Railway safety and signalling: Assessing the state of play of the ERTMS deployment
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European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on railway safety and signalling: assessing the state of play of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) deployment (2019/2191(INI))
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/797 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the interoperability of the rail system within the European Union(1),
– having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network and repealing Decision No 661/2010/EU, and in particular Article 47(2) thereof(2) (the TEN-T Regulation),
– having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/6 of 5 January 2017 on the European Rail Traffic Management System European deployment plan(3),
– having regard to the special report of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) of 3 October 2017 entitled ‘A single European rail traffic management system: will the political choice ever become reality?’,
– having regard to the European Green Deal,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 9 December 2020 entitled ‘Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy – putting European transport on track for the future’ (COM(2020)0789),
– having regard to the Commission’s seventh monitoring report of 13 January 2021 on the development of the rail market under Article 15(4) of Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2021)0005),
– having regard to Decision (EU) 2020/2228 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020 on a European Year of Rail (2021)(4),
– having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2016 on the competitiveness of the European rail supply industry(5),
– having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Transport and Tourism (A9-0181/2021),
A. whereas the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) is the EU standard for automatic train protection, which creates an interoperable railway system in Europe;
B. whereas four memoranda of understanding on cooperation for the deployment of the ERTMS have been signed by the Commission and European rail manufacturers, infrastructure managers and railway undertakings, with the last one being in September 2016;
C. whereas important legislative steps have been taken, including the adoption in June 2016 of the Fourth Railway Package – which regulates rail governance issues and reinforces the role of the European Railway Agency (the Agency) as the system authority for the ERTMS – and the revision of the technical specifications for interoperability (TSIs) for the on-board and trackside control command and signalling (CCS TSI) subsystems adopted through Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/919(6), which gives legal status to the European Train Control System (ETCS) Baseline 3 Release 2 and GSM-R (Global System for Mobile Communications – Railway) Baseline 1 specifications;
D. whereas a new ERTMS European deployment plan (EDP) was adopted on 5 January 2017(7), laying down the timetable for the deployment of the ERTMS on core network corridors (CNCs);
E. whereas a fully deployed ERTMS would allow for traffic capacity to be increased by up to 30 % on existing railway infrastructure;
F. whereas the Commission also published an ERTMS action plan(8) identifying actions to address barriers to ERTMS implementation and interoperability and aiming for a target of converting about one third of the CNCs by 2023;
G. whereas between 2014 and 2020, the EU budget supported ERTMS deployment with an estimated total budget of EUR 2,7 billion, out of which EUR 850 million came from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)(9) and EUR 1,9 billion came from European Structural and Investments Funds (the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund) in the eligible regions;
H. whereas the deployment of the ERTMS must involve the decommissioning of Class B system installations of ETCS trackside components along with the widespread retrofitting of rolling stocks with ERTMS on-board unit interoperable subsystems;
I. whereas there is no legal obligation in place for Member States to adopt measures to ensure that railway undertakings invest in the ERTMS;
J. whereas the ECA has warned that the full core network deployment of the ERTMS is currently far behind schedule and will not be completed by the 2030 deadline, citing the lack of Member State coordination as one of the primary reasons for this delay;
K. whereas the Alvia train accident in Santiago de Compostela on 24 July 2013 caused the death of 80 people and left a further 144 injured;
L. whereas for the new programming period, according to the EU climate tracking methodology for EU expenditure, the ERTMS accounts for 40 % of the contribution to climate and environment objectives and whereas 30 % of expenditure under the Cohesion Policy Funds and InvestEU, 37 % under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)(10) and 60 % under the CEF must be allocated to actions combating climate change;
M. whereas the RRF establishes that 20 % of investments should be digitally oriented and whereas in its methodology for digital tagging established in Annex VII of the RRF Regulation, 100 % of investment in the ERTMS is digital;
1. Underlines that rail is the most sustainable and energy-efficient mode of mass passenger and freight transport, but that it is not yet achieving its full potential, in spite of the positive developments in the sector, such as the constant increase in rail passenger volumes and rail freight volumes, even if these have been uneven over the past few years;
2. Points out that the European Green Deal calls for a major modal shift to rail and that the new Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy sets the milestones of doubling high-speed rail traffic by 2030 and rail freight traffic by 2050, which require a share increase in rail transport capacity that cannot be obtained without a large-scale acceleration of the roll-out of the ERTMS throughout the EU;
3. Stresses that one of the EU’s main objectives for rail coordination is to strengthen the robustness of the core network and to increase the share of freight and passenger transport by rail;
4. Recalls that the ERTMS was launched in the 1990s and that its aim is to ensure the safety of railway traffic, to foster interoperability among national rail networks and cross-border rail transport, to reduce the costs of purchasing and maintaining signalling systems and to increase the capacity of rail infrastructure and the reliability of the rail transport system;
5. Stresses that the full deployment of the ERTMS will help to create a single European railway area, is essential for making the European railway sector fit for the digital age, will increase the profitability of rail transport, will enable the operating density of a line to be increased, and is a prerequisite for rail to finally be competitive with other modes of transport; welcomes, therefore, the fact that the new Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy confirms that the ERTMS should be a key priority in order to create a truly smart and efficient transport system by achieving objectives such as sufficient capacity allocation and traffic management for both passengers and freight;
6. Stresses that the ERTMS has become a global standard for train control and communication, and has been deployed in almost 50 countries around the world, providing excellent opportunities to increase high-added-value business and to create expertise within the EU and for deployment in non-EU countries; calls for the establishment of a standardised EU traffic management system and believes that an EU standard must be swiftly developed before a global rail traffic management system standard is imposed on the EU; calls on the Commission, moreover, to use bilateral EU cooperation to promote the deployment of the ERTMS in non-EU countries;
7. Welcomes the Commission’s work to establish a CCS architecture framework to ensure that rail fully embraces digitalisation that builds the ERTMS, which should allow for easier and more affordable updates and upgrades thanks to further standardisation and modularisation, the introduction of the ‘plug and play’ principle and the harmonisation of data modelling;
Governance
8. Welcomes the new tasks entrusted to the Agency under the Fourth Railway Package and recognises the prominent role of the Agency as a one-stop shop which ensures consistency in the development of the interoperable ERTMS, that ERTMS deployment complies with the specifications in force, and that ERTMS-related European research and innovation programmes are coordinated with the development of ERTMS technical specifications; regrets, therefore, the recent reduction of the yearly budget of the Agency;
9. Believes that the Agency should be provided with the appropriate financial and human resources and be further empowered to overcome the challenges of ERTMS deployment and functioning that still exist (harmonisation of operational rules and requirements, specification maintenance and change, conformity-to-type and length-of-type approval procedures and public procurement procedures etc.), to increase competitiveness and to lead the technical introduction of new technologies;
10. Highlights the role of the ERTMS Coordinator in determining which lines and corridors need to be equipped with the ERTMS as a matter of priority, and in ensuring its deployment in the most cost-efficient way in close cooperation with the Member States and the stakeholders;
11. Believes that the role of the ERTMS Coordinator needs to be significantly improved, both in terms of resources and implementing powers, in order for the deployment targets to be met; welcomes, therefore, the opportunity to strengthen the role of the ERMTS Coordinator in the upcoming revision of the TEN-T Regulation by providing them with, for instance, a decisive role in the selection of projects, expanded oversight responsibilities and by making receipt of CEF grants contingent upon their consent, particularly in relation to the main cross-border links;
12. Welcomes the fact that the ERTMS Coordinator reports back to Parliament on a yearly basis;
13. Underlines that an approach to ERTMS deployment coordinated between all Member States and led by the ERTMS Coordinator is the only way to overcome the current patchwork situation, especially with regard to cross-border projects; invites, therefore, the Commission to establish a framework for discussion and coordination among Member States, infrastructure managers and railway undertakings on ERTMS deployment led by the ERTMS Coordinator, with the aim of fostering the exchange of best practices, aligning national deployment plans, encouraging joint actions for ERTMS deployment on cross-border corridors, improving conformity authorisation procedures, and increasing the overall commitment of the Member States; recalls that more efforts need to be made by railway infrastructure managers collectively to equip and put ERTMS into operation on cross-border sections simultaneously and in a technical consistent manner;
14. Believes there is a need for a regulatory framework for the digitalisation of the rail system which puts the ERTMS at the heart of a digital rail system evolution; welcomes, in this respect, the commitment of the railway sector to enable the industrialisation of the ERTMS and the contribution of the Shift2Rail Joint Undertaking (S2R JU) to research and innovation with the aim of addressing the removal of the remaining technical obstacles that are holding back the rail sector in terms of interoperability and ensuring the transition to a more integrated, efficient and safe EU railway market, guaranteeing the proper interconnection of technical solutions and aiming to make the EU’s railway system more sustainable, digital, competitive, reliable and attractive; strongly supports its new successor initiative, the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking System pillar, which coordinates the evolution of the system, new technology developments, technological migration plans, industrialisation and deployment, especially for the ERTMS, with a view to ensuring more efficient collaboration and better use of scarce resources;
15. Calls for coordination between the Agency and S2R JU to be further strengthened in order to better prioritise investments in the digitalisation of European railways; underlines, in this regard, that the Agency should have a more prominent role than just being an observer of the S2R JU governing board;
Interoperability and deployment
16. Welcomes the satisfactory results demonstrated by the ERTMS in terms of speed, capacity and safety wherever it has been deployed; regrets, therefore, that compared with the targets set in the EDP, at the end of 2020 only around 13 % of the CNCs were operated in accordance with the ERTMS, and ERTMS deployment in most of the corridors ranged between 7 % and 28 %; notes, moreover, that investment in ERTMS is not a systematic target for the core network – despite the TEN-T deployment plans and guidelines recommending such investment – or even on isolated sections unconnected to the core network; believes, therefore, that a corridor approach must be strengthened to overcome the obstacles to the deployment of ERTMS, in particular in the corridors with the lowest rates of deployment such as the Atlantic corridor, and especially within the Iberian Peninsula; calls, moreover, on the Commission to list the cross-border rail connections on the core network where full trackside deployment of the ERTMS has not been achieved and to publish its findings in order to draw attention to the EU added value of fully deploying the ERTMS on these rail connections;
17. Believes that a ten-fold increase in the deployment pace of the ERTMS is urgently needed to achieve the digital transition and to improve the safety of the EU railway system, railway passengers and workers; is of the opinion that the ERTMS needs to be rolled out on the core network by 2030 and on the comprehensive network by 2040; recalls the need to avoid delays to installations and activations of the ERTMS, which could compromise safety; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to maintain and reinforce the binding nature of the targets in its revisions of the TEN-T guidelines, the ERTMS EDPs and the CCS TSIs;
18. Believes that harnessing the full potential of the ERTMS unquestionably depends on the completion of the TEN-T core network; therefore calls on the Commission to strengthen the role of the core network coordinators in the upcoming revision of the TEN-T Regulation and includes measures on EU management of the core network infrastructure;
19. Points out that there are still currently roughly 30 different national signalling systems, especially in areas with predominantly local, domestic traffic, where existing Class B systems have a remaining economic lifetime, and that this diversity of systems partly explains the fragmentation and the variability in ERTMS deployment costs; highlights that the Class B systems are a bottleneck for ERTMS roll-out and for rail traffic cross-border operations in the EU network, as they require a more expensive and difficult safety authorisation for rail transport operators and constitute a major barrier to the competitiveness of rail transport, hampering the technical and operational compatibility of railways across the EU and resulting in additional costs for the sector, including maintenance costs;
20. Stresses that the Class B decommissioning process is moving at a slow pace; regrets that only a few Member States have adopted plans to decommission Class B signalling systems in their ERTMS national implementation plans (NIPs) and that there is at present no legal obligation nor timetable at EU level to decommission Class B systems;
21. Believes that an efficient and quick deployment of the ERTMS can only be achieved by setting binding targets, reinforced with penalties for infrastructure managers in the event that adequate budget and resources are made available, but the deployment deadline is missed;
22. Urges the Commission to come up with an overarching decommissioning strategy for Class B systems, with regulatory deadlines aligned with the binding targets to be set at EU level; believes that the effectiveness of this strategy and its long-term worthiness for investment depend on the involvement of all stakeholders, including railway undertakings and suppliers, and the willingness of Member States to fulfil their obligations under the TEN-T Regulation;
23. Calls on the Commission, moreover, to introduce a regulatory provision to ensure that the ERTMS NIPs are legally aligned – in both regulatory and geographic terms – with the binding ERTMS deployment targets set in EU legislation, in order to complete its introduction within the core network by 2030 and within the comprehensive network by 2040;
24. Points out that current national rules and the lack of harmonisation of operational requirements relating to the ERTMS, such as engineering rules, and technical barriers, such as variable axle gauges, voltage and dimension of the wagons, which may differ along the entire railway network, affect interoperability, impeding the seamless operation of the EU rail network and hampering the profitability of railway operators;
25. Stresses that the cost of upgrading trackside and on-board systems varies widely depending on the network; notes that the equipment’s lifespan implies a long period of depreciation of investments, which is a major economic criterion for future investments; draws attention to the difficulties associated with frequent changes in standards, which limit the lifespan of equipment in an unpredictable way for the rail sector, resulting in a disincentive to invest; stresses, therefore, the importance of regulatory stability in order to allow for a return on the investment made; asks the Commission to carefully analyse further changes when updating the TSI for 2030 and to ensure compatibility;
26. Deplores the fact that in the five years till mid-2019 almost 80 % of new vehicles put into use in the EU were either subject to a derogation or were exempted from the requirement to fit the ERTMS; believes that given the deployment of the ERTMS in the comprehensive network, no derogations or exemptions from the requirement to fit ERTMS should be granted to new rolling stock; urges the Commission, in this respect, to undertake concrete initiatives to tackle this issue by enacting an appropriate regulatory framework and ensuring that a set of economic incentives are in place to foster the investments of railway undertakings in ERTMS on-board units;
27. Stresses that the timeframes for authorisation processes for retrofit projects, especially for conformity-to-type authorisation processes for rolling stock for the national area of use only, still differ because of diverging assessments by national safety agencies on the need to re-authorise certain modifications, resulting in it taking up to one month to re-authorise each rolling stock; calls on the Commission to undertake legislative initiatives, including updates of current implementing regulations, to ensure that the authorisation procedures following type authorisation processes, especially conformity-to-type authorisation procedures related to the retrofit of on-board ERTMS subsystems for the national area of use, are streamlined and harmonised by means of fast-tracked control operations in order to reduce the time needed to grant conformity-to-type certificates; believes, moreover, that conformity processes should further strengthen the involvement at an early stage of the industrial suppliers and national safety agencies concerned in order to avoid discouraging railway undertakings from undertaking large-scale and ambitious deployment projects; calls, moreover, for greater involvement of the Agency in conformity-to-type procedures carried out when the retrofitted rolling stocks are destined for the national area of use only;
28. Calls for a systematic approach to the roll-out of the ERTMS, both on-board and trackside;
29. Recalls that according to the recent business case study on the nine CNCs, the dual on-board migration strategy for ERTMS deployment, which focuses on first equipping the fleet with the ERTMS, has a better economic outcome compared to the dual trackside migration strategy;
30. Notes that the slow pace of the trackside installation disincentives a steady ERTMS deployment; believes that the trackside migration strategy, which focuses on installing ERTMS on top of legacy systems which are kept operational until the whole fleet is equipped, should also be accelerated, especially in the light of the upcoming alignment of the Rail Freight Corridors Regulation(11) with the revision of the TEN-T guidelines, and in this respect calls for further cooperation between the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA), infrastructure managers and national safety authorities to achieve full compatibility of ERTMS trackside versions; recalls that the incompatibilities between the different ERTMS trackside versions already deployed must be resolved and future compatibility for all ERTMS lines must be ensured, and in this sense calls for further cooperation between ERA and infrastructure managers and national safety authorities;
31. Calls on the Commission to take account of ERTMS equipment when drawing up the rail connectivity index;
32. Stresses that prototypes are one of the major bottlenecks for on-board retrofitting due to the complicated, time-consuming and expensive nature of their development; points out, moreover, the current possible risk of the same prototype project receiving funding from multiple EU sources; calls for the creation of an EU platform for the development of prototypes in order to favour large economies of scale, harmonisation and competitiveness, as well as the creation of a transparent register of solutions that have already been funded;
33. Underlines that without standardised interfaces with ‘plug and play’ technology – both trackside and on-board – the rail system will not be able to introduce and grasp the benefits of ERTMS game changers like automatic train operation, the future radio mobile communication system, satellite positioning or Level 3 technology; calls on the Commission to take into consideration the fact that GSM-R technology, which was state-of-the-art when the ERTMS was first launched, is becoming obsolete owing to the roll-out of 4G and 5G;
34. Points out the need to ensure synergies between the ERTMS and the European Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) as soon as possible, especially since GNSS signal availability relies on virtual balises, which would be less costly to deploy and to maintain, since it would speed up the ERTMS roll-out and since it would enhance the competitiveness of the ERTMS outside the EU; calls on the EU rail industry to develop technical solutions in order for the GNSS to enable the ERTMS on a large scale; calls on the Commission, moreover, to consider introducing the GNSS in the upcoming ERTMS TSI CCS revision in order to close the remaining technological gaps and embrace innovation; calls on ERA to closely coordinate, support and streamline research and development projects of space and rail stakeholders in order to include GNSS train location data in the ERTMS as early as possible; calls, moreover, for cooperation between the Agency and the GNSS Agency to be stepped up in order to phase the GNSS into ERTMS standards;
35. Underlines the current inefficiencies and difficulties in public procurement for ERTMS deployment; calls on the Commission to work with the Agency to establish a common EU tender format for procurements, based on the proposal agreed by the sector in 2018, and to address in a legislative proposal all the technical aspects for ensuring successful procurement (e.g. maintenance clauses) and compatibility with the latest ERTMS baseline available;
36. Recognises that the ERTMS is the flagship of EU industry’s innovative power; calls on the Commission to present a legislative proposal for an ERTMS industrial strategy as part of the New Industrial Strategy for Europe, addressing insufficient industrial capacity, the lack of suitable workshops for retrofitting, the lack of an adequate, stable and predictable budget and the shortage of qualified staff and ensuring the transition from the current project-approach to the industrialisation of the ERTMS roll-out;
37. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to boost, under the European Green Deal, dual vocational training for new jobs created by digitalisation and innovation in relation to the new challenges generated by ERTMS deployment, by providing sufficient support for the re-skilling and upskilling of railway workers, such as training on the new signalling system;
Funding
38. Recalls that the proper functioning of the EU railway network relies on proper investment in infrastructure and rolling stocks and on good maintenance;
39. Notes that between 2014 and 2020, the EU budget supported ERTMS deployment with an estimated total budget of EUR 2,7 billion, out of which EUR 850 million came from the CEF and EUR 1,9 billion came from the European Structural and Investments Funds (the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund) in the eligible regions;
40. Stresses that the investment needed to deploy the ERTMS on the core network is estimated at EUR 12 billion for trackside systems and EUR 5 billion for on-board systems;
41. Stresses that investments in the deployment of the ERTMS contribute to achieving the climate and digital mainstreaming targets of EU financial instruments, and should therefore be considered a priority in the implementation of these instruments;
42. Recalls that EU financial support is available for both trackside and on-board ERTMS investments, but that this can only cover a limited amount of the overall cost of deployment, leaving individual infrastructure managers and railway undertakings to shoulder most of the costs; believes that it is necessary to improve the financial instruments in place to incentivise large-scale investments in the ERTMS; invites the Commission, in this respect, to draw up all-encompassing guidelines in support of a large-scale strategy for the funding of the ERTMS both trackside and on-board;
43. Calls on the Commission to identify a basket of measures that the Member States and the European Union may undertake to scale up the deployment of the ERTMS on board while ensuring that businesses are viable for the undertakings involved, and taking into due consideration the role of network managers as potential providers;
44. Recalls the ECA’s finding that, overall in the EU, 50 % of TEN-T funds originally allocated to ERTMS projects have been decommitted and that implementation delays and reductions in project scope were the main reasons for this; calls on the Commission and the Member States to address this problem;
45. Recalls that EU funds are not sufficient to cover all the expected needs and therefore calls on the Commission and the Member States to cooperate closely and to make planning, financial and political commitments to further improve the attractiveness of investing in the ERTMS, and to guarantee legal certainty for private investors; notes that the duration of CEF grant agreements could be extended to better reflect the actual time needed to implement ERTMS projects;
46. Stresses the priority nature of funding equipment for cross-border links; takes the view that since EU co-financing rates for the ERTMS are insufficient, they should be increased; calls on the Commission, in this respect, to evaluate the opportunity to grant ERTMS projects a co-financing factor even higher than 50 % under CEF funding when such projects are embedded in ambitious large-scale accelerated plans to scale up ERTMS deployment, in order to incentivise ambitious strategies for the ERTMS in the Member States;
47. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure, promote and facilitate synergies between all EU financial instruments such as the CEF and its Blending Facility, the Cohesion Funds and InvestEU, and access to Next Generation EU, and calls on the Commission to encourage the Member States to make the ERTMS one of their main priorities in their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs);
48. Recalls the strategic importance of Next Generation EU and the RRF in supporting the ambitious large-scale deployment plan for the ERTMS in the NRRPs of the Member States, and invites the Commission to ensure that ERTMS funding is granted adequate relevance during the preparatory phase of the NRRPs;
49. Stresses the need for EU funds to be granted for new railway line projects only if they include ERTMS equipment; calls, moreover, for the Agency to systematically assess the compliance of EU-funded projects with the TSIs to avoid difficulties concerning the compatibility of the ERTMS versions installed;
50. Calls on the Member States to grant a reduction of 75 % in track access charges for 10 years to railway undertakings that successfully equip 100 % of their locomotives with ERTMS Baseline 3;
51. Stresses that the method of calculating EU aid for ERTMS equipment, based on a flat rate per kilometre, is suitable for linear sections but less appropriate for urban nodes which require many trackside objects and complex ERTMS settings over a short distance; suggests considering breaking costs down by the number of sets of points on the track;
o o o
52. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.
Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/919 of 27 May 2016 on the technical specification for interoperability relating to the ‘control-command and signalling’ subsystems of the rail system in the European Union (OJ L 158, 15.6.2016, p. 1).
Commission staff working document of 14 November 2017 entitled ‘Delivering an effective and interoperable European Traffic Management System (ERTMS) - the way ahead’, SWD(2017)0375.
Regulation (EU) No 1316/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility, amending Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 680/2007 and (EC) No 67/2010 (OJ L 348, 20.12.2013, p. 129).
Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17).
Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2010 concerning a European rail network for competitive freight (OJ L 276, 20.10.2010, p. 22).
Trade related aspects and implications of COVID-19
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European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on the trade-related aspects and implications of COVID-19 (2020/2117(INI))
– having regard to the Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066),
– having regard to the Commission white paper of 17 June 2020 on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies (COM(2020)0253),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 27 May 2020 entitled ‘Europe’s moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation’ (COM(2020)0456),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ (COM(2020)0381),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 27 May 2020 entitled ‘Adjusted Commission Work Programme 2020’ (COM(2020)0440) and to President von der Leyen’s letter of intent to President Sassoli and Chancellor Merkel of 16 September 2020 entitled ‘State of the Union 2020’,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 entitled ‘A new Circular Economy Action Plan: For a cleaner and more competitive Europe’ (COM(2020)0098),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 10 March 2020 entitled ‘A New Industrial Strategy for Europe’ (COM(2020)0102),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 10 March 2020 entitled ‘An SME Strategy for a sustainable and digital Europe’ (COM(2020)0103),
– having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 March 2020 entitled ‘Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa’ (JOIN(2020)0004),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2020 entitled ‘Shaping Europe’s digital future’ (COM(2020)0067),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),
– having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 2 December 2020 entitled ‘A new EU-US agenda for global change’ (JOIN(2020)0022),
– having regard to the non-paper of the Commission services of 26 February 2018 on feedback and the way forward on improving the implementation and enforcement of trade and sustainable development (TSD) chapters in EU free trade agreements and its 15-point action plan on TSD chapters,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 14 October 2015 entitled ‘Trade for All – Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy’ (COM(2015)0497),
– having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (the Paris Agreement),
– having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
– having regard to its resolutions of 26 November 2020 on the EU Trade Policy Review(1), of 9 June 2021 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives’(2), of 20 May 2021 entitled ‘Shaping the digital future of Europe: removing barriers to the functioning of the digital single market and improving the use of AI for European consumers’(3), of 25 March 2021 on establishing an EU strategy for sustainable tourism(4), of 10 March 2021 entitled ‘Towards a WTO-compatible EU carbon border adjustment mechanism’(5), of 10 March 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability(6), of 10 February 2021 on the New Circular Economy Action Plan(7), of 25 November 2020 entitled ‘A New Industrial Strategy for Europe’(8), of 7 October 2020 entitled ‘Implementation of the common commercial policy – annual report 2018’(9), of 16 September 2020 on the EU’s role in protecting and restoring the world’s forests(10), of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency(11), of 12 December 2017 entitled ‘Towards a digital trade strategy’(12), and of 5 July 2016 on a new forward-looking and innovative future strategy for trade and investment(13),
– having regard to the opinion of its Committee on International Trade of 15 April 2021 on the report entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives’,
– having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Development and the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0190/2021),
A. whereas COVID-19 has caused a global pandemic, giving rise to an unprecedented global health, economic, social and humanitarian crisis, which has created bottlenecks and disruptions of an unprecedented scale to international trade, causing it to plunge as the virus spread, slashing global production and employment, decreasing the level of foreign direct investment (FDI), and increasing geopolitical tensions;
B. whereas the pandemic has demonstrated strategic vulnerabilities in the EU and global supply chains, including for critical raw materials, and essential medical goods such as personal protective equipment and active pharmaceutical ingredients, and has highlighted the need for enhanced resilience and diversification at global, regional and local level;
C. whereas the COVID-19 outbreak has further increased inequalities and has added to concern among citizens about job losses in certain sectors, the changing nature of work and the pressure on workers’ wages and rights; whereas these problems must be addressed in order to retain public support for global trade;
D. whereas the COVID-19 outbreak risks creating a set-back in the worldwide fight against climate change, yet we need global action and cooperation to develop policies and streamline climate action in internal and external policy, as the vaccine alone will not be sufficient to address the social, environmental and economic crisis caused by COVID-19;
E. whereas though the European Union has substantially reduced its domestic greenhouse gas emissions, those embedded in imports have been constantly rising, thereby undermining the Union’s efforts to reduce its global greenhouse gas emission footprint;
F. whereas international trade in goods and services is set to increase by 8.4 % in 2022 according to International Monetary Fund estimates(14) and trade policy must play a full roll in the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas the Commission communication on the Trade Policy Review must be complemented by continued dialogue and transparency with the European Parliament, which will play a key role in its implementation, as well as by a strategy to increase EU resilience and strategic autonomy, including tailored policy measures and instruments in the area of domestic production, nearshoring, diversification of suppliers and stockpiling;
G. whereas the EU, as the world’s largest trading bloc and with its extensive network of trade agreements, is the biggest actor on the world trading scene and finds itself in a unique position to cooperate globally, drive the implementation of EU standards, values and sustainability frameworks in partner countries, and secure the sustainable recovery of the world economy, in line with the European Green Deal and the Paris Agreement;
H. whereas the divisions within the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the urgent need for its reform have complicated the coordinated efforts to keep global supply chains open, and the priority must now be to rebuild trust in multilateral institutions as entities able to deliver global answers, by rapidly moving forward on the discussions on the WTO trade and health initiative;
I. whereas it is important for there to be close cooperation between the WTO and other international bodies, notably the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN institutions and the World Bank, in order to tackle the crisis in a comprehensive manner, paying special attention to the health and economic implications in developing countries;
Fair, resilient and green value chains
1. Stresses that trade policy finds itself at a crossroads; notes that the geopolitical reality has changed and stresses that the EU still has to position itself in this new environment; is convinced that COVID-19 has reinforced the need for a thorough review of the EU’s trade policy; stresses that Parliament is ready to contribute actively to the Trade Policy Review;
2. Stresses the importance of fair, resilient and sustainable value chains that respect human rights, labour rights and environmental standards; recalls that mandatory due diligence across supply chains should be an instrument to achieve this; stresses that more attention should be given to the vulnerable position of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in the EU and especially in developing countries, as large companies are more likely to overcome exogenous shocks; stresses the importance of using strategic foresight to increase the EU’s and developing countries’ preparedness for and resilience to any future shocks and health crises, including in the emergence of new disease mutations and future pandemics, aiming to develop future-proof strategies and responses; points out that a key pillar of an EU sustainable supply-chain strategy would be to require companies largely exposed to international supply chains to be subject to legally binding reporting requirements in the context of the forthcoming revision of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive(15);
3. Calls for the EU to ensure that trade also works for the economically disadvantaged; recalls, in this regard, that the specific actions to promote ‘fair and ethical trade schemes’ to which the Commission committed in the ‘Trade for All’ strategy have become even more relevant under the current circumstances given that bottom-up fair trade initiatives can ensure that trade benefits the economically disadvantaged actors in the supply chain; emphasises the importance of predictable long-term orders and takes note of the successful ordering schemes of that nature in the fair trade sector;
4. Calls on the Commission to promote fair trade initiatives through EU programmes involving young people and the private sector, in external action in general, in the implementation of TSD chapters, through EU delegations, and by rewarding best practices and facilitating knowledge exchange among local, regional and national authorities, civil society, schools and universities in the EU, including through the extension of the ‘EU Cities for Fair and Ethical Trade Award’ to schools and universities and the setting up of an annual fair trade week hosted in Brussels by the Commission; demands that the Commission report on support for fair-trade initiatives by the EU and the Member States;
5. Notes that global value chains often involve asymmetrical effects, including for least developed countries, an uneven distribution of risks, and disproportionally adversely impact women; deplores the fact that during the pandemic this uneven distribution has led to some European businesses offloading the costs of lower demand throughout their supply chains, including in developing countries, and cancelling orders that were already produced and in some cases even shipped; calls on the Commission to engage with Member States, local governments, the private sector and civil society to achieve a fairer distribution of negative impacts and risks across supply chains; calls on the Commission to present concrete proposals following its pledge of ‘zero tolerance of child labour’ before the end of 2021, which the UN has declared International Year for the Eradication of Child Labour;
6. Stresses that the tourism value chain is one of Europe’s main industrial ecosystems; emphasises, in this regard, that due to restrictions on travel and supply chains and disruptions caused by the COVID-19 crisis, tourism-related sectors such as hospitality, as well as other major industries (aeronautical, automotive, steel, shipbuilding and marine), are suffering trade and economic collapse;
7. Stresses that effective rules ensuring fair competition and a level playing field for European businesses, in both the internal market and third-country markets, are necessary to guarantee mutually beneficial trade relations with international partners and protect the single market from aggressive investment strategies by non-EU actors trying to take advantage of the current crisis; emphasises the importance of trade defence instruments in this regard; underlines that the enforcement regulation should have a positive contribution to the goal of ensuring fair competition and a level playing field, and stresses that TSD chapters are an integral part of trade policy;
8. Calls on the Commission to swiftly complete the EU’s trade defence toolbox in 2021 through legislative proposals supported by impact assessments, giving priority to an anti-coercion instrument, an instrument to tackle distortions caused by foreign subsidies and state-owned enterprises, and the conclusion of negotiations on the International Procurement Instrument; points out the coercive effect of extraterritorial sanctions by third countries and the need to safeguard the functioning of financial instruments from such measures; notes the importance of public financial intervention during the COVID-19 pandemic;
9. Is convinced that openness should go hand in hand with safeguarding our strategic sectors and should be closely connected with an ambitious, forward-looking industrial policy in line with the Green Deal and digital strategy, which can increase the EU’s capabilities to withstand future shocks in strategic sectors, boost economic recovery and ensure the competitiveness of EU businesses, creating quality jobs and ensuring that Europe plays a crucial role in the production of innovative goods and future services;
10. Believes that supply chain diversification and resilience should be a key priority for the revised EU trade policy; highlights the coupling of trade and security interests and calls for the proportional strengthening and enforcement of foreign direct investment screening, thereby complementing and supporting Member State efforts to implement such screening to safeguard European strategic sectors, and preventing the establishment of detrimental and exploitable economic dependencies on non-EU actors;
11. Is convinced that the EU is too dependent on a limited number of suppliers for certain critical raw materials, goods and services, especially medical and pharmaceutical goods, and that this undermines its strategic autonomy and geopolitical objectives; insists that the EU should overcome these undesirable dependencies via a horizontal mix of policies to incentivise companies to stockpile, increase manufacturing, diversify sourcing strategies and, where necessary, promote nearshoring and reshoring, which could create new trading opportunities for partners in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods and must be accompanied by regulatory approximation in strategic sectors;
12. Stresses the risks to critical supply chains made apparent by the COVID-19 crisis and calls on the Commission to pay particular attention to the sustainability of EU supply chains in its forthcoming industrial strategy, identifying which supply chains could benefit from increased resilience through supply diversification, reshoring and stockpiling; believes, however, that companies should ultimately decide for themselves how to manage their global supply chains;
13. Points out that the Commission should promote a circular economy on a global level and underlines the role that trade agreements should have in enhancing the circular economy’s objectives, diversifying supply and strengthening open trade relations for critical goods and services, and that shortening or altering supply chains to the EU’s neighbourhood and Africa can have a positive effect on their sustainable, green, inclusive and resilient economic growth, as well as for the EU’s strategic interests;
14. Notes that the EU’s agri-food supply chains remained operational during the pandemic but deplores the fact that export restrictions and trade barriers have caused numerous disruptions to it; notes that the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), which brings together the principal trading countries of agricultural commodities with the aim of enhancing food market transparency and the policy response for food security, can be regarded as an example of good practice; calls on the Commission to explore whether this model could be used in other value chains as well; supports actions to facilitate trade taken to promote food safety standards and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) in response to COVID-19; notes that according to the UN World Food Programme (WFP), COVID-19 brought the number of people at risk of acute food shortages in 2020 in low and middle-income countries up to 265 million, a figure up 130 million compared with 2019; calls on the Commission to identify and explore in cooperation with the UN the most appropriate measures to ensure that this pandemic does not translate into a food crisis in the developing world;
15. Calls on the Commission to come up with a digital trade strategy which increases the market access of European businesses, strengthens digital infrastructure, harmonises regulatory frameworks, modernises trade and customs tools, and protects EU citizens’ rights under the GDPR(16);
16. Calls on the Commission to make thorough assessments of whether the new EU model clause on data flows will preserve Europeans’ data protection and privacy rights in the case of a dispute with a trading partner; stresses that existing and future measures protecting the fundamental rights to privacy and personal data protection must not be undermined by international trade agreements; urges the Commission to take the relevant commitments of third countries into account when assessing their adequacy, including for onward transfers of data;
17. Underlines the acceleration of the digital revolution due to COVID-19 and recognises the importance of the EU taking the lead in setting standards for a sustainable, digital-driven global economy and keeping international data flows open so as to rapidly overcome a range of trade barriers and bottlenecks; underlines that the EU can set a global standard for fair and resilient digital trade in its bilateral and multilateral engagements and in plurilateral negotiations on e-commerce and investment facilitation; underlines that the digital chapter in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement can serve as a model for future trade agreements;
18. Calls for incentives to be provided, including by means of tailor-made legal provisions on State aid, for EU businesses to make their value chains more sustainable and to shorten or adjust their supply chains where it could be beneficial to the EU’s economy, resilience, geopolitical objectives and/or strategic autonomy, in order to ensure that external social, environmental and economic costs are fully internalised into the price in line with EU policies such as the Farm to Fork Strategy, the Circular Economy Action Plan, the Biodiversity Strategy and stepping up EU action to protect and restore the world’s forests;
19. Calls on the Commission to thoroughly review how and to what extent transfers of emerging and disruptive technologies are taking place from the EU to authoritarian states via trade and investment flows; calls on the Commission to propose new measures to limit such transfers, including supply-chain cooperation with like-minded partners; calls for a dialogue on semiconductors to be started with Taiwan;
Trade policy for critical health products: lessons learned from the COVID-19 crisis
20. Underlines that international trade governance, putting international cooperation over competition, has an essential role to play in the rapid development of medical treatments and vaccines, the rapid scaling up of production, the development of resilient global value chains and equitable global market access, and, in this context, underlines that the current pandemic should provide impetus to strengthened international cooperation and global preparedness for health emergencies, requiring further engagement by the EU and the Member States acting together as ‘Team Europe’; underlines the need to address trade-related causes of pandemics and zoonoses, such as the impact of trade on biosphere degradation;
21. Welcomes the proposal by several government leaders for an international treaty on the pandemic response and calls for it to include a strong trade pillar; underlines that the international trade framework must foster cooperation and put into place both structural and rapid response mechanisms to help governments overcome the challenges associated with health emergencies; underlines that such arrangements should encompass on the one hand, a needs-oriented ‘demand-side’ approach providing joint financing and globally coordinated advance purchases, and on the other hand, an integrated ‘supply side’ strategy for scaling up production capacity across the whole value chain; maintains that progress needs to be made in the areas of transparency on available stocks, global supply networks, production capacities and the pricing of essential health products, the implementation and development of exceptions for public health security in the intellectual property rights (IPR) framework, increasing the global mobility of essential services, protecting and fostering the resilience of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and developing an intersectional approach to tackling the negative impact of health crises on gender equality, income equality, and the position of minorities;
22. Calls for the establishment of a new Committee on Trade and Health at the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference in order to prepare guidelines on how governments can implement existing exceptions and flexibilities in international trade law so as to increase public health security, and what mechanisms must be put in place to improve the global response to health emergencies and to lay the groundwork for a trade pillar for the negotiations on a future international treaty on the pandemic response;
23. Stresses that global supply chains for raw materials and the production and distribution of vaccines must benefit from open trade relations; underlines that protectionism in the production and distribution of vaccines can hinder the response to the global pandemic; emphasises, in this connection, the detrimental effects of unilateral measures such as export restrictions and bans, the lack of transparency of global stocks and the subsequent price speculation with regard to scarce essential goods, not least for low- and middle-income countries; calls, therefore, for the EU to encourage the adoption of the WTO trade and health initiative by the end of 2021, to encourage stronger global cooperation and to be much more demanding as regards the transparency of the supply, production and cost of medical products, the resilience of global healthcare systems, and accessible and affordable medical products and services; calls for the EU to ensure that future advanced purchase agreements are fully disclosed, particularly for next-generation vaccines;
24. Calls for the EU to integrate commitments with regard to trade secrets, proprietary data and technology transfers, and demand the necessary transparency from suppliers, including a cost-profit analysis per product;
25. Is therefore concerned about the new rise in export restrictions on vaccines by the main manufacturing countries such as the US, the UK, China, India and, to a lesser extent, the EU and emphasises that this might endanger the rapid global scaling up of vaccine production capacity, disrupt production chains and lead to retaliation; urges the Commission to engage with producing countries to rapidly eliminate export barriers; reaffirms that the EU export authorisation mechanism is a temporary measure, only to be used as a last resort, and should evolve into a transparency mechanism; insists on receiving timely and comprehensive access to such data; emphasises that greater transparency has increased EU citizens’ trust in the EU’s vaccine rollout and management of the COVID-19 pandemic;
26. Is deeply concerned about the rising number of variants of COVID-19; emphasises that the lack of production and distribution of vaccines in third countries could lead to the increase of new and different types of variants; recognises that the EU is one of the largest exporters of vaccines to third countries, but that in absolute terms, these exports are not yet sufficient to tackle the global pandemic; stresses that the COVAX Facility is currently not able to distribute vaccines to the most vulnerable in accordance with demand; underlines that timely global access to vaccines can benefit the recovery and resilience of the global economy, as well as the EU economy; urges the Commission to pursue effective vaccine and medical supply diplomacy to strengthen the EU’s credibility and diplomatic visibility and calls for more international efforts to speed up the delivery of vaccines to COVAX;
27. Underlines that the vaccines against COVID-19 and its variants should be a global public good and that urgent multilateral efforts should be focused on the equitable distribution of vaccines across the world, rapidly increasing global production capacities, and establishing effective partnerships and technology transfers, including in low- and middle-income countries; emphasises that, based on lessons learned, it is crucial to continue to improve the public-private partnership frameworks behind the development and production of vaccines and other essential health technologies; welcomes the Global C19 Vaccine Supply Chain and Manufacturing Summit held on 8 and 9 March 2021 and calls for the establishment of structural platforms to rapidly scale up vaccine production in more countries, which could take the form of a public-private-partnership clearing house to bring together private and public parties to enable and scale up partnerships, monitor bottlenecks, and identify measures to support vaccine manufacturing and deployment; underlines the efforts made by the Director-General of the WTO in bringing members forward in the discussion on trade and health initiatives;
28. Emphasises that international trade policy must play a proactive role in this endeavour by facilitating trade in raw materials, alleviating shortages of qualified and experienced personnel, solving supply chain problems and revisiting the global framework for IPR for future pandemics; insists, in this regard, on a constructive dialogue about a temporary waiver of the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in order to ensure that countries do not face retaliation over COVID-19 related patent infringements during the pandemic;
29. Underlines that researchers and industry have put major effort into the development of new COVID-19 diagnoses, treatments and vaccines; emphasises the key role played by public sector resources, allowing pharmaceutical companies to de-risk the whole vaccine value chain by means of funding and large subsidies for research and development, as well as through large-scale advanced purchase agreements; underlines also the fundamental contribution of healthcare workers, patients, COVID-19 survivors and the general public who have participated in clinical trials and other research and development activities on different therapeutics and vaccines; considers that a multilateral IPR legal framework can provide protections and incentives which are critical for preparedness against future pandemics and recognises its role in facilitating the broad and unprecedented collaboration among governments, research institutions and pharmaceutical companies;
30. Emphasises the critical importance of open technology, know-how and research sharing for an effective pandemic response and of the full participation of pharmaceutical companies in multilateral initiatives such as C-TAP (COVID-19 Technology Access Pool) and the newly established WHO Technology Transfer Hub in order to harness their full potential;
Trade and sustainable development
31. Supports the mainstreaming of the European Green Deal and the European Digital Strategy into the communication on the Trade Policy Review (TPR) and calls for an assertive trade policy geared towards multilateralism, resilience and sustainability in line with the EU’s commitment to implementing the UN SDGs; calls for a concrete action plan, roadmap and timeline to make this ambition a reality; invites the Commission, therefore, to engage with partners to update existing trade and investment agreements by making use of their review clauses;
32. Welcomes the incorporation of the Paris Agreement as an essential element in each future trade, investment and partnership agreement; stresses that ratification of the International Labour Organization (ILO) core conventions and respect for human rights are requirements for concluding free trade agreements (FTAs); calls for the Union to engage with future and existing trading partners to ratify and effectively implement other outstanding ILO conventions and multilateral environmental agreements when reviewing and negotiating agreements; asks for ambitious chapters on gender, women’s empowerment and SMEs, as well as dedicated chapters on digital trade, to be included in each trade agreement;
33. Underlines that the post-COVID-19 recovery is a unique opportunity to set the agenda to promote sustainable growth; calls on the Commission, therefore, to speed up its review of the 15-point action plan on TSD chapters in 2021 so that it can be implemented in ongoing negotiations; expects the review to address enforceability and recalls, in this regard, the non-paper from the Netherlands and France on trade, social economic effects and sustainable development(17); suggests that, as a minimum, recent advances in the enforceability of EU trade policy should be considered, namely the ability to tackle any non-compliance by partners through unilateral sanctions as a last resort, such as the introduction of tariffs or quotas on certain products or the cross-suspension of other parts of an agreement;
34. Calls on the Council and the Commission to include in TSD and agricultural chapters provisions regarding animal welfare, fair trade and the circular economy; emphasises the role of the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer in this regard and calls for close cooperation with the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade in the monitoring and scrutiny of TSD enforcement; calls on the Commission to draw on the lessons learned from the recent panel of experts so that TSD chapters include a roadmap with concrete and verifiable commitments;
35. Regrets that brown goods still receive preferential treatment over green goods and that tariffs and trade barriers are working against sustainable trade; underlines that removing tariffs and trade barriers for green goods and services should be designed in compatibility with WTO rules in order to contribute to innovative solutions to tackle the climate crisis and contribute to the goals of the Green Deal, as well as the SDGs and sustainable development worldwide; requests that the Commission look into instruments to tackle these distortions and walk the talk of the Green Deal by implementing it in all aspects of trade policy;
36. Points out that high up-front costs, which could only repay themselves over time, and a lack of know-how and equipment are currently hindering or slowing developing countries in their green and digital transition; demands that the Commission use all trade instruments and development cooperation policies at its disposal to increase financial support, technical assistance, technology transfers, capacity building and digitalisation in order to empower developing countries and enable them to achieve sustainable resilience and to better implement due diligence across the supply chain;
37. Calls for the EU to take a leading role within the multilateral framework to engage with like-minded countries and trade partners in pursuing a strong environmental agenda, including the progressive development of disciplines, to end both market-distorting and environmentally harmful subsidies in trade agreements and at the WTO, including disciplines on fossil fuel subsidies, building on the ‘do no significant harm’ principle;
38. Stresses the importance of drawing up sustainability impact assessments on an ex ante, intermediate and ex post basis, following a concrete timeline, addressing possible risks as early as possible, and, if ex post evaluations prove this to be necessary, address negative impacts; calls on the Commission to brief Parliament regularly on the ongoing and finalised sustainable impact assessments; stresses the need to develop a comprehensive framework with concrete targets to advance the SDGs, the Green Deal and the ILO Decent Work Agenda in trade and investment agreements; emphasises that the new agreements should only be concluded once these targets have been fulfilled and that existing agreements should be revised accordingly;
39. Emphasises that transparency, dialogue and good communication with citizens and stakeholders are key to creating support for trade policy and harnessing its benefits; welcomes, therefore, the Acces2Markets gateway and the Commission’s efforts in promoting this tool; insists that the role and responsibilities of civil society and domestic advisory groups (DAGs), whose monitoring role could be further extended, must be clearly defined in the EU’s political and trade agreements and that financial assistance must be accompanied by capacity-building measures to enable it to function effectively; emphasises the potential of EU delegations in supporting the work of third-country DAGs and monitoring and implementing trade agreements, paying special attention to supporting SMEs in taking advantage of agreements and trade facilitation measures; deplores the lack of an overarching structure in this regard;
40. Stresses the need for more coherency and transparency in scrutinising EU trade policy; underlines the need for coherent, clear, measurable and objective criteria for the EU’s trade policy and the engagement of EU citizens, better dialogue between the Commission and Parliament, more policy coherence and better scrutiny of all aspects of trade policy; stresses the role of ex ante, intermediate and ex post sustainable impact assessments in this regard; calls on the Commission to engage with Parliament at all stages of its proposals, follow up on proposals made by the DAGs, reinvigorate civil society dialogue and cooperate more intensively with civil society in the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC); calls for Parliament to structure regular consultations with the DAGs;
Multilateralism and Europe’s geopolitical place in the world
41. Invites the Commission to identify possible concrete and specific actions and a roadmap to implement the concept of open strategic autonomy, and to ensure that all options are on the table; notes with concern that geopolitical competition and tensions have accelerated following the COVID-19 outbreak;
42. Recalls the geopolitical significance of a strong, diversified and resilient EU trade policy; recalls that the EU’s high energy-dependency rate is a challenge for open strategic autonomy, which compels us to accelerate the energy transition; stresses that the EU’s market strength, values and adherence to cooperation, fairness, reciprocity and rules-based trade should form the basis of our openness;
43. Strongly recommends that the EU seek out new and consolidate existing partnerships with like-minded partners; considers that plurilateral trade agreements with a limited number of partners and a focus on strategic issues offer a better and more concrete avenue for implementing the concept of open strategic autonomy and would attract support among civil society;
44. Stresses, however, that where cooperation is not possible, the EU should pursue its interests through autonomous measures to protect its values and fight against unfair trading practices in accordance with international law;
45. Welcomes the Trade Policy Review’s affirmation of multilateralism and the extensive proposals made for the necessary in-depth WTO reform across all its functions;
46. Shares the emphasis placed by the Commission in its vision for WTO reform on economic recovery, sustainable development, unfair state subsidies and digital trade, and urges the Commission to expend all efforts to implement its agenda, including goals on gender, human rights and labour standards;
47. Stresses the importance of ensuring the swift connection of the WTO with other organisations in the multilateral system such as the WHO, achieving a consensus in Geneva, ensuring that international organisations work jointly on mastering global challenges, and concluding the fisheries subsidy negotiations at the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference;
48. Stresses the importance of the WTO trade and climate initiative and reiterates its support for an environmental goods agreement; welcomes, in this context, the approach of the new Director-General of the WTO and expects the Commission to strongly support her in order to provide new impetus to the organisation so that it can tackle the challenges the multilateral trading system is currently facing;
49. Stresses the importance of effective dispute settlement in establishing stability and predictability in the multilateral trading system and the need to resolve the current situation of the Appellate Body in cooperation with the US, in order to make it operational again and in this way ensure that trade disputes can be properly resolved; asks the Commission to propose as part of its WTO trade and climate initiative the inclusion of environmental expertise in the context of dispute settlements, where relevant;
50. Emphasises that reviving the WTO negotiating function will play a key role in any substantial reform of the organisation; notes, in particular, that competitive distortions caused by industrial subsidies and state-owned enterprises, particularly in China, need to be addressed and asks the Commission to put forward proposals to identify and differentiate categories of subsidies according to their contribution to legitimate public goals;
51. Underlines that in order to revive the WTO negotiating function, the EU must work together with like-minded partners to find common ground for WTO reform in the broadest sense; reaffirms that meaningful progress in WTO reform needs a broad consensus and coalitions of like-minded partners; calls on the Commission to continue engaging in plurilateral negotiations as a step towards multilateral agreements; supports the Commission’s proposal to initiate negotiations on a plurilateral agreement on competitive neutrality with like-minded partners; is convinced that EU leadership and transatlantic cooperation are crucial for any meaningful WTO reform to succeed;
52. Calls for the Commission to actively pursue a solution to the mismatch between the level of development and the level of commitment taken within the international trading system; stresses that special attention has to be paid to developing countries and their specific needs in relation to economic growth, sustainable development and WTO reform;
53. Considers it essential that the next WTO Ministerial Conference address the sanctions regime to prevent the consequences of breaching international trade rules by some members from being paid by sectors not responsible for non-compliance;
54. Shares the suggestion made in the Trade Policy Review that the G20 should strengthen cooperation and coordinate efforts on their paths towards carbon neutrality and other aspects of the Green Deal; stresses, however, that in order for this approach to be effective, some G20 members will need to raise their emission reduction commitments; calls on the Commission to deliver an efficient carbon border adjustment mechanism;
55. Supports the new forward-looking transatlantic agenda based on common interests and shared values and goals, aiming to counterbalance the development of economic and trade cooperation in the Pacific, to achieve meaningful WTO reform and to find common solutions to common problems;
56. Recognises at the same time that some diverging interests remain; invites both the Commission and the US administration to cooperate closely in the new political context to secure a level playing field for businesses in order to increase market access for EU companies, continue to explore agreements on conformity assessment and the elimination of industrial tariffs, agree on ambitious social, technological and environmental standards, and build on each other’s experience so as to promote such standards more efficiently on the global stage;
57. Urges both sides to solve bilateral trade disputes, supports the suspension of the Airbus-Boeing tariffs and urges that this matter be resolved permanently in order to find a solution to digital taxes; urges the US to remove the Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminium;
58. Calls for joint efforts to put workers and companies at the centre of trade policy in order to emerge from the pandemic, speed up the economic recovery and facilitate trade in vaccines and essential medical goods; reiterates that we should work together to achieve meaningful WTO reform and reinstate a well-functioning Appellate Body; encourages both sides to stick to WTO commitments under the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and to find common solutions to common problems, but underlines the need for the EU to act autonomously if needed;
59. Supports the joint communication entitled ‘A new EU-US agenda for global change’ and calls for the swift establishment of a new EU-US Trade and Technology Council; calls for close EU-US cooperation on emerging and disruptive technologies, including joint export and import restrictions vis-à-vis authoritarian states;
60. Calls on the Commission to put trade, the climate and related reforms at the core of transatlantic relations, while noting the high level of ambition that the new US administration is demonstrating in this area, which should also be based on new approaches such as those introduced by the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA);
61. Is aware of the importance of the EU’s trade relationship with China, which in 2020 became the biggest trading partner of the EU in terms of the trade in goods; firmly believes that EU-China trade relations require a more balanced and reciprocal approach; stresses that the process of the ratification of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), which can only start when the EU has achieved substantial progress in the elaboration of suitable and effective autonomous measures to be deployed in efforts to counter market-distorting practices and to defend strategic EU interests, including a ban on products made using forced labour, an upgraded trade defence toolbox and a working sanctions mechanism on human rights;
62. Underlines that ratifying the CAI is unthinkable in the context of the evolving dynamics of the wider EU-China relationship and considers deeply regrettable the unacceptable Chinese escalation of placing elected Members of the European Parliament and European entities under sanctions, as this further erodes trust and hinders bilateral cooperation; underlines that the ratification process of the CAI will not start until the Chinese sanctions against Members and Parliament bodies are lifted;
63. Underlines that Parliament will carefully scrutinise the agreement, including its provisions on sustainable development, and reminds the Commission that it will take the human rights situation in China, including in Hong Kong, into account when asked to endorse the investment agreement;
64. Urges the Commission to move forward with an investment agreement with Taiwan, showing commitment to meaningful engagement in trade and investment relations and taking the necessary steps towards an impact assessment, public consultations and a scoping exercise before the end of 2021; reiterates the importance of the bilateral structural dialogue, including on matters related to multilateralism and the WTO, technology and public health, as well as essential cooperation on critical supplies such as semiconductors;
65. Welcomes the Trade Policy Review’s engagement towards Africa and the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods in an effective, sustained and constructive fashion and calls for concrete steps to deepen the EU’s relations with these partners, including in the field of energy;
66. Reiterates the importance of a strategic and sustainable partnership with South-East Asia and India; calls on the Commission, in this context, to remain engaged with the region and proactively promote rules-based trade relations for a comprehensive and ambitious Indo-Pacific strategy;
67. Points out that the COVID-19 crisis has underlined the significance of a new partnership with the African continent that fosters an inclusive and sustainable policy approach; underlines in this context that the issue of debt reductions and debt cancellations needs to be addressed; stresses that the EU needs to actively support the diversification of inner-African value chains;
68. Welcomes the entry into force of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as an instrument to actively accompany Africa’s regional, economic and political integration and to improve its access to global markets;
69. Underlines the importance of the EU’s commitment to our trade relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, including the overseas countries and territories; expresses concern about the impact of COVID-19, especially on women, in this region;
70. Calls for all the EU institutions to maintain as a priority our trade and development cooperation and the development of greater resilience to pandemics and health emergencies; calls on the Commission to maintain a structural dialogue with partners in the abovementioned regions to this end;
o o o
71. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.
Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups (OJ L 330, 15.11.2014, p. 1).
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).
Non-paper from the Netherlands and France on trade, social economic effects and sustainable development, accessed at ‘the Netherlands at International Organisations (permanentrepresentations.nl)’.
Common system of value added tax: conferral of implementing powers to the Commission to determine the meaning of the terms used in certain provisions *
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European Parliament legislative resolution of 7 July 2021 on the proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards conferral of implementing powers to the Commission to determine the meaning of the terms used in certain provisions of that Directive (COM(2020)0749 – C9-0002/2021 – 2020/0331(CNS))
– having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2020)0749),
– having regard to Article 113 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C9‑0002/2021),
– having regard to the reasoned opinion submitted, within the framework of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, by the Swedish Parliament, asserting that the draft legislative act does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity,
– having regard to Rule 82 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A9-0201/2021),
1. Approves the Commission proposal;
2. Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;
3. Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;
4. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.
Amendments to Parliament's Rules of Procedure
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European Parliament decision of 7 July 2021 on amendments to Parliament's Rules of Procedure concerning Rules 99, 197, 213, 214, 222, 223, 230, 235 and Annex V, and on insertion of a new Rule 106a (2021/2048(REG))
– having regard to Rules 236 and 237 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A9-0214/2021),
1. Decides to amend its Rules of Procedure as shown below;
2. Decides that the amendments shall enter into force on the first day of the part-session following that of their adoption, with the exception of:
(a)
the amendment to Rule 213(1) concerning gender diversity, which shall enter into force at the opening of the first part-session following the next elections to the European Parliament due to be held in 2024;
(b)
the amendment to Rule 223 on the term of office of the members of the bureaux of the delegations, which shall enter into force at the opening of the first part-session following the next elections to the European Parliament due to be held in 2024;
3. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Council and the Commission, for information.
Present text
Amendment
Amendment 1 Parliament's Rules of Procedure Rule 99
The provisions governing the procedure for granting discharge to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget in accordance with the financial provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Regulation (EU, Euratom) No966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council1 (the “Financial Regulation”) are attached to these Rules as an annex.
The provisions governing the procedure for granting discharge to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget in accordance with the financial provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council1 (the “Financial Regulation”) are attached to these Rules as an annex.
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1 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (OJ L 298, 26.10.2012, p. 1).
1 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).
Amendment 2 Parliament's Rules of Procedure Rule 106 a (new)
Rule 106 a
Procedure for delivering Parliament’s position on the establishment or extension of Union trust funds for external actions
1. Where the Commission consults Parliament on its intention to establish or extend a trust fund for emergency or post-emergency actions pursuant to Article 234(1), third subparagraph, or Article 234(5), first subparagraph, of the Financial Regulation, the committee responsible shall draw up draft recommendations.
Those draft recommendations may include specific recommendations to the Commission concerning the details of the trust fund, such as the objectives that it should pursue or how it should operate.
Rule 118(2) to (6) shall apply mutatis mutandis.
2. Where Parliament is asked by the Commission to give its approval to a draft decision on the establishment or extension of a trust fund for thematic actions pursuant to Article 234(1), fourth subparagraph, or Article 234(5), first subparagraph, of the Financial Regulation, the committee responsible shall prepare a recommendation to approve or reject the draft decision.
Rule 105(1) to (4) shall apply mutatis mutandis.
3. Members or a political group or groups reaching at least the medium threshold or the committee responsible may submit to Parliament a motion for a resolution requesting the Commission to discontinue appropriations for a Union trust fund, or to revise the constitutive agreement with a view to the liquidation of a Union trust fund, pursuant to Article 234(5), second subparagraph, of the Financial Regulation.
Amendment 3 Parliament's Rules of Procedure Rule 197
Rule 197
deleted
Motions calling for a matter to be declared inadmissible
1. At the beginning of the debate on a specific item on the agenda, a political group or Members reaching at least the low threshold may present a motion calling for it to be declared inadmissible. Such a motion shall be put to the vote immediately.
The intention to present an inadmissibility motion shall be notified at least 24 hours in advance to the President who shall inform Parliament immediately.
2. If the motion is carried, Parliament shall immediately proceed to the next item on the agenda.
1. At the first committee meeting after the appointment of committee members pursuant to Rule 209, and again two and a half years thereafter, the committee shall elect a bureau consisting of a Chair and of Vice-Chairs from among its full members in separate ballots. The number of Vice-Chairs to be elected shall be determined by Parliament upon a proposal by the Conference of Presidents. The diversity of Parliament must be reflected in the composition of the bureau of each committee; it shall not be permissible to have an all male or all female bureau or for all of the Vice-Chairs to come from the same Member State.
1. At the first committee meeting after the appointment of committee members pursuant to Rule 209, and again two and a half years thereafter, the committee shall elect a bureau consisting of a Chair and of Vice-Chairs from among its full members in separate ballots. The number of Vice-Chairs to be elected shall be determined by Parliament upon a proposal by the Conference of Presidents. The diversity of Parliament must be reflected in the composition of the bureau of each committee. The Chair and the first Vice-Chair of a committee shall not be of the same gender. Gender balance shall also apply to the other members of the bureau. It shall not be permissible for all of the bureau members to come from the same Member State.
The Chair shall announce in committee all decisions and recommendations of the coordinators, which shall be deemed to have been adopted if they have not been contested. They shall be duly mentioned in the minutes of the committee meeting.
The Chair shall announce in committee all decisions and recommendations of the coordinators, which shall be deemed to have been adopted if they have not been contested. In cases of contestation, the committee shall vote with a simple majority.Those decisions and recommendations shall be duly mentioned in the minutes of the committee meeting.
Amendment 7 Parliament's Rules of Procedure Rule 222 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. When the Commission has published a citizens’ initiative in the relevant register pursuant to point (a) of Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council1, the President of the European Parliament, on a proposal from the Chair of the Conference of Committee Chairs:
1. When the Commission has published the notice on a citizens’ initiative in the relevant register pursuant to Article 14(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 of the European Parliament and of the Council1, the President of the European Parliament, on a proposal from the Chair of the Conference of Committee Chairs:
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1 Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on the citizens’ initiative (OJ L 65, 11.3.2011, p. 1).
1 Regulation (EU) 2019/788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the European citizens' initiative (OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 55).
Amendment 8 Parliament's Rules of Procedure Rule 222 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) shall task the committee responsible for the subject-matter according to Annex VI with organising the public hearing provided for in Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No211/2011; the committee responsible for petitions shall be automatically associated under Rule 57;
(a) shall task the committee responsible for the subject-matter according to Annex VI with organising the public hearing provided for in Article 14(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788; the committee responsible for petitions shall be automatically associated under Rule 57;
Amendment 9 Parliament's Rules of Procedure Rule 222 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) may, where two or more citizens’ initiatives published in the relevant register pursuant to point (a) of Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 have a similar subject-matter, decide, after consulting the organisers, that a joint public hearing is to be organised at which all of the citizens’ initiatives involved shall be dealt with on an equal footing.
(b) may, where two or more citizens’ initiatives for which the notices have been published in the relevant register pursuant to Article 14(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 have a similar subject-matter, decide, after consulting the organisers, that a joint public hearing is to be organised at which all of the citizens’ initiatives involved shall be dealt with on an equal footing.
Amendment 10 Parliament's Rules of Procedure Rule 222 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) shall ascertain whether the Commission has received the organisers at an appropriate level in accordance with point (b) of Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011;
(a) shall ascertain whether the Commission has received the groupof organisers at an appropriate level in accordance with Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788;
3. The Chair of the committee responsible for the subject-matter shall convene the public hearing at an appropriate date within three months of the submission of the initiative to the Commission pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011.
3. The Chair of the committee responsible for the subject-matter shall convene the public hearing at an appropriate date within three months of the submission of the initiative to the Commission pursuant to Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2019/788.
The committee responsible for the subject matter shall invite a representative group of organisers, including at least one of the contact persons referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011, to present the initiative at the hearing.
The committee responsible for the subject matter shall invite a representative group of organisers, including at least one of the contact persons referred to in Article 5(3), first subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/788, to present the initiative at the hearing.
8. Parliament shall hold a debate on a citizens’ initiative published in the relevant register pursuant to point (a) of Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011, at a part-session following the public hearing and shall, when placing the debate on its agenda, decide whether or not to wind up the debate with a resolution. It shall not wind up the debate with a resolution if a report on an identical or similar subject matter is scheduled for the same or the next part-session, unless the President, for exceptional reasons, proposes otherwise. If Parliament decides to wind up a debate with a resolution, the committee responsible for the subject matter or a political group or Members reaching at least the low threshold may table a motion for a resolution. Rule 132(3) to (8) concerning the tabling and voting of motions for resolutions shall apply mutatis mutandis.
8. Parliament shall hold a debate on a citizens’ initiative for which a noticehas been published in the relevant register pursuant to Article 14(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788, at a part-session following the public hearing and shall, when placing the debate on its agenda, decide whether or not to wind up the debate with a resolution. It shall not wind up the debate with a resolution if a report on an identical or similar subject matter is scheduled for the same or the next part-session, unless the President, for exceptional reasons, proposes otherwise. If Parliament decides to wind up a debate with a resolution, the committee responsible for the subject matter or a political group or Members reaching at least the low threshold may table a motion for a resolution. Rule 132(3) to (8) concerning the tabling and voting of motions for resolutions shall apply mutatis mutandis.
3. The bureaux of the delegations shall be constituted in accordance with the procedure laid down for the standingcommittees in Rule 213.
3. The bureaux of the delegations shall be constituted in accordance with the procedure laid down for the committeebureaux in Rule 213. However, members of the bureaux of the delegations shall be elected for the duration of the parliamentary term.
1. When Parliament is informed that the Commission has been invited to submit a proposal for a legal act under Article 11(4) of the Treaty on European Union and in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 211/2011, the committee responsible for petitions shall ascertain whether this is likely to affect its work and, if need be, shall inform those petitioners who have addressed petitions on related subjects.
1. When Parliament is informed that the Commission has been invited to submit a proposal for a legal act under Article 11(4) of the Treaty on European Union and in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2019/788, the committee responsible for petitions shall ascertain whether this is likely to affect its work and, if need be, shall inform those petitioners who have addressed petitions on related subjects.
2. Proposed citizens’ initiatives which have been registered in accordance with Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011, but which cannot be submitted to the Commission in accordance with Article 9 of that Regulation since not all the relevant procedures and conditions laid down have been complied with, may be examined by the committee responsible for petitions if it considers that follow-up is appropriate. Rules 226, 227, 228 and 229 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
2. Proposed citizens’ initiatives which have been registered in accordance with Article 6 of Regulation (EU) 2019/788, but which cannot be submitted to the Commission in accordance with Article 13 of that Regulation since not all the relevant procedures and conditions laid down have been complied with, may be examined by the committee responsible for petitions if it considers that follow-up is appropriate. Rules 226, 227, 228 and 229 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
1. Where, in accordance with Article 65(1) of the Financial Regulation, Parliament decides to reserve to itself the right to authorise expenditure, it shall act through its Bureau.
1. Where, in accordance with Article 73(1) of the Financial Regulation, Parliament decides to reserve to itself the right to authorise expenditure, it shall act through its Bureau.
Amendment 18 Parliament's Rules of Procedure Annex V – Article 2 – paragraph 1
1. Parliament shall consider a report from the committee responsible concerning discharge by 30 April of the year following the adoption of the Court of Auditors' Annual Report as required by the Financial Regulation.
1. Parliament shall consider a report from the committee responsible concerning discharge by 15 May of the year following the adoption of the Court of Auditors' Annual Report as required by the Financial Regulation.
Financial Activities of the European Investment Bank - annual report 2020
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European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2020 (2020/2124(INI))
– having regard to Articles 15, 126, 174, 175, 177, 208, 209, 271, 308 and 309 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and to Protocol No 5 to the Treaties on the Statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB),
– having regard to the climate strategy and new lending policy in the energy sector adopted by the EIB in November 2019,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 14 January 2020 entitled ‘Sustainable Europe Investment Plan – European Green Deal Investment Plan’ (COM(2020)0021),
– having regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation of 14 January 2020 establishing the Just Transition Fund (COM(2020)0022),
– having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal(1),
– having regard to the EIB Financial Report for 2019, published on 5 May 2020,
– having regard to the EIB Activity Report for 2019 entitled ‘The Green Thread’, published on 7 May 2020,
– having regard to the adoption of the Climate Bank Roadmap by the EIB Board of Directors on 11 November 2020 and to the EIB’s new climate strategy of November 2020,
– having regard to the report on EIB Operations Inside the European Union 2019, published on 3 September 2019,
– having regard to the report on EIB-supported projects outside the EU in 2019 entitled ‘Global reach: the impact of the EIB beyond the European Union’, published on 10 December 2020,
– having regard to the EIB’s Financial Report and Statistical Report for 2019, published on 5 May and 7 May 2020,
– having regard to the EIB’s Audit Committee Annual Reports, Fraud Investigations Activity Report and Complaints Mechanism Report for 2019,
– having regard to the EIB Group Risk Management Disclosure Report for 2019, published on 6 July 2020,
– having regard to the EIB’s approval of the ratification of the Paris Agreement by the EU of 7 October 2016,
– having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 13 March 2020 on a coordinated economic response to the COVID-19 outbreak (COM(2020)0112),
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/460 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 508/2014 as regards specific measures to mobilise investments in the healthcare systems of Member States and in other sectors of their economies in response to the COVID-19 outbreak (Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative)(2),
– having regard to its resolution of 17 April 2020 on EU coordinated action to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences(3),
– having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2020 on the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan – How to finance the Green Deal(4),
– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 11 December 2020 on the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and Next Generation EU, COVID-19, climate change, security and external relations,
– having regard to special report no 03/2019 of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) entitled ‘European Fund for Strategic Investments: Action needed to make EFSI a full success’, published on 29 January 2019,
– having regard to the EIB Activity Report for 2020 entitled ‘Crisis Solutions’, published on 20 January 2021,
– having regard to special report no 12/2020 of the ECA entitled ‘The European Investment Advisory Hub – Launched to boost investment in the EU, the Hub’s impact remains limited’, published on 12 May 2020,
– having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2020 on institutions and bodies of the Economic and Monetary Union: preventing post-public employment conflicts of interest(5),
– having regard to the letter from the Ombudsman to the President of the EIB of 22 July 2016 on conflict of interest issues and the reply from the President of the EIB of 31 January 2017,
– having regard to the decision of the Ombudsman in case 2168/2019/KR on the European Banking Authority’s decision to approve the request from its Executive Director to become CEO of a financial lobby group,
– having regard to the 2019 report by Counter Balance entitled ‘Is the EIB up to the task in tackling fraud and corruption? Challenges for the EU Bank’s governance framework’,
– having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Development and the Committee on Budget,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A9-0200/2021),
A. whereas under Article 309 TFEU and in line with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the EIB is tasked with contributing to the achievement of the Union’s objectives, including through various investment instruments such as loans, equities, guarantees, risk-sharing facilities and advisory services;
B. whereas under Article 18 of its Statute, the EIB must ensure that its funds are employed as rationally as possible in the interests of the Union;
C. whereas the EIB is the public lending arm of the European Union and one of the biggest multilateral financial institutions in the world; whereas, as a consequence, the EIB is the EU’s natural partner for the implementation of financial instruments, in close cooperation with national and multilateral financial institutions;
D. whereas the EIB took on a significant role in mobilising finance for the economy, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), following the economic fallout caused by the COVID-19 pandemic which began in 2020;
E. whereas the EIB plays an important role in the EU’s strategy to tackle climate and environment related challenges, as outlined by the Commission, with EUR 350 billion of additional investment needed annually to achieve the updated 2030 climate and energy targets;
F. whereas the EIB committed in 2019 to support the objectives of the European Green Deal, align all its financing activities with the goals of the Paris Agreement and become the ‘EU Climate Bank’;
G. whereas the EIB Board of Directors has approved the Climate Bank Roadmap for 2021-2025;
H. whereas the EIB has started the review process of its 2011 transport lending policy, with the goal of supporting accessible, efficient, green and safe transport;
I. whereas support for SMEs and mid-caps (companies of medium-size value) is a fundamental public policy goal of the EIB; whereas in 2020 alone, the EIB Group supported over 425 000 SMEs and mid-caps with new financing; whereas support for SMEs accounted for 40 % of overall EIB signature volume;
J. whereas EIB investment has the capacity to support the social sector, including health, education and housing;
K. whereas in 2020 the EIB approved loans worth EUR 10,23 billion for projects outside the Union, including EUR 2,3 billion in least developed countries (LDCs);
L. whereas the high-level group of wise persons on the European financial architecture for development released its final report on 7 October 2019, in which it outlined the three following possible options for building the future European Climate and Sustainable Development Bank: a) building on the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the external financing activities of the EIB; b) pulling together the external activities of the current EU financial institutions in a new financial institution with mixed ownership; c) transferring all external activities of the EIB into an EIB subsidiary with significant other shareholders; whereas the Council conclusions of December 2019 indicated that only options a) and c) should be explored; whereas the results of feasibility studies on each option, which were supposed to be delivered in autumn 2020, still have not been delivered;
M. whereas the EIB Group is currently working to develop counterparty alignment guidelines with environmental and sustainability objectives;
General considerations
1. Expresses serious concerns about the severe macroeconomic imbalances deriving from the COVID-19 crisis and their related impact on sustainable economic growth, investment, resilience, employment rates, education and socio-economic inequalities; stresses that the economic and social crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly harmed economic growth in the EU and that one of the main fallouts is the decline in investment, which is currently insufficient to fulfil EU’s objectives; underlines that the fall in public and private investment has reached alarming levels;
2. Highlights the fundamental role of the EIB as the EU’s public bank – being the only international financial institution that is entirely owned by EU Member States and fully guided by EU policies and standards – in supporting the economic recovery in the post-pandemic context and targeting investments for the materialisation of European priorities;
3. Underlines the EIB’s crucial role in supporting the economic recovery in the short and medium term in conjunction with the European Green Deal, the European Climate Law, the European Industrial Strategy, the Next Generation EU (NGEU) Recovery Instrument, the EU’s long-term budget, InvestEU and other European financial instruments; welcomes the EIB’s financial engagement in InvestEU as a way to help overcome the investment gap in the EU, the root causes of which still need to be addressed; welcomes, moreover, the EIB’s central role in supplying advisory support under the InvestEU Advisory Hub;
4. Supports the European Council’s conclusion that the EIB should have the necessary capital to implement Union policies and the invitation to the EIB Board of Governors to review the capital adequacy of the EIB in view of the instruments included in the MFF and NGEU, as well as the Bank’s contribution to the Union’s ambitions in fighting climate change and digitalising Europe’s economy;
5. Takes the view that a capital increase is justified in order to allow the Bank to provide long-term finance, foster inclusive sustainable growth, social and regional cohesion and support key real economy investments which otherwise would have not taken place, while keeping the current AAA status, which is an important asset for the Bank;
6. Notes that the EIB is a highly leveraged institution; calls on the shareholders of the EIB to reflect on the optimal equity structure and agree on a capital increase, both cash-in and callable in nature; emphasises that a capital increase should go hand in hand with greater transparency, democratic accountability, efficiency in the management structure and environmental sustainability;
7. Calls on the Commission, in this context, to study the possibility of being represented on the EIB Board of Governors through the subscription of EIB capital using funds from the EU budget;
8. Notes that, according to the Commission’s 2030 Climate Target Plan, over the period 2021-2030 the EU will need to invest EUR 350 billion more annually than it did over the period 2011-2020; stresses that an even larger role for the EIB is required to meet this climate investment gap; calls on the Board of Governors to seize the opportunity of favourable lending conditions for the EIB to increase issuance and maturity of bonds while preserving its strong capital position;
9. Welcomes the recent capital increase of the European Investment Fund (EIF)(6);
10. Asks the EIB as the EU’s public bank to make the utmost concerted efforts to deliver strong and policy-driven financing activity in line with the respective legal provisions that deliver economic efficiencies, support sustainable growth and do not hamper access to high-quality public services; calls on the EIB to give priority to public purpose projects that promote EU policy objectives and sustainable economic growth, in particular those that would not otherwise be ‘bankable’, both within and outside the EU, with a view to addressing the unprecedented global challenges of the decades to come, in particular combating climate change;
11. Calls on the EIB to further strengthen its in-house capacity and expertise to ensure a mission-driven long-term commitment in its partnerships, promote coordination among national and regional actors, and further develop conditions for higher risk taking in innovation and growth-inducing investments;
12. Emphasises the importance of the additionality factor to be provided by the EIB to investments across the EU; underlines the need to coordinate strategies with other European institutions and multilateral and National Development Banks;
13. Commends the EIB’s efforts in setting out targets and encourages it to strengthen implementation on the ground of its environmental and social standards and to improve evaluations of the economic, social and environmental impacts of projects supported, as well as their additionality and sustainability;
14. Stresses that the EIB must seek to avoid crowding out private investments through its activities;
15. Stresses the importance of avoiding further geographical imbalances in the EIB’s lending activity so as to ensure a broader geographical and sectoral allocation of investments, address regional disparities, namely those resulting from long-term investment deficits and geographical disadvantages, and enhance economic and social convergence and cohesion;
16. Welcomes the efforts already made by the EIB in this regard but stresses that more needs to be done, as recent reports demonstrate a persistently high level of geographical concentration of projects;
17. Calls for the EIB to contribute to addressing systemic deficiencies that prevent certain regions or countries from taking full advantage of EIB financial opportunities by, inter alia, strengthening its efforts to expand its loan activities, providing technical assistance and advisory support, especially in regions which attract low investment and which did not benefit significantly from the derogation from the State-aid rules during the pandemic crisis because of a lack of financial capacity or room for manoeuvre of the state;
Mobilising funds to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic
18. Welcomes the EIB’s rapid mobilisation of up to EUR 40 billion of emergency financing to fight the crisis caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, through the setting up of loans, credit holidays and measures to alleviate the liquidity of SMEs and mid-caps;
19. Welcomes, in addition, the subsequent creation of the EUR 25 billion European Guarantee Fund (EGF) in response to the COVID-19 crisis, not least its positive impact in providing financial support to SMEs and the health sector; regrets, however, the slow roll-out of the EGF, with the first funds only approved in late 2020 due to late submission from Member States and State aid clearing processes; stresses that the EGF was set up to be temporary in nature; suggests that the EGF should remain operational beyond 2021 given the prolonged impact of the COVID-19 crisis and the repeated lockdowns in many Member States;
20. Notes that support guaranteed by the EGF to financial intermediaries should be subject to a number of assessment criteria, such as environmental, social and corporate governance policies;
21. Calls on the EIB to consider proposing additional incentives for projects and credit lines already approved in order to get the projects off the ground as soon as possible and ensure the swift implementation of funds;
22. Welcomes the creation of a EUR 6 billion investment instrument to support the financing of the healthcare sector, namely medical infrastructure, research, and the development of vaccines; calls on the EIB to prioritise the strengthening of public health systems;
23. Notes that in the context of the COVID-19 response and as of 30 September 2020, the EIB has approved 84 operations within the EU for a total investment of EUR 23,5 billion; notes also that 88 % of the approved operations were allocated to SMEs and mid-caps and the health sector; highlights the importance of supporting SMEs, as the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic are particularly hard for these companies;
24. Welcomes the creation of a targeted financing initiative of up to EUR 5,2 billion in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in order to support countries outside the EU;
25. Welcomes the EIB’s participation in COVAX, with an investment of EUR 400 million in the COVAX Advanced Market Commitment;
26. Underlines that in the light of the successive and unpredictable waves of COVID-19 infections, these instruments will need to be further strengthened, enforced, and extended; asks the EIB to stand ready to upscale existing instruments and launch new supportive financial initiatives, as appropriate;
Becoming the EU Climate Bank
27. Welcomes the fact that in 2020, 40 % of the EIB’s lending was environment and climate related;
28. Welcomes the fact that the EIB is the world’s largest issuer of green bonds which have raised EUR 34,6 billion of Climate Awareness Bonds and Sustainability Awareness Bonds over 12 years; calls on the EIB to continue and to expand the issuance of green bonds to enhance the liquidity of that market and to remain involved in the development of an EU green bond standard;
29. Welcomes the new Climate Risk Assessment (CRA) system established to assess the physical climate risk in direct lending and suggests that the EIB propose harmonised screening methods in its action plans , using, where appropriate the Taxonomy Regulation(7);
30. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to support the Commission’s Sustainable Finance Action Plan, in particular by aligning with the EU taxonomy for tracking climate action and environmental sustainability finance, and by adopting the ‘Do No Significant Harm’ criteria as a basis on which to evaluate projects;
31. Calls on the EIB to uphold its commitment to align all of its operations with the objectives of the Paris Agreement as soon as possible, and in a timeframe that is coherent with the EU’s objective of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; highlights that developing advanced alternative and sustainable fuels will require significant investments in order to overcome the current technological frontier; calls on the EIB to establish and conclude green transition contracts for high emitting sectors in order to ensure that they align their business models with climate neutrality objectives;
32. Recognises the need for the EU and its Member States to redirect capital flows towards climate adaptation and mitigation in order to make our economies, businesses and societies more resilient to climate and environmental shocks and risks;
33. Welcomes the adoption by the EIB Board of Directors of the ambitious EIB Climate Bank Roadmap for 2021-2025, and the inclusion of the shadow carbon pricing mechanism in particular, which provides a crucial framework to support the transition and implementation of the European Green Deal and marks a decisive step towards making the EIB the EU Climate Bank, promoting sustainable investments and protecting the environment during the critical decade ahead;
34. Welcomes the EIB’s climate leadership and the decision to increase EIB financing for climate action and environmental sustainability, including renewable energies, from around 30 % to at least 50 % by 2025;
35. Notes that the roadmap envisages the introduction of a transition period until the end of 2022, which causes a delay in the alignment with the objectives of the Paris Agreement; calls on the EIB to strive for maximum compliance with the Paris Agreement in the ongoing appraisal procedures, and full compliance as of 2023 at the latest;
36. Notes that the EIB will structure future work on the implementation of the Roadmap around ten new action plans, which will build on the first five years of implementation of the EIB’s 2015 climate strategy; demands, in this context, to be regularly and fully informed on the implementation of the Roadmap;
37. Calls on the EIB to take into account the inputs from relevant stakeholders, local authorities, trade unions and NGOs in its investment strategy as the EU’s Climate Bank and in the context of the implementation of the Roadmap;
38. Welcomes the EIB’s development of a biodiversity risk assessment and the adoption of the Environmental, Climate and Social Guidelines on Hydropower Development; recalls that biodiversity protection is fundamental for EU sustainability, with critical effects for European economic, health and food conditions; calls on the EIB to further develop biodiversity-proofing components in its financial instruments in order to avoid adverse effects on biodiversity;
39. Acknowledges the challenges and progress achieved during the implementation of the Natural Capital Financing Facility (NCFF); calls on the EIB to consider providing a grant component under the NCFF to support the initial scaling up of local projects and facilitate generating revenues; believes that an evaluation of the NCFF should be embedded in a broader assessment of the EIB on how to support ecosystem and biodiversity restoration in the EU;
40. Welcomes the commitment by the EIB in the Climate Bank Roadmap to focus support on sustainable rearing and dairy industries, and in particular to address animal welfare;
41. Calls on the EIB Group to use its new operations as a way of supporting the goals of the EU Chemicals Strategy for Sustainability, since they would boost innovation for safe and sustainable-by-design chemicals, materials and products, the Circular Economy Action Plan based on non-toxic material cycles and the upcoming Zero Pollution Action Plan for water, air and soil;
42. Welcomes the upcoming review of the EIB’s transport lending policy and the EIB’s commitment to end support to airport expansions by the end of 2022; stresses the importance of aligning the EIB’s transport portfolio and transport lending policy with the Paris Agreement as soon as possible;
43. Calls for the swift adoption of a new transport financing policy strategy aimed at decarbonising the EU transport sector by 2050 at the latest and promoting accessible, efficient, green and safe means of transport; underlines, in this context, that the EIB should continue its engagement in financing innovation and green technology for aviation; requests in this context that the new transport policy also take into account the geographical features of EU regions, such as insular, innermost and outermost regions;
44. Calls on the EIB to increase support for modal shifts towards low-carbon transportation, such as cycling and public transport, in particular for underserved communities and localities;
45. Highlights the crucial role of the EIB in meeting the goals of the Just Transition Mechanism and asks for more commitment and concrete action in this respect, namely through structural programme loans, InvestEU and as a financing partner for the public sector loan facility; invites the EIB to use its role as financing partner for the public sector loan facility as an opportunity to strengthen its capacity to finance smaller projects and community-led initiatives and to build partnerships with municipalities and other public entities so that no one is left behind in the process of economic transition;
46. Underlines that Member States and regions have different starting points; notes that the transition towards a carbon-neutral economy must be inclusive and fair, and must leave no one behind; emphasises that special attention should be paid to the protection of the citizens and workers that will be most affected by the transition; suggests that the EIB proactively work with Member States with a view to supporting regions where jobs are highly dependent on high-emitting industries;
47. Welcomes the new EIB energy lending policy and its commitment to end investments in fossil fuel by the end of 2021; calls on the EIB to assess the compatibility of investments made in 2021 towards high-carbon projects with the updated 2030 climate targets; insists that the EIB implement the principle of energy efficiency and set the objective of tackling energy poverty in all its energy lending;
48. Welcomes the Smart Finance for Smart Buildings initiative that facilitates investments in energy efficiency projects; calls for the reinforcement of housing investments promoting energy efficiency and tackling energy poverty, and for further investments in social and affordable housing, also to contribute to the renovation wave strategy;
Support for innovation, SMEs, industry and digitalisation
49. Considers that mistakes of the past should not be repeated and that efficient investment in innovation, infrastructure, education and skills are crucial elements to recover from the economic and social crisis, ensure sustainable and inclusive growth and create high-quality jobs and long-term competitiveness; emphasises, in addition, that a regulatory environment composed of predictable rules, a level playing field and administrative efficiency also contributes to crowding in private investment;
50. Welcomes the fact that in 2020 the EIB supported innovation and skills with EUR 14,43 billion; calls on the EIB to further enhance its support for innovation and skills;
51. Highlights the importance of the EIB’s role in the success of the InvestEU programme in the post-pandemic recovery; underlines that the EIB will continue to be the main investment partner for the implementation of the InvestEU programme;
52. Hopes that the new InvestEU programme will enable further risk-taking by the EIB in real economy projects and support for SMEs in particular, including through capital support;
53. Recalls that SMEs are the backbone of Europe’s economy, representing 99 % of all businesses in the EU and employing around 100 million people; welcomes the fact that in 2020 the EIB provided financing for SMEs and mid-caps, with investment totalling EUR 30,56 billion and supporting 425 000 companies;
54. Reiterates that supporting microenterprises, SMEs and mid-caps must remain a key objective for the EIB, and one that should be further strengthened during the current economic crisis, notably to assist them with financing, internationalisation, decarbonisation and access to ICT tools; stresses that SMEs often have limited administrative resources available and thus should benefit from easily accessible financing channels; welcomes efforts made to provide online assistance and counselling to SMEs in accessing EIB lending and calls for this advisory capacity to be extended;
55. Calls on the EIB to complement efforts to build a data-driven society in a transparent, trustworthy, interoperable and inclusive manner, with a particular focus on the adaptation of SMEs to enhance their competitiveness;
56. Stresses, in this regard, that European SMEs are lagging behind in embracing digital technologies with only 66 % of manufacturing companies in the EU adopting at least one digital technology;
57. Highlights the need to upscale lending to female-led SMEs to promote a more gender equal recovery;
58. Calls on the EIB to mobilise sufficient support for infrastructure towards delivering faster internet speed to all regions in the EU and bridging the existing digital divide, and also requests that the EIB continue its support for advancing digital skills, in particular for employees in sectors of the economy in need of adjustment and requalification;
59. Notes that the COVID-19 outbreak revealed the fragility of the EU’s supply chains and the insufficiency of IT networks; calls on the EIB to align its investment strategy to help ensure greater resilience of the internal market’s value chains and strengthen the European industrial sector, especially in strategic areas;
60. Calls on the EIB to play a role in assisting and financing the creation of innovation ecosystems and knowledge economies throughout the EU, and in promoting place-based industrial transformation, where universities, businesses, SMEs and start-ups can develop long-lasting partnerships for the common good and which can make a meaningful contribution to achieving the objectives of the Green Deal and the digitalisation of the economy;
61. Highlights the need for the EIB to have a strong focus on projects directed towards young people, especially for start-ups and projects directed towards tackling the increasingly significant problem of youth unemployment and young people in precarious jobs;
Investment in social infrastructure and welfare
62. Notes that during the ongoing COVID-19 crisis, social welfare systems in the Member States have come under unprecedented strain; calls on the EIB to partner with the Commission and the Member States to increase investment in the social sector;
63. Acknowledges that the COVID-19 crisis has had a disproportionate impact on certain parts of society; urges the EIB to assist Member States in projects that address inequalities, including gender inequalities, and those affecting marginalised communities;
64. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to invest in the social sector, thereby fostering well-being, access to education, health and housing, as well as the acquisition of skills required in a modern knowledge-based economy;
65. Calls on the EIB to support projects in Member States which deliver on the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, the SDGs and the social reforms identified in country specific recommendations under the European Semester;
66. Notes that the COVID-19 pandemic has had negative impacts on children’s education and well-being across the globe, with millions of children still without access to education due to lockdown measures and therefore at risk of regression and suffering potential lifelong effects; welcomes the EIB’s investment in education, as it helps to fight poverty and inequalities, boosts economic growth and improves gender equality; calls on the EIB to increase its investment in education to help mitigate the severe impact of the COVID-19 crisis on education systems globally;
Supporting development and sustainability outside the EU
67. Welcomes the fact that the EIB is the largest multilateral lender in the world that strives to support EU external cooperation and development policies; notes that the EIB has been active outside the EU for over 50 years, with EUR 150,1 billion in loans granted in 150 different countries as of the end of 2020, of which EUR 10,23 billion were signed in 2020;
68. Calls on the EIB to apply a suspension to its pending loans, to carefully assess the debt impact of its future operations, and to express public support for the creation of a multilateral debt workout mechanism to address both the impact of the crisis and the financing requirements of the 2030 Agenda, given that all EIB shareholders are committed to the G20 commitment to suspend the debt of 77 countries following the debt crisis linked to the COVID-19 outbreak;
69. Stresses the need for full alignment of EIB investments in third countries with EU external action and sustainable development priorities;
70. Acknowledges that the EIB will further reinforce its support to green investment outside the EU; insists that the EIB should apply the same standards and criteria to assess and evaluate projects inside and outside the Union, including those recently agreed in the Climate Bank Roadmap;
71. Considers, in this context, that the EIB should enhance its monitoring of and reporting on projects outside the EU and improve its analysis of their economic, social and environmental impacts and increase the efficiency of the Results Measurement Framework (REM), while strengthening human rights due diligence for projects in non-EU countries;
72. Takes the view that tailored indicators to measure the reduction of inequalities, tax revenue generation for host countries, and the impact on gender balance and marginalised groups should also be considered;
73. Notes that private sector investment will be essential to fill the funding gap for the SDGs; recalls the crucial role of the EIB in de-risking private investment, particularly in fragile contexts; is concerned, however, about the use of EU development funds for de-risking private investment given the lack of evidence as to the capacity of this financial modality to demonstrate additionality and fulfil development objectives, as recently reported in the final review of EFSD as well as the opinion of the European Court of Auditors (No 7/2020); stresses the need for donors to prioritise grant-based financing as the default option, especially for LDCs, and for them not to favour blending, guarantees or any loans over grants, since they fall short of the SDGs and could increase countries’ burden of debt;
74. Welcomes the agreement reached between the European Council and Parliament on the regulation setting up the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument; notes in particular the role that the EIB will play in the context of the European Fund for Sustainable Investment;
75. Highlights that climate change is a crucial challenge to achieving sustainable development, as it threatens to worsen living conditions and poverty; calls therefore for the EIB to prioritise investment in projects that helps third countries to realise the UN Sustainable Development Goals and that delivers on social and environmental justice, food security, public services and fair economic opportunities for citizens; appreciates that the EIB will further reinforce its support to green investment outside the EU, which will help underline the EU’s role as a global leader on climate and environmental sustainability;
76. Calls on the EIB, while respecting its external lending mandate, to increase its engagement in least developed countries and those experiencing conflict, enhance cooperation with EU delegations, and increase its presence on the ground with additional staff focusing on development issues;
Delivering on governance, accountability, transparency and integrity
77. Recalls its request for an interinstitutional agreement between the EIB and Parliament in order to improve access to EIB documents and data and enhance democratic accountability, including the ability to submit questions for written answer to the EIB, and the specification of the rights of Parliament and its Members as regards access to documents and data, and the organisation of hearings and economic dialogues;
78. Proposes, in addition, and in the meantime, the establishment of a protocol for an interim Memorandum of Cooperation between the EIB and Parliament, applicable with immediate effect, in order to improve interinstitutional dialogue and enhance the EIB’s transparency and accountability;
79. Calls on the EIB to increase its reporting to Parliament regarding its decisions, progress achieved and the impact of its lending activities, notably through regular structured dialogues, and to apply the same reporting and accountability provisions as set out in the EFSI Regulation(8);
80. Calls on the EIB to step up its efforts in terms of communication; believes it is vital that it should engage with EU citizens in order to better explain the aims of its policies and illustrate its contribution to the daily lives of its citizens;
81. Welcomes the EIB’s launch of a public consultation on the review of its transparency policy in December 2020; notes, however, that the current proposal falls short of meeting the demands made by Parliament and civil society organisations to step up its transparency policy in line with the best practices and standards employed by other financial institutions;
82. Calls on the EIB to ensure the timely publication of more ample information on all its financing activities in line with international best practices, including environmental and social assessments, in order to make them accessible to potential beneficiaries, affected groups and local civil society organisations;
83. Reiterates its call on the EIB to operate on the basis of the ‘presumption of disclosure’; calls notably for the timely publication of the agendas and minutes of meetings of the Management Committee and welcomes the publication of the agenda and minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors; underlines that the future transparency policy should reinforce the transparency requirements for all its operations and require project promoters to make environmental impact assessments (EIAs) publicly available, by including stringent, yet proportionate, transparency obligations in the specific contractual clauses signed with all EIB clients;
84. Reiterates its call for the disclosure of the opinions issued by the Commission within the framework of the procedure in accordance with Article 19 of the EIB Statute on the EIB financing operations for the purpose of assessing their compliance with the relevant EU legislation and EU policies; calls on the Commission and the EIB to reach an agreement to ensure full transparency on such opinions and their underlying rationale;
85. Notes that the appointment of the former EIB vice-president as a member of Iberdrola’s Board of Directors raised serious concerns regarding risks of conflicts of interest, despite the fact that the move was duly notified in advance and has complied with the provisions applicable to former members of the EIB Management Committee; notes further that a binding opinion from the EIB Ethics and Compliance Committee issued prior to the nomination did not raised any objection to the case and asks for further explanation to be provided regarding this opinion; notes that this post-public employment with barely any cooling-off period constitutes a risk to the reputation and independence of the EIB; recalls that the European Ombudsman found that the European Banking Authority’s decision not to forbid its Executive Director from becoming the CEO of a financial industry lobby was maladministration and that forbidding the job move would have been a necessary and proportionate measure; calls on the EIB to evaluate the need to further improve rules and practices regarding conflicts of interest;
86. Expresses its concern that the eight EIB vice-presidents, in addition to their sectoral responsibilities, oversee project proposals from their home countries, alongside other country responsibilities; regrets the failure of the EIB to act on Parliament’s request to include in the Code of Conduct of the Management Committee a provision excluding the possibility of their Members overseeing lending or the implementation of projects in their home countries;
87. Welcomes the EIB’s internal review and the revision of its anti-fraud policy and its intention to elevate the policy to group level, thereby applying it to both the EIB and the EIF; urges the EIB to take an ambitious and broad approach to this review and address the existing weaknesses in its due diligence and internal control mechanisms and to strengthen its policy against fraud and corruption, in line with the repeated demands of Parliament;
88. Stresses the importance of the EIB’s anti-fraud investigative office having robust competences, sufficient resources and independence; calls on the EIB to enhance its cooperation with the European Ombudsman, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) where appropriate, and to report criminal cases to national authorities; urges the EIB to strengthen the autonomy and efficiency of the Complaint Mechanism Office and the Fraud Investigation Division;
89. Recalls that the Commission asked the EIB to share more information on the effective application of contractual clauses enabling the EIB to halt or withdraw funding(9) and expects that Parliament will have full access to this information;
90. Welcomes the progress achieved with the implementation of the EIB’s Group Strategy on Gender Equality and Gender Action Plan; takes note of the 2019 Progress Report on Diversity and Inclusion; notes that women represent 51,4 % of the EIB workforce;
91. Regrets the fact that women are still not sufficiently represented in managerial and senior office positions; believes that more needs to be done in this regard during the implementation of the second phase of the action plan in 2021, and calls, therefore, on the EIB to further encourage the participation of women and actively promote balanced gender representation in its senior positions; calls on the EIB to further enhance the promotion of all forms of diversity and inclusion within its organisation and to set ambitious targets;
92. Urges the EIB to collect, where possible, gender-disaggregated data and to develop tools and methodologies to conduct gender analysis and gender impact assessment for EIB projects and operations both inside and outside the European Union, and to consult with independent experts to this end;
93. Expresses serious concerns about allegations regarding harassment and the working environment at the EIB; recognises that recent efforts have been made by the EIB to address these and other relevant staff issues; urges the EIB to ensure that a policy of zero tolerance towards all types of harassment is effectively implemented, including preventive and protective measures as well as proper and reliable complaint and victim support mechanisms; urges the EIB management to genuinely engage in dialogue with staff representatives in order to address their concerns;
94. Welcomes the fact that the EIB will review its environmental and social standards and calls for a wide and inclusive public consultation on these issues; highlights the potential for the EIB to include further standards on other policy priorities; calls on the EIB to include social considerations when evaluating adverse impacts of potential investments;
95. Reiterates that sustainability, as defined in EU law(10), is a broad concept and that investments are sustainable only if they take into account the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle in connection with social or environmental sustainability objectives; welcomes the fact that the EIB committed to fully aligning its tracking methodology for climate action and environmental sustainability objectives with the framework defined by the EU Taxonomy, including the incorporation of the DNSH(11) in all its operations;
96. Calls on the EIB to take this opportunity to strengthen its human rights policy; expects notably that human rights due diligence obligations be reinforced and that the human rights dimension in its project planning be made more prevalent, in particular for projects in non-EU countries;
97. Expects the EIB to conduct thorough monitoring that fully takes into account concerns expressed by concerned parties and stakeholders, in particular those pertaining to human rights violations;
98. Highlights that investee companies of the EIB should follow good governance principles, including in tax matters; welcomes the fact that the EIB does not enter into new or renewed operations with entities incorporated or established in jurisdictions listed for tax and anti-money laundering/combating financing of terrorism (AML-CFT) purposes and that a case-by-case risk assessment is carried out when contracting counterparties are incorporated or established in jurisdictions which are generally cooperative but have not yet solved outstanding tax good governance deficiencies (jurisdictions listed in Annex II to the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions);
99. Highlights that extensive checks are required to ensure that counterparties do not benefit from other legal links to such jurisdictions; calls on the EIB to enforce prevention measures and regular assessments against the use of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions, and of harmful tax practices by partners;
100. Encourages the EIB Group to update in the future its non-cooperative jurisdiction (NCJ) policy on the basis of future developments to tax good governance in the EU or at international level; recalls that the policy provides for a general prohibition from entering into operations with contracting counterparties incorporated or established in NCJs, except under strict conditions;
101. Takes note of the December 2020 Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism Framework of the EIB; is concerned that the framework outlined is not detailed on specific procedures to align the Bank’s activities with EU law, namely on customer due diligence and in particular when enhanced due diligence takes place;
102. Reiterates previous concerns expressed by Parliament about the lack of control over the funds managed by financial intermediaries and the difficulty of monitoring final beneficiaries and compliance with eligibility criteria;
103. Welcomes the fact that the EIB is currently working to develop counterparty alignment guidelines; invites the EIB to develop an ambitious action plan for a ‘counterparts alignment framework’ and ensure that the guidelines provide for greater transparency and stricter due diligence over its partners and their eligibility to disburse EIB-backed funds under strict conditionality, comprising ethical, integrity, social and environmental criteria; reiterates that this framework should also include future requirements for all financial intermediaries and corporate clients to have in place a forward-looking decarbonisation plan aligned with the Paris Agreement using science-based emissions targets as soon as possible and no later than 2025, without prejudice to the ability of the EIB to offer technical assistance on devising such decarbonisation plans;
104. Asks the EIB, while preserving commercially sensitive data, to publish more regular, in-depth and comprehensive information on the financial intermediaries responsible for leveraging EIB funds (198) and to include contractual clauses concerning mandatory disclosures from these institutions on lending activity;
105. Stresses that the EIB should reinforce and make full use of contractual clauses enabling it to suspend disbursements or other mitigating measures to protect the integrity and reputation of its operations in cases of projects’ non-compliance with environmental, social, human rights, tax and transparency standards;
106. Calls for a stringent exclusion policy for the exclusion of entities found engaged in fraud, corruption, money laundering or other forms of wrongdoing from EIB financing;
107. Welcomes the European Court of Auditors’ (ECA) work with respect to Union budget funds managed by the EIB and calls on the institutions to agree on enhancing ECA audit rights within the limits of the EU Treaties;
108. Takes note of the ECA’s criticism in its special report no 12/2020 entitled ‘The European Investment Advisory Hub – Launched to boost investment in the EU, the Hub’s impact remains limited’ and calls on the EIB to draw the necessary conclusions for its work going forward;
109. Invites the ECA to produce a special report with recommendations on the performance of the EIB’s activities and their alignment with EU policies and objectives;
110. Takes note of the ECA’s special report no 3/2019 entitled ‘European Fund for Strategic Investments: Action needed to make EFSI a full success’, in particular its observations on the need for comparable performance and monitoring indicators for all EU financial instruments and budgetary guarantees; calls on the Commission to ensure proper follow-up in collaboration with the EIB, as a major implementer in the context of InvestEU;
o o o
111. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Investment Bank, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 (OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 13).
Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2015 on the European Fund for Strategic Investments, the European Investment Advisory Hub and the European Investment Project Portal and amending Regulations (EU) No 1291/2013 and (EU) No 1316/2013 — the European Fund for Strategic Investments (OJ L 169, 1.7.2015, p. 1).
Executive summary of the evaluation of Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 granting an EU guarantee to the European Investment Bank against losses under financing operations supporting investment projects outside the Union (SWD(2019)0333), 13 September 2019.
Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on sustainability‐related disclosures in the financial services sector (OJ L 317, 9.12.2019, p. 1), Article 2.
Control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank - annual report 2019
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European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank - annual report 2019 (2020/2245(INI))
– having regard to the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group 2019 Activity Report,
– having regard to the EIB Group Financial Report 2019 and the EIB Group Statistical Report 2019,
– having regard to the EIB Group Sustainability Report 2019 and its accompanying EIB Group Carbon Footprint Report,
– having regard to the Report on the implementation of the EIB Group Transparency Policy in 2019,
– having regard to the EIB Complaints Mechanism Report 2019,
– having regard to the Annual Report 2019 on EIB Activity in Africa, the Caribbean, the Pacific, and the Overseas Countries and Territories,
– having regard to the Audit Committee Annual Report for the year 2019,
– having regard to the EIB Investment Report 2019/2020: accelerating Europe’s transformation,
– having regard to the EIB Group Corporate Governance Report 2019,
– having regard to the Fraud investigations Activity Report 2019,
– having regard to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2019,
– having regard to the 2019 EFSI Report from the European Investment Bank to the European Parliament and the Council,
– having regard to European Court of Auditors (ECA) Special Report no 03/2019 of 29 January 2019 entitled ‘European Fund for Strategic Investments: Action needed to make EFSI a full success’(1),
– having regard to ECA Special Report no 12/2020 of 12 May 2020 entitled ‘The European Investment Advisory Hub – Launched to boost investment in the EU, the Hub’s impact remains limited’,
– having regard to the European Investment Advisory Hub Report 2019,
– having regard to the Commission’s evaluation of Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 granting an EU guarantee to the European Investment Bank against losses under financing operations supporting investment projects outside the Union (SWD(2019)0333), and the executive summary thereof (SWD(2019)0334), published on 13 September 2019,
– having regard to Articles 3 and 9 of the Treaty on European Union,
– having regard to Articles 15, 126, 174, 175, 208, 209, 271, 308 and 309 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), to Protocol No 5 thereto on the Statute of the EIB and to Protocol No 28 thereto on economic, social and territorial cohesion,
– having regard to the Rules of Procedure of the European Investment Bank,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2015 on the European Fund for Strategic Investments, the European Investment Advisory Hub and the European Investment Project Portal and amending Regulations (EU) No 1291/2013 and (EU) No 1316/2013 – the European Fund for Strategic Investments(2),
– having regard to the Commission report of 28 May 2019 on the management of the guarantee fund of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) in 2018 (COM(2019)0244),
– having regard to the Tripartite Agreement of September 2016 between the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors and the European Investment Bank,
– having regard to its resolution of 10 July 2020 on control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2018(3),
– having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0215/2021),
A. whereas the EIB is treaty-bound to contribute to EU integration, economic and social cohesion and regional development through dedicated investment instruments such as loans, equities, guarantees, risk-sharing facilities and advisory services;
B. whereas the primary objective of the EIB, according to Article 309 TFEU, is to contribute to the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interest of the Union, by facilitating the financing of projects for developing less developed regions, and projects of common interest to several Member States which are of such a size or nature that they cannot be entirely financed by the various means available in the individual Member States;
C. whereas the EIB Group is treaty-bound to contribute to EU integration and regional development, in accordance with Article 309 TFEU and Protocol 28;
D. whereas the EU has experienced severe underinvestment since the financial crisis while facing an urgent investment demand to cope with the required green and digital transformation of the economy and society;
E. whereas the EIB adopted a new Energy Lending Policy in November 2019 and a Climate Bank Roadmap in December 2020;
F. whereas the EIB is expected to play a key role in financing the European Green Deal through the Sustainable European Investment Plan;
G. whereas the EIB is expected to support a fair green transition through the Just Transition Mechanism;
H. whereas public policy goals such as territorial and social cohesion, sustainable development, and tackling (youth) unemployment, poverty and social exclusion should be the core focus and targets of the Bank in its task of contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market;
I. whereas from 2014 to 2019, the Bank provided more than EUR 100 billion of financing in cohesion regions;
J. whereas the EIB is considering becoming the first Multilateral Development Bank to be aligned with the Paris Agreement and the Council already asked the EIB and the EBRD to present these plans for future discussions;
K. whereas safeguards against fraud, including tax fraud and money laundering, and against the financing of terrorism risks and corruption have to be duly included in the EIB’s due diligence and contractual conditions;
L. whereas the EIB plays an important role outside the EU through its external lending activities as the biggest multilateral financial institution in the world;
M. whereas the EIB plays a central role in the efforts of the EU to ensure the implementation of the Agenda for Sustainable Development;
Main track record of EIB funding activities 2019
1. Notes that in 2019, the Bank’s lending signatures amounted to EUR 63,3 billion (of which EUR 61,9 billion under the Bank’s own resources), in line with the target set in the 2019 Operational Plan (EUR 63 billion +/-10 %) and significantly above 2018 volumes (EUR 55,6 billion, of which EUR 54,3 billion under the Bank’s own resources); notes that total disbursements reached EUR 48,1 billion in 2019 (of which EUR 47,5 billion under the Bank’s own resources), compared to EUR 52,6 billion in 2018 (of which EUR 51,8 billion under the Bank’s own resources); observes that the EIB generated healthy financial results, recording an annual net surplus of EUR 2,4 billion in 2019 as compared to EUR 2,3 billion in 2018;
2. Takes note of the rate of impaired loans, which stood at 0,4 % of the total loan portfolio at the end of 2019 (0,3 % at the end of 2018) despite the Bank’s recent move towards higher risk lending operations;
3. Notes with appreciation that in 2019 the EIB met its annual target for cohesion lending of at least 30 % of all new operations in the EU, pre-accession and EFTA countries; notes that in 2019 the EU provided EUR 16,13 billion to projects in EU cohesion regions; highlights the paramount importance of the continued support to the regional development and EU social and economic cohesion objectives as laid down in Protocol 28 to the Treaties;
4. Notes the inclusion in the EIB Operational Plan 2019 of references to the UK withdrawal from the EU and of the outcomes of discussions on the EIB’s role in the multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027; supports the focus on the higher-risk ‘Special Activities’ business line, including projects linked to EFSI and the Advisory Services, with 530 new assignments expected in 2019 to support EUR 35 billion in investments;
5. Welcomes the new EIB Group Equity Strategy that will aim to better address investment gaps in the equity market; calls on the EIB to implement the recommendation from the study ‘The EIB and the new EU missions framework’ to further promote higher risk-taking by developing suitable patient, long-term, higher-risk financial instruments building on existing risk-sharing mechanisms (e.g. EFSI, InnovFin);
6. Welcomes the adoption in 2019 of the new Climate Risk Assessment (CRA) to provide a systematic assessment of the physical climate risk in direct lending, allowing the EIB and its client to understand how climate change may affect the financed project and to identify remedial measures;
7. Welcomes the adoption of a new tax policy in March 2019, incorporating measures to counter tax avoidance via tax integrity due diligence checks and an anti-tax avoidance toolbox; notes that the EIB will not be able to invest in countries featured on the EU black list of prohibited jurisdictions, and that non-compliant jurisdictions will receive ‘enhanced vigilance’; reiterates that heightened tax due diligence should apply whenever tax havens appears in the corporate structure of clients, promoters or intermediaries;
8. Calls on the EIB to make full use of its anti-tax avoidance toolbox for risk-sensitive projects in the course of its tax due diligence and to use relocation requirements when necessary; notes the revised EIB Group anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML-CFT) framework and calls on the EIB to update its policy in light of the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, which entered into force in January 2020, and to cooperate with the relevant authorities to ensure adequate sanctions for breach of law and stringent standards on financial intermediaries;
9. Notes that in 2019 the EIB’s complaint Mechanism registered 84 new cases, handled 173 cases and closed 113 cases; invites the EIB to continue its effort to enable civil society to report cases of concern that will be dealt with in an effective and independent manner; stresses the importance of monitoring how the Complaint Mechanism’s recommendation are implemented; calls on the EIB to address the findings of the Complaint Mechanism with concrete actions;
10. Welcomes the fact that the EIB is implementing its exclusion policy and is committed to applying it rigorously through discretionary exclusion proceedings and settlement agreements; asks the EIB to report about the number and scope of the decisions on suspension/interruption of payments and/or retrieval of loans or requests for anticipated reimbursement of loans as a consequence of prohibited conduct or other malpractices affecting the financed activities; calls on the EIB to report about the nature of the financial support affected by the alleged misbehaviours and about the geographical distribution of such cases, if it is legally possible to do so;
11. Welcomes the EIB Group Update on COVID-19 in the EIB Financial Report 2019, shedding light on the emergency response package adopted in 2020 to support the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) and mid-cap sectors in the Union, encompassing liquidity lines and guarantee schemes for banks and asset-backed securities purchase programmes and considering the creation of a European Guarantee Fund (EGF) focused on financing support to SMEs; notes with appreciation that the EIB Group has extended its contribution outside of the EU, with a focus on investments in the health and private sectors; urges the EIB to require companies supported by the EGF or other funding programmes put in place to tackle the COVID-19 crisis to contribute to achieving the 2030 targets proposed by the Commission in the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan, as well as to comply with social and environmental conditions, including the adoption of decarbonisation plans, so as to increase their resilience, and to refrain from paying out dividends, bonuses for senior management and share buy-backs;
12. Welcomes in this sense the SMEs window in the InvestEU fund; stresses the need to focus on long-term financing, namely by supporting projects that would not be financed otherwise, in particular for innovative start-ups and SMEs; emphasises however that the EIB’s financing activities are no substitute for sustainable fiscal policies in the Member States; calls on the EIB to increase investment in breakthrough innovations, especially for the green transition, in order to support European companies;
13. Calls on the EIB to increase financing to address the technological transition, support development of skills adapted to the current and future labour market needs, further promote investment in digital skills of employees and entrepreneurs, digital infrastructure and capacity-building for digitalisation, provide funds for long-term research and innovation and SMEs, support the social economy and enhance social and territorial cohesion, namely by filling current investment gaps in public housing and infrastructure;
14. Notes the different economic situations and capacities of the Member States and underlines the importance of ensuring a just transition to help the most affected regions and countries to adjust to imminent changes so that no one is left behind; highlights the need to proactively support areas where jobs are currently dependent on high-emitting industries, with substantial investment in training and alternative economic opportunities to guarantee quality jobs, thereby ensuring a smooth transition; takes the view that consistency and coordination with other EU financing instruments in this regard will be crucial;
15. Recalls the Gender Action Plan, endorsed with the intention of guiding the implementation of the EIB gender strategy and integrating the promotion of gender equality into the EIB business model; calls on the EIB to report on the progress achieved in the first phase of the action plan, on objectives such as revising the due diligence framework to address impacts and risks of EIB investments for the rights of women, ensuring equal access to benefits generated by EIB investment, and investing in women’s participation in the economy and the labour market;
EFSI functioning and effectiveness
16. Recalls that the EFSI has a distinct governance structure than the EIB and its investment operations take place within two thematic areas, i.e. the Infrastructure and Innovation Window managed by the EIB and the SME Window managed by the European Investment Fund (EIF);
17. Takes note of the results presented in the European Investment Advisory Hub Report 2019; commends the positive impact of the European Investment Advisory Hub (EIAH); calls to further strengthen the EIB’s in-house financial and advisory capacities to ensure long-lasting commitment to the implementation and long-term financing horizon of EU missions such as beating cancer, adapting to climate change, ensuring a fair transition in the regions most impacted by the Green Deal transformations, protecting our oceans, living in greener cities and ensuring soil health and food; welcomes the fact that in following up on the ECA’s recommendations, the EIB presented its ‘Study in response to ECA Recommendation 5: improving the geographical spread of EFSI supported investment’ in July 2019; takes note of the conclusions of this analysis; which documents considerable efforts on the side of the EIB and the Commission to facilitate a more balanced geographical distribution of EFSI investment to contribute to sustainable long-term economic convergence across the Union;
18. Calls on the EIB to make geographical distribution of EIB financing more balanced, in accordance with its role in ensuring territorial and social cohesion; calls for the EIB to address shortcomings that prevent certain regions or Member States from taking full advantage of its financial instruments;
19. Calls for the strengthening of technical assistance and the financial expertise of local and regional authorities, especially in regions with low investment capacity, before project approval, in order to improve accessibility; calls for intensified cooperation with national promotional banks and institutions;
The EIB’s role in financing the European Green Deal
20. Recalls that in November 2019, in line with the political ambition behind the European Green Deal, the EIB Board of Directors decided to increase the level of climate and environment commitment for the EIB Group with the aim to transform the EIB from ‘an EU bank supporting climate’ into ‘the EU’s climate bank’ and pledged to gradually increase the share of its financing dedicated to climate action and environmental sustainability to reach 50 % of its operations in 2025 and to align all financing activities with the goals of the Paris Agreement from the end of 2020; welcomes the adoption of the Climate Roadmap; calls on the EIB to assess the consistency of the projects already in the pipeline before November 2020 with the objective of climate neutrality by 2050 while ensuring business continuity, taking into account the transition period provided for until the end of 2022;
21. Welcomes the EIB’s use of a progressively increasing shadow cost of carbon as part of the overall approach to ensure that EIB operations are consistent with the 1,5˚C target, while ensuring a just transition towards a carbon-neutral economy that leaves no one behind;
22. Notes that the climate problem cannot be solved without the support of industry, and that large-scale change can only be achieved if the needs of industry are taken on board and the necessary incentives are given for innovative climate solutions;
23. Notes that according to the EIB Sustainability Report, absolute emissions of the EIB portfolio in 2019 are estimated at 3,9 million tonnes of CO2e per year, up from 2,2 million tonnes of CO2e per year in 2018; notes that the overall reduced or avoided emissions from the same financing are estimated at 3,1 million tonnes of CO2e per year in 2019 compared to 3,5 million tonnes of CO2e per year in 2018; calls on the EIB to increase efforts to decrease absolute emissions; calls on the EIB to systematically disclose greenhouse gas (GHG) footprint calculations for all projects that are subject to carbon foot printing, in order to enhance transparency;
24. Welcomes the Energy Lending Policy agreed by the EIB Board of Directors in November 2019 and in particular the decision to end financing for fossil fuel energy projects; notes however that gas infrastructure projects included in the fourth list of Projects of Common Interest and gas projects already under appraisal by 14 November 2019 are not excluded from EIB financing until the end of 2021; highlight that these projects could be financed as long as they contribute to the task of the EIB to facilitate a just transition and balanced development in the EU; notes that in 2019 the EIB provided EUR 685 million of financing to natural gas transmission and distribution; calls on the EIB to assess and address potential risks linked to lock-in of carbon intensive assets;
25. Reminds the EIB of Parliament’s call to explain how the Trans Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline will be aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement by the end of 2020; notes that the project is subject to an enquiry by the European Ombudsman(4) concerning the failure of the EIB to ensure proper climate impact assessment for both projects; urges the EIB to address any shortcomings of the environmental impact assessment and address negative environmental, climate and social impacts as a matter of priority;
26. Notes that under the current Energy Lending Policy, gas-fired power plants and gas network projects that are planned to transport low carbon gas are eligible under the condition of a ‘credible plan’ including an emissions trajectory included in the EIB finance contract; calls on the EIB to ensure that the criteria for these plans to be considered credible are in accordance with its mandate in contributing to a just transition, in order to avoid the risk of supporting gas projects which are not aligned with climate targets; notes that the EIB will make a mid-term review of the energy lending policy in early 2022;
27. Notes that in 2019 the EIB supported several projects involving hydropower; welcomes the Environmental, Climate and Social Guidelines on Hydropower Development; welcomes the fact that the EIB is currently upgrading its reporting requirements for intermediated lending to account for counterparty alignment with the Paris Agreement and the EU Taxonomy on Sustainable Finance, as well as reviewing its Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework; stresses that such new requirements should enhance the transparency of EIB operations involving financial intermediaries in order to identify and avoid potential negative environmental or human rights impacts of hydropower operations both inside and outside the EU, while safeguarding access to finance for SMEs;
28. Recalls that the EIB Group has in place an Environment and Social Framework, welcomes the fact that the EIB reports on environmental, social, and economic impacts and provides ex-ante as well as ex-post evaluations of the screening exercise regarding environmental and social impacts; expresses its concern over the risk that the EIB and the EIF finance carbon intensive activities via financial intermediaries; calls on the EIB Group to further monitor the compliance of binding environmental, social, governance and fair taxation criteria as part of the upcoming guidelines on counterparty alignment, including lists of restricted activities and the requirement for clients to have clear and binding decarbonisation plans in line with the Paris Agreement, while safeguarding access to finance for SMEs;
29. Underlines that the financial needs of farmers, especially young farmers and new entrants, are significant, and that famers and enterprises in this sector have a lower rate of success when applying for financing; calls for the EIB to work on financing initiatives that will boost the accessibility of finance for the agricultural sector;
30. Notes the EIB Group’s growing involvement in the agricultural sector; insists that EIB financing needs to support rural communities and the transition of the agricultural sector in line with European policy objectives including with more respect for animal welfare, and that it should avoid contributing to stocking densities exceeding the carrying capacity of the land;
31. Notes that the financing provided within the Union in 2019 for transport was higher than in 2018 (EUR 9 325 million against EUR 8 237 million in 2018) and that the contraction of financing for roads and motorways was offset by increases in financing for railways and air transport; stresses the importance of aligning the Transport Lending Policy and the EIB’s transport portfolio with the Climate Bank Roadmap, in particular the decarbonisation of the transport sector by 2050 but also with the Commission’s upcoming strategy for sustainable and smart mobility as a response to the new European Green Deal, with other areas of EU transport policy, while ensuring a just transition and balanced social and territorial development; welcomes the EIB’s commitment not to finance existing airport capacity expansion and port infrastructure dedicated to the transport and storage of fossil fuels; calls for the policy to avoid locking in carbon intensive assets and to support modal shifts towards zero-carbon mobility both for freight and passengers at urban and inter-urban level, such as rail, safe cycling and clean public transport, in particular for underserved communities and localities, and for renewables-based electrification infrastructure;
32. Welcomes the EIB’s leading role in the Green Bond Market in 2019 by issuing EUR 4,1 billion in Climate Awareness Bonds (CABs) and Sustainability Awareness Bonds (SABs); stresses the importance of transparent and credible documentation and tracking of proceeds underlying CABs and SABs and to ensure consistency with the EU Sustainable Finance Taxonomy and the upcoming EU Green Bond Standard;
33. Welcomes the upcoming revision of the EIB’s environmental and social framework and the development of climate, environmental and social risk management tools to assess physical, transition and systemic risks; calls on the EIB to ensure it is in place by the end of 2021; welcomes the EIB’s commitment to adopt the ‘do no significant harm’ criteria from Regulation (EU) 2020/852(5) as a basis and to set stricter standards whenever justified;
The EIB’s operations outside the EU
34. Recognises that the most important mandate guiding EIB operations outside the Union is the External Lending Mandate (ELM), under which EIB operations during the period from 2014 to 2020 were backed by a dedicated guarantee fund, with a ceiling of EUR 32,3 billion, providing a legal basis and a guarantee to the EIB against losses under financing operations in 68 eligible countries outside the EU; notes that the Commission proposed that the External Lending Mandate (ELM) would not continue in its present form; notes the creation of the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) guarantee accommodating new EIB mandates;
35. Welcomes the support of the EIB provided throughout 2019 in the formulation of the Just Transition Mechanism, which helps territories and regions most affected by the transition to a climate-neutral economy, especially those with the least capacity to deal with the cost of the transition; highlights the importance of the EIB for implementing the Mechanism in the next years, ensuring that no regions are left behind;
36. Notes that the Union development policy will be implemented via the new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), of which the EIB is a key implementer; expresses concern about the use of EU development funds for de-risking private investment given the lack of evidence as to its capacity to provide additionality and fulfil development objectives, as recently reported in the final review of EFSD as well as opinion of the European Court of Auditors No 7/2020 of 11 September 2020; stresses the need for donors to prioritise grant-based financing as the default option, especially to least developed countries, in order to avoid increasing the debt burden;
37. Reiterates that the EIB’s external operations are expected to contribute to EU policy objectives, fostering developing countries’ sustainable economic, social and environmental development, particularly in the most disadvantaged among them, as well as compliance with objectives approved by the Union; recognises poverty eradication, domestic resource mobilisation and human rights as core topics within the EU development finance architecture; recalls that stakeholder engagement is the cornerstone of sustainable and inclusive development;
38. Notes that the EIB is bound by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; stresses that human rights principles are integrated into its due diligence procedures and standards at project level including by allowing for the suspension of disbursements in the case of serious violations of human rights or environmental and social standards; notes that the complaints mechanisms was reinforced at the end of 2018; calls on the EIB to ensure that its complaints mechanism is easily accessible, timely and effective, in order to detect and redress possible human rights violations in EIB-related projects; asks the EIB to report to Parliament and the Board of Governors about this;
39. Calls on the EIB to fully support the achievement of United Nations Sustainable Development Goals through its activities within the framework of specific mandates decided by the EU Council of Ministers and the European Parliament;
EIB governance, transparency and accountability
40. Reiterates the importance of ethics, integrity, transparency, communication and accountability of the EIB Group in all its operations and policies;
41. Expresses its concern about the lack of transparency of the EIB’s operations through financial intermediaries such as commercial banks and investment funds; stresses the need to assess the economic and social impact of intermediated loans by making information about ultimate beneficiaries available; calls for the EIB to establish standard reporting obligations with financial intermediaries and by the final beneficiaries, respecting where needed the confidentiality agreements between the financial intermediary and the final beneficiary but providing a solid structure for gathering data and information;
42. Expresses grave concern about allegations against the EIB of harassment and sexual harassment in the workplace, impunity for perpetrators of harassment, dissatisfaction of employees, deficiencies in recruitment procedures for senior staff and a lack of functioning employee participation in management; calls on the EIB to ensure that all alleged cases of harassment are independently investigated and to ensure transparency on the outcomes of past and current investigations and the sanctions applied, so as to restore trust and create a culture of accountability; calls on the EIB to publish the results of staff satisfaction surveys for the period 2010-2021; calls for an independent assessment of the transparency and quality of recruitment procedures of senior, managerial, professional and administrative positions in the EIB; calls on the EIB to present an action plan to restore trust between management and staff and to strengthen employee participation in decision-making;
43. Expresses its concern over reports that several former vice-presidents have taken up employment at entities associated with the EIB without respecting a cooling-off period; deplores the fact that such practices are not strictly regulated and prohibited by the EIB’s code of conduct; regrets that the ongoing review of post-employment policy has not yet been finalised and stresses that stricter rules should be implemented; calls on the EIB to align its policy on post-employment with that of the Commission and peer institutions;
44. Expresses concern that the vice-presidents are still responsible, among other countries, for their country of origin which can create conflict of interest; calls on the EIB to act on Parliament’s request to include in the Code of Conduct of the Management Committee a provision excluding the possibility of their members overseeing lending or the implementation of projects in their home countries;
45. Welcomes the EIB decision of 6 February 2019 laying down internal rules concerning the processing of personal data by the Fraud Investigations Division within the Inspectorate General and the Office of the Chief Compliance Officer; stresses that in terms of Corporate Compliance, adequate resources must be devoted to control and monitor external activities, conflict of interests, procurement and gifts;
46. Regrets the still persistent lack of diversity and gender balance at the senior management level and within the EIB Group’s governing bodies as well as a very high share of women in support functions; notes that the bank set targets to increase the percentage of female managers to 33 % and the share of women at senior executive level to 40 %, and the share of women at executive level to 50 % by 2021; urges the EIB to strengthen its efforts at promoting gender balance at all levels of staff; urges the EIB to encourage the Members States that put forward vice-president nominees to also consider diversity and gender balance targets; calls on the EIB to establish proper representation within its secretariat of nationals from all Member States, while at the same time respecting the competencies and merits of the candidates; calls on the EIB to publish a gender and nationality breakdown of middle and senior management positions;
47. Regrets that the EIB still does not fully disclose the details of the beneficial ownership of its clients; stresses that in some cases the data of the involved economic operators is not communicated by the promoters or financial intermediaries; stresses that the disclosure of beneficiaries and their beneficial ownership is in line with the existing legal framework; recalls, however, that it is possible for Member States to provide for exemptions to the disclosure through the registers of beneficial ownership information and to access to such information, in exceptional circumstances; asks the EIB to use the available tools and to implement the standards promoted by the fifth AML Directive to make accessible such data; invites the Bank to explore which measures could be taken in case of unjustified refusal by a jurisdiction to provide such information; reiterates the need that EIF Compliance and EIB OCCO work together to bring consistency to the design and implementation of the EIB Group policies in the sectors of AML-CFT;
48. Invites the EIB to disclose details of the beneficial ownership of its customers on its website with a view to increasing the visibility of its operations and helping prevent cases of corruption and conflicts of interest;
49. Asks the EIB to make the disbursement of direct and indirect loans conditional on the publication of country-by-country tax and accountancy data, and on the disclosure of information on beneficial ownership by the beneficiaries and financial intermediaries involved in financing operations;
50. Calls on the EIB to finalise the revision of the EIB Group Anti-Fraud Policy (AFP) launched in 2019, in line with demands expressed by Parliament; welcomes the intensive dialogue between the EIB and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) on its updating; invites the EIB to take advantage of OLAF’s support role, enhanced with the new Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy (CAFS) adopted in April 2019; maintains that the European Public Prosecutor’s mandate should include the prosecution of criminal activities affecting EIB financing;
51. Reiterates the importance of the involvement of relevant national, regional and local stakeholders, including climate experts, trade unions, civil society actors, business representatives, SMEs and academia, when assessing the impact of investments; including through transparent communication, as well as the importance of assessing the needs and expectations of the people impacted by the project; emphasises that consultations must be inclusive of all the interested communities, accessible to vulnerable groups, tailored to the individual needs of the stakeholders and continuous throughout the project lifecycle; calls for respect for the principle of compliance with the principle of free, prior, and informed consent from all the affected communities (besides the indigenous population) in case of land and natural resource-based investments; asks the EIB to report on the implementation of the above principles; welcomes the Bank’s consultation of stakeholders on selected policies, as laid down in Article 7.10 and 7.11 of EIB Group’s Transparency Policy;
52. Calls on the EIB to take account of all risks to the environment posed by large-scale infrastructure projects, and to finance only projects with proven added value both for the local population as well as in environmental, social and economic terms; stresses the importance of both rigorous monitoring of possible risks of corruption and fraud in this context and conducting meticulous ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of the projects to be financed;
53. Recalls that Article 287(3) TFEU defines the ECA’s audit powers in relation to the EIB; recalls that the ECA is competent to audit the EIB’s activity in managing Union expenditure and revenue; recalls that the Audit Committee is competent to audit the EIB’s share capital according to Article 12 of Protocol 5 (Statute of the EIB); points out that this results in the ECA being unable to provide a complete overview of the links between the EIB Group operations and the Union budget; recalls that Article 308(3) TFEU allows the Council to amend the Protocol on the Statute of the EIB by simple decision without a full Treaty revision; emphasises the increased importance under the new multiannual financial framework of EU guarantees and other financial instruments managed by the EIB; calls therefore on the Council to amend Article 12 of Protocol 5 to give the ECA a role in auditing the EIB’s share capital; notes that the current tripartite agreement between the Commission, the EIB and the ECA concerning audits of operations which are financed or backed by the Union budget expires in 2020; calls on the Commission, the ECA and the EIB to enhance the role of the ECA and further strengthen its auditing powers regarding activities of the EIB in the renewal of the tripartite agreement governing the rules of engagement;
54. Invites the EIB Group and the Commission to launch the revision process of the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) provisions dating back to May 2014, setting out the rules governing the centrally managed EU instruments entrusted to the EIB Group;
55. Asks the EIB to explore together with the Commission ways to coordinate the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) and the Exclusion Policy of the EIB in order to achieve synergies and to guarantee full coverage of critical situations affecting EIB operations and the Union’s financial interests;
56. Notes the adoption in March 2019 of the EIB Group Whistleblowing Policy and takes note of its compliance with the general principles and standards integrated in Directive (EU) 2019/1937(6), which entered into force at a later time; regrets that the policy applies solely to cases of internal whistleblowing; expects the EIB’s whistle-blower protection policy to be ambitious and to set high standards; urges the EIB to include both internal and external whistleblowers and to establish clear and well-defined procedures, time frames and guidelines in order to provide whistleblowers with the best guidance and protect them from any possible retaliation;
57. Invites the EIB to enhance its communication strategy; believes that, as the world’s leading donor and multilateral borrower, it is essential that the EIB communicates with clarity and relevance on its mission and its status and that it addresses a wide variety of audiences;
58. Notes the further increase in the number of allegations reported to the EIB Investigative Division in 2019, with 228 new allegations (184 in 2018) out of which 69 % originated from staff members and 30 % from external sources including project-related parties, civil society and the media; observes that 59 % of the investigative actions concern cases of fraud, followed by corruption (15 %) and collusion (6 %) and that more than one third of the allegations scrutinised are related to the transport sector;
59. Notes that in 2019, out of the 220 cases completed, 40 were substantiated, corresponding to 18 % of the cases completed, and resulted either in referrals to competent authorities or in recommendations to EIB Group services; notes also that 62 % of such referrals (25 out of 40) were made to OLAF; asks the EIB to report on the outcome of actions undertaken including, where available, amounts that were recovered;
60. Calls on the EIB to increase proactive transparency by making non-confidential documents publicly available in a user-friendly database in a timely manner; reiterates its call to operate on the basis of the ‘presumption of disclosure’ rather than the ‘presumption of confidentiality’;
61. Calls on the EIB Group to improve its accountability; asks for a Memorandum of Understanding between the EIB Group and the Parliament to improve Parliament’s access to EIB documents and data related to strategic orientation and financing policies in order to strengthen the Bank’s accountability; suggests the idea of a quarterly dialogue with the relevant committees of Parliament to participate in the investment strategy of the EIB and ensure adequate oversight; stresses the importance of greater Parliament scrutiny over decision of the EIB Board of Directors; calls for better information sharing from the Commission in order to increase its transparency towards Parliament on the positions it takes in the EIB Board of Directors; reiterates its call for the disclosure of the opinions issued by the Commission within the framework of the procedure in accordance with Article 19 of the EIB Statute on the EIB financing operations for the purpose of assessing their compliance with the relevant EU legislation and EU policies; calls on the Commission and the EIB to reach an agreement to ensure full transparency on such opinions and their underlying rationale as far as is legally possible;
62. Calls for the timely publication of the full agendas and minutes of meetings of the Management Committee and Board of Directors; underlines that the future Transparency Policy should reinforce the transparency requirements for all its operations and require project promoters to make Environmental Impact Assessments and related documents publicly available, by including stringent transparency obligations in the specific contractual clauses signed with all EIB clients; asks the EIB to publish more regular, in-depth and comprehensive information on the financial intermediaries responsible for leveraging EIB funds and to include contractual clauses concerning mandatory disclosures from these institutions on lending activity;
Follow-up to Parliament’s recommendations
63. Calls on the EIB to continue reporting on the state of play and status of the previous recommendations issued by Parliament in its annual resolutions, especially as regards:
(a)
impacts (economic, environmental and social) of its investment strategy and results achieved to contribute to the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interests of the Union,
(b)
actions adopted to enhance the prevention of conflicts of interests,
(c)
measures to strengthen transparency following integrity due diligence of clients in order to prevent tax avoidance, fraud and corruption,
(d)
actions undertaken to follow up on the calls and requests adopted via the present resolution;
o o o
64. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission and asks that the Council and EIB Board of Directors hold a debate on Parliament’s positions presented herein.
Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 (OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 13).
Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17).
Genetically modified soybean DAS-81419-2
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European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean DAS-81419-2 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D073421/01 – 2021/2759(RSP))
– having regard to the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean DAS-81419-2 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D073421/01),
– having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed(1), and in particular Articles 7(3) and 19(3) thereof,
– having regard to the vote of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, on 17 May 2021, at which no opinion was delivered,
– having regard to Articles 11 and 13 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers(2),
– having regard to the opinion adopted by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on 26 October 2016, and published on 5 December 2016(3),
– having regard to its previous resolutions objecting to the authorisation of genetically modified organisms (‘GMOs’)(4),
– having regard to Rule 112(2) and (3) of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety,
A. whereas, on 9 February 2012, Dow Agro Sciences Ltd submitted an application to the national competent authority of the Netherlands for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean DAS-81419-2 (‘the GM soybean’), in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (‘the application’); whereas the application also concerned the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of the GM soybean for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation;
B. whereas, on 26 October 2016, EFSA adopted a favourable opinion, which was published on 5 December 2016, in relation to that application;
C. whereas the GM soybean has been developed to produce two synthetically derived Bt toxins, Cry1F and Cry1Ac, which confer resistance to certain lepidopteran species, and to be resistant to the herbicide glufosinate(5);
Lack of assessment of herbicide residues, metabolites and cocktail effects
D. whereas a number of studies show that herbicide-tolerant GM crops result in a higher use of ‘complementary’ herbicides, in large part because of the emergence of herbicide-tolerant weeds(6); whereas, as a consequence, it has to be expected that the GM soybean will be exposed to both higher and repeated doses of glufosinate, and that therefore a higher quantity of residues may be present in the harvest;
E. whereas glufosinate is classified as toxic to reproduction 1B and therefore meets the ‘cut-off criteria’ set out in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7); whereas the approval of glufosinate for use in the Union expired on 31 July 2018(8);
F. whereas assessment of herbicide residues and their break-down products found on GM plants is considered outside the remit of the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (‘EFSA GMO Panel’) and is therefore not undertaken as part of the authorisation process for GMOs;
G. whereas, due to specific agricultural practices in the cultivation of herbicide-tolerant GM plants, there are specific patterns of applications, exposure, occurrence of specific metabolites and emergence of combinatorial effects that require special attention; whereas those were not considered by EFSA;
Outstanding questions concerning Bt toxins
H. whereas toxicological tests for GM authorisations are carried out with isolated Bt toxins; whereas little significance can be attributed to toxicological tests conducted with proteins in isolation due to the fact that Bt toxins in GM crops, such as maize, cotton and soybeans, are inherently more toxic than isolated Bt toxins; whereas this is because protease inhibitors (PI), present in the plant tissue, can increase the toxicity of the Bt toxins by delaying their degradation; whereas this phenomenon has been demonstrated in a number of scientific studies, including one conducted for Monsanto 30 years ago which showed that even the presence of extremely low levels of PI enhanced the toxicity of Bt toxins up to 20-fold(9);
I. whereas those effects have never been taken into account in EFSA risk assessments, even though they are relevant for all Bt plants approved for import or cultivation in the Union; whereas risks, arising from this enhanced toxicity due to the interaction between PI and Bt toxins, to humans and animals consuming food and feed containing Bt toxins cannot be ruled out;
J. whereas a number of studies show that side effects have been observed that may affect the immune system following exposure to Bt toxins and that some Bt toxins may have adjuvant properties(10), meaning that they can increase the allergenicity of other proteins with which they come into contact;
K. whereas assessment of the potential interaction of herbicide residues and their metabolites with Bt toxins is considered outside the remit of the EFSA GMO Panel and is therefore not undertaken as part of the risk assessment; whereas this is problematic since residues from spraying with glufosinate are known to disturb the microbiome which, for example, may enhance immune reactions in combination with Bt toxins(11);
Comments from Member State competent authorities
L. whereas Member State competent authorities submitted comments to EFSA during the three-month consultation period(12); whereas critical comments include the feedback that the submitted data concerning pest and disease pressure are insufficient for a detailed analysis of ecological interaction of the GM soybean with the environment, that the applicant only refers to substantial unintended losses of the GM soybean during loading and unloading as a route for environmental exposure and that other routes of exposure of the environment by waste materials from processing or use of the soybean (e.g. manure, faeces from animals fed the GM soybean) were not specifically assessed and that the proposed monitoring plan does not address relevant questions for the general surveillance of human and animal health and cannot be regarded as sufficiently elaborated;
Undemocratic decision-making
M. whereas the vote on 17 May 2021 of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 delivered no opinion, meaning that the authorisation was not supported by a qualified majority of Member States;
N. whereas the Commission recognises that the fact that GMO authorisation decisions continue to be adopted by the Commission without a qualified majority of Member States in favour, which is very much the exception for product authorisations as a whole but has become the norm for decision-making on GM food and feed authorisations, is problematic;
O. whereas, in its eighth term, the European Parliament adopted a total of 36 resolutions objecting to the placing on the market of GMOs for food and feed (33 resolutions) and to the cultivation of GMOs in the Union (three resolutions); whereas, in its ninth term, the European Parliament has already adopted 18 objections to placing GMOs on the market; whereas there was not a qualified majority of Member States in favour of authorising any of those GMOs; whereas the reasons for Member States not supporting authorisations include lack of respect for the precautionary principle in the authorisation process and scientific concerns relating to the risk assessment;
P. whereas despite its own acknowledgement of the democratic shortcomings, the lack of support from Member States and the objections of Parliament, the Commission continues to authorise GMOs;
Q. whereas no change of law is required for the Commission to be able not to authorise GMOs when there is no qualified majority of Member States in favour in the Appeal Committee(13);
Upholding the Union’s international obligations
R. whereas Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 provides that GM food or feed must not have adverse effects on human health, animal health or the environment, and requires the Commission to take into account any relevant provisions of Union law and other legitimate factors relevant to the matter under consideration when drafting its decision; whereas such legitimate factors should include the Union’s obligations under the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (‘SDGs’), the Paris Climate Agreement and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD);
S. whereas a 2017 report by the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the right to food found that, particularly in developing countries, hazardous pesticides have catastrophic impacts on health(14); whereas UN SDG Target 3.9 aims by 2030 to substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination(15); whereas authorising the import of the GM soybean would increase demand for this crop treated with a herbicide that is toxic to reproduction and that is no longer authorised for use in the Union, thereby increasing the exposure of workers in third countries; whereas the risk of increased worker exposure is of particular concern in relation to herbicide-tolerant GM crops, given the higher volumes of herbicides used;
T. whereas deforestation is a major cause of biodiversity decline; whereas emissions from land-use and land-use change, mostly due to deforestation, are the second biggest cause of climate change after burning fossil fuels(16); whereas the Paris Climate Agreement and the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 adopted under the UN CBD and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets promote sustainable forest management, protection and restoration efforts(17); whereas UN SDG 15 includes the target of halting deforestation by 2020(18); whereas forests play a multifunctional role that support the achievement of most UN SDGs(19);
U. whereas soya production is a key driver of deforestation in the Amazon, Cerrado and Gran Chaco forests in South America; whereas 97 % and 100 % of soya cultivated respectively in Brazil and Argentina is GM soya(20); whereas the vast majority of GM soybeans authorised for cultivation in Brazil and Argentina are also authorised for import into the Union; whereas the GM soybean is already authorised for cultivation in Argentina and Brazil(21);
V. whereas a recent peer-reviewed scientific study found that the Union is the region with the largest carbon footprint in the world associated with soya imports from Brazil, 13,8% larger than that of China, the largest soya importer, due to a larger share of emissions from embodied deforestation(22); whereas another recent study found that approximately a fifth of the soya exported to the Union from Brazil’s Amazon and Cerrado regions, mostly for animal feed, may be ‘contaminated with illegal deforestation’(23);
1. Considers that the draft Commission implementing decision exceeds the implementing powers provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003;
2. Considers that the draft Commission implementing decision is not consistent with Union law, in that it is not compatible with the aim of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, which is, in accordance with the general principles laid down in Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council(24), to provide the basis for ensuring a high level of protection of human life and health, animal health and welfare, and environmental and consumer interests, in relation to GM food and feed, while ensuring the effective functioning of the internal market;
3. Calls on the Commission to withdraw its draft implementing decision;
4. Welcomes the fact that the Commission finally recognised, in a letter of 11 September 2020 to Members, the need to take sustainability into account when it comes to authorisation decisions on GMOs(25); expresses its deep disappointment, however, that the Commission continues to authorise GM soybeans for import(26) despite objections by Parliament and a majority of Member States;
5. Calls on the Commission to move forward with the utmost urgency concerning the development of sustainability criteria, with full involvement of Parliament; calls on the Commission to provide information on how this process will be undertaken and in what timeframe;
6. Urges the Commission, again, to take into account the Union’s obligations under international agreements, such as the Paris Climate Agreement, the UN CBD and the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for draft implementing acts to be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum explaining how they uphold the principle of ‘do no harm’(27);
7. Highlights that the amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 17 December 2020 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 182/2011(28), which were adopted in Parliament as a basis for negotiations with the Council, state that the Commission shall not authorise GMOs when there is not a qualified majority of Member States in favour; insists that the Commission respect this position and calls on the Council to proceed with its work and adopt a general approach on this file as a matter of urgency;
8. Reiterates its calls on the Commission not to authorise herbicide-tolerant GM crops until the health risks associated with the residues have been comprehensively investigated on a case-by-case basis, which requires a full assessment of the residues from spraying such GM crops with complementary herbicides, an assessment of the herbicide break-down products and any combinatorial effects;
9. Reiterates its call on the Commission to fully integrate the risk assessment of the application of complementary herbicides and their residues into the risk assessment of herbicide-tolerant GM plants, regardless of whether the GM plant concerned is to be cultivated in the Union or is for import into the Union for food and feed uses;
10. Reiterates its call on the Commission not to authorise the import for food or feed uses of any GM plant which has been made tolerant to a herbicide-active substance that is not authorised for use in the Union;
11. Welcomes the announcement of a legislative proposal from the Commission on ‘Measures to avoid or minimise the placing of products associated with deforestation or forest degradation on the EU market’; in the meantime, given the urgency of tackling deforestation in the Amazon, Cerrado and Gran Chaco forests and the fact that Union demand for GM soybeans contributes to deforestation in that region, calls on the Commission to immediately suspend the import of GM soybeans cultivated in Brazil and Argentina, using Article 53 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 if necessary, until effective legally binding mechanisms have been put in place to prevent the placing on the Union market of products associated with deforestation and related human rights violations;
12. Reiterates its call for the implementation of a European vegetable protein production and supply strategy(29), which would enable the Union to become less dependent on GM soybean imports and to create shorter food chains and regional markets;
13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
Scientific Opinion of the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms for placing on the market of genetically modified insect-resistant soybean DAS-81419-2 for food and feed uses, import and processing under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (application EFSA-GMO-NL-2013-116), EFSA Journal 2016; 14(12): 4642, https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/4642
–––––––––––––––––– In its eighth term, Parliament adopted 36 resolutions objecting to the authorisation of GMOs. Furthermore, in its ninth term Parliament has adopted the following resolutions:European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MZHG0JG (SYN-ØØØJG-2), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0028).European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean A2704-12 (ACS-GMØØ5-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0029).European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 × 1507 × MON 88017 × 59122 × DAS-40278-9 and genetically modified maize combining two, three or four of the single events MON 89034, 1507, MON 88017, 59122 and DAS-40278-9 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0030).European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified cotton LLCotton25 (ACS-GHØØ1-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0054).European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 89788 (MON-89788-1) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0055).European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 × 1507 × NK603 × DAS-40278-9 and sub-combinations MON 89034 × NK603 × DAS-40278-9, 1507 × NK603 × DAS-40278-9 and NK603 × DAS-40278-9 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0056).European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize Bt11 × MIR162 × MIR604 × 1507 × 5307 × GA21 and genetically modified maize combining two, three, four or five of the single events Bt11, MIR162, MIR604, 1507, 5307 and GA21 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0057).European Parliament resolution of 14 May 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87708 × MON 89788 × A5547-127, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0069).European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events MON 87427, MON 89034, MIR162 and NK603, and repealing Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1111 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0291).European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean SYHT0H2 (SYN-ØØØH2-5), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0292).European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 87460 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two, three or four of the single events MON 87427, MON 87460, MON 89034, MIR162 and NK603, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0293).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87751 × MON 87701 × MON 87708 × MON 89788, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0365).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × MON 87411 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events MON 87427, MON 89034, MIR162 and MON 87411 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0366).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MIR604 (SYN-IR6Ø4-5) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0367).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 88017 (MON-88Ø17-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0368).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 (MON-89Ø34-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0369).European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified cotton GHB614 × T304-40 × GHB119 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0080).European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MZIR098 (SYN-ØØØ98-3), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0081).
See, for example, Bonny, S., ‘Genetically Modified Herbicide-Tolerant Crops, Weeds, and Herbicides: Overview and Impact’, Environmental Management, January 2016;57(1), pp. 31-48, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26296738 and Benbrook, C.M., ‘Impacts of genetically engineered crops on pesticide use in the U.S. - the first sixteen years’, Environmental Sciences Europe; 28 September 2012, Vol. 24(1), https://enveurope.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/2190-4715-24-24
Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 1).
For a review, see Rubio-Infante, N., Moreno-Fierros, L., ‘An overview of the safety and biological effects of Bacillus thuringiensis Cry toxins in mammals’, Journal of Applied Toxicology, May 2016, 36(5), pp. 630 648, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/jat.3252
Parenti, M.D., Santoro, A., Del Rio, A., Franceschi, C., ‘Literature review in support of adjuvanticity/immunogenicity assessment of proteins’, EFSA Supporting Publications, January 2019, 16(1): 1551, https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.2903/sp.efsa.2019.EN-1551
The Commission ‘may’, and not ‘shall’, go ahead with authorisation if there is no qualified majority of Member States in favour at the Appeal Committee, according to Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 (Article 6(3)).
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, ‘Global status of commercialized biotech/GM crops in 2017: Biotech Crop Adoption Surges as Economic Benefits Accumulate in 22 Years’, ISAAA Brief No. 53,(2017, pp. 16 and 21, http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/53/download/isaaa-brief-53-2017.pdf
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1).
