interim measures before the CJEU and actions regarding non-implementation of the Court’s judgments; asks the Commission to explicitly state reasons when it decides not to use the tools recommended by Parliament;

8.  Highlights the importance of supporting and strengthening cooperation between the EU institutions, the Member States, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); welcomes the fact that the EPPO became operational on 1 June 2021;

9.  Underlines that the annual rule of law report is a separate tool complementary to the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; calls on the Commission to use the findings of the annual report in its assessment for the purposes of the regulation; asks the Commission to include in its annual Rule of Law Report a dedicated section with an analysis of cases where breaches of the principles of the rule of law in a particular Member State could affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget in a sufficiently direct way;

10.  Regrets the fact that the Commission has not sent written notifications to Member States since the entry into force of the regulation, despite many concerns about the breaches of the rule of law identified in the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report, as well as the existence of two ongoing Article 7 procedures, which have an impact on the sound financial management of the Union budget and remain unresolved by Member States; notes that the absence of actions under Article 5(1) and Article 6 of the regulation constitutes a refusal by the Commission to fulfil its obligations under it;

11.  Recalls that in its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092, the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism, a concrete deadline was given to the Commission by Parliament, and notes with disappointment that the Commission did not meet its obligations within this deadline; stresses that this constitutes a sufficient basis for taking legal action against the Commission under Article 265 TFEU;

12.  Regrets the Commission’s failure to respond to Parliament’s requests by 1 June 2021 and to activate the procedure laid down in the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in the most obvious cases of breaches of the rule of law in the EU; instructs its President to call on the Commission, within two weeks from the date of adoption of this resolution at the latest, on the basis of Article 265 TFEU, to fulfil its obligations under this regulation; states that, in order to be prepared, Parliament shall, in the meantime, immediately start the necessary preparations for potential court proceedings under Article 265 TFEU against the Commission;

13.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council and the Member States.

(1) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 1. (2) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0103. (3) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0360. (4) OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 66. (5) Judgment of 3 June 2021, Hungary v Parliament, C-650/18, ECLI:EU:C:2021:426. (6) OJ C 129, 5.4.2019, p. 13. (7) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1.

European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on the views of Parliament on the ongoing assessment by the Commission and the Council of the national recovery and resilience plans (2021/2738(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0288 RC-B9-0331/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Articles 174 and 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(1) (RRF Regulation),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on the right of information of the Parliament regarding the ongoing assessment of the national recovery and resilience plans(2),

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the RRF Regulation was adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure;

B.  whereas the RRF is an unprecedented instrument in terms of volume and means of financing; whereas the Commission is preparing to issue common EU debt, since all EU Member States have now successfully ratified the Own Resources Decision(3);

C.  whereas the green investment under the RRF will be financed through the issuance of green bonds;

D.  whereas democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF is only possible with the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations in all stages;

E.  whereas Article 26 of the RRF Regulation establishes a recovery and resilience dialogue in order to ensure greater transparency and accountability and for the Commission to provide information to Parliament concerning, among other things, the recovery and resilience plans of the Member States and their assessment;

F.  whereas Parliament expresses its views on the issues under the recovery and resilience dialogue, including through resolutions and exchanges with the Commission; whereas the Commission has to take these views into account;

G.  whereas the RRF Regulation identifies six areas of European interest, all of which represent the scope and objective of the instrument;

H.  whereas the RRF Regulation is based on Article 175 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and establishes that the general objective is to reach the objectives set out in Article 174 in order to strengthen the Union’s economic, social and territorial cohesion by improving the resilience, crisis preparedness, adjustment capacity and growth potential of the Member States, by mitigating the social and economic impact of the crisis, in particular on women, children and youth, and contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by supporting the green transition, by contributing to the achievement of the Union’s updated 2030 climate targets in the new EU Climate Law and by complying with the objective of EU climate neutrality by 2050 – in particular through the national energy and climate plans adopted in the framework of the governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, established by Regulation (EU) 2018/1999(4), and of the digital transition, thereby contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and the integration of the economies of the Union, fostering high-quality employment creation, and contributing to the strategic autonomy of the Union alongside an open economy and generating European added value;

I.  whereas during the Porto Social Summit held on 7 and 8 May 2021, the EU’s leaders recognised the European Pillar of Social Rights as a fundamental element of the recovery and whereas in the Porto declaration they underlined their determination to continue deepening its implementation at EU and national level;

J.  whereas the specific objective of the RRF is to provide the Member States with financial support with a view to achieving the reform and investment milestones and targets set out in their recovery and resilience plans; whereas this means that the plans (including digital and green measures) have to contribute to the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights, quality job creation and upward social convergence;

K.  whereas European added value does not materialise merely because the RRF is a European initiative;

L.  whereas as a rule, the Member States should have submitted their national recovery and resilience plans to the Commission by 30 April 2021; whereas to date, 23 Member States have submitted their recovery and resilience plans to the Commission;

M.  whereas Parliament held a plenary debate followed by the adoption of a resolution on 18 May 2021 on the right of information of Parliament regarding the ongoing assessment of the national recovery and resilience plans;

N.  whereas in order to ensure proper democratic oversight over and parliamentary scrutiny of the implementation of the RRF, as well as greater transparency and democratic accountability, the Commission must regularly inform Parliament, orally and in writing, of the status of the assessment of the national recovery and resilience plans, including the reforms and investment related to the scope based on the six pillars (including the general and specific objectives and the horizontal principles) and the 11 assessment criteria set out in the RRF Regulation;

1.  Considers that the RRF constitutes a historic EU instrument to foster economic, social and territorial cohesion, bring convergence, enhance competitiveness and help the Member States to mitigate the economic and social impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, set their economies on strong and sustainable growth trajectories, prepare the EU to address long-term challenges such as the just, green transition and digital transformation, and generate EU added value;

2.  Expects the Commission to only approve plans that fully meet the provisions and targets of the RRF Regulation and to make no political concession that goes against the regulation and its spirit, while distancing itself from the fact that it was closely involved in the development of the plans ahead of their submission; requests that the Commission meticulously applies the letter and the spirit of the RRF Regulation in the assessment process of the national recovery and resilience plans and provides deep and comprehensive assessments before the adoption of the relevant draft Council implementing decision; welcomes, however, the Commission’s efforts to ensure the swift adoption of the relevant Council implementing decisions before the summer, and its continuous engagement with the Member States to help them deliver high-quality plans that significantly contribute to our shared European objectives;

3.  Is convinced that the funds must be fairly distributed across sectors, societies and future generations to ensure the highest possible impact on economic and social upward and territorial convergence, prosperity for all and economic stability; calls on the Commission to insist on ambitious reform measures as part of the national plans in all Member States and stresses that ambitious plans and sound execution are essential in order to make full use of this opportunity; calls for full transparency and accountability in the allocation and use of the funds; recalls that the RRF must not be perceived as business as usual;

4.  Calls on the Commission to carefully assess whether RRF resources are serving the RRF Regulation’s objective to advance economic, social and territorial cohesion in the Member States; calls on the Commission to discourage the practice of repackaging projects without a real added value, notably for lagging regions, especially when this risks widening the social, economic and territorial convergence gap of the EU;

5.  Reiterates Parliament’s call to ensure the right of information of Parliament regarding the ongoing assessment of the national recovery and resilience plans, in order to enable the democratic scrutiny of Parliament in the Commission’s assessment and implementation of the RRF;

6.  Calls on the Commission to carefully assess and ensure that each national recovery and resilience plan effectively contributes to all six pillars referred to in Article 3 of the RRF Regulation in a comprehensive and balanced manner; recalls that each measure should contribute to one or more of the policy areas of European relevance structured in the six pillars;

7.  Stresses that plans must meet the regulatory requirements, including the 37 % and 20 % shares for the green and digital transitions respectively, throughout its implementation phase; calls on the Commission to assess the qualitative and quantitative side of the measures proposed in order to ensure that they effectively meet both quantitative and qualitative targets, including for the implementation phase;

8.  Recalls that in accordance with the RRF Regulation, the RRF must not finance recurring national expenditure, such as permanent tax breaks, unless in duly justified cases, and calls on the Commission to assess this criterion in a holistic manner;

9.  Notes that cross-border projects encompassing more than one Member State generate high European added value and spill-over effects and regrets that few national plans contain cross-border projects; calls on the Commission to strongly encourage Member States to facilitate cross-border projects financed through the RRF;

10.  Notes that few Member States have chosen to request loans in the national recovery and resilience plans already submitted; calls on the Member States to consider the best use of the loans available to avoid any loss of opportunity; is concerned that a significant amount of the loans may remain unused at the end of the RRF and calls on the Member States to carefully assess their needs and to make the best use of this possibility when submitting their recovery and resilience plans or by amending their plans;

11.  Calls on the Commission to take into account the possible future need to amend national plans to ensure compliance with the requirements of the RRF Regulation in preparation for the draft Council implementing decision;

12.  Recalls that the recovery and resilience plans should not affect the right to conclude or enforce collective agreements or to take collective action in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and with Union and national law and practices;

13.  Highlights that investments must have a lasting impact; calls on the Commission to assess to what extent the reforms and investments made under the RRF will further enable the closing of the investment gap in all areas in Europe, as estimated by the Commission, in order to deliver on the digital transition and on climate, environmental and social sustainability goals, including the Paris Agreement and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs);

Green transition

14.  Stresses that in line with the methodology set out in Annex VI to the RRF Regulation, all plans should dedicate at least 37 % of the total allocation (grants and loans) of the individual plans to the climate; calls on the Commission to pay attention when assessing the 37 % climate spending target in order to ensure that there is no double, mis- or false tagging of the measures and to prevent greenwashing; is concerned that some investments are labelled as green investments despite not being covered by the tracking methodology set out in Annex VI; suggests applying additional scrutiny on any extension of the climate tracking methodology in Annex VI of the RRF Regulation; insists that the necessary safeguards to meet the target in the implementation phase are fully included in the targets and milestones in the draft Council implementing decision; calls on the Commission to encourage the Member States to undertake the reforms that will facilitate the successful implementation of the investments;

15.  Recalls that the ‘do no significant harm’ provisions are a crucial tool for supporting the green transition, alongside the requirement that a minimum of 37 % of expenditure (grants and loans) on investments and reforms contained in each national recovery and resilience plan should support climate objectives, and for avoiding the financing of measures that contradict the Union’s climate objectives; recalls that all measures must respect the ‘do no significant harm’ principle within the meaning of Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852(5), as required under the RRF Regulation; is concerned, in this context, about the lack of compliance with this principle in the assessment of the plans and calls on the Commission to ensure full respect for the ‘do no significant harm’ principle, including during the implementation phase, and to publish all the related assessments; insists that the implementation of the RRF cannot lead to any lowering of environmental standards or run against environmental laws and regulations; highlights in this respect the concerns about the potential negative impact of operations located in or near biodiversity-sensitive areas (including the Natura 2000 network of protected areas, UNESCO World Heritage sites and Key Biodiversity Areas, as well as other protected areas);

16.  Recalls that, reflecting the importance of tackling the dramatic loss of biodiversity, the RRF should contribute to the mainstreaming of biodiversity action in Union policies; calls on the Commission to publish an overview of measures that effectively contribute to the green transition, including the biodiversity-related measures listed that effectively contribute to biodiversity in the recovery and resilience plans; is concerned that most of the recovery and resilience plans contain very limited or no measures at all in favour of biodiversity; expects the Commission to strictly apply the ‘do no significant harm’ principle in that respect, too, and notably to reject reforms or investments that could harm biodiversity or are not accompanied by adequate flanking measures;

17.  Is concerned about the fact that many national recovery and resilience plans focus on short-term investments; is supportive of green investments that lead to Europe’s economic transformation, and in particular those that do not excessively subsidise the purchase of durable consumption goods;

Digital transformation

18.  Stresses that in accordance with the RRF Regulation, all plans should have measures that effectively contribute to the digital transition or address the challenges resulting therefrom, and that account for an amount which represents at least 20 % of a recovery and resilience plan’s total allocation, based on the methodology and provisions outlined in the RRF Regulation;

19.  Recalls that for investments in digital capacities and connectivity, Member States should provide in their plans a security self-assessment based on common objective criteria identifying any security issues, and detailing how those issues will be addressed in order to comply with the relevant Union and national law; calls on the Commission to ensure that all national plans containing such investments provide such an assessment and that the respective measures do not run counter to the strategic interests of the Union;

20.  Believes that digital actions have great potential for boosting the EU’s competiveness internationally and for the creation of high-quality jobs, and is concerned that there are national plans that do not achieve an adequate balance in terms of investments in digital transformation, and notably in digital infrastructure;

21.  Calls on the Commission to encourage the Member States to fully adhere to the principles of interoperability, energy efficiency and personal data protection, as well as to promote the use of open-source solutions in digital investments;

Boosting growth, economic, social and territorial cohesion and prosperity for all

22.  Welcomes notably the measures in the recovery and resilience plans submitted to support smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, economic cohesion, productivity, competitiveness, research and innovation, health and a well-functioning single market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), enhance the creation of high-quality employment, fight poverty and inequality, promote culture and education, develop competences and skills, support children and youth, increase crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the economy;

23.  Calls on the Commission to assess and ensure that national recovery and resilience plans pay adequate attention to measures for children and youth, especially in countries in which structural problems have been identified in areas such as early-school leaving, youth unemployment, child poverty and early childhood education; insists that reforms and investments in youth, in particular those related to upskilling, reskilling, education, vocational training and dual education, digital skills, lifelong learning, active labour market policies, policies investing in access and opportunities for children and youth and policies that bridge the generational gap, should encourage the development of competences in addition to purchasing equipment, and should be aligned with the Youth Guarantee and other national measures; stresses that reforms and investments for children should be aligned with the principles of the Child Guarantee and focus on the right of access to high-quality public services, free healthcare, free education, free childcare, decent housing and adequate nutrition for every child in poverty;

24.  Welcomes the measures included in the plans contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights and EU initiatives in the employment, education, health and social care areas to strengthen social cohesion, strengthen social protection systems and reduce vulnerabilities; reminds the Commission that the recovery and resilience plans have to comply satisfactorily with the assessment criteria and calls on the Commission to carefully assess the social consequences and impact of each measure to ensure compliance with the RRF Regulation; insists, therefore, that the Commission ensure that each plan adequately reflects these criteria;

25.  Believes that green and digital investments have great potential for quality job creation, reducing inequalities and narrowing the digital gap; calls on the Commission to ensure that the most vulnerable communities and regions, such as lignite and coal regions in transition, and those most affected by climate change, benefit from green and digital investment; stresses that the expected social and economic return on green and digital investments should be identified in the national recovery and resilience plans in order to ensure maximum impact;

26.  Requests that the Commission and the Council ensure that gender equality and equal opportunities for all, and the mainstreaming of those objectives, are taken into account and promoted throughout the preparation and implementation of recovery and resilience plans; expects the Commission to systematically collect, analyse and report on existing sex-disaggregated data for the implementation of the RRF in line with European Court of Auditors (ECA) Special Report 10/2021; is deeply concerned that most recovery and resilience plans fall short of significantly contributing to and mainstreaming these objectives and fail to include explicit and concrete measures to address the issue of gender inequality, thereby risking to endanger the ability of those plans to mitigate the social and economic effects of the crisis on women and to respond to the relevant country-specific recommendations (CSRs);

27.  Asks the Commission to assess national recovery and resilience plans in terms of addressing national measures to fight aggressive tax planning, tax evasion or tax avoidance or ineffective anti-money laundering measures;

28.  Recalls that the recovery and resilience plans should comprise measures for the implementation of reforms and public investment projects through a coherent package; reminds the Commission that national recovery and resilience plans must address sustainable and growth-enhancing reforms and investments that address the structural weaknesses of Member State economics, and that, to this end, all plans are expected to contribute to effectively address all or a significant subset of the challenges identified in the relevant CSRs, including the fiscal aspects thereof; underlines that the recovery and resilience plans shall be consistent with the relevant country-specific challenges and priorities identified in the context of the European Semester, and aligned with the RRF Regulation; highlights that all measures, and notably those linked to the digital and green transformations, should also be assessed from economic and social perspectives; insists that the Commission devote particular attention to ensuring that the proposed reforms are genuine, new and more ambitious, starting as soon as possible;

29.  Calls on the Commission to ensure balance between reforms and investments and consistency of the national plans, including new reforms, with existing achievements and challenges identified in the relevant CSR;

30.  Stresses that creating and fostering high-quality employment creation is one of the objectives included in the RRF Regulation and that this should be done through a comprehensive package of reforms and investments in order to promote stable contracts, decent wages, collective bargaining coverage and social protection floors, including decent pensions above the poverty threshold;

31.  Regrets the fact that the national recovery and resilience plans are not being coordinated sufficiently with partnership agreements and EU programmes such as InvestEU; calls for the creation of synergies and complementarities between the RRF, the partnership agreements, InvestEU and other EU actions; invites the Commission and the Member States to facilitate the use of the national compartment of InvestEU, which could favour, in particular, the creation of solvency support instruments for SMEs;

32.  Reminds the Commission that the significant involvement of SMEs and start-ups is an explicit objective of the RRF Regulation, including in public procurement processes; calls on Commission to ensure that RRF funds will not predominantly benefit large corporations and will not inhibit fair competition; calls on the Commission to pay the utmost attention to ensure that SMEs and start-ups benefit from RRF financing, including through the formulation of milestones and the ongoing guidance on programme implementation in the Member States; suggests to include the share of RRF funds whose ultimate recipients are SMEs be included in the ongoing monitoring, inter alia through common indicators;

Involvement of stakeholders

33.  Recalls that Article 18(4)(q) of the RRF Regulation states that the national recovery and resilience plans should contain ‘a summary of the consultation process, conducted in accordance with the national legal framework, of local and regional authorities, social partners, civil society organisations, youth organisations and other relevant stakeholders, and how the input of the stakeholders is reflected in the recovery and resilience plan’; calls on the Commission to prompt the Member States to consult all national stakeholders and to ensure their involvement, including that of civil society, social partners, and local and regional authorities, in the implementation and, in particular, the monitoring of the plans to ensure that consultations take place for future amendments or new plans, if any;

34.  Recalls that Article 152 TFEU establishes that the Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at its level and must respect their autonomy; underlines that adequate involvement of national stakeholders, such as the national parliaments, local and regional authorities, social partners, NGOs and civil society, in the preparation and implementation of the recovery and resilience plans is decisive in the success of the national plans and of the RRF as a whole, so as to enhance national ownership of the plans, ensure the fast, transparent, effective and qualitative absorption of the funds, increase transparency, and prevent overlapping, gap and double funding; echoes the concerns raised by the Committee of the Regions and other stakeholders and deplores the fact that many Member States have not or only inadequately involved regional and local authorities in the drafting process of the plans, as well as the lack of transparency of these processes despite relying on them to channel a large portion of the RRF’s funds; further deplores the fact that in some instances not even national parliaments were adequately involved or informed; encourages the Commission to set up a structured dialogue with regional and local authorities and to have a dedicated dialogue with European social partners;

Arrangements, milestones and targets

35.  Insists that all reforms and investments must be linked to milestones, targets and costing that are relevant, clear, detailed and adequately monitored, and in particular that ensure full compliance with the RRF Regulation and the EU acquis, representing clear commitments from Member States;

36.  Demands that the Commission ensure that, prior to the assessment of the fulfilment of the milestones and targets agreed in the Council implementing decision and the national recovery and resilience plans, Parliament is provided with the preliminary findings concerning the fulfilment of the milestones and targets, as required by Article 25(4) of the RRF Regulation;

37.  Reminds the Commission that investments should be accompanied by reforms and calls to ensure that all approved retroactive measures are clearly accompanied by corresponding milestones and targets and fulfil all the requirements of the legislation, and invites the Member States to use this provision wisely; reiterates that the RRF is designed to support projects that respect the principle of additionality of Union funding; notes that the lack of truly additional projects financed by the RRF could limit its macroeconomic impact;

38.  Highlights that the structures put in place at national level to channel, implement or monitor the RRF should be adequate to support a lasting impact of the measures in the recovery and resilience plans;

Institutional resilience, governance, administrative capacity and rule of law

39.  Recalls that the RRF and each of the national recovery and resilience plans should fully respect the Rule of Law Regulation(6) and that the measures set out in those plans should not go against the EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; insists that to this end, the Commission must ensure that no projects or measures go against these values during both the assessment and implementation phases and requests that it take appropriate action for a review;

