European Parliament legislative resolution of 16 September 2021 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion on behalf of the Union of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cabo Verde amending the Agreement on facilitating the issue of short-stay visas to citizens of the Republic of Cape Verde and of the European Union (05034/2021 – C9-0116/2021 – 2020/0319(NLE))

P9_TA(2021)0378 A9-0264/2021

(Consent)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the draft Council decision (05034/2021),

–  having regard to the draft agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cabo Verde amending the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde on facilitating the issue of short-stay visas to citizens of the Republic of Cape Verde and of the European Union (05034/2021),

–  having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 77(2), point (a), and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9‑0116/2021),

–  having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4) and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0264/2021),

1.  Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;

2.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Republic of Cabo Verde.

European Parliament decision of 16 September 2021 referring the matter to the committee responsible for interinstitutional negotiations on the basis of the unamended proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA, as regards its alignment with EU rules on the protection of personal data (COM(2021)0020 – C9-0005/2021 – 2021/0008(COD))(1)

P9_TA(2021)0379 A9-0236/2021

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(1) Decision adopted under Rule 59(4), fourth subparagraph, of the Rules of Procedure (A9-0236/2021).

European Parliament decision of 16 September 2021 referring the matter to the committee responsible for interinstitutional negotiations on the basis of the unamended proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/41/EU, as regards its alignment with EU rules on the protection of personal data (COM(2021)0021 – C9-0006/2021 – 2021/0009(COD))(1)

P9_TA(2021)0380 A9-0237/2021

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(1) Decision adopted under Rule 59(4), fourth subparagraph, of the Rules of Procedure (A9-0237/2021).

European Parliament legislative resolution of 16 September 2021 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Korea on certain aspects of air services (05210/2021 – C9-0120/2021 – 2019/0044(NLE))

P9_TA(2021)0381 A9-0251/2021

(Consent)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the draft Council decision (05210/2021),

–  having regard to the draft agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Korea on certain aspects of air services (15082/2019),

–  having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 100(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v), and Article 218(7), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9‑0120/2021),

–  having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4) and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Transport and Tourism (A9-0251/2021),

1.  Gives its consent to conclusion of the agreement;

2.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Republic of Korea.

European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy (2021/2037(INI))

P9_TA(2021)0382 A9-0252/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 12 March 2019 entitled ‘EU-China – A strategic outlook’ (JOIN(2019)0005),

–  having regard to the EU-China dialogue on human rights, launched in 1995, and the 37th round thereof, held in Brussels on 1 and 2 April 2019,

–  having regard to the EU-China Strategic Partnership launched in 2003,

–  having regard to the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation,

–  having regard to the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy of June 2016,

–  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998(1) and Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999(2) of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 28 July 2020 on Hong Kong,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on the human rights situation in China, in particular those of 17 December 2020 on forced labour and the situation of the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region(3), of 18 April 2019 on China, notably the situation of religious and ethnic minorities(4), of 4 October 2018 on mass arbitrary detention of Uyghurs and Kazakhs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region(5), of 12 September 2018 on the state of EU-China relations(6), and of 15 December 2016 on the cases of the Larung Gar Tibetan Buddhist Academy and Ilham Tohti(7),

–  having regard to its previous resolutions and recommendations on Hong Kong, in particular those of 19 June 2020 on the PRC national security law for Hong Kong and the need for the EU to defend Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy(8), of 21 January 2021 on the crackdown on the democratic opposition in Hong Kong(9), and of 13 December 2017 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Hong Kong, 20 years after handover(10),

–  having regard to its resolution of 26 November 2020 on the EU Trade Policy Review(11),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on Chinese countersanctions on EU entities and MEPs and MPs(12),

–  having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on connectivity and EU-Asia relations(13),

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and other UN human rights treaties and instruments,

–  having regard to the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

–  having regard to the 2014 Protocol to the International Labour Organization Forced Labour Convention of 1930, which has not been signed by China,

–  having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and to the Paris Agreement, which came into force on 4 November 2016,

–  having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concluded on 10 December 1982 and in force since 16 November 1994,

–  having regard to the report of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General of 25 November 2020 entitled ‘NATO 2030: United for a New Era’,

–  having regard to China’s 14th Five-Year Plan and to the principles of ‘dual circulation’ and ‘secure supply chains’,

–  having regard to Article 36 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which guarantees all citizens the right to freedom of religious belief, and to Article 4 thereof, which upholds the rights of ‘minority nationalities’,

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0252/2021),

A.  whereas in its strategic framework on human rights and democracy, the EU pledges that human rights, democracy and the rule of law will be promoted ‘in all areas of the EU’s external actions without exception’, and that it will ‘place human rights at the centre of its relations with all third countries, including its strategic partners’;

B.  whereas through its strong economic growth and assertive foreign policy agenda, notably its investment strategy, its ‘Going Global’ and ‘Made in China 2025’ policies, and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is asserting a stronger global role both as an economic power and as foreign policy actor, which poses serious political, economic, security and technological challenges to the EU, which in turn has significant and long-lasting consequences for the world order, and poses serious threats to rules-based multilateralism and core democratic values;

C.  whereas the People’s Republic of China is a unitary, one-party communist state, governed by the Communist Party of China (CPC), which is committed to Marxism–Leninism; whereas as such it does not share democratic values such as individual freedom, freedom of speech and freedom of religion;

D.  whereas China is increasingly aspiring to a more global role, as Chinese President Xi Jinping openly vowed in his report delivered at the 19th Communist Party Congress in 2017 that by 2049 China would become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence;

E.  whereas the long-term tradition of democracy in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan demonstrates that democracy is valued by the Chinese people;

F.  whereas in Macau, after prohibiting ceremonies to mark the anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre and pressuring media organisations to adopt a pro-China editorial line, this summer, the Chinese authorities excluded 21 candidates, most of whom are members of pro-democracy movements, from participating in the next legislative elections;

G.  whereas China has a track record of human rights violations that eschew the country’s bilateral and multilateral commitments in these areas; whereas China has regularly submitted resolutions to the UN Human Rights Council aimed at making ‘sovereignty, non-interference and mutual respect’ fundamental, non-negotiable principles that override the promotion and protection of the human rights of individuals; whereas China has been pursuing the systemic persecution of the Uyghur people, Tibetans, Mongols and other ethnic minorities, human rights defenders, social activists, religious groups, journalists, and petitioners and protesters against injustices, as well as increasingly repressing all dissenting and opposition voices, especially in Hong Kong; whereas goodwill measures and non-binding commitments have not been sufficient to increase China’s commitment to values that are fundamental for the EU;

H.  whereas the recent departure of foreign correspondents from China and the labelling by the Chinese authorities of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club as an ‘illegal organisation’ are the latest in a long and increasing series of cases of harassment and obstruction against foreign journalists, who are ultimately being driven out of China; whereas this comes as part of an effort to police speech about China worldwide and to determine what kind of speech and discussions are allowed globally, and sees this effort as part of a totalitarian threat;

I.  whereas the existing EU-China strategy has revealed its limitations in the light of recent developments and the global challenges posed by China and needs to be updated;

J.  whereas Parliament has called on the Commission to start the scoping exercise and impact assessment in order to formally commence the negotiations with Taiwan as soon as possible;

K.  whereas since the launch of the Chinese Government’s ‘Strike hard against violent terrorism’ campaign in 2014, the situation of Uyghur and other primarily Muslim ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has rapidly deteriorated; whereas more than one million people are imprisoned in detention camps, called ‘political re-education’ or ‘training’ centres, in which Uyghurs are subject to systemic forced labour, torture, enforced disappearance, mass surveillance, cultural and religious erasure, the forced sterilisation of women, sexual violence, violations of reproductive rights and family separation; whereas legal analysis has concluded that these offences constitute crimes against humanity, even alleged genocide, within the international legal framework; whereas several national parliaments have adopted positions along these lines;

L.  whereas the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime enables the EU to impose restrictive measures on targeted individuals, entities and bodies, including states and non-state actors, responsible for, involved in or associated with serious human rights violations and abuses; whereas on 22 March 2021 four Chinese individuals and one entity directly responsible for serious human rights violations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region were included on the list of natural persons and entities subject to these restrictive measures; whereas in response to these measures, China imposed counter-sanctions on ten European individuals and four entities, including five Members of the European Parliament and two EU institutional bodies, the Subcommittee on Human Rights of the European Parliament and the Political and Security Committee of the Council of the European Union, as well as two European scholars, two think tanks in Germany and the Alliance of Democracies Foundation in Denmark; whereas Chinese sanctions lacked legal justification and a legal basis and directly targeted not only the individuals and entities concerned but also the European Union as a whole; whereas the sanctions are clearly an attempt to deter the EU from continuing its work and action against human rights abuses in China;

1.  Recommends that the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Council:

Open dialogue and cooperation on global challenges

2.  Calls on the VP/HR to ensure that the new EU-China strategy involves China in a principled and interest-oriented dialogue on global challenges, such as human rights, by developing an ambitious, holistic and results-oriented EU strategy for human rights in China as part of this new EU-China strategy, the environment and climate change, nuclear disarmament, the promotion of the economic recovery from COVID-19, the fight against global health crises, and the reform of specific multilateral organisations; calls for this dialogue to be driven by EU fundamental principles and interests and to pursue the core objectives of EU external engagement; stresses that cooperation between both partners will be useful in addressing these global problems; reiterates that China remains an important partner for the EU;

3.  Supports greater dialogue and cooperation with China on peace and security; recognises the importance of cooperating with China to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a new terrorist base and discourage North Korea from continuing its nuclear programme; endorses seeking cooperation on sustainable development, contributions to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, environmental issues, space and aerospace, science, technology and innovation, while fully insisting on freedom of research; stresses that these dialogues and cooperation must be founded on a shared commitment to openness and working together in a transparent, just and equitable manner as part of a rules-based international system, while making sure that European interests and values are safeguarded and developing Europe’s ability to compete with China wherever necessary;

4.  Points out that some fields of cooperation such as ICT, space and aerospace can have a dual use application and can be used against Chinese citizens and the West;

5.  Underlines the importance of encouraging China’s commitment to tackling climate change and other environmental issues by reinforcing an EU-China partnership in this field and emphasises the need to ensure that both EU and China adhere to their respective commitments under the Paris Agreement; stresses the importance of the EU implementing a carbon border adjustment mechanism; notes that over the past three decades China has tripled its carbon emissions and it is now emitting 27 % of the world’s greenhouse gases; stresses the need to ensure coherence between China’s announced global ambitions in the fight against climate change and the environmental impacts of its investment strategies at home and overseas; calls on the Chinese Government to refrain from exporting its coal capacity to third countries, notably in the framework of the BRI;

6.  Calls for result-oriented Human Rights Dialogues to be held on an annual basis and evaluated regularly and calls for a solid benchmarking of the progress made in bilateral dialogues more generally to ensure that these exchanges produce genuine positive outcomes for human rights and human rights defenders in China; asks for the benchmarking results and any progress, stagnation or deterioration to be discussed in a transparent manner; requests that human rights be regularly raised at the highest political level, both at EU-China Summits and at Member State level; calls, furthermore, for a shadow human rights dialogue, involving EU and Member State diplomats, the Chinese diaspora, free and independent NGOs, academics and lawmakers, aimed at forging a better understanding of the Chinese system and devising better strategies to influence human rights progress in China; underlines that these Human Rights Dialogues need to include, but must not be limited to, the following issues: media freedom and freedom of the press, the rights of minorities, including in the regions of Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet, and free access to these regions including for diplomats and journalists, the situation of Hong Kong, freedom of speech, labour rights, the right of assembly, freedom of religion or belief, and the state of the rule of law in China in general; welcomes the appointment of a new EU Special Envoy for the Promotion of Freedom of Religion or Belief Outside the Union, and calls for the new Special Envoy to be actively involved in supporting the plight of all religious groups and entities, including Muslims, Christians and Buddhists, facing persecution in mainland China and Hong Kong; calls for the relevant EU institutions to use these Human Rights Dialogues to bring up individual cases; remains deeply concerned about the continuing detention of Swedish citizen and publisher Gui Minhai; urges an intervention by the EU and the Member States at the highest level to secure the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners; expresses concern about systemic human rights violations in China and condemns all cases of arbitrary arrests and suppression of the free flow of information and freedom of expression;

7.  Calls for the EU to engage in dialogue with China on possible ways to improve, in a transparent manner, initial response capabilities for infectious diseases that have the potential to develop into epidemics or pandemics, including recognition, risk-mapping and early warning systems to ensure better global preparedness to respond to pandemics; calls further on China to allow an independent and transparent investigation into the origins and spread of SARS-COV-2;

8.  Supports the expansion of contacts between peoples on both sides as well as mutual student exchange visits, but encourages the Member States to better monitor the impact of Chinese Government interference in academic freedom;

Enhanced engagement on universal values, international norms and human rights

9.  Condemns in the strongest possible terms the baseless and arbitrary sanctions imposed by the Chinese authorities, which amount to an attack on freedom of speech, on academic freedom, and on the international commitment to and understanding of universal human rights; urges the Chinese authorities to lift these unjustified sanctions; considers that sanctions imposed by the Chinese authorities further erode trust and hinder bilateral cooperation;

10.  Underlines that the consideration and ratification process for the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) cannot start until the Chinese sanctions against MEPs and EU institutions have been lifted;

11.  Highlights, in this context, its resolution of 20 May 2021 on Chinese countersanctions; calls on the Commission, in line with Parliament’s resolution of 20 May 2021 on Chinese countersanctions and with Article 21(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), to use all the tools at its disposal and the debate around the CAI as leverage to improve the protection of human rights and support for civil society in China; urges China to take concrete measures towards putting an end to other human rights violations in China, such as forced labour and the systematic persecution of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim minority groups, Tibetans, Christians and other religious communities and churches, and to uphold its international commitments to Hong Kong under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Hong Kong’s Basic Law through the suspension of planned reforms to the city’s electoral system and the release of pro-democracy legislators and activists; also calls on China to respect the Basic Law of Macau, which will be in force until 2049, and the provisions of the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration(14) preventing any interference in the country’s electoral processes and the functioning of the media;

12.  Underlines that Parliament would take the human rights situation in China, including in Hong Kong, into account before determining its position; reiterates its very serious concerns about the various human rights abuses in China and recalls that full respect for universal values is essential, regardless of the differences between both systems;

13.  Calls on China to abide by international standards including with regard to its impact on climate, the environment, biodiversity, poverty, health, labour rights and human rights; urges China, in the context of promoting sustainable trade and development, to take concrete action towards the ratification and implementation of the four outstanding fundamental Conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; regrets the fact that several international companies, notably in the apparel and textile sector, have been subject to an extensive and widespread boycott after expressing concerns about the reports of forced labour in Xinjiang and taking the decision to cut supply chain ties with Xinjiang, and strongly condemns the political coercion exercised against them by the Chinese Government; reiterates its request for the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to swiftly finalise a supply chain business advisory with guidance for companies on the exposure to risks of using Uyghur forced labour and providing support in urgently identifying alternative sources of supply;

14.  Underlines the need to ensure that the internal market legislation, as well as any due diligence framework or forced labour import ban, be efficiently and effectively used in order to exclude entities operating on the EU internal market that are directly or indirectly involved in human rights abuses in Xinjiang; calls further on European companies in China, as part of their corporate responsibility, to undertake a thorough investigation into the use of forced labour in their supply chains;

15.  Urges the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to launch independent legal investigations into alleged genocide, alleged crimes against humanity and human rights violations, including forced labour programmes taking place in several regions in China, and calls for the EU and its Member States to provide their political backing and garner international support for such an investigation; calls on the Chinese authorities to allow free, meaningful and unhindered access to the region; is extremely concerned about reports of labour programmes in Tibet, which are also being labelled ‘vocational training camps’ by the Chinese authorities; calls on China to comply with its obligations under national and international law to respect human rights, including the rights of minorities in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia;

16.  Condemns the fact that freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of the press are severely restricted in China; deplores the political persecution to which many journalists – who are now in exile – have been subjected; calls on China to ensure that all journalists can conduct their work freely, without impediments and fear of reprisals; stresses that the freedom of the press and media should be ensured; requests that the EU support free speech and free media in China by establishing a European Democratic Media Fund to support independent journalism;

17.  Calls on the Commission to bring forward the proposed Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence Framework as a matter of urgency and to support efforts to achieve the adoption of a similar instrument in the framework of the United Nations;

18.  Calls on the Commission to express its concern over the new Order 15, further constraining religious people and their leaders, to the Chinese authorities;

19.  Calls on the Member States to fully implement the package of measures that was agreed following the introduction of the National Security Law for Hong Kong in July 2020 and to review their asylum, migration, visa and residence policies for Hong Kongers; urges the VP/HR and the Council to assess and update the conclusions on Hong Kong; calls for targeted measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, as necessary, in order to address repression in Hong Kong; calls furthermore for the repeal by China of the National Security Law imposed on Hong Kong in June 2020; calls on those Member States which continue to have extradition treaties with China and Hong Kong in force to suspend individual extraditions wherever the extradition of an individual puts them at risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, where that individual would face charges for politically motivated reasons, in other situations where ethnic minorities, representatives of the pro-democratic opposition in Hong Kong and dissidents in general would be targeted, and wherever this would be in breach of the EU’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights;

20.  Recommends that the leadership of the EU and the Member States decline invitations to the Beijing Winter Olympics in the event that the human rights situation in China and Hong Kong does not improve and no high-level EU-China Human Rights Summit/Dialogue with a tangible outcome takes place prior to the event;

21.  Regrets China’s support for the most oppressive regimes in the world, in particular in Syria, Iran and North Korea, but also in Venezuela and Cuba;

Analysis and identification of the risks, vulnerabilities and challenges

22.  Believes that the future EU strategy on China should provide the necessary tools and data to address the political, economic, social and technological threats stemming from China, including via its BRI, Dual Circulation Strategy, 14th Five-Year Plan, and Made in China 2025, China Standards 2035 and 16+1 policies, including its military modernisation and capacity build-up, and the implications of this for the Union’s open strategic autonomy and for the multilateral rules-based order; notes that there is an urgent need to ensure political will and resources for the implementation of the EU’s Connectivity Strategy; calls for greater coordination between the EU’s Connectivity Strategy and the Blue Dot Network in order to provide a sustainable alternative to the BRI; welcomes the G7 leaders’ agreement to develop a partnership to build back better for the world – the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative – as an alternative to China’s BRI; calls for EU Member States and institutions to embrace the initiative and contribute to it;

23.  Calls on the Commission to commission an EU-wide audit, broken down by Member State, of EU dependency on China in certain strategically important and critical sectors, including pharmaceutical supplies, if possible at both national and subnational level, building on its recent comprehensive analysis entitled ‘Strategic dependencies and capacities’ (SWD(2021)0352), which sets out plans to reduce risks related to undesired dependencies, while maintaining overall relations with China, which should be as reciprocal and balanced as possible and aligned with the EU’s values and strategic priorities;

24.  Calls on the Commission and the Council to elaborate mechanisms to address these threats coherently, in particular by:

25.  Underlines that the bilateral and uncoordinated engagement of some Member States with China, and the failure to inform the Commission when signing Memoranda of Understanding with third countries, is counterproductive and damaging to the EU’s global position and the advantage its Member States have in the negotiations when acting as a Union rather than independent state actors; asks Member States to refrain from signing any such memoranda without consulting the Council and the Commission; calls for the establishment of a coordination mechanism at EU level to deal with such issues; recalls Article 24 TEU, which notes that the ‘Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity’, and that they ‘shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations’;

26.  Stresses that the implementation of the EU-China strategy and national strategies and policies towards China should be regularly coordinated between the EU institutions, the Member States, the different Commission Directorates General and the European Parliament, in order to ensure a comprehensive and consistent policy that avoids compartmentalisation of separate policy areas; believes that policies should also be coordinated with regional and local actors that develop and maintain links with China;

27.  Expresses concern about the increasing incidence of hybrid attacks, Chinese industrial espionage and cyber theft against European companies; stresses the importance of strengthening private and public cyber capabilities; calls for stronger cooperation and the establishment of a system aimed at ending malicious acts in cyber space on the part of China, including cyberattacks, forced technology transfers, cyber-espionage and cyber-enabled intellectual property theft; underscores the need to foster closer cooperation with NATO and G7 countries to fight hybrid threats, including cyber attacks, and disinformation campaigns stemming from China, including by allowing Member States to impose collective countermeasures on a voluntary basis, even if the nature of the attacks is not serious enough to trigger Article 5 of the NATO Treaty or Article 42(7) TEU;

28.  Calls on the Commission to encourage and coordinate actions aimed at countering China’s foreign financing of our democratic processes, including the strategy of elite capture and the technique of co-opting top-level civil servants and former EU politicians;

29.  Is concerned by the assertive and, at times, aggressive diplomatic pressure from the Chinese authorities, e.g. towards the President of the Czech Senate; stresses that EU institutions can in no way bow to pressure, threats or censorship from Chinese channels; is concerned about undue pressure by Chinese officials on researchers and academics working on topics related to China across the EU, including the activities of the Confucius Institutes in the EU;

Building partnerships with like-minded partners

30.  Calls on the VP/HR to coordinate the Union’s actions with like-minded partners on the protection of human rights and support for people in China, Hong Kong and Macau, and for the Chinese diaspora around the world, as well as the defence of liberal democracy in the world, notably in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and with a view to engaging China to respect international law, the right to public demonstrations as an exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, the freedom of navigation, including in the South China and East China Seas, overflight and the peaceful resolution of disputes; underlines, further, that such partnerships and multilateral cooperation with like-minded partners should encompass all elements and measures outlined in the new EU-China strategy;

31.  Expresses grave concern over China’s assertive and expansionist policies in the South China Sea, East China Sea and Taiwan Strait, especially China’s continued military provocation aimed at Taiwan; underlines that the status quo across the Taiwan Strait and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region are of critical importance to the EU and its Member States; reiterates its opposition to any unilateral actions that could escalate tensions and undermine the status quo; encourages the constructive development of cross-strait relations and stresses any change to cross-strait relations must not be made against the will of Taiwan’s citizens; echoes the concerns expressed by Japan and the US over a new law in China that authorises Chinese coastguard ships to use weapons against foreign vessels violating what China considers to be its territory; calls for the EU to address these issues in both the new EU-China strategy and the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, and to increase multilateral diplomatic exchanges in order to achieve the peaceful resolution of disputes and controversies in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS;

32.  Calls for the Member States to invest in stronger cooperation with other democratic and like-minded partners such as the US, Canada, the UK, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan, and calls on the EEAS and the Member States to prioritise and strengthen the Strategic Partnerships with ASEAN and the African Union;

33.  Considers it of primary importance for the EU to develop and promote an ambitious and dynamic transatlantic relationship with the US Government, based on our shared history, values and interests, in the framework of a Transatlantic Dialogue on China, including a parliamentary dimension; highlights the importance of the EU-US partnership in maintaining and demonstrating the united strength of global liberal democracies, including through our work in multilateral organisations; emphasises in this regard that the new EU-US Dialogue on China should be one of the mechanisms for advancing our shared interests and managing our differences, and for reforming multilateral organisations within the framework of the rules-based order; believes that the EU should continue to strengthen the Union’s operational autonomy and resilience toward external threats;

34.  Underlines the importance of the EU remaining attentive to China’s changing role and growing global influence in multilateral organisations, including the UN, to which China is the second biggest financial contributor, and to ensure better coordination among the Member States and like-minded partners towards combining the strength of global liberal democracies, in order to respond to this development; notes that the Chinese Government’s greater engagement with international and multilateral institutions, such as the UN, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Health Organization (WHO), Interpol, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Telecommunication Union and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), including standard-setting bodies, aims to reshape norms, standard and practices globally in order to foster China’s long-term geopolitical strategy and economic interests; regrets that Chinese domestic censorship, now being exercised, inter alia, at the UN, aims to manipulate procedures to minimise scrutiny of China’s conduct, in particular in the case of the situation of ethnic Uyghur Muslims and other Turkic Muslim minorities; calls for the EU to work with like-minded partners to counter these developments;

35.  Stresses that China is the largest provider of peacekeepers among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, but has refused to adopt sections of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the pillar of Responsibility to Protect (R2P); underlines that the EU has integrated R2P into its external action;

36.  Calls for stronger EU cooperation with NATO on Chinese security challenges; supports NATO’s proposal to develop a political strategy for approaching a world in which China will be a global superpower; requests that this strategy be based on different scenarios for the development of relations with China, including the possibility of the further deterioration of security in the South China Sea, and calls for dialogue and coordination with the countries of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue; welcomes NATO’s efforts to carefully monitor the security implications of China’s increased physical presence in the Arctic, as well as in Africa; recommends that EU-NATO cooperation on security challenges related to China be sufficiently taken into account while elaborating the EU Strategic Compass and reviewing the NATO Strategic Concept;

37.  Welcomes the Council’s intention to reinforce the EU’s strategic focus, presence and action in the Indo-Pacific by launching a new EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, as well as a new strategy for connectivity; notes that any such new strategy should be in conformity with the EU-China strategy;

38.  Deems it pertinent for the Commission to provide timely and comprehensive reports on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – the world’s largest free trade agreement – in order to assess developments on the ground; is particularly interested in the implications for the EU’s strategic interests of matters such as standard-setting in the Asia-Pacific as well as provisions on rules of origin; notes that while the EU is not a party to RCEP, the agreement will have implications for the EU; highlights the absence of provisions in RCEP on trade and sustainability, including labour and social standards and climate and environmental objectives;

39.  Recalls, in the context of the regional dynamics, the importance of trade and economic relations between the EU and Taiwan, including on matters relating to multilateralism and the WTO, technology and public health, as well as essential cooperation on critical supplies such as semiconductors; notes that Taiwan is a full member of the WTO; reiterates its call on and urges the Commission and the Council to move towards a bilateral investment agreement with Taiwan and to urgently begin the impact assessment, public consultation, and scoping exercise with the Taiwanese authorities;

40.  Urges the Commission to come up with concrete proposals and action to facilitate Taiwan’s full participation as an observer in the meetings, mechanism and activities of the WHO, the ICAO and the UNFCCC;

Fostering open strategic autonomy, including in trade and investment relations

41.  Underlines that investment and trade conditionality by itself is not enough to counter Chinese assertiveness; finds that the EU should increase strategic autonomy by addressing other dimensions of the EU-China relationship, notably digital and technological sovereignty; underlines, in this context, the need to invest in innovation and research and to develop a competitive and sovereign industrial strategy in areas including, yet not limited to, microchips and semiconductor production, rare earth mining, cloud computing and telecoms technology, in order to decrease the EU’s reliance on China, always with view to ensuring better coordination of those policies with those of other like-minded liberal democracies, while exploring the potential to pool resources and create new synergies;

42.  Notes that in 2020, in the context of COVID-19, China ranked as the EU’s largest partner for trade in goods for the first time, with the trade balance further deteriorating to the EU’s detriment; recalls, however, that the US is still the EU’s top partner in trade in goods and services combined; believes that China’s economic rise and predicted growth will have a considerable impact on global economic developments over the next decade; points out that for different reasons, mutual investment levels remain below their potential and recognises the economic opportunities that characterise the wider region; considers that the volume of trade between China and the EU will require a rules-based and values-driven framework which needs to be rooted in international norms; stresses that respect for human rights is a prerequisite for engaging in trade and investment relations with the EU and urges China to comply with its international obligations and to commit to respecting human rights;

43.  Underlines the key role of the European Parliament in the EU’s common commercial policy, in international negotiations, and in the oversight, scrutiny, ratification and monitoring of the implementation of trade and investment agreements; highlights the need for the Committee on International Trade to be consulted in a timely and proper manner and urges the Commission and the Council to maintain frequent dialogue and carry out comprehensive reporting, reflecting developments on the EU-China bilateral trade and investment agenda;

44.  Underlines the importance of the EU’s strategic trade and investment relationship with China and calls for the EU Member States and institutions to address China with one voice and in a coordinated manner; considers that investment initiatives under the 16+1 format must not undermine the unity of the EU, nor be counterproductive to efforts to speak with one voice;

45.  Calls on the Commission to analyse the EU’s economic dependencies in strategic sectors, such as critical raw materials, some of which are located exclusively in China, and highlights the urgent need to boost the resilience of European supply chains; calls for efforts to diversify and consolidate the EU’s access to the key strategic resources needed to power the EU’s twin engines of growth, with a particular emphasis on the 30 elements included in the fourth, updated list of critical raw materials in 2020; recalls the overall EU objective to build its open strategic autonomy under the common commercial policy; reiterates the increasing significance of the trade-security nexus in the EU’s international trade policy;

46.  Calls for greater transparency, coherence and coordination between the Member States on matters related to bilateral investment projects and deals, particularly on foreign direct investment (FDI) in strategic assets and critical infrastructure; draws attention to the links between economic dependencies and external political leverage at the level of the Member States; recalls the importance of strengthening the EU FDI Screening Regulation in the future in order to make sure that any potential investments that could pose a threat to the EU’s security and public order, in particular by state-controlled enterprises, are blocked; calls on the Member States to urgently adopt a national screening mechanism if they do not have one yet, in line with the Commission guidance from March 2020;

47.  Is convinced that the EU-China bilateral trade and investment relationship is of strategic importance and should be rules-based, with the multilateral trading system and the principle of reciprocity at its core; reiterates that while there are concerning trends towards economic decoupling, a more assertive enforcement of and adherence to commitments is necessary in the overall trade and investment relationship; calls on China to play a more active and responsible part in the WTO and other multilateral initiatives, matching its economic power with its level of development, and to fully adhere to all of its WTO and international obligations; calls on the Commission and the Chinese authorities to cooperate closely to reform the WTO rulebook in order to foster a more sustainable development, promote the green transition and digital revolution, and bring stability and legal certainty to the international trade arena;

48.  Is concerned about the increasingly unbalanced bilateral economic and trade relationship between the EU and China; stresses that rebalancing and a more level playing field are vital to EU interests; believes that China and the EU must build a level playing field and forge a fruitful relationship in spite of the differences between their respective economic systems; highlights, in this regard, the EU’s ongoing work in strengthening its trade toolbox, while recognising the need to maintain an open dialogue on common challenges such as the global fight against climate change; stresses the urgent need for the EU to complete its range of autonomous measures including a more stringent EU FDI Screening Regulation, legislation on foreign subsidies that distort the internal market, the swift adoption of an assertive and effective international procurement instrument, measures on the export of dual-use technology, an effective anti-coercion instrument, a package of sustainable corporate governance legislation, and supply chain legislation with mandatory due diligence requirements, which should also provide for an import ban on forced labour goods; believes that additional targeted measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime should be considered as necessary;

49.  Repeats its deep concern about the many barriers that European businesses face when accessing and operating on the Chinese market; is worried that China’s ‘dual circulation strategy’ referred to in its 14th Five-Year Plan will further deteriorate the business environment for EU companies; highlights, once again, its particular concern about the market distorting practices such as, but not limited to, industrial subsidies, the beneficial treatment of Chinese state-owned enterprises, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers and data localisation, industrial overcapacity in sectors such as steel and the related dumping of exports, other unfair trading practices and the overall increasing political interference in the business environment, including the private sector; calls on the Commission and the Member States to step up their cooperation with like-minded partners at the WTO to develop a joint approach to tackle these unfair Chinese trading practices; welcomes the EU-US dialogue on China as a means to cooperate on topics such as reciprocity, multilateralism, market-distorting practices and the economy and other structural issues where EU-US coordination can bring an added value; is convinced of the vital significance of proper information on the legislative and regulatory developments on the Chinese market, given its opaque and state-driven nature; recalls, in this context, the importance of frequent and frank discussions with EU institutions, the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China and all our partners on the ground;

50.  Considers it pertinent to specifically discuss the negative trade-related effects of and possible remedies for distortions caused by the global excess capacity of steel and aluminium, alongside the importance of tackling industrial subsidies at the WTO; urges China to re-engage in the work of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity in order to eliminate overcapacity and restore a level playing field; notes that despite China’s plans to close down outdated production sites and modernise production, its annual crude steel output has set a record for four straight years; encourages the Chinese authorities to follow through with their pledges to reduce the output of crude steel;

51.  Reminds, in this regard, of the links between trade, patents and standards; believes that standardisation and the normative elements of increasing international competition are essential for the EU’s trade policy and should be one the key pillars of its strategic industrial policy; recalls that standardisation is being reported as an area of risk where China may diverge and decouple; highlights that counterfeiting is a top priority for the EU’s efforts in the commercial aspects of intellectual property protection; is concerned that China remains at the origin of a dominant share of counterfeit and pirated goods arriving in the EU in terms of both value and volume; underlines how the EU-China Agreement on Geographical Indications (GIs) represents a first step in the fight against counterfeiting and urges the Commission to step up its efforts to protect the EU’s intellectual property, including patents; is concerned about the emerging practice of Chinese courts claiming worldwide jurisdiction over the determination of fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing terms for standard essential patents, and barring companies from challenging their decisions; underlines that this practice amounts to allowing Chinese companies not to pay a fair price for the use of standard essential patents and endangers European research; asks the Commission to engage with the Chinese authorities on this matter; calls for closer attention to be devoted to infringements in the fields of digitalisation and communications within all the relevant bodies, including the UN’s International Telecommunication Union, together with the EU’s like-minded partners, in particular the US; calls for more policy discussions about the implications of Chinese initiatives such as Made in China 2025 or, increasingly pertinently, China Standards 2035; is concerned, in this context, about China’s increasing digital authoritarianism and its efforts to promote its digital governance model around the world; emphasises the need to conclude the WTO E-Commerce Agreement under the Joint Statement Initiative in order to promote a basic level of openness and a level playing field with China;

52.  Calls for greater attention to be paid to European SMEs that engage in commercial and investment relations with China and welcomes the Commission’s support for SME-friendly initiatives such as the Access2Markets portal, the Rules of Origin Self-Assessment (ROSA) tool or the China Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) SME helpdesk;

53.  Takes note of the conclusion in principle, at political level, of the EU-China CAI, while acknowledging the Commission’s efforts to address shortcomings linked to market access asymmetries, a level playing field and sustainable development through rules-based engagement; recalls, however, that trade relations do not take place in a vacuum;

54.  Calls on the Commission to consult with Parliament before taking any steps towards the conclusion and signature of the CAI; urges China to take concrete steps towards ratifying and implementing the fundamental ILO Conventions Nos 29 and 105 on forced labour; highlights that China has also committed to effectively implementing the ratified ILO Conventions and to working towards the ratification of other ‘up-to-date’ fundamental ILO Conventions;

55.  Notes that 26 EU Member States have old-style bilateral investment treaties with China;

56.  Recalls, however, that the CAI alone would not solve all issues ailing our economic and political relationship, and therefore has to be considered in the context of a strengthened and more assertive EU toolbox of unilateral measures; underlines that the European Parliament would scrutinise the agreement thoroughly, including the section on sustainable development;

57.  Stresses that proper implementation and effective enforcement would be key determinants of the utility and success of the agreement in redressing structural asymmetries in the trade and investment relationship; highlights the role and relevance of structured and frequent exchanges with the office of the Commission’s Chief Trade Enforcement Officer (CTEO) in efforts to evaluate the future implementation of the CAI provided it is adopted; recalls and reinforces, in this context, the importance of parliamentary diplomacy in facilitating mutual understanding, transparent communication and honest dialogue;

58.  Welcomes the entry into force of the EU-China Agreement on GIs and reiterates the importance of its effective implementation and enforcement on the markets of both parties; welcomes the anticipated expansion of the current agreement to add a further 350 GI names from both sides; underlines that this limited agreement on GIs could serve as a model and basis for future GI agreements; highlights the crucial role that the CTEO will play in monitoring and improving compliance with the agreement; calls on the CTEO to respond immediately should the agreement not be implemented correctly;

59.  Emphasises that China still has a long way to go before it is a free market economy, given the extreme influence the state has on the economy and on businesses’ decisions relating to prices, costs, production and inputs; calls on China, therefore, to take more open-minded measures with regard to its own firms and foreign firms operating in the country;

60.  Calls for increased funding for 5G rollout projects and research into 6G, artificial intelligence (AI) and big data technology, in order to ensure future network security and increased digital sovereignty which will be vital for digitalisation and economic growth, but also for closing the technological gap with China and for eliminating the risks that NATO members and its partners may be exposed to with the integration of China’s 5G technology into the telecommunication networks, as such action could erode the future of democratic governance; calls further for a coordinated EU cybersecurity strategy and for an increase in the Member States’ capabilities in this field, in order, inter alia, to strengthen protection against threats to the EU’s critical infrastructure emanating from third countries, including China;

61.  Underlines the importance of working on AI regulation and on an ethical and civil liability framework for AI systems and affiliated technologies that boosts human-centred and privacy-sensitive innovation, in partnership with key strategic partners that share the EU’s liberal and democratic values; underlines that systems of social scoring are not in line with the EU’s fundamental values; stresses the need for the EU to preserve the rights of the individual; stresses, therefore, that such policies and tools of surveillance should under no circumstances be used in the EU; underlines, therefore, that the EU must work to limit and counter the transnational reach of digital repression;

Defence and promotion of core European interests and values by transforming the EU into a more effective geopolitical actor

62.  Believes that the EU should continue working towards becoming a more effective geopolitical player by ensuring a more united geopolitical approach of its Member States, as well as by fostering its strategic autonomy and capacity, working together with the US and other like-minded partners;

63.  Highlights that the success of the European neighbourhood policy determines the EU’s capacity to take on the role of global actor; warns of the increasing role of China in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU, including candidate countries; calls for a strategic approach at EU level to counter Chinese actions through investments, loans and business activities in neighbouring countries, in particular in the Western Balkans; calls in particular for active EU engagement in providing these countries with a viable alternative to Chinese investments;

64.  Points to the need to strengthen the EU’s tools to defend itself, increase its capacity to protect its interests overseas, play a more proactive, consistent and strategic role in its direct neighbourhood and ensure that the Member States are united in their geopolitical approach;

65.  Believes that the Conference on the Future of Europe should provide a forum for debate on the EU’s external action, such as on issues relating to the protection of human rights, and to discuss how to achieve open strategic autonomy; underlines the importance of discussing issues linked to improving and strengthening the EU’s common foreign and security policy, for instance by giving the VP/HR a stronger mandate to act on behalf of the EU in foreign policy matters and take the necessary steps to introduce qualified majority voting in certain areas of foreign affairs; calls for defence cooperation among the Member States to be strengthened, with the goal of enhancing European strategic defence capabilities, as well as of creating a fully-fledged European Defence Union, which would include European military capabilities;

66.  Points out the need to equip the EEAS with a mandate and the necessary resources to monitor and address Chinese disinformation operations, including the creation of a dedicated Far-East StratCom Task Force focused on disinformation emanating from China; calls on China to refrain from covert means of manipulating public discourse in the EU; encourages the Commission to develop an EU-wide regulatory system to prevent media companies either funded or controlled by third-country governments from acquiring European media companies, in order to preserve independent and free media reporting in the EU; suggests diversifying Chinese-language media in Europe by encouraging cooperation between European media and international partners, such as Taiwan; stresses further the urgent need to significantly boost expert capacity on China in the EEAS and the Commission in general;

67.  Points out the importance of independent studies and research on China in universities, think tanks, research institutions and schools across the EU, free from Chinese financial support or influence, ensuring academic integrity and freedom of speech; calls on the EU, therefore, to develop a programme to finance China-related research and language training in the EU;

68.  Points out the need to introduce, independently from the CPC’s influence, programmes for the study of Chinese culture, language and politics, for example through closer contacts with Taiwanese academia and society;

69.  Calls on the Commission to take into account and include in its strategy China’s rapidly growing interest and involvement in the Arctic; calls for preparedness to ensure freedom of navigation on the Arctic’s Northern Sea Route; takes note of China’s investments in research and strategic infrastructure in the Arctic and notes that the EU should not lose ground in this important region;

o
o   o

70.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and, for information, to the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

(1) OJ L 410 I, 7.12.2020, p. 1. (2) OJ L 410 I, 7.12.2020, p. 13. (3) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0375. (4) OJ C 158, 30.4.2021, p. 2. (5) OJ C 11, 13.1.2020, p. 25. (6) OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 103. (7) OJ C 238, 6.7.2018, p. 108. (8) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0174. (9) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0027. (10) OJ C 369, 11.10.2018, p. 156. (11) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0337. (12) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0255. (13) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0016. (14) China and Portugal Joint Declaration of 13 April 1987 on the question of Macao.