European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean DAS-81419-2 × DAS–44406–6, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D073422/01 – 2021/2760(RSP))
– having regard to the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean DAS-81419-2 × DAS–44406–6, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D073422/01),
– having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed(1), and in particular Articles 7(3) and 19(3) thereof,
– having regard to the vote of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, on 17 May 2021, at which no opinion was delivered,
– having regard to Articles 11 and 13 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers(2),
– having regard to the opinion adopted by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on 15 October 2020, and published on 20 November 2020(3),
– having regard to its previous resolutions objecting to the authorisation of genetically modified organisms (‘GMOs’)(4),
– having regard to Rule 112(2) and (3) of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety,
A. whereas, on 2 March 2016, Dow AgroSciences Ltd submitted an application to the national competent authority of the Netherlands in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003; whereas the application covered the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean DAS-81419-2 x DAS-44406-6 (‘the GM soybean’); whereas the application also covered the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of the GM soybean for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation;
B. whereas, on 15 October 2020, EFSA adopted a favourable opinion, which was published on 20 November 2020, in relation to that application;
C. whereas the GM soybean has been developed to confer resistance to three groups of herbicides: glyphosate, 2,4 dichlorphenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D) and other related phenoxy herbicides (AAD-12) and glufosinate, as well as resistance to lepidopteran pests through the expression of Bt toxins, Cry1F and Cry1Ac(5);
Lack of assessment of herbicide residues, metabolites and cocktail effects
D. whereas a number of studies show that herbicide-tolerant GM crops result in a higher use of ‘complementary’ herbicides, in large part because of the emergence of herbicide-tolerant weeds(6); whereas, as a consequence, it has to be expected that the GM soybean will be exposed to both higher and repeated doses of glufosinate, glyphosate and 2-4,D, and that therefore a higher quantity of residues may be present in the harvest;
E. whereas questions concerning the carcinogenicity of glyphosate remain; whereas EFSA concluded in November 2015 that glyphosate was unlikely to be carcinogenic and the European Chemicals Agency concluded in March 2017 that no classification was warranted; whereas, on the contrary, in 2015, the International Agency for Research on Cancer , the specialised cancer agency of the World Health Organization, classified glyphosate as a probable carcinogen for humans;
F. whereas glufosinate is classified as toxic to reproduction 1B and therefore meets the ‘cut-off criteria’ set out in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7); whereas the approval of glufosinate for use in the Union expired on 31 July 2018(8);
G. whereas assessment of herbicide residues and their break-down products found on GM plants is considered outside the remit of the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (‘EFSA GMO Panel’) and is therefore not undertaken as part of the authorisation process for GMOs; whereas this is problematic since the way in which complementary herbicides are broken down by the GM plant concerned, and the composition and thus toxicity of the break-down products (‘metabolites’), can be driven by the genetic modification itself(9);
H. whereas, due to specific agricultural practices in the cultivation of herbicide-tolerant GM plants, there are specific patterns of applications, exposure, occurrence of specific metabolites and emergence of combinatorial effects that require special attention; whereas these were not considered by EFSA;
I. whereas it therefore cannot be concluded that consumption of the GM soybean is safe for human and animal health;
Outstanding questions concerning Bt toxins
J. whereas toxicological tests for GM authorisations are carried out with isolated Bt toxins; whereas little significance can be attributed to toxicological tests conducted with proteins in isolation due to the fact that Bt toxins in GM crops, such as maize, cotton and soybeans, are inherently more toxic than isolated Bt toxins; whereas this is because protease inhibitors (PI), present in the plant tissue, can increase the toxicity of the Bt toxins by delaying their degradation; whereas this phenomena has been demonstrated in a number of scientific studies, including one conducted for Monsanto 30 years ago which showed that even the presence of extremely low levels of PI enhanced the toxicity of Bt toxins up to 20-fold(10);
K. whereas those effects have never been taken into account in EFSA risk assessments, even though they are relevant for all Bt plants approved for import or cultivation in the Union; whereas risks, arising from this enhanced toxicity due to the interaction between PI and Bt toxins, to humans and animals consuming food and feed containing Bt toxins cannot be ruled out;
L. whereas a number of studies show that side effects have been observed that may affect the immune system following exposure to Bt toxins and that some Bt toxins may have adjuvant properties(11), meaning that they can increase the allergenicity of other proteins with which they come into contact;
M. whereas assessment of the potential interaction of herbicide residues and their metabolites with Bt toxins is considered outside the remit of the EFSA GMO Panel and is therefore not undertaken as part of the risk assessment; whereas this is problematic since residues from spraying with glufosinate are known to disturb the microbiome which, for example, may enhance immune reactions in combination with Bt toxins(12);
Comments from Member State competent authorities
N. whereas Member State competent authorities submitted comments to EFSA during the three-month consultation period(13); whereas critical comments included that the currently available tools for monitoring horizontal gene transfers in natural environments are inadequate to capture rare events and that the applicant is ignoring the potential for creating genetic variability by the transfer of mutated pat, epsps and cry gene variants or fragments thereof, that the data provided to show the human and animal safety of the GM soybean on the basis of its substantial equivalence to conventional soybean are not conclusive and that the combined environmental effects of cry toxins need further research in order to rule out any risk to the environment;
Undemocratic decision-making
O. whereas the vote on 17 May 2021 of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 delivered no opinion, meaning that the authorisation was not supported by a qualified majority of Member States;
P. whereas the Commission recognises that the fact that GMO authorisation decisions continue to be adopted by the Commission without a qualified majority of Member States in favour, which is very much the exception for product authorisations as a whole but has become the norm for decision-making on GM food and feed authorisations, is problematic;
Q. whereas, in its eighth term, the European Parliament adopted a total of 36 resolutions objecting to the placing on the market of GMOs for food and feed (33 resolutions) and to the cultivation of GMOs in the Union (three resolutions); whereas, in its ninth term, the European Parliament has already adopted 18 objections to placing GMOs on the market; whereas there was not a qualified majority of Member States in favour of authorising any of those GMOs; whereas the reasons for Member States not supporting authorisations include lack of respect for the precautionary principle in the authorisation process and scientific concerns relating to the risk assessment;
R. whereas despite its own acknowledgement of the democratic shortcomings, the lack of support from Member States and the objections of Parliament, the Commission continues to authorise GMOs;
S. whereas no change of law is required for the Commission to be able not to authorise GMOs when there is no qualified majority of Member States in favour in the Appeal Committee(14);
Upholding the Union’s international obligations
T. whereas Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 provides that GM food or feed must not have adverse effects on human health, animal health or the environment, and requires the Commission to take into account any relevant provisions of Union law and other legitimate factors relevant to the matter under consideration when drafting its decision; whereas such legitimate factors should include the Union’s obligations under the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (‘SDGs’), the Paris Climate Agreement and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD);
U. whereas a 2017 report by the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the right to food found that, particularly in developing countries, hazardous pesticides have catastrophic impacts on health(15); whereas UN SDG Target 3.9 aims by 2030 to substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination(16); whereas authorising the import of the GM soybean would increase demand for this crop treated with a herbicide that is toxic to reproduction and that is no longer authorised for use in the Union, thereby increasing the exposure of workers in third countries; whereas the risk of increased worker exposure is of particular concern in relation to herbicide-tolerant GM crops, given the higher volumes of herbicides used;
V. whereas deforestation is a major cause of biodiversity decline; whereas emissions from land-use and land-use change, mostly due to deforestation, are the second biggest cause of climate change after burning fossil fuels(17); whereas the Paris Climate Agreement and the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 adopted under the UN CBD and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets promote sustainable forest management, protection and restoration efforts(18); whereas UN SDG 15 includes the target of halting deforestation by 2020(19); whereas forests play a multifunctional role that support the achievement of most UN SDGs(20);
W. whereas soya production is a key driver of deforestation in the Amazon, Cerrado and Gran Chaco forests in South America; whereas 97 % and 100 % of soya cultivated respectively in Brazil and Argentina is GM soya(21); whereas the vast majority of GM soybeans authorised for cultivation in Brazil and Argentina are also authorised for import into the Union; whereas the GM soybean is already authorised for cultivation in Argentina and Brazil(22);
X. whereas a recent peer-reviewed scientific study found that the Union is the region with the largest carbon footprint in the world associated with soya imports from Brazil, 13,8% larger than that of China, the largest soya importer, due to a larger share of emissions from embodied deforestation(23); whereas another recent study found that approximately a fifth of the soya exported to the Union from Brazil’s Amazon and Cerrado regions, mostly for animal feed, may be ‘contaminated with illegal deforestation’(24);
1. Considers that the draft Commission implementing decision exceeds the implementing powers provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003;
2. Considers that the draft Commission implementing decision is not consistent with Union law, in that it is not compatible with the aim of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, which is, in accordance with the general principles laid down in Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council(25), to provide the basis for ensuring a high level of protection of human life and health, animal health and welfare, and environmental and consumer interests, in relation to GM food and feed, while ensuring the effective functioning of the internal market;
3. Calls on the Commission to withdraw its draft implementing decision;
4. Welcomes the fact that the Commission finally recognised, in a letter of 11 September 2020 to Members, the need to take sustainability into account when it comes to authorisation decisions on GMOs(26); expresses its deep disappointment, however, that, the Commission continues to authorise GM soybeans for import(27) despite objections by Parliament and a majority of Member States;
5. Calls on the Commission to move forward with the utmost urgency concerning the development of sustainability criteria, with full involvement of Parliament; calls on the Commission to provide information on how this process will be undertaken and in what timeframe;
6. Urges the Commission, again, to take into account the Union’s obligations under international agreements, such as the Paris Climate Agreement, the UN CBD and the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for draft implementing acts to be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum explaining how they uphold the principle of ‘do no harm’(28);
7. Highlights that the amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 17 December 2020 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 182/2011(29), which were adopted in Parliament as a basis for negotiations with the Council, state that the Commission shall not authorise GMOs when there is not a qualified majority of Member States in favour; insists that the Commission respect this position and calls on the Council to proceed with its work and adopt a general approach on this file as a matter of urgency;
8. Reiterates its calls on the Commission not to authorise herbicide-tolerant GM crops until the health risks associated with the residues have been comprehensively investigated on a case-by-case basis, which requires a full assessment of the residues from spraying such GM crops with complementary herbicides, an assessment of the herbicide break-down products and any combinatorial effects;
9. Reiterates its call on the Commission to fully integrate the risk assessment of the application of complementary herbicides and their residues into the risk assessment of herbicide-tolerant GM plants, regardless of whether the GM plant concerned is to be cultivated in the Union or is for import into the Union for food and feed uses;
10. Reiterates its call on the Commission not to authorise the import for food or feed uses of any GM plant which has been made tolerant to a herbicide-active substance that is not authorised for use in the Union;
11. Welcomes the announcement of a legislative proposal from the Commission on ‘Measures to avoid or minimise the placing of products associated with deforestation or forest degradation on the EU market’; in the meantime, given the urgency of tackling deforestation in the Amazon, Cerrado and Gran Chaco forests and the fact that Union demand for GM soybeans contributes to deforestation in that region, calls on the Commission to immediately suspend the import of GM soybeans cultivated in Brazil and Argentina, using Article 53 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 if necessary, until effective legally binding mechanisms have been put in place to prevent the placing on the Union market of products associated with deforestation and related human rights violations;
12. Reiterates its call for the implementation of a European vegetable protein production and supply strategy(30), which would enable the Union to become less dependent on GM soybean imports and to create shorter food chains and regional markets;
13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
Scientific Opinion of the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms for authorisation of genetically modified of insect-resistant and herbicide-tolerant soybean DAS-81419-2 x DAS-44406-6 for food and feed uses, import and processing submitted in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (application EFSA GMO-NL-2016-132), EFSA Journal 2020;18(11):6302, https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/j.efsa.2020.6302
–––––––––––––––––– In its eighth term, Parliament adopted 36 resolutions objecting to the authorisation of GMOs. Furthermore, in its ninth term Parliament has adopted the following resolutions:European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MZHG0JG (SYN-ØØØJG-2), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0028).European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean A2704-12 (ACS-GMØØ5-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0029).European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 × 1507 × MON 88017 × 59122 × DAS-40278-9 and genetically modified maize combining two, three or four of the single events MON 89034, 1507, MON 88017, 59122 and DAS-40278-9 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0030).European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified cotton LLCotton25 (ACS-GHØØ1-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0054).European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 89788 (MON-89788-1) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0055).European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 × 1507 × NK603 × DAS-40278-9 and sub-combinations MON 89034 × NK603 × DAS-40278-9, 1507 × NK603 × DAS-40278-9 and NK603 × DAS-40278-9 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0056).European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize Bt11 × MIR162 × MIR604 × 1507 × 5307 × GA21 and genetically modified maize combining two, three, four or five of the single events Bt11, MIR162, MIR604, 1507, 5307 and GA21 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0057).European Parliament resolution of 14 May 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87708 × MON 89788 × A5547-127, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0069).European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events MON 87427, MON 89034, MIR162 and NK603, and repealing Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1111 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0291).European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean SYHT0H2 (SYN-ØØØH2-5), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0292).European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 87460 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two, three or four of the single events MON 87427, MON 87460, MON 89034, MIR162 and NK603, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0293).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87751 × MON 87701 × MON 87708 × MON 89788, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0365).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × MON 87411 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events MON 87427, MON 89034, MIR162 and MON 87411 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0366).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MIR604 (SYN-IR6Ø4-5) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0367).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 88017 (MON-88Ø17-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0368).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 (MON-89Ø34-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0369).European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified cotton GHB614 × T304-40 × GHB119 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0080).European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MZIR098 (SYN-ØØØ98-3), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0081).
See, for example, Bonny, S., ‘Genetically Modified Herbicide-Tolerant Crops, Weeds, and Herbicides: Overview and Impact’, Environmental Management, January 2016;57(1), pp. 31-48, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26296738 and Benbrook, C.M., ‘Impacts of genetically engineered crops on pesticide use in the U.S. - the first sixteen years’, Environmental Sciences Europe; 28 September 2012, Vol 24(1), https://enveurope.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/2190-4715-24-24
Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 1).
This is indeed the case for glyphosate, as stated in EFSA Review of the existing maximum residue levels for glyphosate according to Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005, EFSA Journal 2018;16(5):5263, p. 12, https://www.efsa.europa.eu/fr/efsajournal/pub/5263
For a review, see Rubio-Infante, N., Moreno-Fierros, L., ‘An overview of the safety and biological effects of Bacillus thuringiensis Cry toxins in mammals’, Journal of Applied Toxicology, May 2016, 36(5), pp. 630 648, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/jat.3252
Parenti, M.D., Santoro, A., Del Rio, A., Franceschi, C., ‘Literature review in support of adjuvanticity/immunogenicity assessment of proteins’, EFSA Supporting Publications, January 2019, 16(1): 1551, https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.2903/sp.efsa.2019.EN-1551
Member State comments on the GM soybean can be accessed via EFSA’s register of questions : http://registerofquestions.efsa.europa.eu/roqFrontend/questionLoader?question=EFSA-Q-2012-00753
The Commission ‘may, and not ‘shall’, go ahead with authorisation if there is no qualified majority of Member States in favour at the Appeal Committee, according to Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 (Article 6(3)).
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, ‘Global status of /GM crops in 2017: Biotech Crop Adoption Surges as Economic Benefits Accumulate in 22 Years’, ISAAA Brief No. 53 (2017), pp. 16 and 21, https://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/53/download/isaaa-brief-53-2017.pdf
Escobar, N., Tizado, E. J., zu Ermgassen, E. K., Löfgren, P., Börner, J., Godar, J., ‘Spatially-explicit footprints of agricultural commodities: Mapping carbon emissions embodied in Brazil’s soy exports’, Global Environmental Change, Volume 62, May 2020, 102067 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378019308623
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1).
Genetically modified maize 1507 × MIR162 × MON810 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events 1507, MIR162, MON810 and NK603
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European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize 1507 × MIR162 × MON810 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events 1507, MIR162, MON810 and NK603, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D073423/01 – 2021/2765(RSP))
– having regard to the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize 1507 × MIR162 × MON810 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events 1507, MIR162, MON810 and NK603, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D073423/01),
– having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed(1), and in particular Articles 7(3) and 19(3) thereof,
– having regard to the vote of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, on 17 May 2021, at which no opinion was delivered,
– having regard to Articles 11 and 13 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers(2),
– having regard to the opinion adopted by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on 25 November 2020, and published on 13 January 2021(3),
– having regard to its previous resolutions objecting to the authorisation of genetically modified organisms (‘GMOs’)(4),
– having regard to Rule 112(2) and (3) of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety,
A. whereas, on 8 December 2015, Pioneer Overseas Corporation (the ‘applicant’) submitted an application for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize 1507 × MIR162 × MON810 × NK603 (‘the stacked GM maize’) in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003; whereas the application also covered the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of the stacked GM maize for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation;
B. whereas, in addition, the application covered the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from 10 sub-combinations of those single transformation events constituting the stacked GM maize; whereas six sub-combinations of the stacked GM maize have already been authorised; whereas the draft Commission implementing decision covers the remaining four sub-combinations;
C. whereas, on 25 November 2020, EFSA adopted a favourable opinion, which was published on 13 January 2021;
D. whereas the stacked GM maize is derived from crossing four genetically modified maize events, and confers tolerance to herbicides containing glufosinate, and glyphosate as well as producing three insecticidal proteins (‘Bt’ or ‘Cry’ proteins): Cry1F, Cry1Ab and Vip3Aa20 which are toxic to certain lepidopteran pests(5);
E. whereas for the four sub-combinations covered by the draft Commission implementing decision, the applicant did not provide any experimental data;
Lack of assessment of herbicide residues, metabolites and cocktail effects
F. whereas a number of studies show that herbicide-tolerant GM crops result in a higher use of ‘complementary’ herbicides, in large part because of the emergence of herbicide-tolerant weeds(6); whereas, as a consequence, it has to be expected that the stacked GM maize will be exposed to both higher and repeated doses of glufosinate and glyphosate, and that therefore a higher quantity of residues may be present in the harvest;
G. whereas questions concerning the carcinogenicity of glyphosate remain; whereas EFSA concluded in November 2015 that glyphosate was unlikely to be carcinogenic and the European Chemicals Agency concluded in March 2017 that no classification was warranted; whereas, on the contrary, in 2015, the International Agency for Research on Cancer, the specialised cancer agency of the World Health Organization, classified glyphosate as a probable carcinogen for humans;
H. whereas glufosinate is classified as toxic to reproduction 1B and therefore meets the ‘cut-off criteria’ set out in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7); whereas the approval of glufosinate for use in the Union expired on 31 July 2018(8);
I. whereas assessment of herbicide residues and their break-down products found on GM plants is considered outside the remit of the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (‘EFSA GMO Panel’) and is therefore not undertaken as part of the authorisation process for GMOs; whereas this is problematic since the way in which complementary herbicides are broken down by the GM plant concerned, and the composition and thus toxicity of the break-down products (‘metabolites’), can be driven by the genetic modification itself(9);
J. whereas, due to specific agricultural practices in the cultivation of herbicide-tolerant GM plants, there are specific patterns of applications, exposure, occurrence of specific metabolites and emergence of combinatorial effects that require special attention; whereas those were not considered by EFSA;
K. whereas it therefore cannot be concluded that consumption of the stacked GM maize or its sub-combinations is safe for human and animal health;
Lack of maximum residue levels and related controls
L. whereas, under Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council(10), which aims to ensure a high level of consumer protection, specific maximum residue levels (MRLs) should be set for food and feed produced in third countries, when the use of pesticides results in levels of residues different from those resulting from agricultural practice within the Union; whereas this is indeed the case for imported herbicide-tolerant GM crops because of the increased volumes of herbicides used vis-à-vis non-GM crops;
M. whereas, however, according to a 2018 EFSA review of the existing MRLs for glyphosate, available data were insufficient to derive MRLs and risk assessment values for glyphosate in relation to GM maize with an EPSPS modification(11); whereas the stacked GM maize has the EPSPS modification(12);
Outstanding questions concerning Bt toxins
N. whereas toxicological tests for GM authorisations are carried out with isolated Bt toxins; whereas little significance can be attributed to toxicological tests conducted with proteins in isolation due to the fact that Bt toxins in GM crops, such as maize, cotton and soybeans, are inherently more toxic than isolated Bt toxins; whereas this is because protease inhibitors (PI), present in the plant tissue, can increase the toxicity of the Bt toxins by delaying their degradation; whereas this phenomena has been demonstrated in a number of scientific studies, including one conducted for Monsanto 30 years ago which showed that even the presence of extremely low levels of PI enhanced the toxicity of Bt toxins up to 20-fold(13);
O. whereas those effects have never been taken into account in EFSA risk assessments, even though they are relevant for all Bt plants approved for import or cultivation in the Union; whereas risks, arising from this enhanced toxicity due to the interaction between PI and Bt toxins, to humans and animals consuming food and feed containing Bt toxins cannot be ruled out;
P. whereas a number of studies show that side effects have been observed that may affect the immune system following exposure to Bt toxins and that some Bt toxins may have adjuvant properties(14), meaning that they can increase the allergenicity of other proteins with which they come into contact;
Q. whereas assessment of the potential interaction of herbicide residues and their metabolites with Bt toxins is considered outside the remit of the EFSA GMO Panel and is therefore not undertaken as part of the risk assessment; whereas this is problematic since residues from spraying with glufosinate are known to disturb the microbiome which, for example, may enhance immune reactions in combination with Bt toxins(15);
Bt crops: effects on non-target organisms and increased resistance
R. whereas, unlike the use of insecticides, where exposure is at the time of spraying and for a limited time afterwards, the use of Bt GM crops leads to continuous exposure of the target and non-target organisms to Bt toxins;
S. whereas the assumption that Bt toxins exhibit a single target-specific mode-of-action can no longer be considered correct and effects on non-target organisms cannot be excluded(16) whereas an increasing number of non-target organisms are reported to be affected in many ways; whereas 39 peer-reviewed publications that report significant adverse effects of Bt toxins on many ‘out-of-range’ species are mentioned in a recent overview(17); whereas a range of non-target organisms in the Union could be exposed to Bt toxins via spillage, waste and manure resulting from the import of Bt crops; whereas no effects on non-target organisms were evaluated in the risk assessment;
T. whereas the risk assessment did not consider the development of resistance in the target pests to Bt toxins, possibly resulting in the use of less environmentally safe pesticides or increased doses and the number of applications to the GM crop in the country of cultivation; whereas, the United States Environmental Protection Agency is planning to phase out many Bt corn hybrids, as well as some Bt cotton varieties, in the next three to five years, due to the growth in insect resistance to such crops(18);
U. whereas, while it has been claimed that the use of Bt crops leads to a decrease in the use of insecticides, a study undertaken in the United States(19), finds that ‘several analyses on the influence of Bt crops on pesticide-use patterns do not seem to have considered seed treatments and so may have overstated reductions in insecticide use (especially ‘area treated’) associated with Bt crops’;
V. whereas the Union is party to the United Nations (UN) Convention on Biological Diversity (UN CBD), which makes it clear that both exporting and importing countries have international responsibilities regarding biological diversity;
Upholding the Union’s international obligations
W. whereas Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 provides that GM food or feed must not have adverse effects on human health, animal health or the environment, and requires the Commission to take into account any relevant provisions of Union law and other legitimate factors relevant to the matter under consideration when drafting its decision; whereas such legitimate factors should include the Union’s obligations under the UN Sustainable Development Goals (‘SDGs’), the Paris Climate Agreement and the UN CBD;
X. whereas a 2017 report by the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the right to food found that, particularly in developing countries, hazardous pesticides have catastrophic impacts on health(20); whereas UN SDG Target 3.9 aims by 2030 to substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination(21); whereas authorising the import of the GM maize would increase demand for this crop treated with a herbicide that is toxic to reproduction and that is no longer authorised for use in the Union, thereby increasing the exposure of workers in third countries; whereas the risk of increased worker exposure is of particular concern in relation to herbicide-tolerant GM crops, given the higher volumes of herbicides used;
Undemocratic decision-making
Y. whereas the vote on 17 May 2021 of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 delivered no opinion, meaning that the authorisation was not supported by a qualified majority of Member States;
Z. whereas the Commission recognises that the fact that GMO authorisation decisions continue to be adopted by the Commission without a qualified majority of Member States in favour, which is very much the exception for product authorisations as a whole but has become the norm for decision-making on GM food and feed authorisations, is problematic;
AA. whereas, in its eighth term, the European Parliament adopted a total of 36 resolutions objecting to the placing on the market of GMOs for food and feed (33 resolutions) and to the cultivation of GMOs in the Union (three resolutions); whereas, in its ninth term, the European Parliament has already adopted 18 objections to placing GMOs on the market; whereas there was not a qualified majority of Member States in favour of authorising any of those GMOs; whereas the reasons for Member States not supporting authorisations include lack of respect for the precautionary principle in the authorisation process and scientific concerns relating to the risk assessment;
AB. whereas despite its own acknowledgement of the democratic shortcomings, the lack of support from Member States and the objections of Parliament, the Commission continues to authorise GMOs;
AC. whereas no change of law is required for the Commission to be able not to authorise GMOs when there is no qualified majority of Member States in favour in the Appeal Committee(22);
1. Considers that the draft Commission implementing decision exceeds the implementing powers provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003;
2. Considers that the draft Commission implementing decision is not consistent with Union law, in that it is not compatible with the aim of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, which is, in accordance with the general principles laid down in Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council(23), to provide the basis for ensuring a high level of protection of human life and health, animal health and welfare, and environmental and consumer interests, in relation to GM food and feed, while ensuring the effective functioning of the internal market;
3. Calls on the Commission to withdraw its draft implementing decision;
4. Welcomes the fact that the Commission finally recognised, in a letter of 11 September 2020 to Members, the need to take sustainability into account when it comes to authorisation decisions on GMOs(24); expresses its deep disappointment, however, that, since then the Commission has continued to authorise GMOs for import into the Union, despite ongoing objections by Parliament and a majority of Member States voting against;
5. Calls on the Commission to move forward with the utmost urgency concerning the development of sustainability criteria, with full involvement of Parliament; calls on the Commission to provide information on how this process will be undertaken and in what timeframe;
6. Reiterates its call on the Commission not to authorise herbicide-tolerant GM crops until the health risks associated with the residues have been comprehensively investigated on a case-by-case basis, which requires a full assessment of the residues from spraying such GM crops with complementary herbicides, an assessment of the herbicide break-down products and any combinatorial effects, including with the GM plant itself;
7. Reiterates its call on the Commission not to authorise the import for food or feed uses of any GM plant which has been made tolerant to a herbicide-active substance that is not authorised for use in the Union;
8. Calls on EFSA to investigate the substantial differences between native Bt toxins and those expressed by synthetic transgenes in GM crop plants, and to widen its risk assessment in order to fully take into account all interactions and combinatorial effects between Bt-toxins, GM plants and their constituents, residues from spraying with the complementary herbicides, the environment as well as impacts on health and food safety;
9. Calls on EFSA to no longer accept toxicity studies based on isolated proteins which are likely to be different in structure and biological effects compared to those produced by the plant itself, and to require that all tests are carried out with tissue from the GM plant;
10. Calls on EFSA to request data on the impact of the consumption of food and feed derived from GM plants on the intestinal microbiome;
11. Urges the Commission, again, to take into account the Union’s obligations under international agreements, such as the Paris Climate Agreement, the UN CBD and the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for draft implementing acts to be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum explaining how they uphold the principle of ‘do no harm’(25);
12. Highlights that the amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 17 December 2020 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 182/2011(26), which were adopted in Parliament as a basis for negotiations with the Council, state that the Commission shall not authorise GMOs when there is not a qualified majority of Member States in favour; insists that the Commission respect this position and calls on the Council to proceed with its work and adopt a general approach on this file as a matter of urgency;
13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
Scientific Opinion of the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms on assessment of genetically modified maize 1507 × MIR162 × MON 810 × NK603 and subcombinations, for food and feed uses, under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (application EFSA-GMO-NL-2015-127), EFSA Journal 2021; 19(1):6348, https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.2903/j.efsa.2021.6348
–––––––––––––––––– In its eighth term, Parliament adopted 36 resolutions objecting to the authorisation of GMOs. Furthermore, in its ninth term Parliament has adopted the following resolutions:European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MZHG0JG (SYN-ØØØJG-2), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0028).European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean A2704-12 (ACS-GMØØ5-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0029).European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 × 1507 × MON 88017 × 59122 × DAS-40278-9 and genetically modified maize combining two, three or four of the single events MON 89034, 1507, MON 88017, 59122 and DAS-40278-9 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0030).European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified cotton LLCotton25 (ACS-GHØØ1-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0054).European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 89788 (MON-89788-1) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0055).European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 × 1507 × NK603 × DAS-40278-9 and sub-combinations MON 89034 × NK603 × DAS-40278-9, 1507 × NK603 × DAS-40278-9 and NK603 × DAS-40278-9 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0056).European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize Bt11 × MIR162 × MIR604 × 1507 × 5307 × GA21 and genetically modified maize combining two, three, four or five of the single events Bt11, MIR162, MIR604, 1507, 5307 and GA21 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0057).European Parliament resolution of 14 May 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87708 × MON 89788 × A5547-127, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0069).European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events MON 87427, MON 89034, MIR162 and NK603, and repealing Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1111 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0291).European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean SYHT0H2 (SYN-ØØØH2-5), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0292).European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 87460 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two, three or four of the single events MON 87427, MON 87460, MON 89034, MIR162 and NK603, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0293).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87751 × MON 87701 × MON 87708 × MON 89788, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0365).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × MON 87411 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events MON 87427, MON 89034, MIR162 and MON 87411 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0366).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MIR604 (SYN-IR6Ø4-5) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0367).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 88017 (MON-88Ø17-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0368).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 (MON-89Ø34-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council . (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0369).European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified cotton GHB614 × T304-40 × GHB119 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0080).European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MZIR098 (SYN-ØØØ98-3), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0081).
See, for example, Bonny, S., ‘Genetically Modified Herbicide-Tolerant Crops, Weeds, and Herbicides: Overview and Impact’, Environmental Management, January 2016; 57(1), pp. 31-48, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26296738 and Benbrook, C.M., ‘Impacts of genetically engineered crops on pesticide use in the U.S. - the first sixteen years’, Environmental Sciences Europe; 28 September 2012, Vol. 24(1), https://enveurope.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/2190-4715-24-24
Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 1).
This is indeed the case for glyphosate, as stated in EFSA ‘Review of the existing maximum residue levels for glyphosate according to Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005’, EFSA Journal 2018;16(5):5263, p. 12, https://www.efsa.europa.eu/fr/efsajournal/pub/5263
Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 February 2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed of plant and animal origin and amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC (OJ L 70, 16.3.2005, p. 1). See recital 26.
Reasoned opinion on the review of the existing maximum residue levels for glyphosate according to Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005, EFSA Journal 2018; 16(5):5263, p. 4. https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2018.5263
For a review, see Rubio-Infante, N., Moreno-Fierros, L., ‘An overview of the safety and biological effects of Bacillus thuringiensis Cry toxins in mammals’, Journal of Applied Toxicology, May 2016, 36(5), pp. 630648, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/jat.3252
Parenti, M.D., Santoro, A., Del Rio, A., Franceschi, C., ‘Literature review in support of adjuvanticity/immunogenicity assessment of proteins’, EFSA Supporting Publications, January 2019, 16(1):1551, https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.2903/sp.efsa.2019.EN-1551
See, for example, Hilbeck, A., Otto, M., ‘Specificity and combinatorial effects of Bacillus thuringiensis Cry toxins in the context of GMO environmental risk assessment’, Frontiers in Environmental Science 2015, 3:71, https://doi.org/10.3389/fenvs.2015.00071
Douglas, M.R., Tooker, J.F., ‘Large-Scale Deployment of Seed Treatments Has Driven Rapid Increase in Use of Neonicotinoid Insecticides and Preemptive Pest Management in U.S. Field Crops’, Environmental Science and Technology 2015, 49, 8, pp. 5088-5097, https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/es506141g
The Commission ‘may, and not ‘shall’, go ahead with authorisation if there is no qualified majority of Member States in favour at the Appeal Committee, according to Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 (Article 6(3)).
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1).
European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize Bt 11 (SYN-BTØ11-1) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D073424/01 – 2021/2761(RSP))
– having regard to the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize Bt 11 (SYN-BTØ11-1) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D073424/01),
– having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed(1), and in particular Articles 11(3) and 23(3) thereof,
– having regard to the vote of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, on 17 May 2021, at which no opinion was delivered,
– having regard to Articles 11 and 13 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers(2),
– having regard to the opinion adopted by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on 25 November 2020, and published on 13 January 2021(3),
– having regard to its previous resolutions objecting to the authorisation of genetically modified organisms (‘GMOs’)(4),
– having regard to Rule 112(2) and (3) of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety,
A. whereas, on 24 September 2018, Syngenta Crop Protection NV/SA, submitted to the Commission an application, in accordance with Articles 11 and 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, for the renewal of the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize Bt11 (‘the GM maize’) for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation;
B. whereas, on 25 November 2020, EFSA adopted a favourable opinion in relation to the renewal of the GM maize, which was published on 13 January 2021; whereas, on 28 January 2009, EFSA adopted a favourable opinion in relation to the initial authorisation of the GM maize which was published on 17 February 2009(5);
C. whereas the GM maize confers tolerance to herbicides containing glufosinate as well as producing an insecticidal protein, a ‘Bt toxin’, Cry1Ab which is toxic to certain lepidopteran pests(6);
Lack of assessment of herbicide residues, metabolites and cocktail effects
D. whereas a number of studies show that herbicide-tolerant GM crops result in a higher use of ‘complementary’ herbicides, in large part because of the emergence of herbicide-tolerant weeds(7); whereas, as a consequence, it has to be expected that the GM maize will be exposed to both higher and repeated doses of glufosinate, and that therefore a higher quantity of residues may be present in the harvest;
E. whereas glufosinate is classified as toxic to reproduction 1B and therefore meets the ‘cut-off criteria’ set out in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8); whereas the approval of glufosinate for use in the Union expired on 31 July 2018(9);
F. whereas assessment of herbicide residues and their break-down products found on GM plants is considered outside the remit of the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (‘EFSA GMO Panel’) and is therefore not undertaken as part of the authorisation process for GMOs; whereas this is problematic since the way in which complementary herbicides are broken down by the GM plant concerned, and the composition and thus toxicity of the break-down products (‘metabolites’), can be driven by the genetic modification itself;
G. whereas, due to specific agricultural practices in the cultivation of herbicide-tolerant GM plants, there are specific patterns of applications, exposure, occurrence of specific metabolites and emergence of combinatorial effects that require special attention; whereas those were not considered by EFSA;
Outstanding questions concerning Bt toxins
H. whereas toxicological tests for GM authorisations are carried out with isolated Bt toxins; whereas little significance can be attributed to toxicological tests conducted with proteins in isolation due to the fact that Bt toxins in GM crops, such as maize, cotton and soybeans, are inherently more toxic than isolated Bt toxins; whereas this is because protease inhibitors (PI), present in the plant tissue, can increase the toxicity of the Bt toxins by delaying their degradation; whereas this phenomena has been demonstrated in a number of scientific studies, including one conducted for Monsanto 30 years ago which showed that even the presence of extremely low levels of PI enhanced the toxicity of Bt toxins up to 20-fold(10);
I. whereas those effects are not taken into account in EFSA risk assessments, even though they are relevant for all Bt plants approved for import or cultivation in the Union; whereas risks, arising from this enhanced toxicity due to the interaction between PI and Bt toxins, to humans and animals consuming food and feed containing Bt toxins cannot be ruled out;
J. whereas a number of studies show that side effects have been observed that may affect the immune system following exposure to Bt toxins and that some Bt toxins may have adjuvant properties(11), meaning that they can increase the allergenicity of other proteins with which they come into contact;
K. whereas assessment of the potential interaction of herbicide residues and their metabolites with Bt toxins is considered outside the remit of the EFSA GMO Panel and is therefore not undertaken as part of the risk assessment; whereas this is problematic since residues from spraying with glufosinate are known to disturb the microbiome which, for example, may enhance immune reactions in combination with Bt toxins(12);
Bt crops: effects on non-target organisms and increased resistance
L. whereas, unlike the use of insecticides, where exposure is at the time of spraying and for a limited time afterwards, the use of Bt GM crops leads to continuous exposure of the target and non-target organisms to Bt toxins;
M. whereas the assumption that Bt toxins exhibit a single target-specific mode-of-action can no longer be considered correct and effects on non-target organisms cannot be excluded(13) whereas an increasing number of non-target organisms are reported to be affected in many ways; whereas 39 peer-reviewed publications that report significant adverse effects of Bt toxins on many ‘out-of-range’ species are mentioned in a recent overview(14); whereas a range of non-target organisms in the Union could be exposed to Bt toxins via spillage, waste and manure resulting from the import of Bt crops; whereas no effects on non-target organisms were evaluated in the risk assessment;
N. whereas the risk assessment did not consider the development of resistance in the target pests to Bt toxins, possibly resulting in the use of less environmentally safe pesticides or increased doses and the number of applications to the GM crop in the country of cultivation; whereas, the United States Environmental Protection Agency is planning to phase out many Bt corn hybrids, as well as some Bt cotton varieties, in the next three to five years, due to the growth in insect resistance to such crops(15);
O. whereas, while it has been claimed that the use of Bt crops leads to a decrease in the use of insecticides, a study undertaken in the United States(16), finds that ‘several analyses on the influence of Bt crops on pesticide-use patterns do not seem to have considered seed treatments and so may have overstated reductions in insecticide use (especially ‘area treated’) associated with Bt crops’;
P. whereas the Union is party to the United Nations (UN) Convention on Biological Diversity (UN CBD), which makes it clear that both exporting and importing countries have international responsibilities regarding biological diversity;
Comments by Member State competent authorities
Q. whereas Member State competent authorities submitted many comments to EFSA during the three-month consultation period(17); whereas those comments include criticism over the literature search performed by the applicant, that the monitoring reports of the GM maize for the authorisation period have severe shortcomings and that data on glufosinate residue levels, including relevant metabolites, in plant material from the field studies would support the assessment of food, feed, and environmental safety; whereas one competent authority requested an assessment of what impacts the GM crop has on biodiversity in producing and exporting countries, including on how the import of this crop influences the selection of crops in the Union and also raised the ethical issue of whether a commodity whose cultivation will entail operators’ exposure to glufosinate which is toxic for reproduction and no longer authorised in the Union, should be authorised for import into the Union;
Upholding the Union’s international obligations
R. whereas Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 provides that GM food or feed must not have adverse effects on human health, animal health or the environment, and requires the Commission to take into account any relevant provisions of Union law and other legitimate factors relevant to the matter under consideration when drafting its decision; whereas such legitimate factors should include the Union’s obligations under the UN Sustainable Development Goals (‘SDGs’), the Paris Climate Agreement and the UN CBD;
S. whereas a 2017 report by the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the right to food found that, particularly in developing countries, hazardous pesticides have catastrophic impacts on health(18); whereas UN SDG Target 3.9 aims by 2030 to substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination(19); whereas authorising the import of the GM maize would increase demand for this crop treated with a herbicide that is toxic to reproduction and that is no longer authorised for use in the Union, thereby increasing the exposure of workers in third countries; whereas the risk of increased worker exposure is of particular concern in relation to herbicide-tolerant GM crops, given the higher volumes of herbicides used;
Undemocratic decision-making
T. whereas the vote on 17 May 2021 of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 delivered no opinion, meaning that the authorisation was not supported by a qualified majority of Member States;
U. whereas the Commission recognises that the fact that GMO authorisation decisions continue to be adopted by the Commission without a qualified majority of Member States in favour, which is very much the exception for product authorisations as a whole but has become the norm for decision-making on GM food and feed authorisations, is problematic;
V. whereas, in its eighth term, the European Parliament adopted a total of 36 resolutions objecting to the placing on the market of GMOs for food and feed (33 resolutions) and to the cultivation of GMOs in the Union (three resolutions); whereas, in its ninth term, the European Parliament has already adopted 18 objections to placing GMOs on the market; whereas there was not a qualified majority of Member States in favour of authorising any of those GMOs; whereas the reasons for Member States not supporting authorisations include lack of respect for the precautionary principle in the authorisation process and scientific concerns relating to the risk assessment;
W. whereas despite its own acknowledgement of the democratic shortcomings, the lack of support from Member States and the objections of Parliament, the Commission continues to authorise GMOs;
X. whereas no change of law is required for the Commission to be able not to authorise GMOs when there is no qualified majority of Member States in favour in the Appeal Committee(20);
1. Considers that the draft Commission implementing decision exceeds the implementing powers provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003;
2. Considers that the draft Commission implementing decision is not consistent with Union law, in that it is not compatible with the aim of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, which is, in accordance with the general principles laid down in Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council(21), to provide the basis for ensuring a high level of protection of human life and health, animal health and welfare, and environmental and consumer interests, in relation to GM food and feed, while ensuring the effective functioning of the internal market;
3. Calls on the Commission to withdraw its draft implementing decision;
4. Welcomes the fact that the Commission finally recognised, in a letter of 11 September 2020 to Members, the need to take sustainability into account when it comes to authorisation decisions on GMOs(22); expresses its deep disappointment, however, that, since then the Commission has continued to authorise GMOs for import into the Union, despite ongoing objections by Parliament and a majority of Member States voting against;
5. Calls on the Commission to move forward with the utmost urgency concerning the development of sustainability criteria, with full involvement of Parliament; calls on the Commission to provide information on how this process will be undertaken and in what timeframe;
6. Reiterates its call on the Commission not to authorise herbicide-tolerant GM crops until the health risks associated with the residues have been comprehensively investigated on a case-by-case basis, which requires a full assessment of the residues from spraying such GM crops with complementary herbicides, an assessment of the herbicide break-down products and any combinatorial effects, including with the GM plant itself;
7. Reiterates its call on the Commission not to authorise the import for food or feed uses of any GM plant which has been made tolerant to a herbicide-active substance that is not authorised for use in the Union;
8. Calls on EFSA to investigate the substantial differences between native Bt toxins and those expressed by synthetic transgenes in GM crop plants, and to widen its risk assessment in order to fully take into account all interactions and combinatorial effects between Bt-toxins, GM plants and their constituents, residues from spraying with the complementary herbicides, the environment as well as impacts on health and food safety;
9. Calls on EFSA to no longer accept toxicity studies based on isolated proteins which are likely to be different in structure and biological effects compared to those produced by the plant itself, and to require that all tests are carried out with tissue from the GM plant;
10. Calls on EFSA to request data on the impact of the consumption of food and feed derived from GM plants on the intestinal microbiome;
11. Urges the Commission, again, to take into account the Union’s obligations under international agreements, such as the Paris Climate Agreement, the UN CBD and the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for draft implementing acts to be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum explaining how they uphold the principle of ‘do no harm’(23);
12. Highlights that the amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 17 December 2020 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 182/2011(24), which were adopted in Parliament as a basis for negotiations with the Council, state that the Commission shall not authorise GMOs when there is not a qualified majority of Member States in favour; insists that the Commission respect this position and calls on the Council to proceed with its work and adopt a general approach on this file as a matter of urgency;
13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
Scientific Opinion of the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms on assessment of genetically modified maize Bt11 for renewal authorisation under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (application EFSA-GMO RX-016), EFSA Journal 2021; 19(1):6347, https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/j.efsa.2021.6347
–––––––––––––––––– In its eighth term, Parliament adopted 36 resolutions objecting to the authorisation of GMOs. Furthermore, in its ninth term Parliament has adopted the following resolutions:European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MZHG0JG (SYN-ØØØJG-2), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0028).European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean A2704-12 (ACS-GMØØ5-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0029).European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 × 1507 × MON 88017 × 59122 × DAS-40278-9 and genetically modified maize combining two, three or four of the single events MON 89034, 1507, MON 88017, 59122 and DAS-40278-9 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0030).European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified cotton LLCotton25 (ACS-GHØØ1-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0054).European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 89788 (MON-89788-1) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0055).European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 × 1507 × NK603 × DAS-40278-9 and sub-combinations MON 89034 × NK603 × DAS-40278-9, 1507 × NK603 × DAS-40278-9 and NK603 × DAS-40278-9 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0056).European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize Bt11 × MIR162 × MIR604 × 1507 × 5307 × GA21 and genetically modified maize combining two, three, four or five of the single events Bt11, MIR162, MIR604, 1507, 5307 and GA21 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0057).European Parliament resolution of 14 May 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87708 × MON 89788 × A5547-127, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0069).European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events MON 87427, MON 89034, MIR162 and NK603, and repealing Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1111 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0291).European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean SYHT0H2 (SYN-ØØØH2-5), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0292).European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 87460 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two, three or four of the single events MON 87427, MON 87460, MON 89034, MIR162 and NK603, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0293).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87751 × MON 87701 × MON 87708 × MON 89788, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0365).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × MON 87411 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events MON 87427, MON 89034, MIR162 and MON 87411 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0366).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MIR604 (SYN-IR6Ø4-5) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0367).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 88017 (MON-88Ø17-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0368).European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 (MON-89Ø34-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0369).European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified cotton GHB614 × T304-40 × GHB119 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0080).European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MZIR098 (SYN-ØØØ98-3), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0081).
Opinion of the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms on application reference EFSA-GMO-RX-Bt11 for renewal of the authorisation of existing products produced from insect-resistant genetically modified maize Bt11, under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 from Syngenta, EFSA Journal 2009; 7(2):977, https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/977
See, for example, Bonny, S., ‘Genetically Modified Herbicide-Tolerant Crops, Weeds, and Herbicides: Overview and Impact’, Environmental Management, January 2016;57(1), pp. 31-48, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26296738 and Benbrook, C.M., ‘Impacts of genetically engineered crops on pesticide use in the U.S. - the first sixteen years’, Environmental Sciences Europe; 28 September 2012, Vol. 24(1), https://enveurope.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/2190-4715-24-24
Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 1).
For a review, see Rubio-Infante, N., Moreno-Fierros, L., ‘An overview of the safety and biological effects of Bacillus thuringiensis Cry toxins in mammals’, Journal of Applied Toxicology, May 2016, 36(5), pp. 630 648, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/jat.3252
Parenti, M.D., Santoro, A., Del Rio, A., Franceschi, C., ‘Literature review in support of adjuvanticity/immunogenicity assessment of proteins’, EFSA Supporting Publications, January 2019, 16(1): 1551, https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.2903/sp.efsa.2019.EN-1551
See, for example, Hilbeck, A., Otto, M., ‘Specificity and combinatorial effects of Bacillus thuringiensis Cry toxins in the context of GMO environmental risk assessment’, Frontiers in Environmental Science 2015, 3:71, https://doi.org/10.3389/fenvs.2015.00071
Douglas, M.R., Tooker, J.F., ‘Large-Scale Deployment of Seed Treatments Has Driven Rapid Increase in Use of Neonicotinoid Insecticides and Preemptive Pest Management in U.S. Field Crops’, Environmental Science and Technology 2015, 49, 8, pp. 5088-5097, https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/es506141g
The Commission ‘may, and not ‘shall’, go ahead with authorisation if there is no qualified majority of Member States in favour at the Appeal Committee, according to Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 (Article 6(3)).
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ L 31, 1.2.2002 г., p. 1).