40.  Underlines that the success of the RRF and of the national recovery and resilience plans requires robust transparency and accountability from the Commission, the Member States and all implementing partners; calls on the Commission to increase the resources of the ECA, the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to ensure that they have sufficient financial and human resources to scrutinise this unprecedented amount of EU expenditure; calls on the Commission to present, this year, a draft amending budget or a request for a transfer to mitigate these budgetary needs, to this end;

41.  Recalls that the implementation of the RRF should be carried out in line with the principle of sound financial management, including the effective prevention and prosecution of fraud, including tax fraud, tax evasion, corruption and conflicts of interest, and aim to avoid double funding from the RRF and other Union programmes, in particular in the governance structures related to the national plans;

42.  Asks the Commission to thoroughly assess the arrangements proposed by the Member States to prevent, detect and correct corruption, fraud and conflicts of interest when using the funds provided under the RRF and to give a particular attention in this context that the national plans include all necessary reforms, together with relevant milestones and targets, in particular related to the relevant CSRs, where appropriate; urges the Commission to monitor very carefully the risks to EU financial interests in the implementation of the RRF of any breach or potential breach of the principles of the rule of law, with a detailed and in particular attention to public procurement; expects the Commission not to proceed with any payments under the RRF if milestones linked to measures to prevent, detect and correct corruption, fraud and conflicts of interest when using the funds provided under the RFF are not met;

43.  Urges the Commission to insist that Member States implement reform and investment measures, especially in areas which increase the administrative and institutional resilience and crisis preparedness;

44.  Calls on Member States to collect and record data on final recipients and beneficiaries as well as the objectives, amount and location of projects funded by the RRF in an electronic standardised and interoperable format and use the single data mining tool to be provided by the Commission; furthermore, calls on the Commission to finalise the single data mining tool as soon as possible; recalls that Article 22(2) of the RRF Regulation sets the obligations of the Member States to collect and ensure access to standardised categories of data; reminds the Commission to ensure those obligations for the purpose of audit and control and to provide for comparable information on the use of funds in relation to measures for the implementation of reforms and investment projects under the recovery and resilience plans; further reminds the Commission of the need to ensure the transparency of final beneficiaries and to ensure that appropriate arrangements are in place in order to avoid double funding;

Parliament’s assessment of the delegated acts

45.  Stresses that the draft delegated acts subsequent to the RRF Regulation, namely the delegated act on the recovery and resilience scoreboard and the delegated act setting out common indicators for reporting on the progress of the facility and the methodology for reporting social expenditure, do not live up to Parliament’s expectations and must take fully into account the relevant elements of the recovery and resilience dialogue; calls on the Commission to ensure full transparency with regard to the timeline for the approval of the delegated acts subsequent to the RRF Regulation;

46.  Highlights the importance of agreeing on a social tracking methodology to evaluate the national recovery and resilience plans, in order to make sure that the actions set out in the plans contribute to the social objectives as established in the RRF Regulation; believes that the social tracking methodology must follow the structure of the European Pillar of Social Rights and analyse the contribution to it;

47.  States that the scoreboard and common indicators needed to evaluate the progress of the implementation of the recovery and resilience plans in each of the six pillars towards the achievement of the general and specific objectives needs to be efficient; insists that the best evaluation mechanism to follow the progress towards upward social convergence is the Social Scoreboard; Calls on the Commission to include the social indicators from the Social Scoreboard, in particular those related to decent work, social justice, equal opportunities, robust social welfare systems and fair mobility, in the common indicators to be used in the RRF for reporting on social progress, and monitoring and evaluating the plans, as well as in the methodology for social tracking, including for the Child Guarantee and Youth Guarantee; stresses that Parliament will closely analyse the delegated acts that the Commission will present on this matter, in order to establish if the social indicators, scoreboard and social methodology comply with the objectives, and to verify that there are no objections to be made;

Conclusions

48.  Calls on the Commission to assess the submitted plans adequately and in accordance with the RRF Regulation; expresses serious concerns about the compliance of several measures in national recovery and resilience plans with the requirements of the underlying RRF Regulation and asks the Commission to ensure all elements in all of the plans are in full compliance with the RRF Regulation;

49.  Recalls its demand for the Commission to fulfil its obligations under the RRF Regulation to provide Parliament with all the relevant information on the state of play of the implementation of the RRF Regulation and to take into account any elements arising from the views expressed through the recovery and resilience dialogue, including the views shared by the relevant committees and in plenary resolutions; welcomes the Commission’s improved efforts to provide adequate information during regular meetings with Parliament;

50.  Insists that the Commission ensure that the national recovery and resilience plans contain provisions ensuring that the recipients of Union funding shall acknowledge the origin and ensure the visibility of the Union funding, including, where applicable, by displaying the emblem of the Union and an appropriate funding statement that reads ‘funded by the European Union – NextGenerationEU’;

51.  Welcomes the Commission’s written replies to Parliament’s written questions as well as the machine translation of national plans, and expects to receive replies to all future requests of information, such as the matrix for the assessment of the national plans; reiterates Parliament’s expectation that information is provided in a clear and comparable format in a timely manner;

52.  Reminds the Council that, particularly at the stage of the adoption of the implementing decision, ‘relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies shall be shared with the competent committee of the European Parliament’;

53.  Invites the Commission to continue to follow an open, transparent and constructive approach during the recovery and resilience dialogues;

54.  Recalls Parliament’s position in 2020 for a stronger recovery plan and invites the Commission and the Council to assess whether additional measures or funds would be necessary to tackle this crisis;

o
o   o

55.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the European Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17. (2) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0257. (3) Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union (OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1). (4) Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action (OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 1). (5) Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment (OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 13). (6) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 1).

European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on the breach of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the use of minors by the Moroccan authorities in the migratory crisis in Ceuta (2021/2747(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0289 RC-B9-0349/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Morocco, in particular that of 16 January 2019 on the EU-Morocco Agreement(1), and to its resolution of 26 November 2019 on children’s rights on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child(2),

–  having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, in particular the principle of the best interests of the child (Articles 3 and 18),

–  having regard to the General Comments of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, in particular No 14,

–  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

–  having regard to the statement by Morocco of 1 June 2021 on the issue of unaccompanied Moroccan minors in an illegal situation in certain European countries,

–  having regard to the two statements by the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates of 31 May 2021 on the Spanish-Moroccan crisis,

–  having regard to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part(3), which entered into force in 2000, and to the 2013 Mobility Partnership,

–  having regard to the press remarks by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy after the Foreign Affairs Council on 18 May 2021,

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: a new Agenda for the Mediterranean’, notably chapter four on migration and mobility (JOIN(2021)0002),

–  having regard to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the Kingdom of Morocco on cooperation in the field of prevention of illegal emigration of unaccompanied minors, their protection and their concerted return, which was signed in Rabat on 6 March 2007 and entered into force on 2 October 2012,

–  having regard to the statement by the International Organization for Migration of 27 March 2021 on recent arrivals in Ceuta, Spain,

–  having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the relations between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco are legally based on the 2000 Association Agreement; whereas as a close neighbour, Morocco is a privileged partner of the EU in the field of political and economic cooperation as well as trade, technical and development cooperation, as reflected in the instruments to these ends, which include the annual action programmes, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, the European Neighbourhood Instrument and the Global Europe Programme, as well as Morocco’s participation in Erasmus+, and ‘advanced status’ under the European Neighbourhood Policy granted in 2008; whereas Morocco is the third-largest recipient of EU funds under the European Neighbourhood Policy;

B.  whereas the present crisis has given rise to unprecedented diplomatic tensions between Morocco, on one side, and Spain and the EU, on the other; whereas whatever the purposes may be behind the situation created in Ceuta, this unjustifiable incident does not accord with the long-established cooperation and trust-based relationship between both sides, particularly in the field of migration; whereas relations have to be safeguarded and re-established to those preceding the crisis through good neighbourhood relations, and should serve to advance the mutually beneficial relationship by implementing the new, recently published EU Agenda for the Mediterranean in the context of a renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood, in which Morocco is invited to strengthen its partnership with the EU in various areas;

C.  whereas from 17 May 2021, an unprecedented surge of crossings to Spanish territory occurred with around 9 000 people entering, swimming or walking into the Spanish autonomous city of Ceuta after the Moroccan police temporarily eased border controls, opened the gates of their border fence and did not take action to stop illegal entrance; whereas the humanitarian response by Spanish security and armed forces, NGOs and the citizens of Ceuta prevented the occurrence of a genuine tragedy; whereas most of the migrants crossing illegally were Moroccan nationals; whereas such a large movement of people can hardly be regarded as spontaneous; whereas at least 1 200 were unaccompanied minors, and many whole families; whereas some of the children were previously in school and therefore undocumented at the time of their crossing;

D.  whereas on 1 June 2021, the Moroccan authorities decided to facilitate the re-entry of all unaccompanied but identified Moroccan children who are in the European Union irregularly; whereas according to the International Organization for Migration, many have already been returned through family reunification and tracing assistance; whereas a hotline was set up by the Spanish authorities in Ceuta to reunite children and unaccompanied minors with their families; whereas, however, many of the children are still on Spanish premises, such as at the Tarajal warehouse and the migrant reception centres of Pinier and Santa Amelia, under the guardianship of the autonomous city of Ceuta, in order to undergo an assessment of their identity, personal circumstances, vulnerabilities, and risk of persecution and irreparable harm; whereas families are desperately looking for their missing children; whereas this can lead to further risks to the children’s physical, mental, moral, spiritual and social development, as enshrined in the UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child;

E.  whereas most of the children were wrongly led to believe that star footballers were playing in a match with free entrance in the city of Ceuta, and that they were on a school excursion;

F.  whereas the best interests of the child must be the primary consideration in all actions and decisions concerning unaccompanied minors and their physical and mental well-being; whereas it is therefore necessary, with the acknowledgement of and facilitation by all authorities concerned, to recognise these children and, with proper and strengthened cooperation, to find their parents or close family members and return them to their families safely as required by international law, as they did not intentionally leave their families; whereas in the EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child, the Commission recommended that Member States strengthen their guardianship systems for unaccompanied minors, in particular by participating in the activities of the European Guardianship Network; whereas under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, host countries must guarantee all rights for migrant children, including in relation to border control and return;

G.  whereas the crisis was triggered by Morocco due to a political and diplomatic crisis after the leader of the Polisario Front, Brahim Ghali, was admitted to a Spanish hospital for humanitarian reasons due to the state of his health caused by the COVID-19 virus; whereas on 2 June 2021, the Polisario Front leader arrived in Algeria;

H.  whereas the official statements issued by Morocco on 31 May 2021 stressed that the bilateral crisis was not related to the migration issue; whereas the Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs initially acknowledged that the reasons for the crisis of the mass entry of thousands of people, including children, resided in Spain welcoming the leader of the Polisario Front; whereas in another official statement issued later, the Moroccan authorities acknowledged that the real reason was Spain’s supposedly ambiguous position on Western Sahara;

I.  whereas at the special European Council meeting of 24 and 25 May 2021, EU leaders reaffirmed their full support for Spain and stressed that Spanish borders are the EU’s external borders; whereas the situation in Ceuta was also discussed at the Foreign Affairs Council of 18 May 2021, whereupon the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy expressed full solidarity with and support for Spain on behalf of the EU; whereas international law and the principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of state borders must be respected;

J.  whereas a negotiating mandate to conclude a readmission agreement with Morocco was granted by the Council to the Commission in 2000; whereas to date, no such agreement has been finalised and adopted;

K.  whereas the Moroccan authorities should facilitate the return of almost 13 000 seasonal workers stranded in the south of Spain who are due to return in the coming weeks;

1.  Rejects Morocco’s use of border control and migration, and unaccompanied minors in particular, as political pressure against a Member State of the EU; deplores, in particular, the participation of children, unaccompanied minors and families in the mass crossing of the border from Morocco to the Spanish city of Ceuta, putting their lives and safety at clear risk; regrets the deepening of the political and diplomatic crisis, which should undermine neither the strategic, multidimensional and privileged neighbourhood relations between the Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union and its Member States, nor the longstanding, trust-based cooperation in the areas of counter-terrorism, human and drugs trafficking, migration and trade policies; considers that bilateral disagreements between close partners should be addressed through diplomatic dialogue; calls for an appeasement of recent tensions, and for a return to a constructive and reliable EU-Morocco partnership; reiterates its support for continuing to advancing this relationship based on mutual trust and respect; urges Morocco, in this regard, to respect its longstanding commitment to enhanced cooperation on border management and migration mobility in a spirit of cooperation and dialogue; stresses the importance of strengthening the EU-Morocco partnership, which should take account of the needs of both partners in a balanced manner and on an equal footing;

2.  Welcomes the step taken by the Moroccan authorities on 1 June 2021 to facilitate the re-entry of all identified unaccompanied children who are on European Union territory irregularly; calls on Spain and Morocco to work closely to allow for the repatriation of children to their families, which must be guided by the best interests of the child and carried out in compliance with national and international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Morocco has been a signatory since 1990 and has twice ratified (in June and July 1993), together with the relevant agreements between the EU and its Member States and Morocco, in particular the Agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the Kingdom of Morocco on cooperation in the field of prevention of illegal migration of unaccompanied minors, their protection and their concerted return; recalls that the principle of family unity and the right to family reunification should always be safeguarded; underlines that strong cooperation on migration challenges is in the mutual interests of the EU and Morocco; calls on the Kingdom of Morocco to uphold its commitments effectively, as it is crucial to ensure the safe return of children to their families while safeguarding their rights under international law;

3.  Recalls that Ceuta is an EU external border whose protection and security concerns the whole of the European Union; welcomes the prompt reaction of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency to offer resources to support the Spanish Government to help it meet the migration challenges that have arisen as a consequence of this crisis; calls on the Commission to provide emergency funding to address the situation in Ceuta, including funding additional shelter capacity for unaccompanied children;

4.  Expresses its full solidarity with the citizens of Ceuta and applauds the efficient and professional response of the Spanish security bodies and army in the autonomous city, as well as that of NGOs and the citizens of Ceuta, in coping with the crisis and helping to save numerous lives; welcomes the protection provided to unaccompanied children by the Spanish authorities in accordance with EU law and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child;

5.  Reiterates the EU’s consolidated position on Western Sahara, which is based on full respect for international law in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions and the UN-led political process of achieving a just, lasting, peaceful and mutually acceptable negotiated solution by both parties;

6.  Reiterates the inviolability of EU Member States’ national borders and the full and non-negotiable respect for the territorial integrity of EU Member States as a basic principle of international law and as a principle of European solidarity; recalls that undermining the territorial sovereignty of the Member States cannot be tolerated;

7.  Urges the Commission and the Kingdom of Morocco to cooperate and formally conclude an EU-Morocco readmission agreement with the necessary legal safeguards as soon as possible; is convinced that future EU cooperation with the countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean should be based on the long-term objective of tackling the root causes of irregular migration by strengthening economic development, investment and the creation of new job opportunities, and promoting quality education for all children in the region;

8.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Government and Parliament of Morocco.

(1) OJ C 411, 27.11.2020, p. 292. (2) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0066. (3) OJ L 70, 18.3.2000, p. 2.

European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on the situation in Sri Lanka, in particular the arrests under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2021/2748(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0290 RC-B9-0355/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Sri Lanka,

–  having regard to the report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka’,

–  having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 23 March 2021 entitled ‘Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka’,

–  having regard to Regulations No. 01 of 2021 published on 12 March 2021 under Sri Lanka’s Prevention of Terrorism Act,

–  having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism of 14 December 2018 entitled ‘Visit to Sri Lanka’,

–  having regard to the statement by Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, of 24 February 2021 on Sri Lanka,

–  having regard to the final report of January 2020 of the European Union Election Observation Mission to the Sri Lanka Presidential Election of 16 November 2019,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,

–  having regard to the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+), the special incentive programme of which Sri Lanka is a beneficiary,

–  having regard to Rule 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas Sri Lanka has been marred by a decades-long civil war which ended in 2009, during which serious human rights violations were committed by both sides;

B.  whereas the human rights situation in Sri Lanka has been steadily deteriorating, with the new government rapidly backtracking on the limited progress achieved under previous administrations; whereas the space in which civil society and an independent media can operate in the country is rapidly shrinking;

C.  whereas the controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) has been in place in Sri Lanka since 1979 and grants the police broad powers to search, arrest and detain civilian suspects; whereas the wide-ranging powers provided for in the PTA have led to consistent and well-founded allegations of torture and sexual abuse, forced confessions and systematic denials of due process;

D.  whereas in her most recent report on Sri Lanka, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reiterated the calls for a moratorium on the use of the PTA for new arrests until it is replaced by legislation that adheres to international best practices;

E.  whereas the Government of Sri Lanka issued Regulations No. 01 of 2021 on 9 March 2021, expanding the PTA and, inter alia, allowing for two years of detention without trial for causing ‘religious, racial, or communal disharmony’;

F.  whereas the PTA has been systematically used for arbitrary arrests and the detention of Muslims and minority groups in Sri Lanka, including Ahnaf Jazeem, a 26-year-old Muslim teacher and poet, and Hejaaz Hizbullah, a well-known lawyer for minority rights and the rule of law;

G.  whereas on 19 May 2017 Sri Lanka regained access to generous tariff preferences under the GSP+, on the condition that it replaces its PTA and effectively implements 27 international conventions, including human rights conventions; whereas the European Union has repeatedly expressed concern over the PTA and noted Sri Lanka’s failure to repeal the act despite its commitment to doing so;

H.  whereas on 20 October 2020 the Sri Lankan Parliament passed the 20th Amendment to the Constitution, reinforcing the executive presidency;

I.  whereas nearly 12 years on from the end of the war, domestic initiatives for accountability and reconciliation have repeatedly failed to produce results, thus more deeply entrenching impunity and exacerbating victims’ distrust in the system;

J.  whereas there are clear signs of the accelerating militarisation of civilian government functions in Sri Lanka; whereas since 2020, at least 28 serving or former military and intelligence personnel were appointed to key administrative posts; whereas those appointments include at least two senior military officials who were implicated in UN reports in alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity during the final years of the conflict; whereas many suspects in police custody as well as inmates in Sri Lankan prison complexes have been killed; whereas the most recent cases include deaths in police custody in May 2021; whereas 11 inmates at Mahara prison were killed and 117 others injured when guards opened fire to control a riot over COVID-19 conditions in November 2020;

K.  whereas authorities in Sri Lanka handed down capital punishment sentences for drug-related offences in 2019, despite the existence of a moratorium on the use of capital punishment in the country since 1976;

1.  Expresses deep concern over Sri Lanka’s alarming path towards the recurrence of grave human rights violations as described by the most recent UN report on the country, which lists among the early warning signs the accelerating militarisation of civilian governmental functions, the reversal of important constitutional safeguards, political obstruction of accountability, exclusionary rhetoric, intimidation of civil society, and the use of anti-terrorism laws;

2.  Reiterates its strong opposition to the continued application of the current PTA; calls on the Sri Lankan authorities to fulfil their pledge to review and repeal the act and replace it with anti-terrorism legislation which adheres to international best practices; further calls for the immediate suspension of the deradicalisation regulations;

3.  Points out that Regulations No. 01 of 2021 do not provide for procedural guarantees for any person deprived of their liberty as laid down in Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and that they violate Sri Lanka’s own constitutional guarantees under Article 13 of the Sri Lankan Constitution; recalls that deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration centres, which are regulated under similar legislation, have in the past been rife with serious human rights violations such as torture and other ill-treatment, including sexual and gender-based violence;

4.  Expresses grave concern about the arbitrary arrests and detention under the PTA without due process and access to justice, including for civil society activists, lawyers, writers and poets such as Hejaaz Hizbullah and Ahnaf Jazeem; notes with concern the detention of Shani Abeysekara, the former director of the Criminal Investigation Department; urges the Government of Sri Lanka to immediately give those detained a fair trial on valid charges and, if there are no charges, to release them unconditionally;

5.  Deplores the continuing discrimination against and violence towards religious and ethnic minorities and communities in Sri Lanka, including Muslims, Hindus, Tamils and Christians; calls on the Government of Sri Lanka to unequivocally condemn hate speech, incitement to violence and discrimination against religious and ethnic groups in the country, and to hold to account those who advance such divisions, including within the government and military;