European Parliament recommendation of 16 September 2021 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the direction of EU-Russia political relations (2021/2042(INI))

P9_TA(2021)0383 A9-0259/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia, in particular those of 18 September 2014 on the situation in Ukraine and the state of play of EU-Russia relations(1), of 11 June 2015 on the strategic military situation in the Black Sea Basin following the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia(2), of 16 March 2017 on the Ukrainian prisoners in Russia and the situation in Crimea(3), of 14 June 2018 on Georgian occupied territories 10 years after the Russian invasion(4), of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties(5), of 12 March 2019 on the state of EU-Russia political relations(6), of 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe(7), of 19 December 2019 on the Russian ‘foreign agents’ law(8), of 17 September 2020 entitled ‘the situation in Russia: the poisoning of Alexei Navalny’(9), of 21 January 2021 on the arrest of Aleksei Navalny(10), of 29 April 2021 on Russia, the case of Alexei Navalny, the military build-up on Ukraine’s border and Russian attacks in the Czech Republic(11), of 10 June 2021 on the listing of German NGOs as ‘undesirable organisations’ by Russia and the detention of Andrei Pivovarov(12),

–  having regard to the UN Charter, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

–  having regard to the Russian Federation’s membership of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and its consequent commitments and obligations,

–  having regard to EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine, which have been in force since 2014,

–  having regard to the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, which was adopted and signed in Minsk on 12 February 2015 and endorsed as a whole by UN Security Council resolution 2202 (2015) of 17 February 2015 thereon,

–  having regard to the results of the EU Foreign Affairs Council of 14 March 2016, specifically the agreement on the five guiding principles of the European Union’s policy towards Russia, and to the conclusions of the European Council of 24 and 25 May 2021 on Russia, and of 24 June 2021 on external relations,

–  having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 June 2021 entitled ‘EU-Russia relations – Push back, constrain and engage’ (JOIN(2021)0020),

–  having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 June 2020 entitled ‘Tackling COVID-19 disinformation – Getting the facts right’ (JOIN(2020)0008),

–  having regard to the joint declaration of the International Crimea Platform of 23 August 2021;

–  having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0259/2021),

A.  whereas Russia is an integral part of the European continent and the largest neighbour of the Union, and whereas there are strong historical interdependencies, as well as cultural and human ties between Russia and EU Member States; whereas developments in Russia, in terms of its policies and the characteristics of its authorities, are directly affecting the EU and its immediate neighbourhood; whereas despite the barriers imposed in 2014, the EU is still Russia’s largest trading partner and Russia is the EU’s fifth biggest one; whereas the EU is the largest investor in Russia;

B.  whereas Parliament distinguishes between the Russian people and President Putin’s regime, which is a stagnating authoritarian kleptocracy led by a president-for-life surrounded by a circle of oligarchs; whereas critical actions proposed in this recommendation are hence directed towards President Putin’s regime and its criminal actions and anti-democratic policies, while stressing the urgent need to reach out to Russian citizens to show them that the European Union is ready to address their concerns;

C.  whereas the main interest of the EU is to maintain freedom, stability and peace on the European continent and beyond, which are being threatened by the aggressive policies of the Russian authorities, which represent one of the main challenges to the EU’s strategic and foreign policy agenda;

D.  whereas Russia can have a democratic future; whereas like all people, Russian citizens aspire to the universal values of freedom and democracy; whereas the EU should present the Russian people with concrete proposals for mutually beneficial cooperation;

E.  whereas the EU strategy towards Russia needs to combine two major objectives: first, to stop the Kremlin’s external aggression and domestic repression, and second, to engage with the people of Russia and assist them in building that alternative future, which would benefit all the peoples on the European continent, including the Russian people;

F.  whereas the EU’s relations with the Russian Federation are based on the principles of international law, the OSCE’s founding principles, democracy, the peaceful resolution of conflicts and good neighbourly relations; whereas the current Russian Government has shown contempt for these principles despite having committed to them; whereas Russia misuses international institutions, primarily the UN and the OSCE, to prevent justice and conflict resolution worldwide;

G.  whereas Russia rejoined the Council of Europe in 2019, but its extensive violations of human rights continue, as well as its refusal to comply with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights;

H.  whereas President Putin’s foreign policy is clearly aggressive and revisionist, as he wants to be seen as the defender of Russian interests and is trying to gain control over territories he considers were lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union and beyond; whereas the goals of President Putin’s regime also include the following: to assert its authority as a great power; to consolidate the regime’s interference in post-Soviet countries and beyond; to place the sovereignty of powerful states above the right to sovereignty of other states; to use the concept of protecting ethnic Russians abroad as a justification for hybrid war and disinformation; to use frozen conflicts areas as a strategic element for interfering in the affected countries and preventing them from moving closer to the EU and NATO; to use energy resources and illicit money laundering practices as tools for manipulation and blackmailing; to undermine the model of liberal democracy and portray Russia as morally superior, and the West as morally inferior; to supress democracy, democratic opposition and the right for the people to express their free will in Russia; whereas President Putin’s regime in particular rejects multilateralism and the rule-of-law-based international order, disregards international law, including the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 OSCE Charter of Paris, as demonstrated inter alia by the 2020 constitutional amendments, whose adoption process have been deemed by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the ‘Venice Commission’) as ‘clearly inappropriate’ and violated both the Russian law and its OSCE obligations; whereas Russia has failed to implement more than a thousand judgments of the European Court of Human Rights;

I.  whereas the current Russian regime is threatening peace and security in Europe by continuing with systemic human rights violations against its people and aggressive behaviour in its foreign policy, including but not limited to: large-scale military exercises and military build-ups; the illegal and violent occupation and annexation of Crimea; the violation of the territorial integrity and the destabilisation of Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova; support for frozen conflicts and its failure to respect ceasefire agreements in Georgia and Ukraine; alleged acts of terrorism on the territory of EU Member States such as Czechia; cyberattacks and attacks on sensitive infrastructure in EU Member States; violations of international law; election interference; and violations of the sea and air space of countries in the Baltic Sea and in the Black Sea regions; whereas the EU’s failure to respond adequately to the various Russian aggressions since the one against Georgia in 2008 prompted Russia to continue aggressive military and political campaigns, both in its neighbourhood and beyond, thus weakening and undermining the rules-based international order and stability in Europe and elsewhere;

J.  whereas the Russian administration continues to stockpile offensive weapons and station troops close to the EU borders in the Kaliningrad enclave;

K.  whereas under its current regime, Russia is a long-term threat to European security according to the recent assessment of NATO Reflection Group; whereas Russia has established new military bases and modernised old military bases in the north of the country; whereas Russia has upgraded its Northern Fleet to the status of a military district, scaled up different branches of its armed forces and revived the bastion defence concept aimed at protecting its strategic capabilities; whereas NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence on the Eastern Flank has played a crucial role in deterring Russia from carrying out destabilising activities, including military build-up in the Western Military District; whereas the collapse of arms control with Russia (e.g. its withdrawals from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Treaty on Open Skies) and the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as Russia’s rejection of the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is of great concern for the security of European citizens; whereas this is coupled with a dangerous modernisation of Russian nuclear and conventional arsenals and their means of delivery and the introduction of destabilising technologies (hypersonic nuclear-capable missiles, torpedoes, etc.);

L.  whereas in March and April 2021 in particular the Kremlin regime substantially increased its military presence on Ukraine’s eastern and northern border with Russia, which is the biggest concentration of Russian troops since 2014; whereas the Kremlin regime suspended the right of passage for warships and commercial vessels of other countries through part of the Black Sea in the direction of the Kerch Strait, which is a violation of navigation rights guaranteed by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which Russia is a party;

M.  whereas Russia is providing consistent political and economic support to the illegitimate and reprehensible regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus; whereas President Putin’s political and economic investment in the survival of the illegitimate regime of Mr Lukashenka is the only reason why he is still able to continue his brutal persecution of the Belarusian people, who are demanding respect for human rights, free and transparent elections, rule of law and justice; whereas recent political developments in Belarus and Russia have many common features, and the processes in both countries are very significantly influencing each other; whereas the protests against the authoritarian regime and demands for change in Belarus are inspiring similar demands by people in Russia; whereas the Kremlin authorities are increasing repressions of political opposition before the forthcoming Duma elections in September 2021, limiting and denying the possibility to participate and preventing certain opposition politicians from standing for election, and in such a way are destroying political competition by stealing the opportunity of fair elections, as was done by the dictatorship in Belarus in August 2020;

N.  whereas President Putin’s Russia continues its efforts to destabilise EU candidate and associated Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries with the goal of creating obstacles or stopping the process of their Euro-Atlantic integration; whereas a ‘passportisation’ policy is being used to boost the numbers of Russian compatriots and de facto to extend Russian jurisdiction over territories occupied by it and breakaway territories, notably Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Donbas and the Crimean Peninsula; whereas these actions are a violation of international laws;

O.  whereas the 2020 Russian constitutional reforms revised the history of World War II, cleansing Soviet history and naming Russia as a successor of the Soviet Union, introduced the right to intervene internationally in defence of Russian compatriots and outlawed discussions about returning lands claimed by Russia to foreign countries;

P.  whereas the EU should closely monitor Russia’s position and involvement in Afghanistan, as Russia is seeking to exploit the withdrawal of the West to its advantage and fill the resulting power vacuum;

Q.  whereas the EU Member States that allow dual citizenship are exposed to Russia’s passportisation policy; whereas the EU Member States which adopted so-called golden passport regimes enable Kremlin loyalists to enjoy a European quality of life with money stolen from the Russian people and to spread corruption into the EU;

R.  whereas Russia is implementing a hostile ‘Russian World’ concept to prepare the ground for its interference in foreign countries in defence of Russian compatriots; whereas the ‘Russian World’ is being promoted by state-owned media outlets such as Russia Today and Sputnik in the native languages of the EU Member States; whereas the COVID-19 pandemic is being used by the Kremlin’s propaganda machine to enhance division among EU Member States, portray the EU as unable to cope with the pandemic, spread doubts about the vaccines approved by the European Medicines Agency, discourage people in the EU from getting vaccinated, and rehabilitate Russia’s image in the eyes of the EU population, particularly via the promotion of the Sputnik V vaccine;

S.  whereas numerous local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and radical groups, including political movements, receive Russian funding;

T.  whereas Russia remains engaged in several parts of the world, including the Western Balkans, Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Arctic; whereas the Russian Government uses paramilitary units (the ‘Wagner Group’) to support dictatorial regimes around the world and undermine the EU and the international community’s efforts to mitigate conflicts, build peace and ensure stability; whereas the Western Balkans region, which includes potential new EU member states, is characterised by a strong Russian presence, particularly in Serbia; whereas in 2016 in Montenegro, the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU) was involved in attempts to overthrow the country’s parliament, to assassinate the prime minister and to install a pro-Russian and anti-NATO government, to prevent Montenegro’s accession to NATO;

U.  whereas, as far as the EU is concerned, the Kremlin’s regime allegedly involved Russian active-duty intelligence officers in two ammunition depot explosions in 2014 in which two Czech citizens were killed and extensive material damage was caused; whereas the same GRU agents were also responsible for the attempted murder of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in the United Kingdom in 2018 using a military-grade Novichok nerve agent; whereas GRU agents were also charged with the attempted murder of Emilian Gebrev, the owner of an arms factory, and two other people in Bulgaria in 2015, as well as Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, assassinated in Berlin in 2019 by Russian operatives; whereas illegal actions by the Kremlin regime on the territory of Czechia, Bulgaria and many other Member States, the United Kingdom and EaP countries constitute a critical violation of their sovereignty; whereas the Kremlin regime is non-cooperative in investigating those crimes and is sheltering key suspects;

V.  whereas it is deplorable that the Russian authorities are willingly or unwillingly locking their country into dependency on China, which can only weaken the Russian Federation and the entire European continent and, in particular, enable the Chinese authorities to expand their presence and influence in Central Asia and Siberia;

W.  whereas the Kremlin is continuing its disinformation, propaganda and hybrid interference into the EU’s domestic politics and democratic processes, which pose a threat to the fundamental values of the EU – i.e. respect for democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights – and are able to undermine policies of national governments, spread defamation and convey an image of the West as an enemy, promote hatred, intolerance and Soviet nostalgia, rewrite the history of Soviet crimes, and ultimately deepen the rupture between Russia and Europe, particularly with the countries formerly belonging to the communist bloc; whereas the EU and the Member States’ institutions, as well as objects of strategical importance and democratic processes such as elections, are the constant target of Russian cyberattacks; whereas the highest hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church supports the Putin regime; whereas Russian laws allow the repression of religious groups that are deemed extremist; whereas recent findings about the close and regular contacts between Russian officials, including members of the security service, and representatives of a group of Catalan secessionists in Spain require an in-depth investigation; whereas this could turn out to be yet another example of Russian interference in Member States and the constant attempts by Russia to exploit any matter it can to promote internal destabilisation in the EU;

X.  whereas the combination of Western sanctions on Russia, a decrease in revenue from fossil fuel exports, an uncompetitive economy, high military expenditure and domestic social transfers has caused Russia to face financial difficulties; whereas Russia ranks 129th out of 180 countries in the 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index, as massive state-level corruption affects the quality of public services for Russian people, which remain underfunded, including public healthcare, which is of particular importance during the pandemic; whereas nearly 19 million Russians live under the poverty line;

Y.  whereas the Russian Government imposed sanctions inter alia on Parliament President David Sassoli, Commission Vice-President Věra Jourová and six other Member State officials and whereas those sanctions are unacceptable and baseless because they lack any legal justification; whereas the Russian Government also approved a list of ‘unfriendly countries’, which includes Czechia and the United States;

Z.  whereas in 2019, more than 60 % of EU imports from Russia were energy products; whereas the EU should reduce the dependency of its economy, especially in the energy sector, on Russian gas supplies to EU markets, which now stands at 48 %, and is likely to increase; whereas the European Green Deal (EGD) is a major instrument for ensuring the EU’s geopolitical security and whereas according to the Commission’s forecasts, if the EGD is implemented, the EU’s oil and natural gas imports after 2030 are expected to shrink dramatically, with oil imports dropping by 78-79 % and natural gas imports by 58-67 % compared to 2015 figures;

AA.  whereas European gas consumption has peaked and the capacity of the current Nord Stream pipeline is not fully used at the moment; whereas the divisive decision by some Member States to build Nord Stream 2 is incompatible with the values of solidarity and trust of the Energy Union; whereas Nord Stream 2 is incompatible with the goals of the EGD of reducing EU greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030 and achieving no net emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050;

AB.  whereas the EU should call on Russia to guarantee free and unhindered access to the so-called trophy archives, which were transferred to Moscow in 1944 and 1945 from territories occupied by the Soviet Union, as well as to historical archives and artefacts that were taken from European countries by the Russian Empire and are currently kept in Russia;

AC.  whereas the rule of law, an independent judiciary and a free press are at the core of resilient democratic societies;

AD.  whereas the Russian Federation poses not only an external threat to European security, but is also repressing its own people; whereas the situation in Russia is deteriorating dreadfully because of President Putin’s increasing repression of democratic forces, the aim of which is to silence his domestic critics, the political opposition and anti-corruption activists, limit their freedom of assembly and obstruct their activities and those of the Russian civil society, as demonstrated by the detainment of more than 11 000 peaceful demonstrators by Russian authorities just two weeks after the arrest of Alexei Navalny, bringing the total number of Russians detained since January 2021 to more than 15 000; whereas Russia has continued to unlawfully detain its citizens and target opposition leaders, independent journalists, protesters and human rights activists; whereas the prison conditions in Russia remain dreadful and whereas those imprisoned are subject to torture, harassment and physical attacks;

AE.  whereas by adopting laws on ‘foreign agents’ and ‘undesirable organisations’, the Kremlin’s regime is allowing individuals, associations and media outlets to be stigmatised, thereby violating their human rights and freedom of expression and association, restricting the citizens’ rights to commit and contribute to Russian civil society and putting their personal safety at risk; whereas the Kremlin’s regime further enhanced those laws by extending restrictions to persons or entities supporting ‘foreign agents’ and ‘undesirable foreign organisations’, thus systemically barring active members of civil society, human rights NGOs and the opposition from participating in the 2021 parliamentary elections in Russia; whereas, in particular, new pieces of legislation adopted in December 2020 and January 2021 expanded the scope of individuals and groups that can be designated ‘foreign agents’, the definition of ‘foreign funds’, and the requirements for labelling materials; whereas new draft bills proposed in May 2021 aimed at expanding the impact of the law on ‘undesirable’ organisations and imposing bans with retroactive effect on potential candidates for the Russian Parliament; whereas Russian authorities continue to prosecute people over alleged affiliation with groups designated extremist under Russia’s overly broad counter-extremism law; whereas the Russian authorities’ decision to declare the Anti-Corruption Foundation headed by Alexei Navalny an extremist organisation is baseless, discriminatory and has been adopted with the single goal of destroying the opposition’s possibilities to effectively participate in election campaigns;

AF.  whereas, according to the Memorial Human Rights Centre, the Russian authorities are currently holding nearly 400 political prisoners, in violation of the Russian Federation’s obligations under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 23 of the concluding document of the Vienna Meeting of 5 January 1989 of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe;

AG.  whereas over the past two decades, there have been a number of attempted or successful assassinations of regime opponents and independent journalists, either within Russia itself or on foreign soil, including those of Anna Politkovskaya, Boris Nemtsov, Alexander Litvinenko, Sergei and Yulia Skripal, Sergei Protazanov, Pyotr Verzilov, Vladimir Kara-Murza, Alexei Navalny, Zelimkhan Khangoshvili and others; whereas the organisers of those crimes remain unidentified and unindicted because the ongoing repression of social dissent is reinforced by the impunity of police and security forces and by the unwillingness of the judiciary to persecute the real perpetrators of those crimes; whereas representatives of the opposition are systematically subjected to verbal attacks, ad hominem campaigns and dehumanisation by the government or pro-government media; whereas the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s report on the murder of Boris Nemtsov concluded that ‘the main issue for addressing impunity is not the capabilities of the Russian law enforcement, but political will’; whereas the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s report also notes that a full investigation into the assassination ‘would be a first step to address the climate of impunity’ in Russia;

AH.  whereas the illegal constitutional amendments, in addition to giving President Putin a waiver from presidential term limits in 2024, further eroded the right to a fair trial in Russia, including by giving the president the power to nominate the judges of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts and initiate the appointment of all federal judges and the dismissal of senior federal judges;

AI.  whereas media freedom in Russia is rapidly deteriorating as the Russian Government has accelerated its years-long campaign to stamp out civil society and the independent press, threatening organisations such as Meduza, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, VTimes, For Human Rights, the European Endowment for Democracy and Open Russia with onerous legislative, regulatory and bureaucratic burdens, choking off access to all sources of funding not under the control of the government and its allies, tarring them with epithets such as ‘foreign agent’ or ‘undesirable’, which serve to discredit these groups and the high journalistic and human rights principles they represent, without which Russia cannot be democratic, prosperous and free; whereas the media space in Russia is controlled and owned by the state, there is no public broadcaster, the remaining few independent media sources struggle financially and face persecution, including physical attacks and the imprisonment of their workers; whereas since 1992, 58 journalists have been killed in Russia; whereas the ‘sovereign internet’ law enables the government to block any unwanted internet content; whereas the free and independent work of civil society organisations and the media is a cornerstone of a democratic society based on the rule of law;

AJ.  whereas opportunities for impartial election observation have been shrinking steadily in Russia over the past decade, as the absence of provisions for direct accreditation of election-observing citizens forces them to act on behalf of contestants or media outlets and therefore contradicts the very idea of independent election scrutiny by civil society and is also at odds with international standards; whereas the Freedom in the World 2021 report placed Russia in the category of ‘not free’ countries; whereas citizens’ fundamental freedoms are limited in Russia and the election environment is controlled, Russian people are discouraged from participating in public protests by the burdensome bureaucratic procedures established in order for citizens to receive permission and by police violence during peaceful protests;

AK.  whereas those domestic developments will foreshadow possible further deteriorations in the run-up to the September 2021 parliamentary elections in Russia, and could lead to further repression of the political opposition in Russia, including severe human rights violations; whereas the Russian authorities are holding the key opposition players of the parliamentary election campaign in prison or under home arrest; whereas continuing repression of opposition candidates by the Russian authorities by abusing the registration procedures and selectively targeting political opponents and civil society organisations in the streets and courts under fabricated cases will make it simply impossible to speak about fair parliamentary elections in September 2021, as the regime in Russia is destroying political competition and pluralist democracy through those actions;

AL.  whereas there are therefore legitimate doubts that the forthcoming parliamentary elections will be free and fair;

AM.  whereas on numerous occasions Parliament has expressed its concern over the state of democracy, the systematic failure to uphold the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights and principles, the shrinking space for independent and dissident actors, and the attack on media freedom in Russia; whereas the endlessly increasing systemic oppression by the Kremlin of the opposition in Russia is an eye-opener for the whole international community and whereas the EU must be ready to face it and develop a coherent response strategy; whereas, in particular, the EU should build increasing pressure on the Kremlin regime in the run-up to the 2021 parliamentary elections and in its aftermath in order to defend the right for the Russian people to have free elections in which all political parties should have equal access and equal chances;

AN.  whereas the LGBTI+ community in various parts of the Russian Federation faces extensive discrimination, including harassment, torture, imprisonment and killings and whereas the situation is particularly dangerous in Chechnya, which in 2017 started its purge of LGBTI+ people, detaining and torturing dozens and killing at least two, leading to many people seeking safe refuge abroad; whereas existing laws prohibit any public discussion on ‘non-traditional sexual relationships’; whereas following illegal constitutional changes, legislation that negatively affects LGBTI+ people’s rights, including the rights to marry and raise children, has been adopted;

AO.  whereas serious gaps in the official response to widespread gender-based violence and domestic violence continue to exist in Russia, including a lack of sufficient protection and means of redress for victims; whereas the draft law on domestic violence, which was proposed in November 2019, fell short of providing a comprehensive definition of domestic violence; whereas in early 2020, Parliament deprioritised the draft law’s review, which remains pending; whereas Russia’s ombudsperson noted that domestic violence spiked during the COVID-19 pandemic, with reported cases more than doubling during the spring lockdown; whereas the EU strategy on Russia should consequently tackle growing discrimination and gender inequality as well as women’s rights, LGBTI+ and other minorities’ rights in Russia;

AP.  whereas the democratic transformation of Russia is a major geopolitical security interest of the EU and whereas President Putin’s Russia remains the biggest challenge for European security;

AQ.  whereas in its resolutions of 17 September 2020, 21 January 2021 and 29 April 2021, Parliament called on the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, to perform a review of the EU’s policy vis-à-vis Russia, including the five guiding principles agreed in 2016, emphasising that future EU relations with Russia would depend on the pace of Russia’s democratic transformation (or lack thereof); whereas it also called for the EU institutions to devise a new comprehensive strategic approach assuming that any dialogue with Russia must be based on respect for international law and human rights;

AR.  whereas the updated EU strategy should take into account different scenarios, possible developments and clear responses to Russia’s infringements of international law and human rights, including effective instruments against Russia’s interference and spreading of disinformation, as well as instruments for selective engagement, where possible; whereas Parliament has also asked the Council to immediately start preparations and adopt an EU strategy for future relations with a democratic Russia, including a broad offer of incentives and conditions to strengthen domestic tendencies towards freedom and democracy;

AS.  whereas the five EU guiding principles for relations with Russia have contained further aggression against Ukraine by the Kremlin regime, but are silent with respect to containing President Putin’s repression against the people of Russia; whereas the five EU guiding principles for relations with Russia remain valid as a functional framework, but must be paired with an actual strategy aiming to achieve the EU’s goals in its relations with Russia, including inter alia by countering the Kremlin’s current hostile policies and deterring further aggression against its neighbours and by making the consequences for military actions in foreign countries more serious, including actions by proxies and mercenaries; whereas given that there are no prospects for significant positive developments with the current Russian leadership, the five principles should be complemented in order to contain President Putin’s repression of the Russian people and the Kremlin’s broader destabilising activities;

AT.  whereas the new EU strategy should be centred on the ‘push-back, contain and engage’ principles, which are aimed at strengthening the EU’s capacity to combat the Kremlin’s threats, especially in the EaP region, including Belarus, as well as in Russia itself, by defending human rights and assisting Russia’s transformation into a democracy in accordance with the ‘democracy first’ principle; whereas the EU’s overarching key objective should be to shape relations with the Russian Federation in such a way that the peace, stability, security, prosperity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries in the EU and its neighbourhood are preserved, international law is respected and human rights and the rule of law remain the guiding principles; whereas the latest developments in Russia have shown that the EU’s strategy on Russia should be much more proactive and have a clearly defined ‘engagement’ objective, which should focus not only on traditional so-called selective engagement with the Kremlin, but rather on ‘strategic’ engagement with Russian civil society in order to assist in the transformation of Russia towards democracy;

AU.  whereas the EU strategy on Russia should have support for freedom and democracy at its core; whereas such a strategy should be in the security interests of the EU and offer Russia a constructive dialogue; whereas a constructive relationship would still be in the interests of both the EU and Russia and their peoples; whereas there is still a possibility of collaborating to share common interests, solve problems and address strategic challenges, such as climate policy or counter-terrorism, while promoting the values of human rights, the rule of law and democracy, and ensure that a future strengthening of bilateral relations will be dependent on the Russian Federation’s fulfilment of its own commitments to human rights and democracy in accordance with its constitution and its international obligations;

AV.  whereas, at the same time, the EU must focus on saving its credibility concerning its value-oriented behaviour internally, by upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights much more directly and honestly, as police violence, antiquated criminal laws and resistance to gender equality and diversity in some Member States damage its reputation and credibility abroad; whereas the EU must also communicate comparable expectations vis-à-vis all partners, by denouncing violations of international law, consistently taking harsh consequential measures and refraining from applying double standards when assessing such violations;

AW.  whereas unity among the EU Member States is the best policy to deter Russia from carrying out destabilising and subversive actions in Europe; whereas when determining how to coordinate its updated strategy – in particular in strategic areas such as the European Defence Union, the European Energy Union, cyber defence, cyberterrorism and strategic communication tools – the EU should therefore be more unified since Russia’s policy towards it has for a long time been to sideline EU institutions in favour of bilateral relations with Member States, in an attempt to expose and increase the EU’s internal divisions; whereas a constructive dialogue with the Russian authorities would require closer coordination, cooperation and unity between the Member States and more strength and firmness in their response to any provocation and aggression from Moscow, so as to strike a balance between firmness and openness to dialogue on issues of common interest;

AX.  whereas the EU strategy on Russia should support Russia on its path to becoming a democratic country by (i) pushing back and targeting punitive sanctions at those within and close to the Kremlin, who are prepared to steal elections or hand out bribes to win them or commit other major crimes against human rights and democracy values, both inside Russia and in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, (ii) providing assistance to EaP countries by offering an ambitious EU integration policy and developing the EU’s strategic responsibility and geopolitical leadership capacities needed to implement such policies; and (iii) having a strategy of engagement with pro-democratic society in Russia to set a path for future relations with democratic Russia;

AY.  whereas a successful, prosperous and democratic EU Eastern Neighbourhood is considered by the Kremlin as a threat to the stability of President Putin’s regime, because it may provide ‘soft power’ inspiration to ordinary people in Russia; whereas the democratisation of the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood is therefore in the interest of those countries and the EU and has crucial importance for the future democratisation of Russia; whereas the Kremlin’s true aim regarding conflicts in this region is to delegitimise democratic change as a means of transferring power, to prevent the successful development of these states, to discredit liberal democracy and to export Russia’s own system of power;

AZ.  whereas the EU should pursue a long-term strategy on Russia, based on the assumption that – like Ukrainians and Belarusians – the people of Russia can aspire to transform their country into a democracy; whereas the transformation of Russia back into democracy will depend on the willingness of the Russian people; whereas the EU must be ready to assist Russians in their wish to live in a democratic country;

BA.  whereas the role of the EU as a global actor and the foreign policy competences of the EU institutions should be strengthened;

1.  Recommends that the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) review, together with the Member States, the EU policy vis-à-vis Russia, including the five guiding principles, and develop a comprehensive EU strategy towards Russia based on the following principles and actions:

2.  Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the governments and parliaments of the Eastern Partnership countries and the G7 countries, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation.

(1) OJ C 234, 28.6.2016, p. 14. (2) OJ C 407, 4.11.2016, p. 74. (3) OJ C 263, 25.7.2018, p. 109. (4) OJ C 28, 27.1.2020, p. 97. (5) OJ C 224, 27.6.2018, p. 58. (6) OJ C 23, 21.1.2021, p. 7. (7) OJ C 171, 6.5.2021, p. 25. (8) OJ C 255, 29.6.2021, p. 54. (9) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0232. (10) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0018. (11) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0159. (12) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0291.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 16 September 2021 on the proposal for a Council decision on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States (COM(2021)0282 – C9-0205/2021 – 2021/0137(NLE))

P9_TA(2021)0384 A9-0262/2021

(Consultation)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2021)0282),

–  having regard to Article 148(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C9‑0205/2021),

–  having regard to Rule 82 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A9-0262/2021),

1.  Approves the Commission proposal as amended;

2.  Calls on the Commission to alter its proposal accordingly, in accordance with Article 293(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

3.  Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

4.  Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the Commission proposal;

5.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and the Commission.

Text proposed by the Commission   Amendment Amendment 1 Proposal for a decision Recital 2 (2)  The Union is to combat social exclusion and discrimination and promote social justice and protection, as well as equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and the protection of the rights of the child. In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union is to take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against poverty and social exclusion, a high level of education and training and protection of human health as laid down in Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). (2)  The Union is to combat social exclusion and discrimination and promote social justice and protection, as well as equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and the protection of the rights of the child. In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union is to take into account requirements linked to the promotion of inclusive labour markets, a high level of employment, collective bargaining, decent wages, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against poverty and social exclusion, with a special emphasis on vulnerable groups, namely children, persons with disabilities, single parents, ethnic minorities, such as Roma people, LGBTIQA+ people, people living in remote areas and older people, a high level of education and training and protection of human health as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Amendment 2 Proposal for a decision Recital 5 (5)  The European Semester combines the different instruments in an overarching framework for integrated multilateral coordination and surveillance of economic and employment policies. While pursuing environmental sustainability, productivity, fairness and stability, the European Semester integrates the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights, and its monitoring tool, the Social Scoreboard, and it foresees strong engagement with social partners, civil society and other stakeholders. It supports the delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals. The Union’s and Member States’ employment and economic policies should go hand in hand with Europe’s transition to a climate neutral, environmentally sustainable and digital economy, improving competitiveness, ensuring adequate working conditions, fostering innovation, promoting social justice and equal opportunities, as well as tackling inequalities and regional disparities. (5)  The European Semester combines the different instruments in an overarching framework for integrated multilateral coordination and surveillance of economic, employment, social and environmental policies. While pursuing environmental sustainability, productivity, fairness and stability, the European Semester should further integrate the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights, and its monitoring tool, the Social Scoreboard, and it foresees strong engagement with the social partners, civil society and other stakeholders. It supports the delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals, in particular gender equality. The Union’s and Member States’ employment and economic policies should go hand in hand with Europe’s transition to a climate neutral, socially inclusive, environmentally sustainable and digital economy, improving competitiveness, ensuring decent working conditions and robust welfare systems, fostering innovation, promoting social justice and equal opportunities and investing in youth, as well as tackling inequalities and regional disparities and reducing poverty. There is an urgent need to provide for quality and sustainable employment, including initiatives on decent working conditions on teleworking, the right to disconnect, parental and care related leave, the rights of platform workers, a general legal framework on subcontracting, with increased transparency and recommendations on liability, as well as health and safety and strengthening the role of collective bargaining. Amendment 3 Proposal for a decision Recital 6 (6)  Climate change and environmental related challenges, globalisation, digitalisation, artificial intelligence, teleworking, the platform economy and demographic change will transform European economies and societies. The Union and its Member States should work together to effectively address these structural factors and adapt existing systems as needed, recognising the close interdependence of the Member States’ economies and labour markets, and related policies. This requires a coordinated, ambitious and effective policy action at both Union and national levels, in accordance with the TFEU and the Union’s provisions on economic governance. Such policy action should encompass a boost in sustainable investment, a renewed commitment to appropriately sequenced reforms that enhance economic growth, quality job creation, productivity, adequate working conditions, social and territorial cohesion, upward convergence, resilience and the exercise of fiscal responsibility. It should combine supply- and demand-side measures, while taking into account their environmental, employment and social impact. (6)  Climate change and environmental related challenges, globalisation, digitalisation, artificial intelligence, teleworking, the platform economy and demographic change are transforming European economies and societies. While telework could be regarded as a step towards better work-life balance, enabling previously excluded groups of workers to access the labour markets, it also risks diluting boundaries between working and personal time, with possible negative effects on workers’ fundamental rights and their physical and mental health. The Union and its Member States should work together to effectively address these structural factors and adapt existing systems as needed, recognising the close interdependence of the Member States’ economies and labour markets, and related policies. This requires a coordinated, ambitious and effective policy action involving the social partners at both Union and national levels, in accordance with the TFEU, the European Pillar of Social Rights and the Union’s provisions on economic governance. Such policy action should encompass a boost in sustainable investment, a renewed commitment to appropriately sequenced reforms that enhance economic growth, quality job creation, productivity, decent working conditions, social and territorial cohesion, upward convergence, resilience and the exercise of fiscal and social responsibility. It should combine supply- and demand-side measures, while taking into account their environmental, employment and social impact. Following the Statement of EU ministers of finance on the Stability and Growth Pact in light of the COVID-19 crisis of 23 March 2020, which announced a temporary derogation from the Stability and Growth Pact (general escape clause) and the Commission communication of 2 June 2021, entitled ‘Economic policy coordination in 2021: overcoming COVID-19, supporting the recovery and modernising our economy’, which indicated that the general escape clause would continue to be applied in 2022 and was expected to be deactivated from 2023, Member States should make full use of the potential offered by the general escape clause to support undertakings which are in difficulty or lack liquidity, in particular microenterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises, to safeguard jobs, wages and working conditions and to invest in people and social welfare systems. The potential risk for public finances, caused by the prolongation, as well as the potential social negative consequences of its deactivation, expected in 2023, should be evaluated ex-ante. Amendment 4 Proposal for a decision Recital 8 (8)  On 8 May 2021, EU Leaders at the Porto Social Summit (20) recognised the European Pillar of Social Rights as a fundamental element of the recovery noting that its implementation will strengthen the Union's drive towards a digital, green and fair transition and contribute to achieving upward social and economic convergence and addressing the demographic challenges. They stressed that the social dimension, social dialogue and the active involvement of social partners are at the core of a highly competitive social market economy. Member States found that the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan presented by the Commission provided useful guidance for the implementation of the Pillar, including in the areas of employment, skills, health and social protection. They welcomed the new EU headline targets for 2030 on employment (78% of the population aged 20-64 should be in employment), skills (60% of all adults should participate in training every year) and poverty reduction (of at least 15 million, including five million children) and the revised Social Scoreboard with a view to monitoring progress towards the implementation of the Social Pillar principles as part of the policy coordination framework in the context of the European Semester. Moreover, they noted that, as Europe gradually recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic, the priority will be to move from protecting to creating jobs and to improve job quality, and stressed that implementation of the principles in the European Pillar of Social Rights will be essential to ensure the creation of more and better jobs for all within the framework of an inclusive recovery. Finally, Member States stressed the importance of closely following, including at the highest level, the progress achieved towards the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights and the EU headline targets for 2030. (8)  On 8 May 2021, EU Leaders at the Porto Social Summit (20) recognised the European Pillar of Social Rights as a fundamental element of the recovery noting that its implementation will strengthen the Union's drive towards a digital, green and fair transition and contribute to achieving upward social and economic convergence and addressing the demographic challenges. They stressed that the social dimension, social dialogue and the active involvement of the social partners are at the core of a highly competitive social market economy. Member States found that the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan presented by the Commission provided useful guidance for the implementation of the Pillar, including in the areas of employment, skills, health and social protection. They welcomed the new EU headline targets for 2030 on employment (78% of the population aged 20-64 should be in employment), skills (60% of all adults should participate in training every year) and poverty reduction (of at least 15 million, including five million children) and the revised Social Scoreboard with a view to monitoring progress towards the implementation of the Social Pillar principles as part of the policy coordination framework in the context of the European Semester. Moreover, they noted that, as Europe gradually recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic, the priority will be to move from protecting to creating jobs and to improve job quality, and stressed that implementation of the principles in the European Pillar of Social Rights will be essential to ensure the creation of more and better jobs for all within the framework of an inclusive recovery. Finally, Member States stressed the importance of closely following, including at the highest level, the progress achieved towards the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights and the EU headline targets for 2030. Member States should ensure fair mobility and the portability of rights and entitlements through better protection of mobile workers including cross-border and seasonal workers, more effective labour inspectorates and the introduction of effective digital solutions. __________________ __________________ 20 European Council, Porto declaration, 8 May 2021. 20 European Council, Porto declaration, 8 May 2021. Amendment 5 Proposal for a decision Recital 8 a (new) (8a)  Homelessness is one of the most extreme forms of social exclusion, which negatively affects people’s physical and mental health, wellbeing, and quality of life, as well as their access to employment and other economic and social services. The European Parliament, the Commission, national, regional and local authorities as well as Union level civil society organisations have agreed to launch the European Platform on Combatting Homelessness. With the ultimate objective of ending homelessness by 2030, they committed themselves to implementing the housing first principle, promoting the prevention of homelessness and providing access to adequate, safe and affordable housing and support services to homeless people, while putting in place the policy measures necessary, with adequate national and Union funding. Amendment 6 Proposal for a decision Recital 9 (9)  Reforms to the labour market, including the national wage-setting mechanisms, should follow national practices of social dialogue, with a view to providing fair wages that enable a decent standard of living and sustainable growth. They should also allow the necessary opportunity for a broad consideration of socioeconomic issues, including improvements in sustainability, competitiveness, innovation, quality job creation, working conditions, in-work poverty, education and skills, public health and inclusion and real incomes. Member States and the Union should ensure that the social, employment and economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis is mitigated and that transitions are socially fair and just. Strengthening the recovery and the drive towards an inclusive and resilient society in which people are protected and empowered to anticipate and manage change, and in which they can actively participate in society and the economy, should be pursued. A coherent set of active labour market policies consisting of temporary hiring and transition incentives, skills policies and improved employment services is needed to support labour market transitions as highlighted in the Commission Recommendation (EU) on an effective active support to employment following the COVID-19 crisis (EASE). (9)  Reforms to the labour market, including the national wage-setting mechanisms, should follow national practices of social dialogue, with a view to providing fair wages that enable a decent standard of living and sustainable growth. They should also allow the necessary opportunity for a broad consideration of socioeconomic issues, including improvements in sustainability, competitiveness, innovation, quality job creation, working conditions, in-work poverty, gender equality, education and skills, public health and inclusion and real incomes. Member States should therefore respect and strengthen the role of the social partners, promote the extension of the collective bargaining coverage, and support a high trade union and employers’ organisation density in order to ensure an inclusive and socially just recovery. Member States and the Union should ensure that the social, employment and economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis is mitigated and that transitions are socially fair and just. Strengthening the recovery and the drive towards an inclusive and resilient society in which people are protected and empowered to anticipate and manage change, and in which they can actively participate in society and the economy, should be pursued. A coherent set of active labour market policies consisting of temporary incentives for hiring and transition skills, the validation and acquisition of competences and improved employment services is needed to support labour market transitions as highlighted in the Commission Recommendation (EU) on an effective active support to employment following the COVID-19 crisis (EASE). A thorough evaluation of national policies and support schemes which have been deployed to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic is needed in order to enable lessons to be learnt and identify instruments for future use. Amendment 7 Proposal for a decision Recital 10 (10)  Discrimination in all its forms should be tackled, gender equality ensured and youth employment supported. Access and opportunities for all should be ensured and poverty and social exclusion, including that of children, should be reduced, in particular by ensuring an effective functioning of labour markets and adequate and inclusive social protection systems, and by removing barriers to education, training and labour-market participation, including through investments in early childhood education and care and in digital skills. Timely and equal access to affordable long-term care and healthcare services, including prevention and healthcare promotion, are particularly relevant, in light of the COVID-19 crisis and in a context of ageing societies. The potential of people with disabilities to contribute to economic growth and social development should be further realised. As new economic and business models take hold in Union workplaces, employment relationships are also changing. Member States should ensure that employment relationships stemming from new forms of work maintain and strengthen Europe’s social model. (10)  Discrimination in all its forms should be eliminated, gender equality ensured and youth employment promoted. Access and opportunities for all should be ensured and poverty and social exclusion, including that of children, should be eradicated, in particular by ensuring an effective functioning of labour markets and adequate and inclusive social protection systems, and by removing barriers to education, training and labour-market participation, including through investments in early childhood education and care, digital skills and lifelong learning. Member States should boost investment in sustainable, quality jobs and adopt a comprehensive approach for lifting children out of poverty and supporting the parents of children in need. The European Child Guarantee should be mainstreamed across all policy sectors and funding for children’s rights should be prioritised, while making full use of existing Union policies and funds for concrete measures that contribute to eradicating child poverty and social exclusion. Timely and equal access to affordable long-term care and healthcare services, including prevention, not least of mental health issues at the workplace, and healthcare promotion, are particularly important, in light of the COVID-19 crisis and in a context of ageing societies. The potential of persons with disabilities to contribute to economic growth and social development should be further realised. As new economic and business models take hold in Union workplaces, employment relationships are also changing. Member States should ensure that employment relationships stemming from new forms of work strengthen Europe’s social model, while guaranteeing workers’ rights, decent working conditions, including health and safety at work, decent wages and a good work-life balance. Amendment 8 Proposal for a decision Recital 12 (12)  Member States should make full use of REACT-EU(21) reinforcing cohesion policy funds until 2023, the European Social Fund Plus, the new Recovery and Resilience Facility(22) and other Union funds, including the Just Transition Fund and InvestEU, to foster employment, social investments, social inclusion, accessibility, promote upskilling and reskilling opportunities of the workforce, lifelong learning and high quality education and training for all, including digital literacy and skills. While the Integrated Guidelines are addressed to Member States and the Union, they should be implemented in partnership with all national, regional and local authorities, closely involving parliaments, as well as the social partners and representatives of civil society. (12)  Member States should make full use of REACT-EU reinforcing cohesion policy funds until 202321, the European Social Fund Plus, the new Recovery and Resilience Facility22 and other Union funds, including the Just Transition Fund and InvestEU, to foster employment, social investments, social inclusion, accessibility, promote upskilling and reskilling opportunities of the workforce, lifelong learning and high quality education and training for all, including digital literacy and skills. Member States should also make full use of the revised European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers established by Regulation (EU) 2021/691 of the European Parliament and of the Council22a to support workers made redundant as a result of the COVID-19 crisis. While the Integrated Guidelines are addressed to Member States and the Union, they should be implemented in partnership with all national, regional and local authorities, closely involving parliaments, as well as the social partners and representatives of civil society. __________________ __________________ 21 Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards additional resources and implementing arrangements to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social consequences and for preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU) (OJ L 437, 28.12.2020, p. 30). 21 Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards additional resources and implementing arrangements to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social consequences and for preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU) (OJ L 437, 28.12.2020, p. 30). 22 Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17). 22 Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17). 22a Regulation (EU) 2021/691 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013 (OJ L 153, 3.5.2021, p. 48). Amendment 9 Proposal for a decision Recital 13 a (new) (13a)  In its legislative resolution of 10 July 2020 on the proposal for a Council decision on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States, the European Parliament called for a revision of the guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social and employment consequences in order to better respond to the crisis. It is essential that the guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States are revised accordingly. In order to strengthen democratic decision-making, the European Parliament should be involved in defining the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs on an equal footing with Council.

European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 on fair working conditions, rights and social protection for platform workers – new forms of employment linked to digital development (2019/2186(INI))

P9_TA(2021)0385 A9-0257/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services(1),

–  having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1152 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union(2),

–  having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services(3),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR)(4),

–  having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights,

–  having regard to the Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed(5),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 October 2019 on ‘The Future of Work: the European Union promoting the ILO Centenary Declaration’(6),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 13 June 2019 on ‘The changing world of work: reflections on new forms of work and implications for the safety and health of workers’(7),

–  having regard to the Commission proposal of 15 December 2020 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (COM(2020)0825),

–  having regard to the Commission proposal of 15 December 2020 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act) (COM(2020)0842),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 4 March 2021 entitled ‘The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan’ (COM(2021)0102),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2020 entitled ‘A European strategy for data’ (COM(2020)0066),

–  having regard to the Commission White Paper of 19 February 2020 entitled ‘On Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust’ (COM(2020)0065),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 14 January 2020 entitled ‘A strong social Europe for just transitions’ (COM(2020)0014),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 2 June 2016 entitled ‘A European agenda for the collaborative economy’ (COM(2016)0356),

–  having regard to the Commission consultation document of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘First phase consultation of social partners under Article 154 TFEU on possible action addressing the challenges related to working conditions in platform work’ (C(2021)1127),

–  having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on the right to disconnect(8),

–  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on a strong social Europe for Just Transitions(9),

–  having regard to its resolution of 22 October 2020 on the employment and social policies of the euro area 2020(10),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a framework of ethical aspects of artificial intelligence, robotics and related technologies(11),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on the Digital Services Act: Improving the functioning of the Single Market(12),

–  having regard to its position of 10 July 2020 on the proposal for a Council decision on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States(13),

–  having regard to its resolution of 10 October 2019 on employment and social policies of the euro area(14),

–  having regard to the its resolution of 19 January 2017 on a European Pillar of Social Rights(15),

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 June 2017 on a European Agenda for the collaborative economy(16),

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 June 2017 on online platforms and the digital single market(17),

–  having regard to the its resolution of 4 July 2017 on working conditions and precarious employment(18),

–  having regard to the mission letter of 10 September 2019 of Commissioner Nicolas Schmit and to the 2021 Commission work programme,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 18 September 2020 entitled ‘Fair work in the platform economy’,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 5 December 2019 entitled ‘A European framework for regulatory responses to the collaborative economy’,

–  having regard to the European Social Partners’ Framework Agreement on Digitalisation of June 2020(19),

–  having regard to International Labour Organization (ILO) Recommendation No. 198 on Employment Relationship,

–  having regard to the Commission study of 13 March 2020 entitled ‘Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers’,

–  having regard to the Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) report entitled ‘The changing nature of work and skills in the digital age’,

–  having regard to the Commission JRC report entitled ‘Platform Workers in Europe’,

–  having regard to the study entitled ‘The platform economy and precarious work’ published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies on 11 September 2020(20),

–  having regard to the study entitled ‘The Social Protection of Workers in the Platform Economy’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies on 7 December 2017(21),

–  having regard to the Cedefop report of 24 September 2020 entitled ‘Developing and matching skills in the online platform economy’,

–  having regard to the Cedefop briefing note of 30 July 2020 entitled ‘Online working and learning in the coronavirus era’,

–  having regard to the Eurofound study of 24 September 2018 entitled ‘Employment and working conditions of selected types of platform work’,

–  having regard to the Eurofound policy brief of 23 September 2019 entitled ‘Platform work: Maximising the potential while safeguarding standards?’,

–  having regard to the Eurofound research report of 21 September 2020 entitled ‘Back to the future: Policy pointers from platform work scenarios’,

–  having regard to Eurofound’s web repository of the platform economy(22),

–  having regard to the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA) study of 7 November 2017 entitled ‘Protecting Workers in the Online Platform Economy: An overview of regulatory and policy developments in the EU’,

–  having regard to the ILO report of 23 February 2021 entitled ‘World Employment and Social Outlook 2021: The role of digital labour platforms in transforming the world of work’,

–  having regard to the ILO report of 20 September 2018 entitled ‘Digital labour platforms and the future of work: Towards decent work in the online world’,

–  having regard to the ILO’s ‘Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work’ of 21 June 2019,

–  having regard to the European Institute for Gender Equality’s Gender Equality Index 2020: Digitalisation and the future of work,

–  having regard to the Data & Society reports of February 2019 entitled ‘Workplace Monitoring & Surveillance’ and ‘Algorithmic Management in the Workplace’,

–  having regard to study entitled ‘Data subjects, digital surveillance, AI and the future of work’, published by its Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services on 23 December 2020(23),

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A9-0257/2021),

A.  whereas ‘platform workers’ refers to individuals executing work or providing services, with a greater or lesser extent of control, via a digital labour platform; whereas, accordingly, it may include both workers and genuinely self-employed persons;

B.  whereas ‘digital labour platform’ refers to a company which intermediates or offers, with a greater or lesser extent of control, on-demand services, requested by individual or corporate customers and provided directly or indirectly by individuals, regardless of whether such services are performed on-location or online;

C.  whereas ‘platform work’ refers to the work executed and services provided on demand and for remuneration by platform workers, regardless of their employment status, the type of digital labour platforms (on-location or online) or the level of skills required;

D.  whereas there is a lack of sufficient and up-to-date European-wide data on platform work, and whereas data collection methodology varies across Member States, making it difficult to determine the extent of platform work and the number of workers concerned; whereas the further growth of platform work within the labour market is considered highly likely;

E.  whereas platform work can create employment, increase choice, provide additional income, and lower barriers to entering the labour market; whereas platform work may facilitate flexibility and optimisation of resources, and provide opportunities for both people working in or through digital labour platforms and clients, and the matching of demand for and supply of services; whereas innovation in digital tools is a precondition for platform work and can contribute to growth in times of crisis and recovery; whereas platform work can offer advantages for students and those who wish to combine study and work at the same time, as well as creating access to employment for young people not in education, employment or training (NEETs), and people with lower skill levels;

F.  whereas platform work can by no means be limited to the transport of persons or food delivery, as it also consists of professional tasks, household tasks and micro-tasks;

G.  whereas platform work facilitates access to the labour market through modern forms of employment and encourages the development of technologies in order to facilitate the use of platforms and bring them closer both to companies and consumers;

H.  whereas platform work has also raised concerns about precariousness and poor working conditions, lack of or difficult access to adequate social protection, unfair competition, undeclared work, fragmented and unpredictable income and work schedules, lack of dispute resolution mechanisms, deskilling and lack of career advancement, as well as lack of occupational health and safety measures, especially for lower-skilled on-location platform workers and workers performing micro-tasks, as highlighted once again during the COVID-19 crisis; whereas the erroneous classification of workers as self-employed contributes to this situation;

I.  whereas the COVID-19 crisis has served to highlight the role played by platform workers in ensuring business continuity for thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) across the EU by providing a much needed interface between key sectors such as food and transport and consumers, and the platform model has allowed for continued income for some platform workers; whereas more than 60 % of EU residents say that, even after the COVID-19 crisis, they do not intend to stop using online services, including, for example, the possibility of ordering meals online(24); whereas workers in non-standard arrangements are at higher health risk than workers in standard ones(25) and platform workers in particular are often exposed to health and safety risks owing to the characteristics of work they perform, for example cyclists, who are vulnerable road users and who often work in unfavourable and difficult weather conditions, and under speed and efficiency pressure; whereas platform work should not lead to precariousness, insecurity or health and safety risks; whereas the platform workers who suffered loss of income because of the pandemic were often not eligible for income support measures, highlighting their lack of access to social protection; whereas on-location platform workers have an increased risk of contracting COVID-19;

J.  whereas, if not tackled accordingly, the above-mentioned risks might jeopardise the entire European model of the social market economy and the goals of the European Pillar of Social Rights; whereas technological progress might also provide the solutions for adaptation of the European social model to the realities of the 21st century;

K.  whereas digital labour platforms globally generated revenue of at least USD 52 billion in 2019; whereas about 70 % of the revenues generated were concentrated in just two countries, the United States (49 %) and China (22 %), while the share was much lower in Europe (11 %) and other regions (18 %)(26);

L.  whereas platform work covers different realities and is characterised by a high level of heterogeneity in the activities carried out; whereas there are different categories of platform work such as online or on-location, requiring a high or low level of skills, paid per task or per hour, performed as a secondary or primary occupation, and that the profiles of platform workers and types of platforms vary widely; whereas, according to Eurofound(27), in 2017 on-location work in professional services, delivery services and passenger transport and household services represented the most prevalent characteristics of platform work in selected Member States;

M.  whereas most platform workers have another job or other source of income; whereas platform workers tend to be low paid, but with a few earning relatively good incomes; whereas workers in the platform economy tend to be younger and more highly educated than the wider population(28);

N.  whereas platform workers are generally classified as formally self-employed, regardless of their actual employment situation and while often not possessing the levels of professional independence characteristic of the self-employed; whereas, therefore, many platform workers do not benefit from the equivalent social protection, labour rights, or health and safety provisions offered by an employment contract or employment relationship in their respective Member States; whereas digital labour platforms in such cases do not pay social security contributions; whereas a small proportion of platform workers have the status of employee or agency worker; whereas a large number of court rulings and administrative decisions, including at national courts of highest instance and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), regarding on-location platform work, in particular in the transport and food delivery sectors in a number of Member States, have confirmed the existence of an employment relationship between platforms and platform workers, based on their activities and link with their platform, with consequent rights and entitlements; whereas workers should have straightforward means to clarify and confirm their employment status and should not be obliged to vindicate their rights through court proceedings;