Protection of the EU’s financial interests - combatting fraud - annual report 2019
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European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on the protection of the EU’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2019 (2020/2246(INI))
– having regard to Articles 310(6) and 325(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
– having regard to its resolutions on previous annual reports of the Commission and of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF),
– having regard to the Commission report of 3 September 2020 entitled ‘31th Annual Report on the Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – Fight against fraud – 2019’ (COM(2020)0363) and the accompanying staff working documents (SWD(2020)0156, SWD(2020)0157, SWD(2020)0158, SWD(2020)0159 and SWD(2020)0160),
– having regard to OLAF’s 2019 report and activity report of its Supervisory Committee,
– having regard to the annual report of the European Court of Auditors on the implementation of the EU budget for the 2019 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies(1),
– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999(2) (the OLAF Regulation),
– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2223 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013, as regards cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of the European Anti-Fraud Office investigations(3),
– having regard to the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 26 June 2019 in Case T-617/17, Vialto Consulting Kft. v Commission(4),
– having regard to the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 6 June 2019 in Case T-399/17, Dalli v Commission(5) and the judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 25 February 2021 in Case C-615/19 P, Dalli v Commission,
– having regard to the judgment of the General Court of 13 May 2020 in Case T-290/18, Agmin Italy SpA v Commission(6),
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law(7),
– having regard to the European Court of Auditors’ Special Report No 01/2019 of 10 January 2019 entitled ‘Fighting fraud in EU spending: action needed’,
– having regard to the European Court of Auditors’ Special Report No 06/2019 of 16 May 2019 entitled ‘Tackling fraud in EU cohesion spending: managing authorities need to strengthen detection, response and coordination’,
– having regard to the European Court of Auditors’ overview of 9 October 2018 entitled ‘2017 EU audit in brief: introducing the 2017 annual reports of the European Court of Auditors’,
– having regard to the expert report drawn up for the Commission on 10 September 2020 entitled ‘Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States: 2020 Final Report’,
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law(8) (the PIF Directive),
– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office(9),
– having regard to Decision (EU) 2019/1798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 appointing the European Chief Prosecutor of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office(10),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 14 December 2020 on the review of the European Union under the Implementation Review Mechanism of the United Nation Conventions against Corruption (UNCAC) (COM(2020)0793),
– having regard to its resolution of 14 February 2017 on the role of whistleblowers in the protection of EU’s financial interests(11),
– having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom(12),
– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(13),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 April 2019 entitled ‘Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy: enhanced action to protect the EU budget’ (COM(2019)0196),
– having regard to the continuing implementation of the Hercule III programme,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 250/2014(14),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 14 April 2021 on the EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-2025 (COM(2021)0170),
– having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0209/2021),
A. whereas de jure, the Member States and the Commission have a shared responsibility and must work closely together to protect the Union’s financial interests and fight fraud and corruption; whereas de facto, the Member States’ authorities managed approximately 74 % of EU expenditure and collected the Union’s traditional own resources (TOR) with regard to the EU budget for 2019;
B. whereas while it should fulfil its respective responsibilities under shared management for supervision, control and auditing, the Commission is only capable of monitoring approximately 10 % of all expenditure;
C. whereas Article 310(6) TFEU states that ‘the Union and the Member States, in accordance with Article 325, shall counter fraud and any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the Union’; whereas Article 325(2) TFEU states that ‘Member States shall take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union as they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial interests’; whereas Article 325(3) TFEU states that ‘the Member States shall coordinate their action aimed at protecting the financial interests of the Union against fraud’ and, to that end, ‘shall organise, together with the Commission, close and regular cooperation between competent authorities’; whereas under Article 325(4) TFEU, the European Court of Auditors must be consulted on any measures to be adopted by the legislator in the fields of the prevention of and fight against fraud affecting the EU’s financial interests;
D. whereas according to Article 83 TFEU, corruption is a particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension;
E. whereas the diversity of legal and administrative systems in the Member States needs to be adequately addressed in order to create more unified administrative and reporting systems in the EU and to effectively prevent irregularities and combat fraud and corruption with more tangible and satisfactory results;
F. whereas VAT is an important revenue source for national budgets and whereas VAT‑based own resources constituted 11,97 % of total EU budget revenue in 2019;
G. whereas systematic, institutionalised and high-level cases of corruption and deliberate attempts to weaken checks and balances and the independence of the institutions responsible for monitoring and controlling finances in certain Member States seriously harm the Union’s financial interests, while posing a threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law; recalls the detrimental impact of corruption for the trust of EU citizens in the institutions;
H. whereas according to the European Court of Auditors, the Commission’s insights into the scale, nature and causes of fraud are insufficient and not all potential fraud is reported in the irregularity management system;
I. whereas corruption affects all Member States to varying degrees, and is not only a burden on the EU economy, but also undermines democracy and the rule of law right across Europe;
General
1. Welcomes the Commission’s 31st annual report on the protection of the EU’s financial interests and the fight against fraud (PIF Report), which underlines the achievements of 2019 with regard to the consolidation of the institutional framework on the fight against fraud and irregularities at EU level, namely the transposition into national law by 18 Member States of the measures provided for in the PIF Directive by the end of the year, with four more Member States having done so by June 2020; calls on all remaining Member States to take all the necessary measures and ensure the full and correct transposition of the directive in the shortest possible time; calls on the Commission to closely monitor the transposition process in all Member States and to make use of its prerogatives for launching infringement procedures where Member States fail to comply with the transposition process;
2. Regrets the fact that the Commission had to send reasoned opinions to Ireland and Romania on 3 December 2020 for failing to transpose the PIF Directive into national law; notes that Romania transposed the PIF Directive into national law on 15 December 2020;
3. Emphasises that respect for the rule of law is a precondition for sound financial management, including the efficient and effective allocation and management of EU funds and the fight against corruption and mismanagement; strongly welcomes, in that regard, the adoption of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget;
4. Welcomes the fact that the Commission has immediately started its work on a clear methodology and analysis of potential cases; acknowledges that the Commission has clearly stated on several occasions that it will fulfil its role as guardian of the Treaties and apply Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 from the date it entered into force without undue delay, so that no case is lost during the necessary preparation work in the first half of 2021; recalls that Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 applies to all commitments and payments from 1 January 2021, while providing safeguards for final beneficiaries and recipients;
Detected fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities
5. Notes that the total number of fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities reported in 2019 amounted to 11 726 cases overall (2 % fewer cases than in 2018), and involved a value of approximately EUR 1,6 billion – a 34 % decrease on 2018; notes, in this respect, that the data on the number of cases and the corresponding value for each year is continuously assessed and updated and should be considered within a long-term perspective;
6. Notes that the number of detected irregularities reported as fraudulent is an indication of the extent of detection and of the capacity of the Member States and EU bodies to intercept potential fraud, but not a direct indicator of the level of fraud affecting the EU budget or a specific Member State; notes that it is unclear how many fraudulent irregularities go unreported every year, making it very difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-fraud activities; recalls that in 2019, the European Court of Auditors published two special reports in which it highlighted the Commission’s shortcomings with regard to its insights into the scale, nature and causes of fraud and identified weaknesses in the Commission’s strategic approach towards managing fraud risks, calling on it to take more proactive measures to address these issues; calls on the Commission, therefore, to develop a methodology to improve reliability and provide for more accurate estimations of the scale of fraud in the EU; notes that the detection and reporting of an irregularity implies that corrective measures have been taken to protect the Union’s financial interests and that, whenever relevant, criminal proceedings have been launched;
7. Notes that the number of fraudulent irregularities reported in 2019 (939 cases – 8 % of all irregularities) and their related financial amounts (approximately EUR 461,4 million – 28 % of all financial amounts affected by irregularities) decreased significantly compared to 2018; notes that in 2019, the number of fraudulent irregularities reported was 40 % less than in 2015 and 25 % lower than the five-year average for 2015-2019; notes that in 2019, 514 expenditure-related irregularities reported as fraudulent represented 0,3 % of 2019 payments, while 425 revenue-related irregularities reported as fraudulent corresponded to 0,3 % of the gross amount of TOR collected for 2019;
8. Takes into consideration the fact that the number of non-fraudulent irregularities registered in 2019 (10 787 cases) remained stable in comparison to 2018, while the financial amounts involved decreased by 8 % to approximately EUR 1,2 billion; notes that in 2019, 6 550 expenditure-related irregularities reported as non-fraudulent represented 0,5 % of 2019 payments, while 4 237 revenue-related irregularities reported as non-fraudulent corresponded to 1,5 % of the gross amount of TOR collected for 2019;
9. Emphasises that the change in the number of fraudulent or non-fraudulent irregularities detected represents a momentary snapshot that should be seen within the context of other significant factors; stresses that reported falls in the total number of cases of both fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities can either indicate a positive development – an overall decrease in fraudulent activity, or a negative development – a reduction in the level of detection of fraudulent activity;
10. Highlights that in the particular case of fraudulent irregularities, detections were concentrated within a few Member States, which suggests different approaches to the use of criminal law to protect the EU budget; underlines and regrets the fact that many Member States do not have specific laws to combat mafia-type organised crime, whose involvement in cross-border activities and sectors affecting the EU’s financial interests is constantly growing; calls on the Commission to address these differences between the Member States and to consider new harmonising measures;
11. Recalls that deficiencies in the validity and comparability of data and reporting technologies, with varying degrees of digitalisation in the Member States, continue to severely hamper the quality and reliability of the information available to the Commission in the irregularity management system and OWNRES system; regrets the fact that the detection of the misuse, fraud and embezzlement of EU funds is mostly limited to incidental discoveries by the Commission and the Court of Auditors during their sample-based audits or to investigations by OLAF; is concerned by the Court of Auditors’ repeated findings that the work of some national authorities is considered too error-prone and therefore unreliable; emphasises that these deficiencies have an impact on the quality of data reported by the Member States to the Commission on the number of fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities detected; notes that three Member States did not report any fraudulent irregularities in 2019(15); is particularly concerned by the lack of adequate staffing and qualifications of certain national authorities and the lack of internal audits;
12. Underlines the increased risks that the COVID-19 crisis has brought to the implementation of the EU budget; notes with concern that more than half of the fraudulent irregularities were reported by two Member States and that some Member States regularly do not report a single case of fraud; calls on the Commission to pay particular attention to these cases by carrying out monitoring and taking action to ensure the full protection of the EU budget, and to run random, on-the-spot checks, especially in exceptional circumstances of crises; shares the Commission’s view that countering fraud and irregularities is of the utmost importance in a period of crisis(16);
13. Urges the Member States and the Commission to cooperate more closely with regard to exchanging information, improving data collection and enhancing the effectiveness of controls; calls on Member States, in this regard, to publish data on the final beneficiaries in a uniform, machine-readable format and to ensure interoperability with the Commission’s monitoring tools; strongly urges the Commission to conduct a thorough analysis of the underlying reasons and potential structural problems causing the persisting systemic weaknesses in the reliability of the work of some national authorities and to pay particular attention to any potential differences between countries’ systems; calls on the Commission to address clear country-specific recommendations to the national authorities; asks the Commission to establish a structured dialogue with the national authorities and the Court of Auditors to continuously work on capacity-building and exchanges of best practices to improve the reliability of national authorities’ work, and to keep Parliament informed about the progress made; calls on the Commission to offer further support to improve cooperation under the Eurofisc network;
14. Reiterates, in this regard, its call on the Commission to establish a uniform system for the collection of comparable data on irregularities and cases of fraud from the Member States in order to standardise the reporting process and ensure the quality and comparability of the data provided;
Revenue – own resources fraud
15. Notes that 425 irregularities were reported as revenue-related fraud in 2019 – 21 % lower than the five-year average of 541 irregularities per year for 2015-2019; notes, moreover, that the affected amount of TOR estimated and established (EUR 80 million) in 2019 was 19 % lower than the five-year average of EUR 98 million; notes that inspection by anti-fraud services was the most successful method of detecting fraudulent cases;
16. Notes that 4 237 irregularities were detected and reported as non-fraudulent for 2019 – 6 % lower than the five-year average, and that the affected amount of TOR estimated and established was EUR 397 million in 2019, which is 3 % lower than the five-year average; notes, moreover, that non-fraudulent irregularities were primarily detected through post-release controls;
17. Stresses the seriousness of the current situation concerning fraud involving the failure to pay VAT, in particular so-called carousel fraud; calls on all Member States to participate in all of Eurofisc’s fields of activity to facilitate the exchange of information to help combat fraud;
18. Notes from the 2020 Final Report on the VAT Gap that the EU VAT gap dropped to EUR 140 billion in 2018 and could fall below EUR 130 billion in 2019; is concerned, however, that the VAT gap may reach EUR 164 billion in 2020 and asks the Commission for a thorough explanation as to whether this increase was in any way related to the COVID-19 pandemic;
19. Is deeply concerned by the extensive impact of VAT fraud on the EU budget as well as national budgets; deems it very important to step up the fight against the biggest kind of VAT fraud – missing trader intra-community (MTIC) fraud, which comes at an estimated annual cost of EUR 40-60 billion; calls on the Commission to assess the strengths and weaknesses of different potential solutions to tackle MTIC fraud, notably the introduction of a real-time, digital transaction-based reporting system developed by researchers (TX++), or a combination of the definitive VAT system with digital and real-time, transaction-based reporting;
20. Notes that 16 revenue-related anti-fraud measures were reported by the Member States in 2019: eight in the area of customs fraud, five on tax fraud, and three on a mixture of the two; notes that the Commission began an evaluation process in 2019 to determine how useful Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97(17) has been in preventing customs fraud;
21. Notes that between 2017 and 2019, the Commission carried out on-the-spot inspections on the control strategy in the field of customs value in all Member States and found that the Union’s financial interests were not effectively protected, leading to significant losses to the EU budget of TOR; notes that OLAF has issued investigative reports with recommendations for six Member States which have not fully implemented the necessary measures to consistently tackle undervaluation fraud; calls on the Commission to report back to Parliament on the Member States that could provide a good example of best practices to follow and those where significant challenges remain;
22. Notes that just as in 2017 and 2018, solar panels were the goods most affected by fraud and irregularities in monetary terms in 2019; calls on the Commission to recognise the systemic nature of such fraud and strongly urges the Council and the Member States to take robust action in this regard;
23. Notes that there are serious doubts about the accuracy of the TOR (custom duties) amounts transferred to the EU budget by the United Kingdom as a consequence of investigations carried out by OLAF on undervaluation fraud concerning textiles and shoes imported via the UK from China, as well as those conducted by the Commission within the framework of own resources management; strongly criticises the fact that the UK still refuses to make available to the EU budget the missing TOR amounts from 2011-2017 (EUR 2,679 billion gross); welcomes the Commission’s referral to the Court of Justice in March 2019 of an infringement case against the UK concerning the TOR losses due to undervalued imports; asks the Commission to report on any developments in this regard;
24. Is deeply concerned by the non-quantifiable reservation maintained for 2019 by the Commission’s Directorate-General for Budget (DG BUDG), which stated that the undervaluation fraud partly moved to other Member States with certain ramifications on the collection of TOR pending final quantification; notes that the Commission has carried out inspections on undervaluation in all Member States and checked how Member States are organised to address issues of undervaluation, with particular regard to textiles and shoes from China; notes that the undervaluation of goods imported to the EU is and will remain a threat to revenue and poses a significant challenge that will have to be dealt with in the years to come; notes that the Commission will follow up with and hold Member States financially responsible for any potential losses incurred; is concerned that according to provisional calculations, TOR losses in 2019 accounted for 1 % of total TOR for the year; asks the Commission to promptly inform Parliament about the findings and consequences of its inspections and quantification calculations, once these have been finalised;
25. Reiterates that a combination of different detection methods (release controls, post-release controls and inspections by anti-fraud services and others) is the most efficient way of detecting fraud and that the efficiency of each method depends on the Member State concerned, the efficiency of its administrative coordination, and the ability of the relevant Member State services to communicate with one another; calls on the Commission to inform the Council on the Member States that could provide a good example of best practices to follow and those where significant challenges for improvement remain;
26. Notes that over the past five years, the annual TOR recovery rate has varied between 52 % and 66 %, and that the recovery rate for cases reported in 2019 currently stands at approximately 57 %; notes that differences in the Member States’ recovery results may arise from factors such as the type of fraud or irregularity or the type of debtor involved; notes that as of March 2020, the overall recovery rate for all years between 1989 and 2019 was 61 %; reiterates its call on the Commission to report every year on the amount of EU own resources recovered, following the recommendations made by OLAF, and to inform the discharge authority of the amounts still to be recovered;
Expenditure fraud
27. Notes that there were 514 expenditure irregularities reported as fraudulent in 2019 totalling EUR 381,4 million (0,3 % of 2019 payments);
28. Notes that there were 6 550 expenditure irregularities reported as non-fraudulent in 2019, representing 0,5 % of 2019 payments;
29. Notes that with regard to the common agricultural policy (CAP), the detections of irregularities were concentrated in a few Member States, above all for fraudulent irregularities, which suggests that different approaches to the use of criminal law to protect the EU budget or reporting practices on suspected fraud could be significant factors behind the differences between the Member States; notes that while the overall financial amounts were relatively stable in 2019, there was an increase in those relating to direct support and a decrease in those relating to rural development; notes, in particular, that in the area of direct support, most detections indicated the use of falsified documents or requests for aid, while in rural development many detections related to implementation; is worried that the creation of artificial conditions for receiving financial support is a common type of fraud in direct support, indicating a modus operandi in fraudulent irregularities that touches upon ethics and integrity; notes that there was a significant fall in fraudulent irregularities in rural development due to the decline in detections related to the 2007-2013 programming period, in line with the programming lifecycle, and a slow start of detections related to the 2014-2020 programming period, and that more fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities were still detected in rural development than in direct support; points out, however, that market measures recorded the highest fraud detection rate (FDR) at 0,87 %, more than four times that of rural development with regard to fraudulent irregularities, and that non-fraudulent irregularities represented nearly double the irregularities detection rate (IDR) of that of rural development; notes, moreover, that according to the Court of Auditors’ 2017 annual reports(18), the manner in which expenditure is disbursed has an impact on the risk of error and, in particular, errors were mainly confined to cost reimbursements, whereas the error rate for entitlement payments was below the materiality threshold of 2 %;
30. Reiterates its call for the introduction of maximum amounts for the payments that one natural person can receive from the first and second pillar of the CAP and for cohesion funds; is of the opinion that maximum amounts defined per natural person are much harder to circumvent; recalls that beneficiaries can artificially split up their companies or create additional companies that can all receive the maximum amount of funding in order to circumvent a cap defined by legal person; welcomes the intentions of the proposal for the CAP to count all companies belonging to the same group as one beneficiary; deems these endeavours insufficient, however, as opaque and highly complex company structures, which often involve entities in several Member States and/or third countries, make it very difficult to ensure that all companies belonging to the same group are identified as such and are actually treated as one beneficiary, and create other opportunities to circumvent these restrictions; calls on the Commission to include proposals for caps per natural person for CAP and cohesions funds in its proposal for the revision of the Financial Regulation(19);
31. Repeats its concern that CAP subsidies continue to incentivise land-grabbing by criminal and oligarchic structures; reiterates its urgent call on the Commission to establish a complaints mechanism for farmers and SMEs faced with land-grabbing, severe misconduct by national authorities, irregular or biased treatment in tenders or distribution of subsidies, pressure or intimidation from criminal structures, organised crime or oligarchic structures, or another severe infringement of their fundamental rights to lodge a complaint directly with the Commission; welcomes the fact that such a complaints mechanism has been proposed for the new CAP regulation;
32. Notes the complexity of the analysis on cohesion policy data and the different phases of the 2007-2013 programming period; notes that the financial amounts reported were significantly lower than the exceptional year of 2018, but on average are trending upward for the cohesion funds; underlines the importance of cooperation with the judicial authorities and stresses the need to pay closer attention to the unexpected downturn of financial amounts of both fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities, and, excluding ‘exceptional’ cases, for the 2014-2020 programming period of the financial amounts involved in fraudulent irregularities for all funds in 2019, with particular regard to the European Regional Development Fund; stresses the urgent need for the Commission, OLAF and the EPPO to fully investigate whether the different reporting patterns in the Member States in terms of their tendency to detect fraudulent irregularities involving large financial amounts are somehow related to possible conflicts of interest with stakeholders in the Member States or even criminal activity;
33. Is very concerned by media reports about EU-co-financed infrastructure investments which were repurposed after the minimum required period of three or five years; regrets the allegations of fraud and personal enrichment from this repurposing; regrets the fact that the Commission has not been able to provide additional information to dispel the remaining doubts; welcomes the Commission’s intention to follow up properly on these allegations and calls on the Commission to report its findings to Parliament; further calls on the Commission to analyse which Member States have severe problems with the repurposing of EU-co-financed infrastructure projects;
34. Considers the legal minimum durability requirement of three to five years too short given the significant amounts of co-financing and the longevity of such projects; regrets the fact that the co-legislators did not decide to introduce longer durability requirements during the revision of the Common Provisions Regulation(20); notes that there are significant differences between Member States’ national rules on the durability of infrastructure investments and premature repurposing;
35. Calls on the Commission to conduct a thorough analysis on the different national rules on the durability of appropriation requirements of co-financed investments and premature repurposing, both for infrastructure and equipment, with a particular focus on whether national rules go beyond the minimum EU requirements; calls on the Commission to report its findings to Parliament;
36. Reiterates the transparency requirements for the CAP and cohesion policy, which oblige the responsible authorities of the Member States to maintain a publicly available list of final beneficiaries; strongly calls on the Member States to publish such data in a uniform, machine-readable format and ensure interoperability of the information; demands that the Commission collect and aggregate the data and publish lists of the largest beneficiaries from each fund in each Member State;
37. Notes that among the fraudulent irregularities detected in 2019, actions related to health infrastructure were affected by breaches of public procurement rules, with the most common issues detected relating to supporting documents: 15 Member States reported irregularities in actions related to health infrastructure and seven of these also detected fraud; notes that the non-reporting of irregularities in this area by other Member States is not an indication that they were not affected by such risks and calls on the Commission, OLAF and the EPPO to ensure that fraudulent activities, especially those related to fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, do not remain unresolved;
38. Is concerned about continued reports by the Court of Auditors and the Commission about persisting weaknesses in public procurement in several Member States; calls on the Commission to conduct a thorough analysis of the Member States with noticeable weaknesses about the underlying reasons for these and to specify precisely to what extent they are due to formal errors or systemic fraud and corruption; is of the opinion that minor formal errors need to be treated differently and that the Commission should focus more on the more severe issues, such as intentional manipulations of the tender criteria to favour the application of certain or single bidders, corruption relating to bidder selection, conflicts of interest and other fraudulent misuse;
39. Points out that complete transparency in accounting for expenditure is essential, especially as regards infrastructure works financed directly through EU funds or financial instruments; calls on the Commission to provide for EU citizens to have full access to information on co-financed projects;
40. Stresses the need for complete transparency in accounting for the transfers and loans provided for under the Recovery and Resilience Facility and calls on the Commission to provide for Parliament to have full access to information;
41. Invites the Commission to step up its fraud prevention and detection work to ensure that EU money continues to reach the intended beneficiaries and brings effective and measurable benefits to citizens’ lives;
Digitalisation as a means to protect the EU’s financial interests
42. Emphasises that a greater degree of digitalisation, interoperability and harmonisation of reporting, monitoring and auditing in the EU is overdue and indispensable given the cross-border nature of misuse, fraud, misappropriations, conflicts of interest, double funding and other systemic problems; is concerned, moreover, about the controls on the financial instruments managed by intermediaries and the demonstrated weaknesses in the checks on the registered offices of beneficiaries; reiterates the need to make the disbursement of direct and indirect funds conditional on the disclosure of data on effective ownership by the beneficiaries and by financial intermediaries;
43. Regrets the fact that under the current rules, the lack of information about the ownership structures and beneficial owners of companies and groups of companies is significantly contributing to the opaqueness of how funds are currently distributed and hindering a more efficient detection of irregularities; emphasises, once again, the crucial importance of comprehensive, reliable and comparable data for the efficient, effective and timely control of EU spending and the protection of European taxpayers’ money;
44. Reiterates its urgent call on the Commission to propose a legal basis in the Financial Regulation for the creation of an interoperable digital reporting and monitoring system to allow timely, uniform and standardised reporting by the Member States’ authorities in the area of shared management; encourages the mandatory use of existing data-mining and risk-scoring tools, such as Arachne, as one element of the planned reporting and monitoring system; underlines that such an interoperable reporting and monitoring system would allow not only for an earlier and more efficient detection of misuse, fraud, misappropriations, conflicts of interest, double funding and other systemic problems, but also a comprehensive overview of how EU funds are actually being distributed and of potentially unintended concentrations in the hands of a few oligarchic or even criminal ultimate beneficiaries;
45. Recalls that this system should not lead to the national authorities becoming too overladen with bureaucracy or create data congestion; calls on the Commission to determine which indicators and data are truly relevant, necessary and proportionate for auditing and control purposes and achieving the intended programming goals, and to reduce the number of indicators and milestones that need to be entered into the system;
46. Notes that the early detection and exclusion system (EDES) established by Article 135 of the Financial Regulation should ensure effective sanctions on unreliable persons or entities by excluding them from the award and procurement procedures funded under the EU budget and imposing financial penalties; regrets the fact that the database lists only very few economic operators – six as of May 2021; calls on the Commission to review the criteria with a view to reducing complexity and making EDES more applicable in practice;
47. Asks the Commission to consider extending EDES to apply to funds under shared management, with respect for the principles of proportionality and appropriateness, in its proposal for the revision of the Financial Regulation; urges the Member States and the Commission to ensure greater interoperability of existing European and national databases and data-mining tools; acknowledges that the European Data Protection Supervisor sees no general data protection issues with establishing such interoperability, as long as there is a clear legal basis for doing so;
48. Welcomes the current rules on e-procurement, which stipulate that tender opportunities must be published in Tenders Electronic Daily (TED), procurement documents must be accessible electronically with hyperlinks included in the TED notices, economic operators must submit tenders electronically, and contracting authorities must accept electronic invoices;
49. Observes that public procurement is undergoing a digital transformation; welcomes the process of rethinking public procurement with digital technologies in mind; is of the opinion that this reform should go beyond simply moving to electronic tools and should include various pre-award and post-award phases; insists that these reforms should also allow for data-based approaches to be integrated at various stages of the procurement process; calls on the Commission to pay particular attention to framework agreements awarded through public procurement procedures, as the related fraud and corruption pose an increased risk to the Union’s financial interests;
50. Observes that the increasing digitalisation of public services and enhanced transparency rules mean that more information on EU public finances is available in electronic formats; notes, furthermore, that the computing capacity and software currently available allow for a large amount of complex data to be processed in a relatively short period of time, which creates new potential for the detection of fraud using specialised data analytics techniques such as big data, data mining and AI technologies on open data; believes that the abundance of open data represents an opportunity to support the creation of reliable ‘reputation systems’, which can help prevent criminal activities; asks the Commission to carry out a systemic analysis to investigate how the new technologies are being used in the field of fraud detection and prevention, to assess their limitations, and to devise proposals on how to improve their use;
The new Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy
51. Welcomes the adoption of the new Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy on 29 April 2019; welcomes the zero tolerance policy towards fraud; welcomes the reintroduction of the Commission’s corporate oversight of fraud issues by giving OLAF a stronger advisory and supervisory role; recalls that the strategy envisages a binding action plan for the Commission services and executive agencies only, despite the fact that most responsibilities lie with the Member States; calls for a unified approach which should also include the Member States;
52. Calls on the Commission to consider revising its new Anti-Fraud Strategy to fully reflect the operationalisation of the EPPO and its role in fighting fraud;
53. Stresses the importance of prioritising the development and establishment of national anti-fraud strategies (NAFSs) by all Member States, including in the light of the new challenges posed by the COVID-19 crisis and the recovery and resilience plans; is very concerned that according to the follow-up for 2018, only 10 Member States reported adopting or updating an NAFS and communicated it to OLAF, while 17 Member States have still not adopted one(21), with only four of them considering adopting or preparing a new strategy(22); calls on the Member States that have not yet adopted an NAFS to do so without further undue delay; calls on the Commission to assess the NAFSs that have been adopted, to examine why Member States are lagging behind in adopting them, and to push the remaining Member States to progress with adoption;
The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
54. Welcomes the opening of negotiations in 2019 on the revision of the OLAF Regulation with regard to cooperation with the EPPO and the effectiveness of OLAF investigations; welcomes the entry into force of the revised Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2223 in January 2021, which significantly strengthens OLAF’s role and paves the way for smooth collaboration with the EPPO; notes that the new rules include a clear definition of the complementary roles of the two offices, clear rules on how cases are reported, and improves how OLAF can conduct its own investigations; acknowledges that the new legal framework makes OLAF more effective by streamlining the rules for on-the-spot checks and inspections, allowing OLAF to access bank account information via the national competent authorities, reinforcing the rules governing the work of the anti-fraud coordination services in the Member States, and providing better guarantees for those concerned by OLAF investigations through the creation of a controller;
55. Considers that the reinforced powers for OLAF, the launch of the EPPO and the coordination of work across the EU’s entire anti-fraud architecture for identifying, investigating and prosecuting fraudsters constitutes a major step forward in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes, in this regard, the conclusion of working arrangements between the EPPO, Eurojust and Europol, which establish the rules of cooperation and how the EU bodies will work together in the fight against crimes affecting the financial interests of the European Union;
56. Reiterates its assessment on the importance of OLAF’s investigations and its role in coordinating efforts to protect the EU’s financial interests and combat fraud;
57. Recalls that OLAF was created not only for internal investigations but also for supporting Member States in external investigations; stresses that following the creation of the EPPO, OLAF will remain the sole office responsible for protecting the EU’s financial interests in Member States that opted not to join the EPPO; recalls that while the subsidiarity principle prevents OLAF from launching investigations where Member States are in a better position to act, this does not exclude OLAF from conducting analyses of recurring cases, trends and patterns and on how its ability to detect these phenomena has led to enhanced cooperation and successful actions;
58. Strongly believes that OLAF needs to be reinforced with budgetary means and personnel in order to be fully capable of carrying out its duties on prevention and investigation, not least in the Member States not participating in the EPPO; underlines the importance of ensuring that OLAF remains a strong and fully functioning partner to the EPPO; stresses that the future cooperation between OLAF and the EPPO should be based on close cooperation, the efficient exchange of information and complementarity, while avoiding duplications or conflicted competences;
59. Reiterates the fact that OLAF’s remit is to help devise and develop methods to prevent and combat fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union; recalls that one of the key elements of OLAF’s mandate is to promote and coordinate, with and among the Member States, the sharing of operational experience and best procedural practices on the protection of the Union’s financial interests; regrets the fact, therefore, that no assessment of OLAF’s investigative results on expenditure is explicitly given in the PIF Report; invites OLAF to provide tangible guidance and advice to the Member States and the Commission, building on the analysis of its investigative experience;
60. Notes the administrative arrangement for the exchange of information and cooperation between OLAF and the European Court of Auditors signed in 2019 and welcomes more structured cooperation between the Court of Auditors and OLAF;
61. Welcomes the agreement between OLAF and the co-legislators, in close cooperation with the Commission services, towards including standard provisions on the protection of the Union’s financial interests in all legislation on post-2020 spending programmes, harmonised by area;
The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO)
62. Welcomes the appointment of Laura Codruța Kövesi as European Chief Prosecutor in 2019 and the launch of EPPO operations on 1 June 2021; regrets the fact that the date on which the EPPO was due to become operational had to be postponed several times owing to a lack of financial and human resources and severe delays in the appointment of European and delegated prosecutors in a few Member States; asks the Commission to increase the financial and staffing resources of the EPPO to enable it to tackle the challenges that will arise from the spending of the exceptionally large recovery fund;
63. Notes that the appointment procedure for the delegated European prosecutors was launched in 2019 and completed in 2020, with 22 European prosecutors taking their oath before the Court of Justice on 28 September 2020; regrets the lack of nominations of European delegated prosecutors in particular by Slovenia, which cancelled its appointment process, as well as the considerable delays in many other Member States; notes that Chief Prosecutor Kövesi is deeply concerned about Slovenia’s ‘manifest lack of sincere cooperation’ following delays in the recruitment of its delegated prosecutors; urges the Commission to strictly monitor the Member States that have not yet nominated their European delegated prosecutors or have not adapted their national legislation for the operationalisation of the EPPO, where necessary, by suspending their funding on the basis of Article 63(2) and (8) of the Financial Regulation and the sector-specific rules, and/or by launching infringement proceedings; notes, moreover, that by the end of 2019, 18 Member States had notified the Commission that they had incorporated the PIF Directive into national law; calls on the Commission to do its utmost to incentivise all Member States to join the EPPO and urges the five Member States that have not yet joined to do so without undue delay;
64. Recalls that pursuant to Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1696, the selection panel for the appointment of the European prosecutors evaluates the candidates and provides the Council with a ranking which it must take into consideration but which, according to the Implementing Decision, is not binding; recalls that in the case of the candidates nominated by Belgium, Bulgaria and Portugal, the Council did not follow the selection panel’s order of preference; recalls that on 27 July 2020, Austria, Estonia, Luxembourg and the Netherlands published a statement affirming that ‘a competition between rankings of national selection panels and the ranking of the European selection panel must be avoided, at the risk of eroding the European component of the appointment procedure’;
65. Highlights with great concern Malta’s failure to nominate three suitable candidates for the College of European Prosecutors, thereby delaying completion of the college; expresses particular concern, moreover, at media reports that the Portuguese Government provided the Council with wrongful information about the title and experience of the candidate who was ranked second by the European selection panel and eventually appointed as the Portuguese European prosecutor; expresses further concern at the fact that one of the unsuccessful Belgian candidates filed a complaint about the selection procedure before the Court of Justice; regrets the fact that these issues overshadowed the formation of the College of European Prosecutors and calls on the Member States involved to provide Parliament with all the necessary information and documentation to fully assess the rightfulness of the selection process;
66. Recalls that the European and delegated prosecutors must be independent and that any suspicion of an intervention by a national government in favour of a candidate against the recommendation by the European selection panel would have severe and negative repercussions on the reputation, integrity and independence of the EPPO as an institution;
The fight against corruption
67. Welcomes the adoption of Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (the Whistleblower Directive), while noting that the deadline for transposition is 17 December 2021; calls on the Commission to closely monitor and assist the Member States, ensuring the complete, correct and timely transposition of the directive, and to start assessing the implementation by the Member States as soon as the deadline has passed;
68. Highlights the importance of independent media and investigative journalists and reiterates the need to protect them; calls on the Commission to provide for serious legal protections akin to those provided for whistleblowers, and to develop comprehensive measures for the protection and financing of independent investigative journalism, including a rapid response mechanism for journalists in distress and effective legislation to combat strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs);
69. Stresses the importance of the progress made on the Commission’s legislative and policy initiatives to prevent and fight corruption, as well as the regular monitoring and evaluation of the Member States’ legal frameworks via the newly established Rule of Law Report; recalls however, while reiterating its regret that the Commission no longer deems it necessary to publish a specific anti-corruption report, that the newly established Rule of Law Report is highly descriptive; calls on the Commission to augment these reports by issuing recommendations on situations where deficiencies have been identified;
70. Is very concerned by the findings of the 2020 Rule of Law Report, which highlights concerns about the effectiveness of the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases, including high-level corruption cases in several Member States, such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Malta and Slovakia; insists that high-level corruption must be systematically pursued with consistent and resolute action to launch criminal investigations and prosecute corruption cases involving high-level officials or their immediate circle when serious allegations arise;
71. Stresses that the institutions entrusted with the enforcement of criminal law must work effectively and impartially and should be equipped with adequate funding, human resources, technical capacity and specialised expertise in order to be able to carry out their tasks;
72. Highlights that the connection between corruption and fraud in the EU may have a negative impact on the EU budget; calls on the Commission to consider establishing a network of corruption prevention authorities in the European Union;
73. Welcomes the Union’s role as an observer to the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), while reiterating its recommendation that the EU should become a member; fully supports the Stockholm Declaration of December 2019, which calls on European decision-makers to strengthen the fight against corruption;
74. Notes that the appropriate legal basis for the EU to become a full member of GRECO is Article 83 TFEU in conjunction with Article 218 TFEU; notes that full EU membership of GRECO would require an invitation from the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers and the conclusion of an agreement between the Council of Europe and the EU on the arrangements for membership; notes that the applicable decision-making procedure is laid down in Article 218 TFEU for the conclusion of international agreements whereby the Council, acting on a recommendation from the Commission, would need to authorise the Commission to negotiate the arrangements for membership in GRECO with the Council of Europe and request Parliament’s consent, whereupon the Council may adopt a final decision to conclude the agreement;
75. Notes that in the case of full EU membership in GRECO the EU institutions may be monitored and evaluated by the group of states; underlines that the GRECO evaluation system should take into account the specific nature of the EU as a Union based on the principle of conferred competences, its institutions, and the particular features of EU law; emphasises that the EU’s rights and obligations in GRECO and the practical arrangements for its membership as a distinct legal entity, alongside all of its Member States, should be clarified in advance in the agreement on the arrangements for membership;
76. Notes that eight measures of a legislative, organisational and administrative nature were reported by the Member States in 2019 in the area of enhancing transparency, fighting corruption and preventing conflicts of interest in public procurement;
77. Reiterates its call on the Commission to set up an internal corruption evaluation mechanism for the EU institutions;
78. Is concerned about the Czech Chief Prosecutor General citing permanent pressure by the justice minister as reasons for his recent resignation; asks the Commission to look into vulnerabilities of the Czech judicial system and to carefully examine whether any other cases involving members of the Czech Government have been withdrawn or prematurely closed potentially following pressure or unjustified interference; calls on the Commission to also conduct such an analysis for all the other Member States and to keep Parliament informed about its findings and conclusions;
Recommendations
79. Reiterates its call on the Commission to establish a digital and interoperable uniform system for the collection of comparable data on irregularities and cases of fraud from the Member States in order to standardise the reporting process and ensure the quality and comparability of the data provided; underlines the importance of harmonising definitions to obtain comparative data across the EU;
80. Calls on the Commission to ensure the full transparency and quality of data reported by Member States in the irregularity management system; urges the Member States to report complete data in a timely manner; calls on the Commission and the Member States to link the irregularity management system with EDES and Arachne and to provide access to it for all Member States and the Commission;
81. Considers it necessary for the Member States to cooperate more closely with regard to exchanges of information in order to improve data collection and enhance the effectiveness of controls;
82. Emphasises that EDES, as the EU’s blacklist, has huge potential for flagging people and companies that misuse EU funds; notes, in addition, the judgment of the General Court of 13 May 2020 in Case T-290/18 (Agmin Italy SpA v Commission), wherein the Court of Justice confirmed the validity of the respective roles of the panel and the authorising officers and found that the adversarial procedure led by the panel had fully respected the right of the entity concerned to be heard; invites the Commission to include the extension of EDES to funds under shared management in its proposal for the revision of the Financial Regulation; asks the Commission to equip this system with the necessary financial and staffing resources to enable it to operate on a full time basis;
83. Deplores the fact that there are more than 290 monitoring and reporting systems for the CAP and cohesion funds, which makes it impossible to verify the final beneficiaries of those funds and prevent and investigate fraud and corruption effectively; calls on the Commission and the Member States to establish a harmonised or unified reporting system with timely and accurate data in order to remedy this situation;
84. Recalls the need for a more incisive and effective response and coordination at both EU and national level in the fight against corruption and organised crime, including mafia-style crime, with a particular focus on transnational and cross-border aspects, in order to tackle fraudsters’ constant ability to adapt to new technologies and scenarios; stresses that this could be achieved by using AI tools, data-mining and other relevant digitalised tools, while respecting the protection of personal data;
85. Emphasises the particular importance of EU and national anti-fraud institutions and bodies in the context of increased EU resources through the Recovery and Resilience Facility; recalls the importance of supporting and strengthening cooperation among the EU institutions, the EPPO, OLAF, EU agencies – notably Europol and Eurojust – and national authorities in order to detect and tackle fraud and corruption more effectively, while ensuring that roles do not overlap and promoting the exchange of information; recalls the need to ensure greater, more suitable resources for the EPPO, OLAF and the relevant EU agencies in future budgets; reiterates its request for the EPPO to be able to use the financial resources in the 2021 budget for additional staff recruitment, not least given the increased workload from the adoption of the EU’s new long-term budget, Next Generation EU and other cost-driven projects;
86. Highlights the importance of structured information exchange among the competent authorities for cross-checking accounting records relating to transactions between two or more Member States in order to prevent cross-border fraud arising from the structural and investment funds; reiterates its request to the Commission to include in its work programme a legislative proposal for a horizontal regulation on mutual administrative assistance in the area of EU expenditure; emphasises that this information exchange should be in a digital format and conducted through interoperable or shared IT systems and tools to facilitate more timely and efficient cooperation;
87. Regrets the fact that only 13 Member States used Arachne when carrying out their risk analyses; reiterates the importance of this tool and the interoperability of IT systems and databases for the purposes of risk analysis and detection of fraud; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Member States in the Council in particular to move towards Parliament’s position of making the use of Arachne mandatory; calls on the Member States to ensure that the system is supplied with timely and reliable data; is of the opinion that the Commission, the Court of Auditors, the EPPO and OLAF need to have access to this data;
88. Notes that 16 Member States have strengthened risk analysis to detect fraud and irregularities through the use of IT tools; calls on the Commission to facilitate exchanges of good practices between these countries and Member States with no experience;
89. Notes with concern that no information is provided in the PIF Report on the analysis of cases of conflicts of interest, despite the relevance of the new provision adopted in the Financial Regulation in 2018 and the acknowledged importance and impact of this phenomenon; calls on the Commission to fill this gap in its next PIF Report and to devote more attention to fraud relating to public procurement;
90. Highlights that in order to combat corruption effectively and protect the EU’s financial interests, the Commission should adopt a holistic, coherent and systematic approach by developing better rules on transparency, incompatibilities and conflicts of interest, internal control mechanisms, illegitimate lobbying and revolving doors scenarios, which can be detrimental to relations between the institutions and interest representatives;
91. Invites the Commission to explore new avenues for the PIF Report to be shared and analysed alongside other sources of information and annual reports such as the Rule of Law Report, including through enhanced dialogue between Europol, Eurojust and the EPPO in order to help identify trends in fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities, detect weaknesses and provide useful lessons learnt to improve the adoption of fraud-proofing measures by all stakeholders;
92. Welcomes the events organised by OLAF in 2019 dedicated specifically to supporting non-EU countries; strongly encourages the Commission, OLAF and all the other EU institutions and bodies entrusted with the protection of the Union’s financial interests to actively engage and collaborate with partner authorities in candidate, potential candidate and Eastern Partnership countries, by promoting measures to effectively address possible cases of fraud; calls on the Commission to develop specific and regular mechanisms to effectively prevent and combat fraud with EU funds in these states;
93. Regrets the fact that Parliament repeatedly has to address several recommendations without receiving any clear response from the Commission; notes with regret that on some observations and recommendations, the Commission has not taken any tangible action or measures; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with a clear explanation whenever it decides not to follow one of its recommendations;
o o o
94. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.
Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters (OJ L 82, 22.3.1997, p. 1).
The impact on the fishing sector of offshore windfarms and other renewable energy systems
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European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on the impact on the fishing sector of offshore wind farms and other renewable energy systems (2019/2158(INI))
– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled 'The European Green Deal' (COM(2019)0640),
– having regard to the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030, set out in the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled 'EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 – Bringing nature back into our lives' (COM(2020)0380),
– having regard to the Commission recommendations of May 2020 for positive interactions between offshore wind farms and fisheries,
– having regard to the Commission's 2020 Blue Economy Report of 11 June 2020,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 17 September 2020 entitled 'Stepping up Europe's 2030 climate ambition – Investing in a climate-neutral future for the benefit of our people' (COM(2020)0562),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 19 November 2020 entitled 'An EU Strategy to harness the potential of offshore renewable energy for a climate neutral future' (COM(2020)0741),
– having regard to Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive)(1),
– having regard to Directive 2014/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning(2) ('Maritime Spatial Planning Directive'),
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources(3),
– having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),
– having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2018 on international ocean governance: an agenda for the future of our oceans in the context of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals(4),
– having regard to the 'EMODnet Human Activities Vessels Density Mapping – Service, 2019' and 'Offshore Renewable Energy Developments – 2018' mapping services of the OSPAR Data and Information Management System,
– having regard to the North Sea Advisory Council (NSAC) advice of 28 December 2020 on the development of offshore wind farms and fisheries interactions,
– having regard to its position adopted at first reading on 24 June 2021 with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 ('European Climate Law')(5),
– having regard to the study requested by the Committee on Fisheries (PECH) of 12 November 2020 on the impact of the use of offshore wind and other marine renewables on European fisheries,
– having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries (A9-0184/2021),
A. whereas the EU is aiming to become climate neutral by 2050 at the latest, in line with the Green Deal objectives; whereas the Commission has proposed a greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction objective of at least 55 % by 2030, while Parliament has called for a GHG emission reduction target of 60 % by 2030; whereas offshore renewable energy is one of the options that Member States can choose to achieve this target; whereas it should play a key role in achieving these objectives through an integrated approach taking into account the three pillars of sustainability;
B. whereas under the Treaties the EU has the responsibility to ensure security of supply and Member States are responsible for determining the structure of their energy supply and their choice of energy sources, while respecting the EU targets for climate neutrality by 2050;
C. whereas according to the Commission's estimates, 30 % of the EU's electricity demand in 2050 will be met by offshore wind, corresponding to an increase from the current 12 GW offshore wind capacity in the EU-27 to a target of 300 GW in 2050; whereas according to the Commission's estimates demand will reach 40 GW of ocean energy capacity by 2050;
D. whereas according to Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Union energy policy must ensure the functioning of the energy market and security of energy supply, promote energy efficiency and savings and the development of renewable energy and promote the interconnection of energy networks; whereas the definition of the energy mix of Member States remains a national competence, and therefore energy mixes are highly diversified;
E. whereas the Northern Seas (North Sea, Baltic Sea and North-East Atlantic) account for more than 85 % of all offshore wind capacity in EU-27 waters;
F. whereas the geographical characteristics of Member States and European sea basins vary greatly across the EU; whereas the development of offshore wind farms (OFWs) and other renewable energy systems is currently concentrated in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, where conditions are more favourable; whereas, in the future, the possibility or desirability of creating, or of increasing the size or capacity of, offshore renewable energy installations will equally be very different in each basin and Member State;
G. whereas it was agreed in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement that EU fishing vessels would continue to have reciprocal access to UK waters and would therefore continue to share the European marine space which currently contains 110 OFWs with more than 5 000 wind turbines;
H. whereas the supply of wind energy can be irregular and unstable, due to changing weather circumstances;
I. whereas the possibilities for storing wind energy are still very limited;
J. whereas other offshore renewable energy sources such as wave, tidal and thermal technologies, floating photovoltaic installations and the use of algae to produce biofuels play an important role in the Commission's offshore renewable energy strategy, although there are currently no large-scale installations in operation; whereas they can contribute to achieving climate neutrality and enhanced European leadership, and create new jobs; whereas it is necessary to continue research and innovation, as other offshore renewable energy sources could be promising and more appropriate in some areas and have less impact on fishing activities, fish stocks and the marine environment;
K. whereas offshore wind turbines have an average life cycle of 25 to 30 years; whereas very few turbines have so far been decommissioned and recycling is still very complex with 85 to 90 % of a dismantled wind turbine being recycled; whereas a long-term vision based on a circular economy and life-cycle approach is necessary in order to assess the impacts on other activities, such as fishing, and on local communities and ecosystems, at the end of the project; whereas eco-design through the use of specific materials and the design of the infrastructure can foster the development of local biodiversity; whereas recycling methods or maintaining infrastructures as artificial reefs have to be assessed at an early stage of the conception of the project;
L. whereas the most cost- and space-efficient way to achieve the 2050 offshore capacity target would be through the multiple use of the same maritime space by different sectors, by considering a co-benefit approach, according to which each activity benefits from the other, as the cohabitation of activities can be positive in terms of the environment and socio-economic benefits;
M. whereas there is increasing competition between different uses of maritime space, which often leads to the historical uses of evident historical, cultural, social and economic value, such as fishing, being overlooked;
N. whereas the Maritime Spatial Planning Directive states that Member States must take into consideration the interactions of activities and uses such as aquaculture, fishing, and installations and infrastructures for the production of energy from renewable sources, as well as submarine cables, promote the coexistence of relevant activities and apply an ecosystem-based approach;
O. whereas, through their maritime spatial plans, Member States should aim to contribute to the sustainable development of energy sectors at sea, of maritime transport, of the fisheries and aquaculture sectors, and the preservation, protection and improvement of the environment, including resilience to climate change impacts; whereas, in this regard, fisheries and aquaculture interests should receive special attention and should not be marginalised as Member States continue their work and subsequent revisions of national maritime spatial plans;
P. whereas the Commission proposal for an EU Biodiversity Strategy states that 'The EU will prioritise solutions such as ocean energy, offshore wind, which also allows for fish stock regeneration', while a recent study published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies(6) reveals that 'potential fisheries benefits as a consequence of Offshore Renewables installations are not well understood and empirical evidence is pending';
Q. whereas the Commission, in its communication entitled 'An EU Strategy to harness the potential of offshore renewable energy for a climate neutral future', called on public authorities to plan the deployment of offshore renewable energies in the long term and from an early stage, assessing their environmental, social and economic sustainability, ensuring coexistence with other activities, such as fisheries and aquaculture, and making sure the public accept planned deployments;
R. whereas fisheries have a relatively small impact on GDP; whereas it is of the utmost importance for fishing communities in many Member States;
S. whereas around 80 % of all fishing vessels in the EU are small-scale vessels, with most being family-run businesses that go back generations, operating mainly in coastal waters;
T. whereas the cumulation of current and future offshore renewable developments has the biggest impact on fishing operations targeting demersal species and crustaceans;
U. whereas harnessing offshore energy, while ensuring environmental protection and the sustainable development of fisheries and other economic activities, requires joint planning and a rigorous assessment of cumulative impacts, including socio-economic effects;
V. whereas additional research into the effects of OFWs and other offshore renewable energy systems on the marine environment and fisheries resources is needed;
W. whereas Parliament insists that the Union's 2030 target for the climate must be an economy-wide GHG emission reduction of 60 % compared to 1990;
X. whereas exploring EU offshore wind resources and promoting marine renewable energy projects in a manner compatible with other uses of the maritime space, primarily fisheries, while seeking synergies and protecting biodiversity is a necessity;
Y. whereas the monitoring and empirical analysis of fishing practices before, during and after the construction of OWFs is important to create a better understanding of co-existence;
Z. whereas the foundations of offshore renewable energy devices might attract marine life and could have an artificial reef effect;
AA. whereas the International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO) recommends avoiding fishing activities at a minimum distance of 0,25 nautical miles (463 meters) on either side of a submarine cable to minimise risks;
1. Highlights the need to avoid the potential negative long-term impact caused by offshore wind turbines on certain ecosystems, fish stocks and biodiversity, and consequently on fisheries as a whole; emphasises the need for a life-cycle approach to their development, from construction through operation and decommissioning, hence the importance of rigorous and detailed studies to assess the impacts of existing offshore wind turbines;
2. Emphasises that offshore renewable energy should be deployed in such a way as to create opportunities for other activities, through an environmental, social and economic co-benefits approach, ensuring benefits for fishers and local communities;
3. Warns that offshore renewable energy will only be sustainable if it has no negative impact on the environment and on economic, social and territorial cohesion, especially in fisheries-dependent regions;
4. Is concerned about the lack of research into the decommissioning of offshore wind turbines and into the effects of decommissioning on the environment;
5. Reaffirms that it remains the competence of a Member State to decide on its national energy mix and technologies;
6. Emphasises that renewable energy and energy efficiency are among the key drivers for reaching a net zero-emissions economy; highlights that in order to meet the 2030 renewable energy target, offshore renewable electricity infrastructure capacity and production need to be increased accordingly;
7. Highlights the important potential of renewable hydrogen, including from wind and solar energy, in reaching the Union's climate neutrality objective;
8. Stresses that floating wind farms have the potential to be developed in deep water areas, which expands the viable zone for wind energy development while reducing its visibility from shore; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to support the upscaling and commercialisation of sustainable floating offshore wind technology that further reduces the impact on fisheries;
9. Stresses the need to minimise the risk of the large-scale roll-out of OWFs affecting the physical functioning of the sea basin, in particular sea and air currents, which might contribute to a mixing of the stratified water column and consequently influence the nutrient cycle, wave generation, tidal amplitudes and bedload sediment transport, and that the effects of these must be closely monitored, while infrasonic noise from rotating blades could repel fish, as well as marine mammal species, from OWFs, and electromagnetic fields from underwater cables, as well as underwater noise from pile driving, could have severe negative impacts on crustaceans and marine life; stresses in this regard the need for further development and research into how to avoid and mitigate these negative effects;
10. Notes the importance of implementing best practices in terms of minimising disruption and mitigating damage to ecosystems in the planning, operational and decommissioning stages of offshore activity;
11. Takes the view that the installation of marine renewable energy production units must be incorporated into and respond to the development strategies and energy sovereignty of each state while being consistent with the objectives of the European Green Deal;
12. Highlights the importance of taking the morphological and geographical characteristics of the areas in which OWFs are to be established into account;
13. Takes the view that decisions to install offshore renewable energy production infrastructure should be based on the best scientific assessments of the associated impacts and involve all stakeholders in the exploitation of the areas to be occupied, in particular the associated fishing communities and their organisations;
14. Stresses the need to investigate the potential effects, such as artificial reef effects of offshore renewable systems, on marine life and fisheries, which could be limited to the operational phase and to examine how decommissioning can be carried out in such a way that its benefits might not be temporary; underlines that when OWFs are decommissioned, the sites need to be left in a state that allows fishing activities if they had been allowed before construction or during the operational phase, and that protects and respects the environment;
15. Points out the need to consider the characteristics of the seabed when deploying OFWs so as not to build infrastructure where it would risk altering the local habitat and ecosystem;
16. Proposes to assess the combination and integration of OWFs within marine protected areas (MPAs) against clearly defined habitat and biodiversity conservation objectives, including those pertaining to fisheries resources; underlines that management committees should be set up in these MPAs in order to achieve better coexistence of activities, and that approval by the relevant competent authority in charge of the MPAs must be given;
17. Stresses that OWFs should, whenever possible, be placed in zones where fishing is not permitted, in order to minimise negative impacts on the fishing industry;
18. States that OWFs can have an impact on fisheries by changing the spatial distribution and abundance of commercially fished marine species as well as through their closure for safety reasons or the imposition of a change in fishing activity or method, for example from active to passive;
19. Insists on the establishment of dialogue and cooperation with fishers at an early stage in the process; emphasises the need to take into account local ecosystems and the specificities of the local community; highlights the need for proper compensation for fishers if the establishment of OWFs affects their activities;
20. Takes note of the fact that the Commission communication on the biodiversity strategy for 2030 states that 'The EU will prioritise solutions such as ocean energy, offshore wind, which also allows for fish stock regeneration', and that the possibility of a combination of OWFs and protected areas is considered;
21. Stresses that the environmental, social and economic impact of OFWs depends on site‑specific conditions, ecosystems and human activities, and that stakeholder collaboration in the design, implementation and management of OFWs is key to resolving issues of common interest;
22. Notes that the small-scale, coastal and artisanal fishing sector may bear the brunt of the impact of the installation of these offshore renewable energy production units, given their relative proximity to the coast;
23. Stresses that small-scale and coastal fishers will be particularly affected if displacement takes place, as they may not have the capacity to move to fishing grounds further afield or to change fishing method, particularly if OFWs are located in territorial waters (12 nautical miles from the coast); calls for appropriate compensation as a last resort;
24. Stresses the need to facilitate access to insurance for fishing vessels operating in or sailing through areas with OWFs, as it is currently very problematic owing to the insufficient indemnity levels offered by fishing vessels' insurance policies;
25. Points out that any restriction on access to traditional fishing grounds directly affects the livelihoods of fishers from the different coastal EU Member States and dependent jobs ashore; stresses, therefore, that appropriate compensation should be given as a last resort when necessary; furthermore, points out that restrictions on access could undermine the responsible and sustainable provision of food security;
26. Calls on Member States, in line with maritime spatial planning provisions, to designate specific historical and traditional fishing grounds of local fishers as areas that are to remain free of offshore renewables;
27. Stresses that overlap analysis of offshore renewables and fisheries suggests a sharp increase in spatial conflict potential in certain European sea basins over the coming years; stresses, in this context, the need for early spatial planning which includes all relevant stakeholders, with regard to both the placement and the lay-out of OFWs; calls for effective participation, dialogues and networks to be set up at an early stage, in order to reduce and avoid conflicts;
28. Stresses that there are currently some examples of cooperation of (active or passive) fishing activities in areas with OFWs; stresses that cooperative co-design approaches to the deployment of OWFs, in order to combine them with other uses, can reduce the potential impact on fisheries, strengthen the relationship between the various sectors involved and allow for beneficial cooperation between them;
29. Recognises the potential for aqua- and algaculture, as well as for passive fishing, within areas with OWFs; stresses, however, that more research is necessary in order to assess their ecological impact and economic potential;
30. Is concerned about the fact that, apart from prohibitions and restrictions to fishing activities, fishers tend to avoid fishing in areas with OWFs even if access is permitted because of the risk of accidental damage, snagging and loss of fishing gear, and that consequently the fear of potential exposure to liability is a source of concern that hinders coexistence;
31. Stresses that outermost regions' and islands' energy mixes are highly dependent on fossil fuel imports, despite their local characteristics which are conducive to the development of renewables; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to pay special attention and dedicate specific funding to the development of offshore renewable energy in these territories in order to minimise dependency on fossil fuels;
32. Acknowledges the potential of floating offshore wind devices which create opportunities for installations in areas with deep waters, and involve greater distance from the coastline, less visual impact and less potential spatial overlap with fishing areas;
33. Stresses that the decommissioning of offshore wind turbines must neither generate enduring environmental impacts or pose safety risks to fishing vessels due to any remaining sub-seabed infrastructure; points out, in addition, that recycling methods should be further developed in order to reduce the impacts on the environment; considers it essential to ensure that offshore windfarms should only be built if an integrated approach to the life-cycle processes of offshore wind turbines is taken, meaning that it is clear from the beginning how offshore wind turbines can be designed, constructed, used, decommissioned and recycled in a sustainable way; stresses further that decommissioning strategies envisaging alternative future use or removal of the constructions must be integrated into the design and installation plans from the beginning, and that the long-term sustainable impact must be considered in order to adhere to the principles of a circular economy;
34. Urges the creation of an international standard that defines how to decommission turbines and that gives a comprehensive overview of the rules and regulations on decommissioning, while adhering to the principles of a circular economy;
35. Emphasises that financial arrangements should be put in place in order to cover the long-term risks arising from abandoned offshore infrastructure which might be removed so that fishing may safely return;
36. Stresses that any sub-seabed infrastructure left in situ should be subject to appropriate monitoring;
37. Highlights that assessments of the economic, socio-economic and socio-cultural effects of offshore renewables on fisheries are lacking in recent empirical studies; urges the Commission, therefore, to carry out further research in addition to studying the environmental impacts in order to assess the possible economic and social impacts on fisheries of investments in offshore renewables and to identify appropriate ways to overcome these negative impacts;
38. Stresses that standardised monitoring programmes and harmonisation of fishing effort data are required to enable cumulative ecological and socio-economic as well as environmental impact assessment of the expansion of offshore renewable energy and that compatibility and comparability of data have to be improved;
39. Proposes that Member States increase coordination in the field of OWF research in order to facilitate the collection and exchange of research findings and data, as well as exchange of best practices; recalls that offshore wind energy is one of the most advanced technologies, but that other renewable energy systems could be promising, and in certain cases more appropriate, in some areas where fishing activities take place and thus have a less damaging impact on the economic, social and environmental aspects; highlights the importance of boosting investments in research and development in this regard;
40. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to improve cross-border cooperation in maritime spatial planning, including with the United Kingdom, the largest producer of offshore wind in Europe, in order to find solutions to common problems, integrate electricity connections and learn from best practices;
41. States that maritime spatial planning must play a key role, by distinguishing each maritime area on the basis of its own characteristics and has to put greater emphasis on the assessment of achieving co-location options and multi-usage of OFWs, which is of the utmost importance in achieving a win-win situation for sustainable fisheries, aquaculture and the offshore energy sector, and in including the effective participation of fisheries in the decision-making process as opposed to the overly vague notions of 'consultation' and 'observers', the fulfilment of commitments made and the prior resolution of usage conflicts;
42. Calls on Member States, as the competent authority on maritime spatial planning, in the context of their continued work and subsequent revisions of national maritime spatial plans, to take into account the need to ensure that the negative effects of offshore wind turbines on fisheries are avoided and that they are therefore placed away from fishing grounds;
43. Promotes the application of an ecosystem-based approach in maritime spatial planning, with the intention of providing a systems-based framework for understanding and managing marine ecosystems and their interaction with socio-economic activities;
44. Highlights the importance of community energy production schemes which allow coastal communities and cooperatives, including fishers, to generate their own electricity and reinvest profits back into the community;
45. Stresses that OWFs should only be built if the exclusion of negative environmental and ecological, as well as economic, socio-economic and socio-cultural impacts on fishers and aquaculture producers is guaranteed, in line with the objectives of the Blue Economy and the European Green Deal;
46. Urges the Member States to take into account the impact of offshore renewable energy on the marine ecosystem and fisheries when determining their energy mix;
47. Urges the Member States also to continue working on the development and usage of other forms of renewable energy;
48. Calls on the Commission to carry out an impact assessment to examine the expected economic, social and environmental consequences of constructing OWF facilities where they are likely to come into conflict with both the fishing sector and the sustainability of marine life;
49. Stresses that cooperation across the sectors active in the offshore environment and economy will also be a driver for a just transition; calls on the Commission to assess initiatives that stimulate local economies and economic activities offshore and to find synergies between sectors that can serve as a basis for a future-proof economic recovery;
50. Highlights that examples of coexistence between the fishing sector and the offshore wind energy sector already exist, and that this experience should be used to find and share the best available practices for the whole life cycle of marine infrastructure;
51. Stresses that stakeholders should have a right to participate and have a say in maritime spatial planning;
52. Stresses that early, equitable, effective and continuous stakeholder consultation and participation, notably of fishers and aquaculture producers, the creation of transparent guidelines and the payment of compensation could alleviate the potential for conflict and create a level playing field between fisheries and offshore renewables;
53. Calls for the EU to promote and support OWF in its external action, in particular with third countries where access to energy remains uneven and limited, in line with the Green Deal's objectives;
54. Emphasises that the precautionary principle, in accordance with Article 191(2) TFEU, should apply if decisions have to be taken before the required knowledge or information is available;
55. Notes that further measures at EU level might be required, including legislation, given that evidence suggests that Member States' maritime spatial planning does not guarantee the fair inclusion of fishers and other stakeholders and, where appropriate, compensation for fisheries;
56. Urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that maritime spatial plans guarantee the fair inclusion of fisheries, the sustainable continuation of their activities and fairly reflect the legitimate interests of fishers, shellfish gatherers and aquaculturists;
57. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.