6.  Notes the adoption of the 20th Amendment to the Constitution and expresses serious concern about the resulting decline in judiciary independence, the reduction of parliamentary control, and the excessive accumulation of power with the presidency;

7.  Notes with concern the Government of Sri Lanka’s recent proposal to enact a new law on disinformation despite concerns raised by civil society organisations about the threats such a law could pose to the freedom of expression; urges online platforms to take proactive steps to moderate the circulation of hate speech and disinformation online in the Sinhalese and Tamil languages;

8.  Is concerned that provisions in Sri Lanka’s Penal Code, notably sections 365, 365A and 399, have been interpreted in such a way as to criminalise individuals with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities;

9.  Calls on the Commission to urgently evaluate its funding for the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and INTERPOL project ‘Support to Sri Lanka on Counter-Terrorism’ while counterterrorism in Sri Lanka is in certain cases being used as a pretext on which to persecute members of ethnic and religious groups and civil society, including human rights defenders; calls on the EU Delegation to Sri Lanka and the Member States’ representations to increase their support to civil society, especially human rights defenders, environmental defenders and journalists;

10.  Underlines the crucial importance of ensuring that the national reconciliation process is given the necessary attention and results in concrete actions, including accountability for enforced disappearances and past crimes; regrets Sri Lanka’s withdrawal from the commitments it made to the UN Human Rights Council in the context of its sponsorship of resolution of 14 October 2015 entitled ‘Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka’, and encourages it to re-engage with the council, which is instrumental in restoring relations with the international community and creating a process of national reconciliation between the diverse Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim, Hindu and Christian communities;

11.  Calls on the Government of Sri Lanka to prevent any hindrance of the investigation and possible prosecution of members of the security forces accused of serious human rights abuses; insists that an investigation be carried out into allegations of grave human rights abuses and war crimes committed during the civil war by senior figures from all sides; asks the Government of Sri Lanka to end the practice of appointing current and former military commanders implicated in serious abuses to senior government positions;

12.  Calls for a rigorous, impartial and complete investigation into the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings in line with international legal standards; calls, furthermore, for those against whom there is evidence of culpability to promptly be brought to trial, and for those for whom there is insufficient evidence to be released;

13.  Recalls that the GSP+ scheme offers the incentive of better access to the EU market for the country’s exporters, in return for further progress in fully implementing those conventions; recalls that one of Sri Lanka’s key commitments was to fully align its counterterrorism legislation with international human rights conventions in order to secure a favourable trading relationship under the GSP+; recalls the consequences foreseen in the GSP Regulation(1) in the event of a persistent failure to adopt and enact the necessary human rights reforms, repeal abusive legislation and reverse the current trajectory of increasing violations;

14.  Underlines that the GSP+ scheme offered to Sri Lanka has made a significant contribution to the country’s economy, from which exports to the EU have increased to EUR 2.3 billion, making the EU Sri Lanka’s second-largest export market; highlights the ongoing monitoring of Sri Lanka’s eligibility for GSP+ status and stresses that the continuance of GSP+ trade preferences is not automatic; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to take into due account current events when assessing Sri Lanka’s eligibility for GSP+ status; further calls on the Commission and the EEAS to use the GSP+ as a leverage to push for advancement on Sri Lanka’s human rights obligations and demand the repeal or replacement of the PTA, to carefully assess whether there is sufficient reason, as a last resort, to initiate a procedure for the temporary withdrawal of Sri Lanka’s GSP+ status and the benefits that come with it, and to report to Parliament on this matter as soon as possible;

15.  Notes with concern the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the deteriorating labour rights’ situation in the country; urges Sri Lanka to cooperate fully with the International Labour Organization (ILO) to strengthen the labour rights of factory workers, including health and safety conditions for garment workers in special trade zones; calls on the Government of Sri Lanka to effectively implement and strengthen the National Policy on Elimination of Child Labour; calls on the Sri Lankan authorities to adapt the Board of Investment of Sri Lanka Labour Standard and Employment Relation Manual in order to bring it in line with international standards, notably ILO Convention Nos 87 and 98;

16.  Reiterates the European Union’s strong opposition to the death penalty, in all cases and without exception; welcomes Sri Lanka’s continued moratorium on the death penalty; urges the government to abolish the use of capital punishment in the country;

17.  Welcomes the EU’s past support for reconciliation efforts and underscores the EU’s readiness to support Sri Lanka in this field;

18.  Expresses concern about the growing role and interference of China in Sri Lanka;

19.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the Secretary-General of the UN, the UN Human Rights Council, and the Government and Parliament of Sri Lanka.

(1) Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences, OJ L 303, 31.10.2012, p. 1.

European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on the listing of German NGOs as ‘undesirable organisations’ by Russia and the detention of Andrei Pivovarov (2021/2749(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0291 RC-B9-0347/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia, among others its resolution of 29 April 2021 on Russia, the case of Alexei Navalny, the military build-up on Ukraine’s border and Russia’s attacks in the Czech Republic(1), and its resolution of 12 May 2016 on the Crimean Tatars(2),

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

–  having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights and the Protocols thereto, in particular Article 10 thereof on the right to freedom of expression and Article 11 thereof on the right to freedom of assembly and association,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

–  having regard to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and to the international human rights obligations to which Russia has committed itself as Member of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN),

–  having regard to the Opinion No 814/2015 of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe of 13 June 2016 on Federal Law No. 129-FZ on Amending Certain Legislative Acts (Federal Law on undesirable activities of foreign and international non-governmental organisations),

–  having regard to the declaration by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU of 1 May 2021 on the imposition of restrictive measures against eight EU nationals,

–  having regard to the declaration by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU of 15 May 2021 on the publication of a list of so-called ‘unfriendly States’,

–  having regard to the statement by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service (EEAS) of 27 May 2021 on the listing of German NGOs as ‘undesirable organisations’,

–  having regard to the statement by the Spokesperson of the EEAS of 1 June 2021 on the detention of Andrei Pivovarov,

–  having regard to the statement by the Spokesperson of the EEAS of 4 June 2021 on the law on so-called ‘extremist organisations’,

–  having regard to statement by the Chair of the Delegation to the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee of 3 June 2021 on the detention of Mr Andrey Pivovarov, Director of the dissolved ONG ‘Open Russia’ on board of an EU commercial airplane about to take off from St. Petersburg airport,

–  having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the exercise of freedom of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly is a fundamental right enshrined in the constitution of the Russian Federation, as well as in numerous international legal instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights, all of which Russia has committed itself to; whereas the primacy of international law constitutes an obligation for Russia, which cannot be modified or derogated from by the recent constitutional changes;

B.  whereas the Russian Federation has recently adopted repressive laws that have drastically expanded the scope of the individuals and groups that can be designated as ‘foreign agents’ and have increased the restrictions and requirements imposed on them, along with the sanctions for the violation thereof;

C.  whereas non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play a crucial role in modern democratic societies, allowing citizens to cooperate in order to promote various legitimate goals, as a form of necessary public engagement complementing, preparing and monitoring formal political decision-making; whereas NGOs therefore have an important political role and, while abiding by the law, must keep their independence from any undue interference by public authorities;

D.  whereas the Federal Law on undesirable activities of foreign and international non-governmental organisations allows the activities of foreign and international non-governmental organisations to be deemed undesirable on the territory of the Russian Federation; whereas organisations declared undesirable by the Russian authorities face restrictions on their freedom of association by having their activities prohibited and by the introduction of administrative and criminal sanctions linked to these activities; whereas this law has been used by the Russian authorities to facilitate the crackdown on independent civil society organisations active in Russia;

E.  whereas by adopting these laws, the Russian Federation has granted the authorities near total control over independent civil society organisations and empowered Russia’s federal media watchdog (Roskomnadzor) to block online resources; whereas the Russian authorities have banned rallies in public places, curbed the right to participate in single-picket protests and imposed additional restrictions on journalists covering these protests;

F.  whereas on 12 January 2021, Russia’s telecommunications watchdog Roskomnadzor drew up its first eight administrative protocols - all against Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty - for violating the ‘foreign agents’ law; whereas the legislation has been expanded to include individual reporters; whereas, to date, Roskomnadzor has presented Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty with 520 violations of its labelling restrictions, which are expected to result - once all are adjudicated by Russian courts - in fines of USD 2,4 million; whereas in May 2021 Russian authorities began seizing property from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Moscow bureau;

G.  whereas the most recent bill adopted by the State Duma and the Council of Federation in May 2021 drastically restricted rights and liberties in Russia by imposing harsh restrictions on individuals who criticise the government, barring them from participating in public life and running for elections at any level, including the 2021 parliamentary elections, if they have founded, led, worked for, or otherwise participated in the activities of an organisation which is designated as ‘extremist’ or ‘terrorist’ from now on by this bill;

H.  whereas this bill also provides for its retroactive application and is targeted against Aleksei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation, which has already been declared a ‘foreign agent’ and now is in the process of being designated as an ‘extremist organisation’;

I.  whereas the Russian Federation has also broadened the scope of the law on ‘undesirable organisations’ by introducing a prohibition on participation in their activities abroad and assigning the status of ‘undesirable’ to organisations that are believed to be intermediaries in financial transactions with those already banned;

J.  whereas the Russian Federation has designated numerous international and foreign NGOs as ‘undesirable’, including US-based International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute, National Endowment for Democracy, Atlantic Council, as well as the EU funded European Endowment for Democracy, Association of Schools of Political Studies of the Council of Europe, Ukrainian World Congress, media outlets run by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and also by the decision of the Russian Prosecutor General of 26 May 2021 to list three German NGOs as ‘undesirable’, which include the Forum Russischsprachiger Europäer e.V., Zentrum für die Liberale Moderne GmbH and Deutsch-Russischer Austausch e.V.;

K.  whereas an active civil society sphere is a crucial component of a democratic and open society, as well as for safeguarding human rights and the rule of law;

L.  whereas the State Duma, by adopting these bills which include an immediate application of criminal liability, has been targeting the Open Russia civic movement, a networked pro-democracy and human rights structure, which was thereby forced to dissolve in order to protect its activists and supporters from further prosecutions;

M.  whereas on 27 May 2021, Open Russia announced that it would cease its activities to protect its staff and members from criminal prosecution under the Russian legislation on ‘undesirable organisations’;

N.  whereas on 31 May 2021, the former leader of the Open Russia movement, Andrei Pivovarov, was taken off a taxiing Polish LOT plane in Saint Petersburg, arbitrarily detained and two days later placed in pre-trial detention for two months on charges of ‘carrying out activities of an undesirable organisation’ for which he could face up to six years in prison; whereas the activist from Nizhny Novgorod, Mikhail Iosilevich, is also among those who are currently being criminally prosecuted and detained under the same charges;

O.  whereas these actions add to the plethora of politically motivated criminal prosecutions launched by the Russian Federation against individuals who express dissenting views or have announced their ambitions to run for the parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2021 in Russia, such as the jailing of anti-corruption campaigner and opposition politician Aleksei Navalny or the suspended five-year sentence handed down to left-wing opposition blogger and politician Nikolai Platoshkin; draws equal attention to the recent cases against opposition politician Dmitry Gudkov, against media outlets such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Meduza and VTimes, and a number of journalists, accused of being ‘foreign agents’; whereas even student magazines are being targeted by repressive measures; whereas, according to the Memorial Human Rights Centre, the Russian authorities are currently holding nearly 400 political prisoners in violation of the Russian Federation’s obligations;

P.  whereas the Russian authorities have severely clamped down on the peaceful protesters who took to the streets across the country to support Aleksei Navalny and protest against corruption and injustice; whereas according to the Russian monitoring organisation OVD-Info, over 11 000 protesters were arrested during three days of protests in January and February, including dozens of independent journalists and human rights defenders who were covering or monitoring the protests; whereas thousands of administrative prosecutions and more than 100 criminal cases have been initiated across the country, and further arrests and detentions on spurious charges are ongoing;

Q.  whereas according to numerous reports, peaceful protesters sentenced to ‘administrative detention’ have been subjected to ill-treatment, including, inter alia, being placed in severely overcrowded detention facilities, denied food and water for several hours, and being made to spend lengthy periods of time (several hours at a time, often at night time) in police vans during transfer; whereas people who participated in the protests have also reported that they were threatened with expulsion or were expelled from universities or colleges or have lost their jobs; whereas peaceful protesters, including older people and children, were also subjected to excessive use of force by the riot police;

R.  whereas it is crucial to ensure in a comprehensive EU strategy towards Russia that engagement with Russia does not compromise on the values of democracy and the protection of human rights;

S.  whereas the Kremlin regime is doing everything in its power to isolate the people of Russia from the international community and to deprive them of their hope for a democratic future, including through resorting to various ways of prohibiting opposition candidates from participating in the 2021 parliamentary elections in Russia;

T.  whereas research carried out by the Levada Center shows that the ruling United Russia Party is polling at historic lows after backing an unpopular pension reform and pushing through the adoption of a draft of constitutional amendments, including one that could enable President Vladimir Putin to remain in office until 2036; whereas the growing repression against civil society and the political opposition by the Russian authorities reveals the authorities’ fear of popular discontent with the country’s poor socio-economic performance and the corruption of the ruling class;

1.  Calls on the Russian authorities to:

2.  Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the EU Delegations, the Member States and the Commission in preparation of the comprehensive EU strategy towards Russia, and in response to the erosion of the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights in Russia, to focus on:

3.  Expresses its support for all individuals and organisations who are targets of repression, and urges the Russian authorities to stop their acts of harassment and intimidation and their attacks on civil society, the media, human rights organisations and activists; condemns the Russian authorities’ failure to protect these actors against attacks and acts of harassment and intimidation by third parties and to impartially investigate such attacks against them;

4.  Reminds all EU businesses operating in Russia to exercise particular diligence and uphold their responsibility to respect human rights, in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: is concerned with high-ranking European politicians accepting lucrative contracts with Kremlin-owned or linked companies such as Gazprom or Rosnieft;

5.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the President, Government and the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0159. (2) OJ C 76, 28.2.2018, p. 27.

European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on the human rights and political situation in Cuba (2021/2745(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0292 RC-B9-0341/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Cuba, in particular those of 15 November 2018(1) on the human rights situation in Cuba, of 3 December 2019(2) on the case of José Daniel Ferrer, and of 5 July 2017 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part(3),

–  having regard to the PDCA between the European Union and Cuba signed in December 2016 and provisionally applied since 1 November 2017(4),

–  having regard to the hearing on Cuba of the Delegation for Relations with the Countries of Central America, held on 11 December 2020,

–  having regard to the informal video conference of the members of the EU-Cuba Joint Council of 20 January 2021(5),

–  having regard to the third formal Human Rights Dialogue under the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA), held on 26 February 2021(6),

–  having regard to the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review on Cuba of May 2018,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other international human rights treaties and instruments,

–  having regard to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the general recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,

–  having regard to reports by human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Foundation and Prisoners Defenders, to chapter IV.B on Cuba of the 2020 Annual Report of the IACHR, to the Communication of 6 November 2019 to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, and the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, on the Cuban medical brigades, and to the conclusions of the latest Universal Periodic Review of Cuba 2018, on the Cuban medical brigades,

–  having regard to the reports of the Cuban Observatory for Human Rights from the 12 months to May 2021 on repressive actions and arbitrary detentions,

–  having regard to the public hearings of the 179th Period of Sessions of the IACHR,

–  having regard to IACHR resolutions 7/2021, 14/2021 and 24/2021,

–  having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1984, to which Cuba is a State Party,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which Cuba is a signatory,

–  having regard to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders,

–  having regard the Cuban Constitution and its Penal Code,

–  having regard to Resolution 168 of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Investment of the Republic of Cuba of 29 March 2010, to Law 1312 of 12 September 1976 (the so-called ‘Migration Law’) and its regulatory decrees No. 26 of 18 December 2015 and No. 306 of 12 October 2012, to the American Convention on Human Rights and to the 2020 annual report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of April 2021,

–  having regard to the International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions ratified by Cuba,

–  having regard to the definition of ‘civil society organisation’ in the Official Journal of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas with the PDCA, signed in 2016, both parties reaffirmed their respect for universal human rights as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international instruments on human rights; whereas on 5 July 2017, the European Parliament granted its consent to the EU-Cuba PDCA;

B.  whereas Parliament adopted a resolution in 2017 reaffirming its views on democracy, universal human rights and fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression, assembly and political association, and freedom of information in all its forms;

C.  whereas human rights, freedom, dignity, and the well-being of people are best represented and defended in a democracy, which means, among other things, alternation of power, free and fair elections and respect for political pluralism; whereas Article 5 of the recently approved Cuban Constitution underlines the Communist Party of Cuba as the ultimate state authority, reinforced by Articles 4 and 229 underscoring socialism as an irreversible system; whereas the new Constitution of 2019 has served not only to shield the system and freeze any process of reforming freedoms and rights, but also to extend their limitation; whereas the regime seriously restricts people with different political convictions from participating in public political life and holding political office; whereas there is a continuing absence of conditions that provide guarantees for judicial independence, especially around cases involving activists and dissidents;

D.  whereas Decree 349 restricts artists’ freedom of expression by requiring prior authorisation for public and private performances and exhibitions; whereas Decree 370 on online content establishes an ambiguous framework that allows for the persecution of activists and independent journalists, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas the Cuban Penal Code includes provisions such as ‘state of danger’ and ‘pre-criminal security measures’ for which more than 8 000 people are being held in prison with no attributable crime, and 2 500 more have been condemned to forced labour;

E.  whereas since the entry into force of the PDCA almost four years ago, there has been no concrete progress in Cuba vis-à-vis the general principles and objectives pursued by the agreement towards improving the situation of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and economic and social conditions for Cuban citizens; whereas on the contrary, the Cuban regime has increased its repression and human rights violations and the situation has continued to deteriorate throughout Cuban society, producing new waves of resistance and peaceful demonstrations from significant sectors that have been repressed and brutally crushed by the Cuban regime’s repressive structures;

F.  whereas opinion 50/2020 of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, distributed on 14 October 2020, warns that the systemic violation of human rights by the Cuban authorities is common practice; whereas 199 cases of political prisoners in Cuba were registered in last twelve months to 1 June 2021, with 65 new cases of political imprisonment; whereas April has been the most repressive month since the start of 2021, as the Cuban Human Rights Observatory (OCDH) has documented more than 1 018 repressive actions against human rights activists and independent journalists, of which 206 were arbitrary detentions and 13 involved serious violence; whereas according to the Prisoners Defenders organisation, there are currently 150 political prisoners in Cuba;

G.  whereas in the light of the analysis carried out by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on 11 February 2021, precautionary measures in favour of 20 identified members of the San Isidro Movement (MSI) were adopted and it is sufficiently proven that the rights to life and personal integrity of the identified persons are at serious risk; whereas the Cuban authorities illegally broke into the house of independent artist and San Isidro Movement coordinator Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara, and arbitrarily detained him for several hours without any charges; whereas Denis Solís González, a member of the MSI, is arbitrarily being held in prison charged with contempt, and Luis Robles Elizástegui is in prison just for carrying a poster peacefully calling for the release of Denis Solís González; whereas Maykel Castillo Pérez, a member of the MSI and co-creator of the song ‘Patria y Vida’ is being imprisoned arbitrarily and was communicated as disappeared for 14 days by the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances;

H.  whereas contrary to requests by Parliament, there have been no visits to political prisoners in prison or any observation of trials of opponents, dissidents, human rights activists or independent civil society by the EU; whereas international human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Prisoners Defenders among many other independent observers of the human rights situation, including UN Special Rapporteurs, are not allowed to enter Cuba despite years of insisting on the need to visit the island;

I.  whereas Resolution 168 of 2010 of the Ministry of International Trade and Foreign Investment of Cuba, imposes on all civil employees abroad who work for the state or for state-owned enterprises, including medical personnel, unjustified duties and obligations that violate human dignity and the most basic and fundamental human rights; whereas all civil employees who do not finish medical missions or decide not to go back to Cuba are punished under the Cuban Penal Code with eight years in prison; whereas these medical missions have been classified as a modern form of slavery according to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the statement of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (CUB6/2019) on the Cuban medical missions underscored the precarious and inhumane working conditions of the medical personnel, allegations that were supported by Human Rights Watch and 622 testimonies;