O.  whereas the misclassification of some platform workers as self-employed seen in platform work causes uncertainty and deprives workers of their access to employment rights, social protection, entitlements and the application of relevant rules; whereas more and more sectors, such as delivery, transport, human resources, health, childcare, personal and household services and tourism, are likely to be impacted by platform work or similar employment patterns and digitalisation in the future; whereas the development of digital technologies in many sectors, and especially online-based trade and services, comes with opportunities and risks for companies and workers;

P.  whereas new forms of work should remain sustainable and fair, and platform work should be guided by the values of the Union, ethics and a human-centric approach where digital technology remains a tool; whereas, in this regard, equipping every European citizen with digital skills is paramount in the context of the digital transition;

Q.  whereas a high degree of flexibility is appreciated as one of the biggest advantages of platform work;

R.  whereas Member States have developed different approaches, leading to fragmented rules and initiatives with negative effects for workers, companies, including platforms, and consumers arising from the resulting uncertainty; whereas there is a need for a legislative initiative at European level to overcome the resulting legal uncertainty, ensure and improve platform workers’ rights, working conditions and access to social protection, promote the innovation potential of sustainable platform work models, and ensure a level playing field with ‘traditional’ economic actors; whereas most platforms are active in different EU Member States and are often not based in the country where the activities performed by their workers take place;

S.  whereas no definition of ‘worker’ at European level exists, while the case law of the CJEU has established criteria for determining the status of a worker and a self-employed person; whereas the characteristics of employment which enable recognition as an employment relationship or employment contract vary between Member States and are a matter of national competence; whereas a special ‘third status’ for platform workers would further distort competition between digital labour platforms and companies in the traditional economy, especially SMEs, and would not be compatible with the national classifications of workers and genuinely self-employed persons in the Member States, with unpredictable legal, administrative and juridical consequences, as well as entailing the risk of labour market segmentation; whereas platform workers should either be classified as workers or genuinely self-employed persons depending on their actual situation and should enjoy their respective rights and conditions; whereas a rebuttable presumption of an employment relationship would facilitate the correct classification of platform workers in combination with the reversal of the burden of proof, which means that where workers dispute the classification of their employment status in legal or administrative proceedings, it is for the party who is claimed to be the employer to prove that there is no employment relationship in accordance with national definitions as set out in the legislation or collective agreements of the respective Member State; whereas the rebuttable presumption of an employment relationship must not lead to an automatic classification of all platform workers as workers;

T.  whereas the application of existing provisions should be ensured, in particular the Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions and the Regulation on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services;

U.  whereas SMEs are the backbone of Europe’s economy, representing 99 % of all businesses in the EU;

V.  whereas platform work reproduces gender inequalities from the general labour market, such as the gender pay gap and gender segregation in occupations or sectors(29); whereas platform work can be an opportunity to increase the participation of women in the labour force; whereas, however, the representation of women and men varies across the different types of services and platforms, with men more represented in platform work with higher work autonomy and women more likely to perform more precarious platform work with limited work autonomy; whereas people with significant caring and family responsibilities are therefore at a disadvantage and this is likely to have negative consequences, in particular for women(30); whereas women platform workers, in particular drivers and those providing cleaning and care services in private residences, are exposed to the risk of sexual harassment and gender-based violence(31) and might refrain from reporting this because of a lack of reporting tools, the absence of contact with a human manager or fear of negative ratings and loss of future work;

W.  whereas platform work has been a growing phenomenon since its emergence, facilitated by the development of digital technologies in recent years, providing workers, customers and businesses with new opportunities and choices when it comes to the place, time, flexibility and frequency of their relations, including work and the provision of services; whereas, according to the ILO global report, for the majority of on-location-based workers and one third of online-based workers, platform work on digital labour platforms is their main source of income, with higher proportions in developing countries and for women(32); whereas, nevertheless, in the EU it still represents a small share of the general labour market, with an estimated 11 % of the EU workforce having provided services via on-location or online labour platforms at least once, and 1,4 % of them doing this as their main job as of 2019(33); whereas the benefits of digitalisation must be shared broadly and equitably between platforms, workers, clients and society at large; whereas strong safeguards are necessary in order to ensure that platform work provides decent working conditions and to prevent labour market segmentation;

X.  whereas platforms acting as employers have to observe all their obligations as employers and abide by their sectoral responsibilities;

Y.  whereas digital labour platforms use tools such as apps, algorithms and AI as part of their business model in order to match supply and demand, and to manage workers to varying extents; whereas algorithmic management presents new challenges for the future of work and can create power imbalances and opacity about decision-making, as well as technology-enabled control and surveillance which could exacerbate discriminatory practices and entail risks for privacy, workers’ health and safety and human dignity(34); whereas algorithmic management must be fully transparent and under human oversight in order for workers to be able to challenge decisions through effective procedures where necessary and must not be based on biased datasets related to gender, ethnic background or sexual orientation, so as to avoid any risk of discrimination in its outcomes; whereas more vulnerable groups such as women, minorities and persons with disabilities have a higher risk of rating bias(35);

Z.  whereas the issue of non-paid work is particularly sensitive in the platform work environment;

AA.  whereas the creation of cooperatives could constitute an important instrument of the bottom-up organisation of platform work and could encourage competition between platforms;

AB.  whereas there is a great need for integrated transport solutions based on a wide range of services, emphasising the system rather than its components, and whereas platforms can play a role in facilitating mobility as a service (MaaS), logistics as a service (LaaS) and collaborative mobility; whereas such digitalisation could create major opportunities to create a sustainable, innovative and multi-modal transport sector, including through public transport innovation; whereas a forward-looking framework for platform companies must also address potential environmental and health concerns and maximise mobility efficiency, and whereas an in-depth assessment of the environmental impact of platforms in the fields of transport and tourism should therefore be conducted, given that not enough is known about their positive and negative impacts;

AC.  whereas the multiplication of digital intermediation and collaborative platforms is radically changing passenger and freight transport, notably through the provision of new services for enterprises and individuals, the development of multi-modal transport, improved connectivity in isolated areas, enhanced urban mobility or even the optimisation of flow management;

AD.  whereas high-speed wireless and fixed connectivity is essential for the further development of digitalised transport services; whereas the EU is setting the regulatory standards for the use of digital services and products, as it did with the GDPR and the European digital strategy, but lags behind in creating competitive conditions for new digital companies and platforms to develop and grow in the EU;

European legal framework

1.  Notes that the current European framework is unsatisfactory and regrets the fact that EU legal instruments are often not applied to many platform workers as a result of their misclassification and do not sufficiently address the new realities of the world of work; stresses the need to improve the working conditions of all platform workers working through digital labour platforms, including the genuinely self-employed; is concerned that this fragmentation may place many platform workers in a legally precarious situation, resulting in those workers enjoying fewer or more limited rights than should be guaranteed to all workers; considers that inadequate regulation might lead to different interpretations, thereby creating unpredictability and the resultant negative impact on both businesses and workers;

2.  Notes that the meaning of the terms ‘worker’ and ‘self-employed’ are not uniformly defined in all Member States; further notes that the boundary between these two terms is sometimes ambiguous for new forms of work, and that some self-employed persons or workers are therefore at risk of being misclassified and of not enjoying the rights inherent to their status; takes the view accordingly that workers in digital labour platforms should have the same rights and the same access to social protection on an equal basis with non-platform workers of the same category, with full respect for the diversity of national labour market models, the autonomy of social partners and national competences;

3.  Stresses, furthermore, that platform workers working in different Member-States, or combining regular employment with platform work in different Member States, might be subject to entirely different regulations for the same work;

4.  Believes that this legal uncertainty must be urgently addressed for the benefit of workers, companies, including platforms, and consumers; believes that any proposal must recognise the heterogeneity of platforms and of platform workers, as well as the different national labour legislation, social security and health systems, the need for sustainable digital labour platform models and respect the status of platform workers who are genuinely self-employed; takes the view that there should be a European framework, based on a comprehensive impact assessment and consultation with the relevant actors, that safeguards platform work offering decent working conditions, while at the same time tackling precarious forms of platform work and which could be complemented by national legislation or collective bargaining agreements; stresses that any EU legislative initiative should promote innovation, the creation of new business models, cooperatives, start-ups and SMEs, as well as decent jobs; emphasises that the opportunities and flexible working arrangements provided by digital labour platforms should remain possible provided they are not detrimental towards social protection and workers’ rights;

5.  Notes that cases of misclassification are most prevalent in digital labour platforms that strongly organise, directly or by means of an algorithm, the conditions and remuneration of platform work; calls on the Commission, with the aim of facilitating the correct classification of platform workers, to introduce into its forthcoming proposal a rebuttable presumption of an employment relationship for platform workers, in accordance with national definitions as set out in Member States’ respective legislation or collective agreements, combined with the reversal of the burden of proof and possibly additional measures; stresses, therefore, that whenever platform workers dispute the classification of their employment status in legal proceedings before a court or administrative body according to national legislation and practices, it is for the party who is claimed to be the employer to prove that there is no employment relationship; stresses that the rebuttable presumption of an employment relationship must not lead to an automatic classification of all platform workers as workers; considers that the classification of workers should be based on the facts relating to the actual performance of work and criteria, in accordance with national legislation, and not on the parties’ description of the relationship; stresses that such a rebuttable presumption ensures that workers who are genuinely self-employed are able to remain so and can continue to access work through platforms; further calls on the Commission to clarify that establishing a new EU so-called third status between worker and self-employed person cannot be considered, as it would not help to solve the current problems and risks further blurring already confused concepts, and to ensure that platform workers are either classified as workers or as self-employed persons, in accordance with national law;

6.  Emphasises that legislation in the Member States and at European level is far from matching the speed at which the digital transformation is evolving, leading to lack of regulation when it comes to new employment methods, with a direct impact on workers’ rights and the functioning of online platforms;

7.  Stresses that any regulation regarding online platforms must respect the principle of subsidiarity and the different approaches of the Member States, given the existing differences between platforms, from the number of workers to the extent to which they cover the rights of workers, and must stand the test of time and digital transformation;

8.  Welcomes the Commission’s intention to present a proposal for a legislative initiative to improve the working conditions of platform workers by the end of 2021, as announced in the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan and preceded by a two-stage consultation of the social partners; calls on the Commission, if the social partners do not express the wish to initiate the process provided for in Article 155 of the TFEU, and on the basis of the conclusions of public consultations, to put forward a proposal for a directive on platform workers in order to guarantee rights for all platform workers, and to address the specificities of platform work to ensure fair and transparent working conditions, guarantee a healthy and safe working environment, give access to adequate and transparent social protection, as well as their right to organise, to establish, freely join and be represented by, inter alia, trade unions and negotiate collective agreements, access to training and skills, as well as ensuring data protection in line with the GDPR and transparent, ethical and non-discriminatory algorithmic management, while also ensuring a level playing field in all Member States and creating a predictable and stable business environment that fosters investment and innovation;

9.  Calls on the Commission to recognise the status of digital labour platforms either as employer, (temporary) employment agency or intermediary, linked to their sector of activity, in order to ensure all obligations a particular status entails, for, inter alia, social security contributions, responsibility for health and safety, liability for income tax payments, due diligence and corporate social responsibility are met and a level playing field with other companies active in the sector can be preserved;

10.  Stresses the need to better combat bogus self-employment by means of a directive, so as to cover platform workers who are fulfilling the conditions characteristic of an employment relationship based on the actual performance of work, and not on the parties’ description of the relationship;

11.  Stresses that the major impact of online platforms is not limited to benefits offered to consumers, but is instead a wide-scale impact that affects the whole supply chain, including suppliers, manufacturers, distributors and consumers, and must be accordingly taken into account when legislation is being discussed;

Fair and transparent working conditions

12.  Calls on the Commission, when exploring ways to improve working conditions to:

13.  Calls on the Commission to examine the extent to which existing Union rules are applicable to the digital labour platform market and ensure adequate implementation and enforcement; calls on the Member States, in collaboration with social partners and other relevant stakeholders, to assess, in a proactive way and based on the logic of anticipation, the need to modernise existing legislation, including social security systems, so as to stay abreast of technological developments while ensuring workers’ protection; calls on the Commission and the Member States to coordinate social security systems with a view to ensuring the exportability of benefits and aggregation of periods in accordance with Union and national legislation;

A healthy and safe working environment

14.  Stresses that platform workers may be subject to increased health and safety risks for both on-location platform work (such as road accidents or physical injury caused by machinery or chemicals) and online platform work (for example related to ergonomics of computer workstations), which are not limited to physical health but can also affect psycho-social health with unpredictable working hours, intensity of work, competitive environments (rating systems, work incentives through bonuses), information overload and isolation as emergent risk factors; underlines that the Commission proposal must address the occupational health and safety of platform workers in line with the European health and safety legal framework and enable them to exercise their rights, including a right to disconnect, in line with the implementation of the European Social Partners Framework Agreement on Digitalisation without being disadvantaged for so doing; stresses that all on-location platform workers need to be equipped with adequate personal protective equipment and that those active in transportation and delivery need to have guaranteed accident insurance; underlines that digital labour platforms need to put in place safeguards to protect platform workers against violence and harassment, including gender-based violence and set up effective reporting mechanisms;

15.  Considers that all platform workers should be entitled to receive compensation in case of work accidents and occupational diseases, and be provided with social protection, including sickness and invalidity insurance coverage; welcomes, in this respect, the initiatives of some digital labour platforms to provide, as a first step, insurance as well as occupational health and safety measures until a legislative framework has been established and stresses the important role collective agreements can play in this context;

Adequate and transparent social protection

16.  Strongly believes that formal and effective coverage, adequacy and transparency of social protection systems should apply to all workers including the self-employed; calls on the Member States to fully and immediately implement Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed, and to take measures in order to ensure the social protection of platform workers; calls on the Commission to scrutinise Member States’ progress in this regard in the framework of the European Semester’s country-specific recommendations;

17.  Recalls that social protection is a solidarity-based safety net that is beneficial not only to the individual but also to society as a whole; stresses that platform workers face unique challenges in satisfying eligibility requirements and qualifying for social security benefits, which in turn impacts their future prospects and the financial viability and solidarity of social security systems; considers that platform workers should have access to all branches of social security in accordance with their status; recalls in particular the importance of Member States ensuring, and where necessary extending, access to, social protection to self-employed platform workers including for people transitioning from one status to another or who have both statuses in order to guarantee the portability of accumulated social rights and entitlements and for schemes covering maternity and equivalent parental benefits, and unemployment, accident, long-term care, invalidity, sickness, healthcare and old-age benefits;

Representation and collective bargaining rights

18.  Recalls that freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are fundamental rights for all workers, and believes a directive on platform workers should ensure that these rights are effective, applied in full and enforced; is concerned by the occurrence of imbalanced and asymmetrical relationships between digital labour platforms and workers, who often lack the individual bargaining power to negotiate fair terms and conditions; notes further that there are also practical issues such as a lack of common means of communication and opportunities to meet online or in person, which can prevent collective representation in practice; notes also the potential for innovative approaches to open up new avenues for social dialogue and organisation via digital solutions; calls on the Commission to address such impediments in its proposal; stresses the need for platform workers and platforms to be properly organised and represented in order to facilitate social dialogue and collective bargaining;

19.  Underlines that cooperative legal forms could be an important tool for the bottom-up organisation of platform work, which may also have a positive impact on internal democracy and workers’ empowerment;

20.  Regrets the legal difficulties in collective representation faced by platform workers, and is aware that the solo self-employed are generally considered ‘undertakings’, and as such are subject to the prohibition on agreements that restrict competition; acknowledges in this regard the inception impact assessment published by the Commission(37), and the planned initiative to address this obstacle, in addition to the legislative initiative to improve the working conditions of platform workers while respecting existing collective bargaining systems; is convinced that EU competition law must not hinder the improvement of the working conditions (including the setting of remuneration) and social protection of solo self-employed platform workers through collective bargaining, and urges the Commission to clarify that collective agreements fall outside the scope of competition law in order to ensure they can unionise and negotiate collectively, and to guarantee a better balance in bargaining power and a fairer internal market;

Training and skills

21.  Stresses the importance of training, and in particular the need for training to be provided to platform workers by digital labour platforms on the use of their website or the application, the tasks performed and occupational health and safety; stresses further that platform workers, in particular those who are less qualified, should be given access by the platforms to further training enabling skilling and re-skilling to improve their employability and career paths; calls for the facilitation of the recognition, validation and portability of attainments in the field of non-formal and informal learning, but also in the recognition of the skills acquired during platform work; believes in this regard that a ‘certificate of experience’ should be issued for platform workers who have participated in such training, which could be uploaded on individual learning accounts; in this regard, calls on the Commission to address platform workers’ education and training in the forthcoming proposals on a European approach for micro-credentials and individual learning accounts; highlights some strategic partnerships established by platforms to ensure access to training for platform workers (such as language courses, personalised coaching and video coaching) to enable them to take the next steps in their careers; believes such best practices should be mainstreamed across platforms in all sectors;

22.  Underlines that digital competences are of the utmost importance; believes that investment in vocational education and lifelong learning is necessary in order to ensure that workers are equipped with the right skills for the digital age; calls on the Member States to adapt their education and training systems to the digital labour market, with a view to promoting digital literacy and skills, as well as fostering entrepreneurship; highlights that the labour platform economy has so far developed mainly in urban areas; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action to combat the digital divide and ensure access to digital services for everyone; stresses, in this context, the importance of deploying 5G broadband in rural areas;

23.  Stresses the need to ensure the same access to lifelong learning for platform workers as is enjoyed by workers in the traditional economy, in line with national law and practice, while encouraging innovation, promoting competitive and inclusive growth, and guaranteeing a level playing field for businesses;

Algorithms and data management

24.  Considers that the use of algorithms in work should be transparent, non-discriminatory, trustworthy and ethical for workers; underlines that algorithmic transparency and non-discrimination should apply to task assignment and distribution, price-setting, advertising, ratings and interactions; furthermore, points out that algorithmic management functions, in particular task assignment, ratings, deactivation procedures and pricing, and any changes thereto, should be intelligibly explained and communicated in a clear and up-to-date manner and should be part of social dialogue, while respecting trade secrets in accordance with Directive (EU) 2016/943, in particular Recitals 13 and 18, and Articles 3 and 5 thereof; stresses that all algorithmic decisions must be ethical, accountable, contestable and, where relevant, reversible and highlights the importance of regular controls by the relevant authorities in this regard in accordance with national law to prevent erroneous AI output; reiterates that any algorithmic decisions must comply with the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, as enshrined in Article 22(1) of the GDPR, which means that there must be human oversight; stresses that incentivising practices, such as exceptional bonuses, or punitive practices, such as ratings impacting working time and leading to the assignment of less work, must not lead to risky behaviours or health and safety risks, including mental health; is convinced that non-discriminatory algorithms are those which prevent gender, racial and other social biases in the selection and treatment of different groups and do not reinforce inequalities and stereotypes;

25.  Calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure appropriate protection of platform workers’ rights and well-being, such as non-discrimination, privacy, autonomy and human dignity in the use of AI and algorithmic management, including prediction and flagging tools to predict behaviour, real-time monitoring of progress, performance- and time-tracking software, automated behavioural nudges and undue surveillance practices; stresses that workers should always be informed and consulted prior to the use of such devices and practices; believes that the training of algorithm developers in ethical, transparency and anti-discriminatory issues should be encouraged;

26.  Is concerned about the weak respect of intellectual property rights for the creative works of self-employed platform workers, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to tackle this problem and ensure the proper enforcement of applicable legislation;

27.  Believes that workers should be informed of client reviews; stresses that workers should have the right to contest non-payment and to have that contestation reviewed by a platform employee;

28.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that waiting time and being available on the platform is considered as working time for platform workers in an employment relationship;

29.  Recalls that all online platforms must ensure full compliance with EU legislation, including non-discrimination and data protection law; stresses that platform workers, and with their agreement, their representatives, should have full access to all data concerning their own activities, understand how their personal information is processed, be informed on any classification or evaluation of the worker by the platform which may impact their terms of employment or working conditions and have the right to export their ratings; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that platform workers have the effective right to data portability, as enshrined in Articles 20 and 88 of the GDPR; believes that the possibility of a portable skills, client feedback and reputation ratings certificate, recognised between similar platforms, should be explored;

30.  Notes that the nature of the platform work and the absence of a defined workplace can lead to subletting of workers’ accounts and undeclared work; believes that reliable verification processes of the platform user’s identity should be guaranteed without obligatory processing of biometric data;

31.  Stresses that the potential efficiency advantages of online labour platforms over the traditional labour market should be grounded in fair competition; stresses that, with a view to ensuring a level playing field between the labour platform and traditional businesses, especially SMEs, the platform economy, like any other economy, must pay taxes and social contributions and comply with employment and social legislation; underlines the need to adjust related policies accordingly where necessary;

32.  Calls on the Commission to ensure that platform workers and those in any similar form of employment, made possible by technological innovation, are included in the proposals for establishment of a European social security number (ESSN) and that fair mobility rules are applied to platform work in a non-discriminatory manner;

33.  Recognises that the labour platform economy can be used for social purposes; calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote social economy models in the labour platform economy and to exchange best practices in this regard, given that social enterprises have proven to be resilient during the COVID-19 crisis;

Other recommendations

34.  Recalls that a considerable number of platforms are working on implementing internal regulations and programmes in order to create a more secure environment for their workers and considers that such practices should be encouraged by EU and national actions in the field; calls on the Commission to consider establishing a European quality label following a thorough impact assessment, which would be granted to platforms implementing good practices for platform workers in order for users, workers and consumers to make informed decisions, and which would highlight platforms with quality working conditions based on collective agreements and a high degree of transparency;

35.  Notes that data pertaining to the quantity of platform workers, as well as their distribution by sector, is still fragmented; calls on the Commission, with the collaboration of the Member States, to collect robust and comparable data on platform workers in order to get a more accurate idea of the scale of digital labour platform activity and deepen the knowledge of the working and employment conditions of platform workers, including social security coverage and income range;

36.  Calls on the national public employment services and the European Employment Services (EURES) network to communicate better on the opportunities offered by the labour platforms;

37.  Calls on the Member States to encourage innovative forms of platform work in compliance with Union and national legislation, and calls on the Commission to reflect quality working conditions in its upcoming legal framework and maintain flexibility while ensuring workers’ rights;

38.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that platform workers are able to refuse a work assignment if this takes place outside the reference hours and days or if they have not been informed of the work assignment within the agreed minimum period of notice, without suffering any adverse consequences as a result of their refusal;

39.  At the same time, invites the Commission and the Member States to consider innovative, effective and socially beneficial cross-border solutions, ensuring social coverage and protection;

40.  Highlights that guaranteeing respect for workers’ rights is an essential component of sustainable tourism policy; underlines the increasingly important role of digital platforms and data collection in tourism activities; stresses, therefore, the fundamental role the collection of data on platform workers will have in achieving truly sustainable tourism projects which ensure that tourism investments and jobs benefit local communities and workers, while facilitating the fair distribution of profits;

41.  Recalls that women make up only 22 % of workers in the transport industry and also represent a minority of platform workers in the transport and tourism industries, with anecdotal evidence suggesting that female platform workers in the transport industry have worse employment and working conditions than their male counterparts;

o
o   o

42.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 57. (2) OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 105. (3) OJ L 136, 22.5.2019, p. 1. (4) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1. (5) OJ C 387, 15.11.2019, p. 1. (6) https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13436-2019-INIT/en/pdfhttps://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13436-2019-INIT/en/pdf (7) https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9686-2019-INIT/en/pdf (8) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0021. (9) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0371. (10) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0284. (11) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0275. (12) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0272. (13) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0194. (14) OJ C 202, 28.5.2021, p. 35. (15) OJ C 242, 10.7.2018, p. 24. (16) OJ C 331, 18.9.2018, p. 125. (17) OJ C 331, 18.9.2018, p. 135. (18) OJ C 334, 19.9.2018, p. 88. (19) https://www.etuc.org/system/files/document/file2020-06/Final%2022%2006%2020_Agreement%20on%20Digitalisation%202020.pdf (20) Study – ‘The platform economy and precarious work’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A – Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, 11 September 2020. (21) Study – ‘The Social Protection of Workers in the Platform Economy’, European Parliament, Directorate-general for Internal Policies, Policy Department A – Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, 7 December 2017. (22) https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-economy (23) Study – ‘Data subjects, digital surveillance, AI and the future of work’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services, Scientific Foresight Unit, 23 December 2020. (24) https://www.dw.com/pl/ue-chce-lepiej-chroni%C4%87-pracuj%C4%85cych-za-po%C5%9Brednictwem-platform-cyfrowych/a-56676431 (25) Howard, J., Nonstandard work arrangements and worker health and safety, American Journal of Industrial Medicine, Volume 60, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 1-10. (26) ILO, World Employment and Social Outlook 2021, ‘The role of digital labour platforms in transforming the world of work’, p. 20. (27) https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef18001en.pdf (28) Study – ‘The Social Protection of Workers in the Platform Economy’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A – Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, 7 December 2017, p. 34, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/614184/IPOL_STU(2017)614184_EN.pdf (29) European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), Gender Equality Index 2020: Digitalisation and the future of work, p. 14. (30) EIGE, Gender Equality Index 2020: Digitalisation and the future of work, pp. 98-99. (31) EIGE, Gender Equality Index 2020: Digitalisation and the future of work, p. 114. (32) ILO, World Employment and Social Outlook 2021: The role of digital labour platforms in transforming the world of work, p. 22. (33) European Commission Joint Research Centre, ‘Platform workers in Europe: Evidence from the COLLEEM survey’ (2018) and ‘New evidence on platform workers in Europe: Results from the second COLLEEM survey’ (2020). (34) Workplace Monitoring & Surveillance, Data & Society, Mateescu, A., Nguyen, A., Explainer: February 2019. (35) Gender Equality Index Report 2020, Digitalisation and the future of work, p. 99. (36) Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (OJ L 157, 15.6.2016, p. 1). (37) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=PI_COM%3AAres%282021%29102652

European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 on Fishers for the future: Attracting a new generation of workers to the fishing industry and generating employment in coastal communities (2019/2161(INI))

P9_TA(2021)0386 A9-0230/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Article 3(2) and (3) of the Treaty on European Union, and to Article 4(2)(a), (d) and (k), and Articles 9, 153 and 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to Article 349 TFEU,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 October 2017 entitled ‘A stronger and renewed strategic partnership with the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2017)0623),

–  having regard to Council Directive (EU) 2017/159 of 19 December 2016 implementing the Agreement concerning the implementation of the Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 of the International Labour Organisation, concluded on 21 May 2012 between the General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in the European Union (Cogeca), the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) and the Association of National Organisations of Fishing Enterprises in the European Union (Europêche)(1),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy(2),

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 25 September 2019 on ‘Social dimension of fisheries’ (exploratory opinion)(3),

–  having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

–  having regard to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),

–  having regard to the Convention on the International Maritime Organization (IMO),

–  having regard to the Convention establishing the International Labour Organization (ILO),

–  having regard to the Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels of 1977,

–  having regard to the Torremolinos Protocol of 1993 and the Cape Town Agreement of 2012 updating and amending the Torremolinos Convention,

–  having regard to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel (STCW-F) of 1995,

–  having regard to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) fisheries circular No. 966 of 2001 entitled ‘Safety at sea as an integral part of fisheries management’,

–  having regard to the FAO report entitled ‘The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2020’,

–  having regard to ILO Convention 188 of 2007 on Work in Fishing,

–  having regard to the IMO 2005 Voluntary Guidelines for the Design, Construction and Equipment of Small Fishing Vessels,

–  having regard to the report by Europêche, Cogeca ‘fisheries’ and the ETF of December 2000 entitled ‘Mutual Recognition of Certificates in the Sea Fishing Sector in Europe’ (the Bénodet report),

–  having regard to the 2019 Annual Overview of Marine Casualties and Incidents of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA),

–  having regard to the report of the Commission’s Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) of 26 September 2019 entitled ‘Social data in the EU fisheries sector’ (STECF 19-03),

–  having regard to the STECF 2019 Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing Fleet (STECF 19-06) and 2020 Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing Fleet (STECF 20-06),

–  having regard to the conclusions of the study by Parliament’s Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies entitled ‘Training of Fishers’, published in July 2018,

–  having regard to the in-depth analysis by Parliament’s Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies entitled ‘The scope of EU labour law: Who is (not) covered by key directives?’, published in October 2020,

–  having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2014 on specific actions in the Common Fisheries Policy for developing the role of women(4),

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries (A9-0230/2021),

A.  whereas the common fisheries policy (CFP) must ensure that fishing and aquaculture are socially, economically and environmentally sustainable in the long term and that this objective must continue to be carried out in order to maintain the sector’s attractiveness for the labour force; whereas in order to achieve social sustainability, fisheries policies should integrate and improve labour conditions, health and safety, training, social inclusion and a fair standard of living; whereas in many fishing communities and regions of the EU, the social importance of the fisheries and aquaculture sectors outweighs its direct economic contribution;

B.  whereas the public health crisis and trade and market disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have hit fishers across Europe; whereas despite the safety risks and low prices of fish, fishers have continued fishing, supplying high-quality food; whereas during the COVID-19 crisis, fishers have been identified as fundamental workers that exercise critical occupations ensuring important food supply; whereas, as vital professionals, the EU institutions must pay special attention to them, not only for their role, but also for the importance for the Union’s food security;

C.  whereas in the last few years, fisheries across Europe have undergone major structural changes and restructuring with heavy fleet reductions, leading to social consequences for both fishers and fishing communities; whereas there is an increasing need to raise awareness and whereas more attention should be paid to the social dimension of fisheries, for instance assessing social impacts in the framework of impact assessments of policy proposals related to the CFP;

D.  whereas a holistic approach is needed for the different EU strategies, including the EU 2030 biodiversity strategy and the farm to fork strategy;

E.  whereas demographic changes in Europe must also be taken into account;

F.  whereas the current lack of systematic comprehensive data and regular scientific analysis on the social aspects of the CFP compromise fishery policymaking; whereas this data could promote fishing as a successful working career and as a way of contributing to the livelihood of coastal communities, and attract young people to the profession;

G.  whereas fishing, including aquaculture, globally provides food to billions of people, and whereas this sector is an important source of employment and income for the livelihoods of 10-12 % of the world’s population, according to the FAO; whereas, in addition, an estimated 140 million further jobs are related to the rest of the fisheries value chain, in particular in the processing and sale of fisheries products;

H.  whereas, according to STECF report 19-03, women made up 5,4 % of total employment in the small-scale coastal fleet across the EU, in comparison with 1,9 % in the large-scale fleet and 2,3 % in the distant water fishing fleet; whereas, however, women represent the majority of the workforce in certain extractive or semi-culture activities, such as shell fishing on foot, and whereas important work carried out by women to maintain other activities, such as canning and processing, packing, net-making and unloading and cleaning fish (neskatillas), goes unrecorded; whereas there is a data gap between Member States, ignoring women’s work and significant contribution to the sector, which is still not sufficiently recognised;

I.  whereas, according to the latest Eurostat data(5), a total of around 180 000 people were employed in the EU fisheries industry in 2017, of whom around one third in the aquaculture sub-sector; whereas, of that total, 41 000 people were employed in the primary fisheries sector in Spain, and a further 29 000 in Italy, 21 000 in Greece, 20 000 in France and 14 700 in Portugal; whereas, although Italy, Greece and Portugal accounted for only 11 % of EU fishing production in 2017, these three Member States accounted for 35,9 % of employment; whereas, in this context, Spain, France and Portugal are Member States with outermost regions, which increases their maritime dimension, and whereas the fisheries sector plays a vital socio-economic role in these regions;

J.  whereas statistical data published by Eurostat(6) in 2019 shows that, in 2018, in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sector, a total of 14,4 % of workers were aged 65 or over, and whereas this is the sector which employs the largest number of persons in this age group; whereas, although the proportion of workers in this age group has been decreasing consistently since 2008, the actual number of employees in this age group has not decreased by the same proportion;

K.  whereas the fishing sector plays a key role in supplying fish to the public and keeping food balances in equilibrium in the Member States and the EU, and whereas it plays a major role in the socio-economic well-being of coastal communities, to local development, to employment, to the maintenance and creation of upstream and downstream economic activities, and to the preservation of local cultural traditions;

L.  whereas it is necessary to allow for the marked differences in fleets, fleet segments, target species, fishing gear, productivity, consumer preferences, and per capita fish consumption in the Member States, in addition to the specific features of the fishing industry owing to its social structure, the forms of marketing, and the structural and natural inequalities among fishing regions;

M.  whereas the collection of social indicators for the EU fishing fleet, aquaculture and fish processing industry was introduced by Regulation (EU) 2017/1004 on the establishment of a Union framework for the collection, management and use of data in the fisheries sector and support for scientific advice regarding the CFP; whereas social variables are to be collected every three years from 2018 onwards, including: employment by gender, full-time employment (FTE) by gender, unpaid labour by gender, employment by age, employment by education level, employment by nationality, employment by employment status, total national FTE;

N.  whereas according to STECF report 19-03 on social data in the EU fisheries sector, in 2017 there were around 150 000 people employed in the EU fishing fleet, equivalent to some 99 000 FTEs; whereas most workers in the EU fishing fleet (96 %) were male, and 4 % were female; whereas according to the age data reported, the 40-64 age group made up the largest proportion of people employed in the EU fishing fleet (58 %), followed by the 25-39 age group (26 %), while a further 7 % were aged over 65 years, 5 % were in the 15-24 age group and the ages of 4 % of fishers were unknown; whereas there was significant variation in age profiles across the Member States: in Estonia 31 % of fishers were aged over 65 while in many other Member States, the same category only makes up a very low proportion of the fishing population (1 % in Belgium and Germany and 2 % in Finland);

O.  whereas in 2017 52 % of people employed in the EU fishing fleet had a low level of education, followed by 24 % with a medium level and 4 % with a high level; whereas the education level was unknown for a relatively high share of the fishing sector (20 % of workers), which may reflect the fact that this question can be seen as sensitive; whereas education levels varied considerably across Member States: only 1 % of Portuguese fishers had a high level of education while the corresponding figure in Sweden was 21 %;

P.  whereas in 2017, most people employed in the EU fishing fleet were nationals of the country where they worked (86 %), followed by non-EU/EEA nationals (8 %), workers of unknown nationality (3 %), nationals of other EU countries (3 %), and EEA nationals (0,1 %); whereas the proportion of nationals working in different Member States’ fleets varied significantly: 27 % of people employed in the Irish fleet were non-Irish nationals and 36 % of people employed in the Belgian fleet were non-Belgian nationals; whereas in contrast, 94 % of workers in the Italian fleet were Italian born, 99 % of workers in the Portuguese fleet were Portuguese nationals and all of the people employed in the Bulgarian fleet were Bulgarian nationals;

Q.  whereas 61 % of people employed in the EU fishing fleet in 2017 were employees and 36 % were vessel owners, with wide variation in employment status across Member States: employees represented 100 % of workers in the Belgian fleet and only 28 % in the Swedish fleet;

R.  whereas, even so, the majority of Member States and the EU’s economic partners in the fishing industry refer often to the income insecurity of fishing activity in some sectors, which is a factor in young people’s lack of interest in fishing, a trend that has been increasing in recent years, and which creates additional difficulties in maintaining activities troubled by job losses in coastal communities;

S.  whereas, even so, the majority of Member States and the EU’s economic partners in the fishing industry refer often to young people’s lack of interest in fishing, a fact which was first acknowledged at least two decades ago, and which creates additional difficulties in the industry as a whole and exacerbates social problems in coastal communities of the continent and overseas regions;

T.  whereas the special characteristics and permanent structural constraints of the outermost regions need to be acknowledged and considered; stresses that the fisheries sector plays an important role in the socio-economic situation, in employment and in the promotion of economic and social cohesion of these regions, and that there is potential for employment growth in the sustainable blue economy; highlights that geographical location puts outermost regions in a privilege position in the monitoring and control of coastal and oceanic areas and should be used for the EU’s efforts to fight illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing;

U.  whereas the EU IUU regulation(7) only takes in to account illegally-caught fish and does not ensure that fishing associated with serious labour infringements and violations of fundamental human rights on board fishing vessels is also banned;

V.  whereas according to the FAO, fishers depend on their vessels for their survival and risks vary with each type of fishing, the fishing grounds and weather conditions, vessel size, equipment carried and the tasks of each fisher; whereas on larger vessels, the fishing gear and other heavy equipment pose a considerable risk of death or injury to the crew while on small vessels, the risk of capsizing while pulling in a large catch, being flooded in heavy seas or run down by a larger vessel can be considerable; whereas different safety hazards are therefore associated with each different fishing activity and vessel size;

W.  whereas, where accidents and incidents at sea are concerned, of all maritime vessels, fishing vessels are the ones most often lost, although fishing is not the activity that generates the most accidents; whereas a 40 % increase was recorded in 2018 of the number of incidents involving fishing vessels;

X.  whereas 32 000 lives are lost every year in the fisheries sector, not to mention the thousands of victims of more or less serious accidents; whereas furthermore, as has also been pointed out by professional organisations, occupational diseases among those engaged in this laborious activity have increased alarmingly in recent years;

Y.  whereas, when all is said and done, fishing is a backbreaking occupation involving serious risks to the health and safety of those engaged in it; whereas the ILO recognised this problem in a convention dating back to 2007 and called on the countries that have ratified it to guarantee safe and healthy working conditions in this sector;

Z.  whereas, despite the increase in the number of incidents, the number of fatalities arising from accidents and incidents on fishing vessels has shown a downward trend, with the vast majority of incidents being the result of human factors (62,4 %) and system/equipment failures being the second most common cause of incidents (23,2 %); whereas the three most reported factors contributing to accidents on fishing vessels related to human actions are a lack of safety awareness, a lack of knowledge and inadequate working methods among on-board personnel; whereas all these factors cannot be addressed separately from fishing income;

AA.  whereas in 2019, 64,9 % of boats in the EU28 fishing fleet were at least 25 years old(8), and the average age of the fleet as a whole was 29,9 years(9), which means a very large portion of the fleet is old and cannot be relied on to provide the best operating and safety conditions, increasing risks and making operations more onerous;

AB.  whereas safety issues – fishing activity is universally considered a risky profession – the arduous nature of work on fishing boats, with unpredictable incomes, and the lack of guarantees for stable and regular remuneration, are significant factors in younger people’s lack of interest in fishing, thereby jeopardising generational renewal in the fisheries sector and the future of the fishing industry as a whole;

AC.  whereas the lack of standardisation in certification and basic training for fishers, as well as insufficient cooperation among Member States with regard to the mutual recognition of certification and basic training for fishers, was identified as a constraint two decades ago, and however still remains to be resolved;

AD.  whereas the results of the economic performance of the EU fleet generally indicate improvements in income and an annual increase in profits and average earnings for fishers since 2013, when the fleet as a whole is considered; whereas when analysed in detail by Member State, sea basin and fishing fleet, depending on the types of fleet and quotas available, these trends are not absolutely universal and, in particular, are not reflected in trends among the EU’s small-scale coastal fleet;

AE.  whereas while the state of fish stocks in the EU is generally improving, the number of fishing vessels, the fishing capacity and direct employment generated by the sector are constantly decreasing year after year, according to the STECF annual economic report 2019;

AF.  whereas a significant proportion of fishers in some Member States have low and irregular incomes, which put them in an unstable position and do not provide them with enough social protection; whereas these facts are a further factor that lessens fishing’s attractiveness among young people;

AG.  whereas the question raised in the Bénodet report published in 2000 and entitled ‘Fish comes from the sea, but where will future fishermen come from?’, can be reformulated more elaborately two decades later as follows: ‘Fish comes from the sea, and fishers are guardians of fish and the sea, but how will we be able to replenish them and where will future fishers come from?’;

AH.  whereas the opportunities for improving living standards that maritime fisheries activity has provided and can continue to provide should also be highlighted;

AI.  whereas young people who want to start their own business as fishers face significant barriers, especially related to the system of allocation of fishing opportunities and the impact it has on the price of fishing vessels;

AJ.  whereas the Commission must submit a report to Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the CFP by 31 December 2022;

Better information and profiling of the active population in the fisheries sector

1.  Stresses the need to improve how information on the active population in the fisheries and aquaculture production sector, and in the whole value chain, is collected and made available on a regular and systematic basis at EU level and broken down by Member State;

2.  Points out that aggregation of statistical data within the broad agriculture, forestry and fishing sector can hide or camouflage situations and variations, with a negative effect for each of these sectors; stresses that, although they are all primary production sectors, their activities are not interconnected and, in the case of fisheries, they do not even take place in the same environment or geographical area;

3.  Reiterates that, as with stock and habitat management, the best scientific knowledge, based on reliable, up-to-date data with extended time series in a harmonised manner across all Member States, is key to managing and monitoring social developments in the sector, particularly employment developments, without which it will not be possible to follow up and fully implement one of the three sustainability pillars advocated under the CFP – the social pillar;

4.  Points out that the information made available by different bodies seems to demonstrate an ageing of EU fishing crews, but that, as with fisheries management and adaptation of measures taken, the management, monitoring and implementation of actions should be differentiated on the basis of geographical area, fishing fleets and fishing gear used;

5.  Urges the Commission, particularly Eurostat, and the Member States, to take account of employment trends, not only in relation to the total number of jobs, but also with regard to the level of training, gender and age structure of the working population in the fisheries and aquaculture sector and, if possible, also in the fisheries and aquaculture value chain, producing data in this respect in similar detail to that which exists for monitoring economic activity and the performance of the sector in a specific way;

6.  Welcomes the first STECF report on social data on the EU fisheries sector, which provides a comprehensive overview of the social data collected under the EU data collection framework; stresses the need to address the conclusions of this first report and calls, therefore, for future STECF reports on social data to refine the existing social indicators, requiring a proper definition of whom to consider part of the fisheries work force, include new elements for analysis with the integration of indicators linked to overarching social objectives within the CFP, in particular on worker protection, education and training, earnings and safety, and adequate geographic scale, lower than country level, considering the need to know the regional and even local realities;

7.  Welcomes the establishment by the EU’s statistics service, Eurostat, in cooperation with the statistics services of Portugal, Spain and France and their respective outermost regions, of a webpage providing data on the outermost regions(10); deplores, however, the fact that it still does not provide data on the fisheries sector, given the activity’s importance to these regions’ economies; urges the Commission, and Eurostat in particular, to gather sound and up-to-date data on the blue economy and on changes in the job market in the fisheries sector, changes to fishers’ average earnings, their training levels, participation by gender and age group, along with data on the extent and performance of these activities in the outermost regions;

Better working and living conditions on board to improve safety

8.  Points out that, although safety conditions on board have improved, particularly on larger vessels, the number of incidents and accidents recorded by EMSA in 2018 increased by 40 % compared with the previous year, despite the fact that the number of fatalities has been falling steadily in recent years;

9.  Points out that EMSA alone is responsible for intervening and collecting data related to marine casualties and incidents involving fishing vessels more than 15 metres long, or in situations where vessels less than 15 metres long are involved in accidents involving vessels that fall within the scope of Directive 2009/18/EC(11) and, therefore, that accidents and incidents involving fishing vessels will definitely be more numerous than shown by the records available in EMSA’s annual reports;

10.  Notes that IUU fishing in the maritime zones of the EU poses unfair competition to European fishers;

11.  Calls on the Commission to support national authorities in acquiring systems in order to be able to identify and report IUU fishing activities;

12.  Points out that professional maritime activities in general are considered high risk and dangerous, particularly fishing, and that this situation is made worse by the fact that 85 % of EU vessels are small-scale coastal vessels (less than 12 metres in total length) and are, therefore, exposed to greater risks caused by adverse weather conditions and by operating close to shore;

13.  Stresses that small-scale coastal vessels have more difficulties providing protective spaces and improving working conditions with risks also associated to the advanced age of a significant proportion of this fleet; underlines that these vessels are particularly vulnerable to serious meteorological events associated with climate change; emphasises the need for sustained and coordinated action at all levels and policies aimed towards mitigation and increasing adaptation capacity to the consequences of climate change, bolstering resilience, and, at the same time, guaranteeing fishers’ safety conditions;

14.  Recalls that coastal regions and in particular outermost regions are historically dependent on fisheries, that they are already impacted by the consequences of climate change and should benefit from financial support in order to mitigate, adapt to and fight those consequences, consolidate jobs in the fisheries sector and develop a sustainable blue economy with the creation of new ones;

15.  Stresses that, despite international and EU efforts to improve safety conditions on board vessels, particularly fishing vessels, the international conventions setting out the rules and systems for the protection of ships and persons on board apply above all to larger vessels, although many Member States have national rules on measures concerning protection and living conditions for smaller vessels;

16.  Is concerned about the derogations granted by international conventions to small-scale vessels in terms of non-binding labour and safety standards which may result in overall living and working conditions being less favourable to fishers working in certain fleet segments and between Member States; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to take swift and concerted action in order to apply similar standard conditions and support all fishing vessels to follow them, as fundamental pillars of the economy and the identity of small coastal communities;

17.  Reiterates that working and living conditions on board cannot be seen separately from safety conditions; takes the view that good working and living conditions on vessels and the suitable modernisation thereof improve the safety conditions in which fishing operations are carried out, as does time to rest for fishers, with direct implications for their safety, as a large percentage of accidents and incidents on fishing vessels continue to be linked to human error, whether caused by lack of knowledge or training or by fatigue;

18.  Considers that guaranteeing an accessible and adapted working environment, including within the fisheries and aquaculture sector, with a view to reintegrating into the labour market both active and former fishers and other workers in the fishing industry who suffer disabilities, would lead to more social inclusion and help to create more incentives for income generation in the sector and fishing communities;

19.  Points out that maritime workers, including fishers, are often excluded from the scope of EU and Member States’ national legal frameworks on labour, taking into account that many rules do not apply to the reality of these workers’ activities; points out that – as it is not possible to apply general labour schemes since fishers’ income depends on what they catch under the available quotas allocated to them – it is necessary to ensure that a number of basic premises related to employment regulations are provided, in a tailored manner and with due account for the above-mentioned circumstances and the specific characteristics of the inshore and small-scale sector, for seafarers and, in particular, fishers, who are often also owners of their vessels;

20.  Recalls the right for fishers to unionise and use collective bargaining as a way to improve their working conditions;

21.  Points out that, depending on the fishing gear used, the size of the vessel, the area of operation and the weather conditions, fishing presents different risk factors with regard to the working and living conditions that need to be provided on board;