Study - 'Impact of the use of offshore wind and other marine renewables on European fisheries', European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department B – Structural and Cohesion Policies, 12 November 2020.
Connecting Europe facility ***II
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European Parliament legislative resolution of 7 July 2021 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014 (06115/2/2021 – C9-0214/2021 – 2018/0228(COD))
– having regard to the Council position at first reading (06115/2/2021 – C9‑0214/2021),
– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 19 September 2018(1)
– having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 10 October 2018(2),
– having regard to its position at first reading(3) on the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2018)0438),
– having regard to Article 294(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
– having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committees responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to Rule 67 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the recommendation for second reading of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and the Committee on Transport and Tourism (A9-0219/2021),
1. Approves the Council position at first reading;
2. Notes that the act is adopted in accordance with the Council position;
3. Instructs its President to sign the act with the President of the Council, in accordance with Article 297(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
4. Instructs its Secretary-General to sign the act, once it has been verified that all the procedures have been duly completed, and, in agreement with the Secretary-General of the Council, to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;
5. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.
Measures necessary for the implementation of the Protocol on the financial consequences of the expiry of the ECSC Treaty and on the Research Fund for Coal and Steel ***
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European Parliament legislative resolution of 7 July 2021 on the draft Council decision amending Decision 2003/76/EC establishing the measures necessary for the implementation of the Protocol, annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the financial consequences of the expiry of the ECSC Treaty and on the Research Fund for Coal and Steel (09399/2021 – C9-0242/2021 – 2020/0142(APP))
– having regard to the draft Council decision (09399/2021),
– having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 2 of Protocol No 37 on the financial consequences of the expiry of the ECSC Treaty and on the Research Fund for Coal and Steel, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9-0242/2021),
– having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0229/2021),
1. Gives its consent to the draft Council decision;
2. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.
Managing the assets of the ECSC in liquidation and of the Research Fund for Coal and Steel *
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European Parliament legislative resolution of 7 July 2021 on the proposal for a Council decision amending Decision 2003/77/EC laying down multiannual financial guidelines for managing the assets of the ECSC in liquidation and, on completion of the liquidation, the Assets of the Research Fund for Coal and Steel (COM(2020)0321 – C9-0216/2020 – 2020/0143(NLE))
– having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2020)0321),
— having regard to Protocol No 37 on the financial consequences of the expiry of the ECSC Treaty and on the Research Fund for Coal and Steel, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular the second paragraph of Article 2 thereof, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C9-0216/2020),
— having regard to Rule 82 of its Rules of Procedure,
— having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0228/2021),
1. Approves the Commission proposal;
2. Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;
3. Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;
4. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and the Commission.
Visa Information System (VIS): visa processing ***II
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European Parliament legislative resolution of 7 July 2021 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EC) No 810/2009, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240, (EU) 2018/1860, (EU) 2018/1861, (EU) 2019/817 and (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decisions 2004/512/EC and 2008/633/JHA, for the purpose of reforming the Visa Information System (05950/1/2021 – C9-0198/2021 – 2018/0152A(COD))
– having regard to the Council position at first reading (05950/1/2021 – C9‑0198/2021),
– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 19 September 2018(1),
– having regard to its position at first reading(2) on the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2018)0302),
– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposed legal basis,
– having regard to Article 294(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
– having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the decision by the Conference of Presidents of 25 September 2020 to authorise the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs to split the legislative procedure and to proceed on that basis,
– having regard to Rules 67 and 40 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the recommendation for second reading of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0207/2021),
1. Approves the Council position at first reading;
2. Notes that the act is adopted in accordance with the Council position;
3. Instructs its President to sign the act with the President of the Council, in accordance with Article 297(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
4. Instructs its Secretary-General to sign the act, once it has been verified that all the procedures have been duly completed, and, in agreement with the Secretary-General of the Council, to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;
5. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.
Visa Information System (VIS): conditions for accessing other EU information systems for VIS purposes ***II
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European Parliament legislative resolution of 7 July 2021 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 603/2013, (EU) 2016/794, (EU) 2018/1862, (EU) 2019/816 and (EU) 2019/818 as regards the establishment of the conditions for accessing other EU information systems for the purposes of the Visa Information System (05951/1/2021 – C9-0199/2021 – 2018/0152B(COD))
– having regard to the Council position at first reading (05951/1/2021 – C9‑0199/2021),
– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 19 September 2018(1),
– having regard to its position at first reading(2) on the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2018)0302),
– having regard to Article 294(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
– having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the decision by the Conference of Presidents of 25 September 2020 to authorise the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs to split the legislative procedure and to proceed on that basis,
– having regard to Rule 67 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the recommendation for second reading of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0208/2021),
1. Approves the Council position at first reading;
2. Notes that the act is adopted in accordance with the Council position;
3. Instructs its President to sign the act with the President of the Council, in accordance with Article 297(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
4. Instructs its Secretary-General to sign the act, once it has been verified that all the procedures have been duly completed, and, in agreement with the Secretary-General of the Council, to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;
5. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.
Integrated Border Management Fund: Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy 2021-2027 ***II
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European Parliament legislative resolution of 7 July 2021 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing, as part of the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (06487/2/2021 – C9-0226/2021 – 2018/0249(COD))
– having regard to the Council position at first reading (06487/2/2021 – C9‑0226/2021),
– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 17 October 2018(1),
– having regard to its position at first reading(2) on the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2018)0473),
– having regard to Article 294(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
– having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to Rule 67 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the recommendation for second reading of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0220/2021),
1. Approves the Council position at first reading;
2. Notes that the act is adopted in accordance with the Council position;
3. Instructs its President to sign the act with the President of the Council, in accordance with Article 297(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
4. Instructs its Secretary-General to sign the act, once it has been verified that all the procedures have been duly completed, and, in agreement with the Secretary-General of the Council, to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;
5. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.
– having regard to Article 10(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),
– having regard to Article 11 TEU,
– having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Parliament’s position on the Conference on the Future of Europe(1),
– having regard to its resolution of 18 June 2020 on the European Parliament’s position on the Conference on the Future of Europe(2),
– having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the position in the form of amendments of the Committee on Petitions,
– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Culture and Education and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A9-0213/2021),
A. whereas the results of the 2019 European elections sent a positive signal that European citizens are taking an increasing interest in developments at EU level and that they believe that EU legislation has an impact on their daily lives; whereas overall turnout in 2019 was 50,6 %, the highest since 1994 and a notable increase from 2014, when turnout was 42,6 %; whereas, although turnout in 2019 was higher among all groups of the population, the increase was led by the younger generation, with large increases among people aged under 25 and those aged between 25 and 39; whereas despite the overall increase in turnout, large differences remain between individual Member States;
B. whereas according to the Civic Engagement Eurobarometer of June 2020(3), voting in European elections was regarded by 55 % of respondents as the most effective way of ensuring that voices are heard by decision-makers at EU level; whereas, although it is the aim to continuously improve the way in which democracy works in the EU, several Eurobarometer surveys show that citizens are not satisfied with the way democracy works; whereas this perception is not only measured at EU level, but also at national level; whereas a considerable proportion of EU citizens do not feel heard and consider the EU to be a distant entity;
C. whereas Articles 10 and 11 TEU and Articles 20, 21, 24, 227 and 228 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) form the basis for citizens to participate in the making of EU policies and legislation;
D. whereas Article 10(3) TEU lays down that every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union and that decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen;
E. whereas Article 11(1) and (2) TEU requires the institutions to give, by appropriate means, citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action, and to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society;
F. whereas the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making(4), in its paragraph 19, underlines that public and stakeholder consultation is integral to well-informed decision-making and to improving the quality of law-making;
G. whereas Article 165(2) TFEU mandates the EU to encourage the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of socio-educational instructors, and to encourage the participation of young people in democratic life in Europe;
H. whereas EU citizens may only under certain conditions institute proceedings directly before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), in order to enforce their rights under the Treaties, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights; whereas democratic elections to the European Parliament constitute the main bottom-up instrument for citizens in the EU, while other means, namely the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), complaints to the European Ombudsman and petitions to Parliament, which are important supplements to Parliamentarism, must be strengthened;
I. whereas there have been six successful ECIs to date, most recently the ‘Minority Safepack’ initiative and the ‘End the Cage Age’ initiative; whereas Regulation (EU) 2019/788(5) on the ECI, which came into effect in January 2020, intends to make it easier for citizens to call on the Commission to propose legislative acts in its areas of competence in which the Union has the power to act; whereas the ‘Minority Safepack’ initiative was the first ECI to be debated in Parliament on the basis of the revised ECI regulation, and was overwhelmingly supported by Parliament in December 2020 with 76 % of the votes cast; whereas, nevertheless, the impact of ECIs is low, owing in part to the Commission’s lack of follow-up;
J. whereas the European Ombudsman’s recommendations are not legally binding but the rate of compliance with findings is consistently high;
K. whereas citizens of the EU and any natural or legal person residing in or with a registered office in a Member State have the right to submit petitions to the European Parliament under Articles 24 and 227 TFEU whenever the matter affects them directly and falls within the EU’s fields of activity;
L. whereas online public consultations carried out by the Commission are mostly aimed at a particular target group, are not widely disseminated and are sometimes too brief, meaning that they do not reach a significant proportion of the population; whereas the European Court of Auditors, in a comprehensive review of the Commission’s consultation policy in 2019, recommended that the Commission should improve the way it reaches out to citizens in order to promote greater participation;
M. whereas Citizens’ Dialogues conducted by the Commission are a way to provide information to citizens rather than to engage with them in a debate about their vision and what they would like to see change in the EU and do not provide a feedback mechanism to inform citizens about the outcomes of their participation;
N. whereas the current functioning of existing participatory instruments, such as the ECI, public consultations and Citizens’ Dialogues, does not provide sufficient means for citizens to influence EU decision-making; whereas this is largely due to the lack of effective follow-up in the decision-making process at institutional level;
O. whereas most forms of participation are rarely used by individual citizens; whereas individual citizens are largely unaware of the existing participatory instruments and therefore underrepresented in views and data collected through the existing instruments; whereas citizens’ participation does not replace organised civil society;
P. whereas the current participatory instruments do not maximise the potential of citizens’ participation and therefore insufficiently contribute to strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the EU and increasing citizens’ sense of ownership towards an EU that reflects their needs and visions;
Q. whereas reforming the existing participatory instruments, while paying particular attention to the most underrepresented groups of society, notably young people, and further developing a European public sphere can contribute to reinforcing the democratic legitimacy of the EU;
R. whereas improving citizens’ participation and transparency at EU level is key to bringing the Union closer to citizens and increasing citizens’ trust and confidence in EU institutions, as well as achieving a real multi-level democracy; whereas a lack of transparency prevents public debate on any piece of legislation; whereas not all stakeholders have equal access to the EU institutions or information about their work; whereas the Commission should carry out open, transparent and regular dialogues with citizens and civil society organisations; whereas the EU should ensure that civil society can participate actively in the public debate and has the capacity to influence policy and decision-making processes;
S. whereas there is a need to enhance the European dimension of citizenship education, by improving citizens’ understanding of the EU, in order to enable their participation;
T. whereas there is a growing need for European citizenship education classes across Member States; whereas in this context, the work of civil society organisations in civic education and learning should be recognised, and a holistic approach to citizenship education, including both formal and non-formal education and learning, should be encouraged;
U. whereas existing successful projects on citizens’ participation, such as European HomeParliaments and EU Youth Dialogue, have demonstrated that citizens would like to be included in EU decision-making processes on a regular basis;
V. whereas the Council remains a closed-door institution as confirmed by the European Ombudsman’s inquiry OI/2/2017/TE into the Council’s lack of transparency regarding public access to its legislative documents and its decision-making process;
W. whereas the OECD defines open government as ‘a culture of governance based on innovative and sustainable public policies and practices inspired by the principles of transparency, accountability, and participation that fosters democracy and inclusive growth’;
X. whereas the European Citizens’ Consultations of 2018 conducted by Member States about the Future of Europe have proven to be an effective tool to engage with citizens on EU matters; whereas the lack of concrete follow-up and continuity in the process led to mixed results from this participatory effort;
Y. whereas the Conference on the Future of Europe should involve as much public participation as possible and could potentially be a valuable experience of engaging with citizens in order to understand what they truly expect from the EU and the work of the institutions;
1. Stresses the need to reflect on how the Union can become more effective in engaging with citizens under the Union's core principles of representative democracy; believes that citizens should have a greater voice in EU decision-making to make the Union more reflective of citizens’ views and more resilient, democratic and effective; believes in this regard that Treaty change should not be precluded, although it should not be a goal in itself, and that the Conference on the Future of Europe should provide an opportunity to forge a constructive dialogue with citizens on these key topics;
2. Believes that any reform of the Union, in order to make it more social, equitable, cohesive, united, focused, capable, sovereign and accountable, is strengthened by directly engaging with citizens through participatory mechanisms;
3. Underlines that there is an underlying tension between the vision of an EU centred around Member States and an EU centred around EU institutions which can be surpassed by developing an approach and instruments for a European Union of citizens;
4. Points out that the existing participatory instruments have various shortcomings and should therefore be improved and new ones developed to make citizens’ participation more accessible, inclusive, meaningful and effective; opines that, to facilitate public participation in wider political debates and equip citizens with the opportunity to influence political outcomes, with synergies in existing mechanisms, it is imperative that citizen engagement is structured in a way that responds to citizens’ expectations; believes that this bottom-up participatory agenda should complement representative democracy in the EU;
5. Highlights the importance of the ECI as the only participatory tool at EU level which has the capacity to potentially trigger legislation; calls for the response that is given to it to be strengthened through the adoption of a parliamentary resolution for each successful ECI; notes that the Commission must fully comply with its legal obligation to state sufficient reasons for why it did or did not take action on an ECI, and believes that this needs to be more comprehensive to ensure that citizens are provided with an accurate picture of what should be expected from engagement with or the launching of an ECI; regrets the lack of follow-up of successful ECIs by the Commission through legislative measures; believes that, in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2019/788, in case the Commission, within the given deadlines, has failed to publish its intentions, or has set out in a communication that it intends not to take action on an ECI which has met the procedural requirements and is in line with the Treaties, in particular the core values of the Union, enshrined in Article 2 TEU, Parliament could, in line with Rule 222 of its Rules of Procedures, decide to follow up on the ECI with a legislative own-initiative report (INL); urges the Commission to commit itself to submitting a legislative proposal following Parliament’s adoption of such an INL; proposes in that regard to modify the current framework agreement between Parliament and the Commission; asks that the ECI regulation be amended to incentivise the Commission to table a legislative proposal where the ECI submitted meets the relevant requirements;
6. Points out that, following the report of the European Court of Auditors(6), which recognised the effectiveness of the Commission’s public consultations, and given the satisfactory perception of citizens, the Commission should improve its public consultation process in order to promote greater citizens’ participation and to better monitor and assess their contributions;
7. Points out that the current concept and practice of Citizens’ Dialogues should be reinforced and updated;
8. Underlines the benefits of engaging with citizens and civil society in the development of a European public sphere and in complementing the democratic legitimacy of the EU provided by its representative institutions and democratic procedures;
9. Underlines that not all stakeholders, notably citizens and civil society groups, are equally active politically, vocal or influential; therefore, believes that EU participatory democracy requires supporting unorganised citizens and promoting their access to electoral and participatory opportunities within and outside EU channels;
10. Considers that citizens’ trust in the EU institutions is fundamental for democracy, good governance and effective policymaking; believes that the EU institutions must strive for the highest possible standards of transparency, accountability and integrity; stresses that citizens’ access to documents of the European institutions is fundamental for participatory democracy; calls in particular on the Council to increase transparency as regards its decision-making process and access to documents;
11. Underlines the potential of new technologies which can provide new avenues to engage with citizens, to ensure an effective bottom-up approach and improve the capacity of citizens to hold institutions accountable;
12. Stresses that open government, which combines increased transparency and accountability measures and participatory tools, is a good response to the democratic deficit that results from a perceived lack of agency in EU decision-making by EU citizens;
13. Welcomes the envisaged establishment of an ethics body as an independent authority to foster transparency in the EU institutions;
14. Draws attention to the new Citizenship, Equality, Rights and Values Programme, which is expected to give more visibility and impact to activities that contribute to citizens’ dialogues and engagement in participative democracies; stresses the importance of ensuring continuity and increased resources for the ‘citizens’ strand of this programme, including town twinning and remembrance activities; welcomes the introduction of activities aimed at fostering further European values under this programme, such as raising awareness of a common European history; calls for the swift establishment of the ‘Civil Dialogue Group’ under the new programme;
15. Believes that it is important to promote exchanges between citizens of different countries at European, national, regional and local level, in particular through networks of towns and regions, and by facilitating an inter-regional dialogue; calls on the Commission to ensure sufficient funding for that purpose through the ‘Citizens’ engagement and participation’ strand of the Citizenship, Equality, Rights and Values programme;
16. Emphasises that improved information regarding citizens’ concerns will assist the EU institutions in their efforts to be attentive and responsive to these concerns by ensuring adequate channels to reach citizens and gather input and by providing appropriate follow-up in the ensuing decision-making process; calls for participatory mechanisms to be improved to enable citizens’ participation to have a meaningful impact on EU decision-making;
17. Underlines the need to engage with young people in particular in a political debate on the future of Europe and involve them consistently in participatory mechanisms and regularly held citizens’ dialogues, as today’s decisions will determine their future; emphasises the need to identify new means of communication and interaction adapted to the interests of young people;
18. Commends child-specific consultations conducted by the Commission and supports the setting up of an EU children’s participation platform in the future; welcomes the inclusion of young people in the Digital Platform and Citizens’ Panels of the Conference on the Future of Europe; urges the EU institutions to create ways to ensure similar engagement with children and young people in the future on a structural basis and with adequate feedback mechanisms;
19. Calls for genuine involvement of young people and youth organisations in the planning, implementation and evaluation of events and programmes; commends the efforts made by the EU Youth Dialogue to include young people and youth organisations in creating policy and decision-making; calls on the EU institutions to commit to taking tangible action based on the outcomes of the EU Youth Dialogue;
20. Highlights the necessity of engaging with educational institutions and civic education organisations to ensure that active European citizenship becomes part of the curriculum across the EU; calls on the Commission to provide support in order to complement educational programmes in all Member States, notably by supporting the development of a common curriculum on European and global civic education, fostering a better understanding of the existing EU institutions and of the history and cultures of Member States, and encouraging objective and critical thinking of the benefits of the European Union; suggests the inclusion of modules on EU functioning and history in educational curricula and calls on the Commission to propose guidelines for such modules;
21. Recalls the Declaration on promoting citizenship and the common values of freedom, tolerance and non-discrimination through education adopted by the EU education ministers on 17 March 2015, in which they called for strengthened actions in the field of education at European, national, regional and local level in order to safeguard our pluralistic society;
22. Calls on the Commission to launch an annual European Union Olympiad competition on EU functioning and history for young people in high schools, vocational training and other educational structures, in order to boost interest, participation and debate on EU affairs; emphasises that the Erasmus+ programme should also be utilised to enhance European citizenship education, especially among students and young people; reiterates the need for the Commission to better support EU affairs and study programmes that exist across Europe and beyond, building on the successful Erasmus+ programme;
23. Believes that ensuring youth participation will be an essential part of the long-lasting impact of citizens’ dialogue initiatives; stresses the importance, therefore, of focusing on young people in any EU learning activities and suggests that youth engagement tools be promoted, with a special focus on social media, mobile apps, mobile games, quizzes and other youth-friendly formats; welcomes peer-to-peer educational programmes such as the European Youth Parliament and the EU Youth Dialogue as examples of good practices;
24. Underlines the importance of academia, researchers and universities in the improvement of the level of know-how of citizens about participatory mechanisms in the EU in order to increase their participation in the EU decision-making process;
25. Highlights that effective citizens’ dialogues and active citizens’ participation are strongly linked to the European dimension of citizenship education; stresses therefore the need to enhance the European dimension of citizenship education in order to enable citizens’ participation and ability to act as informed citizens and to fully participate in civic and social life at both, the European and Member State level, based on understanding of political, legal, social and economic concepts and structures, as well as global developments and sustainability; calls on the Commission to develop a comprehensive European strategy to enhance citizenship competences in the EU and develop supportive measures aimed at providing equal access to citizenship education to all people residing in the EU in order to enable them to exercise their political rights;
26. Proposes to establish a European network for citizenship education to provide a platform for the exchange of best practices and knowledge regarding methods of enhancing the European dimension of citizenship education; stresses the need for new models and instruments of citizenship education;
27. Highlights the role played by the media in shaping citizens’ opinions on EU policy and the EU itself; stresses the need to uphold an independent and diverse media landscape across Europe, but believes greater effort should be made to tackle disinformation and misreporting in the media on EU issues, notably through increased support for fact-based, pan-European media projects;
28. Underlines the right of citizens to have access to reliable, independent and factual information on the European Union, its policies and its decision-making processes; recognises the need to establish diversified access to a neutral, independent and informative common European news centre, accessible in all the official EU languages, and to develop proactive communication with EU citizens; recalls, too, the value of existing media outlets; considers it necessary to concretely tackle the spread of misinformation and disinformation, especially in times of crises when valid, reliable and timely information is needed most; stresses that the independence of the media is crucial to these processes; calls for the introduction into the functioning of online platforms of downstream feedback, fact-checking and moderation in relation to misinformation and disinformation that are respectful of civil rights and freedom of expression; considers it essential, therefore, to reinforce the training of journalists in order to foster independent and critical thinking;
29. Welcomes the European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP) objective of improving citizens’ participation in democratic systems through informed decision-making; emphasises the need to ensure youth participation and the civic engagement of people from disadvantaged backgrounds under Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps; welcomes the measures announced under the EDAP to strengthen media freedom, freedom of expression and quality journalism; looks forward to the Commission’s proposals for practical and efficient tools to better secure the safety of journalists, who are all too often subjected to threats and undue intimidation, thereby limiting citizens’ right to information; notes with concern the lack of specific proposals to ensure artistic freedom and grant protection to censored and prosecuted artists and invites the Commission to further develop this area under the EDAP;
30. Recognises the right of all EU citizens to request and receive information from the EU institutions in one of the official EU languages; points out that genuine dialogue and the active and informed participation of EU citizens in EU decision-making is only possible if there is no language barrier, and therefore calls on the Commission to make much greater efforts to communicate with citizens in all the official EU languages; notes that in order to strengthen inclusiveness, awareness and visibility, there is a need to improve the accessibility of online content; suggests that all EU websites should be user-friendly and available in all official EU languages;
31. Recalls that European policies and legislation are most times implemented by local and regional administrations and that they have the capacity to reach out more easily and play a central role in educating citizens about the EU, as they are the level of government closest to the citizens; stresses that a first step could be to increase the resources allocated to the liaison offices of the European institutions and to develop their territorial network throughout Europe;
32. Welcomes the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 14 October 2020 entitled ‘Local and regional authorities in the permanent dialogue with citizens’(7); requests, in addition to EU-wide tools for citizens’ participation, the establishment of a network of multi-level governments that should serve as a transmission chain between European institutions and citizens;
33. Reiterates the need to fully engage citizens in EU decision-making in order to enhance the legitimacy of the EU and increase public trust in the work of the institutions; stresses, therefore, the importance of permanent participatory mechanisms to further facilitate and encourage citizens’ participation in EU decision-making beyond the act of voting and other existing channels and instruments; supports awareness-raising activities of these mechanisms to maximise their impact and effectiveness; underlines the need for such mechanisms at European, national, regional and local level and for adequate horizontal and vertical coordination among institutions at different levels;
34. Highlights the fact that regular participatory processes with citizens could serve different purposes, such as influencing annual political or legislative priorities, developing specific proposals in relation to specific questions, discussing institutional matters or deciding on the spending of certain public resources; underlines, however, that while citizens’ participation will prove to be beneficial in some areas, it is important that citizens have a clear understanding of engagement outcomes, including inherent limitations, with appropriate and transparent follow-up procedures;
35. Notes that citizens’ participation mechanisms include a wide range of tools that are complementary, such as citizens’ assemblies, citizens’ initiatives, public consultations, citizens’ dialogues, participative budgeting, referendums, etc.;
36. Recalls that participatory mechanisms for citizens should provide a means for individuals to express their ideas and concerns; underlines the fact that they have to be participatory, inclusive, open, deliberate, transnational, transparent, non-partisan, accountable, effective, visible and engaging;
37. Emphasises that, in order to reach out to as many people as possible, an inclusive approach must be taken; underlines the fact that the selection of participants should ensure a well-balanced representation of the population by the use of adequate communication mechanisms to reach a diverse public, so that the societal and territorial diversity is fully reflected; stresses that all citizens should have equal access to participatory mechanisms, including those living in disadvantaged areas or those who have a lower exposure to EU information; calls for participatory mechanisms to be extended to all, including non-EU citizens residing in the EU as well as EU citizens residing in another Member State or in a non-EU country, who should be offered alternative mechanisms adapted to their needs;
38. Stresses the need for citizens to have access to participation mechanisms in all official Union languages; recalls that language barriers make the European institutions distant from citizens and prevent the development of a truly inclusive European democracy;
39. Underlines the importance of giving full access to persons with disabilities to all the different instruments that the EU provides to citizens, particularly through systematic interpretation and translation into sign language and easy-to-read language;
40. Highlights that civil society organisations, social partners and other stakeholders should play a major role in all participatory instruments; considers that proper methodologies supporting their participation are crucial; underlines the fact that, in order for such instruments to be successful, the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) must be involved;
41. Stresses that the purpose, rules and timeframes of any participatory process must be communicated from the very beginning in order for them to be effective; underlines that communication on citizen engagement needs to highlight the practical role of any mechanism, otherwise failing to meet expectations will reduce participation, and in turn legitimacy;
42. Emphasises the need to have a good balance between a common format and diverse national practices for the regularly held citizens’ dialogues in order to provide citizens with a European framework that accommodates various traditions of deliberation at national level;
43. Stresses that digital technologies should be a complement to face-to-face participation instruments and should especially be used to encourage participation among populations that have difficulties participating in traditional participatory instruments;
44. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop accessible, innovative and inclusive tools for citizens’ participation and dialogues, making better use of digital technologies to allow all citizens (such as younger and older people, people with disabilities, mobile EU citizens, people living in rural or less populated areas) to play an effective part in EU decision-making, building on the lessons from the way the COVID-19 pandemic has acted as an accelerator for the use of digital tools; points out the added value of a non-bureaucratic and comprehensive website providing citizens with information about all European participatory initiatives; underlines the crucial role of social media, especially for children; stresses that the purpose of such innovative tools should be to support representative democracy and that transparency at all levels should be ensured;
45. Calls for fact checking and moderation with regard to disinformation in the functioning of online platforms that are used to engage with citizens;
46. Recalls that, prior to the launching of any participatory process, the EU institutions must commit themselves to following up on their outcome in the light of their competences and legislative procedures, since citizens’ disappointment often stems from a lack of follow-up; stresses that citizens should have a clear understanding of citizen engagement and dialogue structures so that expectation meets reality, otherwise there is a risk of disenfranchising citizens; highlights that any new participatory instrument should be accompanied by a significant communication campaign, with high-level political engagement at EU and national level, similar to the successful electoral campaign for the 2019 European Parliament elections;
47. Stresses that the EU institutions must actively provide guidance to participants throughout the participatory process; underlines that at the end of this process, its outcome must be clearly defined, so that it can be subject to an obligatory response; proposes that participants should be provided with written feedback on each proposal or recommendation in clear language at the end of such exercises, in which the EU institutions clarify their intention to implement that proposal or recommendation or justify their decision not to do so; recognises that there are difficulties and challenges to overcome if participative mechanisms are to contribute more significantly to democratic quality, and in turn to a sense of ownership and European identity;
48. Highlights the need to establish a framework for the follow-up to citizens’ dialogues in order to take citizens’ input effectively into account; proposes that part of the follow-up could be to translate the outcome into initiative reports and public hearings and to involve citizens, including the most underrepresented groups of society, notably young people, throughout these steps;
49. Believes that citizens’ participatory processes must adhere to the highest possible level of transparency; notes that transparency and open data reinforces trust in public institutions and therefore their legitimacy; highlights that promoting the democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions through public engagement requires a greater understanding of EU decision-making; calls for the creation of a standard for open government at EU level that could serve as a basis for other levels of government;
50. Proposes that the Commission’s ‘Have your say’ website becomes a one-stop resource granting access to all participatory instruments at EU level; notes that the COVID-19 pandemic has encouraged the use of digital media and online conference systems, and therefore sees further opportunities that digitalisation offers for citizens’ participation; points out that this has helped citizens to participate more quickly, widely and inclusively in decision-making; believes that the EU should promote new and innovative ways for citizens’ participation, enabling the use of digital technology tools that facilitate multilingual dialogue with citizens; calls on the Commission to embrace further digital possibilities for citizens’ participation, in all official EU languages, including tutorials, past examples and information on relevant legislation; believes that provisions should be made for persons who are blind, visually impaired or otherwise print-disabled;
51. Encourages the setting up of an independent civil society, academic and social partners forum in order to monitor the process and its follow-up by the EU institutions;
52. Encourages the facilitation of the establishment of an independent civil society organisations network, based on voluntary participation, to bring together different democracy initiatives, including across different regions, in order to facilitate information sharing and knowledge transfer as well as to ensure that best practice methods are used; believes that this will increase citizens’ awareness of EU decision-making procedures, as well as ensure more opportunities for citizens to influence policy-making;
53. Welcomes the proposal from the Presidents of the EESC and the CoR to set up an interinstitutional working group on citizens’ participation in EU decision-making processes;
54. Commits to engaging with the other EU institutions and stakeholders to strengthen additional channels of citizen input, including the expansion of citizens' dialogues and the establishment of a permanent mechanism for citizens’ participation with a formally binding follow-up process;
55. Calls on the Commission to present a proposal for an interinstitutional agreement on civil dialogue on the basis of Article 11(2) TEU, stating that institutions must maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society;
56. Underlines the importance of fostering civic engagement and active participation in a coordinated and coherent way at local, regional, national and EU level; believes, in this context, that the role, activities and independence of European Commission Representations and European Parliament Liaison Offices (EPLOs) in the Member States should be strengthened, in order to facilitate civic engagement and direct dialogue with citizens, provide access to and the dissemination of information and raise awareness about the European Union and its policies through broad and well-coordinated use of communication tools for the digital and physical participation of citizens;
57. Points out the New European Bauhaus initiative as a recent innovation to encourage and facilitate citizens’ participation; highlights that the initiative brings citizens, experts, businesses, and institutions together and facilitates conversations about making tomorrow’s living spaces more affordable and accessible;
58. Proposes the introduction of citizens’ participation mechanisms for pilot projects, including ‘participatory budgeting’ to allow the shaping of the expenditure side of the Union’s budget and crowdsourcing to enable citizens to be involved in the co-creation of policies with EU decision-makers;
59. Stresses the need to facilitate citizens’ participation, with sufficient engagement from EU institutions, in the structural reforms of the EU by reforming the Convention method as provided for in Article 48 TEU; proposes that this be discussed in the Conference on the Future of Europe;
60. Welcomes the Conference on the Future of Europe and believes that it is a great opportunity to engage directly with citizens in a meaningful dialogue on the future of Europe and to provide responses to their demands;
61. Underlines the importance of balanced participation of civil society organisations alongside institutional representatives in the Conference on the Future of Europe; stresses the need for a solid follow-up on the outcome of the Conference, keeping citizens informed of the different steps in the resulting decision-making process, ensuring that the dialogue with citizens is meaningful and that it continues after the formal end of the Conference on the Future of Europe;
62. Stresses that citizens’ agoras organised in the framework of the Conference on the Future of Europe should serve as a pilot for their future institutionalisation as a permanent mechanism of citizen participation in key debates;
63. Expects that the Conference on the Future of Europe will bring an important contribution in the further development of citizens’ participation in the EU policy-making process and pave the way for the establishment of new permanent mechanisms for citizens’ participation;
64. Considers that the Conference on the Future of Europe provides an opportunity to discuss possible mechanisms for the active participation of citizens in the consultation process in order to influence the annual Work Programme of the Commission and the State of the Union address; notes that such a mechanism could work on an annual basis, starting in the first months of each year with national and regional citizens agoras that should prepare the priorities to be discussed in a transnational European citizens agora, which could be concluded on Europe Day; points out that the priorities resulting from the European citizens agora should be presented to the EU institutions in order to feed into the consultation mechanism that leads to the establishment of the annual Work Programme of the Commission;
65. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.
Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making (OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1).
Regulation (EU) 2019/788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the European citizens' initiative (OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 55).