J.  whereas Cuba has ratified the eight fundamental conventions of the ILO; whereas Cuba is breaching ILO Conventions 29 and 105 on forced labour;

K.  whereas Parliament has awarded its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to Cuban activists on three occasions: Oswaldo Payá in 2002, the Ladies in White (Berta Soler) in 2005 and Guillermo Fariñas in 2010; whereas the Cuban authorities have systematically prevented Sakharov laureates and their relatives from leaving the country and participating in international events, including those organised by the European Parliament, despite numerous invitations, the last time being on 11 December 2020; whereas their tactics have included harassment, intimidation and the arbitrary arrest of Berta Soler and Reinaldo Escobar, as well as restricting the internet connections of the other participants; whereas the Chair of the Delegation for Relations with the Countries of Central America, the Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and a Vice-President of Parliament signed a joint declaration repudiating the harassment of the activists; whereas there are concerns over their defence and support by the EU delegation in Havana; whereas neither the European External Action Service (EEAS) nor the EU Delegation in Cuba have made a statement defending them or shown any kind of public or private support;

L.  whereas the current EU Ambassador in Havana signed a letter addressed to the President of the United States, requesting, among other things, the lifting of the US embargo on the island, as well as non-interference in Cuban affairs; whereas this fact constitutes a clear over-reaching of the Ambassador’s diplomatic functions and illustrates the highly politicised role played by the EU embassy in Havana; whereas current EU Ambassador in Havana has publicly made statements affirming that ‘Cuba is not a dictatorship’;

M.  whereas the Cuban Government refused the participation of independent civil society organisations in the ‘EU-Cuba Civil Society Seminars’ that took place ahead of the third formal Human Rights Dialogue; whereas on 26 February 2021, the EU and Cuba held their third formal Human Rights Dialogue under the PDCA; whereas the two sides discussed the issue of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; whereas the EU recalled the need to respect international human rights law obligations; whereas the dialogue is intended to produce tangible results and cannot be considered a goal in itself; whereas any political dialogue must include direct intensive participation of independent civil society and all opposition political actors with no restrictions, as stressed in Article 36 of the PDCA;

N.  whereas Parliament has, on several occasions, invited the diplomatic representatives of the Cuban Government to hearings and activities regarding Cuba; whereas these invitations were not only declined, but also responded to in the form of letters full of insults and unfounded accusations against Parliament and its Members; whereas Parliament is most likely the only EU institution which has not been granted permission to visit the country following the provisional entry into force of the PDCA, an attitude which clearly contradicts the essential element upon which a political dialogue agreement should be based;

O.  whereas the PDCA included a so-called ‘human rights clause’, which is a standard essential element of EU international agreements that allows the PDCA to be suspended in the event of violations of the provisions on human rights;

1.  Strongly condemns the existence of political prisoners, the persistent and permanent political persecution, acts of harassment and arbitrary detentions of dissidents in Cuba; also condemns the current attacks against artists of the San Isidro Movement, peaceful dissidents, independent journalists, human rights defenders and members of the political opposition; calls for an immediate end to these actions and urges the Cuban authorities immediately to release all political prisoners and those arbitrarily detained solely on the grounds of exercising their freedom of expression and assembly; strongly condemns the arbitrary detention of Aymara Nieto Muñoz, Mitzael Díaz Paseiro, Iván Amaro Hidalgo, Edilberto Ronal Arzuaga Alcalá, Yandier García Labrada, Denis Solís González, Luis Robles Elizástegui and the 77 prisoners of conscience; expresses solidarity with the members of the San Isidro Movement and all activists and human rights defenders in their efforts to advance freedom of expression in Cuba;

2.  Calls for better guarantees for the right to a fair trial and for the independence of the judiciary, and to ensure that persons deprived of their liberty have access to an independent lawyer; regrets the 1 941 acts of repression that occurred in April (1018) and May 2021 (923); demands that those detained be allowed independent medical evaluation, access to telephone communication and regular visits from family, friends, journalists, and diplomats;

3.  Deeply regrets the lack of commitment and willingness of the Cuban regime to endeavour to advance towards even minimal progress towards change or to open channels that could allow for ways to reform the regime, which would improve social and political participation as well as the living conditions of citizens; regrets the fact that, despite the entry into force of the PDCA almost four years ago, the situation regarding human rights and democracy has not improved and has not led to any substantial and tangible positive result for the Cuban people; calls for compliance with the binding obligations set out in this agreement and calls for clear benchmarks be adopted in this respect;

4.  Acknowledges the right of the Cuban people to demand the democratisation of their country through a dialogue with civil society and the political opposition in order to establish a roadmap towards democratic multi-party elections;

5.  Demands that the Cuban Government implement legal reforms in order to guarantee freedom of the press, association and demonstration, and launch the political reforms enabling free, fair and democratic elections that take account of the sovereign and freely expressed will of the Cuban people; urges the Cuban Government to align its human rights policy with the international standards defined in the charters, declarations and international instruments to which Cuba is a signatory and to allow civil society and political opposition to actively participate in political and social life with no restrictions; calls on the Cuban Government to recognise independent journalism as a legitimate practice and to respect the rights of independent journalists in Cuba;

6.  Calls for the immediate repeal of Decrees 349 and 370 and other Cuban laws that violate freedom of expression;

7.  Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to acknowledge the existence of political opposition to the Cuban Government, and therefore to include it in the institutionalised, formal, open and public political dialogues between the EU and Cuba, upholding the pillars of the PDCA;

8.  Regrets that the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Havana excluded the Cuban democratic opposition and both European and Cuban independent civil society organisations from the political dialogues due to the lack of endorsement by the Cuban authorities; underlines that this decision is contrary to the PDCA and stresses that both parties have an obligation to fully comply with the agreement; calls on the VP/HR and the EEAS to refuse to participate in future political and human rights dialogues with Cuba unless civil society is adequately represented;

9.  Reminds the EEAS that the participation of civil society in the political dialogues and the agreement’s cooperation projects is an essential part of the PDCA and that excluding civil society from cooperation funds and/or participation in the agreement while, on the contrary, allowing participation and access to cooperation funds exclusively for companies in which the state participates or which it controls, as has been the case since the signing of the agreement, should be remedied immediately;

10.  Condemns the systemic labour and human rights violations committed by the Cuban state against its healthcare personnel assigned to work abroad on the medical missions, which are in breach of core ILO conventions ratified by Cuba; urges Cuba to effectively implement and comply with the American Convention on Human Rights and ILO Conventions 29 and 105 respectively; calls on the Cuban Government to ensure the right of Cubans to exit and return to their country, including for doctors deployed in medical missions abroad, in line with international human rights standards; calls on the Cuban Government to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and to ensure the rights to freedom of association, including the registration of organisations, and collective bargaining, in line with ILO standards;

11.  Calls on the EEAS to insist that the Cuban authorities fulfil the binding obligations established in the PDCA between the EU and Cuba, in particular concerning respect for basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, as stressed in Articles 1(5), 2(c), 5, 22 and43(2) of the agreement respectively; insists therefore that the European Union closely follow and monitor respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba when implementing the PDCA, and submit regular reports relating thereto to Parliament;

12.  Considers that the imprisonment of Denis Solís González, Luis Robles Elizástegui, Maykel Castillo Pérez (‘Osorbo’), who is a member of the MSI and co-creator of the song ‘Patria y Vida’ and is being imprisoned arbitrarily and was communicated as disappeared for 14 days by the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances, and more than 120 political prisoners and convicts of conscience, and all the arbitrary and repressive actions registered in April and June 2021, constitute a breach of the agreement and a case of special urgency, as established in Article 85 (3b) of the PDCA; calls for the EU to convene an urgent meeting in this regard accordingly;

13.  Deeply regrets the Cuban authorities’ refusal to allow European Parliament delegations to visit Cuba; calls on the authorities to permit entry to the country as soon as the sanitary conditions allows; calls on all Member States’ representatives to address the issues of human rights violations in Cuba while visiting the Cuban authorities and to meet with Sakharov laureates in order to guarantee the coherent internal and external implementation of the human rights policy of the European Union;

14.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government and National Assembly of People’s Power of Cuba, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

(1) OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 70. (2) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0073. (3) OJ C 334, 19.9.2018, p. 99. (4) OJ L 337 I, 13.12.2016, p. 3. (5) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2021/01/20/ (6) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/eeas-statement-of-28-february-2021-on-th/product-details/20210409DPU29364

European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on the systematic repression in Belarus and its consequences for European security following the abductions from an EU civilian plane intercepted by Belarusian authorities (2021/2741(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0293 RC-B9-0328/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus,

–  having regard to the European Council conclusions on Belarus of 12 October 2020 and 24 May 2021,

–  having regard to the declarations by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU, in particular that of 24 May 2021 on the forced diversion of Ryanair flight FR4978 to Minsk on 23 May 2021,

–  having regard to the joint statement by the G7 foreign ministers and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 27 May 2021 on Belarus,

–  having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/908 of 4 June 2021 amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus(1), whereby it introduced a ban on the overflight of EU airspace and on access to EU airports by Belarusian carriers of all kinds,

–  having regard to the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) of 26 March 2021 on the EU’s support to the International Accountability Platform for Belarus,

–  having regard to the report of the Moscow Mechanism rapporteur of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of 5 November 2020 on alleged human rights violations related to the presidential election of 9 August 2020 in Belarus,

–  having regard to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and the Montreal Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to all human rights conventions to which Belarus is a party,

–  having regard to the awarding of the European Parliament’s 2020 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to the democratic opposition in Belarus,

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas on 23 May 2021 a Polish-registered aircraft serving Ryanair flight FR4978, an international passenger flight between two EU capitals (Athens to Vilnius), while in Belarusian airspace, was forcefully diverted on the orders of Aliaksandr Lukashenka and was escorted by a Belarusian fighter jet to Minsk National Airport based on the false pretence of a bomb threat, jeopardising the safety of the more than 170 passengers and crew on board, many of them EU citizens;

B.  whereas the Belarusian authorities did not discover any explosive devices, but detained two passengers – Raman Pratasevich, a Belarusian national, and his companion Sofia Sapega, a Russian national and student of the European Humanities University in Vilnius;

C.  whereas Raman Pratasevich is a Belarusian journalist, activist and former editor-in-chief of the influential Telegram channel Nexta, which played a pivotal role in informing the population about the abuses committed by the authorities and in mobilising protests in Belarus after the falsified presidential election on 9 August 2020, thereby contributing to disclosing the regime’s systematic repression and serious human rights violations; whereas Raman Pratasevich had been living in exile in the EU since 2019 to avoid fabricated criminal charges and had been granted political asylum in the EU;

D.  whereas Raman Pratasevich’s unlawful detention and inhuman treatment by the Belarusian regime, including forced confessions in staged interviews broadcast by the Belarusian state television, are of the greatest concern to the international community and underline the urgency of coordinated international action, in particular since Belarus remains the only European country that still applies capital punishment, and is therefore not a member of the Council of Europe; whereas Raman Pratasevich did not look like a person making confessions of his own free will, and whereas any forced confessions are prohibited under the Convention against Torture; whereas his lawyers are still denied access to him and Aliaksandr Lukashenka threatened to invite investigators from the Russian-occupied Donbas region to interrogate him; whereas Raman Pratasevich has been put on the terrorist watch list and thus risks facing capital punishment;

E.  whereas the interception of a civilian aircraft constitutes a serious breach of international conventions in the area of aviation safety and highlights the international consequences of the continuous and incessant repression in Belarus for security in Europe and unmistakably demonstrates that the regime has become a threat to international peace and security; whereas the forced landing of the plane as an act of state-sponsored terrorism and the arrest of a so-called enemy of the Belarusian regime was designed to send a chilling signal to all of its opponents, in particular those living abroad, that the regime is determined to hunt them down and that they are not safe abroad;

F.  whereas an investigation by the International Civil Aviation Organization is ongoing; whereas in addition to Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega several unidentified persons also disembarked in Minsk; whereas the Russian Federation has detained several Belarusian opposition activists who fled to Moscow and continues to support the Belarusian regime, also financially;

G.  whereas the Belarusian authorities have continued their repression against the peaceful Belarusian people, with many citizens being harassed, arrested and convicted for expressing opposition to the regime or to the widespread human rights violations taking place in Belarus; whereas more than 34 000 Belarusian are estimated to have been detained at some point for protesting against the regime, before and after the 9 August 2020 elections; whereas there are over 470 political prisoners in Belarus, including 7 minors; whereas some 3 000 politically motivated criminal cases have been opened against protestors, and there are 4 600 claims of torture, violence and ill-treatment;

H.  whereas the human rights situation in Belarus continues to deteriorate, with growing numbers of political prisoners; whereas human rights defenders have documented hundreds of cases of torture and ill-treatment, while several people are missing or were found dead; whereas inhumane treatment, torture and deliberate refusal to provide medical care continue in Belarusian detention centres and prisons, where several protesters, such as Vitold Ashurak, died under suspicious circumstances, while others, such as 17-year-old Dzmitry Stakhouski and Stsiapan Latypou, were harassed and threatened to the point of attempting to commit suicide;

I.  whereas on 25 May 2021 European Belarus activists Yauhen Afnahel, Pavel Yukhnevich, Maksim Viniarski and Andrei Voinich, opposition leader Pavel Seviarynets, blogger Dzmitry Kazlou, and community activist Iryna Shchasnaya were sentenced to four to seven years in prison on fabricated ‘extremism’ charges; whereas on 2 June 2021 political prisoner Dzmitry Furmanau, together with Yauhen Raznichenka and Uladzimir Kniha, were sentenced to up to four years in prison in what is known as the ‘Tsikhanouski case’; whereas on 3 June 2021 the court convicted a fifth group of defendants, consisting of the political prisoners Aliaksandr Khrapko, Radzivon Medusheuski, and Ihar Vinakurau, Andrei Aniskevich, Alena Loika, Halina Chuhunova, Andrei Niamirski, Dzmitry Kurhanau, Katsiaryna Smirnova, Mikita Uvarau, Safiya Nisht, Siarhei Ksenzhuk and Illia Palkhouski, in the ‘dancing protest trial’ by handing down sentences ranging from 18 months of home confinement to one year in prison; whereas on 3 June 2021 political prisoner Siarhei Piarfiliyeu was sentenced to two years of imprisonment and his son Stanislau Piarfiliyeu to two years of restricted freedom (home confinement);

J.  whereas the Belarusian authorities are continuing their crackdown and harassment of independent Belarusian journalists and engaging in deliberate attempts to hamper objective reporting; whereas hundreds of journalists were arrested, including two Belsat journalists who were subsequently sentenced; whereas dozens have faced administrative detention and experienced violence and several have been fined; whereas journalists have been placed in pre-trial detention and faced criminal charges; whereas there have been numerous reports of the authorities revoking the accreditation of journalists, including foreign media correspondents, several of whom have been arrested and expelled from Belarus; whereas on 18 May 2021 Belarusian authorities raided the offices of Tut.by, the largest independent Belarusian news site, arrested many of its staff and blocked its website;

K.  whereas human rights defenders, opposition politicians, civil society representatives, trade union representatives and other activists are systematically subjected to intimidation, harassment and restrictions on their fundamental freedoms; whereas there is no indication that the Belarusian authorities are investigating the thousands of reports of police brutality filed since mid-August 2020, or the killings of protesters; whereas the widespread impunity for human rights violations perpetuates the desperate situation of the Belarusian people; whereas the absence of the rule of law impedes their right to a fair trial;

L.  whereas according to the Belarusian Students’ Association, an independent student union, more than 460 students have been detained, almost a third of whom are women, and more than 150 students have been arbitrarily expelled from universities, with many fleeing to neighbouring countries fearful for their safety;

M.  whereas on 31 May 2021 the Belarusian authorities further tightened the already strict travel rules, making it close to impossible for Belarusian citizens to exit the country, including for those who have long-term residency permits abroad;

N.  whereas there is growing repression against representatives of the Polish minority in Belarus, including the arrest and sentencing of the Chairwoman of the Union of Poles in Belarus, Andżelika Borys, and the detention of journalist, blogger and member of the Union of Poles in Belarus, Andrzej Poczobut; whereas the Polish schooling system in Belarus is under growing pressure from the regime; whereas these actions have been accompanied by anti-Polish propaganda on state TV; whereas Lukashenka created a new public holiday in Belarus to be celebrated on 17 September to mark the anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939;

O.  whereas Belarus started the commercial operation of the Astravyets nuclear power plant without addressing all the safety recommendations contained in the 2018 EU stress test report, and as a result the Astravyets plant is unsafe and poses serious nuclear safety threats to all Europe;

P.  whereas the European Union has so far imposed sanctions against 88 Belarusian individuals and 7 entities, including Aliaksandr Lukashenka;

1.  Strongly condemns the 23 May hijacking and forced landing of Ryanair flight FR4978 in Minsk and the detention by Belarusian authorities of journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega; considers this horrendous act a violation of international law which constitutes an act of state terrorism;

2.  Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega, as well as all other journalists and political prisoners held in Belarus;

3.  Recalls the Council’s decision to strengthen existing restrictive measures by introducing a ban on Belarusian carriers of all kinds from entering EU airspace and accessing EU airports, and advises the Council to draw up a plan to facilitate Belarusians’ attempts to leave the country; calls on the International Civil Aviation Organization and the European Aviation Safety Agency to investigate and take the appropriate measures regarding this unacceptable incident, which challenges international norms and standards; highlights that this grave incident significantly breached trust and that every state should act responsibly in fulfilling their obligations under the Chicago Convention so that aircraft can operate safely and securely; calls on Ryanair to cooperate and share with the authorities all the relevant information regarding this incident;

4.  Calls for a thorough assessment of the consequences of abductions from an intercepted civilian plane, not only for international air transport and aviation safety but also for overall security in Europe and the safety of Belarusian and other citizens exiled or seeking shelter or asylum in EU Member States;

5.  Stresses that such an investigation should explore Russia’s possible role in the terrorist acts perpetrated by the Belarusian regime; underlines that if this is deemed to have been the case, any Russian national directly or indirectly involved in the operation should be sanctioned under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act); highlights the importance of the EU’s contribution to the investigation, including through the involvement of EU bodies such as Europol, Eurojust or the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in the work of joint investigation teams and operations;

6.  Reiterates its non-recognition of the election of Aliaksandr Lukashenka to the post of President of Belarus; considers the current regime in Belarus as illegitimate, illegal and criminal; continues to support the people of Belarus in their legitimate demands and aspirations for free and fair elections, fundamental freedoms and human rights, democratic representation, political participation and dignity; condemns the crackdown on the thousands of Belarusians who peacefully protested in defence of their right to freedom, democracy and dignity;

7.  Strongly condemns and demands an immediate end to the violence and repression by state authorities in Belarus, and in particular the unlawful detention, the torture and the ill-treatment in detention, and the criminal prosecution of peaceful citizens and expresses its support and solidarity with Belarusian society; condemns the regime’s systematic repression against civilians, which since the August 2020 stolen elections has forced more than 14 000 Belarusians to flee the country, through violence, intimidation and other forms of coercion; reiterates that this ongoing campaign of repression and the forced displacement of civilians amounts to grave violations of human rights; deplores the fact that Belarus is currently the only country in Europe where the death penalty is still enforced and insists on the need for its immediate and permanent abolition; condemns the recent measures taken by the Belarusian authorities that banned most Belarusian citizens from leaving the country, including many foreign residency permit holders;

8.  Condemns the harsh and unjust court sentences recently given out to numerous political prisoners and detainees, including opposition leader Pavel Seviarynets, and the trials against democratic Belarus opposition figures such as Viktar Babaryka, Mikola Statkevich and Siarhei Tsikhanouski; deplores the sentencing of Pavel Sevyarynets, Yauhen Afnahel, Andrei Voynich, Pavel Yukhnevich, Dzmitry Kazlou, Maksim Viniarski and Iryna Shchasnaya in a closed trial in the city of Mahiliou;

9.  Reiterates the importance of the independent Belarusian media and journalists and the important role they play in Belarusian society; condemns the suppression of the media and access to the internet, as well as the beating, arrest and intimidation of journalists and bloggers; underscores the right of the people of Belarus to have unhindered access to information;

10.  Condemns the repression and hostile actions carried out by the authorities against representatives of the Polish minority and against the Polish school system in Belarus; calls, in this respect, for the unconditional release of Andżelika Borys, Andrzej Poczobut and other political prisoners;