22.  Recalls the steps taken internationally, particularly under the Torremolinos Protocol (1993) and the Cape Town Agreement (2012), to amend and improve the Torremolinos Convention (1977), which was established as a means to address fishing vessel safety, and points out that, even with the 2012 reduction in requirements, this Convention is still not in force and urges all Member States that have yet to ratify the Torremolinos Convention to do so; recalls that the Protocol has been transposed into EU legislation through Council Directive 97/70/EC setting up a harmonised safety regime for fishing vessels of 24 metres in length and over(12);

23.  Welcomes the establishment of the IMO 2005 Voluntary Guidelines for the Design, Construction and Equipment of Small Fishing Vessels, points out, however, that as voluntary guidelines, they can serve only as guidance, and no legal obligation or standardisation of basic norms is applicable to small-scale coastal fishing vessels; stresses that some Member States have adopted provisions on the construction and safety of, and living conditions aboard, small fishing vessels and recommends that these rules be harmonised at EU level;

24.  Recalls that the ultimate goal of the CFP is to make fishing activity socially, environmentally and economically sustainable; stresses that improving fishers’ living standards, with better working and safety conditions, is one of the elements to promote employment and development of coastal communities, attract young people and achieve the generational renewal that is essential for the survival of this activity, which also provides healthy food;

25.  Highlights that successfully addressing current developments such as the expansion of off-shore energy production, the effective implementation of marine protected areas and the full enforcement of the landing obligation can influence the attraction of young generations to the sector; urges the Member States to allocate EU funding to support jobs, promote sustainable fishing and advance gender equality in the industry;

26.  Urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that the best safety, work and living standards are in place on fishing vessels, regardless of their size;

27.  Reminds Member States that the deadline set for transposition Directive (EU) 2017/159, which incorporates ILO Convention 188 (ILO C 188) into the Union’s legal framework, was 15 November 2019; recalls that given the large number of self-employed fishers in the EU, and the fact that the directive does not cover the majority of them, it is necessary for the Member States to ratify ILO C 188 to ensure fair competition among all fishers;

28.  Calls on Member States to urgently ratify ILO C188 to ensure a level playing field among fishing companies across the world, especially considering the strong international dimension of the fishing sector; urges Member States to provide the necessary resources for it to be transposed into national legislation and applied effectively and, where appropriate, to delegate inspection and document issuance functions to classification companies, given the current problems in coordinating these functions in some countries;

29.  Urges the Commission to present, as quickly as possible, a proposal for an accompanying directive on control and enforcement provisions, as was done for the maritime transport sector, in order to establish a harmonised inspections system;

30.  Stresses the need to take into account the arduousness of the work of fishers when designing welfare mechanisms, for example by guaranteeing the right to retire earlier than the average worker without being penalised for it;

31.  Welcomes the fact that the new European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) will make a significant contribution to improving the working, living and safety conditions on EU vessels, and to improving those conditions without increasing their fishing capacity, with particular attention paid to in-shore and small-scale coastal fishing vessels; stresses that EMFAF contributes to the sustainability of fisheries and the blue economy, contributing to the implementation of UN Sustainable Development Goal 14;

32.  Calls for the inclusion in the Common Fisheries Policy of overarching social objectives in parallel with environmental objectives, acknowledging that the wellbeing of workers on board fishing vessels is essential for the future of the industry;

33.  Underlines the clear contradiction between the CFP and the requirements set out in social legislation such as ILO C 188, transposed into EU law by Directive (EU) 2017/159; stresses that according to these legal texts, there is a requirement for more space on board, on a mandatory basis for vessels of 24 metres in length or over, while the fishing industry is prevented from increasing space on board; highlights the contradiction between the need for Member States to respect the standards set out in ILO C 188 and the rules of the CFP, which make the obligation impossible to fulfil; urges the Commission to identify alternative formulas for measuring fishing capacity, in the context of the EMFAF, and reaffirms that an increase in the gross tonnage of vessels should be permitted when the additional volumes are a response to the need to improve the safety and comfort of crews (also known as social or safety tonnage) and that these operations should be eligible for funding; emphasises that the space on board dedicated to the kitchen, cabins, toilets or recreational areas has nothing to do with the ability of the vessel to find, catch or store fish, and therefore, the fishing capacity;

34.  Recalls that the average age of ships in the European fleet is 23 years, and that for small-scale vessels the age can even go beyond 40 years; highlights that the future EMFAF should include a strategy for fleet modernisation without increasing fishing capacity;

35.  Insists, further, on the need for regular monitoring and systematic statistical information harmonised at EU level on incidents and accidents involving vessels not covered by Directive 2009/18/EC, as it is only by monitoring and assessing changes in these figures, by geographical areas, fleets and fishing gear used, that it will be possible to find solutions that make improvement possible and that reduce and prevent the occurrence of such accidents, particularly in local and coastal fishing vessels;

36.  Suggests that the Commission look, in this context, into expanding EMSA’s mission, giving it the additional capacity to carry out this monitoring and to regularly present information on it;

37.  Believes, further, that other conditions must be obtained to maintain fishing activity and secure the succession of new generations in the sector, including by investing in the modernisation of port infrastructure;

Better training and ensuring that training is recognised at EU level

38.  Stresses that the Bénodet report, which identified the problems concerning young people’s lack of interest in fishing, and shone a spotlight on the diversity and complexity of training and certification systems for fishers among Member States, seems to have been forgotten and that, two decades later, no significant developments have been made; stresses the need for harmonisation and type approval of nautical and fisheries training requirements and procedures at EU level, as well as embarkation procedures and requirements;

39.  Points out that the movement of labour between Member States, and even from third countries to the EU, is increasing and that any generational renewal of labour in fisheries that this movement could lead to continues to be hampered by the absence of standardisation in training and certification systems for fishers; stresses the need for type approval of these systems at EU level and to align them with the requirements of the STCW and STCW-F Conventions;

40.  Stresses that this situation clearly undermines the free movement of persons, which is a founding principle of the EU, as reflected in many treaty provisions;

41.  Points out that even if a fisher from a non-EU country has labour certifications recognised in the fishing area, it is difficult for a Member State to make it possible for that person to access the same work in another Member State;

42.  Stresses that in other areas of maritime activity, both recreational and professional, major developments have been made towards international recognition of training, irrespective of the country in which it is obtained, and all that is needed is for cooperation to be stepped up with a view to the recognition of basic training provided by schools or educational institutions which are part of the internationally recognised national education systems of each Member State or third country;

43.  Notes that, under the 1995 STCW-F Convention, the IMO establishes a number of fundamental standards regarding training and safety conditions, including minimum safety training requirements for all types and sizes of fishing vessel; points out that, while this convention has been in force since September 2012, it applies only in those countries that have ratified it; urges all Member States that have yet to ratify this convention to do so;

44.  Recalls that mutual recognition of qualifications and maritime safety certificates within the EU will increase staff mobility and make the maritime professions more attractive to young generations; is of the opinion that recognition of certificates should not require excessive financial and bureaucratic burdens;

45.  Notes that although the European Union implemented the 1993 Torremolinos Protocol into its acquis through Directive 97/70/EC and the 2007 Work in Fishing Convention through Directive (EU) 2017/159, it has not so far acted as swiftly or energetically with regard to safety training; recalls that Decision (EU) 2015/799(13) authorising Member States to become party to or to accede to STCW-F has proven ineffective, given that ratification and accession rates among Member States remain low; recalls that Directive (EU) 2017/159 obliges Member States to adopt legislation on training and certification of fishers; stresses therefore that Union legislation on safety training for fishers should go further than what is laid down in the STCW-F by also introducing standards for all fishing vessels of less than 24 metres, which form the majority of the Union’s fishing fleet; calls on the Commission to present a proposal for a directive transposing the STCW-F into the Union’s acquis in order to complete the implementation in EU law of the internationally agreed minimum standards for ensuring safety at sea in fishing;

46.  Points out that, while the acquisition of practical knowledge and hands-on work experience provides a solid basis that remains valid for the training of fishers in a number of Member States, formal certification that also values practical experience is the only way to ensure proper recognition of the necessary knowledge; notes that formal certification not only enhances the personal status of fishers but also provides a form of social recognition for this profession;

47.  Underlines the importance of providing workers in the fisheries sector, in particular young people and people interested in such work, fair and inclusive access to counselling, to quality internships and to vocational education and training, thereby enabling them to adapt to new market trends such as organic food, short supply chains, specialised tourism, and the sale and promotion of local products by using new technologies; affirms that appropriate and specific education and training are essential to encourage young people to perpetuate coastal fishing activities and traditions;

48.  Encourages the creation of an association of young European fishers to promote the generational renewal of the fisheries sector and to represent and bring together young fishers and their organisations throughout the Union; calls on the Commission to support the mobilisation of budgetary resources for the implementation of projects to achieve that end;

49.  Notes that, while European funding has been invested in teaching establishments and schools providing advanced vocational training and certification in the blue economy, its oldest sector of activity, fisheries, still has difficulty in gaining acceptance in such establishments, except under regional or national education or training programmes, without a European recognition of the education obtained; stresses the need to move towards standardisation and type approval for fisheries training in the EU and cooperation between Member States; to that end, advocates that full use be made of EMFAF and European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) resources;

50.  Welcomes the fact that the European Social Fund (ESF) has been widely used to revitalise coastal and rural areas; recalls that fishers should be supported in continuing their career ashore if, due to health reasons, changes in the labour market or other factors, they cannot continue working at sea; believes that EU funds, especially the ESF, should support their smooth professional transition, including through lifelong learning;

51.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to establish common bases for a standard training and certification system for the various categories of fishers, allowing rapid recognition at European level of the certification obtained in a given Member State; considers that this should include a procedure for the recognition of certificates obtained outside the Union that is compatible with the European training recognition system, facilitating the movement of fishers within the EU;

52.  Notes that Directive 2005/36/EC(14) on the recognition of professional qualifications does not establish a standardised level of training and certification for all fishers and hinders the movement of fishers between Member States; recalls that while the Union has introduced specific, different rules for recognition of seafarers’ certificates of competency based on STCW Convention, so far the Commission has not proposed specific rules as provided for in the STCW-F Convention for recognition of fishers’ certificates of competency; calls, therefore on the Commission to propose specific measures for recognition of fishers’ certificates of competency in line with the provisions of the STCW-F Convention, not only for European fishers but also for citizens of non-EU countries having ratified or acceded to the STCW-F;

53.  Points out that, while the aim of the EMFAF is to contribute to the full implementation of the CFP, in order to achieve this objective, fishers must be properly trained and certified, requiring a portion of the funding to be earmarked for the training and certification of existing and incoming fishers; emphasises that the administrative burden required by the EMFF led to constraints in the use of funds for training, in particular for small-scale fishers, and that the new EMFAF will have to overcome these difficulties in order to make an effective contribution to crew training;

54.  Highlights the need to ensure that EMFAF and ESF+ execution data specify the exact budget used by each Member State to address regional needs in terms of education, training, employment and inclusion;

55.  Points out that while ever more requirements must be fulfilled to work on board a ship, training is in short supply, which sometimes causes vessels to be grounded since crew must attend compulsory training onshore; calls on the EU to help streamline training courses and make it easier to carry out training days on-board by promoting distance learning courses using new technologies;

56.  Stresses that knowledge and innovation are essential to ensuring that the fisheries sector grows in a smart, resilient and sustainable manner;

57.  Points out that given the new jobs that may be created by the blue economy, circular economy and fishing and gastronomic tourism, it would be wise to develop predictive vocational training concerning these new professions and these sectors’ training needs, as has been proposed in the naval sector;

Ensuring gender equality in access and employment in this sector

58.  Points out that, although the statistical data available indicates that women account for only 12 % of those employed in productive fisheries activity, many vessels, in particular small-scale coastal fishing vessels, are in many cases operated as small family enterprises in which all necessary logistical and administrative support is provided on an informal basis by women not officially engaged in any other form of employment;

59.  Stresses the need to guarantee that fishers have access to training and certification, particularly for seasonal and part-time employment;

60.  Points out that there are Member States in which such informal ancillary activity does not generate any pay, welfare, pension or workplace illness entitlements for the women involved and that, should the operation of the vessels be suspended, temporarily halted or terminated, only the officially recognised workforce is entitled to welfare benefits, thus increasing existing worker inequalities; stresses the need for Member States to fully professionalise these women’s work by recognising their role and integrating them into national social protection systems;

61.  Underlines that actions to attract young people to fishing activity must ensure gender balance and consider the role of women in the entire fishing industry, from the catching of fish to the management of vessels to aquaculture, marketing and the processing of fisheries products, as well as their role in science and administration;

62.  Calls on the Commission to launch initiatives to acknowledge the work of women in fisheries and to secure equal pay between genders; recalls that the gender equality strategy for 2020-2025 requires that the relevant EU funds support actions to promote women’s participation in the labour market and work-life balance, promote investments in care facilities, support female entrepreneurship, and fight gender segregation;

63.  Believes that there is no reason to exclude women or hamper their access to this profession, as demonstrated by the increasing number of female crew members and skippers on working fishing vessels; observes that there are fortunately a number of particularly active associations representing women employed in the fisheries sector, especially in the EU fisheries advisory councils and in sectoral associations;

64.  Welcomes the establishment in some EU countries of women’s associations in the fisheries sector; calls on the EU and the Member States to support the promotion and establishment of new associations to provide women with greater visibility and assistance;

65.  Believes that, while the role of women in the fisheries sector is frequently informal, they must be given economic and social recognition and be properly paid; points out that better information regarding their activities and measures to improve their status and heighten their profile will help to not only enhance their personal and social advancement, but also demystify their role in the fisheries sector;

66.  Considers that the current capacity measurements rules jeopardise women’s access to the sector since separate cabins, toilets and showers are needed to guarantee their privacy and well-being;

67.  Urges the Commission and the Member States to implement measures to improve the qualifications of women involved in the blue economy, particularly the fisheries, shellfish, aquaculture and canning industries and to promote official recognition of their contribution to the sea-industry supply chain; considers it necessary, furthermore, to ensure that EMFAF funding within the 2021-2027 framework and beyond makes a significant contribution to equal treatment for women in the maritime fisheries sector, being earmarked in particular for measures to improve their living, working and safety conditions on board fishing vessels and ensuring that the necessary changes are made to this end;

Promoting professional fishing activity and generational renewal in the sector

68.  Recalls that the EU, the largest single market in fisheries products, accounts for only 6 % of total world catches, being highly dependent on fishery and aquaculture imports from non-EU countries; points out that European-owned companies and vessels generate a proportion of these imports;

69.  Points out that CFP standards are among the most stringent and make an important contribution to environmental, economic and social sustainability and that, although there is still much room for improvement, progress made in recent decades shows what can be done in this direction, contributing, on the one hand, to the sustainability of fish stocks and habitats and, on the other, to increasing the earnings of fishers and ship owners;

70.  Highlights that promoting high standards in terms of the environmental and social sustainability of the fisheries sector is, among other factors, key to attracting a new generation of fishers and providing long-term economic stability for the sector;

71.  Calls for the EU to examine the value of measures such as laying artificial reefs, in its exclusive economic zones, for the protection of marine life;

72.  Stresses that the continuous fall in EU support for the sector under successive multiannual financial frameworks, and in particular the cut in funding supporting the fisheries sector and the Common Market Organisation, is one of the factors which has been serving to worsen the situation in the sector; reiterates, therefore, that the EU’s financial support for the fisheries sector needs to be stepped up considerably;

73.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to take the action needed to maintain and boost systems and means of support, including funding, in order to promote concentration of supply, including by providing real support for the establishment and operation of producer organisations (POs), particularly for small-scale coastal and artisanal fishing;

74.  Stresses that operational programmes must encourage POs – by providing the requisite financial support – to market their products directly, working within the value chain, as a means to enhance the value of their production and boost the added value of fishery products;

75.  Calls on the Commission, working in close cooperation with the Member States, to establish and implement support mechanisms for small-scale, artisanal and coastal fisheries that make it possible to tackle the specific problems in this part of the sector;

76.  Stresses the importance of setting up home markets for traditional products of particular quality, to be backed up by fairs, small businesses, and the catering industry, as this would enhance the added value of local products and promote local development;

77.  Calls on the Commission to consider better ways to promote the marketing of processed fishery products with higher added value, including canned products, following the example of certain agricultural products, and programmes for the external promotion of EU fishery products, including their presentation at international exhibitions and fairs;

78.  Points out that the fisheries sector is central to the socio-economic situation, employment, and the promotion of economic and social cohesion in the outermost regions, whose economies are affected by permanent structural constraints and which have few possibilities for economic diversification; considers it essential, therefore, to maintain and step up EU support for the fisheries sector in those regions, with a view, in particular, to offsetting the additional costs of remoteness when it comes to selling certain fishery products from some outermost regions; points to the specific features of fisheries sector value chains in the outermost regions and maintains that special support is needed in order to strengthen them and facilitate access to markets, an aim that could be achieved by not only re-establishing a programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI) for fisheries but also by establishing a POSEI scheme for transport geared towards setting up and operating particular trade routes;

79.  Stresses the need to ensure the continuity of fishing activity, generational renewal and greater social recognition for this sector and its importance for the sustainable supply of healthy food for Europeans that come from environmentally sound habitats;

80.  Stresses the significant contribution of fishers to the advancement of scientific knowledge, through both their direct involvement in the collection of fishing data and their collaboration with science in the provision of additional information regarding the state of the marine environment, species and habitats and the conservation thereof for scientific purposes;

81.  Notes that training for fishers can play an important role in continuing the involvement in and contribution of fishing activities to the protection of nature supporting the implementation and use of more sustainable fishing techniques, in accordance with the CFP objectives of sustainable exploitation of resources;

82.  Points out that developing marine research and innovation potential in the outermost regions is essential to driving the growth of the blue economy in those regions; adds, furthermore, that boosting their participation in international research networks that involve their universities, with knowledge of their unique characteristics, may help the outermost regions to improve their innovation systems and create jobs; urges the Commission to make an effort to equip these regions with the means to study and harness their biodiversity efficiently;

83.  Underlines the common fisheries policy goal of promoting selective fishing and the EU target of achieving climate neutrality by 2050; highlights progress towards a low-emission cutter fleet and innovative fishing techniques that contribute to the achievement of both the 2050 target and the selectivity objective; calls on the Commission to encourage and prioritise these developments in order to hold out prospects for the sector through innovation;

84.  Points to the joint development of shipbuilding and the scientific ‘triple zero’ approach: zero emissions, zero waste, zero accidents on board, encouraging a move towards the design of vessels in European fleets, including artisanal fishing fleets, along more circular, efficient and sustainable rather than mainly economic lines;

85.  Observes that, given the right training and specific skills, fishers could contribute even more to the advancement of scientific knowledge through the in situ collection and registration of environmental data, providing verification of that obtained by remote observation using satellites and other instruments; stresses the important role played by universities and marine research centres, in cooperation with sea schools, with regard to training fishers to meet this need; emphasises that in 2019, the EU fleet, consisting of more than 81 000 fishing vessels of all sizes, provided an incomparable number of platforms constantly collecting fishing and other marine data on an almost daily basis; notes that this is a facility that can and should be used, with suitable incentives to that end, for the collection of even more data regarding the seas of Europe and the world; urges official scientific fisheries advisory bodies such as International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) or STECF to make greater use of the data gathered by the EU fleet;

86.  Points out that the involvement of young people and generational renewal will not only ensure the continuity of the oldest activity of the blue economy, but also secure populations in coastal areas and surrounding rural areas, preserving the cultural heritage of many coastal communities; considers it to be of vital importance that younger generations are better informed and more aware of sustainability issues, with new knowledge, and of the need for all to contribute to tackling and combating climate change, which is having the hardest impact on sea and coastal areas around the planet;

87.  Believes that the fisheries sector would be more attractive to more young people if it was affiliated and complemented with emerging sectors, for example tourism; urges, in this context, the Member States and their regions to cut the red tape in fishing tourism as a source of income; calls, further, on the Commission to promote back-up lines, within the framework of existing EU programmes, for the restoration of the tangible and intangible heritage associated with maritime activities, preserving the identity of coastal communities and optimising their use for tourism;

88.  Notes that the protection of the environment is a growing concern for young people in Europe; stresses the importance of the sustainable management of fisheries to attract young fishers; calls for the promotion of low-impact fishing not only as a way to reduce the impact of fisheries on the marine environment but also to attract new generations of fishers;

89.  Points out that there is substantial untapped potential in fishing tourism;

90.  Stresses the importance of the inclusion of fishers in collaborative and community-based maritime spatial planning, for the sustainable development and protection of the marine environment;

91.  Stresses the importance of ocean literacy, which must promote digital literacy and the digitisation of fishing activity; highlights that despite improved skills among older users, software applications are easier and more intuitive for younger generations when it comes to collecting and registering data under the new Fisheries Control Regulation, which is currently under review, or utilising new applications and equipment to improve the safety, working conditions and wellbeing of fishers at sea;

92.  Welcomes the strategic changes in the EU, especially the green and digital transitions, that must contribute to protecting existing jobs and creating new and quality jobs in territories that strongly depend on fisheries and to further boost their economic development; underlines the importance of safeguarding traditional occupations in the fisheries sector, with a balanced transition to prevent losing the added value of the experience acquired by older fishers; urges the Commission and the Member States to establish life-long learning systems to keep skills up-to-date and create opportunities for all age cohorts;

93.  Points out that improvements in the conservation status of fish stocks have boosted fishers’ productivity and average earnings, as well as achieving a reduction in carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions; notes that fishers have been increasingly involved in the collection of all marine litter, including but not only lost or abandoned fishing gear, and that their ecological contribution in this respect should be recognised, encouraged and duly rewarded; stresses in this regard the possibility to consider supporting the creation of new activities and supplementary income streams related with marine litter collection and the implementation of the European strategy for plastics in a circular economy;

94.  Stresses that the sustainable management of fish stocks and the setting of fishing quotas in line with the objective of restoring and maintaining fish stocks above biomass levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield is key to creating an economic environment in which young people are confident enough to make the required investments to become fishers;

95.  Stresses the need for the Member States to establish the economic incentives and port infrastructure needed to collect and recycle properly the waste and plastic picked up by young fishers that, in return, may deliver them financial gains on top of their main activity;

96.  Calls on the Members States, in line with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 on the CFP, to also use criteria related to age when allocating the fishing opportunities available to them;

97.  Welcomes the fact that the new 2021-2027 EMFAF will provide assistance and support for young fishers engaged in the first purchase of a vessel or fishing enterprise; stresses the need to attract young people not only to sea fishing activities, but also to fishing enterprise management and aquaculture, thereby ensuring generational renewal across the entire sector; calls on Member States to promote this renewal by removing obstacles and supporting people who want to start a career in the fisheries sector and to address issues such as the high cost of initially starting a business, the methods for allocating fishing opportunities, income instability, gender equality and uncertainty about career duration;

98.  Reiterates the need, as a means to protect earnings from fishing, to provide the sector and its workers with proper economic and social compensation to offset the resource conservation measures being imposed or temporary cessation assistance for the purposes of resource management; proposes, to this end, that the EMFAF support the establishment of a wage compensation fund that makes up for all lost earnings and covers non-fishing periods and that such periods be treated as actual working time for the purposes of the retirement pension and other social security entitlements; supports, furthermore, the establishment of a guaranteed minimum wage;

99.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to support efforts to promote social dialogue between the parties, concerning the following in particular: (a) training for young entrepreneurs in the fisheries sector; (b) professional updating and skills development for sustainable fisheries; (c) raising awareness of good fishing practices; (d) safety and protection of human life at sea; (e) on-board health and safety of workers;

100.  Points out that investment in generational renewal should continue to be a priority for the EU, that one of the main successes of our common project is self-sufficiency in food and that the gradual ageing of those working in the fisheries sector constitutes a real risk;

101.  Considers that attention and support should be particularly focused on small-scale fisheries, which are potentially less predatory and more sustainable, not only in terms of biological resource management but also from a socio-economic point of view;

102.  Points out that generational renewal, with an intake of fishers who are well trained and informed about the latest technologies, procedures and ways of ensuring the sustainability of resources, is also a way for the EU to contribute to the global movement to combat, reduce and eliminate IUU fishing;

103.  Considers that generational renewal and diversification of activities remain a challenge, and that the EMFAF should take steps to promote vocational training and career development, and to increase incomes and job security;

104.  Points out that the need to improve the image of the sector, including the role of women, and on-board working, living and safety conditions, for the attraction of new generations, as well as the need to improve procedures for the recognition of fishery certificates in view of the obstacles to the movement of fishers between Member States and the need for workers in this sector, are factors promoting the hiring of fishers from outside the EU who are, in certain cases, employed illegally;

105.  Considers, in line with the European Economic and Social Committee opinion on the social dimension of fisheries, that it is essential to develop general principles and operational guidelines for fair labour market services in the fishing sector since non-EU fishers are important in order to maintain activity in the sector in several regions; stresses in this regard that the Commission and the Member States should promote the guidelines on the decent employment of migrant fishers developed in 2020 by the European social partners in the fisheries sector;

106.  Calls on the Commission and the Council of the EU to use trade policy to ensure that similar environmental and social sustainability standards are applied to both European and foreign operators, opening up the internal market only to compliant products; notes that the EU would otherwise be sending the wrong message to the international community, rewarding those who have done the least for the sustainability of fish stocks and the fair treatment of fishers;

107.  Expresses concern at the situation of fishers who are deprived in practice of their right to vote, including in elections to the European Parliament, because they are at sea; urges Member States to ensure that crew members who are EU citizens and are at sea are effectively able to exercise their right to vote in the various electoral processes;

108.  Notes that small-scale coastal fisheries are likely to enable a better work-life balance for fishers, and therefore stresses the importance of promoting a regulatory framework that protects small-scale fisheries;

109.  Calls for the deployment of new social cohesion programmes; welcomes basic income pilot projects in the EU’s coastal areas with the lowest GDP per capita, including in the outermost regions;

110.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to raise public awareness in Europe, particularly among younger generations, including schools and job search agencies, of the importance of fishing activities as a career opportunity; stressing also the contribution made by fishers to food supply in Europe, the protection and conservation of oceans and marine life, and the shaping of the culture and way of life of coastal communities, thereby debunking the preconception that fishers are predators interested only in exploiting resources with no thought for the future;

111.  Recalls that European fleets meet among the highest standards in the world in terms of safety, working conditions, skilled jobs, the protection of the environment and biodiversity, and minimising their environmental footprint that they have demonstrated their commitment to this priority, supporting and helping the development of new control technologies by continuously adapting to new and demanding regulations, and that, while improvements to European policies are still ongoing, the CFP has for decades taken account of the necessity for scientifically guided species management;

112.  Encourages the Commission to design, in cooperation with the Member States and their coastal regions, a proper strategy to promote European fish, accompanied by proper financial support, including for species for which there is less demand and which have less commercial value, with a view to increasing their value and, at the same time, preventing the concentration of effort on species that have a higher value and are, therefore, more likely to be overfished;

113.  Stresses the importance of increased investment in the research, modernisation and innovation that would benefit young fishers and coastal communities;

114.  Highlights the need to promote and support the decarbonisation of the fisheries fleet, which currently depends 100 % on fossil fuels, in order to enable the fisheries sector to make an effective contribution to the European Green Deal and support access for younger generations to the fisheries sector with innovative initiatives;

115.  Recognises fishers as food suppliers and essential workers, who even during catastrophic events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, continued to secure daily landings in challenging environments; highlights the considerable economic and social impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the need for the Member States to allocate sufficient EU funding to supporting the preservation and creation of jobs in the fisheries sector and the blue economy;

116.  Draws attention to the impact of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on the fisheries sector, in particular in the coastal regions of the affected fishing fleets; considers that this impact will affect not only fishing vessels and their fishers, but entire communities and employment in those areas;

117.  Underlines its view that generational renewal must take into account the objectives of the European Green Deal and the need to ensure digital transition also in the blue economy; notes that this means not only attracting young people to fishing but also ensuring that they are informed and properly trained, offering them attractive career prospects and the opportunity to improve their personal situation – particularly by improving their income and ensuring its sustainability – and contribute to the cohesion of their local communities, especially in the most isolated coastal regions and those with fewer job opportunities, enabling them to work for economic, social and environmental change in these areas, while enhancing the role of women in this sector through enhanced mobility and employment opportunities throughout the EU, without difficulties or restrictions regarding recognition of their skills and training; considers that generational renewal must not lead to a clash between generations, and should include fishers of all ages ensuring balance in the ecological and digital transition in order to ensure that the legacy of experience is not lost;

118.  Points out that the next generation of European fishers will not only make the EU’s sector more competitive in the future but also play a part in securing food supplies in Europe over the coming years;

119.  Urges the Commission to address the aspects and demands set out in this resolution in its next report on the implementation of the CFP;

120.  Concludes that this resolution provides us with a unique opportunity to highlight the value of the future face of the European fisheries sector, which is strategically important, and to show Europe which path to follow: more young fishers, better fishing and better practices;

o
o   o

121.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 25, 31.1.2017, p. 12. (2) OJ L 354, 28.12.2013, p. 22. (3) OJ C 14, 15.1.2020, p. 67. (4) OJ C 285, 29.8.2017, p. 150. (5) https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Fishery_statistics#The_factors_of_production (6) https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/10166544/KS-02-19%E2%80%91681-EN-N.pdf/c701972f-6b4e-b432-57d2-91898ca94893 (7) Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1936/2001 and (EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1093/94 and (EC) No 1447/1999 (OJ L 286, 29.10.2008, p. 1). (8) On the basis of the ratio of vessels more than 25 years old versus the total number of vessels: https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do (9) https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/facts_figures_en?qt-facts_and_figures=2 (10) https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/RCI/#?vis=outermost.population&lang=en (11) OJ L 131, 28.5.2009, p. 114. (12) OJ L 34, 9.2.1998, p. 1. (13) Council Decision (EU) 2015/799 of 18 May 2015 authorising Member States to become party, in the interest of the European Union, to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel, of the International Maritime Organization (OJ L 127, 22.5.2015, p. 20). (14) Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications (OJ L 255, 30.9.2005, p. 22).

European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 on plans and actions to accelerate the transition to innovation without the use of animals in research, regulatory testing and education (2021/2784(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0387 RC-B9-0425/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard Articles 13 and 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Directive 2010/63/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2010 on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes(1),

–  having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency (the ‘REACH Regulation’)(2),

–  having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC(3),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal products(4),

–  having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on cosmetic products(5),

–  having regard to its resolution of 3 May 2018 on a global ban to end animal testing for cosmetics(6),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 15 March 2021 entitled ‘Sustainable Chemicals Strategy of the Union: Time to Deliver’ (6941/21),

–  having regard to the Commission report of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘2019 report on the statistics on the use of animals for scientific purposes in the Member States of the European Union in 2015-2017’ (COM(2020)0016),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 September 2020 on a new European Research Area (ERA) for Research and Innovation (COM(2020)0628),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 25 November 2020 on a Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe (COM(2020)0761),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 27 May 2020 entitled ‘Europe’s moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation’ (COM(2020)0456),

–  having regard to its resolution of 10 July 2020 on the Chemicals Strategy for Sustainability(7),

–  having regard to Special Eurobarometer 340 on Science and Technology,

–  having regard to the second interim report on the online consultation on the Future of Europe and to the key conclusions from the citizens’ dialogues and citizens’ consultations,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 3 June 2015 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Stop Vivisection’ (C(2015)3773),

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas Directive 2010/63/EU on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes sets out the final goal of the ‘full replacement of procedures on live animals … as soon as it is scientifically possible to do so’ and whereas it underlines that the use of animals for such purposes should only be considered where a non-animal method is unavailable; whereas, however, there has been little change in the overall number of animals used for scientific purposes since the entry into force of this directive, according to the latest data of 2018;

B.  whereas the directive requires transparency in the use of animals in science and applies to the use of animals in all disciplines, from basic research to applied research, the development of medicines and the safety testing of chemicals; whereas there is still a lack of transparency; whereas all Member States have enacted it in national legislation and whereas all sector-specific pieces of legislation, such as those pertaining to pharmaceuticals, food or chemicals, must be in line with the objectives of the directive, meaning that the use of live animals should only occur if there are no suitable alternatives available; whereas this alignment is necessary to protect human and animal health and the environment today;

C.  whereas previous animal testing has contributed to advances in developing treatments for human health conditions, as well as medical devices, anaesthetics and safe vaccines, including COVID-19 vaccines, and has also played a role in animal health;

D.  whereas in 2017 the use of animals for scientific purposes was reported 9,58 million times; whereas the main purpose was research (69 %), followed by regulatory use to satisfy legislative requirements (23 %) and routine production (5 %); whereas among the testing carried out for regulatory purposes, the majority involved medical products for humans (61 %), followed by veterinary medicinal products (15 %) and industrial chemicals (11 %)(8); whereas non-human primates have been used for such testing in some parts of the EU and many other types of animals have been used for scientific purposes every year; whereas in a single year up to 12 million(9) animals are bred and killed for the purpose of animal testing without being used in actual experiments;

E.  whereas the toolbox of non-animal testing models is growing and shows the potential to enhance our understanding of diseases and accelerate the discovery of effective treatments; whereas this toolbox includes, for example, new organ-on-chip technology, sophisticated computer simulations, 3-D cultures of human cells for drug testing and other modern models and technologies;

F.  whereas the Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) has produced a series of reports listing and describing advanced non-animal models in seven disease areas, with a view to accelerating the development of these technologies; whereas, however, EU research, innovation and education initiatives should be fully aligned with the priorities identified in these reviews;

G.  whereas, while formal encouragement for non-animal methods is unique to the EU, there are bureaucratic hurdles to their acceptance, their use is not properly enforced and funding for their development remains inadequate;

H.  whereas European citizens have consistently demonstrated support for an end to the use of animals for scientific purposes;

I.  whereas within the Commission, the Directorates-General for Environment, for Health and Food Safety, for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, for Research and Innovation and the JRC all have responsibilities for different areas of animal research and testing, and whereas there is no formal coordination mechanism to ensure an active, coherent and synergy-based approach to achieving the full replacement of animals;

J.  whereas the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) have put in place strategies to actively reduce and replace animal testing, but the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) still has to put in place a reduction and replacement strategy and has asserted that immediate targeted investment is required in order to develop effective non-animal predictive toxicology methods and directly support regulatory objectives;

K.  whereas the positive impact on animal welfare in the EU of the landmark ban on animal testing for cosmetics has successfully shown that phasing out the use of animal testing is feasible without jeopardising the development of the cosmetics sector; whereas, however, there are still regulatory requirements for continued animal testing for effects on workers handling chemical ingredients exclusively used in cosmetics, and their impact on the environment; whereas, nevertheless, the setting of clear deadlines for the phasing out of such testing in the EU has driven innovation in EU companies and has enjoyed public support;

L.  whereas the replacement of animal testing by advanced non-animal methods will be necessary to achieve the Commission’s ambitious health and environmental goals set out in the NextGenerationEU recovery plan and the European Green Deal, and whereas where validated non-animal alternatives are already available, these must be given priority;

M.  whereas certain Member States have adopted national implementing measures that ensure a high level of protection of animals used for scientific purposes, while others only apply the minimum requirements laid down in Directive 2010/63/EU;

1.  Calls on the Commission to improve coordination to achieve the goal set out in Directive 2010/63/EU by establishing a high-level inter-service taskforce, involving all key Directorates-General and agencies, to work with the Member States and relevant stakeholders to draw up an EU-wide action plan, with the aim of driving the active phase-out by reducing, refining and replacing procedures on live animals for scientific and regulatory purposes, as soon as scientifically possible and without lowering the level of protection for human health and the environment, while accelerating the development of the alternative animal-free methods, technologies and instruments necessary for change; stresses that a clear and ambitious timeline and list of milestones should be set out to incentivise progress;

2.  Highlights that past use of animals-based research has contributed significantly to advances in the treatment of many human health conditions and played a role in animal health, and stresses that although phasing out the use of animals for scientific purposes is the ultimate goal, non-animal methods are not yet available across all scientific research areas; underlines also that there are cases where animal experiments are still needed to gain scientific insights in the long search for an effective remedy for certain diseases due to the current unavailability of non-animal methods; highlights that the Joint Research Centre recognises that heavy reliance on animal testing can hinder progress in certain fields of disease research(10), in which animal models fail to capture key features of human disease, and considers that moving towards alternative models could enable new breakthroughs acknowledges, furthermore, that experiments that are carried out on animals because of the unavailability of non-animal methods must only take place in optimal conditions that minimise pain, distress and suffering and protect the welfare of the animals concerned;

3.  Underlines that the action plan should include ambitious and achievable objectives, reduction targets and timelines to be set under the overarching reduction and replacement goal in order to incentivise change, with concrete and coordinated actions accompanied by indicators, as are applied to other EU policy areas, and should use the ALURES statistical EU database as a point of reference, leading to absolute and sustained reductions in the number of animals used across the EU for scientific purposes;

4.  Stresses that the plan should include, inter alia, proposals for better implementation and enforcement of existing initiatives, including a well functioning system of controls;

5.  Highlights the need to deepen the European Research Area and for the plan to build on research undertaken in the EU to date and to include mechanisms for the preferential funding of non-animal methods across all EU research and innovation initiatives, as such alternative methods bring additional costs and investment needs; points, therefore, to the need for increased and targeted funding under Horizon Europe for advanced non-animal models; calls on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to make sufficient medium- to long-term funding available to ensure the fast development, validation and introduction of alternative testing methods to replace animal testing methods, particularly for key toxicological endpoints; calls on the Commission to fully implement its commitment to the grouping of substances and the use of generic risk assessments as important means to better protect human health and reduce animal testing;

6.  Calls on the Commission to set reduction goals in consultation with relevant agencies, in particular ECHA and EFSA, through a more proactive implementation of the current regulations on the safety of chemicals and other products, and to support the reduction goals by using a fully connected and interoperable EU chemical safety database; recalls that Article 13 of REACH requires that the test method requirements be updated as soon as non-animal methods become available;

7.  Highlights that the private sector can be actively involved in the plan, in particular companies willing to switch to non-animal models, as well as start-ups developing and perfecting them, through participating in collaborative approaches to phasing out animal testing; believes that government bodies must take on a coordinating role and enter into a positive and constructive dialogue with the sector, allowing for bottom-up solutions; calls for a better coordinated, cross-sectoral and EU-wide approach across all Member States and all EU agencies, including via the cross-sectoral European Partnership for Alternative Approaches to Animal Testing;

Education and training

8.  Urges the Commission to work together with Member States to prioritise actions to educate, train and retrain scientists, researchers and technicians in using advanced non-animal models and in sharing best practices, and to raise awareness of validated non-animal models both among safety assessment experts and among those involved in evaluating project proposals and attributing funding;

9.  Stresses the need for a sustained training and education effort to ensure the widest possible knowledge of alternatives and processes in laboratories and among competent authorities;

10.  Points out that academic institutions have an essential role to play in terms of promoting alternatives to animal testing in scientific disciplines and disseminating new knowledge and practices, which are available but not always widely used;

11.  Highlights the need to work within international structures to speed up validation and acceptance of alternative methods, ensure knowledge transfer and provide financial support to non-EU countries, where scientists may be unaware of alternative methods and where testing facilities may lack the necessary research infrastructure;

o
o   o

12.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ L 276, 20.10.2010, p. 33. (2) OJ L 396, 30.12.2006, p. 1. (3) OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 1. (4) OJ L 167, 27.6.2012, p. 1. (5) OJ L 342, 22.12.2009, p. 59. (6) OJ C 41, 6.2.2020, p. 45. (7) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0201. (8) Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: 2019 report on the statistics on the use of animals for scientific purposes in the Member States of the European Union in 2015-2017, p. 16 (COM(2020)0016) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0016&from=EN (9) Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of Directive 2010/63/EU on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes in the Member States of the European Union, p. 7 (SWD(2020)0015) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0015&from=EN (10) Dura, Adelaide; Gribaldo, Laura; Deceuninck, Pierre (2021): EURL ECVAM Review of non-animal models in biomedical research - Neurodegenerative Diseases. European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC) [Dataset] PID: http://data.europa.eu/89h/a8fd26ef-b113-47ab-92ba-fd2be449c7eb

European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime listed in Article 83(1) TFEU (2021/2035(INL))

P9_TA(2021)0388 A9-0249/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Articles 2 and Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union,

–  having regard to Articles 8,10 and 19, Article 83(1) and Article 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and in particular Articles 1 to 4, 6 to 8, 10 to 12, 21, 23 to 26, 47 and 49 thereof,

–  having regard to the country-monitoring reports by the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025’,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 June 2020 entitled ‘EU Strategy on victims’ rights (2020-2025)’,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 12 November 2020 entitled ‘Union of Equality: LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025’,

–  having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 25 November 2020 entitled ‘EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III – An Ambitious Agenda for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in EU External Action’,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 March 2021 entitled ‘EU strategy on the rights of the child’,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 14 April 2021 on the EU Strategy on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings 2021-2025,

–  having regard to Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA(1),

–  having regard to Directive 2011/99/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the European Protection Order(2),

–  having regard to Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA(3),

–  having regard to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal number 5 ‘Gender Equality’,

–  having regard to General recommendation No. 33 on women’s access to justice of 3 August 2015 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,

–  having regard to General recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19, of 14 July 2017 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,

–  having regard to the survey by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights entitled ‘Violence against women: an EU-wide survey’, published in 2014,

–  having regard to the report by European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights entitled ‘Crime, safety and victims’ rights’, published in 2021,

–  having regard to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

–  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,

–  having regard to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women on 15 September 1995 and to the subsequent outcome documents adopted at the United Nations Beijing +5 (2000), +10 (2005), Beijing +15 (2010) and Beijing +20 (2015) special sessions,

–  having regard to the glossary of the European Institute for Gender Equality,

–  having regard to the agreed conclusions of the sixty-fifth session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women that took place from 15 to 26 March 2021,

–  having regard to the provisions of the United Nations legal instruments in the area of human rights, in particular those concerning women’s rights, and to other United Nations instruments on violence against women, including the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women of 20 December 1993,

—  having regard to its resolution of 5 April 2011 on priorities and outline of a new EU policy framework to fight violence against women(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 25 February 2014 with recommendations to the Commission on combating Violence Against Women(5),

–  having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2017 on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, by the European Union, of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence(6),

–  having regard to its resolution of 13 February 2019 on experiencing a backlash in women’s rights and gender equality in the EU(7),

–  having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the EU’s accession to the Istanbul Convention and other measures to combat gender-based violence(8),

–  having regard to its resolution of 26 November 2020 on the de facto ban on the right to abortion in Poland(9),

–  having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the gender perspective in the COVID-19 crisis and post-crisis period(10),

–  having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the EU Strategy for Gender Equality(11),

–  having regard to its resolution of 10 February 2021 on the implementation of Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims(12),

–  having regard to its resolution of 11 February 2021 on challenges ahead for women’s rights in Europe: more than 25 years after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action(13),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions on Women, Peace and Security, published on 10 December 2018,

–  having regard to the United Nations brief ‘COVID-19 and Ending Violence Against Women and Girls’, published in 2020(14),

–  having regard to the legal opinion of the Advocate-General at the Court of Justice of the European Union on the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, aimed at clarifying the legal uncertainty if and how the Union can conclude and ratify the Convention, delivered on 11 March 2021(15),

–  having regard to Rules 47 and 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (A9-0249/2021),

A.  whereas equality between women and men is a core value of the Union enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and recognised in Article 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’); whereas the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination is a fundamental right enshrined in the Treaties and in the Charter; whereas ending male violence against women and girls is a prerequisite to achieving real equality between women and men;

B.  whereas Article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) requires the Union, in all its activities, to aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between women and men;

C.  whereas gender-based violence, both online and offline, and the lack of access to adequate protection is the most severe manifestation of gender-based discrimination and constitutes a violation of fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter, such as the right to human dignity, the right to life, the right to physical and mental integrity, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the prohibition of slavery and forced labour, the right to liberty and security and the right to respect for private and family life;

D.  whereas, pursuant to Article 83(1), third subparagraph, TFEU, on the basis of developments in crime, the Council may adopt a decision identifying other areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis;

E.  whereas, when adopting such a decision under Article 83(1), third subparagraph, TFEU, the Council is to act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament;

F.  whereas the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) and the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the ‘Istanbul Convention’) define gender-based violence against women as violence directed against a woman because she is a woman or violence that affects women disproportionately; whereas ‘violence against women’ means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life;

G.  whereas LGBTIQ+ persons are also victims of gender-based violence because of their gender, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics;

H.  whereas gender-based violence against LGBTIQ+ persons includes physical violence, psychological violence, forced marriages, sexual violence, including ‘corrective’ rape and sexual harassment, female and intersex genital mutilations, forced sterilisation of trans and intersex people, so-called ‘honour’ crimes, conversion therapy, hate speech, both online and offline, bullying and harassment, socio-economic deprivation and violence that occurs within the family and/or domestic unit;

I.  whereas, under the Istanbul Convention, gender is defined as ‘the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women and men’, which recalls that many forms of violence against women are rooted in power inequalities between women and men;

J.  whereas the expression ‘in all their diversity’ in this resolution recalls the position that women, men and non-binary people fall into heterogeneous categories, including, but not limited to, in relation to race, colour, ethnic or social origin, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics, state of health, marital status or migrant or refugee status; whereas that expression affirms the commitment to leave no one behind and to achieve a gender-equal Europe for everyone; whereas no real progress can be made on gender equality without an intersectional approach;

K.  whereas gender-based violence is rooted in gender stereotypes, heteropatriarchal structures, power asymmetries and structural and institutional inequalities; whereas gender-based violence affects all areas of society;

L.  whereas gender-based violence targets women and girls in all their diversity and LGBTIQ+ persons, driven by a desire to punish those seen as transgressing societal norms of gender hierarchies, gender expression and binary gender systems; whereas gender-based violence aims at establishing, enforcing or perpetuating gender inequalities and reinforcing gender norms and stereotypes;

M.  whereas the EIGE defines ‘femicide’ as the killing of women and girls because of their gender; whereas femicide can take different forms such as the murder of women as a result of intimate partner violence, the killing of women and girls because of their gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics, female and intersex genital mutilations and so called ‘honour killings’; whereas femicides are the extreme manifestation of existing forms of violence against women and represent the ultimate act of violence, which is experienced in a continuum of violence; whereas many types of femicide are not counted in official figures and remain invisible;

N.  whereas exposure to intimate partner violence, whether physical, sexual or psychological, has a severe impact on children and perpetuates abuse in future generations as children who witness intimate partner violence against their mother or one of their parents are more likely to experience such violence in later life, both as victims and as perpetrators; whereas laws protecting the dignity of the child and recognising the child as a victim in such cases play a crucial role in protecting both woman and child victims; whereas custody laws must be designed in a way that does not give custody rights to perpetrators of intimate partner violence;

O.  whereas gender-based violence includes many types of violence, including intimate partner violence and domestic violence; whereas the EIGE, similarly to the Istanbul Convention, defines domestic violence as all acts of physical, sexual, psychological or economic violence that occur within the family or domestic unit, irrespective of biological or legal family ties, or between former or current spouses or partners, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence as the victim;

P.  whereas online gender-based violence and online sexual harassment are cross-border in nature; whereas violence in the form of cyber violence, including online harassment, cyber-bullying, cyberstalking, sexist hate speech, non-consensual disclosure of sexual images, doxing, identity theft or hacking, disproportionally affects women and girls;

Q.  whereas violence against women and girls is one of the most widespread violations of women’s rights in Europe; whereas surveys conducted by the Union show that one in three women in the Union, which represents 62 million women, has experienced physical and/or sexual violence since the age of 15 and one in two women (55 %) has experienced sexual harassment; whereas the World Health Organization (WHO) reports that worldwide almost one third (27 %) of women aged between 15 and 49 who have been in a relationship have reported that they have been subjected to some form of physical and/or sexual violence by their intimate partner; whereas the WHO reports that globally as many as 38 % of all murders of women are committed by intimate partners;

R.  whereas there is a lack of updated comprehensive and comparable disaggregated data on all forms of gender-based violence across the Union; whereas the lack of comparable data is also the result of a lack of harmonisation in definitions linked to gender-based violence; whereas comprehensive and comparable disaggregated data is essential to document gender-based violence and its root causes; whereas the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights published its latest survey on violence against women in 2014, and whereas most recent figures are not available;

S.  whereas gender-based violence comes with important costs for our European societies, be it in terms of lost economic output or the provision of services, including health, legal, social and specialised services; whereas, however, the highest costs are borne by the victims of gender-based violence, who have to permanently live with the emotional scars of those traumatic experiences; whereas the well-being of victims of gender-based violence should guide Union action;

T.  whereas the impact of the COVID-19 crisis resulted in a dramatic increase in gender-based violence, in particular intimate partner violence, including physical and psychological violence, coercive control, and online violence; whereas World Health Organization Europe Member States have reported a 60 % increase in emergency calls from women subjected to violence by their intimate partner; whereas lockdown measures have made it more difficult for victims of intimate partner violence to seek help because they are often confined with their abusers and have limited access to support services, and because insufficient support structures and resources have exacerbated an already existing ‘shadow’ pandemic;

U.  whereas education has a central part to play in order to prevent gender-based violence, in particular by challenging the negative social norms that drive this phenomenon and by empowering youth to recognise, address and prevent those acts;

V.  whereas gender-based violence continues to be underreported in the Union; whereas two thirds of victims do not report gender-based violence to the authorities(16);

W.  whereas, according to the EIGE, secondary victimisation, also known as re-victimisation, ‘occurs when the victim suffers further harm not as a direct result of the criminal act but due to the manner in which institutions and other individuals deal with the victim’; whereas, according to the EIGE, ‘secondary victimisation may be caused, for instance, by repeated exposure of the victim to the perpetrator, repeated interrogation about the same facts, the use of inappropriate language or insensitive comments made by all those who come into contact with victims’;

X.  whereas gender-based violence may be perpetuated by persons in positions of authority, while placed in custodial settings such as prisons, mental health facilities, detention centres, welfare facilities and refugee camps; whereas situations of overcrowding, high levels of stress and lack of privacy may also lead to gender-based violence; whereas, by ensuring that police officers are specially trained to have the soft skills to carefully listen, understand and respect all women who have experienced gender-based violence, they can help address underreporting, re-victimisation and create a safer environment for survivors of gender-based violence;

Y.  whereas ensuring affordable and safe access to an independent justice system is indispensable to the promotion of a safer environment for all survivors of gender-based violence; whereas effectively tackling gender-based violence implies setting-up training programmes for the professionals involved, such as social workers, healthcare providers, law enforcement officials, people working in the justice system, so that they are able to identify, address and respond to gender-based violence;

Z.  whereas the conviction rates for perpetrators of violence against women, and in particular sexual violence including rape and sexual assault, are unacceptably low in all Member States, showing that there are systematic deficiencies in the way law enforcement authorities address gender-based violence, and whereas this in turn results in a widespread culture of impunity and a serious impairment to gender equality and the fight against gender-based violence;

AA.  whereas sexual violence is part of a continuum of gender-based discrimination and violence closely intertwined with persistent inequalities and broader attacks on gender equality and women’s and girls’ human rights;

AB.  whereas the Istanbul Convention is the most comprehensive instrument in Europe to combat specific forms of male violence against women and girls, as well as domestic violence; whereas the Istanbul Convention establishes a comprehensive framework of legal and policy measures for preventing such violence, supporting victims and punishing perpetrators;

AC.  whereas disinformation campaigns to undermine gender equality also block progress on the issue of eliminating violence against women, as has been seen in relation to the Istanbul Convention, leading to public opposition and regrettable political decisions in some Member States;

AD.  whereas the Istanbul Convention has been signed by all Member States and ratified by 21; whereas Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia have not yet ratified the Istanbul Convention; whereas Poland announced its intention to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention; whereas Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention sets a bad precedent; whereas the Istanbul Convention has not yet been ratified by the Union;

AE.  whereas violations of women’s rights are international, Europe-wide and cross-border in nature; whereas women and girls in Europe and other victims of gender-based violence do not benefit from the same level of protection against violence across the Union due to different national legislative frameworks and protection and prevention mechanisms;

AF.  whereas Union action aiming to eradicate violence against women and girls and other forms of gender-based violence demands that the Commission pursue several parallel avenues, both legislative and non-legislative, including proposing the identification of gender-based violence as an area of crime that meets the criteria specified in Article 83(1) TFEU and, at the same time, proposing a directive on gender-based violence using that Article as a legal basis;

AG.  whereas combating gender-based violence is a key priority of the Union’s Gender Equality Strategy and of the Union’s external action; whereas in its work programme for 2021, the Commission announced a new legislative proposal to prevent and combat gender-based violence based on Articles 82, 83 and 84 TFEU, as well as a specific proposal to extend the list of the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension set out in Article 83(1), second subparagraph, TFEU to include all forms of hate crime and hate speech; whereas combatting gender-based violence is among the priorities of the President of the Commission(17).