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty,
– having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 21 and 42 thereof,
– having regard to its resolution of 13 June 2018 on EU-NATO relations(1),
– having regard to its resolution of 11 December 2018 on military mobility(2),
– having regard to its resolution of 14 February 2019 on the future of the INF Treaty and the impact on the European Union(3),
– having regard to the statement by the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of 2 August 2019 on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,
– having regard to its legislative resolution of 26 November 2019 on the proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax and Directive 2008/118/EC concerning the general arrangements for excise duty as regards defence effort within the Union framework(4),
– having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report(5),
– having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report(6),
– having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC, concerning procurement in the fields of defence and security, and of Directive 2009/43/EC, concerning the transfer of defence-related products(7),
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 14 November 2016 on the EU Global Strategy for the Union’s foreign and security policy, entitled ‘Shared vision common action: a stronger Europe’,
– having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2017/971 of 8 June 2017 determining the planning and conduct arrangements for EU non-executive military CSDP missions and amending Decisions 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian armed forces (EUTM Mali) and (CFSP) 2016/601 on a European Union CSDP military training mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA)(8), establishing the EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC),
– having regard to the defence package presented by the Commission on 7 June 2017 in the ‘Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence’ (COM(2017)0315),
– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 13 and 14 December 2018 on security and defence,
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 June 2020 on security and defence,
– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 of 5 November 2020 establishing the general conditions under which third States could exceptionally be invited to participate in individual PESCO projects(9),
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 November 2020 entitled ‘A recovery advancing the transition towards a more dynamic, resilient and competitive EU industry’,
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 November 2020 on the PESCO Strategic Review 2020,
– having regard to the decision of the Council of 6 May 2021 to approve the participation of the US, Canada and Norway in the PESCO project on military mobility,
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 April 2021 on an EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,
– having regard to the decision of the US to rejoin the Paris Agreement,
– having regard to the joint statement adopted at the EU-US Summit on 15 June 2021,
– having regard to the joint statement adopted at the EU-Canada Summit on 15 June 2021,
– having regard to the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap proposed by the European External Action Service on 6 November 2020,
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 2 December 2020 entitled ‘A new EU-US agenda for global change’ (JOIN(2020)0022),
– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 10 and 11 December 2020 on EU-US relations,
– having regard to the Council decision of 22 March 2021 establishing the European Peace Facility (EPF),
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018),
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 7 June 2017 entitled ‘A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external action’ (JOIN(2017)0021),
– having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 26 February 2021 on security and defence,
– having regard to the agreement between the negotiators of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 December 2020 on the European Defence Fund (EDF),
– having regard to the political agreement between the European Parliament and the Council of 18 December 2020 on the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) for the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) period (2021-2027),
– having regard to the Security of Information Agreement of 14 March 2003 between the EU and NATO,
– having regard to the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, signed in Warsaw on 8 July 2016 by the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, and the Secretary-General of NATO,
– having regard to the common set of 74 proposals for the implementation of the Warsaw Joint Declaration endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017,
– having regard to the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation, signed in Brussels by the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, and the Secretary-General of NATO on 10 July 2018, and to the Brussels Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 11 and 12 July 2018,
– having regard to the five progress reports by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Secretary-General of NATO on the implementation of the common set of proposals submitted jointly in June and December 2017, and in June 2018, 2019 and 2020,
– having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular SDG 16 aiming to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development,
– having regard to the nuclear disarmament obligation for nuclear-armed States Parties set out in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
– having regard to the Wales Summit Declaration, issued on 5 September 2014 by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales,
– having regard to the Brussels Summit communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 14 June 2021,
– having regard to the G7 leaders’ communiqué of 13 June 2021 entitled ‘Our shared agenda for global action to build back better’,
– having regard to the US-Russia Summit held in Geneva on 16 June 2021,
– having regard to the UN Agenda for Disarmament entitled ‘Securing our Common Future’,
– having regard to the report of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary-General of 25 November 2020 entitled ‘NATO 2030: United for a New Era’, co-chaired by Thomas de Mazière and Wess Mitchell,
– having regard to the NATO 2030 Young Leaders Group report of 4 February 2021 entitled ‘NATO 2030: Embrace the change, guard the values’,
– having regard to the visit by the NATO Secretary-General to the College of Commissioners of 15 December 2020,
– having regard to the participation of the VP/HR in the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers of 17 and 18 February 2021, and in the meeting of NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers of 23 and 24 March 2021,
– having regard to the State of the Union speech of 14 September 2016 by Commission President Juncker,
– having regard to the statements of 19 February 2021 by the political leaders of NATO and the EU at the Special Munich Security Conference ‘Beyond Westlessness’,
– having regard to the exchange of views during the 3 March 2021 session of the Interparliamentary Conference for the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the common security and defence policy (CSDP),
– having regard to European Court of Auditors (ECA) Review No 09/2019 of 12 September 2019 on European defence,
– having regard to the exchange of views with the NATO Secretary-General during the joint meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, and the Delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held on 15 March 2021,
– having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0192/2021),
A. whereas European and transatlantic solidarity and partnership form the basis for the past, current and future security of the transatlantic partnership; whereas both NATO and the EU are different in nature but evolving in the same volatile geopolitical context;
B. whereas both the EU and NATO have begun reflection processes in order to properly adjust to the unprecedented global security changes; whereas in June 2020, EU leaders agreed to launch a process aimed at defining a ‘Strategic Compass’; whereas at their recent Summit on 14 June 2021, NATO leaders decided to begin working on the next Strategic Concept, which will be endorsed at their next Summit in 2022;
C. whereas in November 2020, the EU’s first comprehensive, 360-degree, classified analysis on the full range of threats and challenges the EU faces, or might face in the near future, was prepared cooperatively by the EU Member States’ intelligence services; whereas in November 2021, the VP/HR is scheduled to present a draft of the Strategic Compass, which Member States will then discuss and are scheduled to adopt in March 2022; whereas the Strategic Compass aims to facilitate the emergence of a ‘common European security and defence culture’;
D. whereas the EU explicitly recognises the role of NATO for its members in defending Europe and its citizens (Article 42(7) TEU); whereas NATO has the primary responsibility of collective defence (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty); whereas NATO remains a crucial guarantor in the field of capabilities, ensuring the technical and human interoperability of the allied forces and the consistency of their equipment policies; whereas the commitment to collective self-defence, embodied in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and Article 42(7) TEU, is the guarantee of solidarity between allies and between Member States;
E. whereas the common values, common history and special relationship shared by the EU, European members of NATO, the US and Canada constitute the keystone of the Transatlantic Alliance; whereas the EU and NATO share common security challenges, common defence interests and the same increasingly challenging security environment;
F. whereas following the 2016 Joint Declaration, a process of cooperation between the EU and NATO was set in motion, centred around 74 common proposals for action in the areas of countering hybrid threats, operational cooperation, including at sea and on migration, cybersecurity and defence, defence capabilities, defence industry and research, exercises, and supporting eastern and southern partners’ capacity-building efforts;
G. whereas Europe’s security and defence depends on the political will and civilian and military capacity of Europeans to assume their responsibilities in a strategic environment that has deteriorated considerably in recent years; whereas NATO should not be seen merely as a continuation of a project from the past, but as a vision for the future of the world’s security and stability, which needs to continue adapting its political strategy to new challenges, maintain political solidarity and cohesion, and remain a credible, technically innovative organisation;
H. whereas the only legal framework for EU-NATO relations continues to be the 2003 Agreed Framework, which is limited to the sharing of collective NATO planning structures, assets and capabilities with the EU when it comes to the planning and conducting of EU CSDP military operations in accordance with the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements;
I. whereas on 10 November 2020, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that ‘we need to pursue nuclear arms control and disarmament as a matter of urgency’ and on 15 December 2020, NATO allies reaffirmed their commitment to the preservation and strengthening of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation;
J. whereas the EU and its Member States, in particular since the publication of the 2016 EU Global Strategy, have pursued policies enabling them to be a more active and influential global actor for peace and security, and have consequently intensified their cooperation in the field of security and defence; whereas milestones include the establishment of the European Defence Fund (EDF) and its precursor programmes, the launch of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), as well as the agreement on the European Peace Facility (EPF);
K. whereas CARD provides the EU with an instrument to further harmonise Member States’ efforts in defence capability development and to identify additional areas for cooperation;
L. whereas in the framework of the CSDP, 5 000 EU military and civilian staff are currently deployed in six military and 11 civilian missions and operations on three continents; whereas these missions have successfully provided support, capacity building and training with the goal of ensuring peace, security and stability in conflict and post-conflict areas; whereas Europe’s capacity relies heavily on the Union’s ability to intervene credibly in external theatres of operations;
M. whereas recent months have seen unprecedented levels of high-level EU-NATO interaction, such as the first discussion between a NATO Secretary-General and the College of EU Commissioners in December 2020, and the participation of the NATO Secretary-General in the European Council in February 2021;
N. whereas NATO, through its Defence Planning Process (NDPP), sets its ‘Level of Ambition’ every four years by identifying in qualitative and quantitative terms the pool of forces, equipment and capabilities that allies should have in their inventories to support the full spectrum of NATO missions and be able to respond to possible threats and challenges;
O. whereas the US has long called on the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts in terms of investments in their security and defence, as an important contribution to burden-sharing within the alliance;
P. whereas the COVID-19 pandemic is having a significant impact on international relations and national budgets and has further exacerbated existing global tensions and security challenges such as the irresponsible and aggressive deployment of forces; whereas China and Russia in particular have tried to use the pandemic to advance their strategic interests; whereas the EU and NATO have cooperated closely since the beginning of the pandemic, addressing matters such as the distribution of medical equipment and personnel, the repatriation of citizens, cyber and hybrid threats, and countering disinformation activities and hostile propaganda;
Q. whereas the Commission, when presenting the Defence Action Plan, underlined that industrial overcapacity, fragmentation and inefficiency in European military capability production has yearly costs of EUR 25 to 100 billion, which are borne by the national defence budgets of the Member States;
R. whereas democracies need to adequately respond to today’s challenges; whereas a number of NATO and EU members face internal challenges to democracy; whereas, globally, authoritarian regimes, such as Russia and China, appear to have consolidated their influence and are pursuing an aggressive agenda;
S. whereas NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EfP) in the eastern flank of the alliance, with four multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, is led by the US, the UK, Canada and Germany respectively;
T. whereas NATO has successfully tested its Rapid Air Mobility initiative to enable the urgent transport of medical supplies during the COVID-19 pandemic;
70 years of the transatlantic bond through NATO
1. Is convinced that the European Union and NATO have converging security and defence interests; welcomes the intensified EU-NATO cooperation that has been in place since the signature of the 2016 Warsaw Joint Declaration and was reinforced by the 2018 Brussels Joint Declaration, and underscores that a reinvigorated strategic EU-NATO partnership is essential to address the security challenges facing Europe and its neighbourhood; commends the achievements of the alliance and underlines its continued relevance; underlines that NATO needs to step up its efforts to adapt to the changing nature and increased level of threats, in order to remain a credible and sustainable global actor for collective security and peace in the world; recalls that for Member States which are also NATO allies, NATO is the cornerstone of collective defence; calls for the EU to keep deepening the transatlantic bond and its important partnership with NATO;
2. Reaffirms its previous commitment to the EU’s ambitions in the field of security and defence, and reiterates the EU’s ambition to be a global actor for peace and security; underlines the fact that NATO remains the bedrock of the security and collective defence of its members and the transatlantic community as a whole, and an indispensable forum for consultations and security decisions between allies; reaffirms its support for transatlantic cooperation, partnership and friendship, which have contributed to Europe’s success over the past 70 years and have been the basis for its stability and security since the end of the Second World War;
3. Underscores that the EU-NATO partnership and transatlantic cooperation as a whole are built on a common history and support for the core values of democracy, freedom, respect for human rights, the rule of law, the promotion of peace and international cooperation, and a rules-based international order; stresses that NATO is more than a military alliance and represents a symbol of shared democratic values;
4. Underlines that NATO is a valued partner also to EU Member States which are not members of the alliance; recognises that NATO cooperates with some of the non-NATO EU Member States, inter alia through its Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII); recalls that EU-NATO cooperation must be without prejudice to the security and defence policy of the non-NATO EU Member States; recalls that NATO cooperation with non-NATO EU Member States is an integral part of EU-NATO cooperation; welcomes the involvement of the non-NATO EU Member States in the alliance’s initiatives, while respecting neutrality policies, the respective constitutional frameworks, the involvement of third countries and the EU’s ambitions; stresses that the two organisations have clearly distinct features and that each should cooperate with full respect for the autonomy and decision-making procedures of the other on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and inclusiveness, without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policies of any of the Member States; recalls the different nature and roles of both organisations, the EU being a civilian organisation with a military arm for out-of-area operations under Article 43(1) TEU (Petersberg Tasks), and NATO being a military and political alliance in charge of organising the collective territorial defence of its members;
5. Highlights that the transatlantic community is faced with a broad array of emerging threats, systemic competition and unprecedented common challenges to our democratic societies, the rule of law and respect for fundamental freedoms which affect the security of the Member States and of their citizens, whether directly or indirectly, ranging from conventional threats, ineffective arms control and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the absence of nuclear weapons risk reduction, instability in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods, climate change, pandemics and terrorism, to hybrid threats, disinformation, cyber attacks, malicious use of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), unsafe migration and a shifting global power balance; stresses that, in view of the resulting challenge to the international rules-based order, stronger EU-NATO cooperation contributes to effective global governance and multilateralism;
6. Underscores that the transatlantic community can only successfully manage these challenges by further deepening cooperation and taking the partnership to a new level; underlines the fact that both the EU and NATO have unique abilities and strengths; considers therefore that the complementarity of efforts and advanced cooperation are of the utmost importance for maintaining transatlantic security; underlines that maintaining political cohesion and unity, as well as strengthening political consultation, must be priorities for the EU-NATO partnership in order to better address common challenges;
7. Is confident that the transatlantic community is capable not only of adapting to the new challenges but also of tackling them; expresses its gratitude for the excellent work performed by the numerous EU, NATO and national staff members who work hard to protect our citizens;
8. Pays tribute and respect to all the service members of the transatlantic alliance who fell or were wounded in service, as well as to those currently serving;
Enhancing both transatlantic and EU-NATO cooperation
9. Applauds the strong signal of transatlantic unity and cooperation sent by the NATO Summit on 14 June 2021, which demonstrated that the alliance remains vital and capable of adapting to current and new challenges; believes that the conclusions on EU-NATO cooperation should also be reflected in the work on NATO’s next Strategic Concept; welcomes the appointment by the NATO Secretary-General of the independent group of experts, and commends in particular their recommendations for stronger EU-NATO cooperation; endorses the proposals by the Commission President and the VP/HR of December 2020 for an EU-US Security and Defence Dialogue; welcomes the clearly stated commitment of the Biden administration to engaging with EU and NATO partners in all domains;
10. Strongly welcomes the EU-US Summit of 15 June 2021 and the expression of unwavering support for robust NATO-EU cooperation; welcomes the joint EU-US recognition of the contribution EU security and defence initiatives can make to both European and transatlantic security and welcomes the stated intention to launch a dedicated EU-US dialogue on security and defence; underlines both the key relevance of the US security presence in Europe for Europe’s security and its full commitment to transatlantic security cooperation; underscores that a strong EU-US partnership is a key element of successful EU-NATO cooperation; underlines that the transatlantic partnership benefits from predictable foreign policy-making and multilateral engagement; considers the change of the US administration as an opportunity to reaffirm shared values, such as democracy, the rule of law, multilateralism, peace and prosperity, and to enhance international cooperation in tackling common threats, which could include, where possible, joint sanctions;
11. Fully shares the view expressed in the final communiqué of the recent NATO Summit that the ongoing strategic processes within NATO and the EU offer a unique opportunity to further intensify our consultations and cooperation to enhance the security of our citizens and promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond; reiterates its call, therefore, for the ongoing and future work being carried out in parallel on both the EU’s Strategic Compass and the recently announced work on NATO’s next Strategic Concept to establish clear priorities and identify additional synergies in order to strengthen the transatlantic bond and further EU-NATO cooperation; calls on all actors involved to use this opportunity to link these processes at both political and technical level; underlines the fact that both processes should ensure coherence and identify common regional and global threats, and the necessary next steps to address those threats; expresses its vision that the EU Strategic Compass could lay the foundations for an EU contribution to NATO’s next Strategic Concept; believes that these distinct processes should separately highlight the added value of each organisation, help define, where relevant, a better division of tasks and, by means of a constant dialogue and close coordination, map out whether the EU or NATO should take the lead in a given field in a mutually reinforcing way;
12. Expects that the completion of the Strategic Compass will deepen EU solidarity and contribute to progress towards a common strategic culture among Member States; welcomes the first common threat analysis of November 2020 and calls for steps forward towards an agreed common threat assessment; considers that the EU’s integrated approach could be updated to take into account the findings of the threat analysis undertaken within the Strategic Compass process; believes that the security dimension of the countries in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, in particular the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the Western Balkans, should be properly taken into account in the drafting of the Strategic Compass, since the European security environment and European resilience cannot be achieved without the long-term security and resilience of all the EU’s neighbours;
13. Emphasises that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty as well as Article 42(7) TEU and Article 222 TFEU are important instruments for guaranteeing solidarity in a crisis towards members of the respective organisations; recalls that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was invoked after the September 2001 terror attacks in New York and Washington to express solidarity towards the US and that Article 42(7) TEU was invoked after the November 2015 terror attacks in Paris to express solidarity towards France; encourages a discussion about the relationship between Article 42(7) TEU and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which establish respectively the EU’s and NATO’s unequivocal commitment to solidarity and security, during the review of the Strategic Concept and the drafting of the Strategic Compass, while considering that the autonomous decision-making of both organisations should be fully respected;
14. Welcomes the positive language on EU-NATO cooperation in the final communiqué of the NATO Summit on 14 June 2021; believes, however, that significantly more efforts are needed to advance EU-NATO cooperation and achieve a true strategic partnership; underlines that the EU is a partner of NATO and that EU-NATO cooperation is mutually reinforcing and based on the agreed guiding principles of transparency, reciprocity, inclusiveness and the decision-making autonomy of both organisations; stresses that the development of coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities is essential to increase the security of the Euro-Atlantic area in line with the principle of the single set of forces; reiterates that a European capability to act, either in partnership or autonomously, is essential for complementarity and to contribute to the fulfilment of NATO’s core tasks, as well as to enhance conflict prevention, and hence for the security of the European continent as a whole;
15. Is of the opinion that future EU-NATO cooperation should build on experience and lessons learned from both the EU’s unique expertise in civilian crisis management and capacity building, in particular the ‘Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability’ (CPCC), and its military crisis management expertise, namely the ‘Military Planning and Conduct Capability’ (MPCC), together with the experience gained from deploying 37 military operations in the field since 2003 and providing assistance to military actors in partner countries via the ‘Capacity Building in support of Security and Development’ (CBSD) initiative and the African Peace Facility instrument, which has been integrated into the European Peace Facility;
16. Welcomes the clear language in the NATO Summit communiqué of 14 June 2021 on the importance of resilience; stresses that both the EU and NATO should strengthen their cooperation and coordinate it more effectively in the key field of resilience, and highlights the EU’s ambition to develop a meaningful approach towards strengthening the various civilian and military aspects of resilience, inter alia in the area of protecting critical infrastructure, such as in the transport, energy and IT sectors, as well as the role of the EU as a key actor in fighting disinformation and fake news;
17. Welcomes the positive decision by the Council of 6 May 2021 authorising the coordinator of the Military Mobility project, the Netherlands, to invite the US, Canada and Norway, following their respective requests, to participate in the PESCO project on military mobility; underlines that such participation would mark an important step towards increased coherence between the respective EU and NATO capability development efforts, and would constitute a concrete example of a reinvigorated transatlantic partnership; recalls that exceptional participation by third countries in PESCO projects, provided that it does not undermine the objective of fostering the EU CSDP and that they meet an agreed set of political, substantive and legal conditions, can be in the Union’s strategic interest, especially if they provide technical expertise or additional capabilities; considers that this is particularly true of strategic partners such as NATO allies, countries in the Western Balkans and EaP partners; recalls its position that third-country participation can only be exceptional, decided on a case-by-case basis and at the invitation of the EU Member States, and underlines that such participation should provide added value and contribute to strengthening the CSDP; recalls also that participation by third countries must respect the relevant rules set out in Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639;
18. Underlines the importance of transatlantic cooperation on a range of international issues, such as climate change, pandemic response, emerging disruptive technologies, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, the fight against terrorism, including jihadist and state-sponsored terrorism, energy, maritime security and resilience, and in the area of outer space;
19. Recognises the important cooperation between the EU and NATO in the Western Balkans, such as that between the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and Kosovo Force (KFOR); pays tribute to Operation EUFOR Althea, whose operational headquarters are located at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) on the basis of the Berlin Plus arrangements with NATO, which has been contributing under these arrangements to a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina since it took over from NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in 2004; notes that the experiences of and lessons learned from these missions and operations are instrumental in ensuring that all current and future EU-NATO cooperation provides peace, security and stability in affected regions, in supporting and training local partners and in building capacities; notes the important role that NATO integration has played in the Western Balkans by stabilising these countries, which was important for their EU perspective and gradual EU integration; believes that the EU and NATO should provide more support to the countries of the Western Balkans to counter malicious foreign interference from countries such as Russia, China, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, as well as radical groups and non-state actors; welcomes the fact that three Western Balkan countries in the EU accession process, Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia, have become NATO allies;
20. Calls on Member States and NATO allies alike to harness every means possible to support the strengthening of military-security cooperation with candidate and potential candidate EU countries and with eastern and southern neighbourhood partners, as without this the security and stability of the region cannot be assured; recalls the important role that the EU can play in supporting NATO’s open door policy by maintaining close political and operational synergies with its aspirant countries, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and Georgia; stresses the significance of contributions made by NATO’s various partner countries to Euro-Atlantic security; urges stronger coordination and the effective division of labour between the EU and NATO in cooperating with third countries, with a particular emphasis on NATO’s Enhanced Opportunities Partnership (EoP) countries; reiterates its support for both EU and NATO Enlargement;
Threats and challenges faced by the EU and NATO
21. Expresses its utmost concern regarding the continuous revisionist, militaristic and aggressive policies pursued by Russia under President Putin; welcomes the clear language on Russia used during the recent NATO and EU-US Summits, and welcomes the establishment of an EU-US high-level dialogue on Russia; underscores the need for both NATO and the EU to have a consistent, proactive strategy and to lawfully, swiftly and unitedly respond to acts of traditional and hybrid aggression and provocation by Russia; reiterates its previous condemnation of Russia’s illegitimate and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014; condemns Russia’s continuous use of cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns, fake news, assassination plots and poison attacks against opposition figures; calls for the EU and NATO to leverage and expand current engagements to counter Russia’s direct and indirect aggressions and activities directed against Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, as well as its ongoing assertive activities in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, in the Sea of Azov, in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the High North; recalls the importance of respecting international borders and the territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbours; recalls that the transatlantic partners must coordinate their dual-track approach of deterrence and dialogue with Russia, maintaining regular contact in the areas of arms control, military transparency and any other issues related to security;
22. Condemns the recent Russian sanctions against top European officials and other EU citizens, including the President of the European Parliament, and regrets President Putin’s evident rejection of dialogue, as well as the violation of a number of major international commitments and continuous violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and considers Russia’s continued aggressive actions and increased military assertiveness as a threat to international security and stability; expresses concern about Russia’s recent large-scale military activities in and around Ukraine; expresses, in this context, its unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and calls for its military capabilities and resilience to be strengthened;
23. Recognises that the growing influence, assertiveness, and military, technological and political rise of China need to be met with a coordinated transatlantic strategy; welcomes, in this light, the strong language used during the recent NATO and EU-US Summits; expresses serious concern regarding the policies pursued by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities when it comes to, among other things, the suppression of democracy in Hong Kong, the discriminatory treatment of religious and cultural minorities, especially the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, threats towards Taiwan, or aggressive policies and actions in the South China Sea; further points to the relevance of the fact that China, as an authoritarian regime, has entered into systemic competition with the transatlantic partnership by undermining the rules-based international order, which has been built over many decades, and in turn is attempting to reshape it according to the CCP’s own values, doctrine and interests; recalls China’s increased presence on the international stage as well as in Europe through its Belt and Road Initiative, its investments in critical infrastructure in Europe, its activities in cyber space, in the Arctic regions and in Africa, and its documented intellectual property theft and stockpiling of ballistic missiles; calls for close observation of Chinese activities in the area of information and communication technologies (ICT), especially with regard to its Digital Silk Road initiative, in order to prevent dependencies on infrastructure under the control of Chinese companies, which carries the risk of unilateral Chinese influence on international norm development in ICT; calls for the EU and NATO to increase coordination on securing critical digital infrastructure and telecommunications networks against tampering by foreign countries, by phasing out equipment that is produced by entities from non-democratic countries such as China;
24. Encourages the EU and NATO to commence a strategic dialogue to develop a common and coordinated approach towards China, drawing on each organisation’s strengths and capacities in order to generate the most added value possible based on commonly agreed strategic goals;
25. Expresses serious concern that authoritarian adversaries and competitors of the transatlantic partnership are not only using military but also political, economic, technological and social tools to undermine our societies and democracies; points to the significant security and economic challenges posed by hybrid threats, cyber attacks, foreign interferences, interference in elections and disinformation campaigns, which constitute an attack against the very nature of our democracies; condemns the recent increased cases of cyber attacks and espionage by state and non-state actors against EU Member States and NATO allies in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, including targeting the healthcare sector; underlines the fact that any European effort in the field of resilience must also include, as the basis for ensuring support for our defence activities, a clear public communication strategy to increase public awareness of transatlantic security challenges; considers that the EU and NATO should seek to agree on and implement an all-encompassing approach for bolder, coordinated, proportionate responses and adequate conflict prevention, and crisis management mechanisms to counter common novel threats;
26. Highlights that NATO remains a unique forum for defence cooperation between the EU and its former Member State, the UK; calls for a comprehensive, inclusive and strategic security and defence partnership between the EU and the UK; calls for NATO and the EU to increase common action on the international stage to protect democracy, including by strengthening multilateral organisations in order to defend the rules-based multilateral order against rising authoritarian powers; calls for the active development of closer ties with like-minded democracies around the world; believes that enhanced partnerships with countries such as Japan, Australia and India, who together with the US form the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, as well as South Korea and New Zealand, along with intensified cooperation with Taiwan, would not only increase our overall security but could help to ensure more effective implementation of global norms and rules, as laid out by multilateral fora such as the UN; also encourages EU-NATO cooperation with ASEAN members in this context;
27. Encourages the EU, NATO and the UN to further explore opportunities for closer cooperation in crisis management, humanitarian actions, peacekeeping and the capacity building of partners, especially in joint areas of operation; calls for the creation of a more inclusive environment by increasing women’s participation across the three core tasks and throughout their political and military structures; urges the EU and NATO to work together for a more systematic implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (WPS) and to develop joint education and training activities;
28. Underlines the need for a consistent, clear, coherent and coordinated EU-NATO approach to the southern neighbourhood, addressing both traditional threats such as terrorism and the growing, aggressive presence of Russia and China; points to the past cooperation between NATO Operation Ocean Shield and EU Naval Force Atalanta in combating piracy and providing safe passage in the Gulf of Aden;
29. Calls for cooperation and coordination in the Mediterranean between the EU’s Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI and NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian; emphasises that both operations contribute to security and stability in the Mediterranean;
30. Is preoccupied by growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, which represent a threat to regional and global stability, and calls for intensified cooperation with like-minded partners in the region, which should include regular political dialogue and consultation, information exchange, and the coordination of training and exercises;
31. Calls for strong commitment and coordination between the EU and NATO in sustaining the progress made in the past two decades in Afghanistan in the light of the withdrawal of the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, which should take place in an orderly, and coordinated manner; encourages further support to Intra-Afghan peace talks, with the insistence that the process preserves and builds on the political, economic and social achievements of the Afghan people since 2001, particularly the protection of women’s, children’s and minority rights;
32. Supports enhanced coordination between the EU, the UN and NATO in Iraq, inter alia through the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Iraq and NATO’s Mission Iraq (NMI), which both help to stabilise the country;
33. Encourages EU-NATO dialogue and cooperation with partner countries in Latin America and the Caribbean; points out that Colombia is the only NATO partner country in Latin America and stresses the need to consolidate further partnerships in the region;
34. Recognises that hybrid and cyber attacks by hostile states and non-state actors challenge the traditional definition of interstate conflict, espionage and sabotage; calls for the EU to further develop its own toolbox for protecting critical infrastructure against hybrid attacks; welcomes the work undertaken in the framework of the European Defence Agency’s (EDA) Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector (CF SEDSS) to improve the protection of critical infrastructure within the EU; emphasises that both the EU and NATO should further strengthen their own capabilities to prevent, deter and respond to hybrid and cyber attacks, including against their own institutions; welcomes the clarification in the 2021 NATO Summit communiqué that the North Atlantic Council can decide to invoke Article 5 in the event of hybrid warfare, as it can in the event of an armed attack; calls for increased cooperation and cyber defence training; proposes the creation of a common cyber threat information hub, as well as a joint EU-NATO task force for cybersecurity, in order to define and agree on collective responses to cyber threats; calls for strong coordination between the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in this respect; calls for increased EU-NATO coordination as regards establishing collective attribution for malicious cyber incidents;
35. Welcomes the work of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid COE), the Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU Institutions, bodies and agencies (CERT-EU) and the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) and sees this as a good example of EU-NATO cooperation; believes that a common response to cyber threats could be further developed through the Hybrid COE, including through joint courses and training; is convinced that more steps are needed, such as efforts to create more synergies between civilian and military components, to advance common resilience and hence avert future hybrid threats; points furthermore to EU-NATO potential in shaping global cyber norms, based on our shared common values; considers that the EU and NATO should coordinate their positions in developing an agenda for international arms control in key areas of EDTs with a military application;
36. Calls for the EU and NATO to step up joint efforts to achieve and maintain global technological leadership in military capabilities, including through the collaborative funding of research projects based on frontier technologies, quantum computing and artificial intelligence, thereby fostering the development of cutting-edge military capabilities anchored in democratic values; highlights the role that civilian-oriented start-ups and SMEs play in today’s innovation in the field of emerging technologies; stresses that emerging technologies also offer opportunities to strengthen our defence postures; further stresses that interoperability, common technological standards and joint investment in cutting-edge technology, research and innovation are key for the EU and NATO to continue their ambition of protecting our citizens in the best possible way; emphasises that the development of artificial intelligence (AI) that respects fundamental rights and supports public interest requires the strengthening of an EU AI framework which involves public, private and civil society stakeholders; recommends that initiatives such as the EDIDP, PESCO and the EDF facilitate the engagement of small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) by advancing efforts that support incubation and capital investment; encourages the development of a set of common EU AI capabilities to bridge technical gaps in order to ensure that Member States lacking the relevant technology-industry expertise or the ability to implement AI systems in their defence ministries are not left behind;
37. Notes the rapidity of technological developments, including digitalisation and the increased potential of AI, and calls on EU Member States and NATO allies to seek closer cooperation so that they maintain the technological edge as regards these megatrends, ensure the interoperability of their IT systems, and jointly strive to develop common ethical standards for these new technologies and to promote them globally; calls for the EU and NATO to take the lead in global efforts to set up a comprehensive regulatory framework for the development and ethical use of weapons with a certain degree of autonomy; encourages EU and NATO allies to actively take part in international negotiations on a legally binding instrument that would prohibit lethal autonomous weapons systems without meaningful human control; highlights that EU-NATO cooperation is fundamental to counter the ambition of adversaries such as China and Russia of technological dominance and the malign use of technology;
38. Recognises the unprecedented challenge to global peace, prosperity, security, including human security, and stability posed by climate change as a ‘threat and crisis multiplier’; calls for enhanced EU-NATO dialogue and a set of actions to counter climate change and its multifaceted consequences for international security; recalls that the EU has a wider range of competences and instruments that allow it to provide a comprehensive response to the challenges posed by climate change and the collapse of biodiversity; underlines that both the EU and NATO should increase investments in green technologies with the aim of improving military effectiveness while minimising the environmental footprint and avoiding further damages to ecosystems;
39. Acknowledges that space is a critical domain and that new technologies are rapidly enabling its use as one of the domains for defence; recognises that this creates both opportunities for EU-NATO cooperation and challenges for transatlantic security; acknowledges that NATO’s space operability depends on its members’ space-based assets, while highlighting the need to enhance cooperation based on existing EU programmes such as Galileo and Copernicus; believes that EU-NATO cooperation on space could help to promote space safety standards and best practices across the international community, ensuring mutual benefits in the areas of communication, navigation and intelligence; underlines the need for the EU and NATO to strive to prevent the weaponisation of space; notes the growing importance of space security and satellites, stresses the importance of the EU Satellite Centre and asks the agency to analyse and provide a report on the safety and/or vulnerabilities of the EU and Member State satellites to space debris, cyber attack and direct missile attack;
40. Recognises the growing strategic importance of the High North and Arctic regions and their political, economic, environmental and security dimensions, and recognises the importance of coordination between the EU and NATO in the Arctic; stresses that the Arctic must remain an area of peaceful cooperation and calls for confidence-building measures to avoid steps leading towards an increased military presence in the region; notes that the Arctic Council is mandated to enhance constructive dialogue and sustainable development; recalls the EU’s application for observer status in the Arctic Council, recalls that the EU is currently updating its Arctic policy, and reiterates its call for enhanced cooperation with all Arctic partners, both bilaterally and regionally, including within the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Northern Dimension partnerships, on all issues of common interest; underlines the importance of ensuring freedom of navigation in the High North; recalls the parliamentary dimension of cooperation in the Arctic, inter alia through the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR), in which the European Parliament participates;
41. Commends the close cooperation between EU and NATO during the COVID-19 pandemic; underlines the important role of NATO allies and EU Member States’ armed forces during the COVID-19 pandemic and welcomes military assistance for civil support operations, notably for the deployment of field hospitals, patient transport, and equipment delivery and distribution; encourages EU-NATO initiatives aimed at facilitating the cross-border use of military logistical capabilities to tackle such emergencies, in order to allow for greater coordination, synergy, solidarity and support; stresses the need to increase the EU’s and NATO’s chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence (CBRN) preparedness; is convinced that common EU and NATO efforts in tackling the COVID-19 crisis directly contribute to enhanced resilience for our societies; underlines that the COVID-19 pandemic has shown the challenges that disruptive emergencies, especially those of a non-traditional nature such as pandemics and natural disasters, pose to our current resilience; notes with concern that the COVID-19 crisis has had a negative impact not only on public health and the economy, but also on security, by accelerating geopolitical rivalries and enhancing uncertainties such as the continuity of supply chains, with lasting consequences for European and international security and stability; calls for the strengthening of EU-NATO cooperation with regard to better addressing non-traditional emergencies, which should include exercises on lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic, regular training exercises with the aim of better preparing Member States and allies to anticipate and better manage natural and man-made disasters, and the development of stockpiles of emergency equipment and necessary assets;
Time to deliver on EU defence ambitions
42. Is convinced that the Member States must increase their efforts to meet the EU’s level of ambition and improve the EU’s ability to act with a more capable, deployable, interoperable and sustainable set of military and civilian capabilities and forces, which would give the EU the capacity to contribute more equitably and decisively to transatlantic security, while enabling it to advance towards strategic autonomy and further pave the way to progressively frame a European Defence Union (EDU) in the spirit of Article 42 TEU, should the European Council, acting unanimously, so decide; stresses that strategic autonomy strengthens transatlantic security, and by no means aims to duplicate measures and resources or decouple from or weaken NATO, but in fact aims to be complementary to and interoperable with NATO efforts and capabilities; underlines at the same time that EU strategic autonomy not only entails defence capability development, based on a strong and independent European Defence Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB), but also the institutional capacity enabling the EU to act, where possible with partners, particularly with NATO, and independently if necessary; believes that these increased European capability development efforts will allow the EU to take greater responsibility for European security, including in the European neighbourhood, and global stability, and to better promote common EU-NATO interests and values; emphasises that a European Union with strategic autonomy will act as a cornerstone for the Transatlantic Alliance and facilitate a more efficient and effective approach to a number of the global challenges arising today and in the immediate future;
43. Firmly believes that, given the unprecedented level of challenges, the EU’s ambitions for PESCO and capability development must cover a full-spectrum force package; recalls that EU investments in defence are investments in the security of the transatlantic community as a whole, which will result in fairer burden-sharing between transatlantic NATO partners; underscores the need to advance defence capability development in order to adequately respond to common threats; believes that EU Member States, especially the 21 common EU-NATO members, need to act coherently and should consider identifying a clear ‘European ambition’ regarding capability development, in particular by increasing their investment in research and innovation and without disregard for the transatlantic partnership; calls on the 21 common EU-NATO members to apply the ‘single set of forces’ principle by declaring the same pool of potentially available capabilities for planning purposes within the EU and NATO; encourages stronger efforts by members of both organisations to achieve greater coherence of output between the NDPP and EU initiatives on capability development, in particular the High-Impact Capability Goals (HICG), the EU’s Capability Development Plan (CDP) and the EU CARD where requirements overlap, to avoid unnecessary duplications and to better respond to new threats; highlights the important role of the EDA in producing the EU CDP; underscores that any review of the EU’s objectives must also reflect on its Headline Goals and HICG; underlines that such a review is fundamental in order to reap the full benefits of initiatives such as PESCO; is convinced, furthermore, that the EU must improve the nexus between planning, research and the development of capabilities;
44. Believes that the European allies in NATO, supported where possible by non-NATO European partners, as appropriate, should aim to ensure adequate burden- and responsibility-sharing with the objective of contributing an adequate share of the NDPP, reflecting on the importance and role of Europeans within the alliance; believes that this would have the simultaneous added effect of enhancing Europe’s ability to defend itself and would consequently also increase its operational capacities;
45. Underlines that the transatlantic partnership can only be successful if all Member States fulfil their commitments, including defence investment pledges, and engage in mutual support; underlines NATO’s 2 % goal, reconfirmed at the September 2014 NATO Summit in Wales and fulfilled by some European NATO allies, and stresses that achieving this objective is also an investment in European security and stability, thereby ensuring preparedness for new global challenges; recalls, similarly, the commitment to spending 20 % of the annual defence budget on the crucial area of research and development; underlines that new threats, such as cyber and hybrid threats, are add-ons to the existing security challenges and hence require additional resources; underlines the fact that, as the pandemic has illustrated, security cannot merely be measured in terms of a percentage of GDP spent, and that multiple other elements should also be taken into consideration when judging contribution efforts to enhance the alliance’s common defence; calls for defence spending in absolute figures not to be reduced by the economic challenges that EU and NATO members are facing due to the COVID-19 pandemic;
46. Underscores that Europe, as far as possible, should look at these strategic challenges in a comprehensive and coherent way through the EU’s ‘integrated approach’, which should be continuously improved through better coordination mechanisms and command structures, as well as by taking into account new threats and challenges, and should then consider which capabilities it can develop together which would ultimately both serve the EU Member States’ contribution to NATO’s collective defence, while enhancing the interoperability of their capabilities;
47. Reiterates its support for an effective implementation of the Defence Package directives concerning, respectively, procurement in the fields of defence and security and transfers of defence-related products; stresses that the full implementation of these directives would constitute an important step towards a European Defence Union by making EU defence policy more coherent and by fostering the development of the European defence industry; is convinced that their implementation is an effective way to counter the continued fragmentation of the EU’s internal market for defence products, which is still leading to unnecessary duplication and the multiplication of inefficiencies in defence spending by the Member States; underscores the importance of a strong, competitive and innovative European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), combined with the emergence of an EU defence equipment market which fully respects internal market rules, and the EU’s Common Position on arms exports; considers that this would increase European security and better equip members of both organisations; calls for further efforts to ensure a fully functional common defence market; highlights the importance of the EDF in pooling national resources for joint research, development, acquisition, procurement, maintenance and training, and calls for a strategic long-term orientation for its project funding; calls for greater synergies between the EDTIB and leading private sector actors in developing dual-use emerging technologies such as AI, while ensuring synergies with other actors (members of civil society, researchers etc.); underscores the importance of cooperation between the EDA and NATO and recognises the value of EU defence industrial cooperation within the Trans-Atlantic Defence Technological and Industrial Cooperation (TADIC); recalls the long-term ambition of building strong transatlantic cooperation in the defence and industrial sector in order to facilitate transatlantic technological and industrial development, addressing inter alia issues related to security of supply, a common approach to intellectual property rights, foreign direct investments and reciprocal access to defence markets; calls on the Commission to collaborate actively with NATO in order to facilitate transatlantic technological and industrial development; points out that European defence initiatives are complementary to those of NATO and designed to encourage Member States to engage in the field of defence; encourages close cooperation between the EDA and the NATO International Staff;
48. Highlights the importance of joint European projects, such as the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), the Eurodrone, with full respect for international law, and the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), and calls for further ambitious and tangible projects;
49. Welcomes the EU and the US’s commitment, as expressed at the recent EU-US Summit, to work towards an administrative arrangement between the EDA and the US; calls for the conclusion of a similar arrangement with other non-EU NATO allies, especially those with which EU accession negotiations have started, as appropriate, while respecting all the necessary safeguards to protect the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States, in order to deepen transatlantic defence cooperation by ensuring that the military technology used is fully interoperable at a technical level;
50. Welcomes the extension of the New START Treaty, which gives both signatories additional time to pursue negotiations with a view to agreeing on a new arms control instrument; calls for the EU and NATO to strive for the involvement of other states, notably China; recalls the need to increase cooperation and investment in the key area of air and missile defence; expresses strong concern about the expiry of the INF Treaty, which has created a new security risk for European countries in particular; calls for Europe’s security concerns to be recognised and properly addressed; regrets the recent withdrawals from the Treaty on Open Skies;
51. Reaffirms its full support for the EU and its Member States’ commitment to the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime; underlines the need to take effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament; reiterates its previous statement that international peace and security are strengthened in a world free from the existence and proliferation of nuclear weapons; urges the EU and NATO to strive towards an ambitious agenda for the preservation and strengthening of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes as a cornerstone of global, transatlantic and European security, and recalls the need to pursue policies designed to move forward with the reduction of nuclear arsenals and to set limits on the deployment of hypersonic missiles; expresses concern about the current developments and initiatives in Iran as regards its uranium enrichment programme; reiterates its continued support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as the best possible means of obtaining assurances of an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy by Iran; welcomes the resumption of talks, and calls on all parties to return to full compliance;
52. Calls for the EU and its institutions, while building on the foundation laid by the ‘integrated approach’, to develop both a common security and defence culture, which respects the specific character of the security and defence policies of the Member States, as well as a strategic approach, throughout its policy-making, which should apply in particular to decisions in the fields of trade, supply chain management, investment screening, development cooperation, infrastructure, mobility and digital technologies; underlines the key role of the Strategic Compass in this regard; underlines that in areas such as hybrid and cyber threats, as well as countering disinformation campaigns, the EU institutions are well positioned to develop joint responses; welcomes, in this regard, the December 2020 Security Union Package and believes that this is a good first step which needs to be swiftly followed up by further actions; notes the proposal for an NIS 2 Directive;
53. Stresses the significance of military mobility in ensuring the speedy movement of forces within and beyond the EU, which is important for an effective and preventive defence; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up efforts to continue to reduce procedural barriers to military mobility; welcomes the indispensable role of the EU when it comes to enhancing military mobility, and demands a significant increase in efforts made to implement this project, particularly through PESCO, but also by encouraging Member States to stimulate their industrial bases to propose competitive projects eligible for EU co-funding; calls for increased synergies on the EU side between the various actors involved; emphasises that a whole-of-government approach involving the EU institutions, Member States and NATO is necessary for military mobility to succeed; calls for consideration of an action plan focusing on EU-NATO common interests in military mobility by increasing ambition in areas such as digitalisation, the cyber resilience of transport infrastructure and systems, and the possibility of using artificial intelligence solutions for the benefit of military mobility; believes that this project demonstrates both the added value of EU-NATO cooperation and proof of how EU instruments and competences can contribute to NATO’s collective defence; welcomes the fact that significant amounts of EU funds have been allocated to collaborative defence projects, despite not matching initial ambitions; recalls that 38 of the 46 current PESCO projects respond to NATO defence planning priorities and welcomes potential third-country participation in such projects, in line with the provisions of the relevant Council decision;
Towards an ambitious partnership
54. Fully subscribes to the statement in the recent NATO communiqué that the European Union remains a unique and essential partner for NATO; reiterates, in this light, its firm belief that EU-NATO relations need to be upgraded to a truly strategic level in order to reach the partnership’s full potential, building on the unprecedented progress already achieved and with the overall objective of building a genuine organisation-to-organisation relationship; calls for regular special summits with the participation of all NATO and EU heads of state and government in order to maintain trust and understanding at the highest levels, and expresses its long-term vision for an EU-NATO Partnership Council; encourages a discussion, furthermore, on the creation of a permanent Council of EU Defence Ministers, which should closely liaise with meetings of NATO defence ministers; underlines the principle of inclusiveness in this regard;
55. Reiterates the principle of inclusiveness, and encourages an increased number of joint informal meetings, as well as joint statements and communications by EU and NATO institutions’ principals; reiterates its previous calls for the EU and NATO to organise regular, and more ambitious, joint exercises, building on the existing practice of Parallel and Coordinated Exercises (PACE), ensuring the involvement of all Member States and allies, which would serve to enhance mutual EU-NATO understanding and further enhance staff-to-staff cooperation; encourages an enhanced exchange of unclassified and classified information in future exercises, in an inclusive and non-discriminatory manner, as a first step in the exchange of information in real crisis situations;
56. Calls on all members to work towards the conclusion of a security agreement between Cyprus and NATO;
57. Welcomes the progress made on the 74 common proposals for action; believes, however, that more political support is needed to ensure full implementation; further calls for flagship projects to be put forward, for example in the field of EDTs and air-to-air refuelling, modelled after projects such as in the area of military mobility in order to increase ownership and make cooperation more tangible and results-orientated;
58. Underlines that the EU and NATO must coordinate their efforts to combat terrorism by improving current practices of intelligence-sharing among Member States and NATO allies, with a particular emphasis on achieving better common situational awareness in key areas, including emerging safe havens, terrorists’ use of EDTs and hybrid tactics;
59. Acknowledges that in view of the institutional limitations, EU-NATO cooperation to a large extent takes place on an informal and technical staff-to-staff level, limiting at times the active involvement of all Member States and allies; considers these limitations a vulnerability for transatlantic, as well as European, security, due inter alia to the potential blocking of access to NATO structures for EU CSDP operations; believes that this situation is unsustainable and therefore strongly urges all stakeholders to work together in good faith to seek a solution which would render cooperation more formal and predictable on all levels, with a view to building a genuine and solid organisation-to-organisation relationship; welcomes the discussion about future EU military command capacities, which must be interoperable and compatible with NATO in order to ensure the most effective operational capacity of the single set of forces;
60. Underlines the need to reinforce allies’ unity, solidarity and cohesion; acknowledges the serious disputes between allies in the Eastern Mediterranean; welcomes the establishment of NATO’s de-escalation mechanism; recalls its concerns about Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 Russian missile system; stresses the importance of further trust-building measures based on dialogue and mutual respect; is deeply concerned about the behaviour of Turkey, a strategically important neighbour and NATO ally; calls on Turkey to avoid further provocative and destabilising actions, and encourages it to pursue a foreign, security and domestic policy that aligns with the obligations and expectations of an EU candidate country and NATO ally;
61. Recalls that both the EU and NATO are built around common democratic principles; recalls that the North Atlantic Treaty is directly tied to the UN Charter; calls on NATO to demand from its members full compliance with all articles of the UN Charter; underlines that the transatlantic partnership not only needs strong militaries but also strong and resilient societies; emphasises the mutually reinforcing link between strong democratic foundations, based on respect for the rules-based international order, and a strong transatlantic partnership, which only together can ensure the longevity of our democracies; supports the idea put forward by the Biden administration for a global summit of democracies; calls for increased efforts to take into account the high aspirations of younger generations and enable the effective participation of young people in our democratic processes, and to clearly present to young people the strategic challenges that our societies face, in order to assure that they engage with these critical issues and actively support our common efforts;
62. Recalls that a stronger role for the EU in security and defence has been described as a priority for EU citizens in Eurobarometer surveys; suggests that EU-NATO cooperation and security and defence issues at large should be addressed during the upcoming Conference on the Future of Europe in order to ensure that people’s voices are heard;
63. Underlines the importance of a proactive, effective and transparent communication, both in the EU and externally, and calls for even closer cooperation between the respective staff at both NATO and the EU on strategic communication, especially with regard to countering disinformation, foreign interference and cyber attacks, in strategically important areas such as the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries; calls for improved information-sharing in identifying hybrid attacks in order to increase responsiveness; insists, however, on the fact that both the EU and NATO must maintain their respective independent capacities; supports the idea of launching independent centres of excellence for the study of foreign languages spoken in strategically important regions;
64. Underlines the importance of parliamentary diplomacy and reiterates its previous calls for an enhanced role for the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA); recommends that the status of the European Parliament’s delegation in the NATO PA be upgraded by the NATO PA Standing Committee to full status, reflecting the importance of EU-NATO cooperation; calls for a joint meeting between Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives in order to discuss the common security threats to the transatlantic partnership and how enhanced EU-NATO cooperation could help address to them;
65. Welcomes the first-ever participation of a NATO Secretary-General in a meeting of the College of Commissioners on 15 December 2020, which sent a strong message of mutual commitment in order to enhance the partnership between NATO and the EU; commends NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg on his leadership and determination to advance EU-NATO relations, which corresponds to the ambitions and priorities laid out by the EU leadership;
o o o
66. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European External Action Service, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Secretary-General of NATO, the European Defence Agency, the governments and national parliaments of the EU and NATO Member States, and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
Old continent growing older - possibilities and challenges related to ageing policy post 2020
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European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on an old continent growing older – possibilities and challenges related to ageing policy post-2020 (2020/2008(INI))
– having regard to Articles 6, 153, 156 and 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the “Charter”), in particular Articles 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35 thereof,
– having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
– having regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union stating that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age is a general principle of EU law as a special case of equal treatment(1),
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 7 June 2010 on active ageing,
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 9 September 2020 on the human rights, participation and well-being of older persons in the era of digitalisation,
– having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals,
– having regard to the Political Declaration and Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing adopted at the Second World Assembly on Ageing of 8-12 April 2002,
– having regard to the Ministerial Declaration adopted at the fourth UN Economic Commission for Europe Ministerial Conference on Ageing in Lisbon on 22 September 2017 entitled ‘A Sustainable Society for all Ages: Realizing the potential of living longer’,
– having regard to the report of the UN Independent Expert on the enjoyment of all human rights by older persons on the impact of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) on the enjoyment of all human rights of older persons, submitted for the 75th session of the UN General Assembly on 21 July 2020,
– having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights,
– having regard to Decision No 940/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2011 on the European Year for Active Ageing and Solidarity between Generations (2012)(2), and to the original Commission communication of 6 September 2010 thereon (COM(2010)0462),
– having regard to the Council recommendation of 19 December 2016 entitled ‘Upskilling Pathways: New Opportunities for Adults’(3),
– having regard to the Council recommendation of 22 May 2018 on key competences for lifelong learning(4),
– having regard to its resolutions of 7 September 2010 on the role of women in an ageing society(5) and 15 November 2018 on care services in the EU for improved gender equality(6),
– having regard its resolution of 11 November 2010 on the demographic challenge and solidarity between generations(7),
– having regard to its resolution of 26 May 2016 on poverty: a gender perspective(8),
– having regard to its resolution of 13 September 2016 on creating labour market conditions favourable for work-life balance(9),
– having regard to its resolution of 14 June 2017 on the need for an EU strategy to end and prevent the gender pension gap(10),
– having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2017 on the deployment of cohesion policy instruments by regions to address demographic change(11),
– having regard to its position adopted at first reading on 28 March 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing ‘Erasmus+’: the Union programme for education, training, youth and sport and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1288/2013(12),
– having regard to Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation(13) and establishing the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation,
– having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council directive of 2 July 2008 on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426), and to Parliament’s position of 2 April 2009 thereon(14),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 October 2006 entitled ‘The demographic future of Europe – from challenge to opportunity’ (COM(2006)0571),
– having regard to the Commission report of 15 December 2006 entitled ‘European Economy – the impact of ageing on public expenditure: projections for the EU-25 Member States on pensions, healthcare, long-term care, education and unemployment transfers (2004-2050)’,
– having regard to the report of the Commission and the Social Protection Committee for the Ministers in the Employment and Social Affairs Council of 7 October 2014 entitled ‘Adequate social protection for long-term care needs in an ageing society’,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 26 April 2017 entitled ‘An initiative to support work-life balance for working parents and carers’ (COM(2017)0252),
– having regard to the Commission report of 24 November 2017 entitled ‘The 2018 Ageing Report: Underlying Assumptions & Projection Methodologies’,
– having regard to the Commission interinstitutional paper of 25 May 2018 entitled ‘The 2018 Ageing Report: Economic & Budgetary Projections for the 28 EU Member States (2016-2070)’,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0152),
– having regard to the Commission report of 17 June 2020 on the impact of demographic change (COM(2020)0241),
– having regard to the report of the World Health Organization (WHO) of 1 April 2002 entitled ‘Active Ageing: A Policy Framework’,
– having regard to the WHO report of 1 October 2007 entitled ‘Global Age-Friendly Cities: A Guide’,
– having regard to the WHO world report of 30 September 2015 on ageing and health,
– having regard to the WHO’s global strategy and action plan on ageing and health for 2016-2020 and UN’s decision to proclaim 2021-2030 as the Decade of Healthy Ageing,
– having regard to the UN Principles for Older Persons adopted by General Assembly resolution 46/91 of 16 December 1991,
– having regard to the Global AgeWatch Index 2015,
– having regard to the UN report of 2019 on world population ageing,
– having regard to the position of active ageing as one of the key elements of the Europe 2020 strategy,
– having regard to the European Skills Agenda for sustainable competitiveness, social fairness and resilience,
– having regard to the 2010 UK Equality Act, which makes it illegal to discriminate against people based on gender reassignment, sexual orientation and sex,
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU(15) (the Work-Life Balance Directive),
– having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,
– having regard to the position in the form of amendments of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A9-0194/2021),
General remarks
A. whereas Europe’s ageing population is a demographic phenomenon which involves a decrease both in fertility and mortality rates and a higher life expectancy;
B. whereas the population of the EU is decreasing; whereas in 1960, EU residents made up 13,5 % of the global population, while in 2018 they accounted for 6,9 % and by 2070 are expected to account for around 4 %(16); whereas this situation is related to, among other factors, a fall in birth rates in the EU vis-à-vis other regions in the world, which leads to population ageing with an effect on the age composition and relative shares of different age groups and contributes to the inversion of the demographic pyramid; whereas the demographic transition is a universal phenomenon and the EU’s decreasing share of the world’s population reflects an earlier start in this global process(17); whereas the active participation of older people in society should not be underestimated; whereas more than 20 % of those aged between 65 and 74 and around 15 % of those aged 75 or over participate in formal and/or informal voluntary activities(18);
C. whereas the current demographic situation has a severe impact on the social, economic and territorial cohesion of the EU; whereas it is important for the EU to mainstream demographic aspects into all of its policies; whereas the working-age population (people aged between 15 and 64) is expected to decrease significantly from 333 million in 2016 to 292 million in 2070; whereas by 2100, people aged 80 and over are projected to account for 14,6 % of the population(19);
D. whereas gender equality is a basic value of the EU recognised in the Treaties and in the Charter, and whereas the EU is committed to integrating it into all of its activities;
E. whereas longevity is a remarkable collective achievement underpinned by significant progress in economic and social development and in health, which has considerably improved quality of life and contributed to a 10-year increase in the average life expectancy of men and women over the last 50 years; whereas life expectancy is expected to rise from 78,3 to 86,1 years for men and 83,7 to 90,3 years for women between 2016 and 2070; whereas the increase in average life expectancy must be viewed, in all circumstances, as a factor in the advancement of civilisation and never as a constraint; whereas data shows that in 2018, the estimated number of healthy life years was 64,2 for women and 63,7 for men(20); whereas, however, the discrepancy between life expectancy and healthy life years is worrisome and should be urgently addressed;