11.  Calls on the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Commission and the Member States’ national diplomatic representations in Belarus to closely monitor the situation and trials of individual political prisoners in Belarus, including those of Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega, to offer them support and to work to secure their release; in this regard, calls on the Lukashenka regime to put an immediate end to any actions tending to intimidate or harass the members of national and European diplomatic services, in line with Belarus’s international obligations under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations;

12.  Underlines the urgent need to maintain and expand contacts and cooperation with representatives of Belarusian democratic forces in Minsk and in exile, and in particular with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and members of the Coordination Council and National Anti-Crisis Management; therefore, joins the calls to invite their representatives on the occasion of the G7 summit of 11-13 June 2021 and the Eastern Partnership summit in 2021 and recommends continuing to invite them to high-level bilateral meetings at governmental level, as well as to parliamentary sessions and interparliamentary meetings, and to create groups dedicated to Belarus in all national parliaments of the EU Member States;

13.  Calls on the Council to extend as soon as possible the lists of persons and entities under EU sanctions by including individuals and entities involved in the interception and forced landing of Ryanair flight FR4978 and the detention of Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega; recalls that the journalist Raman Pratasevich is at risk of facing the death penalty;

14.  Urges the Council to proceed with utmost urgency with the fourth package of sanctions against individuals and entities who took part in or were complicit in the electoral fraud, repression, torture or the ill-treatment and human rights violations in Belarus, including the persecution of independent journalists and bloggers, and to begin work on a subsequent package; calls for the sanctioning of a substantially larger number of Belarusian officials, such as prosecutors, judges and law-enforcement employees who play a role in the repression and wrongful conviction of regime critics, as well as police, prison service staff, members of parliament and government and the agents working for the regime in the areas of propaganda, media, disinformation and hate-speech, of individuals and entities who support Lukashenka and his regime, such as Marat Markov, who interviewed Raman Pratasevich on the state channel ONT on 2 June, and of those who participated in the incident of 23 May, such as intelligence officers and aviation authorities; recalls, in this regard, the need to take full advantage of the options for restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act);

15.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strictly deny any financial support to the Belarusian regime and therefore to refuse any new credit lines to Belarusian banks and to halt any investments into infrastructure projects or economic undertakings in Belarus; calls on the Commission to adopt measures to prevent European financial institutions from acquiring bonds or any other financial instrument issued by the Belarusian Government and affiliated public institutions; welcomes the fact that the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have suspended financing of projects in the Belarusian public sector and calls for an investigation into how the unused funds can be reoriented towards civil society and the private sector where it is not related to the regime; calls on the International Monetary Fund and the EU Member States not to provide direct budgetary support to the regime under any circumstances, and to refrain from using the special drawing process announced for 2021;

16.  Reminds all EU businesses operating in Belarus of its previous call to exercise particular diligence and uphold their responsibility to respect human rights, in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: in addition, asks them to refrain from any new investment and to also publicly protest against the Belarusian authorities’ ongoing repression in the country;

17.  Calls on the Council to swiftly adopt and implement economic sanctions, which must be substantial and have, as much as possible, an immediate effect on the Belarusian regime, its supporters and the economic actors that support the regime; calls for these economic sanctions to target public and private companies controlled by the regime or closely entangled with the regime’s business interests or known for dismissing their employees for participating in strikes or protests; calls for sectoral sanctions to target in particular the crude oil and oil-products, potash, steel and wood-processing industries; furthermore calls for the termination of cooperation and financing for Belarusian state-owned banks and for limiting credit lines from international banks for subsidiary banks in Belarus and for consideration to be given to temporarily suspending Belarus from the SWIFT system; asks for EU-registered companies, particularly Siemens AG, to stop collaborating with the Belarusian authorities through sharing technology and know-how; calls on the Member States and the EU institutions to increase their efforts to tackle the substantial cigarette smuggling from Belarus into the EU, which provides funds to the Lukashenka regime; encourages a coordinated EU action of solidarity to offset the economic hardships for the Member States most affected by the economic sanctions on Belarus;

18.  Welcomes the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) decision to suspend the Belarusian broadcaster BTRC’s EBU membership; calls for the suspension of Belarus from international sport bodies and international sports events, including European and world championships and the Olympic Games in Tokyo; urges the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) to remove broadcasting rights for the EURO 2020 football tournament from Belarusian state television TVR and assign them to the independent Belsat TV free of charge;

19.  Calls on the Member States to improve their cooperation on intelligence matters regarding the crisis in Belarus and to expel known and suspected Belarusian intelligence officers active across the Union; encourages its President to restrict access to the European Parliament for the staff of the Embassy of Belarus in Brussels, including physical and remote access to meetings hosted by the European Parliament, and to review Parliament’s communication with the Embassy of Belarus;

20.  Is deeply concerned about Russia’s involvement with Lukashenka’s regime, including financial support and close cooperation between intelligence services;

21.  Emphasises the need for international engagement, including discussions at the UN and NATO; calls for the EU to closely coordinate its measures with the United States, the G7 partners and other like-minded countries and to seek broad alignment by the EU’s partners, in particular by European neighbours such as Ukraine, in order to achieve the highest possible impact of the sanctions; recalls the Ukrainian Government’s decision to join EU Member States in imposing transport sanctions on Belarusian airlines, and calls on the Commission and the Council to impose punitive measures on Belavia and its passengers flying to Russian-annexed Crimea; welcomes the upcoming EU-US and US-Russia summits and considers them important opportunities to coordinate positions between the EU and its partners;

22.  Stresses that although the EU’s best chances to properly deal with unlawful states is through sanctions-mechanisms, the EU, in addition to sanctions on Belarusian state-owned enterprises, should utilise existing internal pressures in Belarus by supporting Belarusian civil society;

23.  Calls on the Commission and the VP/HR, together with international partners, to initiate the organisation of a high-level ‘Future of Democratic Belarus’ international conference on the resolution of the crisis in Belarus, and the investigation and prosecution of crimes by the Belarusian authorities against the people of Belarus and the democratic transformation of Belarus; considers that such a conference, led by the EU and attended by international financial institutions, G7 countries, EU Member States and institutions and others willing to pledge a multi-billion euro financial package, will serve to support the future reform efforts and restructuring of the economy and will send a strong signal of support to the Belarusian people;

24.  Recalls its previous initiative for a high-level mission, involving former high-ranking European officials, to explore every possible avenue to stop the violence and free political prisoners and which could help create a conducive environment for an inclusive domestic political dialogue in Belarus;

25.  Urges the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to increase direct support to and engagement with the Belarusian opposition, civil society, human rights defenders and independent media, in Belarus and abroad, including through capacity-building and financial support, and increase support to the European Endowment for Democracy in its activities on the ground; calls, in this regard, for the EU and other international organisations to provide financial and technical support to media outlets and independent journalists in order to enable them to carry out their duties of informing society about the ongoing developments in Belarus; reiterates, in this regard, its call for increased assistance for the Belsat TV channel;

26.  Commits to help strengthening the capacity of the democratic forces, enhancing the role of civil society, supporting the fully fledged political dialogue leading to a peaceful transition of power in Belarus, as well as young political leaders and human rights defenders, through Parliament’s democracy support mechanisms;

27.  Welcomes the outline for a EUR 3 billion comprehensive plan of economic support to a future democratic Belarus presented by the Commission; calls on the Commission and the Council to further develop and promote this plan and communicate clearly that once democratic change happens in Belarus, the EU will be ready to provide tangible assistance to put the country on a path of reform and modernisation; notes that the EU needs to propose a comprehensive set of actions to prepare the democratic forces of Belarus for the implementation of this package;

28.  Calls for the EU to coordinate with the United States, the G7 partners and other like-minded countries to freeze cooperation with Lukashenka’s public sector and reorient the cooperation with Belarusian civil society and Belarusian private companies outside the scope of the regime;

29.  Rejects the unacceptable threats of Aliaksandr Lukashenka that the Belarusian authorities will not stop irregular migrants and drug trafficking and expresses its concern regarding the increase in irregular migration from Belarus into the EU and about the potential involvement of Belarusian authorities in this phenomenon; calls for the Member States and EU institutions to follow developments in these areas and take the appropriate measures;

30.  Condemns the misuse by the Belarusian leadership of law-enforcement authorities for political purposes; calls on Interpol to immediately and thoroughly review current and future requests made by Belarus and to take all appropriate measures to prevent Belarus from misusing Interpol for political purposes;

31.  Underlines the need for a comprehensive investigation into the crimes committed by the Lukashenka regime against the people of Belarus, which should be concluded with the setting-up of an international tribunal to prosecute those crimes; urges that, in the absence of Belarusian authorities’ willingness to establish rule of law and accountability, the international community must take action to help secure evidence of crimes and ensure investigation and prosecution of those responsible throughout the full chain of command; welcomes the initiatives by several EU Member States to apply the universal jurisdiction principle and prepare court cases against Belarusian perpetrators of repression and encourages all other Member States to follow their example; calls for active support for all international initiatives that seek to address the impunity in Belarus, such as the International Platform Against Impunity and the Justice Hub in Vilnius;

32.  Urges the VP/HR, the Commission, the Council and the Member States to continue raising the situation in Belarus in all relevant European and international organisations such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the UN Human Rights Council and other UN specialised bodies, with the aim of securing urgent international action on the situation in Belarus and overcoming the obstruction of Russia and other countries to such action;

33.  Encourages the Member States to further facilitate the procedures for obtaining visas and residence for those fleeing Belarus for political reasons or for those who require medical treatment as a result of violence perpetrated against them, and to offer them and their families the necessary support and assistance; calls on the Member States to implement the recommendations of the OSCE Moscow Mechanism rapporteur in relation to granting asylum in cases of persecution covered under the Geneva Refugee Convention and to further facilitate the procedure for the issuance of emergency visas and provision of temporary shelter in EU countries; calls on the Member States and the Commission to offer scholarships to Belarusian students and scholars expelled from universities and imprisoned for their pro-democratic stance; calls on the Member States to provide financial support to those exiled institutions, such as the European Humanities University in Vilnius, that are nurturing a new generation of Belarusians who are challenging the country’s corrupt and illegitimate system;

34.  Calls on the Commission, the Member States and the EEAS to cooperate with international partners, such as the OSCE Moscow Mechanism and the UN Human Rights Council, as well as human rights defenders and civil society on the ground, to ensure the monitoring, documentation and reporting of human rights violations and subsequent accountability and justice for victims; welcomes the establishment of the International Accountability Platform for Belarus and calls for the EU institutions and Member States to support its functioning; commits to the effective functioning of the European Parliament’s Platform on the fight against impunity in Belarus and to coordinating a timely international reaction to developments in Belarus;

35.  Reiterates the need for all Member States to take a unified position in responding to the state terrorism orchestrated by the regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka and supported by the Kremlin; underlines the importance for the EU of countering disinformation on the situation in Belarus within the EU, as well as other forms of hybrid threats undertaken by third parties in this regard; expresses solidarity with Latvia following the unjustified expulsion of its diplomats by Belarus; condemns the launch of a criminal investigation by the Belarusian Prosecutor General against the Foreign Minister of Latvia, as well as the Mayor of the capital city Riga; condemns all attempts by the Belarusian authorities to exert pressure on EU Member States, including the Belarusian prosecutors’ request to question Lithuania’s former president Valdas Adamkus, based on his alleged connections with an SS-subordinated auxiliary police battalion that carried out punitive operations in Belarus during World War Two;

36.  Reiterates its concern about the commercial operation of the Astravyets nuclear power plant just 45 km away from Vilnius and underlines the risks it carries for EU countries; stresses the importance of addressing the nuclear safety threats posed by the Astravyets nuclear power plant, regrets that Belarus is not engaging on the nuclear safety of the Astravyets plant in complete transparency and has not committed to full implementation of the recommendations of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) peer review of the plant, and calls for the introduction of effective safeguards against the direct or indirect sale of Belarusian electricity produced by the Astravyets plant to EU markets;

37.  Underlines that the current situation is a test of the credibility of the European Union and the effectiveness of its foreign policymaking; recalls that the situation in Belarus, a neighbouring country and member of the Eastern Partnership, has a direct impact on the EU and that the EU should show sufficient determination to offer tangible and long-term support to democratic forces that strive to bring freedom and democracy to Belarus; calls for the EU not to hesitate, by acting swiftly and proactively;

38.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the authorities of the Republic of Belarus.

(1) OJ L 197 I, 4.6.2021, p. 3.

European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on the situation in Afghanistan (2021/2712(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0294 RC-B9-0324/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Afghanistan,

–  having regard to the EU‐Afghanistan Joint Way Forward (JWF) on migration issues of 2 October 2016,

–  having regard to the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, of the other part, signed on 18 February 2017,

–  having regard to the North Atlantic Council statement on the Afghanistan Peace Negotiations of 9 December 2020,

–  having regard to the remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan of 14 April 2021,

–  having regard to the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework, agreed to at the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan of 4-5 October 2016,

–  having regard to the 2020 International Ministerial Pledging Conference (Afghanistan Conference) held on 23 and 24 November 2020,

–  having regard to the joint statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the External Affairs Minister of India of 4 May 2021 on Afghanistan,

–  having regard to the communiqué of the Special Envoys and Special Representatives of the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, NATO, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States of 7 May 2021 on the Afghan Peace Process,

–  having regard to the Afghanistan Opium Survey 2020 published jointly by the Afghanistan National Statistics and Information Authority and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in April 2021,

–  having regard to the EU Guidelines for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Child, on Children and Armed Conflict, and on Human Rights Defenders,

–  having regard to the UN Security Council resolutions on Afghanistan,

–  having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolutions on Afghanistan,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to Rule 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas in February 2020 the U.S. and the Taliban signed an agreement that paved the way for the first direct talks between the Taliban and representatives of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan since 2001;

B.  whereas on 14 April 2021 the US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken announced the unilateral withdrawal of US troops by 11 September 2021; whereas NATO allies follow the principle of ‘in together, out together’, and will withdraw at the same time;

C.  whereas the Afghan peace talks between the Afghan Government and Taliban started in 2020 in Doha; whereas the ceasefire agreement was not adhered to, and currently the peace talks are in a stalemate, with the Taliban waiting for the withdrawal of Allies troops;

D.  whereas since 2001, the EU has had an active presence in Afghanistan to support social and economic development and coordinate international assistance; whereas many EU Member States, NATO partners and allied countries have contributed military and civilian resources to the stabilisation and development of Afghanistan, suffering heavy casualties and losses; whereas a stable and independent Afghanistan that can provide for itself and deny a safe haven to terrorist groups is still in the vital security interests of EU, NATO and their member countries;

E.  whereas it is paramount to preserve the progress of the past two decades in Afghanistan, particularly regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms;

F.  whereas representation of women and their rights in the Afghan peace talks is not proportional, and a more committed approach on this is required from the negotiating parties;

G.  whereas women, children and ethnic minorities will be the most affected by the failure of the Afghan peace talks and by attempts to pursue a military solution to the conflict; whereas Afghan women have already started limiting their movements to reduce risk, and children’s access to education and play is hampered by the threat of violence;

H.  whereas the security situation in Afghanistan is gradually worsening, and the number of attacks against Afghan forces is growing, as well as targeted assassinations of Afghan activists, media workers, educators, doctors, judges and government officials; whereas the number of Taliban attacks has increased significantly since the beginning of the Afghan peace talks, aiming to take over control of government-controlled territories; whereas Afghanistan was ranked as the most affected country in the 2020 Global Terrorism Index; whereas 4 million out of the country’s population of 36 million are displaced persons; whereas 3 million people are living in internal displacement as a result of violence and another 1 million because of natural disasters; whereas 2,5 million Afghans have already fled the country in search of security, with the majority settling in Iran and Pakistan;

I.  whereas Afghanistan is the largest beneficiary of EU development assistance in the world; whereas over the last 20 years the EU’s contribution to Afghanistan has led to substantial gains in life expectancy, literacy, maternal and child mortality and women’s rights; whereas between 2002 and 2020, the EU has provided more than EUR 4 billion, and has already pledged EUR 1,2 billion in both long-term and emergency assistance for the 2021-2025 period; whereas this pledge was accompanied by the communication by the EU and countries that together represent about 80 % of the total official development assistance to Afghanistan underlining the key elements in order to continue receiving the assistance, including continued commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights;

J.  whereas there is a widespread absence of accountability for attacks and killings in Afghanistan; whereas on 12 March 2021 members of the UN Security Council condemned the alarming number of attacks deliberately targeting civilians in Afghanistan;

K.  whereas the recent spike in violence has taken place against a background of long-term widespread human rights violations in the country perpetrated by terrorists, armed groups and security forces, including extrajudicial killings, torture and sexual violence; whereas it is estimated that around 150 000 people have died in the 20-year war, including 35 000 civilians;

L.  whereas demonstrable progress in the rights of women and girls has been made in Afghanistan since 2001, including access to education, healthcare and participation in civic and political life; whereas these improvements are arguably the most successful achievements in the county’s recent development; whereas this partial progress is now under threat and must urgently be preserved and strengthened;

M.  whereas despite these improvements, women and girls continue to face appalling threats on a daily basis, including barriers to accessing essential services and attacks including domestic, sexual and gender-based violence; whereas the 2019/20 Women, Peace and Security Index ranked Afghanistan the second-worst country for women; whereas at least 85 people were killed and 147 wounded, most of them schoolgirls, when the Sayed al-Shuhada girls’ school in Kabul was bombed on 8 May 2021; whereas on 2 March 2021, three women journalists were killed in Jalalabad;

N.  whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically increased the poverty rate in Afghanistan; whereas COVID-19-related measures and the deteriorating security situation have resulted in restrictions in the access of humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people;

O.  whereas in 2021 Afghanistan is expecting to face a drought, increasing the current number of 5,5 million people experiencing emergency level food insecurity, with an additional 17,6 million expected to face acute food insecurity;

P.  whereas the economic cost of terrorism in Afghanistan was equivalent to almost 20 % of its GDP in 2018, and deprives Afghan children of their future, the possibility of obtaining an education, prospects for stable employment and services such as healthcare provided by the state;

Q.  whereas Afghan businesses suffer extortion at the hands of the Taliban, who force farmers into opium cultivation and illegal mining activities;

1.  Considers that Afghanistan is at a critical juncture, as the confluence of the fragile domestic situation, a deteriorating security situation, intra-Afghan peace talks effectively in a stalemate and the decision to withdraw US and NATO troops by 11 September 2021, which can bring new uncertainties, less stability, danger of intensification of internal conflicts and a vacuum that in the worst case scenario will be filled by the Taliban; expresses concern that this would be a very worrying perspective for the country and for the sustainability of the socio-political achievements and progress of the last 20 years;

2.  Expresses its deep concern and condemns in the strongest terms the alarming increase in violence in Afghanistan, including targeted killings of children, female professionals, journalists and media workers, educators, human rights defenders, civil society, activists, doctors, government officials and members of the judiciary; urges all sides to immediately agree on a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire;

3.  expresses concern about the fragility and instability of the Afghan Government and its lack of control over much of the country, which exacerbates the impact of the violence on the civilian population; calls on the Taliban to immediately cease their attacks against civilians and the national forces, and to fully respect international humanitarian law; expresses its deepest condolences and support to the victims of terror attacks and their families;

4.  Stresses the need to avoid a ‘failed state’ scenario, and reiterates its commitment to an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process and post-conflict reconstruction as the only credible path to inclusive, long-term peace, security and development; highlights that this is more important than ever as the date of the withdrawal of US and NATO troops is fast approaching; urges the Council, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission to prepare and present to Parliament, as soon as possible, a comprehensive strategy for future cooperation with Afghanistan after the withdrawal of NATO Allies’ troops, and urges the EU and its Member States, NATO and the US to remain engaged with this objective;

5.  Supports, in this regard, the immediate resumption of the peace talks in Doha in order to achieve a political settlement to the conflict and a permanent, nationwide negotiated ceasefire; underlines that only a political settlement offers hope for lasting peace, and recommends the parties to seek help from a third-party mediator, such as the United Nations, to help to agree on a political roadmap for a prosperous Afghanistan; encourages the EEAS and the Commission to assume a stronger role in urging both sides to the negotiating table, and to offer facilitation or mediation if desired by the Afghans;