Causes and impact of gender-based violence and ensuring a holistic approach in preventing it

1.  Condemns all forms of violence against women and girls in all their diversity and other forms of gender-based violence, such as violence against LGBTIQ+ persons on the grounds of gender, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics, which is considered to refer to different acts of online and offline violence that result in, or are likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering;

2.  Highlights that, due to lockdown and social distancing measures during the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a worrying increase in gender-based violence experienced by women and girls across the Union, including intimate partner violence, physical, sexual, economic and psychological violence, coercive control and cyber-violence, resulting in an overwhelming need for support services for those victims;

3.  Insists that when addressing violence against women, the definition of ‘women’ must include girls under the age of 18;

4.  Denounces femicide as the most extreme form of gender-based violence against women and girls; stresses that femicide is a very severe violation of human rights and that the Union should draw up a plan to prevent and combat violence, detect situations of risk, and support and protect victims;

5.  Stresses that violence against women and other forms of gender-based violence are still shrouded in silence and are the result of the continuous manifestation of historically unequal access to and distribution of power and resources, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men, as well as violence directed towards LGBTIQ+ persons, with a huge impact on victims, their families and communities;

6.  Welcomes the #MeToo movement, which symbolises the voice of women breaking the wall of silence that surrounds sexual harassment and sexual violence against women in all their diversity across all ages, sectors and places; denounces the fact that in some countries victims of sexual harassment and sexual violence are increasingly being charged and even convicted of defamation, thus creating a chilling effect, re-victimising and silencing the women who dare to speak out;

7.  Recognises that progress towards equality has occurred thanks to the hard fought feminist struggle against the global oppression of women and girls;

8.  Underlines that this situation is aggravated by social and economic inequalities and significant reductions in available funding, especially during times of crisis, with the consequent effect of pay and pension gaps, the feminisation of precarious work and more precarious living conditions for women; highlights that those inequalities and power unbalances have a transversal and global nature, common to the whole territory of the Union, and not limited to specific Member States;

9.  Underlines that rigid gender norms based on patriarchal stereotypes contribute to the discrimination and subjugation of women, including lesbians, bisexual, trans and intersex women, lead to increased exposure to gender-based violence for anyone who does not conform to them and contribute to the invisibility of violence suffered by gay, bisexual and intersex men;

10.  Stresses the importance of addressing and promoting through education the equal status and power relation between men and women and between boys and girls, and eliminating biases and gender stereotypes that lead to harmful social gender norms; deplores the high number of instances of violence targeting women in all their diversity, including lesbians, bisexual and trans women, as well as trans, intersex and non-binary people;

11.  Underlines the wide range of psychological impact that gender-based violence has on victims, including stress, the feeling of being unsafe or vulnerable, concentration problems, anxiety, panic attacks, social isolation, low self-esteem, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, lack of trust and of sense of control, as well as fear or even suicidal thoughts; underlines the importance of the provision of mental health services for victims of those crimes, which are also often provided by NGOs and civil society actors;

12.  Recalls that gender-based violence also has a social, economic and democratic impact, such as lack of access to employment, isolation, the withdrawal from public life or the deprivation of material or financial resources, which reinforces the disadvantaged position of women; stresses that gender-based violence is exercised as a form of coercive control over women which prevents gender equality, social mobility, economic empowerment and the exercise of their rights as Union citizens, including their full civic participation and the free development of their lives without violence;

13.  Highlights the detrimental economic impact that gender-based violence, and the subsequent mental health issues it causes, can have on victims, including their ability to seek employment and the financial burden imposed on them by taking legal action and points out that the estimated annual societal costs of gender-based violence (EUR 290 billion) (between EUR 49 billion and EUR 89,3 billion for cyber-harassment and cyberstalking) exceed the estimated annual costs of particularly serious crimes as listed in Article 83(1), second subparagraph, TFEU(18);

14.  Stresses that the Istanbul Convention remains the international standard and a key tool for the eradication of gender-based violence by following a holistic and coordinated approach that places the rights of the victim at the centre and addresses the issues from a wide range of perspectives; reiterates its call to conclude the Union’s ratification of the Istanbul Convention on the basis of a broad accession, and highlights the importance of its ratification by Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia; notes with concern the attempts in some Member States to spread disinformation about the Istanbul Convention, such as the denial of the existence of gender-based violence; condemns the fact that such disinformation is gaining a foothold in Europe and is thus contributing to the difficulty of protecting women’s rights;

15.  Points out that the Istanbul Convention should be understood as the minimum standard to eradicate gender-based violence and that the Union should pursue even more decisive and effective legislative measures in that regard; recalls that such new legislative measures should, in any event, be consistent with the rights and obligations set by the Istanbul Convention and should be complementary to its ratification; calls on the Member States to take into account the recommendations by Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence and to improve their national law to bring it more in line with the provisions of the Istanbul Convention in order to ensure proper implementation and enforcement;

16.  Denounces the fact that the combat against gender-based violence is negatively affected by attacks on women’s and girl´s rights and gender equality; condemns the actions of anti-gender and anti-feminist movements in Europe and worldwide that systematically attack women’s and LGBTIQ+ rights, including sexual and reproductive rights, and aim to overturn existing laws that protect them, thus endangering the respect of human rights and of the rule of law; condemns all disinformation that is deliberately spread about the Istanbul Convention and other tools and initiatives to combat violence against women in the Union, which hinders the protection of women from violence; urges the Commission to ensure that civil society organisations supported and funded by the Union do not promote gender discrimination;

17.  Calls on the Commission to increase and secure long-term funding dedicated to preventing and combating violence against women and girls and other forms of gender-based violence through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme, including support for shelter organisations and other civil society organisations working in that area; reiterates the importance of using benchmarks and indicators to measure progress;

18.  Stresses that there are substantial differences in the legal definition and treatment of gender-based violence across the Member States; points out that this greatly hampers the Union’s legislative actions against gender-based violence, including Directives 2012/29/EU, 2011/36/EU and 2011/99/EU;

19.  Emphasises the importance of preventive measures in combating violence against women and girls; notes that such measures require a clearer focus in the entire judiciary, as well as in schools and in healthcare, to prevent and minimise the risk of violence;

20.  Insists on actions addressing the underlying causes of gender inequality, including counteracting sexism, patriarchal gender norms, stereotypes and values; regrets the lack of research and knowledge that forms the foundation for effective policy and law-making in preventing gender-based violence; calls, therefore, on the EIGE and Eurostat to act as a knowledge hub on violence against girls in the Union; underlines the fact that men’s violence against women starts with boys’ violence against girls; considers, therefore, that preventive measures must start at an early age; underlines the need for gender equality to have a central place in education and calls for educational measures directed towards, and implemented with, young people, including age-appropriate information, comprehensive sexuality education, the development of non-violent relationships, feminist self-defence training in the context of the implementation of Article 12(6) of the Istanbul Convention and paragraph 125(g) of strategic objective D.1. of the Beijing Platform for Action, and more general actions to combat segregation, gender inequality and discrimination;

21.  Stresses that the attack against women’s rights and gender equality is often one dimension of a broader deterioration in the situation of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, and therefore calls on the Commission and on the Council to consider women’s and LGBTIQ+ rights violations in the context of ongoing Article 7 TEU proceedings;

22.  Stresses the need for Union-wide awareness-raising campaigns which include information targeted at educating younger citizens of the Union about gender equality and on the impact of online and offline gender-based violence, which would support efforts to ensure that women and girls can live their lives freely and safely in all spheres;

23.  Calls on the Commission to work together with the Member States to make sure that gender-based violence is effectively tackled throughout national curricula; welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a Union-wide campaign on gender stereotypes included in the Gender Equality Strategy and its commitment as regards ‘educating boys and girls from an early age about gender equality and supporting the development of non-violent relationships’, as key for effective prevention;

24.  Stresses the importance of promoting cooperation between the Member States on the issue of gender-based violence, which also enables the Member States with successful policies to share their experiences through the exchange of best practice;

25.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to improve the regular availability and comparability of quality, disaggregated data on all forms of gender-based violence at Union and national level and for the harmonisation of data collection systems among Member States through cooperation with Eurostat, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and the EIGE; believes that quality data will be essential for clear and measurable targets in the elimination of gender-based violence; welcomes the announcement of a new Union-wide survey by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on the prevalence and dynamics of all forms of violence against women;

26.  Stresses that, in order to increase the understanding of gender-based violence within the Union, it is necessary to ensure that at least the following categories are included in the data collection at the level of law enforcement intervention: (a) the gender of the victim; (b) the gender of the perpetrator; (c) the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator; (d) the existence of a sexual violence dimension; (e) whether the violence has a gendered motivation, and (f) other socio-demographic characteristics relevant for an intersectional analysis; stresses that, in addition to those data, it is necessary to have general data on the number of complaints, the number and types of protection orders issued, the rates of dismissal and withdrawal of complaints, prosecution and conviction rates, the time taken for the disposal of cases, information on the sentences imposed on perpetrators and on reparations, including compensation, provided to victims, incidents reported to helplines or health and social services dealing with cases of violence against women and sample surveys;

Addressing all forms of gender-based violence

27.  Highlights the need for targeted legislation and policies with an intersectional approach to address the situation of victims of gender-based violence who experience intersectional forms of discrimination based on gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics and on other grounds such as race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age, sexual orientation, state of health, marital status or migrant or refugee status; emphasises the need in policy and law-making to add specific and measurable undertakings, including in relation to groups protected from discrimination by Union law and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union;

28.  Calls on the Member States and the Commission within their work to combat gender-based violence to ensure that all legislative and non-legislative initiatives aim to eradicate all forms of gender-based violence, specifically including women in all their diversity and violence against LGBTIQ+ persons on the grounds of gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics; recalls that Parliament has previously strongly encouraged Member States to adopt laws and policies banning conversion therapy, female and intersex genital mutilations and forced sterilisation practices;

29.  Stresses that gender-based violence is a serious violation of human rights and dignity that can take the form of psychological, physical, sexual and economic violence, and includes, inter alia, femicide, intimate partner violence, sexual harassment, cyber violence, stalking, rape, early and forced marriage, female genital mutilation, crimes committed in the name of so-called ‘honour’, forced abortion, forced sterilisation, sexual exploitation and human trafficking, institutional violence, second order violence, vicarious violence and secondary victimisation;

30.  Recalls that human trafficking and sexual exploitation is a form of gender-based violence against women and girls and stresses the importance of a gender-sensitive approach to human trafficking;

31.  Condemns the phenomena of second order violence, which is physical or psychological violence, reprisals, humiliation and persecution exercised against people who support victims of gender-based violence; stresses that those acts hamper the prevention, detection, support and recovery of women in situations of gender-based violence;

32.  Is deeply worried by the nature, extent and gravity of gender-based violence and harassment in the workplace; welcomes in that regard the recent adoption by the International Labour Organisation of Convention No. 190 on violence and harassment in the world of work and calls on the Member States to ratify and implement it without delay; calls also on the Commission and the Member States to adequately complete the existing framework for effective measures to prohibit violence and harassment in the workplace, as well as preventive measures, effective access to gender-responsive, safe and effective complaint and dispute resolution mechanisms, training and awareness-raising campaigns, psychological support services and remedies;

33.  Insists that cyber violence, including online sexual and psychological harassment, cyber-bullying, cyberstalking, non-consensual disclosure of sexual images, sexist hate speech online and new forms of online harassment such as zoom bombing or threats online, constitutes a form of gender-based violence;

34.  Regrets the fact that cyber violence disproportionally affects women and girls and is becoming increasingly common; recalls that gender-based cyber violence is a continuum of, and is inseparable from, offline violence as they are both interlinked; stresses that cyber violence threatens progress on gender equality and has a silencing effect, which is detrimental for the democratic principles of the Union; regrets the fact that women with a public profile, such as politicians, journalists, artists and activists, are often the target of gender-based cyber violence with the intention of discouraging their presence in public life and decision-making spheres;

35.  Stresses the cross-border nature of cyber violence, with perpetrators using platforms or mobile phones connected to or hosted by Member States other than where the victim is located; highlights the need for a coordinated approach of the Union to improve timely and accessible reporting tools, effective content removal mechanisms, and effective cooperation between online platforms and Member States’ law enforcement authorities for combating online gender-based violence in full compliance with fundamental rights;

36.  Calls on the Member States and the Commission to adopt specific measures to eradicate all forms of online violence, including through appropriate training for law enforcement officers, which disproportionally affects women and girls, and to specifically address the increase in such violence during the COVID-19 pandemic;

37.  Recalls that violations of sexual and reproductive rights, including sexual violence, gynaecologic and obstetrical violence and harmful practices, are a form of gender-based violence against women and girls and transgender and non-binary persons, as reflected in the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy, and are an impediment to gender equality;

38.  Encourages the Commission to promote regular exchanges of good practice between Member States and stakeholders on sexual and reproductive rights within its proposals for additional measures to prevent and combat forms of gender-based violence;

39.  Highlights the fact that reproductive coercion and the denial of safe and legal abortion care is also a form of gender-based violence; stresses that the European Court of Human Rights has ruled on several occasions that restrictive abortion laws and the lack of implementation violates the human rights of women; emphasises that girls’ and women’s autonomy and ability to make free and independent decisions about their bodies and lives are preconditions for their economic independence, for gender equality and for the elimination of gender-based violence; strongly condemns the attack against women’s rights and gender equality in the Union, in particular the setback to women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights and the de facto ban on safe and legal abortion in Poland;

40.  Deplores the visible deficiencies in the law enforcement system, which result in low conviction rates in cases of gender-based violence against women and girls, and impunity for perpetrators; calls on all Member States to amend the definitions of ‘sexual violence’ and ‘rape’ in their national law so that they are based on the absence of consent, as laid down in the Istanbul Convention;

41.  Is concerned about the sexualisation of children, especially the sexualisation of girls by men; considers it imperative to enhance the protection provided under criminal laws on sexual offences against children, in particular where the perpetrator displays negligence with regard to the child’s age;

42.  Underlines that women and girls with disabilities are two to five times more likely to experience various forms of violence; highlights that the Union is obliged, as a party to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, to take measures to ensure the full respect of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of women and girls with disabilities; notes that the Union should advance its efforts in that direction, inter alia by ratifying the Istanbul Convention;

43.  Stresses that women from minorities and, in particular, Roma and Muslim women, including those wearing religious clothing, are disproportionately impacted by gender-based violence, in particular in the public space, at the workplace and online; highlights that gender-based violence against Roma and Muslim women should be addressed with an intersectional approach which takes into account discrimination on the grounds of gender in combination with discrimination on the grounds of religion and ethnicity;

44.  Notes that the Commission must address the particular situation of migrant women’s protection against gender-based violence, in particular cases of intimate-partner violence where the victim’s residence status depends on co-habitation or marital status, and recalls that under Directive 2012/29/EU access to appropriate protection, support services and effective remedies must be available to all victims of gender-based violence, including the right to receive information and to be able to participate in criminal proceedings, and that all rights must apply in a non-discriminatory manner, including with respect to their residence status;

45.  Underlines that most of the current migration and refugee laws in Europe do not address the vulnerability of migrant and refugee women, the consequences of which include increased exposure to gender-based violence while on the move, unsafe reception conditions, insufficient protection measures and a lack of access to justice for migrants in the Union;

46.  Considers that intimate partner violence is not only a crime against the victim of violence but should also be considered a crime against any child who witnesses it, including due to the long lasting negative effects on the child’s wellbeing and development; denounces the fact that children of perpetrators of intimate partner violence are often the object of ill-treatment as a way to exercise power and violence against the mother, a phenomenon known as vicarious violence and a form of gender-based violence;

Protection, Support and Reparation 

47.  Calls on Member States to take all necessary measures to promote and ensure support and reparations for women and girls in all their diversity and all survivors of gender-based violence and to promote and ensure their protection against all forms of violence, recalls that such measures should be adequate, attributed in a timely manner, holistic and proportionate to the gravity of the harm suffered and with due attention to the needs of those who experience intersectional forms of discrimination and violence;

48.  Calls on the Member States to comply with the Istanbul Convention by providing protective and supportive measures for women based on a gendered understanding of violence against women and intimate partner violence and that focus on the human rights and safety of the victim, thus avoiding institutional violence being inflicted on victims as a result of laws or administrative or enforcement practices that are insensitive to gender considerations and/or lack sufficient knowledge and appropriate procedures, which can lead to impunity for perpetrators as well as re-victimisation;

49.  Calls on Member States to ensure that children are also considered victims of gender-based violence in cases of intimate partner violence, and that their dignity and safety is paramount; welcomes, in that respect, laws that criminalise exposing a child to violence in close relationships; calls furthermore on Member States to make sure that custody laws are in line with that principle, in the sense that custody rights not be accorded to the parent perpetrator of intimate partner violence;

50.  Underlines the obligation on Member States to ensure that there is adequate support and services for survivors of gender-based violence adapted to their specific needs, including in times of crisis; recalls the importance, in that context, of providing support to independent civil society organisations and women’s shelter organisations, which are the organisations with the know-how needed to ensure the protection of women;

51.  Calls on Member States to guarantee access for victims to support services and essential services, including sexual and reproductive health services, and to guarantee such access in rural areas also; firmly supports the availability of public services throughout all stages of the reparation processes, in particular with regard to the provision of essential psychological, legal and employment seeking support;

52.  Calls on the Member States and the Commission to raise awareness and ensure that information to victims and perpetrators of gender-based violence is available in all Union languages, with the aim of ensuring that the rights of victims are upheld when they exercise their fundamental right to freedom of movement within the Union;

53.  Considering the structural context of discrimination and inequality, calls on the Member States to step up their work in order to ensure that victims have equal access to justice and to an independent judicial system which is physically, economically, socially and culturally available to all victims of gender-based violence and to guarantee that the rights of the victim are placed at the centre in order to avoid discrimination, traumatisation or re-victimisation during judicial, medical and police proceedings by mainstreaming the gender perspective throughout the process;

54.  Underlines with concern that most Member States still have issues with the complete or correct transposition and/or practical application of Directive 2012/29/EU, as reflected in the Commission’s Strategy on Victim’s Rights, and calls on the Member States to duly and diligently transpose it completely and correctly;

55.  Underlines that the failure to address the lack of trust and confidence in law enforcement authorities and in the judicial system by survivors of gender-based violence is an important contributor for underreporting; calls on the Member States to improve the resources and training of practitioners and law enforcement officers, including judges, public prosecutors, judicial staff, forensic experts and other professionals dealing with victims of gender-based violence; calls on the Member States to evaluate the possibility of establishing specialised courts for that purpose; is convinced that ensuring that police officers and judges have increased knowledge and soft skills to carefully listen, understand and respect all survivors of gender-based violence will contribute to addressing underreporting and re-victimisation and will create a safer environment for survivors of gender-based violence;

56.  Calls on all Member States to fully comply with the Istanbul Convention by adopting treatment programmes for perpetrators of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the aim of preventing further violence, providing insights regarding the destructive gender norms, asymmetric power relations and values underpinning gender-based violence and ensuring that the safety and the human rights of victims are the primary concern;

57.  Stresses the importance of ensuring access to justice for all survivors of conflict-related gender-based violence, including access to quality legal assistance, and the full accountability for perpetrators of all gender-based conflict-related crimes against women and girls, as well as men and boys, by activating legal procedures at national, regional and international levels, in particular through the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

58.  Calls on the Member States to fully implement Directives 2011/99/EU, 2012/29/EU and 2011/36/EU;

59.  Underlines that the absence of a Union legal act to combat gender-based violence and the disparities in Member States’ national laws lead to different levels of protection for survivors;

60.  Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to extend the areas of crime listed under Article 83(1), second subparagraph, TFEU to encompass hate crime and hate speech; urges the Commission to include sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics as discrimination grounds specifically covered by that Article; considers such a measure to be essential to ensure the protection of LGBTIQ+ persons in the Union;

61.  Points out the importance of making full use of the training possibilities available to Member States through the various programmes and bodies, offices and agencies of the Union and calls on the Member States to provide recurrent and effective training that includes the gender and human rights perspective and international standards; calls on Member States to ensure that victims have the right to public high quality legal aid before and during legal proceedings;

62.  Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to come up with a proposal in 2021 for a directive to prevent and combat gender-based violence in order to implement the standards of the Istanbul Convention; stresses that that new directive must be complementary to existing and upcoming legislative and non-legislative measures in order to achieve coherent Union action on gender equality, as well as an eventual ratification of the Istanbul Convention; reiterates, therefore, its call on the Union to ratify the Istanbul Convention; recalls in addition the commitment of the President of the Commission to extend the areas of crime to encompass specific forms of gender-based violence in accordance with Article 83(1) TFEU;

Next steps at Union level 

63.  Stresses that gender-based violence, both online and offline, is a particularly serious crime and a widespread violation of fundamental rights and freedoms in the Union which needs to be addressed with greater efficiency and determination on a common basis; stresses that gender-based violence is the result of societal and systemic structural gender inequalities that have a cross-border dimension; points, in particular, to the growing anti-gender, anti-LGBTIQ+ and anti-feminist movements, which are well organised and have a cross-border nature; considers in addition that the cross-border dimension of gender-based cyber violence and the great individual, economic and societal impact of gender-based violence across all Member States reaffirm the need to combat gender-based violence in its multiple dimensions on a common Union basis;

64.  Calls for the Union to urgently address the increase in gender-based violence during the COVID-19 pandemic; calls, in that regard, on the Commission to develop a Union protocol on gender-based violence in times of crisis and to include protection services for victims, such as helplines, safe accommodation and health services, as ‘essential services’ in the Member States in order to prevent gender-based violence and support victims of violence during crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic;

65.  Stresses that the adoption of regional and international instruments, such as the Istanbul Convention, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women and other United Nations resolutions, also demonstrates the need to combat all forms of gender-based violence on a common basis;

66.  Stresses that the special need to combat violence against women and girls and other forms of gender-based violence on a common basis also results from the need to establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions, including a common definition of gender-based violence, as well as minimum rules concerning key issues of prevention, underreporting, victim protection, support and reparation, and the prosecution of perpetrators; underlines that the approaches and levels of commitment of Member States to prevent and combat gender-based violence vary significantly and, therefore, that a common basis approach would also contribute to law enforcement in cross-border operations;

67.  Requests that the Commission submit, on the basis of Article 83(1), third subparagraph, TFEU, a proposal for a Council decision identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime that meets the criteria specified in that Article, following the recommendations set out in the Annex hereto and requests the Commission to use that new area of crime as a legal basis for a holistic and victim-centred directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence, both online and offline;

68.  Calls on the Commission to propose a comprehensive directive on gender-based violence that implements the standards of the Istanbul Convention and other international standards such as the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women’s recommendations on gender-based violence and includes at least the following elements:

69.  Calls on the Commission to appoint a coordinator against violence against women and other forms of gender-based violence;

o
o   o

70.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the accompanying recommendations to the Commission and the Council.

ANNEX TO THE RESOLUTION:

COUNCIL DECISION

on the identification of gender-based violence as an area of crime that meets the criteria specified in Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 83(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Having regard to the consent of the European Parliament,

Whereas:

(1)  Equality between women and men is at the core of the Union’s values and is a fundamental principle of the Union enshrined in the Treaties and recognised in Article 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’). The right to equal treatment and non-discrimination is a fundamental right enshrined in the Treaties and in the Charter. Ending male violence against women and girls is a prerequisite to achieving real equality between women and men.

(2)  Article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) requires the Union, in all its activities, to aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between women and men.

(3)  Pursuant to the Article 83(1), third subparagraph, TFEU, the Council may, on the basis of developments in crime, adopt a decision identifying areas in addition to those specified in Article 83(1), second subparagraph, TFEU of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis.

(4)  When adopting such a decision under Article 83(1), third subparagraph, TFEU, the Council is to act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

(5)  The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) and the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (‘Istanbul Convention’) define gender-based violence against women as violence directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. Under the Istanbul Convention, ‘violence against women’ is defined as any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.

(6)  LGBTIQ+ persons are also victims of gender-based violence because of their gender, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics.

(7)  Gender-based violence against LGBTIQ+ persons includes physical violence, psychological violence, forced marriages, sexual violence, including ‘corrective’ rape and sexual harassment, female and intersex genital mutilations, forced sterilisation of trans and intersex people, so-called ‘honour’ crimes, conversion therapy, hate speech both online and offline, bullying and harassment, socio-economic deprivation and violence that occurs within the family and/or domestic unit because of the victim’s gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics.

(8)  Gender-based violence is rooted in gender stereotypes, heteropatriarchal structures, power asymmetries and structural and institutional inequalities. Gender-based violence affects all areas of society.

(9)  Under the Istanbul Convention, gender is defined as ‘the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women and men’, which recalls that many forms of violence against women are rooted in power inequalities between women and men.

(10)  Gender-based violence, both online and offline, and the lack of access to adequate protection is the most severe manifestation of gender-based discrimination and constitutes a violation of fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter such as the right to human dignity, the right to life and to physical and mental integrity, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the prohibition of slavery and forced labour, the right to liberty and security and the right to respect for private and family life.

(11)  Gender-based violence, both online and offline, is a particularly serious crime and a widespread violation of fundamental rights and freedoms in the Union which needs to be addressed with greater efficiency and determined on a common basis.

(12)  The adoption of regional and international instruments, such as the Istanbul Convention, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women and other United Nations resolutions, demonstrates the need to combat all forms of gender-based violence on a common basis.

(13)  The special need to combat violence against women and girls and other forms of gender-based violence on a common basis also results from the need to establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions, including a common definition of gender-based violence, as well as minimum rules concerning key issues of prevention, underreporting, victim protection, support and reparation, and the prosecution of perpetrators. The approaches and levels of commitment of Member States to prevent and combat gender-based violence vary significantly and, therefore, a common basis approach would also contribute to law enforcement in cross-border operations.

(14)  Gender-based violence meets the criteria to be identified as a new area of crime under Article 83(1) TFEU,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Gender-based violence is hereby identified as an area of crime that meets the criteria specified in Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels,

   For the Council

   The President

(1) OJ L 101, 15.4.2011, p. 1. (2) OJ L 338, 21.12.2011, p. 2. (3) OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57. (4) OJ C 296 E, 2.10.2012, p. 26. (5) OJ C 285, 29.8.2017, p. 2. (6) OJ C 337, 20.9.2018, p. 167. (7) OJ C 449, 23.12.2020, p. 102. (8) OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 48. (9) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0336. (10) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0024. (11) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0025. (12) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0041. (13) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0058. (14) https://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2020/issue-brief-covid-19-and-ending-violence-against-women-and-girls-en.pdf?la=en&vs=5006 (15) https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=238745&doclang=en (16) https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-figures (17) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en_0.pdf (18) EPRS interim European Added Values Assessment (EAVA) on gender-based violence, p.35.

European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 on the government crackdown on protests and citizens in Cuba (2021/2872(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0389 RC-B9-0436/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Cuba, in particular those of 10 June 2021 on the human rights and political situation in Cuba(1), of 28 November 2019 on Cuba, the case of José Daniel Ferrer(2), and of 5 July 2017 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part(3),

–  having regard to the PDCA between the European Union and Cuba signed on 12 December 2016 and provisionally applied since 1 November 2017(4),

–  having regard to the formal EU-Cuba human rights dialogue held under the EU-Cuba PDCA, and in particular the third dialogue of 26 February 2021,

–  having regard to the declaration by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the European Union of 29 July 2021 on recent events in Cuba,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other international human rights treaties and instruments,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of which Cuba is a signatory,

–  having regard to the letter of the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances requesting urgent action and urging the Cuban authorities to respond about the 187 missing persons,

–  having regard to the statement of 16 July 2021 by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet calling on Cuba to release detained protesters,

–  having regard to the statement of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and its special rapporteurships of 15 July 2021,

–  having regard to the EU guidelines on human rights defenders and those on freedom of expression online and offline,

–  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union(5) and in particular Article 12 on freedom of assembly and of association,

–  having regard to the complaint of 8 September 2021 by the Cuban Observatory for Human Rights (OCDH) to the EU Special Representative for Human Rights Eamon Gilmore on the repression against protesters,

–  having regard to the Cuban Constitution and its Criminal Code,

–  having regard to the Decree Law 35 on telecommunications, information and communication technologies and the use of the radio-electric spectrum and Resolution 105 of 2021 on the regulation on the National Intervention Model to respond to cybersecurity incidents of the Republic of Cuba,

–  having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas on 11 July 2021, thousands of Cubans took to the streets in over 40 towns to peacefully protest against the chronic shortages of medicines and other essential goods, the general mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic and the systematic restrictions on human rights, in particular freedom of expression and assembly by the Cuban authorities; whereas these were the largest protests in Cuba since the 1994 ‘Maleconazo’ protest;

B.  whereas the Cuban authorities responded with extreme violence and repression against protestors and human rights defenders; whereas President Díaz-Canel explicitly called on all government supporters, including special forces units such as the ‘Black Berets’ – an elite unit of the revolutionary armed forces – to fight peaceful protestors, exacerbating the violence, leaving hundreds of civilians injured, and resulting in police searches, arrests at protesters’ homes and police violence;

C.  whereas the Cuban authorities adopted new methods of repression such as the suspension, surveillance, censorship and control of telecommunications services in violation of international human rights law in order to control and cover up the grave human rights violations they were committing; whereas the Cuban authorities must protect and ensure human rights, such as peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, without discrimination based on political views, and comply with international human rights standards with respect for the principles of legality, exceptionality, responsibility and necessity;

D.  whereas Decree Law 35 updates the Cuban legal framework on the procedures for and conditions to obtain the required permits for the use of the national radio-electric spectrum and imposes obligations on telecommunications operators to suspend, monitor, intercept and control users and pass on their information to the Cuban authorities; whereas the decree is internationally recognised as illegal; whereas Resolution 105 establishes the Cybersecurity Incidents Regulation in a broad manner, providing a legal framework for the prosecution of individuals for a wide range of accusations and allowing sanctions to be imposed, mobile phones and computers to be seized, home searches to be carried out and even allowing the government to act as a facilitator for the initiation of criminal proceedings for crimes currently mentioned in the Criminal Code whose definitions are internationally recognised as illegal; whereas Decree Law 370, which was also enacted after the approval of the new 2019 Constitution, restricts freedom of expression on social networks;

E.  whereas the regime cut off the internet for several days so that citizens were unable to publicly report the acts of repression and human rights violations they were suffering; whereas the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs Bruno Rodríguez described the US attempt to reinstate the internet signal on the island as an ‘aggression’;

F.  whereas the IACHR and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights have condemned the Cuban State’s repression and the use of force in response to peaceful protests, have also called for the prompt release of all those who have been detained and have urged the Cuban Government to address the underlying social issues through dialogue;

G.  whereas the OCDH has reported that as at 5 September 2021, 1 306 persons, including 27 minors, had been missing or detained since the protests of 11 July 2021; whereas other reports by non-governmental organisations such as Prisoners Defenders indicate that more than 5 000 people were detained during that period, with allegations of arbitrary detentions, incommunicado detention, forced disappearances, use of criminal figures as a way to criminalise participation in protests, torture and ill-treatment, surveillance and house arrests, and violence against the protestors; whereas the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances initiated urgent action in Cuba for 187 cases under Article 30 of the Convention on Enforced Disappearances on 15 July 2021 (official urgent actions AU Nos 1200 to 1386/2021); whereas Cuba has the sixth highest number of urgent actions on enforced disappearances that needed to be taken since 2017 in the world, despite the PDCA now being fully in force;

H.  whereas among the detained were a significant number of activists, journalists and leaders of political opposition movements such as José Daniel Ferrer, leader of the Unión Patriótica de Cuba (Patriotic Union of Cuba), whose whereabouts are unknown to date, as well as teachers, students and artists such as Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara of the Movimiento San Isidro; whereas Diubis Laurencio Tejeda was confirmed dead by the police after being shot from behind in Havana while protesting;

I.  whereas Sakharov Prize laureates continue to suffer from systematic repressive actions, including arbitrary detentions, raids and sieges of their homes, aggressions and arbitrary fines, which have been documented by both the Observatorio Cubano de Derechos Humanos and the Centro Cubano de Derechos Humanos; whereas the Ladies in White have suffered at least 318 such repressive actions in the last three months, 60 in June, 142 in July and 116 in August; whereas Sakharov Prize Laureate Guillermo Fariñas Hernández has stated that, in line with the above-mentioned information from human rights organisations, he has also suffered systematic repression monthly for years, and that his phone calls are monitored and that when he leaves his home he is systematically detained just a few hundred metres away, and that in September alone he has been arbitrarily detained on three occasions, the last time on 8 September 2021;

J.  whereas many were given summary trials and sentences for different types of crimes, including terrorism, public disorder, contempt, incitement to commit crimes and the spread of an epidemic, without minimum guarantees of due process; whereas several of those arrested are considered prisoners of conscience;

K.  whereas more than 8 000 people are also being held in prison for no attributable crime and 2 500 more have been condemned to forced labour for the same cause, all charged with ‘social pre-criminal dangerousness’, a charge entirely sustained by their ‘observed behaviour in contradiction to the norms of socialist morality’ (Articles 72-84 of the Cuban Penal Code);

L.  whereas on 5 July 2017, Parliament granted its consent to the PDCA on the condition that clear improvements are made in Cuba in relation to human rights and democracy; whereas Parliament has repeatedly condemned human rights violations in Cuba underscoring the breach of Articles 1(5), 2(c), 5, 22 and 43 of the PDCA; whereas there has not been concrete progress in Cuba vis-à-vis the agreement’s general principles and objectives on improving the situation of human rights and whereas on the contrary, the Cuban regime has intensified its repression and labour and human rights violations, including the increase in political prisoners; whereas the PDCA has failed in its core aim to improve fundamental freedoms in Cuba;

M.  whereas the Cuban State keeps systematically violating the labour and human rights of its healthcare personnel assigned to work abroad on medical missions, which makes it equivalent to modern slavery according to the UN;

N.  whereas in its resolution of 10 June 2021, Parliament reminds the European External Action Service that the participation of civil society in political dialogues and the agreement’s cooperation projects is an essential part of the PDCA and that excluding civil society from cooperation funds and/or participation in the agreement while, on the contrary, allowing participation and access to cooperation funds exclusively for companies in which the state participates or controls, as has been the case since the signing of the agreement, should be remedied immediately;

O.  whereas the PDCA included a so-called human rights clause, which is a standard essential element of EU international agreements that allows the PDCA to be suspended in the event of a violation of the provisions on human rights;

P.  whereas the OCDH has formally requested ‘the application of the new European Union sanctions regime for those natural persons or state institutions involved’ in the serious human rights violations in Cuba;

1.  Condemns in the strongest possible terms the extreme violence and repression against protesters, human rights defenders, independent journalists, artists, dissidents and opposition political leaders by the Cuban government in the aftermath of the 11 July 2021 protests; deplores the loss of life and sends its condolences to the relatives;

2.  Calls on the Cuban authorities to cease repression, release all political prisoners, prisoners of conscience and those arbitrarily detained solely on the grounds of peacefully expressing their freedom of expression and assembly, and guarantee due process; condemns the fact that the government’s response to these protests included the deployment of the Black Berets and civilian groups that responded to President Miguel Díaz-Canel’s call to ‘defend the Revolution’;

3.  Deplores the fact that the Cuban authorities have used the wave of detentions in the wake of the 11 July 2021 protests to criminalise the legitimate and peaceful democratic demands of its population, claw back control, re-establish a culture of fear among its population and silence some of the country’s most charismatic opponents;

4.  Calls for respect for the human rights of the Sakharov Prize laureates, who suffer from constant repressive acts, and condemns the arbitrary arrest for more than two months of José Daniel Ferrer, who has been isolated from his family and whose location is unknown;

5.  Underlines the utmost necessity for the Cuban authorities to listen and respond to the demands for civil and political rights, and for freedom and democracy, and to engage in an inclusive national dialogue on a process of modernising and democratising the country, with a view to taking all necessary measures to undertake much-needed internal economic reforms while ensuring the political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights of the population are met and an effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic is provided;

6.  Is deeply concerned about the findings of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention regarding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty in Cuba, which show there is a systematic problem of arbitrary detentions, as confirmed in the working group’s reports 12/2017, 55/2017, 64/2017, 59/2018, 66/2018, 63/2019 and 4/2020;

7.  Denounces the Cuban authorities’ lack of respect for the human rights and freedoms enshrined in universal human rights conventions, in particular the freedoms of assembly, press and expression both online and offline, as well as their repression against any form of democratic expression and the absence of spaces for pluralistic political participation; calls on the EU to publicly condemn them; deplores the recently adopted Decree Law 35 and Resolution 105, which provide broad legal avenues to criminalise individuals taking part in legitimate peaceful protests, by exercising control over means of telecommunication, paving the way for new methods of repression; calls on the Cuban authorities to update the legal framework in accordance with international law and repeal Decree Law 35 and any other legislation that restricts the fundamental freedoms of its citizens;

8.  Is concerned about the deplorable detention situation and the continuing absence of conditions that provide guarantees for judicial independence; demands that those detained have access to fair trials, be allowed to have independent medical evaluations, be given adequate food and water, be allowed to make telephone calls and be allowed regular visits from family, friends, journalists and diplomats; calls for effective criminal and administrative investigations aiming to identify, prosecute and punish those responsible for torture and ill treatment;

9.  Calls on the Cuban authorities to comply with the recommendations of the IACHR and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to engage in constructive dialogue with genuine civil society; calls on Cuba to immediately grant the UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and independent human rights organisations access to the country to document the human rights situation and to monitor and observe the upcoming trials of the hundreds of activists and ordinary Cubans who remain detained; calls on the EU to observe the trials and visit the political prisoners in prison;

10.  Regrets that, despite the PDCA, the situation of democracy has not improved and the deterioration of the human rights situation in Cuba has only worsened; stresses that Cuba has been systematically violating the fundamental provisions of this agreement since its entry into force; deeply regrets the lack of commitment and willingness of the Cuban regime to endeavour to advance towards even minimal progress for change or open channels that could allow for the regime to be reformed;

11.  Stresses that contrary to the PDCA, Cuban and independent European civil society organisations have been systematically prevented from participating in the human rights dialogues between Cuba and the European Union, within the broader framework of the human rights dialogue of the PDCA, such as the one that took place on 26 February 2021; recalls, in this sense, that any dialogue between the European Union and Cuban civil society and funding opportunities must include all civil society organisations without any limitations;

12.  Recalls its strong support for all human rights defenders in Cuba and their work; calls on the EU delegation and Member State representations in the country to seriously enhance their support for genuine and independent civil society in their engagement with the Cuban authorities, and to use all available instruments to enhance the work of human rights defenders;

13.  Considers that the latest repressive actions of the Cuban authorities against citizens add to the persistent and systematic actions against prisoners of conscience, human rights defenders, dissidents, opposition and civil society activists, artists and journalists, all of which constitute additional breaches of the PDCA;

14.  Recalls that the PDCA contains a human rights clause – a standard essential element of EU international agreements – which allows the agreement to be suspended in the event of violations of human rights provisions; calls on the European Union to trigger Article 85(3b) to call an immediate meeting of the joint committee in the light of the breaches of the agreement on the part of the Cuban Government, which constitutes a ‘case of special urgency’;

15.  Calls on the Council to use the EU Magnitsky Act(6) provisions and adopt sanctions against those responsible for human rights violations in Cuba as soon as possible;

16.  Deeply regrets the Cuban authorities’ refusal to allow Parliament delegations to visit Cuba despite Parliament having granted its consent for the PDCA; calls on the authorities to immediately allow the delegations entry to the country;

17.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government and National Assembly of People’s Power of Cuba, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the governments of the member states of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0292. (2) OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 17. (3) OJ C 334, 19.9.2018, p. 235. (4) OJ L 337 I, 13.12.2016, p. 3. (5) OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391. (6) Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses (OJ L 410 I, 7.12.2020, p. 1).