F. whereas a longer, healthier life is valuable for both individuals and societies, creating new opportunities for the participation and inclusion of older people in economic and social life; whereas social engagement at an older age contributes, in turn, to individual health and well-being; whereas there is a correlation between longevity and social status; whereas participation in a range of social activities such as volunteering, sport and hobbies, as well as regular contact with family and friends, tend to have a positive impact on the overall health of older people and prevent their isolation;
G. whereas the natural change in the EU population has been negative since 2012, with more deaths (4,7 million) than births (4,2 million) recorded in 2019; whereas the fertility rate in the EU is falling and dropped to 1,55 in 2018; whereas this is linked to a variety of factors, including better health and increased levels of education(21), but also the general socio-economic situation, including uncertainty and income devaluation, which affects all groups but above all young people, in particular their quality of life, work-life balance and life planning; whereas demographic change could have an impact on the EU’s economic and social sustainability in the medium and long term; whereas access to quality public services is a decisive factor in quality of life; whereas the economic and social impact of demographic change underlines the need to strengthen social security and healthcare systems;
H. whereas there is research that points to the correlation between fertility rates and policies that encourage better job opportunities, decent working and living conditions, flexible working arrangements, decent family support, financial support during maternity, paternity and parental leave, quality childcare from the early years on, and a more equal distribution of care responsibilities between men and women;
I. whereas the rates of part-time employment are higher for women (31,3 %) than for men (8,7 %) and also affect older women (49,8 % of older men compared to 64,1 % of older women); whereas in 2018, the number of usual working hours in the EU-28 averaged 30,3 hours per week for men aged between 65 and 74 and 24,1 hours per week for women of the same age, and whereas men are expected to be part of the labour force for 38,6 years, while the corresponding figure for women is 33,7 years(22);
J. whereas closing the gender employment gap is conditional on the fulfilment of basic social rights and the provision of basic social services;
K. whereas women aged between 55 and 64 have a lower employment rate than men (52,4 % for women compared to 65,4 % for men), and are the most likely providers of informal care services in the home(23);
L. whereas the total number of people of working age (15-64) will fall by 20,8 million in the EU between 2005 and 2030 as the baby boomer generation retires, resulting in a greater burden on the Member States’ healthcare and pension systems; whereas the total age‑dependency ratio is expected to reach 57 % by 2100, almost double that of 2019 (31 %);
M. whereas the median age in the EU-28 rose from 38,3 years in 2001 to 43,1 years in 2018(24); whereas in 2018, 19 % of EU citizens were 65 or older and whereas their needs should be taken into account in the political decision-making process at EU, national and regional levels;
N. whereas life is accompanied by changes such as the loss of a partner, relatives or friends, the degradation of one’s health and changes in one’s habits, work patterns and financial situation; whereas older people are particularly exposed to the phenomena of social exclusion and isolation; whereas an increasing number of adults in the EU are experiencing social isolation (75 million people – 18 % of the population); whereas the risk of social isolation is highest among older people, while the feeling of loneliness is most significant in the 26-45 age bracket(25);
O. whereas more than 50 % of carers under the age of 65 combine care with employment; whereas, as is often pointed out by the Commission, care responsibilities are one of the main reasons for women’s lower levels of labour market participation, either because they reduce their working hours or leave paid work altogether, amounting to a loss for Europe of EUR 370 billion per year; whereas estimates show that 80 % of all care across the EU is provided by informal carers, who are mostly women (75 %), indicating the existence of a gender care gap strongly influencing the gender pension gap; whereas care provided by informal carers without any formal employment contract is particularly problematic, as it leaves them outside of the labour market and without any possibility of regularisation; whereas this type of situation leads to a double negative effect, whereby, on the one hand, these informal carers (mostly women) are low paid as a rule, lack social protection, do not pay social security contributions and as a result either do not receive any pensions at the end of their working lives, or only receive the minimum pension, and, on the other hand, this type of situation has a negative impact on the state and its relevant institutions, which are deprived of social security contributions and taxes paid by employers and employees;
P. whereas persons with disabilities or people belonging to ethnic, racial, linguistic, sexual or other minorities of all ages have concealed or are concealing part of their identity out of fear or the threat of rejection or abuse; whereas older persons with disabilities or of different racial, ethnic or social origins, genetic features, language or sexual orientation face more discrimination, stigma and non-consensual procedures and are at greater risk of social exclusion;
Q. whereas COVID-19 also has a major impact on demography; whereas many older people have died and, as some studies suggest, the coronavirus has had a considerable impact on EU population trends, such as a reduction in life expectancy and family planning;
R. whereas the impact of gender differences in health and health inequalities related to socio-cultural factors should be duly taken into account while elaborating our ageing policies; whereas certain diseases and conditions associated with age have a differentiated impact on women and men, such as depression or cardiovascular diseases; whereas certain diseases and conditions affect more women than men, such as Alzheimer’s or dementia, breast cancer, incontinence, osteoporosis and osteoarthritis; whereas the prevalence of such conditions will increase in our ageing societies;
S. whereas demographic change does not have a uniform impact on all countries and regions, but has a bigger impact on regions that are already lagging behind, aggravating existing territorial and social inequalities; whereas rural, peripheral and outermost regions, including islands, are most affected by depopulation, with mainly young people and women leaving those areas, resulting in an increasing share of older people living there, which could increase the risk of social isolation; whereas the rural population in some regions is less likely to be at risk of poverty and social exclusion than the urban population(26);
T. whereas the number of older people (80 and older) in the EU will increase by 57,1 % between 2010 and 2030(27), with significant consequences for social security systems;
U. whereas the COVID-19 lockdown measures and the economic recession have had a disproportionate effect on women because of the unequal sharing of care responsibilities, sectoral specialisation and increased domestic violence;
V. whereas between 2000 and 2015, the population of those aged 60 and over in the EU grew by 68 % in cities and 25 % in rural areas;
W. whereas according to the European Spatial Planning Observation Network, the population in European agglomerations will increase by 24,1 million by 2050, accounting for almost half of the total EU population, while the rural population will decrease by 7,9 million people;
X. whereas older women are generally more likely than older men to face severe difficulties in accessing basic goods and services, such as health services, long-term care and decent housing, owing to a range of factors such as the gender pay gap and the pension gap, women’s greater longevity or the greater proportion of older women living alone(28);
Y. whereas older people are more likely to experience limited access to the internet as well as lacking awareness and knowledge about existing and emerging technologies; whereas only 35 % of people aged 55-74 possess basic digital skills, compared to 82 % of those aged 16-24(29) and, as a consequence, older people are more vulnerable to exclusion, including digital exclusion; whereas both the social and digital exclusion of older people has been exacerbated by the lockdown and social measures taken by the Member States in response to the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas barrier-free and user‑friendly technologies can help to overcome these challenges; whereas the Council addressed this problem in 2020 and issued conclusions on the human rights, participation and well-being of older persons in the era of digitalisation;
Z. whereas the population fell by up to 15 % in some regions of the EU between 1998 and 2018 owing to rapid depopulation and population ageing; whereas rapid demographic change generates disproportionally high adjustment costs; whereas almost two thirds of regions that experience a rapidly shrinking population have a low GDP per capita(30); whereas population ageing is causing a shrinking working-age population and may result in the decline of municipalities and villages throughout the EU; whereas decisions to merge municipalities and villages or to incorporate them into other municipalities or cities may also result in municipalities and villages disappearing altogether;
AA. whereas all policies addressing demographic opportunities and challenges must take an inclusive, rights- and evidence-based, people-centred approach, and must uphold the principles of equality – particularly gender equality – and non-discrimination, and safeguard women’s rights, including their sexual and reproductive and economic rights; whereas tackling demographic challenges must by no means undermine individual reproductive autonomy; whereas access to sexual and reproductive health services and commodities is essential for physical, mental and social well-being;
AB. whereas in some Member States there are tendencies to instrumentalise demographic change in order to undermine sexual and reproductive health and rights, thus contributing to the erosion of personal freedoms; whereas all policies addressing demographic change must be rights-based, people-centred, tailor-made and evidence-based, and must uphold sexual and reproductive rights;
AC. whereas EU policies and action on ageing and demographic change must be fully in line with the EU Gender Equality Strategy for 2020-2025; whereas there is a close correlation between demographic challenges and gender mainstreaming, which should be reflected in the relevant policy responses;
AD. whereas time use statistics show an uneven share of care work by gender all around Europe; whereas in spite of significant national differences linked to the extension of welfare and social services and different female activity rates, women bear a disproportionate proportion of the care burden with profound implications for their labour market performance and their fertility choices;
AE. whereas particular attention should be paid to the very old in order, where necessary, to help people who have lost their independence and prevent them from becoming isolated;
AF. whereas the proportion of pensioners aged 65 and over at risk of poverty in the EU has gradually increased since 2013;
AG. whereas older people contribute to society and have continued to do so during the COVID-19 pandemic, including as employees, caregivers or volunteers; whereas, for instance, many older medical professionals have come out of retirement to support efforts to contain the pandemic; whereas informal carers, most of whom are women, have stepped up their efforts to compensate for reduced education, child and long-term care services during the pandemic;
AH. whereas an ageing population can act as a source of knowledge about local traditions, food and ways of life in rural areas, which, in turn, can be used to develop local tourism and business;
AI. whereas the upcoming long-term vision for rural areas will outline the EU’s strategy for tackling the impact of demographic change on our socio-economic fabric;
AJ. whereas generational renewal is one of the post-2020 specific objectives of the common agricultural policy (CAP); whereas knowledge transfer and intergenerational learning are crucial to increasing cooperation and solidarity between generations, thus bridging the generation gap;
Health and care
AK. whereas due account should always be taken of the ethical risks arising from the use of technology in health;
AL. whereas the WHO defines healthy ageing as the process of developing and maintaining the functional ability that enables well-being in older age; whereas there is a correlation between perceived health and income; whereas in 2017 less than one third (32,4 %) of older people in the first income quintile (20 % of the population with the lowest incomes) perceived their health as good or very good, compared to 54,7 % of older people belonging to the 20 % of the population with the highest incomes(31); whereas the results of the European Health Interview Survey show that the majority of older people were found to have chronic illnesses or complaints, and only one in nine declared the absence of such problems, and whereas many disabilities emerge or become more pronounced at an older age; whereas almost half of older people in the EU (aged 65 and over) have reported difficulties with at least one personal activity or domestic activity(32); whereas about a quarter of the EU population experienced long‑standing limitations due to health problems in 2018(33); whereas approximately 15 % of adults aged 60 and over have a mental disorder;
AM. whereas in most developed countries, older people are considered to be those aged 65 and over; whereas the 65+ age group is very heterogeneous, with significant differences in health, lifestyle, status, and living and social conditions; whereas generalisations should therefore be avoided; whereas focusing on the age of 65 as the upper age limit for data collection often does not correspond to the reality of older people’s economic and social activities, making for incomplete and inaccurate data; whereas older people are absent from many statistics and data‑gathering exercises, as it is common not to collect statistics for people over 65; whereas this is no longer adequate in the light of the growing share of the population living to an older age;
AN. whereas although the educational gender gap is favourable to women in most European countries, women nonetheless pay a maternity labour penalty while men have paternity labour bonuses on activity rates and wages; whereas showing the difficulties women face in making maternity compatible with the development of a professional career, diminishing the available options both for maternity and the development of a professional career, is important; whereas juggling a career and maternity usually ends up with women postponing maternity age, decreasing the potential number of children, or with women remaining childless; whereas all of these factors decrease fertility rates below the replacement rate with the subsequent ageing of the population;
AO. whereas the number of people who are dependent on the assistance of others or have health and long-term care needs increases with age; whereas the share of individuals in need of such services is higher in those aged 80 or over; whereas dependence is exacerbated by ageing, but is also affected by other elements, such as socio-economic and environmental factors as well as educational attainment, interpersonal relations and personal well-being; whereas the needs for care and support are diverse and the appropriate means to ensure autonomy and independence differ; whereas the vast majority of care for older dependent people is being provided by informal, usually unpaid female carers aged 60 or over themselves;
AP. whereas informal and formal care systems are under pressure from demographic change, compounded by shortages of formal care workers; whereas Eurofound research shows the need to provide access to home or community care for people with minor long-term care needs, not only to support informal carers and to improve quality of life for care receivers, but also to quickly spot and respond to emerging needs;
AQ. whereas there is no uniform definition of dependence in the EU; whereas older age does not necessarily equal dependence;
AR. whereas some older people cannot benefit from active ageing measures and policies owing to various factors such as their place of residence, the state of their health, a lack of motivation, and the lack of habit of or opportunities for regular physical, mental, cultural or social activity and recreation; whereas older people may also face difficulties in accessing sports, culture and physical rehabilitation centres and have to contend with financial constraints or the lack or inadequacy of activities adapted to their individual psychophysical conditions; whereas an effective active ageing strategy should have a positive impact on older people, society and the economy as a whole;
AS. whereas creating conditions for healthy ageing and self-reliance for women and men through a comprehensive approach to old age as a life stage, as well as adapting housing and local environments in a way that allows older people to live in their own home and its surroundings for as long as possible, will bring systemic and individual benefits;
AT. whereas care and support should aim to maintain the autonomy, independence and well‑being of older people; whereas the idea of ageing in place in one’s community in an age-friendly environment is of key importance to urban planning and enhancing the transition from institutional care to community-based services; whereas, moreover, the possibilities for maintaining autonomy and independence depend on conditions such as age‑friendly environments, accessibility and the affordability of services, including quality housing and community-based care; whereas demographic change requires suitable responses to specific health needs and for support services and facilities;
AU. whereas non-standard forms of work have been spreading and, while providing flexibility to carry out care responsibilities, they do not always respond to working people’s needs, and whereas the impossibility of organising a care agenda makes it more difficult for women to combine maternity and work;
AV. whereas the accumulation of health risks, injuries and chronic illnesses throughout one’s life increases the risk of disability; whereas older people consult general practitioners and medical specialists more often, but also report greater difficulties in accessing medical services in some Member States than the average population due to, inter alia, the price of medical services, long distances and long waiting lists(34); whereas investment in the care economy is essential to ensure a decent life for all those in need of care and carers; whereas people in older age groups are more vulnerable and thus susceptible to disease and to complications and fatalities linked to different diseases, including COVID-19; whereas COVID-19 has highlighted the need for more robust health systems and more intensive care capacity; whereas in this context, access to medical treatment and the provision of personal protective equipment in long-term care facilities should be ensured as a matter of urgency;
AW. whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that accessible and high-quality public services and care services are an effective response to the population’s needs, including those of older people who, in a number of circumstances during the pandemic, have experienced and continue to experience age discrimination in accessing medical and care services, including obstacles to medical treatment in general; whereas the COVID-19 pandemic once more shed light on the lack of adequate housing, quality care facilities and sufficient care and support services; whereas the highest shares of COVID-19 infections and deaths in the EU relate to nursing and care homes, residential services for older people and persons with disabilities, and other social services(35); whereas many older people have died during the pandemic as a result of many intensive care units being overwhelmed; whereas in some cases, one of the main criteria for the decision on the availability of intensive care treatment was the age of the patient; whereas many older people have faced obstacles in accessing medical treatment other than for COVID-19 and whereas care services in general have been reduced or halted altogether during the pandemic;
AX. whereas the ageing population of the EU brings new challenges for gender equality, as women continue to be the main providers of care (both paid and unpaid)(36); whereas the coronavirus crisis has exacerbated this situation;
AY. whereas older people are less resistant to extreme weather events such as repeated heat waves;
The right to age with dignity
AZ. whereas guaranteeing a dignified life means securing the right to a timely retirement for workers, enabling them to enjoy a healthy and independent retirement; whereas the right to retirement must be linked to working time and not be dependent on variations in average life expectancy or any other reason used to put pressure on workers; whereas the enjoyment of retirement time should be based on an income that makes decent living conditions possible, including health protection, cultural enrichment and the acquisition of new skills, enabling pensioners to be fully included in the social environment in which they live;
BA. whereas living with dignity, particularly for older people, cannot be disconnected from the right to accessible housing, in sanitary and comfortable conditions, enabling older people to grow old with social and family protections; whereas in a number of situations involving pressure from property speculation, older people have been the first to be evicted, which has increased their social isolation and functional dependency;
BB. whereas women are at greater risk of poverty and social exclusion on account of, among other factors, the persisting problem of gender employment, the wage and pension gap, more career interruptions due to family and care responsibilities, and more part-time(37), sometimes precarious and temporary employment(38), notably in the case of single mothers; whereas these factors make it difficult for many women to save money for later in life and make them particularly vulnerable to old age poverty;
BC. whereas according to Eurostat, women receive lower pensions than men in all EU Member States; whereas women in the EU aged 65 and over receive a pension that is on average 30 % lower than that of men;
BD. whereas a 2019 Eurobarometer survey shows that 40 % of people in the EU feel discriminated against on the grounds of age; whereas ageism is present at different levels and manifests itself in different forms, including in individual approaches and the perception of oneself and in relations between generations; whereas ageism has been shown to reduce health and life expectancy and hinder full participation in social, cultural and civil life, and can lead to restrictions on older people’s access to services or active participation in the labour market both at national and EU level and services in the workplace, giving rise to marginalisation and social exclusion; whereas according to the most recent European Working Conditions Survey, age discrimination was the most common form of discrimination in the workplace; whereas other forms of discrimination highlighted by older people include access to financial products and services, healthcare, education, training and leisure(39); whereas successfully combating age discrimination and age stereotypes including in the labour market is essential for active ageing, for engendering more solidarity between generations, and for making use of the experience acquired by older workers; whereas strengthening equal access to goods and services is also essential in this regard;
BE. whereas according to the WHO, active ageing is the process of optimising opportunities for health, participation and security in order to enhance quality of life as people age, allowing people to realise their potential for well‑being throughout their lives and to participate in society according to their needs, desires and capabilities, while providing them with adequate protection, security and care when they need assistance;
BF. whereas the EU and several Member States are playing an active part in considerations regarding new international instruments to protect the rights of older persons; whereas such international deliberations should be actively supported and encouraged; whereas while Directive 2000/78/EC establishes a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, it fails to address discrimination in other spheres of social life and multiple discrimination;
BG. whereas older people sometimes fall victim to violence, abuse and other worrying acts, such as fraud and unfair business practices, deprivation of legal capacity and the means to manage their own affairs; whereas the phenomenon of abuse against older people should be better covered by data and research on its incidence and ways to prevent it; whereas efforts to produce more comprehensive data on the mistreatment of older people are necessary;
BH. whereas the EU is funding pilot initiatives, such as EUROPeAN, MILCEA and WeDO, in the field of combating crime against older people;
BI. whereas older people in rural or remote areas may face higher age-related risks, including poverty, poorer access to quality healthcare and services, less social support, fewer opportunities for social interaction and a lack of access to public transport services;
Employment and active ageing
BJ. whereas according to a 2012 Eurobarometer survey, 60 % of people in the EU were against raising the statutory retirement age while 61 % were of the opinion that everyone should be able to continue working beyond the statutory retirement age; whereas depending on their financial needs, almost half of workers aged 50 or over would prefer to work fewer hours, while a significant proportion of retired people would prefer to work at least a few hours per week(40); whereas working past retirement age is associated with workplace policies supporting employability and workers staying in employment longer if they wish to do so; whereas the hiring rates of older workers who are not in employment are, however, extremely low and whereas older workers are at high risk of becoming long-term unemployed; whereas the poverty and social exclusion rates for persons aged between 55 and 64 are higher than the EU average for all ages; whereas 56 % of people in the EU are worried that their income in old age will not be sufficient(41); whereas the likelihood of finding a new job decreases with age, partly on account of structural barriers including age discrimination(42); whereas data shows that people who are retired but continue to work out of choice have a higher level of life satisfaction than fully retired people on average(43); whereas the sense of purpose in life generally declines after the age of 50, but remains much stronger for individuals who continue to work after retirement or have childcare or long-term care responsibilities(44); whereas combating unemployment among older workers in the EU remains very important;
BK. whereas appropriate working and employment conditions, including improved occupational health and safety, a better work-life balance, an age-appropriate working environment, lower quantitative demands and working time autonomy, may enable and encourage older people to stay in the labour market if they wish to do so;
BL. whereas specific attention needs to be paid to the needs of workers in very physically or psychologically demanding jobs; whereas this issue can be addressed through occupational health and safety strategies, policies supporting work-life balance, access to and take-up of education and training opportunities at work or outside of it, support for intergenerational exchanges in workplaces and the option to retire progressively, which will bring both individual and societal benefits;
BM. whereas an older EU with a smaller workforce may put pressure on public budgets and social security and healthcare systems; whereas it is estimated that the total cost of ageing(45) will be 26,7 % of GDP by 2070(46); whereas a study conducted for the Commission in 2018 on the silver economy (people aged 50 and over) estimates that the contribution of the EU silver economy to GDP will reach EUR 6.4 trillion and 88 million jobs by 2025; whereas this would be equivalent to 32 % of EU GDP and 38 % of employment in the EU(47);
BN. whereas promoting a life-cycle perspective and raising awareness of the importance of age-friendly working environments among employers is essential for active ageing; whereas the fight against unemployment among young and older people remains a key challenge in many regions; whereas the EU and the Member States still need to produce an adequate response to challenges in the labour market; whereas there is a need to adapt the skills of older workers, who are particularly threatened by economic restructuring, and to pursue policies to support the labour market mobility of older people, especially in terms of re-employment;
BO. whereas employers are often reluctant to offer adequate training to older workers; whereas lifelong learning contributes to active ageing and allows people to work and fully participate in society; whereas Parliament has adopted a resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing ‘Erasmus+’;
BP. whereas ensuring quality employment, including decent wages, occupational health and safety and a good work-life balance for workers throughout their careers, is a prerequisite for a sustainable working life and active and healthy ageing after retirement; whereas this entails not only reducing the incidence of occupational risks, but also encouraging and supporting health-promoting habits among workers and addressing risks such as psychosocial risks and musculoskeletal disorders; whereas the health and performance of older workers is not determined by their age, but by a series of closely related factors, such as individual lifestyle and exposure to hazards in the workplace(48); whereas quality jobs as well as safe and healthy workplaces are not only important for the well-being of workers, but also for the competitiveness of companies and the sustainability of welfare systems;
BQ. whereas the impact of demographic change in the labour market has underlined the importance of further improving business management and working methods, as well as the significant role of digital solutions such as teleworking, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, as they offer numerous opportunities to enhance the working conditions of employees, including for those close to the age of retirement, and provide a more inclusive work environment, especially for work-life balance purposes and persons with disabilities;
BR. whereas regions with high unemployment rates are characterised by higher ageing rates and a shrinking population;
BS. whereas employed workers in the 55-64 age group represented 59,1 % of the labour force in the EU in 2019(49); whereas in 2016, around one third of managers of family farms were aged 65 or over, and the majority (57 %) were aged at least 55 or over; whereas only 1 in 10 farm managers were under the age of 40;
Tackling demographic challenges with the support of EU funds
BT. whereas programmes, projects and actions that promote active ageing strategies should be reflected in all policy fields and whereas the Member States should make use of all available EU instruments, such as the European structural and investment funds, in particular the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Cohesion Fund, the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and the Connecting Europe Facility, to tackle demographic challenges; whereas EU funds facilitate the provision of essential infrastructure;
BU. whereas initiatives such as the Access City Award encourage the adaptation of public spaces to the needs of older people and persons with reduced mobility and have a positive effect on their independence; whereas such initiatives not only improve the quality of their lives, ensure their social inclusion and guarantee their equal enjoyment of fundamental rights, but can also have a positive economic effect;
BV. whereas the number of single-person households has increased by 19 % since 2010; whereas in 2019, 40 % of women in the EU aged 65 or over lived alone, which is more than double the share of men living alone(50); whereas in many Member States, housing for young people, single people, older people and persons with disabilities, chronic diseases and functional limitations is inadequate due to accessibility problems, low-quality standards or the high cost of living and housing; whereas dwellings should be affordable, accessible, safe and comfortable, all of which are particularly important factors, not only for older people; whereas many older people are less likely to renovate their homes if they are not owners;
BW. whereas human rights are universal, inalienable, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated and belong to all people and to all generations, without discrimination on any grounds; whereas older people, including persons with disabilities, are valuable to society and therefore should participate in society to the fullest extent and live their lives with dignity and as independently as possible; whereas solidarity between generations should guide the recovery of the EU with a view to achieving a fairer, more inclusive and more resilient society that leaves no one behind;
BX. whereas all Member States and the EU are parties to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and thus legally bound to guarantee individual autonomy, non-discrimination, full and effective participation in society and equal opportunities and accessibility; whereas there are over 80 million persons with disabilities in the European Union, the majority of whom are women and girls, and whereas most disabilities are acquired with age; whereas older persons with disabilities are at higher risk of poverty and discrimination(51); whereas policies on ageing must ensure the protection and social inclusion of persons with disabilities, as well as their access to the labour market and services; whereas mobility is key to fostering independent living and autonomy; whereas ensuring a fully accessible transport chain from door to door is critical;
BY. whereas neurodegenerative diseases, such as Alzheimer’s disease and other forms of dementia, remain underdiagnosed in most European countries; whereas there is a clear indication that the current number of nine million confirmed cases of dementia will double by 2050(52); whereas dementia is the leading cause of dependency and disability among older people in the European Union and currently affects around 10 million people, and whereas its prevalence is expected to double by 2030;
BZ. whereas the CAP remains the key instrument to support the rural economy and job creation in rural areas;
CA. whereas our food security depends on successful generational renewal in agriculture;
Combating discrimination against older people
1. Stresses that valuing older people and tackling discrimination against them is only possible through social, cultural and economic inclusion policies which focus on providing fair pensions that ensure a good quality of life; stresses, therefore, the importance of public social security systems that are distributive and based on contributive solidarity between generations, providing everyone, regardless of their own contributions (which is particularly relevant, for example, for women who have spent their careers working as carers), with a decent quality of life free from poverty and social exclusion;
2. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen their efforts to combat all forms of discrimination against older people, particularly against women, especially in the areas of employment, access to financial products and services, healthcare, housing, promoting autonomy, education, training and leisure activities; calls, furthermore, on the Commission and the Member States to promote a positive perception of old age in society and the social inclusion of older people by stimulating age-friendly environments in the EU through appropriate measures, and to support the exchange of good practices at all governance levels and strengthen their support for the silver economy in the EU; calls on the Commission to follow up on the implementation report of Directive 2000/78/EC after 20 years with a view to strengthening the framework for age discrimination in employment and occupation;
3. Stresses the importance of gender equality, gender mainstreaming and the protection of minority rights with regard to tackling demographic challenges;
4. Regrets the existing gender pension gap and asks the Member States to put forward concrete measures to tackle it, including by combating the gender pay gap and increasing women’s employment rate through work-life balance measures, combating precarious and informal work, and ensuring a minimum income for all;
5. Stresses that an extension of the legal retirement age does not represent an adequate tool for addressing and resolving the current economic and social crisis, as it could result in the further deterioration of the fundamental rights of older workers;
6. Stresses that in order to provide more opportunities for women in rural areas, it is essential to maintain the existing sub-programme dedicated to that end in the next multiannual financial framework; asks in particular for support to be provided to women farmers through measures to promote access to land, installation support and social security coverage;
7. Calls on the Commission and the Council to establish a Year of Intergenerational Solidarity and Active Ageing complementing and building on the aims and spirit of the European Day of Solidarity between Generations and the 2012 European Year for Active Ageing and Solidarity between Generations, in order to raise awareness about the problems older people face and promote strategies to mitigate them, as well as to eliminate stereotypes and prejudice, strengthen the links and solidarity between the generations, counteract social exclusion and address sexual health issues; stresses the importance of this initiative in not only the context of demographic change, but also the COVID-19 pandemic, which has hit vulnerable groups, including older people and their carers, particularly hard; also invites the Member States to consult with academic experts and civil society organisations when addressing demographic challenges; calls on the Commission and the Council to swiftly implement the Council conclusions on the human rights, participation and well-being of older persons in the era of digitalisation, including the creation of a ‘platform for participation and volunteering after working life’ and the promotion of intergenerational exchanges and ties;
8. Recalls that the gender pension gap resulting from the gender pay gap stands at 37 % and stems from accumulated inequalities throughout the course of women’s working lives and from the periods of absence from the labour market that are imposed on women as a result of multiple forms of inequality and discrimination; stresses the need to urgently address this gap in the light of demographic change given that its impacts will be acutely felt by older women for a long time to come;
9. Welcomes the Commission’s Green Paper of 27 January 2021 entitled ‘Ageing: Fostering solidarity and responsibility between generations’ (COM(2021)0050); calls on the Commission to prepare an EU action plan on demographic change and solidarity between generations, taking into account the diversity and complexity of the situation in specific age groups as well as differences in the Member States; underlines that such a plan should be socially inclusive and aimed at enabling dignified, active and healthy ageing and should be developed in line with the WHO’s Decade of Healthy Ageing with the involvement of representatives of all generations; calls on the Commission and the Member States to pay particular attention to the situation of older people when implementing the Sustainable Development Goals; reiterates its call on the Member States to adopt without further delay the proposed Council directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, which is essential for combating discrimination on all grounds and in all spheres of social life and for fighting multiple discrimination;
10. Recalls that demographic change is a phenomenon which does not concern only older people in rural areas but in fact all generations, regardless of their place of residence; stresses therefore the importance of a life-cycle approach of related policies covering all regions, including urban areas;
11. Considers that the long-term vision for rural areas will need to place particular emphasis on programmes for the active involvement of older people in rural community life;
12. Stresses the need to better investigate and prevent violence against older people;
13. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ratify and implement the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence;
Health and long-term care for older people
14. Highlights that older women are more affected by the high costs of long-term care as women’s life expectancy is higher, while their health outcomes at the end of life are lower, increasing their need for long-term care and assistance; recalls also that women make up the vast majority of informal carers, leaving in particular older women of working age with fewer opportunities to access the labour market and to build up their own pension entitlements;
15. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure a decent life for dependent persons; underlines the need to promote strategies on personalised quality support for dependent persons; stresses that the specific needs of persons with different diseases, including neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s and dementia, from diagnosis to treatment and long-term care, should be taken into account;
16. Points out the importance of flexible forms of work in allowing women and men to reconcile work and family life, and the need for awareness-raising campaigns on the equal division of domestic work and care and nursing, better investment in care infrastructure and equal, non-transferrable and remunerated maternity and paternity leave in order to makes advances in better sharing paid and unpaid work by gender;
17. Stresses the need to combat gender segmentation in the labour market, particularly for future-oriented, highly paid careers such as the science, engineering, technology and mathematics (STEM), ICT and digital sectors; stresses the importance of education in these areas throughout the life course, including for older women, in order to increase their continued participation in the labour market;
18. Calls on the Member States to ensure equal access to health and care services, including at home, as well as residential or community-based long-term care and palliative care, without discrimination on any grounds;
19. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to safeguard and advance sexual and reproductive rights and ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health services and commodities;
20. Calls on the Commission to take an evidence- and human-rights-based approach to tackling demographic challenges in the EU, ensuring that all EU residents can fully realise their sexual and reproductive health and rights; condemns any attempt to instrumentalise demographic change in order to undermine gender equality and sexual and reproductive health and rights, and calls on the Commission and the Council to uphold Union values in this regard;
21. Underlines the paramount importance of fully protecting the right to care and support for older people, enabling their access to affordable, quality and holistic care and support services, adapted to individual needs, and promoting well-being, autonomy, independence and community inclusion, without any form of discrimination; emphasises the key role of adequately funded social protection schemes in making care affordable and truly accessible;
22. Calls on the Commission to put forward a care deal for Europe and a European carers’ programme aimed at making the transition towards a care economy that entails relevant investment and legislation at EU level, taking a comprehensive approach towards all care needs and services and setting quality guidelines for care throughout the life course, including for children, older persons and persons with long-term needs, with a view to identifying and recognising the various types of informal care-giving, and guaranteeing financial support for carers, appropriate periods of leave and affordable services, among other things;
23. Calls for the adoption of the necessary measures to promote higher employment rates among women, such as affordable care and childcare, adequate periods of parental leave, and flexibility in working hours and places of work also for men; points out that, according to OECD projections, total convergence in participation rates would result in a 12,4 % increase in per capita GDP by 2030;
24. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to pursue a Health in All Policies approach, assessing the health impact of policy choices in all relevant areas;
25. Recalls that higher birth rates require more job opportunities, stable employment and housing, decent working and living conditions, flexible work arrangements, generous family support and paid parental leave for both parents, quality childcare from the early years onwards, and an equal distribution of unpaid care and domestic responsibilities between men and women; stresses that in the light of demographic changes and the projected increases in life expectancy, it is key to ensure women’s full participation in the labour market without career breaks, interruptions or moves to part-time and temporary work, as this will lower women’s risk of poverty in old age; urges, therefore, the Member States to swiftly and fully transpose and implement the Work-Life Balance Directive and invites them to go beyond the minimum standards laid down in the directive;
26. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to further explore user-friendly, safe and accessible assistive digital technologies, telecare and telemedicine, especially in regions affected by demographic decline and remote regions; underlines that the use of these technologies should be fully consistent with the existing data protection framework, while ethical issues pertaining to the use of technology in health should always be duly taken into account; encourages the Member States to set up day-care centres for older people close to schools and nurseries, which could foster intergenerational ties;
27. Believes that every person should have the right to choose quality care services that are suitable for them and their family; believes that the approach to the development of care services should take into account all categories of users and their differences and the wide range of preferences for the types of care services they require; notes that care services should be developed so as to enhance the continuity of care, preventive healthcare, rehabilitation and independent living;
28. Calls for a regulatory framework that guarantees quality care services, telecare and telemedicine by providing care professionals with legal safeguards and laying down the necessary requirements for training, with the purpose of securing care and primary care for all EU citizens, whatever their age, across all geographical areas;
29. Encourages the Member States to support flexible, adequate and tailor-made care models, and stresses that active, healthy ageing, well-being and the employability of older people of working age are essential to ensuring the sustainability of social security and care systems; calls on the Member States to support the development of age-friendly environments and home, family-based and community-based care solutions, including for persons with dementia, to develop a public network of support services and medical equipment, to promote mobility, independent living, social inclusion and autonomy, and to facilitate civil society and social economy initiatives on these issues;
30. Calls on the Member States to better acknowledge the value of informal care, to improve social protection and the various forms of support for informal carers, to provide professional support, training and peer counselling for informal carers, and to introduce, in close cooperation with social partners, different forms of periodic relief for family members caring for older people, especially those needing respite care and day-care services, and support services including flexible working arrangements; encourages the Member States to put forward targeted strategies to help informal carers and recognise their contribution to care for older people, and to put forward proposals for adequate relief services; emphasises that providing informal care should be a choice and that formal care services should be promoted;
31. Encourages the Member States to develop volunteering and assistance for older people, as this has a special role to play in crisis situations, as demonstrated by the COVID-19 pandemic;
32. Calls on the Member States to combat poverty among women, especially in later life, which has a negative impact both on women’s social security and the EU’s GDP levels, and to ensure that workers enjoy appropriate social protection;
33. Calls on the Member States to ensure access to rehabilitation and reintegration services with a view to supporting older workers to return to the labour market after health-related career breaks if they wish to do so, since active ageing is key to health;
34. Stresses that the feminisation of poverty is the result of several factors, including gender inequalities in career progression, the fact that women are often employed on non-standard contracts, the absence of social security status for partners assisting self-employed workers, and poverty in households headed by single mothers;
35. Stresses that the COVID-19 outbreak has served as evidence of how essential it is for Member States to have robust, inclusive and crisis-proof health systems; calls on the Member States to ensure there are a sufficient number of professionals in the field of health and care services and to ensure access to geriatric medicine throughout the EU; calls on the Member States to ensure adequate working and employment conditions in medical and care occupations and to invest in education and training as a means of guaranteeing the quality of care provided; calls for the creation of incentives to take up the profession of carer for older people;
Social protection and social inclusion
36. Calls on the Member States to guarantee a decent standard of living for older people, and in that regard calls on them to share their best practices, in particular as regards the setting of minimum pensions;
37. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop recommendations on reducing the risk of poverty and social exclusion in older age, focusing especially on the gender pension gap, older persons with disabilities, older migrants, older Roma, older persons belonging to ethnic, racial, linguistic or sexual minorities and other groups that are disproportionately affected by poverty and social exclusion; encourages the Social Protection Committee to dedicate more analysis to groups facing high rates of poverty and social exclusion;
Active ageing
38. Stresses that the creation and implementation of age-appropriate lifelong learning opportunities is a vital and indispensable element for enhancing social and economic sustainability and personal welfare; calls on the Member States to invest in skills and education and to develop formal, non-formal and informal educational, training and lifelong learning projects, as well as opportunities for better integration for older people, including online education, whether they are still part of the labour market or are already retired;
39. Emphasises, in this context, the need to strengthen the digital skills of older people, which can help them not only to benefit from online education, but also improves their access to healthcare and other digital services; calls for accessible and affordable digital skills programmes catered to the needs of older people; calls on the Commission to take specific actions targeting older people; calls, furthermore, on the Commission and the Member States to support upskilling and reskilling initiatives, in particular for vulnerable groups, in order to help people find a quality job and in order to meet the needs of the labour market, counter the digital gap and ensure that these persons effectively adapt and benefit from innovative management and working methods and digital solutions, such as teleworking;
40. Calls on the Member States to use the ESF+ and ERDF funds to support the creation of quality jobs, promote a better work-life balance and provide job opportunities in regions at risk of depopulation, with special attention paid to improving the labour market participation of women; stresses the importance of counselling services, lifelong learning and programmes for reskilling and upskilling workers at all ages;
41. Calls on the Member States and the European Network of Public Employment Services to develop exchanges of practices in integrating older jobseekers into the labour market;
42. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to decent wages for all workers, either through statutory minimum wages or collective bargaining;
43. Underlines that tackling demographic change should follow a rights-based approach, promoting and creating equal opportunities, dialogue and solidarity instead of competition between people of different generations;
44. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the proper implementation of the Work-Life Balance Directive and to support regional and local initiatives and projects aimed at striking a better balance between work and private life for men and women;
45. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal to launch a programme for ‘digital volunteers’(53) to enable young qualified people and experienced senior citizens to share their digital skills with traditional businesses; encourages the Member States to develop volunteering and mentoring to transfer knowledge between generations, in order to counteract social exclusion and allow the sharing of skills and experience, encourage the upgrading of the skills of younger and older workers and preserve traditional crafts as part of Europe’s heritage;
46. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to bridge the digital divide and further explore the possibilities for social inclusion and integration into the labour market of older people of working age, particularly those who are housebound, by using the internet, other information technologies and artificial intelligence for cultural, entertainment, education, work, communication and medical purposes, including telecare and telemedicine in a safe manner, and ensuring the highest level of protection of personal data, while acknowledging the importance of direct personal contact and a dignified and human-centric approach; calls in particular for strategies to improve digital skills, connectivity and access to devices in long-term care settings;
47. Notes that improving the connectivity and accessibility of services in rural and remote areas is crucial to addressing the depopulation of these regions and the social and digital exclusion of the older population living there; calls, therefore, on the Member States to recognise the significance of rural and remote areas in all their diversity, and to develop their potential through stimulating investments in the local economy, fostering entrepreneurship and improving their infrastructure;
48. Calls on the Commission to support the Member States in fighting poverty, which particularly affects single mothers and has been further increased by the crisis, leading to greater social exclusion;
49. Underlines the essential impact constantly evolving digital technologies have on people’s daily lives, and thus stresses the need for high-speed internet and vital and up-to-date technological equipment in schools, hospitals and all other relevant public services facilities, including effective e-governance; considers the possibilities created by lifelong learning, in combination with digitalisation, essential to provide the ageing population in rural and remote areas with various opportunities, including supplementary income; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to support educational and training programmes that help the ageing population to develop skills and gain knowledge in areas such as e-commerce, online marketing and ICT; calls on the Member States to ensure that all households have access to high-speed internet and digital equipment and to advance the acquisition of digital skills, especially for vulnerable groups;
50. Considers that the EU’s green and digital transition should harness the full potential of ageing rural communities; recalls, in this regard, the importance of ensuring access to broadband internet and basic services in rural areas, the uptake of e-skills and new approaches to sustainable development, such as the concept of smart villages and sustainable food system transformation;
51. Highlights that as a result of the evolution, digitalisation and specialisation of agriculture, both people within the sector and those in the process of entering into it require an appropriate level of digital, technical and economic training, and calls for the promotion of exchange schemes, discussions, online training courses and e-learning;
52. Calls on the Member States to take into account the specific situation of older workers in the labour market through measures such as individualised training and optimised working hours;
53. Calls on the Commission to support the Member States in the increasing use of the structural funds for investment in public childcare and care for older and dependent people;
54. Calls on the Member States to support the functioning and development of older people’s organisations and other forms of social participation;
55. Calls on the Commission and the Social Protection Committee to delve deeper into non-standard labour market trajectories in the next Pension Adequacy Report, fully analysing the gender gap in pensions in all its dimensions and in all the three pillars of pension systems; calls further on the Commission to assess the adequacy of minimum pensions, which are particularly relevant to avoiding old-age poverty;
56. Underlines that the emerging silver economy could turn into one of the main economic drivers, particularly in rural areas, and could provide opportunities for the health and long-term care sectors to offer high-quality care in a more efficient way; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take into account the potential of the silver economy in EU and national strategies and to promote it more vigorously, including in tourism and cultural exchanges geared towards older people;
57. Recalls that the outermost regions are especially predisposed to depopulation and require a special set of measures to mitigate the negative demographic changes they often face; calls on the Member States to proactively use the available structural and investment funds in order to address the challenges these regions encounter;
58. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to involve organisations representing and safeguarding the interests of older people when making decisions which affect them;
59. Stresses that teleworking can offer numerous opportunities to remote areas, with it being one of the best ways to utilise digital technologies in order to maintain the population of rural and remote areas and at the same time benefit local communities and their economies; calls on the Commission to put forward an EU teleworking agenda with a view to developing a legislative framework laying down clear minimum standards and conditions for remote work across the EU;
60. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to mainstream the rights of older persons with disabilities into all disability- and ageing-related policies and programmes, ensuring full compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;
Special policies and research
61. Calls on the Member States to use EU funds and private investments combined with national and local investments to provide affordable, adequate, safe and accessible housing and to adapt buildings to the needs of older, vulnerable and disadvantaged people; stresses that buildings should have accessibility features; stresses that safe housing is housing where the possibility of dangers has been reduced and where responding to danger is made easier; recalls that accessible housing should go hand in hand with adequate infrastructure;
62. Underlines the indispensable role regional and local authorities have in addressing the ever-deepening demographic issues in rural and remote areas in a meaningful and sustainable way;
63. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote best practices for an efficient ageing policy;
64. Calls on the Member States to promote initiatives to strengthen intergenerational bonds and to support older people who, for health or financial reasons, have to leave their homes to find affordable housing that meets their needs;
65. Calls on the Member States to take the gender dimension into account when reforming pension systems and adapting the retirement age, considering the differences between women and men in work patterns and the higher risk of discrimination against older women in the labour market;
66. Calls on the Member States to prevent and redress violence against older women as part of their national responses to COVID-19, including helplines and support services, paying particular attention to residential care settings;
67. Asks the Commission and the Member States to create effective programmes for combating violence against women that incorporate the age dimension in order to prevent the physical, sexual, psychological and economic abuse that can be inflicted on older people, most of whom are women; proposes that statistical surveys be carried out on the increase in violence against older people with the aim of shedding light on this serious problem – which older people are normally incapable of reporting, since they may accept the ill-treatment they suffer as part and parcel of being old and dependent – and with a view to combating abuse against older people more effectively and with greater commitment on the part of society as a whole;
68. Emphasises that sheltered and supported housing can be conducive to the deinstitutionalisation of care; calls on the Member States to explore the possibilities to promote sheltered, supported and intergenerational housing, as well as housing adaptations based on quality criteria;
69. Encourages the Member States to carry out information and education campaigns and actions dedicated to older people on road safety, showing the impact of physiological changes and the deterioration of psychomotor skills on the ability to move around on the road, thus improving safety for all road users;
70. Encourages the Member States to increase spending from the ESF+, the ERDF and the Just Transition Fund for the training and retraining of older workers, ensuring equal access to public services, with particular emphasis being placed on encouraging companies to employ older workers and adapting public infrastructure, including transport, and public spaces to the needs of older people; invites the Member States to promote investments in public services in rural areas with the aid of structural funds, which would attract the younger generation and increase the well-being of older people living in these areas; calls for greater use of European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development funds to counteract the isolation and social exclusion of older people in rural and disadvantaged areas, with a special focus on areas at risk of depopulation; invites the Member States to take advantage of the possibilities offered by Next Generation EU in that respect;
71. Underlines the importance of adequate, reliable and comparable data as a basis of policies and measures for tackling demographic challenges; calls on the Commission to revise the EU statistical framework by increasing the upper age limit for the collection of data, ensuring the inclusion of persons living in institutions and providing disaggregated data by gender and age, with full respect for privacy and fundamental rights standards; calls on the Commission and the Member States to collect more data and to step up their support for the development of research into healthy ageing and old-age related diseases and the living conditions of older people;
72. Welcomes the European Pillar of Social Rights action plan and calls for the swift and effective implementation of the principles outlined in the pillar; calls on the Commission, with a view to improving and strengthening the representation of older people in the EU law-making process and mirroring the existing EU Youth Parliament, to consider EU Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme funding for such an initiative;
73. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to focus their actions on increasing the healthy life years of older people; underlines, in this respect, the importance of programmes for lifelong health promotion and education, disease prevention and regular examination and to undertake new initiatives such as better disease prevention policies and more effective healthcare programmes to stimulate the process of healthy ageing; calls on the Commission and the Member States to actively engage in the WHO Decade of Healthy Ageing by drawing up healthy ageing plans in the EU that cover access to health and care services, as well as strategies for health promotion and prevention; calls on the Commission to set up an ambitious research agenda on physical and mental health as part of the Horizon Europe programme; encourages the Member States to consider using the funds provided by the multiannual financial framework and Next Generation EU for this purpose;
74. Calls on the Member States to encourage intergenerational exchange by, among other endeavours, promoting voluntary work by younger people for older people, and to foster and finance intergenerational centres, as these can be crucial for fighting age discrimination and ensuring the social inclusion of older people; encourages the Member States to set up community care centres and volunteering and lifelong learning opportunities targeting older people close to schools and nurseries, and to work to foster intergenerational ties by encouraging exchanges between these services; urges the Member States and the Commission to promote programmes, projects and actions that further the social, cultural and political participation of older people;
75. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote and support an inclusive labour market and societies that allow for equal participation and draw on the skills and talents of all; calls on the Member States to develop employability and career management strategies to prepare for an ageing workforce and more volatile labour markets in the light of the frequent and profound transformations in labour markets; underlines that such strategies should include the promotion of education, training and lifelong learning for persons of all ages, healthy workplaces that provide reasonable accommodation for employees with health difficulties or disabilities, a better work-life balance, and the promotion of intergenerational exchanges in the workplace; calls, moreover, for the EU Platform of Diversity Charters to place greater focus on the promotion of age and (dis)ability diversity in workplaces; calls on the Commission to emphasise psychosocial and physical, age-related risks for both women and men in the new strategic framework for health and safety in the workplace; underlines that occupational health and safety is crucial;
76. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to facilitate access to work, for those who wish to, for people aged 60 and over, in particular women, as this would increase their lifetime incomes, and to introduce part-time, low‑risk professional activities for older people when they are still healthy and able to take on responsibilities; stresses the importance of creating paid employment opportunities for people who have already reached the statutory retirement age and wish to remain or get active, not only with a view to generating additional income, but also as a means to tackle social exclusion; encourages, moreover, incentives for volunteering and mentoring in order to boost knowledge transfer between generations; underlines that such measures and activities must not be at the expense of young jobseekers or the long-term unemployed;
77. Calls on the Commission to adopt an EU strategy on carers; stresses that investment in care services is essential as it will not only increase women’s employment rates, providing job opportunities in the formal economy for previously informal carers and promoting a work-life balance for women, but also improve the living conditions of older people through investment in long-term care facilities, measures to improve mental health and combat isolation, and measures to prevent and combat violence against older women, as well as investing in people’s health and education, to ensure that they stay active and in good health as they grow older; calls on the Member States to adopt a set of indicators for the access to and sustainability of care systems for older people, as well as a common quality framework for older people’s care services; stresses the importance of ensuring that care for older people remains a national competence;
78. Calls on the Member States to devote greater attention to older people, who are particularly vulnerable to viral infections, including COVID-19; calls on the Commission and the Member States to combat the isolation, neglect and social exclusion experienced by older people during the COVID-19 pandemic by promoting awareness-raising campaigns, conducting research, facilitating exchanges of views, and combining EU structural and investment funds; calls on the Member States, furthermore, to ensure the application of patient rights in cross-border healthcare as well as the availability of and access to safe and affordable medicines; stresses that the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the need for more solidarity from the EU; calls on the Commission to devise and adopt an EU charter for the rights of older people on the basis of Article 25 of the Charter;
79. Recognises the prominent role that cohesion policy and the CAP could play in promoting and boosting the employability and inclusion of women in rural and remote areas faced with demographic issues; calls on the Member States to make better use of the relevant funds to that end;
80. Calls on the Member States to use REACT-EU funds to tackle demographic change(54);
81. Highlights that new technologies and innovative methods could prove to be useful to reduce the costs of services of general interest, while retaining the standard of living and quality of services in remote and sparsely populated areas; encourages the Member States and the relevant regional and local authorities to invest in unconventional and innovative measures designed to provide essential services for the population and create a suitable environment to attract people to return and reverse depopulation;
82. Calls on the Member States to enhance their exchange of best practices on the creation of suitable demographic policies and initiatives to harness the possibilities of and address the challenges posed by the EU’s ageing population;
83. Recalls the specific nature of family farming, which blends agricultural activity and family life, with older farmers remaining active beyond the age of retirement;
84. Recognises the potential of older people, including farmers, to become the driving force of a vibrant silver economy in rural areas based on social innovation, inclusive rural communities and a healthier living environment; calls on the Commission to carefully study this potential when building its long-term vision for rural areas and active ageing;
85. Calls on public institutions to promote the creation of a special protection system that takes account of the specific nature of unemployment affecting agricultural workers, owing to the very temporary nature of agricultural seasonal work; points out that this could provide greater security for those who choose to work in agriculture;
86. Points out that an ageing workforce and the lack of generational renewal constitute a more serious issue in agriculture than in other sectors; believes that creating new vocations to enable generational renewal, by ensuring the attractiveness and profitability of professions in the agriculture sector, is key to reversing this trend;
87. Acknowledges that only 11 % of all farm holdings in the European Union are run by farmers under the age of 40(55); calls on the Member States to remove all barriers preventing young farmers from entering the agricultural sector, including the difficulty of gaining access to land; calls, furthermore, on the Member States to promote new ways of collaboration between the generations such as partnerships, share-farming, long-term leasing and other arrangements which could address the lack of land and encourage young people to become farmers;
88. Reiterates that some of the obstacles to generational renewal in agriculture are linked to access to land and farm transfer from one generation to the next; recalls that older farmers faced with the risk of low pensions, loss of income (including CAP payments) and social exclusion in rural areas post-retirement tend to remain active and keep their farms longer; underlines, in this context, the need for tailored policy instruments to guarantee smooth farm transitions and active ageing for older farmers in rural communities;
89. Notes that in many Member States national pension systems do not provide retired farmers with sufficient income; regrets the fact that the extension of agricultural activity beyond the legal retirement age, which slows down generational renewal, is often the only way to deal with this situation; stresses that support under the CAP is not intended to replace a pension system;
90. Notes the growing need for highly qualified young professionals in agriculture, especially in the regions, and draws attention to the need to take all measures to encourage young people to study agricultural professions, as well as to facilitate the transfer of knowledge from older people to the younger generation;
91. Believes that farm partnerships between older and younger generations are key to deepening intergenerational solidarity, knowledge transfer and mutual learning, which is particularly important for the uptake of new technologies and digital skills in farming;
92. Considers that family workers still represent the vast majority of agricultural labour in Europe, but notes that this type of labour has been steadily declining for years and is expected to decline further in the near future; stresses that the unstoppable rural exodus from certain parts of the EU will lead to rural areas facing economic, social and environmental problems that need more ambitious and coordinated policies;
93. Stresses the importance of supporting rural areas in their diversity, encouraging investments in projects that support local economies, including better transport accessibility and digital connectivity; considers it important to recall that maintaining agricultural employment has direct implications for keeping rural economies alive; believes in addition that the challenge faced by all farmers in understanding the role of, and engaging with, modern technology and innovation in agriculture should not be underestimated; stresses therefore the importance of lifelong vocational training, advisory services and knowledge exchange, both within and outside the framework of the CAP;
94. Considers that access to farming for women should be facilitated through appropriate public services, enabling them to work in agriculture to a greater extent;
95. Notes that an ageing population, particularly in agricultural and rural areas, is an unavoidable trend that must be taken into account when designing economic and social policies; considers that the issue of an ageing population requires a multidimensional approach, and stresses the importance of promoting wider complementarity and synergy between policy areas and support instruments; recalls that adequate resources and services are essential to provide older people with an age-friendly environment;
96. Emphasises that inequalities in access to land, direct payments and support, both between and within EU countries, are among the issues that need to be addressed in order to halt regional decline, and to encourage older people past retirement age to leave farming and young people to start farming;
97. Calls on the Member States to take into account the proportion of older people (over the age of 65) in rural regions when devising their strategic plans, and to consider introducing measures that cover or target older inhabitants in rural areas, for example through a more flexible approach to the conditions applicable to real and active participation by that age group in the economic life of the region concerned;
98. Points out that, in the light of the situation arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, it is necessary to commit to a living and dynamic countryside, eliminating red tape and investing in infrastructure and quality services in rural areas in order to curb the ageing process in agriculture and promote the role of women as heads of holdings;
99. Notes that an effective mobility system is one of the prerequisites for regional economic development, territorial cohesion and the development of regional potential; points out that it is therefore necessary to provide the requisite funding for the development and maintenance of transport links, which could encourage the older generation to stay in agriculture for longer and attract young people from regional centres to work in the countryside;
100. Highlights the role and importance of the CAP in encouraging generational renewal in the agricultural sector; calls on the Member States to favour actions to increase the numbers of young farmers in their strategic plans and to promote consistency with other instruments available at national and EU level;
101. Highlights the central role played by community-led local development initiatives in restoring and keeping living and thriving local rural economies, and the need to keep a sufficient level of funding for the LEADER programme; calls on the Member States to make full use of LEADER’s capacities;
102. Notes the importance of the services provided by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), especially for older people; calls for the strengthening of funding for the activities of NGOs in the regions;
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103. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control et al., ‘High impact of COVID-19 in long-term care facilities, suggestion for monitoring in the EU/EEA’, Eurosurveillance, Vol 25, Issue 22, 4 June 2020.
The share of temporary contracts for people aged 15-64 has been stable in recent years. In 2018, it amounted to 12,1 % of total employment. The share among women is slightly higher (13,1 %) than for men (11,2 %) (Eurostat).
European Agency for Fundamental Rights, bulletins on the fundamental rights implications of the Coronavirus pandemic in the EU: No 3 of June 2020 focusing on older people and No 6 of 30 November 2020 focusing on social rights.
In the 2018 Ageing Report, the total cost of ageing is defined as being calculated on the basis of public spending on pensions, healthcare, long-term care, education and unemployment benefits.
Commission interinstitutional paper of 25 May 2018 entitled ‘The 2018 Ageing Report: Economic & Budgetary Projections for the 28 EU Member States (2016-2070)’.
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work report of 4 October 2016 entitled ‘The ageing workforce: Implications for occupational safety and health – A research review’.