6.  Reaffirms that a negotiated political settlement leading to peace must build on the economic, social and political achievements of the last 20 years; underscores that the long-term development of Afghanistan will depend on accountability, good governance, the sustainable provision of human security, including the reduction of poverty and the creation of job opportunities, access to social and health services, education, and the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights;

7.  Urges the Afghan Government to actively involve the Afghan Parliament in all relevant processes, to end all measures that prevent effective cooperation between government and parliament and to improve parliamentary scrutiny rights, while the Afghan Parliament should represent the diverse Afghan population; stresses the necessity for continued support for the holding of free and fair elections, in line with international standards, support for election observation missions to the country and for improving the transparency of government expenditure in order for the Government of Afghanistan to be fully accountable to its citizens;

8.  Recalls that in order to build on the achievements of the last 20 years, the Afghan state should be genuinely committed to fighting and preventing terrorism and armed groups, drug production and trafficking, and addressing the root causes of and managing irregular and forced migration; tackling regional instability; striving for poverty eradication; preventing radicalisation leading to violent extremism; fighting against the impunity of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law;

9.  Deplores that before signing the Joint Declaration on Migration Cooperation, the Commission did not present the declaration to Parliament, and that Parliament had no chance to express its opinion on it; calls on the Commission to carry out a human rights impact assessment on the Joint Declaration on Migration Cooperation;

10.  expresses concern about the threat posed by terrorism to Afghanistan and the region, in particular the continuing presence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL-Da’esh) and their affiliates, in particular ISIL-Khorasan Province and Al-Qaida; recalls that the terrorist acts in Afghanistan are perpetrated by multiple actors including the Taliban, Al-Qaida and the so-called Islamic State; underlines the real risk of greater instability and violence as US and NATO troops withdraw; reiterates, therefore, the urgent need for the EU to coordinate with stakeholders including the Afghan Government and security forces, the US, NATO and the UN to ensure the transition is as smooth as possible;

11.  Condemns all terrorist activity and all terrorist attacks in Afghanistan; underscores the importance of the effective fight against financing of terrorism and of dismantling financial networks supporting terrorism; is very worried about the findings of the UN Monitoring Team’s report indicating that the relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaida has grown deeper, and its warning that the Taliban would be opposed to peace talks and prefer a military takeover. takes note, furthermore, of the reports that indicate that the Taliban is actively preparing military operations in 2021;

12.  Recalls that there can be no sustainable development without security and vice versa; notes in this regard that international support to Afghanistan following the withdrawal of troops must ensure a holistic approach to continue financial and technical support for security, including the Afghan national defence and security forces, and economic and development reforms, with particular emphasis on strengthening democracy, the rule of law and human rights, notably for women, young people and minorities;

13.  Recognises the work of local and international NGOs, which provide services, assistance and relief to the Afghan people despite the security risks; remains concerned about the dangerous climate in which civil society organisations (CSOs), including journalists and human rights defenders, are operating; urges the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Commission and the Member States to continue providing substantive support to civil society and to continue their dialogue with the Afghan Government to urgently reduce barriers to the activities of non-governmental organisations; urges the Afghan authorities, the Taliban and all the other relevant actors to ensure the safety of local and international CSOs, NGOs and humanitarian organisations;

14.  Calls for a credible and transparent investigation under UN auspices into the recent attack which targeted a girls’ school killing 85 people, mostly girls between the age of 11 and 17 and the attack on 12 May 2020 on the maternity wing of the Dasht-e Barchi hospital in Kabul supported by Médecins Sans Frontières; invites the EEAS, Commission and Member States to consider urging the UN Human Rights Council to establish a commission of inquiry into serious violations of international humanitarian law in Afghanistan;

15.  Stresses that impunity and corruption remain serious obstacles to improving security coordination, the provision of public services and economic reform; welcomes the creation of the Anti-Corruption Commission in Afghanistan in November 2020 to implement the newly adopted anti-corruption strategy, and urges the EEAS and the Commission to maintain high levels of EU support to tackling corruption in the country;

16.  Emphasises that European support will remain conditional on preserving and building upon the achievements of the past 20 years, on effectively enhancing inclusive and accountable governance, strengthening institutions, democratic pluralism, the rule of law, combating corruption, strengthening independent media, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all Afghans, especially women, children, all persons belonging to minorities and groups at risk; recalls that girls’ right to education, which is a great achievement of the last 20 years, should be undisputed; stresses the need for clear benchmarks and monitoring mechanisms to measure the progress made and the efficient and transparent use of European funds;

17.  Stresses the absolute imperative of preserving the progress made on women’s rights in Afghanistan over the last 20 years; recalls the participation of women in the peace talks on the part of the Afghan Government, and insists there must be no compromise on women’s rights in the peace process; emphasises that progress on women’s rights in areas of the country not under government control must also be addressed in the negotiations; urges greater representation and full consultation of women’s organisations throughout the talks; underlines that the full participation of women in the post-reconstruction phase and in political and civic life in Afghanistan is a fundamental prerequisite to establishing sustainable peace, security and development; calls on the EEAS, Commission and Member States to further support the empowerment of women as a key condition for continuous financial support to the country;

18.  Deeply regrets that women and girls continue to face significant challenges including domestic, sexual and gender-based violence, forced marriage and limited access to healthcare; insists that progress on these areas must remain a high priority for the EU; welcomes EU-funded projects supporting women’s empowerment and participation in decision-making;

19.  Reiterates the need for continuous EU support to assist Afghanistan in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, to provide the Afghans with vaccines, and to help organise vaccination efforts;

20.  Underlines the importance of addressing the urgent threats to food security as a result of climate change, droughts and the COVID-19 pandemic; calls on the EU to stand by its commitment made at the 2020 Afghanistan donor conference, and urges the EEAS and the Commission’s DG ECHO (Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations) to take a leading role and close the funding gap so as to ensure food aid is mobilised and coordinated in a timely manner in order to address looming food insecurity; urges all donors to maintain or increase their humanitarian aid, especially their support for the Afghan health system and the promotion of access to healthcare by Afghan women and girls;

21.  Recalls that the impact of opium poppy cultivation extends beyond Afghanistan’s borders, affecting neighbouring countries and Europe, which is the main destination for heroin produced in Afghanistan; emphasises the need for the Afghan Government to strengthen efforts to counter this threat, and reiterates the need for longer-term agricultural development and assistance to create dependable jobs and incomes from alternatives to opium cultivation; notes that this is a necessary step to address the illicit drugs trade, money laundering and terrorist financing;

22.  Points at the potential for economic growth in Afghanistan from developing its natural resources in a sustainable manner; stresses that European aid for the development of infrastructure could benefit the Afghan people by providing employment and resources for critical public services and ensure environmental protection;

23.  Stresses the need to use European funds to invest in improving the regional connectivity to facilitate trade and transit, which would give Afghanistan the means to grow economically;

24.  Recalls that Afghanistan is a landlocked country situated at the junction connecting Asia and the Middle East, and recognises that support and positive cooperation from neighbouring central-Asian countries and regional powers, in particular China, Iran, India, Russia and Pakistan, are essential to the stabilisation, development and economic viability of Afghanistan; calls on the EEAS and the Member States to intensify their dialogue with Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries; underlines the crucial role of these countries in the stabilisation of Afghanistan and in not allowing it to descend into chaos once foreign troops leave; stresses the need for increased EU-US coordination on Afghanistan in order to maintain an important role for them in Afghanistan to the extent possible;

25.  Recalls the responsibility of the governments of the countries that are withdrawing their troops from Afghanistan to protect, if needed grant visas and repatriate local staff, in particular translators, who have been supporting their efforts and whose lives might be now in grave danger; calls for this to be preceded by a thorough individual assessment, taking full account of all eligibility and security aspects;

26.  Calls on the EEAS, the Commission and the Member States to ensure the security of European forces and staff in Afghanistan, as well as of local staff who work or have worked for Member States’ representations or the EU Delegation in the country; asks the EEAS and the Commission to contribute funding for an enhanced security zone to ensure a diplomatic presence after the withdrawal of troops;

27.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Special Envoy for Afghanistan, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the Government and Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘End the cage age’ (2021/2633(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0295 B9-0296/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) ‘End the cage age’ (ECI(2018)000004), which received 1,4 million validated signatures from across every Member State of the then EU-28 and is the first valid ECI on farmed animals,

–  having regard to the public hearing on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘End the cage age’ of 15 April 2021,

–  having regard to the Special Eurobarometer 442 entitled ‘Attitudes of Europeans towards Animal Welfare’, which concluded that 82 % of EU citizens believe that the welfare of farmed animals should be better protected than it is now,

–  having regard to Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to Council Directive 98/58/EC of 20 July 1998 concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes(1),

–  having regard to Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens(2),

–  having regard to Council Directive 2008/119/EC of 18 December 2008 laying down minimum standards for the protection of calves(3),

–  having regard to Council Directive 2008/120/EC of 18 December 2008 laying down minimum standards for the protection of pigs(4),

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on the Common Agricultural Policy adopted on 5 December 2018 (CDR 3637/2018),

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on Agro-ecology adopted on 5 February 2021 (CDR 3137/2020),

–  having regard to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) Scientific Opinion of 21 November 2019 entitled ‘Health and welfare of rabbits farmed in different production systems’,

–  having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2017 on minimum standards for the protection of farm rabbits(5),

–  having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2018 on animal welfare, antimicrobial use and the environmental impact of industrial broiler farming(6),

–  having regard to the Commission Staff Working Document of 31 March 2021 entitled ‘Evaluation of the European Union Strategy for the Protection and Welfare of Animals 2012-2015’ (SWD(2021)0077),

–  having regard to the European Court of Auditors Special Report No 31/2018 on animal welfare in the EU,

–  having regard to the European Parliamentary Research Service study of November 2020 entitled ‘End the Cage Age: Looking for Alternatives’,

–  having regard to Rule 222(8) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

A.  whereas the TFEU establishes citizenship of the Union and further enhances the democratic functioning of the Union by providing, inter alia, that every citizen has the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union through an ECI;

B.  whereas the importance of the ECI in shaping EU policy initiatives and developments should be acknowledged, as should the lack of action to follow up previous successful ECIs;

C.  whereas Article 13 TFEU clearly recognises animals as sentient beings; whereas it further states that the Union and its Member States must pay full regard to the requirements of animal welfare when formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture policies;

D.  whereas the high animal welfare standards already in place in the EU, which are among the highest in the world, should be acknowledged;

E.  whereas the Farm to Fork Strategy recognises the urgent need to improve animal welfare and to broaden its scope, highlighting the benefits it brings for animals, food quality, reducing the need for medication and preserving biodiversity, and following the latest scientific advice;

F.  whereas a study by the European Parliament’s Research Service commissioned by the Committee on Petitions entitled ‘End the Cage Age: Looking for Alternatives’ found that cage-free housing systems can be achieved in Europe, recommending financial and policy measures in the short term and legislation in the long term; whereas this study confirms that ‘the EU can make sure that animal products that do not comply with EU standards cannot be imported into the EU’;

G.  whereas the proposed ECI refers to ‘hundreds of millions of EU farm animals […] kept in cages for most of their lives’;

H.  whereas rabbits are the animals most commonly housed in cages, with approximately 85 % in barren cages and 9 % in enriched cages, while approximately 50 % of laying hens in the EU were housed in enriched cages in 2019, with the percentages being considerably higher in most eastern, central and southern EU Member States; whereas in the pig sector, the large majority of sows are caged during certain stages of their reproductive cycle;

I.  whereas the proposed ECI aims to improve animal welfare;

J.  whereas the keeping of animals in cages as a livestock production system was born out of the confluence of several factors, namely: the need to identify the best animals for genetic selection, the improvement of hygiene conditions, and better management that allowed automation, and thus the more efficient use of increasingly scarce labour to compensate for the increase in the price of land or the cost of facilities;

K.  whereas the complexity of animal health and welfare should be recognised; whereas the characteristics of different animals should be taken into account in designing housing systems to suit their needs;

L.  whereas over 300 million farmed animals each year are caged for part or all of their lives, and there are grave concerns throughout the EU about the welfare of animals reared and farmed in cages, as animals are not even able to stand straight, to stretch or to turn around, and it is impossible for animals kept in cages to exhibit their natural behaviour;

M.  whereas farmers have made high investments to improve animal welfare, and have not yet fully recovered their investment; whereas these systems have been jointly developed by farmers, veterinarians, scientists and non-governmental organisations in order to ensure that the welfare requirements of each species are covered;

N.  whereas the market-driven efforts that farmers are making should be acknowledged, as should the need to obtain a return from the market in order to continue investing in sustainability;

O.  whereas the risk of relocating animal production and thus displacing core animal health and welfare issues to third countries should be recognised;

P.  whereas the shift in housing systems to full cage-free housing systems will require additional investments and lead to an increase in production costs, especially at the beginning of this transition due to investment costs that farmers will have to bear; whereas sanitary issues in farm breeding must be always kept in mind;

Q.  whereas the 2014-2020 cumulative expenditure for the common agricultural policy (CAP) as declared by the Member States at the end 2019 on animal welfare measure represented only 1,15 % of the CAP allocation(7);

R.  whereas any change in housing systems should achieve a balance between several aspects of sustainability, i.e. animal welfare, animal health, environmental protection and farmers’ competitiveness;

S.  whereas full cage-free housing systems need to provide adequate microclimate conditions and to be suitable for each geographical region in the EU and for all climate conditions, including extreme weather conditions;

T.  whereas a few Member States have already advanced beyond the minimum EU standards and prohibited the use of enriched cages for egg-laying hens, both barren and enriched cages for rabbits, or sow stalls and farrowing crates, with phase-out legislation in other Member States due to come into force in 2030 at the latest;

U.  whereas before introducing any changes in housing systems, the costs of the required transformation both in the short and long term have to be assessed; whereas an impact assessment must take into account the needs of sectors according to animal species, including economic and sanitary issues;

V.  whereas the shift in housing systems will increase the risk of animals spreading transmissible diseases and developing social stress due to dominance and competition, which affects their health and could increase the need for medication;

W.  whereas to facilitate such a substantial shift, appropriate financial investment support and compensation to offset farmers’ higher productions costs and farmers’ income losses has to be ensured;

X.  whereas animal welfare has been included as a specific objective in the common agricultural policy, and Member States can therefore make this funding available for the transition away from cages, for example through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development;

Y.  whereas it should be recognised that in some cases, some forms of cage for housing brings more animal-welfare related benefits than negative effects for the animal concerned; whereas in any case cages must be proportionate to the size of the animal housed and the purpose to be achieved;

Z.  whereas the European Court of Auditors Special Report on Animal Welfare in the EU noted that Member States made only a limited use of the common agricultural policy funds to address animal welfare objectives;

AA.  whereas the animal welfare rules and improvements to the size of cages have been programmed in several rural development programmes over the years; whereas the objective of the measure was included in a number of programmes by default by means of measures increasing the size of a cage or a crate;

AB.  whereas if any change in the legal obligations on animal housing is planned, the level of implementation of animal welfare rules in the EU Member States has to be taken into consideration, and a species-by-species approach has to be adopted;

AC.  whereas the European Union imports products produced from animals which are reared in conditions which cannot generally be verified;

AD.  whereas there are alternative systems which are commercially viable and already in use, e.g. barn, free range and organic systems for hens, floor pens, and outdoor free-range or organic systems for rabbits, indoor and outdoor free-farrowing and group housing systems for sows, barn and aviary systems for quail, and group housing systems for calves;

1.  Asks the Commission to provide information by 2022 about its ongoing Fitness Check of current EU animal welfare legislation;

2.  Calls on the Commission to develop a more comprehensive food policy to support the shift towards a more sustainable food system taking into account its economic, social and environmental dimensions, with appropriate support to farmers to prevent in particular small and medium-sized farms from further withdrawing from livestock production, and to prevent its further concentration;

3.  Acknowledges that alternatives to cage farming are being successfully implemented in a number of Member States; considers that alternative systems should be developed, improved and encouraged;

4.  Calls on the Commission to base new animal welfare initiatives strictly on independent scientific research, also taking into account any possible negative impact, such as the risk of diseases, breastbone fracture or cannibalism in the poultry sector;

5.  Calls on the Commission to ensure proper transposition of the ‘End the cage age’ ECI’s demands in the context of the current revision of Directive 98/58/EC, and in line with the EU Green Deal and the Farm to Fork Strategies;

6.  Urges the Commission to eliminate bureaucracy and regulatory constraints in order to allow livestock producers to make the necessary structural changes in their facilities to integrate new animal welfare provisions;

7.  Stresses that the market for animal products from cage-free, free range and organic systems, as well as the market for plant-based alternatives, is growing in the EU;

8.  Notes that the EU has pioneered certain bans on cages for farmed animals, in particular a partial ban on veal crates in 2007, a ban on barren battery cages for egg-laying hens in 2012, a partial ban on sow stalls in 2013, and a total ban on cages in all organic farming throughout the EU;

9.  Recalls that some EU Member States have already adopted national legislation to ban certain forms of caged farming which goes beyond minimum EU standards, increasing the urgency for legislation at the EU level to end the practice of cage farming and to ensure a level playing field for farmers across the EU;

10.  Calls on the Commission to propose legislative instruments on fair and sustainable farming, and in particular, to propose a revision of Directive 98/58/EC with the objective of phasing out the use of cages in EU animal farming, assessing a possible phasing-out by 2027;

11.  Emphasises the need for this phasing-out to be based on a scientifically based impact assessment and to ensure an appropriate transition period;

12.  Calls on the Commission to adopt a species-by-species approach that takes into account and assesses the characteristics of each different animal, which should have housing systems suited to their specific needs;

13.  Calls on the Commission to re-evaluate trade agreements with third countries in order to ensure that they meet the same animal welfare and product quality standards;

14.  Stresses that rabbits are the second most farmed species in the EU in terms of numbers of animals, with a majority of them reared in cages with inadequate welfare standards; calls on the Commission in this regard to propose specific EU legislation on minimum standards for the protection of farmed rabbits;

15.  Calls for shorter supply chains in animal and human nutrition, relying on locally or regionally produced protein crops for animal feed and human consumption; notes that the Farm to Fork Strategy supports sustainable animal production, the establishment of shorter supply chains for food products and a fairer trade policy in which European standards take a more prominent position;

16.  Acknowledges the positive steps made by the EU in recent years, with the comprehensive improvement of animal welfare conditions, the introduction of bans on cages for certain farmed animals, and the banning of cages in all organic farming;

17.  Welcomes the best practices already implemented by several Member States with the adoption of national legislation going beyond EU minimum standards on animal welfare, namely the banning on certain forms of caged farming; urges all Member States to swiftly adopt measures promoting the replacement of cage farming with non-cage alternative systems;

18.  Calls on the Commission to support farmers in their efforts to improve animal welfare, in particular as part of the EU’s Green Deal, CAP Strategic Plans and the Farm to Fork Strategy, in order to avoid a loss of competitiveness and a subsequent relocation of EU production to non-EU countries with lower animal welfare ambitions; believes that all EU production systems should be given a chance to invest in sustainability and animal welfare;

19.  Calls on the Commission to put forward proposals to ban the cruel and unnecessary force-feeding of ducks and geese for the production of foie gras;

20.  Calls on the Member States to assist farmers and stockpeople by providing advice and training, if needed, in order to ease the transition to cage-free systems;

21.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that effective controls and customs checks are performed in order to ensure the reciprocity of quality and safety requirements and of the EU animal welfare standards to strengthen the competitiveness of European agriculture in the global market for all agri-food products imported into the EU;

22.  Reiterates the importance of enforceable trade and sustainable development chapters in all EU trade agreements as a means of guaranteeing that the EU’s higher regulatory ambitions are consistent with EU trade policy, and that they are complied with by non-EU countries that have signed trade agreements with the EU;

23.  Underlines that trade and sustainable development chapters should also take account of equivalent production standards, in particular animal welfare;

24.  Considers a fair trade policy that ensures a level playing field to be a precondition for higher European standards; urges the Commission, therefore, to step up its efforts on controls on imported food products;

25.  Insists that all animal products imported into the EU should be produced in full compliance with relevant EU legislation, including on the use of cage-free farming systems;