European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 on the case of human rights defender Ahmed Mansoor in the United Arab Emirates (2021/2873(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0390 RC-B9-0434/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to having regard to its previous resolutions on the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in particular its resolution of 4 October 2018 on the UAE, notably the situation of human rights defender Ahmed Mansoor(1),

–  having regard to the statement of 10 December 2020 by Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell at the Foreign Affairs Council stating that human rights are in the DNA of the European Union,

–  having regard to the statement of 1 January 2019 by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service (EEAS) on the case of Ahmed Mansoor,

–  having regard to the UN Human Rights Experts statement of 12 June 2018 calling for the immediate release of jailed human rights defender Ahmed Mansoor, and of 7 May 2019 condemning his detention conditions,

–  having regard to the Arab Charter on Human Rights,

–  having regard to the Cooperation Arrangement of 2018 between the UAE and the EEAS;

–  having regard to the most recent round of the EU-UAE human rights dialogue held on 9 June 2021 in a virtual format and the second meeting between senior officials of the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the EEAS held virtually on 3 March 2021,

–  having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, both of which the UAE is party to,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

–  having regard to the EU global human rights sanctions regime,

–  having regard to the EU guidelines on human rights defenders,

–  having regard to the EU guidelines on freedom of expression,

–  having regard to the EU guidelines on torture and other cruel treatment,

–  having regard to the fact that in 2015 Ahmed Mansoor was awarded the prestigious Martin Ennals Award for Human Rights Defenders,

–  having regard to the fact that Loujain al-Hathloul was awarded the 2020 Václav Havel Human Rights Award by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,

–  having regard to Rule 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas on 29 May 2018, after a grossly unfair trial, Ahmed Mansoor was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison by the Court of Appeal in Abu Dhabi on charges related to his human rights advocacy; whereas on 31 December 2018 the ruling was upheld by the UAE’s Federal Supreme Court; whereas he was also fined one million UAE dirhams (EUR 232 475) and will be placed under surveillance for three years upon his release;

B.  whereas the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation stated on 29 March 2017 that ‘the Office of Public Prosecution for Electronic Crimes ordered the detention of Ahmed Mansoor on a charge of spreading false and misleading information over the internet, through agendas aimed at disseminating antipathy and sectarianism’; whereas other statements by the UAE authorities indicated that the sole reason for his detention was, in fact, the views he shared online; whereas the charges against him are based on alleged violations of the UAE’s 2012 Cybercrime Law; whereas according to both the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, he was convicted solely for his human rights advocacy, including tweeting about injustices in his country, taking part in webinars on human rights and sending messages to human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs);

C.  whereas since his arrest in March 2017, Ahmed Mansoor has remained in solitary confinement in Abu Dhabi’s al-Sadr prison, where he has been deprived of basic necessities and denied his rights as a detainee under Emirati law and international human rights law, including the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners; whereas he has been prohibited from making any form of contact with other inmates and his family, apart from four 30-minute visits by his wife and limited phone calls to his mother and wife; whereas he went on hunger strike twice in 2019 in order to request that his basic rights as a prisoner be respected;

D.  whereas the UAE authorities have violated Ahmed Mansoor’s rights for more than 10 years with arbitrary arrest and detention, death threats, physical assault, government surveillance and inhumane treatment in custody;

E.  whereas the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders has stated that ‘the conditions and treatment that [Emirati human rights defenders Ahmed Mansoor, Mohammed al-Roken and Nasser Bin Ghaith] are subjected to, such as prolonged solitary confinement, are in violation of human rights standards and may constitute torture’;

F.  whereas a group of UN human rights experts has called on the UAE Government to release Mr Mansoor, describing his arrest as a direct attack on the legitimate work of human rights defenders in the UAE;

G.  whereas prior to his most recent arrest in 2017, Ahmed Mansoor called for universal and direct elections in the UAE and for the Federal National Council, a government advisory board, to be granted legislative powers; whereas he also administered an online forum called Al-Hiwar al-Emarati (the Emirati Dialogue) which criticised UAE policies;

H.  whereas there is systematic persecution of human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers and teachers speaking up on political and human rights issues in the UAE; whereas since 2011 in particular, the state has intensified its crackdown on freedom of association, assembly and expression; whereas human rights defenders and members of their families are subjected to forced disappearances, prolonged arbitrary detention, torture, judicial harassment and unfair trials, travel bans, physical and digital surveillance, and arbitrary dismissal from work;

I.  whereas the vague and overly broad definition of terrorism in Emirati law makes it possible to qualify a wide range of peaceful and legitimate activities as amounting to terrorism;

J.  whereas the UAE uses sophisticated spyware to target activists and other voices of dissent; whereas Ahmed Mansoor was targeted with spyware provided by the Israeli company NSO Group; whereas the Pegasus leak of July 2021 reported the use of the NSO spyware by the Emirati authorities against a range of targets, including human rights defenders both in the UAE and abroad; whereas Loujain al-Hathloul, a prominent Saudi women’s rights defender, was also subjected to cyberattacks by the UAE authorities, who hacked into her email before arresting and forcibly transferring her to Saudi Arabia;

K.  whereas women in the UAE continue to be subjected to a range of discriminatory laws and practices; whereas violations of women’s rights include the kidnapping and hostage-taking of Saudi and Emirati women and women’s rights activists, a lack of investigation and accountability in alleged crimes against women, including for example the sexual assault of British national Caitlin McNamara, where the accused perpetrator was not investigated or held accountable, systemic discrimination against women, the exploitation of women migrant workers, sex trafficking and sexual slavery;

L.  whereas the kafala (sponsorship) system is still being implemented in the UAE as an integral part of its social and legal order; whereas according to reports by international human rights organisations, the UAE’s inhumane practices against foreign workers, who constitute 80 % of the country’s population, are pervasive, and such violations increased during the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas in preparation for the upcoming international fair, Expo 2020 Dubai, to be hosted from October 2021 until March 2022, businesses and construction companies are coercing workers into signing untranslated documents, confiscating their passports, exposing them to extreme working hours in unsafe weather conditions and providing them with unsanitary housing;

M.  whereas the UAE and the EU have signed a reciprocal bilateral short-stay visa waiver agreement exempting UAE citizens from requiring Schengen visas;

N.  whereas the EU is the main donor to Interpol’s inter-judicial cooperation programmes; whereas the Inspector General of the UAE’s Ministry of Interior, Major General Ahmed Nasser al-Raisi, is a candidate for the Interpol presidency;

O.  whereas the UAE has not ratified several core UN human rights treaties, notably the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its optional protocols abolishing the death penalty and against torture, and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances;

P.  whereas the EU considers the UAE a partner, including in areas of political and economic relations; whereas the EU and the UAE have held human rights dialogues since 2013 with biannual meetings, and whereas the 10th EU-UAE human rights dialogue held on 9 June 2021 provided an opportunity to discuss issues of concern with the UAE authorities;

1.  Strongly condemns, once again, the detention of Ahmed Mansoor and all other human rights defenders in the UAE, who have been imprisoned solely for exercising their basic human rights, including their rights to freedom of speech, association, peaceful assembly and expression both online and offline, which are enshrined not only in universal human rights instruments, but also in the Arab Charter on Human Rights; deeply deplores the gap between the UAE’s claims to be a tolerant and rights-respecting country and the fact its own human rights defenders are detained in harsh conditions;

2.  Reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional release of Ahmed Mansoor, Mohammed al-Roken and Nasser bin Ghaith, as well as all other human rights defenders, political activists and peaceful dissidents;

3.  Urges the UAE authorities, pending their release, to ensure that Ahmed Mansoor and all other prisoners are treated in line with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners; urges, in particular, that Mansoor be removed from solitary confinement, and that all prisoners be allowed regular lawyer and family visits and be provided with adequate medical care, that UN experts and international NGOs be allowed to visit Mansoor and others in prison and monitor detention conditions, and that all torture allegations be thoroughly investigated;

4.  Expresses its grave concern at the continued reports, including through leaked letters published in July 2021, that Ahmed Mansoor still remains in dire conditions in solitary confinement; reminds the UAE authorities that prolonged and indefinite solitary confinement amounts to torture; calls on the UAE authorities to guarantee all detainees, including prisoners of conscience, due process and fair trial; urges the authorities to amend the Anti-Terrorism Law, the Cybercrime Law and Federal Law No 2 of 2008, which are repeatedly used to prosecute human rights defenders, in order to comply with international human rights standards;

5.  Calls on the UAE authorities to stop the harassment of and immediately lift the travel ban against human rights defenders; insists that the authorities guarantee that human rights defenders in the UAE are able to carry out their legitimate human rights activities in all circumstances, both inside and outside the country, without fear of reprisal and free of all restrictions, including judicial harassment;

6.  Calls on the VP/HR to closely follow the case of Ahmed Mansoor to secure his immediate release and that of other human rights defenders; calls, in particular, on the VP/HR to request prison visits to the human rights defenders during his upcoming visit to the UAE and to publicly and privately call for their immediate and unconditional release during meetings with the UAE authorities; calls on the EEAS to report back to Parliament on the actions undertaken so far by the EU Delegation and Member States in Abu Dhabi aimed at providing Mr Mansoor with appropriate support;

7.  Urges all Member States, given the UAE’s internal repression, in line with Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items(2), to suspend the sale and export of surveillance technology to the UAE and their maintenance and updating if no concrete and measurable steps are taken to address such abuses;

8.  Calls on the EEAS to propose the adoption of EU targeted measures against those responsible for grave human rights violations in the UAE, including the persecution of Ahmed Mansoor and other human rights defenders, under the EU global human rights sanctions regime; reiterates that all sanctioning procedures must be evidence-based and initiated only when concrete human rights violations can be determined;

9.  Calls for the EU to adopt and make public meaningful human rights benchmarks and a list of individual cases for its human rights dialogue with the UAE, with a view to enabling a genuine and results-oriented discussion on human rights;

10.  Calls for the EU to include a discussion on human rights, particularly the situation of human rights defenders, as a permanent item on the agenda of the annual summit between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council;

11.  Expresses concern at the reported use by the UAE authorities of the NSO Group’s spyware for the unlawful targeting of the mobile phones of hundreds of individuals in the United Kingdom, including lawyers, academics and a parliamentarian; calls on the VP/HR to request clarification on these reports from the UAE authorities, including with regard to the possible targeting of EU nationals or individuals on EU territory, and to report back to Parliament;

12.  Recalls that in 2015 the EU signed a short-stay visa waiver agreement with the UAE; calls on the Commission to report to Parliament on the compliance of this agreement with the relevant EU legislation, notably as regards the consideration of human rights and fundamental freedoms as a criteria for visa exemption; calls on the Commission and the Council to report to Parliament on progress in this area;

13.  Calls on the members of Interpol’s General Assembly, and in particular the EU Member States, to duly examine the allegations of human rights abuses concerning General Major Nasser Ahmed al-Raisi ahead of the election of the presidency of the organisation from 23 to 25 November 2021; notes the concerns expressed by civil society regarding his candidacy and the potential impact on the reputation of the institution;

14.  In order to signal their disapproval of the human rights violations in the UAE, invites the international companies sponsoring Expo 2020 Dubai to withdraw their sponsorship and encourages Member States not to participate in the event;

15.  Deeply deplores the role of the UAE authorities in the extradition of the women’s rights activist Loujain al-Hathloul to Saudi Arabia, where she has been imprisoned, tortured and persecuted for the advocacy of women’s rights;

16.  Expresses its concern about the situation of women in the UAE, despite some progress, and calls on the authorities to reform the Personal Status Law to provide women with equal rights and to ensure that Emirati women can pass nationality to their children on an equal basis to men;

17.  Welcomes the UAE’s moratorium on executions since 2017; calls on the UAE to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its protocol aiming at the abolition of the death penalty;

18.  Supports the continued and strengthened dialogue between the EU, its Member States, and the UAE on issues of mutual interest, as provided for in the Cooperation Arrangement; considers that regular interparliamentary meetings between Parliament and its partners in the Gulf region are an important forum for developing a constructive and frank dialogue on all issues of concern, including human rights, security and trade;

19.  Calls for the establishment of more stringent transparency rules regarding the lobbying activities of foreign organisations towards EU institutions;

20.  Calls for the translation of this resolution into Arabic;

21.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government and Parliament of the United Arab Emirates, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the governments of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

(1) OJ C 11, 13.1.2020, p. 21. (2) OJ L 206, 11.6.2021, p. 1.

European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 on the situation in Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya (2021/2874(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0391 RC-B9-0445/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Kenya, in particular those of 30 April 2015(1) and on of 18 May 2017 on the Dadaab refugee camp(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on a new EU-Africa Strategy – a partnership for sustainable and inclusive development(3),

–  having regard to the joint statement of 21 June 2021 by the Republic of Kenya and the European Union,

–  having regard to the declaration by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU on the International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia, 17 May 2021,

–  having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2019 on the situation of LGBTI people in Uganda(4),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 May 2021 entitled ‘The Horn of Africa: a geo-strategic priority for the EU’,

–  having regard to the joint statement of 29 April 2021 by the Government of Kenya and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps Roadmap,

–  having regard to the UNHCR statement of 25 March 2021 on the situation of LGBTIQ+ refugees in Kakuma camp,

–  having regard to the UN Secretary-General’s message of 17 May 2021 on the International Day against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 12 November 2020 entitled Union of Equality: LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0698),

–  having regard to Articles 2, 3(5), 21, 24, 29 and 31 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Articles 10 and 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which commit the EU and its Member States, in their relations with the wider world, to upholding and promoting universal human rights and the protection of individuals, and adopting restrictive measures in the event of grave human rights breaches,

–  having regard to the values of human dignity, equality and solidarity contained in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,

–  having regard to Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which recognises the right to seek asylum from persecution in other countries,

–  having regard to the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF for Africa),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe(5),

–  having regard to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984,

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 25 March 2020 entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024’ (JOIN(2020)0005),

–  having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR),

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

–  having regard to the UNHCR Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework,

–  having regard to the decision by the High Court of Kenya of 8 April 2021 temporarily blocking the closure of the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 23 September 2020 on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum (COM(2020)0609),

–  having regard to the UN Global Compact on Refugees,

–  having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas Kenya hosts the second largest number of refugees and asylum seekers in Africa after Ethiopia; whereas according to the UNHCR, as of 31 May 2021, Kenya’s population of refugees and asylum seekers stands at 519 989 in Kakuma, Dadaab and urban areas;

B.  whereas the Kakuma camp is located in Turkana county, one of the poorest counties in Kenya; whereas according to the UNHCR, the living conditions in the camp are dire and constantly deteriorating, with extreme poverty, poor housing and infrastructure, and lack of water, sanitation, medicines and electricity supplies; whereas both the local population and the refugees are suffering severe food and water shortages and a lack of basic needs; whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened an already alarming humanitarian situation in the camp and the county in which it is located;

C.  whereas the human rights and security situation at Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya has deteriorated exponentially; whereas armed robberies, thefts, rapes and killings are often reported, with women, children, persons with disabilities and LGBTIQ+ people being the most vulnerable to violence; whereas these attacks are currently under investigation;

D.  whereas women and girls in the camp are subjected to various forms of sexual violence, most frequently rape; whereas refugee girls, new arrivals and single women who are heads of a household are particularly at risk; whereas rape is perpetrated by refugee men from the camp, local community members, and/or security guards; whereas other forms of violence such as child and forced marriage, female genital mutilation and intimate partner violence are also common;

E.  whereas on 15 March 2021 in Kakuma 3 Block 13, two refugees suffered second-degree burns during an arson attack with a petrol bomb while they were sleeping; whereas one of the victims, Ugandan refugee Chriton Atuhwera, perished as a result of the injuries he sustained; whereas a growing number of LGBTIQ+ refugees have been attacked and injured, with many having to flee the refugee camp to an area where they are not protected and not legally allowed to stay;

F.  whereas although Kenya law punishes consensual same-sex relations with up to 14 years in prison, it is the only country in the region which accepts refugees based on sexual orientation and gender identity; whereas around 300 refugees and asylum seekers registered in Kakuma refugee camp have an LGBTIQ+ profile with most of them having reported that they are living peacefully in the Kakuma community according to the UNHCR;

G.  whereas according to the 2020 global review by the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), nearly half of the countries worldwide where homosexuality is outlawed are in Africa; whereas just 22 of 54 African nations have legalised homosexuality;

H.  whereas in many African nations the standing anti-LGBTIQ+ laws date back to the colonial era;

I.  whereas in March 2020 some refugees with LGBTIQ+ profiles asked the UNHCR to relocate them outside Kenya as a result of the hostility of the country towards them; whereas over the past few months over 30 LGBTIQ+ people have been relocated from the Kakuma 3 part of the camp to other parts based on the safety concerns they raised and following careful assessment by the UNHCR on the ground; whereas the European Parliament mandate on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Union Resettlement Framework and amending Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council called efforts to be made over time to achieve a fair distribution of resettled persons among the Member States, and that those efforts should be combined with efforts to establish international binding rules regarding the shared worldwide responsibility to resettle persons in need of resettlement as indicated by the UNHCR;

J.  whereas in November 2020 the Kenyan Government and Human Rights Watch confirmed that the era of COVID-19 had seen an exponential increase in attacks on the LGBTIQ+ persons, notwithstanding that violence more generally had also flared up;

K.  whereas resettlement departures from Kenyan refugee camps of LGBTIQ+ people continue to fall short of actual needs; whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has slowed down the process; whereas, according to the UNHCR, since 2019 some 235 refugees with this profile have been put forward for resettlement, of whom 48 % have departed the country;

L.  whereas in spite of the fact that the UNHCR and its partners had prepared facilities to respond to the pandemic, 65 % of camp-based refugees have reported less access to health facilities after the outbreak compared to before the outbreak in March 2020, mainly owing to fear of infection and the unavailability of medical staff; whereas only 3 % of the Kenyan population is fully vaccinated against COVID-19; whereas the vaccination campaign in Kenyan refugee camps started on 30 March 2021, with the Kakuma camp being allocated 2 000 doses of vaccines;

M.  whereas the Kenyan Government has made several attempts to close the camp in recent decades; whereas on 24 March 2021, Kenya’s interior minister gave the UNHCR a 14-day ultimatum to draw up a plan for the closure of both Dadaab and Kakuma camps; whereas on 8 April 2021, the Kenyan High Court temporarily postponed the closure for 30 days; whereas on 29 April 2021 the UNHCR and the Kenyan Government agreed on a roadmap towards a later closure of the Kukuma and Dadaab camps by 30 June 2022; whereas the roadmap includes voluntary return for refugees to their countries of origin in safety and dignity, departures to third countries under various arrangements and alternative stay options in Kenya for certain refugees from East African Community (EAC) countries;

N.  whereas while the UN acknowledged the government’s concerns and recognised that refugee camps should not be long-term solutions to forced displacement, international and human rights organisations have warned that an abrupt and disorderly closure would lead to a humanitarian catastrophe and that forced repatriations would violate international law; whereas refugees at Kakuma in general live in fear of being deported;

O.  whereas, in spite of its vast natural resources, the Horn of Africa is one of the poorest regions in the world; whereas food security is extremely precarious and millions of people living in the region suffer from malnutrition and are at risk of famine; whereas drought and armed conflicts are the two main reasons for displacement of persons in the region, including in Kenya, as stressed by the Nairobi Global Plan of Action adopted at the summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on 26 March 2017; whereas conflicts such as those in Somalia and Ethiopia, and pre- and post-election violence in Uganda and Tanzania, make voluntary return unjustifiable for reasons of safety and dignity for most refugees in Kakuma camp; whereas since late 2019, Kenya has been affected by a combination of unprecedented threats and severely impacted by climate change, witnessing the largest desert locust invasion in the last 60 years, floods that have marked the rainfall seasons and COVID-19 restriction measures;

P.  whereas the EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa signed at the Valletta summit on 12 November 2015 was designed to address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration by promoting resilience, economic opportunities, equal opportunities, security and development; whereas the EU is responding to the life-saving basic needs of refugees hosted in Kenyan refugee camps; whereas the EU Trust Fund for Africa is established under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), and must be aligned to the primary objective of EU development policy, which remains ‘the fight against poverty’;

Q.  whereas since 2012 the EU has provided more than EUR 200 million in humanitarian aid and has allocated EUR 286 million through the European Development Fund (EDF) for the period 2014-2020, focusing on job creation, food security, resilience and institution building, and education in particular; whereas Kenyan asylum seekers are totally dependent on humanitarian support for their basic needs; whereas the new NDICI – Global Europe financial instrument will continue the implementation of EU programmes in Kenya;

R.  whereas in 2021 the EU allocated EUR 15 million in funding for humanitarian projects in Kenya, aiming first at assisting refugees and, since 2016, EUR 45 million for refugees and host communities in Kenya under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa; whereas in the Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps, the EU continues to support the provision of basic life-saving aid such as food assistance, healthcare, undernutrition treatment, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), protection and education;

1.  Expresses its deep concern about the humanitarian situation and the reports of protracted violence within the Kakuma camp; strongly condemns the arson attack with a petrol bomb perpetrated on 15 March 2021 in Kakuma 3 refugee camp against two LGBTIQ+ refugees; is deeply concerned about the standing threats in Kakuma refugee camp against individuals with an LGBTIQ+ profile; recalls that over 30 individuals have been urgently relocated in the last few months;

2.  Urges the Kenyan authorities to continue investigating and to bring full clarity regarding this crime and to hold those responsible to account in accordance with Kenyan law and with respect to international human rights law;

3.  Recognises the important and constructive role that Kenya plays and recalls the challenging regional situation, which is characterised by regional crises and conflict; acknowledges the importance of the Kakuma refugee camp for thousands of refugees and asylum seekers in the bordering regions of Kenya, including the most vulnerable of their number, notably those with an LGBTIQ+ profile that people who face criminalisation and even the death penalty in their countries of origin;

4.  Commends the collaborative work done over the years between Kenya’s Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS), the UNHCR and other partners when addressing the protection of all refugees; stresses, however, that the current situation in the Kakuma camp is unsustainable in a long-term perspective and requires an efficient, coordinated response by the Kenyan Government, the governments of the region and the international community as a whole, including the EU; takes note of the recent adoption of the Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps Roadmap in this regard;

5.  Calls on the Kenyan Government to maintain Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps, at least until the situation in the region stabilises; urges the Kenyan Government to ensure that the human rights of refugees are respected when taking any decisions that concern them; stresses that EU financial assistance to third countries for the reception of refugees should not be a substitute for the responsibility of the EU in hosting and resettling a fair share of people in need of international protection;

6.  Calls on the Kenyan Government, the UNHCR and the international community to commit to working together and finding alternative, durable, appropriate and rights-based solutions that are in line with the responsibility-sharing principles and goals of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR); recommends that, in order to be effective, this should include the resettlement to the EU of a meaningful number of refugees in need of international protection;

7.  Stresses the need for a more integrated and comprehensive regional approach to the management of refugees and for the strengthening of cooperation between Kenya and its neighbouring countries on political, security, humanitarian and development issues in order to address the root causes of forced displacement; calls for the need for adequate security in refugee camps to be met, and on the Kenyan Government to enhance security within the Kakuma camp and strengthen the protection of refugees, in particular the most vulnerable groups; calls on the law enforcement authorities and the other branches of government in Kenya to ensure that refugees are protected and safe;

8.  Calls on the Kenyan Government and the UNHCR to ensure the implementation of the repatriation programme fully in line with international obligations and Kenya’s domestic responsibility; insists that any repatriation process in the country of origin must be voluntary, safe, sustainable, dignified and rights-based, with returnees having access to objective, neutral and pertinent information on what will happen should they decide not to volunteer;

9.  Expresses grave concern at the situation in the Horn of Africa, particularly regarding poverty and food insecurity; calls on the Commission to release the emergency humanitarian aid needed to cope with the refugee problem and the famine in the region; calls for the aid provided by the EU and the Member States in the Horn of Africa to be used, as a matter of priority, to address violence, including sexual violence, and the problems linked to severe inequalities, poverty, chronic malnutrition, access to health and public services, particularly reproductive healthcare, and the achievement of sustainable development goals;

10.  Calls for the EU to address the issue of food insecurity and lack of basic needs in the Kakuma camp, including, inter alia, access to water, sanitation, healthcare and electricity services not only via refugee-exclusive assistance, but also through its support to national development programmes whose ability to fulfil development effectiveness has been ensured and is regularly assessed;

11.  Underlines that the growing instability in the region represents an obstacle to the safe return of refugees to their countries of origin; calls for the EU, in collaboration with the international donor community, to continue to step up its efforts as a mediating partner and in support of sustainable and long-term socio-economic development in the region, thus creating an enabling and safe environment for voluntary returns and the reintegration of refugees;

12.  Calls for greater efforts to protect forcibly displaced LGBTIQ+ people and for greater solidarity on the part of the international community in responding to resettlement needs globally, as these remain far greater than the actual number of spaces available;

13.  Calls on the Commission to regularly report to Parliament on the implementation and programming for the EU Trust Fund for Africa and calls for a specific impact assessment covering its human rights impact to be carried out by the Commission, with the support of the Fundamental Rights Agency; calls on the Commission to present the result of such impact assessments in a timely manner to Parliament, including within the framework of the Working Group on External Financial Instruments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Development;

14.  Calls for the EU to continue to work closely with the Kenyan Government, the UNHCR and the wider international community in order to help find solutions to the protracted refugee situation in the region; calls for the EU to enhance the defence and promotion of human rights in Kenya;

15.  Recalls that in the European Union, persecution on the basis of sexual orientation is considered a criterion for asylum application and for granting asylum; calls for the EU and its Member States to adhere to this principle; calls for the EU, notably the EU Delegations and the EU Special Representative on Human Rights, to effectively make full use of the LGBTI Toolkit and its accompanying guidelines in their dialogue with all African nations that still criminalise homosexuality and, more generally, in their dialogue with all countries in which the persecution of or violence against LGBTIQ+ people is widespread;

16.  Insists that the EU Delegation in Kenya continue to monitor the situation of vulnerable people, more specifically LGBTIQ+ people and Black African women closely and to actively support civil society organisations, human rights defenders and LGBTIQ+ people on the ground;

17.  Urges the EU to keep up its efforts to convince both the Kenyan Government and the African Union to reconsider their approach on LGBTIQ+, noting that their stance may in one way or another be placing LGBTIQ+ persons at risk of inhuman and degrading treatment that runs counter to the values of equality and equal protection enshrined in law;

18.  Reminds the Kenyan authorities of their commitment to respect the right to freedom of opinion and expression as enshrined in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its obligations to guarantee fundamental rights, as provided for in the African Charter and other international and regional human rights instruments, including the Cotonou Agreement and, specifically, Articles 8 and 96 thereof; urges the Kenyan Government to guarantee, in all circumstances, the physical integrity and psychological well-being of all refugees, irrespective of their sexual orientation, gender identity or expression;

19.  Calls on the international community to guarantee that refugees are covered by the COVID-19 vaccination programmes; stresses that allowing refugees to benefit from national services and integrating them into national development plans is essential for both refugees and the communities hosting them, and is in line with the pledge to ‘leave no one behind’ in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development;

20.  Reiterates that there can be no development without improved security in the region; strongly underlines, however, that funding must be devoted to economic, human and social development in the region, with a particular focus on the development challenges identified by the Trust Fund decision; recalls that EDF and official development assistance (ODA) funds should be used exclusively for development objectives;

21.  Stresses the importance of allocating a substantial share of NDICI – Global Europe to civil society organisations in third countries, including Kenya, for providing assistance and for the protection and monitoring of the rights of migrants; calls for the EU to ensure that a significant part of the programming through this instrument is earmarked for the improvement of human rights and international protection for refugees, notably in Kenya;

22.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the Speaker of the Kenyan Parliament, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD, the governments of the IGAD Member States, the African Union, the Pan-African Parliament, and the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly.

(1) OJ C 346, 21.9.2016, p. 51. (2) OJ C 307, 30.8.2018, p. 131. (3) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0108. (4) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0042. (5) OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1.

European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 on the implementation of the EU requirements for exchange of tax information: progress, lessons learnt and obstacles to overcome (2020/2046(INI))

P9_TA(2021)0392 A9-0193/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Articles 4 and 14 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

–  having regards to Articles 113 and 115 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC(1) (DAC),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1286/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing an action programme to improve the operation of taxation systems in the European Union for the period 2014-2020 (Fiscalis 2020) and repealing Decision No 1482/2007/EC(2),

–  having regard to Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation(3),

–  having regard to Council Directive (EU) 2015/2376 of 8 December 2015 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation(4),

–  having regard to Council Directive (EU) 2016/881 of 25 May 2016 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation(5),

–  having regard to Council Directive (EU) 2016/2258 of 6 December 2016 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards access to anti-money-laundering information by tax authorities(6),

–  having regard to Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements(7),

–  having regard to the Commission proposal of 15 July 2020 for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation (DAC7) (COM(2020)0314),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 2 June 2020 on the future of administrative cooperation in the field of taxation in the EU,

–  having regard to its position of 10 March 2021 on the proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation(8),

–  having regard to the Commission inception impact assessment of 23 November 2020 on the proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards measures to strengthen existing rules and expand the exchange of information framework in the field of taxation to include crypto-assets and e-money,

–  having regard to the Commission report of 18 December 2017 on the application of Council Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of direct taxation (COM(2017)0781),

–  having regard to the Commission report of 17 December 2018 on overview and assessment of the statistics and information on the automatic exchanges in the field of direct taxation (COM(2018)0844),

–  having regard to the Commission Staff Working Document of 12 September 2019 on the evaluation of the Council Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation repealing Directive 77/799/EEC (SWD(2019)0327),

–  having regard to the European Court of Auditors Special Report No 03/2021 entitled ‘Exchanging tax information in the EU: solid foundation, cracks in the implementation’,

–  having regard to its resolution of 26 March 2019 on financial crimes, tax evasion and tax avoidance(9),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 7 May 2020 on an Action Plan for a comprehensive Union policy on preventing money laundering and terrorist financing (C(2020)2800),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 15 July 2020 on an Action Plan for fair and simple taxation supporting the recovery strategy (COM(2020)0312),

–  having regard to the study entitled ‘Implementation of the EU requirements for tax information exchange’ published by its Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services(10),

–  having regard to the OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) of 19 July 2013,

–  having regard to the OECD report of 9 December 2020 entitled ‘Peer Review of the Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information 2020’,

–  having regard to the European Economic and Social Committee opinion of 18 September 2020 entitled ‘Effective and coordinated EU measures to combat tax fraud, tax avoidance, money laundering and tax havens’(11),

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A9-0193/2021),

A.  whereas the EU is confronted with unfair or aggressive tax practices, such as the fact that European Union Member States lose between EUR 160 and 190 billion per year(12) as a result of tax evasion and profit shifting by multinationals; whereas this loss is of a significant magnitude given the health, social and economic crisis the Union is currently facing and struggling with; whereas EU taxpayers held EUR 1,5 trillion offshore in 2016, resulting in an average tax revenue loss of EUR 46 billion in the EU as a result of tax evasion by individuals(13); whereas these amounts are only a segment of the general problem of tax avoidance by individuals and companies and this value is illegitimately subtracted from national budgets and, therefore, represents an additional burden on compliant taxpayers;

B.  whereas cooperation between tax administrations has significantly improved at EU, as well as at global, level over recent years with the aim of curbing tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax fraud more effectively, in particular as a result of the G20/OECD Common Reporting Standard approved in 2014;

C.  whereas repeated revelations by investigative journalists, such as the LuxLeaks, the Panama Papers, the Paradise Papers, the cum-ex/cum-cum scandals and, most recently, the OpenLux have contributed to an increased awareness and pushed the EU to further develop its set of tools against tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax fraud; whereas the OpenLux revelations have demonstrated the necessity for the exchange of tax information to be more qualitative and to deliver results;

D.  whereas the DAC, which entered into force in January 2013 and replaced Council Directive 77/799/EEC concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation, laid down the rules and procedures for cooperation between Member States on the exchange of information (EOI) between tax administrations of the Member States, notably the automatic exchange of information (AEOI) on income and assets;

E.  whereas the DAC was subsequently amended five times to gradually extend the scope of AEOI to information on financial accounts and related income (DAC2), advance cross-border rulings (ACBRs) and advance price arrangements (APAs) (DAC3), Country-by-Country Reports (CbCR) filed by multinational enterprises (DAC4), to provide access by tax authorities to beneficial ownership information as collected under Anti-Money Laundering (AML) rules (DAC5), and finally to extend the scope of AEOI to tax planning cross-border arrangements and introduce mandatory disclosure rules for intermediaries (DAC6);

F.  whereas the provisions for AEOI under DAC1 to DAC4 entered into force between January 2015 and June 2017 and its initial impact can be evaluated, while it is too early to assess the impact of the provisions of DAC5 and DAC6, which only entered into force in January 2018 and July 2020 respectively;

G.  whereas the Commission proposed a further amendment in July 2020 to extend the scope of AEOI to, inter alia, income earned via digital platforms (DAC7) and has announced a further amendment to provide access to information on crypto-assets (DAC8); whereas such a revision could be an opportunity to improve the framework for information exchange as a whole;

H.  whereas the Council has concluded its negotiation on several DAC revisions, including the recent DAC7 proposal, without taking the opinion of the European Parliament into account, acting against the principles of sincere cooperation and the European Parliament’s role in a consultative process as stated in Article 115 TFEU;

I.  whereas the difficulties encountered in the Council in agreeing on the improvements put forward by the Commission do not provide sufficient answers to global tax issues;

J.  whereas some inconsistencies between the international and European standards remain, notably on the deadline for communicating tax information; whereas a majority of Member States release aggregated CbCR information under Action 13 of the BEPS Action Plan;

K.  whereas the Union has signed agreements with third countries, including Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and Switzerland to ensure that DAC2 equivalent information is shared with the Member States; whereas later versions of the DAC have not been subject to similar agreements;

L.  whereas only very limited information is publicly available on the implementation of DAC1 to DAC4, with almost no quantitative information on the exchange of information concerning CbCRs under DAC4, and whereas quantitative information on the implementation of the DAC at Member State level is rare;

M.  whereas Parliament fully respects the principle of national tax sovereignty;

N.  whereas the available information shows that the EOI under DAC1 and DAC2 provisions for AEOI have increased significantly since the entry into force, and that Member States exchanged about 11 000 messages referring to nearly 16 million taxpayers and to income and/or assets worth over EUR 120 billion under DAC1 provisions between 2015 and mid-2017, and about 4 000 messages covering some 8,3 million accounts with a total value of almost EUR 2,9 trillion under DAC2 as of 2018;

O.  whereas the AEOI provisions under DAC3 have led to a significant increase in reported ACBRs and APAs compared to the period before, when they were only shared on rare occasions and on a spontaneous basis, in spite of a legally binding requirement to share many ACBRs and APAs since 1977, as 17 652 ACBRs/APAs were reported in 2017 compared to only 2 529 in 2016, 113 in 2015 and 11 in 2014; whereas success cannot be measured solely by a total increase in reported ACBRs and APAs, as demonstrated by the LuxLetters revelations;

P.  whereas it is in the responsibility of Parliament, along with the Council, to exercise political scrutiny over the Commission, as laid down in the Treaties according to Article 14 TEU, including its enforcement and implementation policy, and whereas this requires adequate access to relevant information; whereas the Commission must be responsible to the European Parliament according to Article 17(8) TEU;

Q.  whereas the Commission opened 73 infringement procedures in total, related mainly to delays in the transposition of the DAC by Member States, and two infringement procedures are still ongoing as of January 2021; whereas the delayed or deficient transposition of the DAC by Member States justified several infringement procedures and this scenario justifies Parliament in its stance for a strict control by the Commission on the transposition of European legislation on tax matters and, specifically, on DAC provisions;

R.  whereas the OECD created a global standard for the AEOI with its Common Reporting Standard (CRS) in 2014 and more than 100 jurisdictions worldwide have committed to AEOI of financial accounts as of 2021;

S.  whereas Parliament acknowledges it has no legislative power in the area of direct taxation and has only a limited legislative power over indirect taxation;

T.  whereas the DAC framework should be accompanied by equal attention to the capacity and willingness of tax administrations to facilitate compliance and serve the interests of taxpayers;

U.  whereas the Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation must be an instrument to enhance the coordinated work of national tax administrations, but must consider dimensions such as: i) the reinforcement of tax administrations’ resources (in human, financial and infrastructure – mainly digital infrastructure); ii) the protection of taxpayers’ rights, such as data protection; iii) the safeguarding of professional and industrial secrets, with high standards of cybersecurity in the exchange of information process; iv) the reduction of administrative and bureaucratic burdens on taxpayers and companies; v) the promotion of higher performance standards for tax administrations, with tighter deadlines to comply with European rules; and vi) the safeguarding of the competitiveness of our companies, with simpler and faster ways to guarantee compliance with administrative requirements;

V.  whereas the economic crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic required enormous fiscal and budgetary efforts by governments, including in the form of aid to companies; whereas the beneficiaries of such support must fulfil their social responsibilities, such as cooperating adequately with tax authorities, in order to guarantee a comprehensive exchange of tax information;

W.  whereas the effectiveness of the exchange of tax information depends less on the quantity of data exchanged, but on its quality; whereas data quality and completeness are therefore essential in order to reap the greatest benefits from the DAC framework; whereas the lack of information publicly available on the quantitative data of the EOI performed under DAC1 to DAC4 makes democratic scrutiny by national parliaments and the European Parliament significantly more difficult;

X.  whereas the progressively digitalised and globalised economy possesses complex and challenging dimensions, such as digital assets and crypto-assets, it is nevertheless important to increase cooperation between national tax administrations in this field; whereas a clear definition of crypto-assets, in line with the ongoing work within the OECD and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), would be important to enhance the fight against tax evasion and to promote fair taxation; whereas the proliferation of crypto-currencies is a topical issue and should be considered in any effort to increase administrative cooperation, based on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

Y.  whereas tax policies are at the core of national fiscal and tax sovereignty, and represent national competences; whereas any major decision at European level must be based on strict respect for the intergovernmental logic that governs this field of European integration; whereas important decisions on further integration on this matter must always be taken so as to respect the treaties, national competences and fiscal and tax national sovereignty; whereas Parliament agrees with the ambition to find innovative solutions on tax matters, bearing in mind the institutional framework that we wish to preserve;

Z.  whereas administrative cooperation in the field of taxation must be an instrument to enhance the fight against tax fraud and evasion by individuals and enterprises, through improved communication channels and effective EOI practices;

AA.  whereas the consecutive revisions of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation prove that this is a dimension of ongoing interest for Member States and European policy makers, that the European instruments are gradually and progressively evolving according to a logic of closer cooperation, and that citizens are aware of the European solutions’ added value in terms of tackling issues linked to taxation, mainly in combating tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax fraud;

AB.  whereas the EOI on income and capital gains from individuals, in particular on immovable property, is undermined by shell companies;

AC.  whereas the beneficial owners of shares in companies are not being automatically exchanged under the current framework;

AD.  whereas family offices often hold large cross-border assets through the direct ownership of companies or through closely held investment entities(14); whereas such financial institutions may suffer from conflicting interests, contributing to the unreliable reporting of tax information; whereas unrealised capital gains of individuals held abroad in low-taxed companies are hardly covered by national tax systems at all; whereas this both enables high net worth individuals to accumulate wealth, building on low-taxed income while the middle classes can only accumulate wealth based on fully taxed income;

AE.  whereas a properly functioning and effective EOI framework can alleviate budgetary pressures in all Member States;

Coverage and reporting requirements

1.  Welcomes the fact that the EU institutions have been continuously improving and widening the scope of the EOI in order to curb tax fraud, tax evasion and tax avoidance, including the recent proposal on DAC7, as well as the plans for DAC8; notes, however, that while the scope of the DAC framework has been steadily increased, too little attention was paid to improving data quality and completeness equally;

2.  Highlights that the EOI between tax administrations has significantly improved at both global and EU level; recalls that DAC2, DAC3, DAC4, DAC6 and DAC7 are directly connected to the work undertaken at OECD level; considers that the measures agreed on the global stage constitute a minimum standard for the EU;

3.  Notes that the better implementation and application of the rules by tax authorities are necessary in order to minimise the risk of the non-declaration of income and therefore calls on the Commission to guarantee better enforcement of the rules; notes, however, that some types of income and assets are still excluded from the scope, which presents a risk of circumventing tax obligations; calls on the Commission to assess the need and the most appropriate way, and to present concrete proposals, to include the following ownership information, items of income and non-financial assets in the AEOI: (a) the beneficial owners of immovable property and companies; (b) capital gains related to immovable property and capital gains related to financial assets, including currency trading, in particular to find ways for tax administrations to be better informed to identify realised capital gains; (c) non-custodial dividend income; (d) non-financial assets such as cash, art, gold or other valuables held at free ports, customs warehouses or safe deposit boxes; (e) ownership of yachts and private jets; and (f) accounts at larger peer-to-peer lending, crowdfunding and similar platforms;

4.  Observes that the effectiveness of DAC1 is seriously constrained by the fact that Member States are only required to report at least two categories of income; takes note of the recent amendment that obliges the Member States to exchange all information that is available, on at least four categories of income with respect to taxable periods as of 2024; calls on the Commission, after an impact assessment, to make it mandatory to report on all categories of income and assets in the scope; calls on the Member States to develop effective and accessible registries for the purposes of EOI; notes that such efforts will also benefit domestic tax collection;

5.  Observes the challenge posed by gathering information about e-money and/or crypto assets, and the difficulty of including them in AEOI because of their independence from intermediaries; calls for the establishment of a comprehensive framework for collecting information about e-money and crypto assets;

6.  Observes that the definition of reporting Financial Institutions (FIs) and types of accounts that need to be reported in DAC2 involves a risk of circumvention and increased bureaucracy; calls for an assessment and, if appropriate, a proposal by the Commission to extend the reporting obligations to other relevant types of FIs, while avoiding further red tape, but to reconsider the qualification of closely held managed Investment Entities as FIs, to review the definition of excluded accounts and to remove the thresholds applicable to pre-existing entity accounts; recalls that with adequate IT systems in place, a practice of zero exemptions and zero thresholds can contribute to less bureaucracy; calls on the Commission to assess the obligation for FIs, where there is no information to report, to file nil returns with the objective of decreasing bureaucracy;

7.  Observes that DAC3 contains certain blind spots and might have unintended negative effects such as tax administrations not exchanging ACBRs if these are too favourable, or tax administrations resorting to informal arrangements in order to avoid exchanges, as revealed by the practice of shadow tax rulings through ‘information letters’ in Luxembourg; deplores the preferential treatment of high net worth individuals; therefore calls for the scope of EOI under DAC3 to be widened to include informal arrangements, not ‘advance’ (for example post-transaction agreements or after filing the returns) APAs and ACBRs, natural persons and rulings which are still valid, but which were issued, amended or renewed before 2012; regrets that earlier calls by the European Parliament in this regard have been ignored so far; regrets that DAC 3 data entries lack quality and are not yet widely used or exploited by the tax administrations of Member States; advises that a specific notification should be sent to the tax administrations where a company benefiting from a tax ruling in the scope of DAC 3 has a taxable presence;

8.  Regrets that bilateral and multilateral APAs are excluded from the EOI under DAC3 where a related international tax agreement does not allow for their disclosure; calls on the Member States to renegotiate existing, and not agree to any future, international tax agreements which do not permit the disclosure of APAs;

9.  Regrets that the summary information in the central directory for ACBRs and APAs is often too brief to be used without having to request additional information; calls on the Commission to develop guidelines on what tax administrations should provide as a summary, which should include all relevant direct and indirect tax implications such as the effective tax rates;

10.  Deplores the practice of shadow tax rulings in Luxembourg, as exposed by the LuxLetters revelations, which leads to informal arrangements not being reported as required by DAC3; urges the Commission to urgently assess a potential breach of the DAC3 requirements by Luxembourg and other Member States with similar practices and to launch infringement proceedings if necessary;

11.  Welcomes the fact that a large number of countries, including many Member States, are releasing anonymised and aggregated information, extracted from the CbCRs as required under DAC4 or Action 13 of the BEPS Action Plan; regrets that a minority of Member States are not publishing this information in international databases; calls for a harmonised approach in this regard and insists that the Commission integrate this requirement into the future revision of the DAC;

12.  Recommends revising the scope of information provided by multinational enterprises (MNEs) that own several entities within the same jurisdiction in order to improve the quality of the information while avoiding excessive compliance costs;

13.  Observes that the consistency of mandatory disclosers under DAC6 is negatively affected by the ambiguity of individual Member States’ interpretation of hallmarks; therefore, calls for greater clarity in the formulation of the main benefit test for hallmarks in categories A and B;

14.  Recalls that the DAC provisions are applicable to every enterprise that is obliged by the reporting duties; however, recalls that MNEs and SMEs have significant differences in terms of their compliance policies and that this must be taken into account in future DAC revisions; understands, therefore, that SMEs’ compliance costs and administrative burden must be reduced;

15.  Recalls that the European rules on administrative cooperation do not replace national rules but rather provide minimum standards for information exchange and cooperative actions;

16.  Acknowledges that in order to improve the objectives of the DAC, the emphasis will have to be placed on closing existing gaps in implementation and monitoring rather than on creating new legislative rules;

Due diligence obligations and beneficial ownership

17.  Notes that the information exchanged is large in volume but of limited quality; welcomes the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors (ECA); observes that joint accounts pose certain difficulties to FIs; is concerned that inaccurate or outdated information on tax residency held by FIs and abuse through multiple residencies may lead to failure to exchange information where this would be required; deplores the use of golden visa and passports to circumvent EOI and reiterates its call to phase out all these current schemes; calls on the Commission to extend its infringement proceedings to all Member States offering golden visas; calls for stronger enforcement procedures at Member State level and to set up domestic systems of penalties for incorrect or incomplete reporting with an effective deterrent effect; calls on the Commission to include on the spot visits in Member States and to assess the effectiveness of their monitoring schemes; calls on the Member States to establish a system of quality and completeness checks of DAC data, the regular provision of feedback for the information received and reports on the usefulness of interventions to the Commission in order to improve future decision-making, as well as procedures for the audit of reporting obliged entities regarding the quality and completeness of data sent; recognises that the information exchanged between Member States via DAC and the underlying systems are confidential;

18.  Points out that there are no prescribed sanctions for FIs which either do not report or which report information falsely or incorrectly, and that measures vary significantly across Member States; recalls that according to Article 25a of DAC2, Member States should implement effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for reporting entities; regrets that the Commission does not assess the size or the deterrent effect of the penalties in each Member State, and that the Commission has not offered any benchmarks for comparison or guidance in this respect; calls for more harmonised and effective sanctions with a deterrent effect on non-compliance;

19.  Recommends the inclusion of a marker to indicate joint ownership of different account holders in order to avoid duplicate reporting and to facilitate accurate identification of account balances; suggest in addition that entities could record the ownership share of each account holder, and flag when an account is held by owners from different jurisdictions;

20.  Notes that DAC5 provided access by tax authorities to beneficial ownership information as collected under anti-money-laundering (AML) rules; observes that the fifth AML Directive (AMLD5) widened the scope for interaction between AML and DAC, and that the AMLD5 should have been transposed by Member States by 10 January 2020; notes further that the effectiveness of the DAC therefore relies heavily on the AML directives in place at Member State level; observes that the effectiveness of the DAC is undermined by the incorrect implementation of these directives, the lack of effective enforcement and the remaining weaknesses in the AML framework such as (i) the fact that beneficial ownership is not determined for individual accounts held through active non-financial entities (NFE), (ii) the lack of beneficial ownership information for real estate properties and life insurance contracts, (iii) the lack of inter-connected national registries in particular real estate with beneficial ownership registries, and (iv) the lack of common definitions for beneficial ownership, due diligence and tax crime;

21.  Regrets the current state of the transposition for AMLD4 across Member States(15), with the Commission launching infringement procedures against eight Member States in December 2020 and three Member States in February 2021(16), notes that the transposition deadline for these provisions was 27 June 2017; further regrets that for AMLD5(17), with a transposition deadline of 10 January 2020, infringement procedures have been launched against 16 Member States(18);

22.  Observes with concern that in the most recent assessment of countries’ AML measures carried out by FATF, the 18 Member States included in the assessment(19) did not perform well across key effectiveness indicators, for example, when being ranked on adequately applying AML measures, most Member States in the scope were rated as displaying a ‘moderate’ or ‘low’ level of effectiveness, with only Spain being rated as having a ‘substantial’ level of effectiveness, and no Member State attaining a ‘high’ level of effectiveness(20);

23.  Observes that increasingly complex structures are being used to conceal the ultimate beneficial owners, and therefore thwart the effective implementation of AML rules; observes further the weaknesses exposed by the OpenLux revelations; believes there should be no threshold for reporting the beneficial owners; recalls its view that beneficial ownership of trusts should have the same level of transparency as companies under AMLD5, while ensuring appropriate safeguards;

24.  Calls on the European Commission to present, in due time, an evaluation of the interaction between AML and DAC;

Legal and practical challenges

25.  Notes that the Commission monitors the transposition of the DAC legislation in the Member States; points out, however, that it has so far neither taken direct and effective action to address the lack of quality of the data sent between Member States, nor carried out visits to Member States, and neither has it ensured the effectiveness of sanctions imposed by Member States for breaches of the DAC reporting provisions; urges the Commission to step up its activities in this regard and to take direct and effective actions to address the lack of quality of data sent by Member States, further develop its guidance for Member States on implementing the DAC legislation, performing risk analysis and using tax information received, and to launch infringement procedures, using, among others, the Global Forum(21) and Financial Action Task Force reviews; calls on the European Commission to prioritise the issue of improving data quality in upcoming reviews of the DAC framework;

26.  Observes with concern that the 2019 Commission evaluation highlighted that Member States often do not go beyond the minimum requirements of the DAC in exchanging information, and this contributed to the cum-ex/cum-cum tax fraud scandal; observes in particular that Member States did not sufficiently cooperate through appropriate mechanisms such as spontaneous exchange in order to alert other relevant Member States of such schemes; observes further that only a small minority of Member States has complete information across all six DAC1 income and capital categories available; stresses the need for more effective, complete and frequent exchanges;

27.  Notes with concern that the Global Forum has recently assessed the legal implementation of the Common Reporting Standard (CRS)(22) referred to as DAC2 in the EU, and notes the fact that not all Member States are fully compliant according to the Global Forum peer review; calls on the Commission to closely monitor Member States and launch infringement procedures until all Member States are fully compliant; looks forward to the Global Forum peer review of the practical enforcement of the CRS and calls on the Commission and Member States to prepare diligently for this process;

28.  Regrets that Member States rarely link the information they send to a TIN issued by the taxpayer’s country of residence; notes that only Lithuania and Ireland appear to include a TIN, as recognised by the receiving country(23); notes further that the sharing of valid taxpayer identification numbers (TINs) is crucial for efficient EOI processes; notes that the TINs of corporations should be reported as well, in order to further facilitate the matching of tax relevant information; recalls that every measure to facilitate taxpayers identification must respect fundamental rights, especially the right to privacy and data protection;

29.  Welcomes the requirement in DAC7 to include the TIN of the Member State of residence for DAC1 and DAC2 to improve data matching and identification across Member States, as proper identification of taxpayers is essential to effective EOI between tax administrations; is concerned that large quantities of information are not matched against relevant taxpayers and under-used, leading to shortfalls in taxation;

30.  Calls on the Commission in close collaboration with Member States to create a validation tool for TINs; notes that this validation tool would increase the reporting effectiveness of FIs significantly, and thus decrease the compliance costs for these institutions; calls on the Commission to, after a proper analysis and impact assessment, re-examine the creation of a European TIN; calls on the Member States to ensure more systematic analysis of unmatched DAC1 and DAC2 data, and to introduce procedures for the systematic risk analysis of information received;

31.  Takes note of the fact that information exchanged on request (EOIR) has often been found to be incomplete and required further clarifications; regrets that in the framework of the EOIR authorities often take up to six months and longer to provide information from the date of receipt of the request; notes with regret that there are no time limits for any follow-up exchanges, which creates the potential for further delay; calls on the Commission to revise this provision, including for follow-up requests, to no later than three months; suggests that the Commission is granted the mandate to systematically assess the degree of cooperation of third countries; calls on the Commission to assess indications that EOIR with several third countries is unsatisfactory, including Switzerland;

32.  Deplores the fact that one Member State, Malta, has received an overall ‘partially compliant’ score in the peer review by the Global Forum for EOIR, meaning the EOIR standard is only partly implemented, leading to significant practical effects(24); notes that 19 Member States are not fully compliant on ‘ownership and identity information’(25); notes that six Member States are not fully compliant on ‘accounting information’(26); notes that five Member States are not fully compliant on ‘banking information’(27); notes that seven Member States are not fully compliant on ‘access to information’(28); notes that three Member States are not fully compliant on ‘rights and safeguards’(29); notes that five Member States are not fully compliant on ‘EOI mechanisms’(30); notes that three Member States are not fully compliant on ‘confidentiality’(31); notes that three Member States are not fully compliant on ‘rights and safeguards’(32); notes that nine Member States are not fully compliant on ‘quality and timeliness of responses’(33); notes that in summary no material deficiencies were identified in only eight Member States(34); regrets the fact that material deficiencies have been identified in 18 Member States(35); deeply regrets that certain Member States obtain a low rating on specific issues such as ownership and identity information; calls on Member States to achieve a compliant rating at the next peer review; notes that the Member States’ underperformance seriously undermines the EU’s credibility in fighting tax evasion and avoidance internationally; expects the Commission to deploy with no further delay all legal and non-legal tools to ensure legislation is being properly implemented; calls on the Commission to launch infringement procedures until all Member States are fully compliant; calls, therefore, on the Member States to fully commit to the DAC’s objectives and the implementation of EOI best practices;

33.  Welcomes the Commission’s proposal in DAC7 to clarify the standard of ‘foreseeable relevance’ which needs to be applied in the context of EOIR, and calls on the Commission to produce guidelines to ensure a standardised approach and a more effective use of EOIR provisions;

34.  Welcomes that the Commission has made available various tools for Member States to develop an EOI and best practices, as well as IT support, mainly through the Fiscalis 2020 programme; stresses the need to further promote the exchange of best practices and develop guidance on the use of information, in particular regarding DAC3 and DAC4;

35.  Notes that the use of information under the DAC for non-tax matters requires prior authorisation from the sending Member State, which is not always granted, even though this information could be useful in increasing the efficiency of criminal and other investigations, and the request is commonly based on justified terms; insists that the use of information exchanged under the DAC should always be authorised for purposes other than tax matters where this is allowed under the laws of the receiving Member State for law enforcement; urges, in this context, the Member States to fully commit to high standards of respect for citizens’ fundamental rights as taxpayers;

36.  Deplores the fact that Council has weakened the Commission’s proposed changes to DAC7, in particular regarding joint audits and group requests; calls on the Council to revise its current position and adopt the Commission’s suggested changes as proposed; notes that the number of group requests is very limited, as only five Member States were sent one or more group requests in 2017; calls on the Commission to prepare a standard group request form and include it in the relevant implementing regulation(36); recalls that for this opportunity, as well as for simultaneous checks, to deliver results, essential training is necessary for tax authority employees in foreign tax legislation, languages, specialisation and interpersonal skills;

37.  Acknowledges the added value of sharing best practices and permanent support from the Commission on the empowerment of national tax administrations; underlines the special role of the Fiscalis 2020 programme in this regard; recalls that, nevertheless, national tax administrations need significant reinforcement on their human, financial and infrastructure resources; calls on Member States, therefore, to commit to sufficient levels of investment in national tax administrations; looks forward to the findings of the new Fiscalis project group on the use of advanced analytics to measure data quality within a common framework;

38.  Takes note of the ECA’s findings(37) that more can be done in terms of monitoring, ensuring data quality and using the information received in order to make the exchange of tax information more effective; invites the Commission and Member States to take into account the ECA’s findings in future work on the DAC framework;

Access to data and monitoring

39.  Notes with great concern that there is not enough evidence to assess the quality of reporting under DAC1 and DAC2 provisions, due to the fact that only a few Member States systematically carry out quality checks on the data exchanged under DAC1 and DAC2; notes with great concern that information is underreported, and what is being reported is underused; notes further that little monitoring of the system’s effectiveness takes place; regrets the fact that the data on EOI under DAC provisions, which is publicly available, is insufficient to adequately assess the evolution of information exchanges and their effectiveness;

40.  Notes that there is no common EU framework for monitoring the system’s performance and achievements, which increases the risk that reported data is incomplete or inaccurate; notes moreover that only a few Member States have set up and apply procedures to audit information submitted by FIs under DAC2;

41.  Regrets that according to the ECA, the Commission is not proactively monitoring the implementation of this legislation, providing sufficient guidance or measuring the outcomes and impact of the system; is deeply concerned about the fact that only one of the five Member States examined by the ECA carried out checks of data quality, which took only the form of manual checks on a limited data sample and were not implemented as a systematic process;

42.  Points out that matching rates show that large quantities of information are not used, since they are not matched against relevant taxpayers, and that Member States are not performing further checks of unmatched data; calls on the Commission and the Member States to establish a common framework for measuring the impact and the cost-benefits of the DAC and to make the DAC exchanges fully auditable and traceable from origin to use of the data by including an origin identifier in every data set; calls on the Commission to publish an annual summary of the information received by Member States, taking into account taxpayers’ rights and confidentially; points out, however, that this report must have aggregated and detailed data to allow proper democratic scrutiny by Parliament; notes that the information communicated to the Commission should not be seen as strictly confidential if the information cannot be attributed to single taxpayers; reiterates that the Commission should be entitled to produce and publish reports and documents using the information exchanged in an anonymised manner, so as to take into account the taxpayers’ right to confidentiality and in compliance with Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001(38) regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents;

43.  Calls on the Commission to publish anonymised and aggregated country-by-country report statistics on an annual basis for all Member States; calls on Member States to communicate country-by-country reports received to the relevant Commission services;

44.  Stresses that the 2019 evaluation carried out by the Commission demonstrated the need for consistent monitoring of the effectiveness of the DAC framework; calls on the Member States to communicate statistics, tax revenue gains and all other relevant information needed to properly assess the effectiveness of all exchanges to the Commission on an annual basis; requests, in the case of EOIR, that the information provided be disaggregated on a country-by-country basis while respecting data protection rules; calls on the Commission to continue to properly monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of EOI, and therefore requests a new comprehensive evaluation by January 2023;

45.  Stresses that tax administrations should fully embrace the digital transformation and its potential to lead to a more efficient allocation of information, reductions in compliance costs and unnecessary bureaucracy; emphasises that this needs to be accompanied by an appropriate increase in financial, human and IT resources for tax administrations;

Consistency with other provisions

46.  Acknowledges that DAC provisions are largely coherent with the OECD CRS, and that they substantially overlap with the US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), while also containing important differences with it;

47.  Deplores the lack of reciprocity under the FATCA; observes that the United States is becoming a significant enabler of financial secrecy for non-US citizens; observes that there are two main loopholes: only information on US assets is shared, and no beneficial ownership information is shared; calls on the Commission and the Member States to enter into new negotiations with the United States in the OECD framework in order to achieve full reciprocity within a commonly agreed and strengthened CRS framework; stresses that this would lead to significant progress and lead to lower compliance costs for FIs and significantly reduce bureaucratic burdens; calls on the Commission and the Member States to enter into negotiations for a UN Tax Convention;

48.  Deplores the side effects the FATCA still has on so-called accidental Americans; regrets that, to date, no lasting solution has been found at the European level;

49.  Observes the possible frictions between the DAC framework and Regulations (EU) 2016/679(39) and (EU) 2018/1725(40); stresses that the data processing provided for in DAC provisions has the sole objective of serving the general public interest in the field of taxation in the Member States, namely curbing tax fraud, tax avoidance and tax evasion, safeguarding tax revenues, and promoting fair taxation;

50.  Supports the Council’s invitation to the Commission to analyse to what extent it would be feasible to further align the scope of tools available for tax authorities under Council Directive 2011/16/EU with the specific provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 904/2010(41);

51.  Welcomes the agreements similar to Directive 2014/107/EU on automatic exchange of financial account information with third countries such as Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and Switzerland; calls for an evaluation of the implementation of such an agreement, and calls therefore for an evaluation, in the light of the current CRS agreement; calls, further, for similar agreements for DACs 3, 5, 6 and 7;

Conclusions

52.  Urges the Commission to come forward with a comprehensive revision of the DAC framework as soon as possible, based on Parliament’s proposals and a wide public consultation; strongly invites the Commission and the Council to exchange views with the Parliament on the matter; regrets the Council’s repeated adoption of decisions weakening the Commission’s proposals to strengthen the DAC framework;

53.  Deeply regrets the fact that all Member States – with the exception of Finland and Sweden – have refused to grant Parliament access to the relevant data to assess the implementation of DAC provisions; deplores the fact that the Commission did not grant Parliament access to the relevant data in its possession; considers that Parliament is thereby in effect being hindered from exercising its political scrutiny function over the Commission under both Articles 14 and 17(8) TEU; notes that this implementation report therefore has significant shortcomings; calls on the Member States and the Commission to cease refusing to share relevant documents in line with Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 which applies directly, and to respect the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 13(2) TEU; calls for Parliament to use all legal means at its disposal to ensure that it receives all documents needed for a complete assessment of the implementation of the DAC;

54.  Understands that the DAC, as it concerns tax matters, is an intergovernmental dimension of European integration; recalls, however, that tax policies are structural for the fulfilment of strategic EU objectives, mainly related to AML, terrorist financing, combating tax fraud and evasion, etc.; deplores the Council’s position on consecutive DAC revisions, based on the repeated mitigation of Commission proposals and disregard of Parliament’s positions; calls on the Council to review its attitude towards the Parliament on tax matters and, specifically, on DAC revisions; urges the Council to grant access to relevant information on DAC implementation in order to guarantee proper democratic scrutiny by the Parliament;

55.  Understands that the DAC has a dual effect: detecting fraud through information sharing and deterring it by making fraudsters more likely to be identified while not letting them go unpunished; recognises that it is more difficult to quantify such deterrent effect, but invites the Commission to further consider this aspect of the DAC in its future evaluations;

o
o   o

56.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 64, 11.3.2011, p. 1. (2) OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 25. (3) OJ L 359, 16.12.2014, p. 1. (4) OJ L 332, 18.12.2015, p. 1. (5) OJ L 146, 3.6.2016, p. 8. (6) OJ L 342, 16.12.2016, p. 1. (7) OJ L 139, 5.6.2018, p. 1. (8) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0072. (9) OJ C 108, 26.3.2021, p. 8. (10) Study - ‘Implementation of the EU requirements for tax information exchange’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services, Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value, Ex-Post Evaluation Unit, 4 February 2021. (11) OJ C 429, 11.12.2020, p. 6. (12) Dover, R. et al: ‘Bringing transparency, coordination and convergence to corporate tax policies in the European Union, Part I: Assessment of the magnitude of aggressive corporate tax planning’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services, European Added Value Unit, September 2015. (13) European Commission, Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union, Taxation Papers, Working Paper No 76, ‘Estimating International Tax Evasion by Individuals’, September 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/2019-taxation-papers-76.pdf (14) Final Report, Ecorys, ‘Monitoring the amount of wealth hidden by individuals in international financial centres and impact of recent internationally agreed standards on tax transparency on the fight against tax evasion’. (15) As of 25 November 2020. See European Commission website Anti-money laundering Directive IV (AMLD IV) – transposition status at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/anti-money-laundering-directive-4-transpositi onstatus_en (16) Information as of 22 December 2020: Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Romania and Slovakia (see European Commission website: https://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringementsproceedings/infringement_decisions/index.cfm?lang_code=EN&typeOfSearch=false∾tive_only=1&noncom=0&r_dossier=&decision_date_from=&decision_date_to=&title=Directive+2015%2F849⊂mit=Search). In February 2021 three additional infringement procedures were launched against Germany, Portugal and Romania https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_21_441 (17) As of 25 November 2020. See European Commission website Anti-money laundering Directive V (AMLD V) – transposition status at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/anti-money-laundering-directive-5-transpositi onstatus_en (18) Information as of 22 December 2020: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. See European Commission website: https://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringementsproceedings/infringement_decisions/index.cfm?lang_code=EN&typeOfSearch=false∾tive_only=1&noncom=0&r_dossier=&decision_date_from=&decision_date_to=&title=Directive+2015%2F849⊂mit=Search (19) Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden, Portugal and Hungary. (20) Financial Action Task Force, 4th Round Ratings, November 2020, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. (21) Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes. (22) https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/175eeff4-en.pdf?expires=1614245801&id=id&accname=ocid194994&checksum=C36736F5E5628939095D507381D7D7C5 (23) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/662603/EPRS_STU(2021)662603_EN.pdf (24) https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/global-forum-on-transparency-and-exchange-of-information-for-tax-purposes-malta-2020-second-round_d92a4f90-en (25) Estonia, Austria, Hungary, Belgium, Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Croatia, Netherlands, Cyprus, Poland, Czechia, Portugal, Denmark, Romania, Slovakia, Greece, Germany, Malta and Spain. Source: footnotes 25-34: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/global-forum-on-transparency-and-exchange-of-information-for-tax-purposes-peer-reviews_2219469x?_ga=2.61374444.131706240.1621422687-1265388792.1602508229 (26) Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Slovakia, Spain and Malta. (27) Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Denmark and Slovakia. (28) Austria, Hungary, Belgium, Latvia, Czechia, Portugal and Slovakia. (29) Hungary, Belgium and Luxembourg. (30) Austria, Latvia, Cyprus, Czechia and Portugal. (31) Belgium, Latvia and Hungary. (32) Hungary, Latvia and Czechia. (33) Italy, Malta, France, Luxembourg, Bulgaria; Portugal, Romania, Greece and Germany. (34) Estonia, Italy, Finland, Lithuania, France, Slovenia, Sweden and Ireland. (35) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/662603/EPRS_STU(2021)662603_EN.pdf (36) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2378 of 15 December 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Council Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1156/2012 (OJ L 332, 18.12.2015, p. 19). (37) https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=57680 (38) Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43). (39) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1). (40) Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39). (41) Council Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 of 7 October 2010 on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of value added tax (OJ L 268, 12.10.2010, p. 1).

European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 on the situation in Afghanistan (2021/2877(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0393 RC-B9-0455/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Afghanistan,

–  having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

–  having regard to UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001), 1373 (2001), 2210 (2015), 2344 (2017), 2513 (2020) and 2593 (2021),

–  having regard to the EU‐Afghanistan Joint Way Forward on migration issues of 2 October 2016,

–  having regard to the Cooperation Agreement of 18 February 2017 on Partnership and Development between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, of the other part(1),

–  having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 24 July 2017 entitled ‘Elements for an EU Strategy on Afghanistan (JOIN(2017)0031),

–  having regard to the declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union of 17 August 2021 on Afghanistan,

–  having regard to the speech of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet at the emergency session of the UN Human Rights Council of 24 August 2021,

–  having regard to the G7 Leaders statement of 24 August 2021 on Afghanistan,

–  having regard to the statement by the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 31 August 2021 on the situation in Afghanistan,

–  having regard to the outcomes of the joint EU, NATO and G7 meeting on Afghanistan,

–  having regard to the Taliban’s announcement of the creation of the caretaker government of Afghanistan of 7 September 2021,

–  having regard to the UN international donor conference on Afghanistan on 13 and 14 September 2021 in Geneva,

–  having regard to the statement of 3 September 2021 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell at the press conference following the informal meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers (Gymnich),

–  having regard to the completion of the withdrawal from Afghanistan of the United States Armed Forces on 30 August 2021,

–  having regard to the EU Guidelines for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Child, on Children and Armed Conflict, and on Human Rights Defenders,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

–  having regard to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951, and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

–  having regard to the UN Refugee Convention of 1951,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,

–  having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979,

–  having regard to the UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the UN Global Compact on Refugees, which followed the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly on 19 September 2016,

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas while under Taliban rule in the 1990s, Afghanistan was the main safe haven and operational headquarters of international terrorist organisations, in particular al‑Qaeda, responsible for numerous barbaric terrorist attacks targeting civilians in Asia, Africa, Australia, Europe and America, and for the deadliest terrorist attack in human history on 11 September 2001 in the United States, in which almost 3 000 people of more than 90 nationalities were killed;

B.  whereas the barbaric attack on the United States 20 years ago triggered UN Security Council Resolution 1368 and led to the US-led intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, which led to the overthrow of the Taliban along with the dismantling and decline of al‑Qaeda and other global jihadist organisations, the progress of which is now in grave peril;

C.  whereas after the attacks of 11 September 2001, NATO invoked Article 5 of its founding treaty, the only time NATO has ever invoked its collective defence, with more than 40 countries contributing to the security of the country, and dozens of other states and organisations, including the EU, engaging in the stabilisation of the country in line with subsequent UN resolutions;

D.  whereas NATO and allied countries have had a presence in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001; whereas in April 2021, following three years of negotiations with the Taliban, the United States announced a withdrawal of troops to be completed by 11 September 2021; whereas the withdrawal of NATO and allied troops was concluded in August 2021;

E.  whereas the Taliban subsequently rapidly advanced on government-controlled territory; whereas the Afghan army and security forces were unable to mount an effective defence and President Ashraf Ghani fled the country; whereas the Taliban established full control over the country and re-established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan;

F.  whereas a US-led evacuation of over 110 000 people from Afghanistan took place in August 2021 without coordination by the international community; whereas the United States and the international community managed to airlift to safety over 120 000 at-risk Afghans, local staff of diplomatic missions and military contingents, and foreign nationals within the space of two weeks in August 2021; whereas an estimated 150‑170 000 Afghans who worked with the international community over the past two decades have been left behind, their lives in peril;

G.  whereas the Taliban announced the formation of a caretaker government on 7 September 2021 under the leadership of Muhammad Hassan Akhund, Head of the Taliban Leadership Council, to which no women or non-Taliban figures have been invited; whereas the Taliban’s caretaker government includes persons responsible for acts of terrorism, including former detainees, individuals under UN sanctions and a person on an FBI most wanted list; whereas many members of the Taliban’s caretaker government are holders of passports issued by Pakistan; whereas this government heavily discriminates against the country’s ethnic and religious minorities;

H.  whereas the Taliban’s caretaker government was formed without keeping the Taliban’s promises of an inclusive government; whereas the Ministry of Women’s Affairs has been dismantled; whereas the Taliban do not envisage continuous participation of women in leadership roles in Afghanistan, are persecuting women leaders, officials and activists, and are using lethal force to disperse women’s rights protests; whereas there is a well-founded fear that the Law on Elimination of Violence Against Women, which imposes criminal penalties for child and forced marriages, domestic violence and numerous other abuses against women, will be repealed;

I.  whereas the Taliban’s caretaker government has issued a countrywide ban on protests and has started a crackdown on the free media, including the detention of and assaults on journalists and imposing new restrictions on media work; whereas the Taliban use propaganda to spread hatred towards the West and the EU;

J.  whereas the human rights situation is rapidly deteriorating; whereas the list of vulnerable and at-risk individuals covers most of the population including women, girls, the LGBTI+ community, ethnic and religious minorities notably Shia Hazaras, members of civil society, academics, journalists, lawyers, judges, artists, and politicians and civil servants from the previous Afghan Government; whereas during armed conflicts women have historically suffered from gender-based violence and sexual violence as a weapon of war;

K.  whereas the Taliban are reportedly targeting individuals for harassment, violence and retribution killings; whereas the majority of women have been prevented from returning to the workplace, universities and schools; whereas protests have erupted in the country in particular against the all-male government and its plans to curtail women’s rights and exclude women from public life, including sporting activities; whereas the Taliban have violently repressed the demonstrations and the local resistance, notably in the Panjshir Valley;

L.  whereas the country is facing an unfolding humanitarian catastrophe; whereas there are severe shortages of food, water and medicines; whereas 18,4 million Afghans need humanitarian support, including 14 million who were already food insecure; whereas the Commission has announced an increase of humanitarian aid to over EUR 200 million for those inside the country and those fleeing;

M.  whereas the crisis in Afghanistan is first and foremost a tragedy for the Afghan people, but is also putting the EU’s own security at risk; whereas the EU should draw the requisite conclusions from this collective failure and prepare for its consequences for our security, including a possible increased threat of terrorism; whereas jihadists around the world feel emboldened by the Taliban’s takeover;

N.  whereas Afghans have been fleeing their country for years and have sought refuge primarily in neighbouring countries, but also in Europe; whereas an increase in the number of Afghans migrating to Europe might take place;

O.  whereas the Commission has neither coordinated the evacuation efforts involving European nationals and Afghan citizens working for the EU and its Member States, nor has it been able to set up a genuine European airlift; whereas the evacuation of EU nationals and Afghans at risk who wish to flee is not over and requires unity between the EU and its Member States, including a communication channel with the Taliban;

P.  whereas communication with the Taliban should by no means lead to the removal of the existing sanctions against its members;

Q.  whereas Kabul International Airport is partially operational again, but Afghanistan’s land borders are heavily guarded with Taliban checkpoints; whereas millions of Afghans remain in the country, unable to leave;

R.  whereas the country remains extremely insecure; whereas the regional Islamic State group ISIS-K claimed responsibility for an airport bombing on 26 August 2021 which killed around 170 people;

S.  whereas the Taliban face internal divisions and opposition from other extremist and hardline groups in Afghanistan; whereas the regime also now has access to military equipment abandoned by Afghan and allied forces; whereas these weapons could easily wind up in the hands of other internationally recognised terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State, al-Qaeda and their affiliates;

T.  whereas Afghanistan is one of the most aid-dependent countries in the world, with approximately more than 18 million people, half of the population, requiring permanent assistance, and one third of the population being food insecure; whereas approximately 600 000 Afghans have been internally displaced in 2021 alone, 80 % of whom are women and children; whereas in total, an estimated 5 million Afghans have been internally displaced within Afghanistan and an estimated 2.2 million Afghan refugees already live in neighbouring countries; whereas the disbursement of humanitarian aid is severely hampered by Taliban control;

U.  whereas 760 000 Afghans have returned from Iran and Pakistan in 2021 so far, which has strained the capacity of existing services and caused concerns about their reintegration and living conditions; whereas the Commission has announced an increase of humanitarian aid to over EUR 200 million for those inside the country and those fleeing;

V.  whereas demonstrable progress in the rights of women and girls has been made in Afghanistan since 2001, including access to education, healthcare and participation in civic and political life; whereas these improvements are arguably the most successful achievements in the county’s recent development; whereas this partial progress is now under serious threat due to the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan;

W.  whereas the Taliban are seeking international recognition, legitimacy and support and have publically declared that they will allow women freedom within Islamic law, which is contradicted by increasing reports of restrictive practices being introduced around Afghanistan and attacks on women, academics, human rights defenders, media workers and civil servants; whereas there are reports of the Taliban tracking individuals who served the previous authorities and then carrying out revenge killings;

X.  whereas more than 75 % of the Afghan state’s budget and more than 95 % of its military budget came from the international community;

Y.  whereas the recent surge of the COVID-19 pandemic in the country, the lack of vaccines and medical supplies, the drought and the upcoming winter are circumstances likely to even further exacerbate the current socio-economic and humanitarian crisis; whereas the logistical and security situation is further hindered by the COVID-19 pandemic;

1.  Deplores the violent takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban and refuses to recognise their current government; expresses its strong concerns about the future of Afghanistan now that the Taliban have taken over the country and are imposing radical sharia law, depriving the Afghan people of the basic rights and freedoms they have enjoyed over the past 20 years; expresses its deepest condolences and support to the victims of ongoing violations and terror attacks, and to their families;

2.  Expresses its sincerest condolences to the families and friends of the service members and civilians that have lost their lives over the past 20 years in Afghanistan;

3.  Expresses its profound and sincere solidarity with Afghans who have fled the country and those who remain; reiterates that this is first and foremost a humanitarian and human rights crisis in which the safety, security and rights of Afghans must be prioritised at all times;

4.  Is deeply concerned about the unfolding humanitarian, economic and refugee crisis in Afghanistan; considers that the safe, peaceful and democratic future of Afghanistan requires an inclusive negotiated political settlement; reiterates its continued commitment to an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process and post-conflict reconstruction as the only credible path to inclusive, long-term peace, security and development;

5.  Regrets that the political process and military planning leading to the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan was undertaken unilaterally and without sufficient coordination with NATO allies; regrets that during the rescue operation in Kabul, no cooperation or coordination among EU Member States took place, especially with regard to the communication with the US, which led to most embassies being caught by surprise by the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul; believes that more coordination would have helped to avoid the ensuing chaos and desperation and would have resulted in more efficient procedures to allow those who were entitled to be rescued to reach the airport in a more orderly and predictable way;

6.  Deplores the lack of communication between the US and European countries and calls on the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission to critically evaluate the process and present this evaluation to the European Parliament by the end of this year;

7.  Expresses its gratitude for the bravery of all servicewomen and servicemen, men and women in uniform, humanitarian aid and development personnel, diplomats and local staff who worked, and in part still work, in Afghanistan; praises the significant sacrifice made for a more peaceful and secure Afghanistan over the last two decades;

8.  Expresses strong disappointment at the rapid collapse of Afghanistan’s state structures, which were not able or willing to withstand the Taliban offensive, which took 10 days, from when they took over the first provincial capital to when they entered Kabul; expresses its disappointment at the failed leadership of President Ashraf Ghani and his decision to flee Afghanistan; demands an investigation into allegations of possible misappropriation of funds from the Afghan budget by President Ghani and other members of the political elite;

A call to end the violence

9.  Is appalled by reported violations including executions of civilians and members of the Afghan national security forces, recruitment of child soldiers, repression of peaceful protest and expressions of dissent and restrictions of human rights especially targeting women and girls, human rights defenders, LGBTI+ people, religious and ethnic minorities, journalists, writers, academics and artists; urges the Taliban to end these practices immediately and to safeguard, in particular, Afghan women’s rights to education, work, sport, free movement, assembly and association, inter alia;

10.  Highlights the need for documentation, transparent and prompt investigations of reports of all violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law, and to hold those responsible to account; supports the use of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (the EU Magnitsky Act) in this regard; expects Member States to ensure the adoption of a resolution to establish a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan with a robust mandate as a matter of priority at the upcoming 48th regular session of the UN Human Rights Council;

11.  Calls on the EEAS and the Member States to ensure the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution for the renewal of the UN mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), which expires on 17 September 2021;

Enhanced coordination of evacuation efforts

12.  Calls on the EU and its Member States to work together to facilitate the further evacuation of EU citizens and Afghans at risk, notably through the use of available safe corridors; recalls that the EU expects the Taliban to facilitate this; reiterates the need to focus in this regard on groups of women that are at particular risk, including all women and girls, human rights defenders, LGBTI+ people, religious and ethnic minorities, journalists, writers, academics, local staff and artists, among others;

13.  Asks the Commission and the EEAS to devise and implement existing and future protection schemes in coordination with the Member States and to define the envisaged protection measures in the light of possible future emergencies that necessitate these measures; believes that the category of local staff should include all staff that have worked for the EU or EU-funded projects;

Continued support for Afghan women and girls

14.  Expresses solidarity with the women and human rights defenders protesting around Afghanistan against the Taliban takeover of the country and who want to live in a free, stable, peaceful and diverse society;

15.  Deeply regrets the fact that 20 years of progress in the rights of women and girls and gender equality is now under severe threat; reiterates its position that this progress must be carefully safeguarded and monitored; stresses that the right to education and employment, freedom from gender-based violence, the protection of fundamental rights, access to healthcare and full participation in decision-making in local and national political, public and civic life must be key demands of the international community in dialogue with the Taliban;

16.  Underscores the need to ensure that women and young people who have left Afghanistan can continue their education in other countries; encourages the development of innovative ways to continue empowering Afghan women and young people, particularly by providing scholarships to study at European schools and universities;

Deep concern about the Taliban’s de facto government

17.  Expresses grave concern about the appointments in the all-male interim government consisting of 33 mullahs, with many under US and UN sanctions and wanted for terrorist activities; notes with the utmost concern the appointment as Minister of Interior of Sirajuddin Haqqani, whose links with terrorist activities have been extensively documented, and the presence of several individuals under UN sanctions in the de facto Taliban government;

18.  Calls for the establishment of a representative and elected government in which women and minority groups can meaningfully participate; recalls that the long-term development of Afghanistan will depend on accountability, good governance, the sustainable provision of human security, including the reduction of poverty and the creation of job opportunities, access to social and health services, education, and the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights;

19.  Emphasises its long-term support for credible, free, fair and transparent elections, in line with international standards, and expresses its support for election observations in the country;

Operational engagement necessary, but no official recognition of the de facto government

20.  Acknowledges that operational engagement with the Taliban’s new de facto government is needed for logistical, operational and humanitarian matters in order to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians in need and safe passage for foreign nationals and Afghans seeking to leave the country; points out that these contacts should remain strictly limited to the relevant purposes at this stage; emphasises that the conditions have not been met for the political recognition of the de facto Taliban rulers who have assumed power by military means and are currently destroying the achievements of the last 20 years;

21.  Recalls that for the EU, a critical litmus test of any kind of relationship with the Taliban will be the preservation of the achievements of the last 20 years, particularly in the area of women’s rights and girls’ education, and making sure that Afghanistan does not descend into being a safe haven for jihadi and other terrorist groups launching or masterminding terrorist attacks from its territory; recalls that the Taliban will be judged by the international community on the basis of their actions on the ground, not by public declarations;

22.  Urges the Commission to swiftly launch an investigation pursuant to Article 19(1)(a) of the GSP Regulation(2) with a view to suspending the trade preferences that Afghanistan has under the Everything But Arms scheme;

23.  Notes the importance of the resumption of an EU presence on the ground when security and political conditions permit;

24.  Calls for the organisation of an EU institutions mission to Kabul when circumstances allow, in order for its participants to familiarise themselves with the humanitarian, migration, economic, and security situation and the state of women’s and minorities’ rights in Afghanistan;

Ensuring that Afghanistan will not become a new bulwark of terrorist organisations

25.  Condemns in the strongest terms the deadly terrorist attack of 26 August 2021 perpetrated by ISIS-K at the Abbey Gate of Kabul International Airport and the Baron Hotel, which claimed the lives of more than 170 people, including 13 US service personnel, and injured more than 200;

26.  Insists that the Taliban and the Government of the Islamic Republic must fulfil their counterterrorism commitments, including preventing al-Qaeda, Daesh or other terrorist groups and individuals from using Afghan soil to threaten or violate the security of any other country, not hosting members of these groups, and preventing them from recruiting, training or fundraising; warns that the failure to crack down on these groups will lead to international sanctions and the isolation of the Taliban;

27.  Urges the Member States to preserve and share whatever intelligence was gained through their military and law enforcement presence in Afghanistan, with a particular emphasis on biometric data that is critical in assisting Member States and third countries in identifying any returning foreign fighters; underscores the fact that combating the financing of terrorism is key to creating an environment conducive to security in Afghanistan; urges all relevant partners to enhance their efforts at dismantling all terrorist financing networks; stresses that the imminent terrorist threat in Afghanistan as a result of the Taliban takeover must be prominently addressed in the EU’s Strategic Compass, which will outline the military threats faced by the EU and its ambitions for the coming years; urges European intelligence services to increase the sharing of regularly updated threat analyses in order to enhance intelligence sharing and institutional cooperation;

28.  Recalls that the production and trade of opium is a significant source of income for the Taliban, the impact of which goes far beyond Afghan borders; expresses concern at the imminent risk that the instability in the country will increase the illicit drugs trade, as well as the flow of arms, money laundering and terrorist financing;

29.  Calls for thorough registration and security checks on those being evacuated from the region and an enhanced exchange of information between the Member States’ law enforcement authorities, the US and Europol to prevent possible security threats stemming from terrorism and organised crime;

30.  Condemns irreparable damages of the cultural sites made by the Taliban and their affiliates and remains cautious that the instability will lead to an increase of international smuggling and theft of cultural heritage that could be used to finance enhanced activity by terror organisations in the region; urges the digitisation of Afghan cultural artefacts to be carried out in Europe in order to support the detection of smuggled goods, and calls for a comprehensive temporary ban against the import of cultural goods from Afghanistan be implemented so as to deprive the Taliban and their affiliates of the potential to profit from cultural smuggling;

Further increasing humanitarian aid

31.  Praises the work of international organisations and local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which provide services, assistance and relief to the Afghan people despite the security risks; calls on the Taliban to ensure the safety of local and international civil society organisations, NGOs and humanitarian organisations, including their female staff, which is essential for providing critical services to Afghan women and girls; stresses that these women humanitarian aid workers must be able to work freely and without fear of retaliation;

32.  Calls for humanitarian assistance to be stepped up further and coordinated with UN agencies and NGOs, including the creation of humanitarian corridors for the provision of food aid, water, sanitation and medication; welcomes the Commission’s decision to increase humanitarian support for Afghanistan from over EUR 50 million to more than EUR 200 million; welcomes the international community’s recent EUR 1 billion pledge for the people of Afghanistan and calls on the Commission to lead advocacy efforts to ensure that the needs of humanitarian support are fully met;

33.  Reiterates that the immediate needs of Afghan women and girls, in particular those who are displaced, need to be prioritised in the context of humanitarian aid; highlights the fact that it is crucial to mitigate vulnerability to gender-based violence and ensure access to healthcare and basic hygiene supplies;

34.  Insists on continued direct EU support for Afghan politicians and civil society activists committed to human rights and fundamental values, many of whom are now in exile, so that they can continue to work to preserve the achievements of the last 20 years and to pursue reforms in Afghanistan;

35.  Emphasises that European financial support via the authorities is conditional on preserving and building upon the achievements of the past 20 years, especially the rights of women and girls; insists that the Taliban must demonstrate respect for and a commitment to safeguarding these achievements, which they have not done so far; stresses that the EU should make sure that humanitarian assistance to Afghan civilians in need is channelled through the relevant international organisations and NGOs, and should insist that the Taliban must ensure safe and unhindered access to local and international NGOs; underscores that the Taliban must not hinder the delivery and disbursement of humanitarian aid to all those in need;

36.  Calls on the Commission to examine all ongoing development projects in the country in order to try to assess which of them can still continue with local partners or NGOs and international organisations without interference from the Taliban regime, with the participation of women, security guarantees for development aid workers, and effective safeguards against corruption as conditions;

The EU must develop a response to a potential migration and refugee crisis

37.  Stresses the fundamental right of Afghans to seek safety; urges all steps to be taken to resume coordinated evacuations from the country under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), notably through the creation of safe corridors and the permanent reopening of Kabul International Airport and Afghanistan’s land borders; calls for specific support for women, girls and people at risk wanting to leave the country, in order to ensure safe routes;

38.  Stresses that the largest proportion of Afghan refugees will seek protection in neighbouring countries first and foremost, and that the EU should therefore plan to provide additional support to Afghanistan’s neighbouring refugee-hosting countries, preferably via the UN and its agencies, as well as international organisations on the ground;

39.  Recalls that financial, logistical and capacity-building support for the reception of Afghan refugees and migrants in neighbouring countries is not an alternative to a fully-fledged European asylum and migration policy; believes that the EU must urgently conclude and implement its New Pact on Asylum and Migration so as to be able to deal with migration flows in a more effective and humane manner;

40.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure a coordinated European effort to pursue a humane asylum policy in which the EU shoulders its moral responsibility in reception and integration in full compliance with the 1951 Geneva Convention; welcomes the planned September Resettlement Forum; stresses that the EU’s policy should include, as a matter of priority, an expansion of resettlement for those who are most at risk and most vulnerable, as well as further complementary pathways, such as humanitarian visas and a special visa programme for Afghan women seeking protection from the Taliban regime; urges the Member States to reassess current and recent asylum applications, including rejected applications, in the light of recent developments; underlines that there must be no forced returns to Afghanistan under any circumstances;

41.  Calls on the Council to utilise available tools such as the Temporary Protection Directive(3) and Civil Protection Mechanism to maximise efforts across the EU to ensure better coordination among Member States and immediate access to protection; reiterates its call on the Commission to publish a legislative proposal for humanitarian visas and calls for equal responsibility-sharing among the Member States;

42.  Calls for enhanced cooperation and support for non-EU countries to help them to combat criminal networks that engage in migrant smuggling and human trafficking; calls on Europol to provide criminal risk analysis and enhanced cooperation with third countries in the broader context of the developments in Afghanistan;

43.  Calls on the Commission to reflect this resolution in the programming of the NDICI-Global Europe instrument and the preparation of the relevant multiannual indicative programmes;

More cooperation needed with countries in the region around Afghanistan, while upholding fundamental human rights and the rule of law

44.  Recognises that the current situation in Afghanistan is not conducive to regional stability; underscores that the West’s withdrawal from Afghanistan has created a void that is resulting in increased instability; highlights that more responsibility now lies with neighbouring and regional powers for the situation in Afghanistan, which need to prevent any outpour of instability beyond the borders of the country; reaffirms the need for the EU to strengthen cooperation with Central Asian countries in this regard, in particular Uzbekistan, with which the EU is currently negotiating an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, as well as Tajikistan; stresses that this cooperation should not undermine the EU’s defence of fundamental values and the rule of law;

45.  Expresses its concern about the safety of Afghan nationals at high risk and those crossing to neighbouring countries over land borders, in particular to Pakistan; regrets the lack of coordination by the international community in this respect and urges the Member States to exploit all possible diplomatic leverage and tools to ensure access to land borders, safe passage and access to diplomatic facilities; stresses the critical coordination role of EU delegations in neighbouring countries in providing practical support in this regard;

46.  Recalls that for many years Pakistan provided safe havens for Taliban members, as well as assistance to their security forces; instructs the EEAS to convey to Pakistan’s leadership that it bears responsibility for security and stability in Afghanistan and that it must use its influence on the Taliban to achieve those aims, and to consider if there is reason to immediately review Pakistan’s eligibility for GSP+ status and the benefits that come with it in the light of current events;

47.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries with immediate support for asylum capacity-building, with the assistance of the European Asylum Support Organisation, and humanitarian aid for the most vulnerable in order to stabilise the region and prevent another migration crisis;

48.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to immediately increase support to countries neighbouring Afghanistan that are hosting large numbers of migrants and refugees, to ensure that people in need of protection get a safe reception and sustainable living conditions;

A wake-up call for the European Union – necessary reforms

49.  Is cognisant of the fact that the withdrawal of US and international forces from Afghanistan is a manifestation of a collective failure of Western foreign and security policy and strategy, with possible long-term detrimental consequences; considers that in the short term it will damage the credibility of the West, create a crisis of confidence and require serious lessons to be drawn from this experience for the future, in particular when it comes to deciding on the nature and mandate of military interventions;

50.  Expresses its deep frustration and concern at the ineffectiveness of the US, NATO, the EEAS and the European Union institutions as a whole over a 20-year period in maintaining and funding the Ghani government, in reality corrupt and alien to the people, as well as armed forces that have proven to be ineffective; expresses its concern at the fact that our collective failure in Afghanistan means a strategic advantage for non‑Western powers and neighbouring countries, notably Pakistan, as well as China and, to a lesser extent, Russia, without their having provided significant support to and been involved in the development of Afghanistan; recalls that the Afghan authorities were embroiled in political infighting and systemic corruption and were not able to overcome weak governance;

51.  Emphasises the importance of good governance, the rule of law and the fight against corruption, on which not enough progress had been achieved in Afghanistan in the context of the war on terror in the country; believes that for the success of state building and the EU’s international human rights agenda, the EU needs to pursue an integrated approach of foreign, humanitarian, development, human rights, security, gender equality and trade policies; urges the Council, the EEAS and the Commission to prepare and present to Parliament, as soon as possible, a comprehensive lesson-based strategy as regards Afghanistan and the countries in the surrounding region;

52.  Believes that this crisis proves the need for the EU to reinforce significantly its capacity to act autonomously and thus strengthen EU defence cooperation by building a genuine European Defence Union, which should go hand in hand with the strengthening of the European pillar of NATO; believes that the EU must invest in military awareness, surveillance and reconnaissance, intelligence and strategic airlift; recalls that the inability of European forces to secure an international airport such as that of Kabul without US support is a striking example of the amount of investment that will be required; welcomes the recent reflections made by the High Representative in this regard, and reiterates its support for fundamental and comprehensive dialogue between EU institutions, EU Member States, national parliaments, European partners and civil society on the way forward;

53.  Believes that EU foreign affairs issues should be decided by an extended use of qualified majority following the EU treaties;

54.  Calls on the EEAS to strengthen the EU’s diplomatic representation in Central Asia, in particular in Tajikistan, in order to be able to receive first-hand information about developments on the ground; insists that the situation in Afghanistan, especially concerning women and girls, ethnic, religious and other vulnerable groups, continue to be assessed and evaluated in the coming weeks and months;

55.  Recognises the importance of close cooperation with the US focused on addressing multiple challenges and providing humanitarian support for the Afghan people, while taking into account the lessons learned in Afghanistan; expresses appreciation to the US military for their support with the evacuation from Kabul International Airport and expresses its deepest condolences to the families of the troops who died in the process;

56.  Calls on the EU and the Member States to ensure effective protection of the EU’s external borders in full compliance with EU law and fundamental rights in order to better prepare for migration movements from the region and unauthorised entries into the EU;

o
o   o

57.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Special Envoy to Afghanistan, the national parliaments of the Member States, and the US Congress.

(1) OJ L 67, 14.3.2017, p. 3. (2) Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences (OJ L 303, 31.10.2012, p. 1). (3) Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (OJ L 212, 7.8.2001, p. 12).