26.  Urges the Commission to ensure sufficient support and a transition period for the progressive adaptation of farmers and livestock breeders, that takes into account the investment cycle of farmers, as well as funding mechanisms with a view to facilitating the transition, while maintaining the competitiveness and social resilience of the EU agri-food sector;

27.  Believes this support and a transition period should be ensured before any legislative changes are proposed to animal and human sanitary guarantees and the protection of workers, in order to prevent land abandonment and further withdrawal from livestock production (especially by small and medium-sized farms without the resources to adapt accordingly);

28.  Reiterates that the Commission needs to support farmers in educating consumers and communicating to them current high animal welfare standards; calls on the Commission and the Member States, therefore, to provide for appropriate financial support and guidance to ensure a smooth transition for the European farmers concerned;

29.  Stresses that the livestock sector is very dynamic and capable of adapting to changes in both legislation and consumer preferences; underscores, however, that in order to do so, it needs to be rewarded for its efforts with direct aid, so that the sustainability of production and the viability of farms are not jeopardised;

30.  Stresses the overall importance of a fair distribution of costs and benefits in the food chain and the role of the market in enabling farmers to become more sustainable; considers in this regard that a voluntary animal welfare label would be suitable to indicating the commitment of the chain from farm to fork to contributing to the aims of the ECI ‘End the cage age’, while ensuring adequate pricing;

31.  Stresses the importance of supporting farmers and helping them to move to more sustainable farming by providing adequate advisory and training services, incentives and financial programmes to support their standard of living and their competitiveness in rural areas, promoting investment and food chain organisation, strengthening small local processors and supporting a short supply chain;

32.  Asks the Commission to promote animal welfare internationally and to conduct initiatives with a view to increasing awareness among non-EU countries, including by measures such as further mutual assistance and accelerated exchange of information between the competent authorities in all Member States and in non-EU countries;

33.  Recalls that livestock farms are innovative places, constantly investing in improving their infrastructure and practices to keep up with the latest scientific evidence and consumers’ expectations;

34.  Calls for the development of an appropriate demand market in which it is possible to market all products produced with higher quality standards at higher prices;

35.  Calls on the Commission to present possible conversion programmes for a faster phasing-out of cage farming, including an assessment of the follow-up costs;

36.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 23. (2) OJ L 203, 3.8.1999, p. 53. (3) OJ L 10, 15.1.2009, p. 7. (4) OJ L 47, 18.2.2009, p. 5. (5) OJ C 263, 25.7.2018, p. 90. (6) OJ C 345, 16.10.2020, p. 28. (7) 13th Financial Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) - 2019 Financial Year, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0387&from=EN

European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on promoting gender equality in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education and careers (2019/2164(INI))

P9_TA(2021)0296 A9-0163/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Articles 2 and 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Article 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

—  having regard to the Commission communication of 10 June 2016 entitled ‘A New Skills Agenda for Europe: Working together to strengthen human capital, employability and competitiveness’ (COM(2016)0381),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0152),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 1 July 2020 entitled ‘European Skills Agenda for sustainable competitiveness, social fairness and resilience’ (COM(2020)0274),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 September 2020 entitled ‘Digital Education Action Plan 2021-2027 – Resetting education and training for the digital age’ (COM(2020)0624),

—  having regard to the study of the European Institute for Gender Equality of 10 August 2017 entitled ‘Economic benefits of gender equality in the EU: How gender equality in STEM education leads to economic growth’,

–  having regard to its resolution of 9 September 2015 on women’s careers in science and universities, and glass ceilings encountered(1),

—  having regard to the strategic framework for European policy cooperation in education and training for 2020,

—  having regard to its resolution of 8 October 2015 on the application of Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 28 April 2016 on gender equality and empowering women in the digital age(3),

–  having regard to its resolution of 17 April 2018 on empowering women and girls through the digital sector(4),

—  having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on closing the digital gender gap: women’s participation in the digital economy(5),

—  having regard to the Council conclusions of 6 December 2018 on gender equality, youth and digitalisation,

–  having regard to the study entitled ‘Education and employment of women in science, technology and the digital economy, including AI and its influence on gender equality’ published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies on 15 April 2020(6),

–  having regard to the study entitled ‘Women in the Digital Age’(7),

—  having regard to the UN International Day of Women and Girls in Science, held on 11 February every year, which seeks to achieve full and equal access to and participation in science for women and girls, and further achieve gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls,

—  having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which entered into force in 2016, and in particular Sustainable Development Goal 5 on gender equality,

—  having regard to the Commission’s 2020 Women in Digital Scoreboard,

—  having regard to the report of the European Institute for Gender Equality on the 2020 Gender Equality Index,

—  having regard to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979, in particular Article 11 thereof,

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (A9-0163/2021),

A.  whereas gender equality is a fundamental value and key objective of the EU and a basic precondition for the full enjoyment of human rights by women and girls that is essential for their empowerment, the development of their full potential and the achievement of a sustainable and inclusive society; whereas the discrimination faced by women associated with gender, stereotypes and inequalities, combined with intersectional discrimination, has a plethora of harmful social and economic consequences, including the reduction of potential advantages for the public sector and businesses in research and innovation and for overall economic development; whereas raising the profile of women in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and women’s professional contributions can establish patterns of success to follow and ultimately lead to more inclusion, as well as enhancing the transformation of and innovation in our societies, for the benefit of the wider public; whereas eliminating the old patterns will promote gender equality; whereas women could play a vital role in filling shortages on the EU labour market;

B.  whereas the EU is facing an unparalleled shortage of women in STEM careers and education, not least given that women make up 52 % of the European population and 57,7 % of tertiary graduates in the EU(8), yet only account for 2 out of 5 scientists and engineers(9); whereas women are under-represented at all levels in the digital sector in Europe, from students (32 % at bachelor’s, master’s or equivalent level) to top academic positions (15 %) in most scientific, engineering and management fields and at higher hierarchical levels, even in sectors where they comprise the majority, such as education; whereas gender stereotypes constitute a serious obstacle to equality between male and female students as early as education and further widen the gender gap in the STEM job sector, which represents a serious obstacle to equality between women and men; whereas the gap is largest in specialist skills and employment in ICT in the EU, where only 18 % are women(10), among STEM graduates, of whom only 36 % are women, and in the digital sector, where there are more than three times more men than women; whereas significant levels of gender segregation among STEM students and graduates lay the ground for future gender segregation in STEM-related careers; whereas very few teenage girls in the Member States (less than 3 %) express an interest in working as an ICT professional at the age of 30(11); whereas it is particularly difficult for women from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds to enter the STEM sector; whereas although there has been a positive trend in the involvement and interest of girls in STEM education, the percentages remain insufficient; whereas attitudes towards STEM do not differ between boys and girls through primary education, and in many cases girls often outperform boys in STEM and ICT-related tasks(12); whereas gender differences in STEM subjects in higher education are not justified by academic performance, as girls and boys show similar levels of achievement in science and maths in secondary level education; whereas, however, girls fear that they will be less successful than boys in STEM‑related careers and, as a result, women are less confident in their own digital skills; whereas social norms and gendered expectations about career choices, which are often reinforced through educational content and curricula, are two of the drivers of gender segregation in higher education;

C.  whereas women who major in STEM fields can struggle to find their place in the STEM job sector and are less likely than their male counterparts to enter STEM occupations or remain in them as a result of the various barriers that exist, such as gender stereotypes, male-dominated workplaces, discrimination and prejudice, conscious and unconscious bias, sexual harassment, a negative working environment, and a lack of female role models and mentors; whereas reducing the gender gap in STEM education areas could reduce the skills gap, increase employment and the productivity of women and reduce professional segregation, which would ultimately foster economic growth through higher productivity and increased labour; whereas closing the gender gap in STEM careers would contribute to an increase in EU GDP per capita by 2,2 to 3,0 % by 2050(13); whereas closing the gender gap in STEM careers would constitute a step towards gender equality and the fulfilment of women’s and girls’ human rights, and would have a positive impact in reducing the gender pay and gender pension gaps;

D.  whereas according to a survey by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights(14), an estimated 55 % of women in the EU have faced sexual harassment since the age of 15 and 14 % of women have experienced cyber harassment since the age of 15; whereas many women have been the victims of new forms of cyber violence during the COVID‑19 pandemic, such as online sexual and psychological harassment; whereas measures to address these new forms of sexual and psychological harassment are urgently needed; whereas high incidences of sexual harassment have been reported in STEM education facilities, including schools, universities and workplaces, which further excludes women from the sector;

E.  whereas the under-representation of women who work in innovative technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), is a matter of concern, as it can negatively affect the design, development and implementation of these technologies, causing the replication of existing discriminatory practices and stereotypes and the development of ‘gender‑biased algorithms’; whereas efforts to tackle gender bias, stereotypes and inequality in the digital sector are insufficient; whereas the gender gap persists across all digital technology domains, notably with regard to AI and cybersecurity, thereby solidifying a male-biased trajectory for the digital sector in the foreseeable future; whereas addressing these biases requires the development of clear ethics and transparency requirements; whereas incomplete and inaccurate data sets and the lack of gender‑disaggregated data can distort the processing and reasoning of AI systems and further jeopardise the achievement of gender equality in society; whereas due consideration should also be given to the unique circumstances of Europe’s small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with particular regard to their size, ability to implement new requirements, and potential as a valuable source and contributor to enable girls, women and female leaders to promote gender equality in STEM education and careers;

F.  whereas new technologies that are biased in terms of gender, ethnicity, race, colour, language, religion or national or social origin are mainly caused by non-disaggregated data, a lack of situated knowledge and the failure to apply a gender perspective in research, which can have harmful consequences for women’s health and well-being, especially those facing intersectional discrimination, and for the safety of products, and can have a negative impact on women’s personal and professional development(15);

G.  whereas teachers and parents can entrench gender stereotypes by discouraging girls from choosing and pursuing STEM studies and careers; whereas gender stereotypes greatly influence subject choices; whereas cultural discouragement and the lack of awareness of female role models and the failure to promote them hinders and negatively affects girls’ and women’s opportunities in STEM studies, related careers and digital entrepreneurship, and leads to discrimination and fewer opportunities for women in the labour market; whereas emphasis should be placed on the factors that motivate girls and nurture their interest in STEM studies, related careers and digital entrepreneurship, such as promoting female role models, teacher mentors and peer group approval and developing creativity and practical experience;

H.  whereas the COVID-19 crisis is likely to result in permanent changes to life in Europe and affect most aspects of people’s lives, the way we perform our work and the way we study and learn, in which digitalisation will have a major role; whereas COVID-19 is also widening the digital gender gap(16) at a time when digital skills are needed more than ever to work, study or stay connected; whereas the rapid digital transformation offers many opportunities to change the gendered patterns of employment, but can also disproportionately affect women’s employment in numerous fields; whereas women are forced to assume a higher share of obligations related to parenting or their families than their male counterparts and, as such, all proposed measures should take into account the possibility of successfully reconciling professional and family life for women so as to include men in these spheres; whereas the boundaries between professional and family life will become less distinct as a result of teleworking and women could have to bear the greatest burden of balancing a career with family care duties;

I.  whereas there is a need to further promote policies aimed at increasing the participation of women in STEM and AI-related fields and to adopt a multi-level approach to address the gender gap across all levels of education and employment in the digital sector; whereas few Member States have included provisions on gender equality in the field of research and innovation and progress to mainstream gender into national research programmes has been slow;

J.  whereas there is a need to promote and support greater entrepreneurship among women and develop an enabling environment in which women entrepreneurs can prosper and enterprise is encouraged; whereas the data on entrepreneurship in the STEM and ICT sector points to an even greater marginalisation of women; whereas the gender gap in start-ups and venture capital investment is similarly striking; whereas as girls tend to study fewer ICT and STEM subjects throughout secondary school and university, far fewer women end up working in these fields and becoming founders and owners of private companies and start-ups; whereas only 17 % of start-up founders are women; whereas on average, start-ups owned by women receive 23 % less funding than those run by men; whereas although women account for 30 % of all entrepreneurs in Europe, they only receive 2 % of the non-bank financing available(17); whereas this figure seems to have fallen to 1 % in the light of the pandemic;

General remarks

1.  Considers that in the light of the considerable gender pay gap in the EU, the fact that women are more likely to have low-wage, part-time and otherwise precarious jobs, the rising demand for STEM practitioners, and the importance of STEM‑related careers for the future of the European economy, increasing the share of women in the STEM sector is critical to fulfilling women’s rights and potential and to building a more sustainable and inclusive economy and society through scientific, digital and technological innovation; highlights that high-level STEM skills are critical to the process of innovation in cutting-edge ICT areas such as AI and cybersecurity and will be increasingly important to the EU’s competitiveness on global markets; underlines, therefore, that the full potential of women’s skills, knowledge and qualifications in these fields can help to boost the European economy and support the goals defined in various EU policies, above all the European Green Deal and the Digital Agenda;

2.  Reiterates that the main goal should be to remove all barriers, in particular sociocultural, psychological and pedagogical barriers that restrict women’s and girls’ interests, preferences and choices, including gender stereotypes, gender discrimination and a combination of biological and social factors, notably that of motherhood with the most decisive periods in women’s careers, without compromising women’s freedom to make decisions; encourages the Member States to promote the participation of women and girls in STEM studies and careers in their relevant national or regional gender action plans or strategies by providing adequate incentives; considers that these action plans or strategies should, among other initiatives, aim to increase gender equality by focusing on the eradication of gender stereotypes, the facilitation of access to education and qualifications, a better work-life balance, equal opportunities, ensuring healthy and safe working and studying environments for women, non-discrimination in the labour market, raising awareness of gender bias and stereotypes across all STEM-relevant sectors, establishing mandatory pay transparency policies, implementing zero tolerance for sexual harassment, and increasing the visibility of female role models;

3.  Reiterates that gender stereotyping, cultural discouragement and a lack of awareness and of promotion of female role models hinders and negatively affects girls’ and women’s opportunities in STEM studies, in related careers and digital entrepreneurship, and can lead to discrimination and fewer opportunities for women in the labour market;

4.  Reaffirms the importance of integrating the awareness of gender bias across all relevant sectors, including in the initial and continuous training of teachers; highlights the need to address structural barriers, such as socio-economic disadvantage and hostile working environments and working conditions for women, which hinder girls and women from entering a predominantly male-dominated field, and the need to increase the visibility of hitherto undervalued role models in order to inspire women and girls; calls on the Commission to introduce and support awareness-raising campaigns and other programmes and initiatives to reduce these barriers in the academic world; stresses that gender equality measures such as the removal of gender stereotypes in education, awareness-raising, the promotion of STEM subjects for girls and women and careers guidance to encourage girls to consider studying in male-dominated fields would lead to a higher number of women graduating in STEM subjects;

5.  Calls on the Member States to combat gendered labour market segmentation in STEM careers by investing in formal, informal and non-formal education, lifelong learning and vocational training for women to ensure their access to high-quality employment and opportunities to reskill and upskill for future labour market demand and prevent a vicious circle of gender segregation of labour; calls on the Commission and the Member States to devise policy measures that fully incorporate the gender dimension through awareness-raising campaigns, training, school curricula and, in particular, careers guidance, in order to promote entrepreneurship, STEM subjects and digital education for girls from an early age with a view to combating existing educational stereotypes and ensuring that more women enter developing and well‑paid sectors; emphasises the need to involve the media, including social media, to encourage the use of inclusive language and to avoid stereotypes that lead to the formation of opinions against girls’ participation and interest in STEM education; calls for STEM facilities to be improved and equal access to them to be guaranteed; calls for specific scholarships for girls and women who wish to pursue a career in the STEM sector;

6.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to take specific account of the situation of women and girls from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds, such as those with disabilities or those living in outermost regions or rural areas, women in poverty, single mothers, students in precarious situations, migrant women and Roma women, and to ensure their full access to and inclusion in digital education and STEM careers in order to prevent the digital divide from widening; calls on the Commission and the Member States to pay careful attention to intersectional discrimination and bias due to ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, age or disability when devising their action plans; calls on the Commission and the Member States to collect comparable, harmonised data to track the progress of women from different socioeconomic backgrounds or racial and ethnic origins through all educational levels, including with regard to their career choices and development, focusing on inequalities in the STEM and digital sectors, which will help to monitor the impact of policies and enable stakeholders to identify shortcomings and their root causes; calls on the Commission to cooperate with the Member States to broaden the indicators used for the Women in Digital Scoreboard so that they include information and data on women in STEM education and careers and to develop a toolkit that includes methodologies, indicators and frameworks to produce more precise data and improve the use of existing information;

7.  Calls on the Member States to offer their full support for the Commission’s initiatives to raise awareness of digital opportunities, such as the ‘no women, no panel’ approach, the EU Code Week, the Digital Skills and Jobs Coalitions, the EU Prize for Women Innovators, the Europe-wide #SaferInternet4EU initiatives and the Skills Agenda for Europe;

Education

8.  Welcomes the Digital Education Action Plan 2021-2027 and its action to ‘Encourage women’s participation in STEM’, and hopes that it will help to develop more attractive and creative ways to encourage girls to pursue STEM studies, as well as boost women’s self-confidence in their digital skills; stresses that girls only go on to account for 36 % of STEM graduates(18) despite outperforming boys in digital literacy(19); highlights that girls who assimilate gender stereotypes have lower levels of self-efficacy and less confidence in their ability than boys and that self-efficacy has a considerable impact on both STEM education outcomes and aspirations for STEM careers; stresses that girls appear to lose interest in STEM subjects with age, which suggests that interventions are needed as early as pre-school and primary school in order to sustain girls’ interest in these fields and fight harmful stereotypes on gender roles for both girls and boys; calls on the Commission and the Member States to create new channels to connect with girls and ensure that digital education reaches them all, and to recognise and invest in teachers as the drivers of cultural change given their potential to boost the continuing participation of girls in science at school; suggests that these endeavours should be stepped up with the development of common guidelines for the Member States with the aim of improving the knowledge and skills of those starting secondary education; calls for the efficient use of EU funds, programmes and strategies including Erasmus+, the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and the Digital Europe Programme in order to actively encourage girls to undertake studies in ICT and STEM subjects and to provide effective support for lifelong learning and training in STEM sectors; calls for gender equality to be duly incorporated in the future EU youth strategy and policies;

9.  Stresses that high-quality, inclusive and non-discriminatory digital education must play a substantial role in increasing the participation of girls and women in ICT and STEM‑related fields and eliminating the digital gender gap; emphasises that digital education must create better digital inclusion and digital literacy and ensure the equal participation of girls and women in the digital age; underlines the importance of ensuring gender mainstreaming in STEM education at all levels, including in extra‑curricular, informal and non-formal education, as well as for teaching staff; calls, therefore, for specific age-appropriate strategies; encourages the Member States to promote computer science education in national curricula and calls on educational bodies to integrate the subjects of robotics, coding, ICT and programming at an earlier stage of pre-school and primary education in order to encourage girls and female students to take up mathematics, coding, ICT classes and science subjects at school;

10.  Recognises the role of schools and teachers in eliminating the gender gap in STEM education and highlights the role of education in promoting the presence of girls in STEM-related courses and in establishing benchmarks to monitor female recruitment and retention; calls on the Member States to invest in developing the skills of primary and secondary STEM teachers to help them to understand and address unconscious preconceptions in their teaching practices and assessments and to engage all learners equally; emphasises the need for the Member States to involve the entire teaching profession in STEM movements and to engage teachers as agents of change; proposes that equality plans be drawn up by educational establishments to promote gender balance among teachers; calls for STEM curricula and educational materials to be strengthened in order to better promote equal participation in STEM; calls for better careers guidance and for new and creative ways to inspire female students to consider a STEM career path; highlights the need, in this regard, to strengthen the capacity of teachers and careers advisers to encourage girls who show an interest in STEM to pursue a career in it, as a better awareness of stereotypes and gender disparities in STEM enables educators and careers advisers to understand the barriers faced by their students, ensure equal participation in STEM classes and promote STEM careers to female students;

11.  Highlights the fact that male teachers and other male staff dominate STEM-related studies in schools, universities and workplaces, leading to an absence of female role models and limited guidance and mentoring opportunities; encourages gender mainstreaming in primary, secondary and tertiary education through gender-sensitive educational content, teacher training and curricula, and urges the committees and institutions involved in recruitment to promote a gender balance to avoid the ‘outsider effect’; emphasises the need for investment in education and training with gender‑sensitive recruitment and selection processes across educational sectors, especially in STEM and emerging digital sectors, where women are under-represented; calls on the Commission and the Member States to find more attractive and creative ways to showcase female role models with successful careers in ICT and STEM in order to boost girls’ self confidence in digital skills and encourage them to pursue ICT and STEM-related studies;

12.  Stresses the need to address financial education, including simulations of financial practices, and its relationship with the gender pension gap; highlights that teaching younger women about subjects like the gender pay gap will pave the way for a future filled with financially confident women;

13.  Notes that every girl should be able take advantage of greater access to world-class digital learning solutions and have the tools and motivations to engage with digital technologies as users and creators; calls on the Member States to take into account ongoing concerns about the risk of the further spread of COVID-19 and to tackle the lack of ICT equipment and connectivity for vulnerable students from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds, such as girls in rural areas or areas that are difficult to reach, and to develop tools to ensure full access to and the smooth functioning of digital education; emphasises the need for special funding programmes for schools in rural areas, which are increasingly finding themselves without the funding for advanced technologies that many urban school districts take for granted; calls, in addition, for better support for educators in rural school systems to help them teach STEM curricula, with particular regard to training, tools and infrastructure;

14.  Underlines the importance of developing networks for women STEM professionals for large-scale communication campaigns to help transform perceptions of women in STEM and for women in STEM to connect with girls through careers support, skills training and networking; commends the various educational initiatives designed to support girls and promote women in the digital economy, including the use of viral social media stories, professional networks organised by women, for women, and initiatives by tech companies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to set up mentoring schemes with female role models in STEM within all levels of education; calls on the Commission to adopt a targeted gender approach in the rollout of traineeships for digital opportunities to give young women from different backgrounds the chance to get hands-on digital, ICT and STEM experience in fields that are in demand on the labour market, and strongly encourages the promotion of internships in STEM businesses during education; encourages the Member States to create initiatives to support girls’ school-to-work transition, such as careers guidance at school, apprenticeships and work experience programmes, with a view to supporting girls’ future aspirations and creating pathways for them to transition into the STEM workforce;

15.  Notes that in its conclusions of May 2015 on the European Research Area Roadmap for 2015-2020, the Council – to no avail – called on the Commission and the Member States to start translating national equality legislation into effective action in order to combat gender imbalances in research institutions and decision-making bodies and integrate the gender dimension better into research and development policies, programmes and projects; recognises the Commission’s objective to encourage the participation of women in STEM with the European Institute of Innovation and Technology and support the EU STEM Coalition to develop higher education curricula which attract women to engineering and ICT; regrets the fact that unequal access for women to research positions, funding and publishing still persists, including an unadjusted gender pay gap in science and academia, despite legal provisions on equal treatment and non-discrimination on the labour market, including on equal pay, being in place in the EU and Member States;

16.  Highlights the number of cases of sexual harassment suffered by female STEM students in tertiary education and calls on the Member States and educational institutions to enact zero tolerance policies for sexual harassment, to agree on strict codes of conduct and protocols, to create safe and private reporting channels for women and girls, and to report all cases of sexual harassment to the relevant authorities; calls on the Commission, the Member States and educational institutions to adopt preventive measures and adequate sanctions for the perpetrators of sexual harassment in order to tackle sexual harassment in schools and STEM educational facilities;

17.  Emphasises the need to include gender-responsive STEM learning and career opportunities in national development plans and policies for the education sector, ICT and science;

Careers

18.  Regrets the fact that women face disproportionately more obstacles in their careers than men owing to the lack of a proper work-life balance and an increase in unpaid care work in most households; notes that the COVID-19 pandemic has further aggravated the situation of women, who have had to balance overtime remote working while caring for children and doing unpaid care work; laments the particularly negative impact of the ‘always on’ culture on the work-life balance of workers with caring responsibilities, who tend to be women; urges public and private institutions to ensure that telework takes into consideration the obstacles in maintaining a better work-life balance and respects the right to disconnect, and to adopt family-friendly policies; urges the Member States to establish adequate measures to guarantee zero tolerance policies for sexual harassment, better maternity leave, significantly more and longer paternity leave, and paid and non-transferable parental leave that will allow women and men to take time off to care for their children, and to combat the norm of the woman being the parent to take a career break in order to overcome a major barrier to women advancing their careers, as well as ensuring flexible working hours, on-site childcare facilities and telework; urges the Member States to fully transpose and implement the Work-Life Balance Directive(20) and calls on the Commission to monitor it effectively; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully assess the causes and factors that lead to a high drop-out rate from STEM careers among women, to formulate recommendations for action to prevent this, if necessary, and to develop mechanisms and programmes to involve women and girls in education, training and employment initiatives and adopt adequate policies and measures to this end; emphasises that COVID-19 is opening a new chapter in the world of work, education, governance and everyday life and has highlighted the particular importance of digital literacy and skills and the need for new conditions on teleworking, which have shown a significant gender divide during the pandemic and ensuing lockdowns; highlights the urgent need to promote gender balance in the digital sector given how people and companies use ICT and other digital technologies to work and interact in the new digital society;

19.  Deems it of the utmost importance to have more female role models and to increase the number of women in leadership positions in the STEM sector; stresses that the declining percentage of women in higher positions has an adverse effect on the recruitment of women, which further reduces the odds of women being appointed to higher positions; regrets the fact that women are under-represented in leadership positions in STEM careers and highlights the urgent need to promote gender equality at all levels of decision-making in business and management; underlines that gender diversity on boards and in decision-making positions improves business performance as a result of a broader spectrum of knowledge, attitudes and experience; deplores the existence of both horizontal and vertical gender segregation in the hierarchies of universities and schools in Europe; draws attention to the fact that women are particularly under-represented in top academic and decision-making positions in academic institutions and universities, indicating the existence of a glass ceiling – invisible barriers of prejudice preventing women from reaching positions of responsibility; urges the Council and the Member States to adopt the proposed Women on Boards Directive and to establish targets for gender balance on decision-making bodies;

20.  Regrets the fact that the gender pay gap remains a reality and is even more pronounced in male‑dominated sectors, such as ICT and technological companies(21); calls on all actors to practice pay transparency; urges the Council to unblock the proposed directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, which aims to extend protection against discrimination through a horizontal approach;

21.  Calls on all the relevant stakeholders to address discrimination in their hiring practices and to introduce quotas to promote the inclusion of women, especially women from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds, women with disabilities and LGBTI+ people;

22.  Encourages the establishment of an inclusive dialogue with the relevant stakeholders, such as private companies, non-governmental organisations, professional orders and institutes, state institutions, regional and local authorities, policymakers and civil society representatives, in order to coordinate and tackle the missing links to promote women in STEM; stresses that in view of the paramount importance of fighting cultural and social stereotypes against women’s abilities and roles in the STEM sector, targeted measures should be adopted to promote gender equality such as gender mainstreaming legislation or policies such as financial incentives or other measures in order to increase girls’ participation in STEM education and careers; calls for incentives to be provided to companies that support female role models, mentoring programmes and career paths, and for the visibility of women to be increased; recognises the essential role played by certain CEOs and senior management people in closing the digital gender gap by developing corporate policies aimed at combating digital gender-related stereotypes, promoting role models, motivating women to explore STEM studies, stimulating the reskilling or upskilling of women, promoting mentoring schemes, and improving the image of ICT jobs; calls on the Commission and the Member States to further engage with all ICT, digital, telecoms, media, audiovisual and technological business partners to promote an inclusive and gender-balanced working culture and environment, including by introducing measures such as awareness campaigns to promote gender equality in the private STEM sectors and public-private partnerships to facilitate access to the STEM labour market for recently graduated students, with the promotion of apprenticeship schemes and internships for girls and young women to enhance their transition to the labour market, through such initiatives as mentorships and scholarships for disadvantaged girls, and with public-private partnerships between education systems, governments and companies that work in emerging technologies, such as 3D technologies, AI, nanotechnology, robotics and gene therapy, and to share information and good practices across the Member States to this end;

23.  Highlights the relationship between the gender gap and the pension gap; calls on the Member States, therefore, to tackle and reduce these and to take further steps to ensure that women can get adequate access to education, the chance to attain economic independence and career progression opportunities;

Digital sector

24.  Regrets the fact that the gender gap exists across all digital technology domains, but is especially concerned about the gender gap in innovative technologies, such as the AI and cybersecurity domains, where the average worldwide female presence stands at 12 % and 20 % respectively(22); proposes that more attention and support should be devoted to sparsely populated and particularly rural areas, where this situation is getting worse;

25.  Stresses that the quality of the data sets used is paramount for the performance of AI technologies, that AI must not reinforce gender inequalities and stereotypes by transforming bias and prejudices from the analogue to the digital sphere on the basis of algorithms, and that AI can contribute significantly to promoting gender equality, provided that an appropriate legal framework is developed and conscious and unconscious biases are eliminated; highlights that one of AI’s most critical weaknesses relates to certain types of bias such as gender, age, disability, religion, racial or ethnic origin, social background or sexual orientation as a result of a homogeneous workforce; notes that intersectional types of discrimination leave women marginalised from emerging technologies, such as women of colour owing to errors in facial recognition technology; emphasises the need for diverse teams of developers and engineers to work alongside key societal actors to prevent gender and cultural biases from being inadvertently included in AI algorithms, systems and applications; supports the creation of educational curricula and public-awareness activities concerning the societal, legal and ethical impact of AI; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take all possible measures to prevent such biases and to ensure the full protection of fundamental rights; stresses that human oversight infrastructure must be developed before AI technologies are rolled out in high-risk sectors, notably health, and must include gender equality experts;

26.  Recognises that AI, if it is free of underlying biases, can be a powerful tool to overcome gender inequalities and stereotypes through the development of unbiased, ethical-by-design algorithms that contribute to overall fairness and well-being; stresses the importance of a common European approach with regard to the ethical aspects of AI; stresses, in addition, that EU AI policy and legislation must respect European values, EU Treaties and laws, and the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights;

27.  Calls for all AI and automation to be socially responsible and designed in such a way as to enable us to overcome inequalities including gender discrimination and to address the challenges faced by women such as unpaid care work, the gender pay gap, cyberbullying, gender-based violence and sexual harassment, trafficking, violations of sexual and reproductive rights, and under-representation in leadership positions; calls for AI and automation to contribute to the enhancement of women’s health and economic prosperity, equality of opportunities, workers’ and social rights, quality education, the protection of children, cultural and linguistic diversity, gender equality, digital literacy, innovation and creativity, including access to finance, higher education and flexible work opportunities; calls on the Commission to help Member States’ competent authorities to devote particular attention to new forms of gender-based violence such as cyber harassment and cyberstalking(23) and to carry out ongoing evaluations and address these issues more effectively;

Entrepreneurship and access to finance

28.  Regrets the fact that women are under-represented in innovation-driven business start‑ups and highlights the gender biases and systemic disadvantages that exist in social structures, particularly those at the intersection of STEM and entrepreneurship; considers it of the utmost importance to have more female role models and to increase the number of women in leadership positions in the STEM sector; calls on the Commission and the Member States to enact policies to support and unleash the entrepreneurial potential of women, who remain an untapped source of economic growth, innovation and job creation, to provide more and better information about entrepreneurship as an attractive career option, especially for young women in school, and to implement public policies that promote female entrepreneurship; considers that the COVID-19 recovery represents a significant opportunity to advance women entrepreneurs to enable them to rebuild our economies and societies; underlines that a genuine COVID-19 recovery will only be a success if a greener, fairer and more gender‑equal Europe is attained and adequate gender mainstreaming of EU recovery funds is secured, while also ensuring that women reap the full benefits in terms of employment and entrepreneurship in sectors where they have traditionally been and continue to be significantly under-represented, including digital, AI, ICT and STEM;

29.  Considers the under‑representation of women in charge of investment decisions at venture capital firms to constitute a major source of the persistent funding gap for women-driven start-ups and enterprises;

30.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase financing opportunities to loans and equity finance for women start-up entrepreneurs and innovators through EU funds and programmes, to facilitate women’s access to existing funds, to create dedicated funds, and to seek new and innovative ways to support women financially and help them to overcome the barriers they face; calls for the European Investment Bank to also be included with regard to access to microfinance; recognises the need for awareness-raising and information campaigns about EU funding possibilities to provide tailored support to women business owners and women entrepreneurs; calls for the European Business Angels Network and European Network of Mentors for Women Entrepreneurs to be further expanded, including by promoting gatherings of women innovators, tech professionals and investors to stimulate and boost innovation and funding for women-led ventures;

31.  Welcomes the Commission’s initiative establishing the EU Prize for Women Innovators, which is awarded every year to European women who have founded a successful company and brought an innovation to market; calls on the Commission and the Member States to find additional ways to encourage more women to start up their own companies and to celebrate inspiring female leaders in innovation;

32.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to implement the Declaration of Commitment on Women in Digital adopted in April 2019 and to develop concrete actions to promote gender equality in the STEM sector, including the creation of the European Girls in ICT and STEM day; calls on the Commission to monitor and report on Member States’ efforts and actions and to ensure the exchange of information and good practices;

o
o   o

33.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ C 316, 22.9.2017, p. 173. (2) OJ C 349, 17.10.2017, p. 56. (3) OJ C 66, 21.2.2018, p. 44. (4) OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 28. (5) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0026. (6) Study – ‘Education and employment of women in science, technology and the digital economy, including AI and its influence on gender equality’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C – Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 15 April 2020. (7) Study prepared by iclaves for the Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, European Commission. (8) Eurostat, Tertiary education statistics, data extracted in September 2020. (9) Eurostat, Human resources in science and technology, annual average data 2016-2020. (10) European Commission, Women in Digital Scoreboard 2020. (11) International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), International Computer and Information Literacy Study (ICILS) 2018. (12) O’Dea, R. E., Lagisz, M., Jennions, M. D. et al., ‘Gender differences in individual variation in academic grades fail to fit expected patterns for STEM’, Nature Communications 9, 3777, 2018. (13) European Institute for Gender Equality, Economic benefits of gender equality in the EU: How gender equality in STEM education leads to economic growth, 2017. (14) EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, Violence against women: an EU-wide survey, 2014. (15) Report of the Expert Group ‘Innovation through Gender’, Gendered Innovations: How Gender Analysis Contributes to Research, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, European Commission, 2013. (16) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Bridging the digital gender divide: include, upskill, innovate, 2018. (17) European Commission and European Investment Bank, Funding women entrepreneurs: How to empower growth, 2018. (18) European Commission, She Figures 2018. (19) International Computer and Information Literacy Study (ICILS) 2018. (20) Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU (OJ L 188, 12.7.2019, p. 79). (21) Lambrecht, A. and Tucker, C. E., ‘Algorithmic bias? An empirical study into apparent gender-based discrimination in the display of STEM career ads’, Management Science, Vol. 65, No 7, 2019, p. 2970. (22) Sax, L. J., Kanny, M. A., Jacobs, J. A. et al., ‘Understanding the Changing Dynamics of the Gender Gap in Undergraduate Engineering Majors: 1971-2011’, Research in Higher Education, Vol. 57, No 5, 2016; Shade, L. R., ‘Missing in action: Gender in Canada’s digital economy agenda’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 39, No 4, 2014, pp. 887-896. (23) EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, Violence against women: an EU-wide survey, 2014, p. 87.

European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on the future EU financing of the radio network Euranet Plus (2021/2708(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0297 B9-0316/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union and Protocol No 2 to the Treaties on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,

–  having regard to Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

–  having regard to the Commission decision of 18 March 2021 on the financing of multimedia actions and the adoption of the work programme for 2021, including the annex thereto,

–  having regard to the question to the Commission on the future EU financing of the radio network Euranet Plus (O-000036/2021 – B9-0023/2021),

–  having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Culture and Education,

A.  whereas radio has proven to be a crucial medium for communicating with people about EU affairs;

B.  whereas in larger and more populous Member States, regional and local radio stations, courtesy of their very high market penetration, often offer a privileged window on EU‑related content for a considerable listenership and make an effective contribution to the preservation of minority languages;

C.  whereas while radio can assert itself as a key medium in a largely digitalised media landscape, the digitalisation of sound broadcasting in the EU is a long-term process that requires radio stations and networks to draw up transition plans, spread the required investments and cushion the full economic impact of this shift;

D.  whereas, founded in 2007, Euranet Plus is a unique network of radio stations in the EU that reports on events in Europe from a transnational perspective; whereas since the network’s establishment, its operational activities have mainly been financed with EU funding; whereas Euranet Plus is currently composed of 13 leading public and private broadcasters in 13 Member States, which together reach a cumulative total of more than 15 million listeners every day(1), and offers a unique range of high-quality production, broadcasting and editorial services to its members, thereby meeting the requirements of Article 195 of the Financial Regulation(2) in terms of the specific characteristics of activities that require a particular type of body;

E.  whereas the current grant agreement with Euranet Plus – worth EUR 2.16 million per year – is set to expire on 31 December 2021;

F.  whereas the European Parliament was notified of the Commission’s decision on the future financing model for multimedia actions in a letter from Commissioner Breton on 18 January 2021, which stated that the grant agreement with Euranet Plus would not be renewed and would be replaced by a competitive annual call for proposals to be launched in 2021;

G.  whereas the Commission did not engage in a strategic dialogue with Euranet Plus, as expressly recommended in a recent audit, before taking its decision on the future financing of radio broadcasting;

H.  whereas the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) has repeatedly asked the Commission to be included in the decision-making process for multimedia actions, has conveyed to the Commission its strong conviction that the planned approach was unfair on Euranet Plus which, as a pan-European radio network with a mission of public service, deserves to be treated as a unique partner for promoting integration and media diversity in the EU, and has expressed, both orally and in written form, its fundamental disagreement with the rapid change planned by the Commission for EU funding for radio broadcasting, which could disrupt the continuity of service;

I.  whereas on 18 March 2021, the Commission went ahead as planned with the adoption of the decision on the financing of multimedia actions and the adoption of the work programme for 2021; whereas the Commission has made it clear through multiple exchanges of views with staff and Commissioners that it intends to uphold its decision regarding future EU funding for Euranet Plus – in total disregard for Parliament’s political will on this matter;

J.  whereas a funding model based on annual open calls for proposals with a very limited duration is not financially sustainable; whereas the fact that a call will be launched this year, with no transitional measures, is unfair on Euranet Plus, a longstanding, trusted partner, makes it impossible for Euranet to draw up a long-term development plan for making the digital shift and investing in further improvements to its products and services, and is likely to lead to the liquidation of the organisation and the redundancy of its staff in early 2022;

1.  Urges the Commission to acknowledge the unique nature of Euranet Plus as an independent radio network that successfully bridges the information gap between the EU and its citizens by strengthening their understanding of and promoting debate on all fields of EU policymaking; underlines that Euranet Plus combines production and broadcasting capacities in providing high-quality editorial services for its affiliated radio stations and the agency itself, which plans co-productions, promotes exchanges and produces pan-European, tailor-made and on-demand formats for its members; concludes that Euranet Plus thus represents a unique gateway for its considerable membership of public and private broadcasters which, with content in 12 official EU languages, reach more than 15 million listeners every day who may otherwise not engage with EU-related issues;

2.  Calls for Euranet Plus’s current core funding to be renewed in the form of a transitional grant agreement for at least two years to enable it to develop a long-term strategic plan to develop the network further by the end of 2027, with a view to expanding its membership and geographic and linguistic coverage, preparing for the digital shift, and investing in further improvements to its products and services; requests that the Commission’s Directorates-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT) and Budget (DG BUDG) form an interinstitutional working group with Euranet Plus and the CULT Committee in order to find the appropriate technical solutions to implement a multiannual operational framework; underlines that such transitional measures will allow the organisation to equip itself for a competitive, multiannual process that could start in 2024; emphasises that this approach will create the most added value in terms of sustainability, efficiency and a sound use of EU public funding, as opposed to short-term procedures that not only force beneficiaries to live a hand-to-mouth existence but are also more costly in administrative terms;

3.  Requests that the Commission urgently revise its decision of 18 March 2021 to ensure that the EUR 2.2 million earmarked for financing activities in radio broadcasting in 2022 in point 2 of the annex thereto is not allocated through an open call, but given directly to Euranet Plus, based on the fact that the organisation continues to meet the requirements of Article 195 of the Financial Regulation;

4.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) Official website of the Euranet Plus Network, ‘Our Network’. (2) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).