European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 on the situation in Lebanon (2021/2878(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0394 RC-B9-0465/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular its resolution of 22 May 2008 on the situation in Lebanon(1),

–  having regard to previous UN Security Council Resolutions, in particular 1559 (2004), 1701 (2006) and 2539 (2020), 2591 (2021),

–  having regard to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the other part(2),

–  having regard to the Council Decision 2007/860/EC of 10 December 2007 providing Community macro-financial assistance to Lebanon(3),

–  having regard to the final report by the European Union Election Observation Mission to Lebanon 2018,

–  having regard to the commitments agreed in the framework of the EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities in November 2016, the CEDRE Conference in 6 April 2018, the Lebanon Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF) in December 2020 and the International Support Group for Lebanon meetings on 11 December 2019, 23 September 2020 and 19 May 2021,

–  having regard to the statement of 5 August 2020 by Commissioner for Crisis Management Janez Lenarčič on the explosion in Beirut,

–  having regard to the International Conference on Assistance and Support to Beirut and the Lebanese People of 9 August 2020 and the Conference in Support of the Lebanese Population of 2 December 2020, organised by France and the UN,

–  having regard to the joint statement of 23 September 2020 by the International Support Group for Lebanon,

–  having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU of 28 September 2020 on the resignation of the Prime Minister-designate of Lebanon,

–  having regard to the report on the Lebanon Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF) adopted by the EU, the UN and the World Bank in December 2020,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 7 December 2020 on Lebanon,

–  having regard to the World Bank’s Lebanon Economic Monitor (LEM) of 1 June 2021 and to the Beirut Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA) prepared by the World Bank Group in cooperation with the EU and the UN,

–  having regard to the statements and remarks by Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell on 19 June 2021 during his visit to the country,

–  having regard to the statement by VP/HR Borrell of 16 July 2021 on the Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri stepping down,

–  having regard to the call of 16 July 2021 by the Chair of the Committee on Foreign, Affairs David McAllister, and the Chair of the Delegation for relations with the Mashreq countries, Isabel Santos, for the Lebanese political leadership to resolve the deadlock after the Prime Minister-designate steps down,

–  having regard to UNICEF’s press release of 23 July 2021 entitled ‘Lebanon: Public water system on the verge of collapse, UNICEF warns’,

–  having regard to the statement of the European External Action Service (EEAS) Spokesperson of 26 July 2021 on the government formation process,

–  having regard to the statement of 28 July 2021 by the Co-Chairs of the second 3RF Consultative Group meeting,

–  having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1277 of 30 July 2021 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Lebanon(4),

–  having regard to the statement by VP/HR Borrell of 3 August 2021 on the one year anniversary of the Beirut port explosion,

–  having regard to the Conference in Support of the Population of Lebanon which took place on 4 August 2021 by videoconference, and to the statement made by VP/HR Borrell during the Conference,

–  having regard to the letter of 4 August 2021 from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the UN Security Council on extending the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL),

–  having regard to the statement issued by the President of the European Council on 4 August 2021 at the third International Conference in Support of the People of Lebanon, held at the joint invitation of the UN Secretary-General and the President of the French Republic,

–  having regard to the statement of 7 August 2021 by the EEAS Spokesperson condemning the firing of rockets from southern Lebanon,

–  having regard to the statement of 26 August 2021 by the UN Secretary-General António Guterres on the deteriorating socio-economic situation in Lebanon,

–  having regard to Decision No 1/2016 of the EU-Lebanon Association Council of 11 November 2016 agreeing on EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities, and to the proposal for a Council decision on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union within the Association Council set up by the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the other part, as regards the extension of the EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities until new updated joint documents are adopted by the EU and Lebanon (COM(2021)0406),

–  having regard to the incidents of August to September 2019, 14 April 2020, 17 April 2020, 27 July 2020, May 2021, 20 July 2021 and 4 to 6 August 2021 which occurred across the Blue Line,

–  having regard to the joint communication of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood – A new Agenda for the Mediterranean’ (JOIN(2021)0002),

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the current situation in Lebanon is extremely alarming and deeply concerning due to the political, economic, social, financial and health crisis, and the state of institutional breakdown; whereas Lebanon is a close and important partner of the European Union; whereas this partnership is based on common interests, long-standing historical and cultural ties, regular political and social dialogue and wide-ranging people-to-people contacts;

B.  whereas Lebanon has a vibrant civil society with numerous activists, community leaders, academics, artists and youth groups mobilising and calling for urgent reforms;

C.  whereas the situation in Lebanon was critical and led to a financial crisis at the end of 2019; whereas mass protests already took place on 17 October 2019 calling for social and economic rights, accountability, the end of corruption and the resignation of all political representatives, also called Lebanon’s October Revolution; whereas on 29 October 2019, former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri announced the resignation of the government;

D.  whereas on 4 August 2020, a devastating explosion of a large amount of ammonium nitrate at the Beirut port caused more than 200 deaths, wounded more than 6 500 people and damaged over 74 000 homes, directly affecting 300 000 people; whereas in the aftermath, former Prime Minister Hassan Diab resigned; whereas one year after the blast, the investigation into the causes that led to the explosion has not yet been concluded – largely because of corruption – and those responsible have not been identified or held to account; whereas a Human Rights Watch report issued on 3 August 2021 shed light on evidence implicating officials in explosion; whereas on 4 August 2021, a further mass street protest took place in Beirut demanding accountability for the port explosion; whereas leaked official documents indicate that Lebanese customs, military and security authorities, as well as the judiciary, had warned successive governments of the dangerous stockpile of explosive chemicals at the port of Beirut on at least 10 occasions over six years, yet no action was taken; whereas Lebanon’s key political figures have obstructed the local investigation into the subsequent explosion, with authorities dismissing the first investigative judge after he summoned political figures for questioning, and rejecting the second investigative judge’s requests to lift the immunity of suspected members of parliament and question senior members of the security forces;

E.  whereas corruption is one of the key challenges stifling Lebanon’s development and prosperity, and deepening alienation from and distrust of the political system; whereas corruption is widespread and permeates all levels of society, as reflected by the country’s global and average performance scores in most governance areas; whereas the National Anti-Corruption Institution is still not operational as the appointment of its commissioners is pending;

F.  whereas Lebanon finally formed a government on 10 September 2021, after three prime ministers-designate, Mustapha Adib, Saad Hariri and Najib Mikati; whereas the new government will urgently need to deliver the necessary substantive policy package of reforms in order for Lebanon to combat corruption and to preserve its stability, unity, sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity;

G.  whereas municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections in Lebanon are scheduled for May 2022 and October 2022; whereas it is crucial for all political leaders to respect the electoral calendar of 2022 and to ensure inclusive, transparent and fair elections with equal access to campaigning for all and access to vote for all Lebanese citizens, including those who reside outside the country as the most recent electoral law adopted in 2017 allowed them to and as the Lebanese Constitution stipulates; whereas the Supervisory Commission for Elections lacks the necessary means to carry out its mandate, raising concerns regarding the transparency and fairness of the campaign and the elections scheduled for next year;

H.  whereas immediately after the massive blast the EU jointly undertook a Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment with the World Bank and the UN to estimate the impact on the population, physical assets, infrastructure and service delivery; whereas the findings include USD 3,8 to 4,6 billion in damages with the housing and culture sectors most severely affected, USD 2,9 to 3,5 billion in losses with housing being the most hit followed by transport and culture, and USD 1,8 to 2,0 billion in priority recovery and reconstruction needs, with transport needs highest followed by culture and housing; whereas the main outcome has been the establishment of the Reform, Recovery, and Reconstruction Framework (3RF), co-managed by the Government of Lebanon; whereas there has been no progress on reforms under 3RF because of months of government formation deadlock; whereas in May 2021, Lebanon’s main electricity producer Electricité du Liban (Electricity of Lebanon) announced that it no longer had enough money to buy fuel; whereas Lebanon is reaching out to several countries in order to address its immediate energy needs;

I.  whereas, despite the suspension of the banking secrecy law, there has been no progress on the forensic audit of the Central Bank; whereas, following reports of a Swiss investigation into transactions allegedly involving the Governor of the Central Bank, Riad Salameh, and his brother, the Lebanese public prosecutor launched an investigation and French prosecutors opened a preliminary investigation into money laundering allegations concerning Salameh; whereas the Governor of the Central Bank denies all allegations;

J.  whereas the EU has committed to supporting the stability and unity of the country through economic assistance; whereas the EU has provided substantial assistance to tackle the immediate consequences and needs following the blast; whereas it mobilised EUR 33 million for emergency needs and more than 250 rescuers from EU Member States; whereas in 2021 alone, the EU has provided Lebanon with EUR 55,5 million in humanitarian aid; whereas an additional EUR 5,5 million were released during summer 2021 to strengthen Lebanon’s COVID-19 response; whereas the EU and its Member States have mobilised EUR 24,0 billion since 2011;

K.  whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the already ongoing and generalised crisis in Lebanon, where there is widespread corruption at all levels of society; whereas both vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups have been severely affected; whereas since the beginning of the pandemic more than 610 000 coronavirus cases and 8 150 deaths have been recorded in Lebanon; whereas the neighbourhoods most affected by the housing destruction caused by the explosion were Gemmayze Ashrafiedh, Mar Mikhael and Rmeil Medawar, and the lack of alternatives today for those whose homes were destroyed could affect the historical social structure, fabric and cohesion of Lebanon;

L.  whereas the Council Decision of 30 July 2021 established a framework for targeted sanctions against persons and entities responsible for undermining democracy or the rule of law in Lebanon; whereas these include an EU travel ban and assets freeze for persistently hampering the formation of a government or seriously undermining the holding of elections, for obstructing or undermining the implementation of plans approved by Lebanese authorities and supported by the EU to improve accountability and good governance, including in the banking and financial sectors, or for serious financial misconduct concerning public funds, for acts covered by the UN Convention Against Corruption or for the unauthorised export of capital;

M.  whereas the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia found that between 2019 and 2020, the headcount poverty ratio had already jumped from 28 % to 55 %; whereas the multidimensional poverty rate in Lebanon has nearly doubled from 42 % in 2019, to 82 % in 2021, and ‘extreme multidimensional poverty’ affects 34 % of the population today; whereas the unemployment rate has risen to over 40 % of the workforce and an increasing share of households have difficulty accessing basic services such as food, water and healthcare; whereas the World Bank reported in its Lebanon Economic Monitor of June 2021 that Lebanon is enduring a severe and prolonged economic depression, likely to rank among the most severe episodes of crisis globally since the mid-19th century;

N.  whereas the war in neighbouring Syria has forced many to flee to Lebanon, which has taken in an estimated 1,5 million Syrian refugees, in addition to some 15 800 refugees of Ethiopian, Iraqi, Sudanese and other origins registered with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and approximately 207 700 Palestine refugees; whereas, according to the World Food Programme, in 2021, 22 % of Lebanese nationals, 50 % of refugees from Syria and 33 % of refugees of other nationalities are food insecure; whereas Lebanon is one of two countries in the Middle East hosting large numbers of migrant domestic workers regulated by the kafala system; whereas since 2011 the EU has contributed EUR 2.4 billion to help Syrian and Palestine refugees through various instruments such as the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI);

O.  whereas in April 2020 the Lebanese Government approved an economic plan and requested an IMF programme on the basis of the necessary reforms; whereas talks with the IMF are still ongoing; whereas according to the IMF, Lebanon urgently needs to initiate comprehensive reforms to bring public finances into order, restructure public debt, restore the banking system, expand the social safety net, reform state-owned enterprises and improve governance; whereas the IMF has designated USD 860 million of special drawing rights to strengthen the country’s depleted reserves and to help with the many urgent needs; whereas the Financial Committee of the Lebanese Parliament rejected the government’s plan for a bail-in that would have allowed the savings of 98 % of the population to be preserved by guaranteeing the assets of bank accounts holding less than USD 500 000 in savings; whereas in the face of criticism about the recovery plan from MPs, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published three statements supporting the government’s proposed plan; whereas the MPs who rejected the recovery plan have vested interests in preserving the interests of Lebanon’s banks, given their relationships as or with shareholders of those banks;

P.  whereas Article 534 of the Lebanese Penal Code is still used to prosecute and arrest LGBTI people; whereas in some areas of the country, men suspected of same-sex relations are routinely arrested and subjected to degrading treatment in police stations;

Q.  whereas on 30 June 2021, the Lebanese Parliament approved a USD 556 million exceptional credit law to fund a ration card system that will provide cash assistance to support the most vulnerable families, replacing the current subsidies system; whereas the implementation of the ration cards should follow the principle of non-discrimination;

R.  whereas the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement is based on respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights, as set out in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which constitutes an essential element of the agreement;

S.  whereas the latest UN Security Council resolution on Lebanon, Resolution 2591 (2021), unanimously adopted on 30 August 2021, extends the mandate of UNIFIL for another year and recalls the need for a permanent ceasefire in line with the principles and elements set out in resolution 1701 (2006);

T.  whereas Lebanon’s neutrality is the key to its future stability; whereas a stable, fully sovereign, united and democratic Lebanon is of crucial importance for the stability, security and peaceful development of the whole of the Middle East; whereas the recently formed government and its ministers must reach political independence and resist any external interference from countries in Lebanon’s neighbourhood or further afield; whereas external interference is detrimental to Lebanon’s development and stability; whereas Hezbollah still controls key ministries in the Lebanese Government; whereas Hezbollah has been listed as a terror organisation by several EU Member States; whereas Hezbollah has repeatedly shown its strong ideological allegiance with Iran, which is destabilising the Lebanese Government and undermining its much-needed cohesion;

1.  Considers Lebanon’s present situation to be a man-made disaster caused by a handful of men across the ruling political class; notes the recent formation of a government after 13 months of political deadlock; regrets the fact that the new cabinet contains only one woman; deeply urges Lebanese leaders to keep their promises and be a functional government that is mission-driven, credible and accountable, that leaves parliamentary divisions aside and that is free from foreign influence; believes that enforcing accountability, upholding free and fair elections and providing basic public services must outweigh any personal consideration within Lebanon’s political class; recalls that elections in May 2022 must by no means be postponed, given the political stalemate and increasing dysfunction of state institutions, and must abide by international democratic standards of freedom, fairness and transparency;

2.  calls on the Lebanese authorities to request that the VP/HR deploy an election observation mission, or alternatively, if it is deemed necessary, an election expert mission, months ahead of the elections; calls on the new Lebanese Government to implement in full the recommendations stemming from the 2018 EU Election Observation Mission; urges the Commission and the Member States to provide all the technical and financial assistance to enable the elections to be held in the best conditions possible and to strive to guarantee the fairness and transparency of the whole process; urges the new Lebanese Government to provide the Supervisory Commission for Elections with all the necessary funds, staff and equipment in order to fully carry out its mandate; calls for an International Humanitarian Task Force under the auspices of the UN to support the implementation of humanitarian assistance and oversee the use of the funds; recalls that the UN has developed a framework to support women as candidates and voters and thus promote greater participation by women in the political process and calls for this framework to be fully integrated into plans for electoral reform;

3.  Calls for the EU to offer Lebanon the deployment of a comprehensive EU administrative advisory mission in order to address the urgent need to counter the accelerating breakdown of public administration and basic services; urges the new government to swiftly implement key governance and economic reforms that will ensure political and economic recovery, including the credible regulation of key economic sectors, such as the electricity sector;

4.  Recalls that a transparent, independent, neutral and effective investigation into the Beirut port explosion is a priority and must be ensured; urges the Lebanese authorities to respect the judicial procedures and the independence of the judiciary and assist every effort that would allow those responsible for the decisions that led to the blast in the port of Beirut to be properly investigated and held to account; calls for an independent international fact-finding mission to Lebanon to investigate the Beirut explosion within the framework of the UN; insists that those found directly or indirectly responsible must be held accountable for the lives lost and the damage done to the Lebanese people;

5.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to release additional humanitarian aid, given the dire conditions on the ground, in particular food aid and hospital and pharmaceutical material, and to provide alternative energy resources including solar panels for all schools and hospitals, channelled through entities other than public entities such as well-known non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations, and faith-based organisations in Lebanon that are able to deliver on reforms; insists on the need to include local civil society organisation in the design, planning, coordination, implementation and evaluation of aid programmes for Lebanon; calls on the Commission to find mechanisms that strategically and flexibly apply the criteria to enable organisations to swiftly access the funds in order for immediate needs to be addressed, while always respecting the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid and international humanitarian law; underlines the need for robust monitoring of EU aid to ensure that it is transferred directly to those in need; strongly deplores the extremely high level of mismanagement and lack of financial oversight over funds delivered in the past;

6.  Calls on the Commission and EU Member States to engage constructively with the new Lebanese Government in delivering the structural and sectoral reforms required to unlock significant EU macro-financial assistance and in strengthening our trade relations, on the condition that tangible progress is made on the implementation of necessary reforms as included in the 3RF;

7.  Calls on the Lebanese authorities to resume talks with the IMF as soon as possible in order for reforms to be tangible for people struggling in Lebanon; urges the Lebanese authorities to implement prior commitments made in the context of the Economic Conference for Development through Reforms with the Private sector (CEDRE) of April 2018, with the support of the International Support Group for Lebanon, and as agreed by all of Lebanon’s political leaders, which entail meaningful and deep economic and governance reforms, including restoring economic stability and the credibility of the financial sector, guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law, and fighting corruption; calls on the Lebanese authorities to provide support for the most vulnerable communities in Lebanon, including through social safety nets; calls on the Lebanese authorities to approve the 2021 budget and prepare the 2022 budget, including a strong programme on social protection, implementing the Emergency Social Safety Net Programme and the National Poverty Targeting Programme; urges the Lebanese authorities to provide for a sufficient budget line for the 2022 elections;

8.  Stresses that due to the Assad regime’s all-out repression against the Syrian popular uprising of 2011, Lebanon has hosted the world’s highest proportion of Syrian refugees; points to the particular responsibility of the Syrian regime in the continuation of this dramatic humanitarian situation; recalls that in order to achieve enduring solutions for displaced persons, sufficient long-term funding and programming are crucial to support internally displaced persons and refugees beyond the humanitarian programme cycle; recalls the vulnerability of Syrian and Palestine refugees in Lebanon and stresses the need to provide adequate, predictable and multi-layered funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and other actors working with refugees, to ensure the full provision of essential services to refugee communities in the country; stresses the need to enhance cooperation and dialogue with NGOs and other service providers helping refugees in the country;

9.  Urges the new Lebanese Government and President to undertake all necessary measures to dismantle corrupt practices, including transfers of public capital and tax evasion, to ensure the full independence of the future members of the National Anti-Corruption Institution and to request the technical support of the international community through UN mechanisms and the UN Convention Against Corruption in order to guarantee both transparency and full accountability to the Lebanese people; recalls that the EU, the World Bank and the UN have demanded the establishment of an independent and transparent judiciary, the adoption of a modern public procurement law and the enactment of an anticorruption strategy, and denounces the lack of action by successive Lebanese governments over the past years;

10.  Stresses the particular responsibility of Hezbollah and other factions in repressing Lebanon’s 2019 popular movement and in Lebanon’s political and economic crisis; calls on all external powers to refrain from meddling in Lebanon’s internal affairs and calls for its sovereignty and political independence to be respected; urges all political factions in the government to end sectarianism and to implement vital reforms for all people living in Lebanon, with no religious or ethnic discrimination;

11.  Expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress towards a permanent ceasefire and other key provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) in view of the latest and continuing tensions along Lebanon’s southern border; reaffirms its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, in line with the recent UN Security Council Resolution 2591 (2021); recalls the position of the EU that the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 (2005) and 1701 (2006) must be fully respected;

12.  Calls on the international community to provide the necessary financial support to enable the Lebanese armed forces and internal security forces to fulfil their essential role in preventing a further collapse of state institutions, securing humanitarian aid and ensuring security and stability, while respecting the right to protest and to freedom of expression; reiterates that accountability of public servants is essential and condemns any violence against protestors;

13.  Calls on the EEAS to propose a list of accountable authorities in Lebanon in cooperation with the Member States; calls for the use of targeted sanctions under the framework adopted by the Council on 30 July 2021, on all persons or entities that fulfil the criteria of that framework; stresses that the introduction of targeted sanctions for obstructing or undermining the democratic political process remains an option that could be activated should the responsible actors in Lebanon continue to stonewall reform and the fight against corruption; calls on all EU Member States without exception to fully cooperate with and strengthen the EU’s new targeted sanctions against corrupted leaders and those responsible for undermining democracy and the rule of law and their affiliates in Lebanon; urges the EEAS and the Council urgently to allocate sufficient resources to the effective development of the new mechanism; calls on the EU Member States and their partners, such as the UK and Switzerland, to cooperate in the fight against the alleged misappropriation of public money by a number of Lebanese officials; suggests that the Member States initiate legal proceedings in their national jurisdictions against the owners of illicitly acquired capital held in their territories and to promote efforts towards the restitution of illegal funds to the Lebanese population;

14.  Recalls that the Association Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Lebanon provides for a political dialogue between Parliament and the new Lebanese Parliament on the basis of the establishment of political cooperation between the two institutions, which may serve as an additional framework, if requested by the Lebanese authorities, to support the recently formed government and overcome the institutional stagnation;

15.  Recalls its strong support for all human rights defenders in Lebanon and their work; encourages civil society and the social and economic partners to play their respective roles in the national dialogue by voicing their aspirations and putting forward proposals for peace, the development and future of the country, and praises the initiatives of local communities and civil society; is extremely concerned by the increasing emigration of the Lebanese population and consequent brain drain, affecting the human resources essential to the reconstruction and recovery of Lebanon and its democratic life;

16.  Calls on Lebanon to ensure the necessary protections against forced labour, as enshrined in national labour law and international human rights standards, including fundamental principles and rights at work, and the International Labour Organization (ILO) Domestic Workers Convention (No. 189 of 2011) in order to address the exploitative nature of the kafala system;

17.  Reiterates its support for the EU’s determination to assist Lebanon in its economic restructuring and the reconstruction of its infrastructure; calls on the Commission to reform the long-term funds and reformulate the strategy and recovery plan for Lebanon in the framework of the EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities under the new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, and to consider funding additional potential partners within civil society, especially in order to find urgent solutions to energy scarcity through renewable energy sources including solar panels;

18.  Calls for the repeal of Article 534 of the Lebanese Criminal Code and for an end to all forms of legal and institutional violence and persecution of LGBTI people; calls for the abolition of other discriminatory laws such as those barring Palestinian refugees from enjoying the same rights as other foreign residents;

19.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance their support to the Lebanese vaccination campaign, which needs international support, and to alleviate the health crisis in Lebanon; calls for support for the salaries of hospital employees and the purchasing of paramedical items;

20.  Reaffirms its strong partnership with Lebanon and its people, anchored in the common values of democracy, pluralism, rule of law and respect for human rights; reiterates its support for the determination of the EU to assist Lebanon in its economic restructuring; pays its respects to the victims of the Beirut port explosion; reaffirms its solidarity with and support for Lebanese civil society, especially journalists and whistle-blowers; calls on the Council and the Commission to continue their efforts to support the reconstruction and economic recovery of Lebanon and to establish closer cooperation with and better funding for civil society organisations in the country;

21.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN Secretary-General, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, the President of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, and the Government and Parliament of Lebanon.

(1) OJ C 279 E, 19.11.2009, p. 69. (2) OJ L 143, 30.5.2006, p. 2. (3) OJ L 337, 21.12.2007, p. 111. (4) OJ L 277 I, 2.8.2021, p. 16.

European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 on media freedom and further deterioration of the rule of law in Poland (2021/2880(RSP))

P9_TA(2021)0395 B9-0461/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter ‘the Charter’),

–  having regard to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

–  having regard to Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights and the related case-law of the European Court of Human Rights,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

–  having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights,

–  having regard to the Commission’s reasoned proposal for a Council decision of 20 December 2017 on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law, issued in accordance with Article 7(1) ΤEU (COM(2017)0835),

–  having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (‘Audiovisual Media Services Directive’) in view of changing market realities(1),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(2) (‘the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation’),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(3),

–  having regard to its resolution of 18 December 2019 on public discrimination and hate speech against LGBTI people, including LGBTI-free zones(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2021 on the declaration of the EU as an LGBTIQ Freedom Zone(5),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2020 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Poland and Hungary(6),

–  having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights(7),

–  having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 on the proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law(8),

–  having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report(9),

–  having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the creation of guidelines for the application of the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(10),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 September 2020 entitled ‘2020 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2020)0580),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 July 2021 entitled ‘2021 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2021)0700),

–  having regard to the letter of 8 March 2021 from the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe to the Polish Prime Minister concerning two draft laws on the media sector in Poland(11),

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas, as enshrined in Article 2 TEU, the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities;

B.  whereas under Article 47 of the Charter, the fundamental right to an effective remedy requires access to an ‘independent’ tribunal; whereas political influence or control of the judiciary and similar barriers to the independence of individual judges have often resulted in the judiciary being unable to fulfil its role as an independent check on the arbitrary use of power by the executive and legislative branches of government;

C.  whereas media freedom is one of the pillars and guarantees of a functioning democracy and the rule of law; whereas media freedom, pluralism and independence and the safety of journalists are crucial components of the right of freedom of expression and information, and are essential to the democratic functioning of the EU and its Member States; whereas public authorities should adopt a legal and regulatory framework which fosters the development of free, independent and pluralistic media;

D.  whereas Poland, along with some other Member States, has not yet implemented all the requirements of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (Directive (EU) 2018/1808), and in particular those regarding independence of the national media market regulator;

E.  whereas the European Audiovisual Observatory of the Council of Europe concluded in 2019 that the independence of the Polish media regulatory authorities was raising concerns regarding the implementation of the appointment procedures and accountability to the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT); whereas, it also concluded that the National Media Council (RMN) had ‘no adequate safeguards for the functional independence from political parties and the government’(12);

F.  whereas in February 2021 a project to impose an advertisement tax was proposed and then withdrawn due to strong criticism on its negative impact on media freedom and plurality of media; whereas on 10 February 2021 about 45 private media outlets went off the air in Poland, running black front pages with slogans for 24 hours in protest against the proposed media advertising tax, and around 40 broadcasters wrote in an open letter to Polish authorities that the new tax would weaken and perhaps force the closure of some media outlets operating in Poland, limiting choice for their audiences;

G.  whereas on 11 August 2021 the Polish Sejm voted in favour of a draft bill that proposes only to allow companies which are majority-owned by entities from the European Economic Area to hold broadcast licences; whereas this draft bill was voted down by the Polish Senate on 9 September 2021, which does not mean the end of the legislative process given the possibility of the Polish Sejm to overrule this decision;

H.  whereas TVN24, an independent media outlet belonging to the US-based Discovery group, would be directly targeted by this draft bill; whereas a decision on the renewal of TVN24’s licence is still pending in Poland, despite the broadcaster requesting the renewal in February 2020; whereas the Polish national media regulator (KRRiT) should issue its decision regarding a new broadcasting licence before the expiry of the current licence, i.e. before 26 September 2021;

I.  whereas, given the inaction of KRRiT, the Discovery group applied to the Dutch authorities for a broadcasting licence for its TVN24 channel and was given one;

J.  whereas Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index 2021 ranks Poland in 64th place, its lowest-ever ranking, dropping from 18th place in 2015;

K.  whereas on 7 May 2021 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the actions of the authorities in appointing one of the judges who had been on the panel of the Constitutional Tribunal in the applicant company’s case had meant that the panel that had tried the case had not been a ‘tribunal established by law’ and that the applicant’s ‘right to a fair trial’ had been violated(13);

L.  whereas on 2 March 2021 the CJEU ruled that successive amendments to the Law on the National Council of the Judiciary, which led to the abolition of effective judicial control of the Council’s decisions to present proposals for the appointment of candidates for Supreme Court judges to the president, are liable to infringe EU law(14);

M.  whereas on 29 March 2021 the Prime Minister of Poland lodged an application to the widely contested and illegitimate ‘Constitutional tribunal’ to consider whether the provisions of the TEU related to primacy of EU law and effective judicial protection are consistent with the Polish Constitution(15);

N.  whereas by order of 14 July 2021, the CJEU granted interim measures requested by the Commission under Article 279 TFEU and related to the functioning of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court and the suspension of further provisions of Polish law affecting judicial independence(16);

O.  whereas on 14 July 2021 the illegitimate Polish ‘Constitutional Tribunal’ ruled that the CJEU’s interim orders on the structure of courts in Poland were inconsistent with the Polish Constitution(17);

P.  whereas on 15 July 2021 the CJEU ruled in its judgment in case C-791/19(18) that the disciplinary regime for judges in Poland was not compatible with EU law;

Q.  whereas on 20 July 2021 the Commission sent a letter to Poland on all the measures taken or envisaged to fully comply with the Court’s order and all the measures necessary to fully comply with the judgment; whereas Polish authorities replied to the Commission on 16 August 2021;

R.  whereas on 22 July 2021 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court was not an ‘independent and impartial tribunal established by law’ and did not meet the standard of a ‘right to a court established by law’ guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (19);

S.  whereas on 7 September 2021 the Commission decided to send Poland a letter of formal notice under Article 260(2) TFEU for not taking the necessary measures to comply fully with the judgment of the CJEU of 15 July 2021 finding that Polish law on the disciplinary regime against judges was not compatible with EU law;

T.  whereas on 7 September 2021 the Commission requested that the CJEU impose financial penalties on Poland to ensure compliance with the Court’s interim measures order of 14 July 2021 related to the functioning of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court and the suspension of further provisions of Polish law affecting judicial independence;

U.  whereas in June 2021 Poland’s Deputy Justice Minister announced that the ruling coalition was currently working on a bill aimed at banning ‘LGBT propaganda’;

V.  whereas on 14 July 2021 the Commission decided to launch infringement procedures against Hungary and Poland related to equality and the protection of fundamental rights, and in particular in response to the declaration of ‘LGBT-ideology free zones’; whereas in a letter(20) of September 2021, the Commission’s services considered that the principle of non-discrimination in the implementation of European Structural and Investment Funds was not ensured and therefore decided to put on hold the REACT-EU programme amendments in relation to the regional operational programmes of five local Polish authorities;

W.  whereas in a Flash Eurobarometer survey of August 2021, the vast majority of respondents agreed that the EU should only provide funds to Member States conditional upon their government’s implementation of the rule of law and of democratic principles; whereas this figure was also very high in Poland (72 %)(21);

Media freedom

1.  Recalls that in its previous resolutions the European Parliament has expressed its concern about previously adopted and newly suggested changes to Polish media law, a re-shaping of the public broadcaster into a pro-government broadcaster; recalls the fact that Article 54 of the Polish Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and forbids censorship;

2.  Criticises in the strongest possible terms the so-called ‘Lex TVN’ draft bill adopted by the Sejm; believes it is an attempt to silence critical content and a direct attack on media pluralism, and that it also violates fundamental rights under the Charter and the Treaties, EU internal market legislation and international human rights and trade law, such as the Audiovisual Media Services Directive; strongly encourages the Sejm to take into account the deliberations and subsequent rejection of the draft bill by the Senate;

3.  Is deeply concerned by the further deterioration of media freedom in Poland and the different reforms put in place by the ruling coalition in order to reduce diversity and critical voices within the media; is deeply concerned by the confirmation of the acquisition of Polska Press Group by a state-controlled oil company, PKN Orlen, even before the final outcome of the Polish Ombudsman appeal against the Competition Authority; is deeply concerned by the editorial changes undertaken within Polska Press Group by the PKN Orlen management in spite of an ongoing appeal that temporarily bars the right of PKN Orlen to exercise its stakeholder rights; strongly condemns the statements of PKN Orlen officials dismissing the court ruling as irrelevant(22);

4.  Is deeply concerned about the deteriorating situation in Polish public media and their failure to perform their public mission, characterised by pluralism, impartiality, balance and independence, a legal obligation under Article 21.1 of the 1992 Broadcasting Act;

5.  Strongly condemns the continuous smear campaigns in public media against judges, journalists and politicians critical of the current government, including SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) lawsuits initiated by government agencies, government officials, state-owned companies or individuals with close ties to the government coalition; calls on the Polish authorities, in cooperation with journalists’ organisations, to monitor and report on attacks against journalists, as well as on lawsuits intended to silence or intimidate independent media, and to guarantee access to the appropriate legal remedies;

6.  Believes that EU binding rules providing robust and consistent protection for the independent media and journalists from vexatious lawsuits intended to silence or intimidate them in the EU are much needed in order to help end this abusive practice, and highlights that the European Parliament is currently working on an own-initiative report on the subject of SLAPPs;

7.  Welcomes the Commission’s recent initiative to issue a Recommendation on Ensuring Safety of Journalists in the European Union; calls on the Commission to deliver on the Media Freedom Act(23) without delay;

8.  Calls on the Commission to ensure proper implementation of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, in particular with reference to the independence of media regulators, transparency of media ownership and media literacy; calls on the Commission to make effective use of infringement procedures in situations where Member States implement these provisions incorrectly or incompletely;

9.  Reiterates its call on the Polish authorities to fully implement the Council of Europe’s Recommendation of 13 April 2016 on the protection of journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors(24);

10.  Expresses its full support for the peaceful protests against the Polish Government led reforms further undermining media freedom in Poland;

Primacy of EU law and the independence of the judiciary and of other institutions

11.  Welcomes the Commission’s latest initiatives as regards the independence of the judiciary; believes, however, that faster action, as repeatedly called for by the European Parliament, would have helped to avoid the continuous erosion of the independence of the judiciary in Poland; reiterates its call on the Commission to launch infringement procedures in relation to the legislation on the illegitimate ‘Constitutional Tribunal’ and its unlawful composition, the Extraordinary Chamber of the Supreme Court and the National Council of the Judiciary;

12.  Is deeply concerned by the fact that the Polish authorities recently have deliberately and systematically violated rule of law-related judgments and orders of the CJEU; calls on the Polish authorities to comply with the various CJEU and European Court of Human Rights rulings regarding the composition and organisation of the illegitimate ‘Constitutional Tribunal’ and the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court in order to comply with the standards of judicial independence that Poland committed to;

13.  Reiterates its condemnation of the practice of prosecuting and harassing judges who are critical of the Polish Government; calls on the Disciplinary Chamber in its current composition to stop all of its activities and cases, including legal cases, and to reinstate all judges who have been removed from their positions as adjudicators by this Chamber, including those judges who continue to be prevented from adjudicating despite them having successfully appealed their suspension by the Chamber in a court of law, as the final verdicts on appeal are subsequently and continuously disregarded by the presidents of the courts in which they serve;

14.  Calls for the offices of the Prosecutor General and that of the Minister of Justice to be separated as per the Venice Commission’s recommendations(25); highlights the opinion of the CJEU Advocate General in the pending case and asks the Commission to be more pro-active in launching an infringement procedure related to the independence of the prosecutor services;

15.  Reiterates the fundamental nature of primacy of EU law as a cornerstone principle of EU law in accordance with well established case-law of the CJEU; recalls that all Member States agreed to attach a declaration concerning primacy to the Treaty of Lisbon; recalls that the effects of this principle are binding on all the bodies of a Member State, without provisions of domestic law, including constitutional provisions, being able to prevent that; denounces any attempt to undermine this principle;

16.  Calls on the Polish Prime Minister not to question the primacy of EU law over national legislation and to withdraw his motion, pending before the illegitimate ‘Constitutional Tribunal’, to review the constitutionality of certain parts of the EU Treaties;

17.  Calls on the Prosecutor General to withdraw his motion before the illegitimate ‘Constitutional Tribunal’ related to the constitutionality of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights;

18.  Calls on the Commission to continue monitoring all the issues already identified and ask for interim measures whenever referring cases to the CJEU in the field of the judiciary and to request financial penalties in cases of non-compliance with the CJEU rulings;

Further assessment of the rule of law situation in Poland

19.  Regrets the lack of progress and the deterioration of the rule of law situation in Poland since its resolution of 17 September 2020, and that the recommendations thereof have not been taken into consideration by the Polish Government; reiterates those recommendations;

20.  Takes note of the announcement of the state of emergency by Poland and other Member States bordering Belarus; notes with concern the humanitarian situation at the border and condemns the attempt by the Belarusian authorities to instrumentalise migrants, including asylum applicants, as a political tool and hybrid threat against Poland and other Member States in response to their support for the democratic opposition in Belarus; calls for a united EU response to find solutions to this situation; calls on the authorities of Poland and other affected Member States to ensure that EU asylum and return law and international human rights law are fully respected also during the emergency situation, including access to asylum and access of media and civil society organisations to the border area, and to take into account the guidance by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and bodies of the Council of Europe; calls on the Commission as the guardian of the Treaties to ensure compliance with relevant EU law; calls on other Member States to demonstrate solidarity and provide assistance to the affected Member States, including relocation of the asylum applicants;

21.  Reiterates its deep concerns expressed in its resolutions over the attempts to criminalise the dissemination of sexuality education in Poland and insists that age-appropriate and evidence-based comprehensive sexuality and relationship education is key to building young peoples’ skills to form healthy, equal, nurturing and safe relationships, free from discrimination, coercion and violence;

22.  Is alarmed by the proposed draft amendments to the Education Law and certain other acts as well as the adopted amendments to the Regulation on Pedagogical Supervision of 1 September 2021(26) which would limit the autonomy of education by shifting powers from the local government to the central authorities, exercising control over school principals and tightening oversight of NGOs contributing to school education;

23.  Reiterates its deep concerns about the attacks on women’s rights in Poland, in particular the setback to women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights after the ruling of the illegitimate ‘Constitutional Tribunal’ which was published in the Official Gazette (Dziennik Ustaw) on 27 January 2021;

24.  Welcomes the appointment of a new Polish Commissioner for Human Rights in July 2021 after the expiry of the term of his predecessor in September 2020;

25.  Is concerned by the fact that since December 2018 the Council has held only one Article 7(1) hearing on the rule of law in Poland; urges the Council to issue concrete recommendations to Poland, as stipulated in Article 7(1) TEU, and to provide deadlines for the implementation of those recommendations; calls on the current and upcoming Council presidencies to keep hearings on Poland on the Council agenda; is concerned about the attitude of successive Council presidencies to no longer report back to the appropriate committee in the European Parliament on the Article 7(1) procedures, and urges the Council to do so at the earliest opportunity;

26.  Reiterates its call on the Council and Commission to expand the scope of Article 7(1) TEU hearings in order to also cover issues related to fundamental rights and democracy, and to include new developments and assess risks of breaches of the independence of the judiciary, freedom of expression, including media freedom, freedom of the arts and sciences, freedom of association and the right to equal treatment, as requested by the European Parliament;

27.  Welcomes the steps taken by the Commission related to the declaration of some ‘LGBT-ideology free zones’ by some local and regional authorities in Poland and their incompatibility with EU values and the importance of non-discrimination in the implementation of European Structural and Investment Funds; calls on the Commission to use all legal grounds in the infringement procedures; calls on the state, local and regional authorities of Member States to halt all cooperation with the Polish authorities declaring ‘LGBT-ideology free zones’; calls on the Commission to continue rejecting EU funding applications by authorities who have adopted such resolutions and to consider ways of ensuring the protection of the final beneficiaries and the continuity of their work, including by considering alternatives to regional managing authorities such as direct granting to civil society organisations that are dependent on EU funding to operate;

28.  Strongly condemns the fact that SLAPPs are also being used against activists who are acting against and informing the public about the resolutions on being free from so-called LGBTI ideology and the ‘Regional Charters of Family Rights’;

29.  Reiterates its position on the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, which entered into force on 1 January 2021 and is directly applicable in its entirety in the European Union and all its Member States for all funds of the EU budget, including resources allocated through the EU Recovery Instrument since then;

30.  Recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation provides a clear definition of the rule of law, which must be understood in relation to the other values of the Union, including fundamental rights and non-discrimination; expresses disappointment at the Commission’s response to the European Parliament in its letter of 23 August 2021; calls on the Commission to immediately trigger the procedure provided for in Article 6(1) of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation for Poland;

31.  Expresses serious concerns regarding the compliance of the draft Polish Recovery and Resilience Plan with Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(27) and with the Charter; calls on the Commission and the Council to carefully analyse every measure outlined in the draft Polish Recovery and Resilience Plan and to only approve the plan if it is established that the Polish authorities have implemented all CJEU rulings, and in particular as regards the independence of the judiciary, and that it would not subsequently lead to the EU budget actively contributing to breaches of fundamental rights in Poland;

o
o   o

32.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council, the Commission, the Committee of the Regions and the Council of Europe.

(1) OJ L 303, 28.11.2018, p. 69. (2) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 1. (3) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17. (4) OJ C 255, 29.6.2021, p. 7. (5) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0089. (6) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0014. (7) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0251. (8) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0225. (9) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0313. (10) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0348. (11) Ref: CommHR/DM/sf 007-2021. (12) Cappello M. (ed.), The independence of media regulatory authorities in Europe, IRIS Special, European Audiovisual Observatory, Strasbourg, 2019. (13) Judgment of 7 May 2021, Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v Poland. (14) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 2 March 2021, A.B. and Others, C-824/18, ECLI:EU:C:2021:153. (15) Application in pending case K 3/21; judgment of the illegitimate ‘Constitutional Tribunal’ expected on 22 September 2021. (16) Order of the Court of Justice of 14 July 2021, Commission v Poland, C-204/21 R, ECLI:EU:C:2021:593. (17) Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 14 July 2021, case P 7/20. (18) Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 15 July 2021, European Commission v Republic of Poland, C-791/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:596. (19) Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 22 July 2021, Reczkowicz v Poland (application no 43447/19). (20) Ares(2021)5444303 - 03/09/2021. (21) Flash Eurobarometer – State of the European Union, IPSOS, August 2021. (22) Poland: Purge of editors begins despite court ruling suspending purchase of Polska Press, International Press Institute, 30 April 2021. (23) For a « European Media Freedom Act », speech delivered to the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education, 19 April 2021. (24) Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the protection of journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors. (25) Opinion No 892/2017 of 11 December 2017. (26) Dz.U. 2021 poz. 1618. (27) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17.

European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 on strengthening transparency and integrity in the EU institutions by setting up an independent EU ethics body (2020/2133(INI))

P9_TA(2021)0396 A9-0260/2021

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024, presented on 10 September 2019,

–  having regard to the mission letter of 1 December 2019 of the President of the Commission to Věra Jourová, Vice-President-designate for Values and Transparency,

–  having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2017 on transparency, accountability and integrity in the EU institutions(1),

–  having regard to its resolution of 26 November 2020 on stocktaking of European elections(2),

–  having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 9 and 10, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 thereof,

–  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 223(2), 245 and 295 thereof,

–  having regard to the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage (‘the Electoral Act’) annexed to the Council decision of 20 September 1976 as amended,

–  having regard to the draft interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on a mandatory Transparency Register,

–  having regard to Special Report No 13/2019 of the European Court of Auditors on the ethical frameworks of the audited EU institutions,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions on the European Court of Auditors’ Special Report No 13/2019,

–  having regard to its decision of 28 September 2005 adopting the Statute for Members of the European Parliament (2005/684/EC, Euratom)(3),

–  having regard to the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, in particular Rules 2, 10 and 11, 176(1), Annex I, Articles 1 to 3, 4(6), 5 and 6 and Annex II,

–  having regard to the annual reports of the Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members,

–  having regard to the annual reports on the application of the Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission, including the opinions of the Independent Ethical Committee,

–  having regard to the recommendations of the European Ombudsman in the joint inquiry into complaints 194/2017/EA, 334/2017/EA and 543/2017/EA on the European Commission’s handling of the post-mandate employment of former Commissioners, a former Commission President and the role of its ‘Ethics Committee’,

–  having regard to the recommendations of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), and various NGOs,

–  having regard to the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities, and in particular Articles 11, 11(a), 12, 12(a), 12(b), 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21(a), 22(a), 22(c), 24, 27 and 40 thereof,

–  having regard to the powers and responsibilities of the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament, as set out in Annex VI to its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Legal Affairs, the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Committee on Petitions,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A9-0260/2021),

A.  whereas the TEU stipulates that ‘the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies and agencies’; whereas this implies that public decisions are taken in the interest of the common good;

B.  whereas the Treaties have established a system of division of powers among the institutions of the Union that assigns each institution its own role within the institutional structure of the Union and in the performance of the tasks entrusted to it;

C.  whereas, while each EU institution has a right to organisational sovereignty, all EU institutions have to meet the highest standards of independence and impartiality;

D.  whereas the TEU and the TFEU set out a European governance framework based on the separation of powers, laying down distinct rights and obligations for each institution;

E.  whereas the independence, transparency and accountability of public institutions and their elected representatives, Commissioners and officials are of the utmost importance for promoting the trust of citizens, which is necessary for the legitimate functioning of democratic institutions;

F.  whereas the ethical standards applicable to the EU institutions are in many respects ahead of those applicable to their national equivalents but they have not been enforced in a satisfactory manner;

G.  whereas the enforcement of the ethical framework could be improved;

H.  whereas citizens’ trust in public institutions and decision-making processes is a pillar of any democratic government and requires exemplarity, integrity, transparency, accountability and the highest standards of ethical behaviour;

I.  whereas the absence of undue influence from interest representatives, including through the provision of paid activities for Members of the European Parliament, gifts or travel invitations, the creation of expectations for future employment following the end of a Member’s mandate or an official’s termination of service, and undue use of information or contacts is key to ensure that democratic processes are not captured by private interests and that citizens rights are fully respected;

J.  whereas the shortcomings of the current EU ethical framework derive largely from the fact that it relies on a self-regulatory approach, the absence of EU criminal law and insufficient resources and competences to verify information; whereas any evolution of the EU ethical framework must have a clear legal basis while respecting the separation of powers as laid down in the Treaties; whereas the creation of an independent ethics body could contribute to strengthening trust in the EU institutions and their democratic legitimacy;

K.  whereas, as a consequence, cases of problematic conduct have occurred; whereas every incidence of unethical behaviour and their inadequate handling by the EU institutions endangers the trust which European citizens place in the EU institutions and have severely contributed to damaging the reputation of the European Union;

L.  whereas the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon in particular is very much on the rise; whereas many Commissioners and a third of those who were Members of the European Parliament from 2014 to 2019 have been recruited by organisations entered in the European Transparency Register; whereas this entails risks of conflict of interest with the legitimate areas of competence of the Member States and the EU institutions and of confidential information being disclosed or misused, as well as risks that former staff members may use their close personal contacts and friendships with ex-colleagues for lobbying purposes;

M.  whereas current ethical standard frameworks at EU level are tailored to the specificities of each EU institution, leading to different processes and levels of enforcement even of the same EU Staff Regulations in different EU institutions, agencies and bodies, thus creating a complex system which is difficult for both EU citizens and for those who have to respect the rules to understand;

N.  whereas the European Court of Auditors recommended, in its Special Report No 13/2019, that in many areas there are good reasons to have harmonised approaches to handling ethical issues within the EU institutions; whereas the European Ombudsman and the European Court of Auditors warned repeatedly about major failures in the EU institutions’ prevention of conflict of interest policies; whereas both the Ombudsman and the Court of Auditors expressed specific concerns about the absence of a common EU ethical framework with clear procedures and reporting channels; whereas this problem concerns in particular the work of Member State representatives in the Council, which needs to address high-level conflicts of interest, revolving doors and transparency rules; whereas the EU ethical rules are not aligned with the OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service;

O.  whereas the example of the ‘Haute Autorité pour la Transparence de la Vie Publique’ in France demonstrates that a single and independent body responsible for the monitoring, enforcement and sanctioning of ethical rules applicable to public bodies is an effective and powerful tool able to achieve a long-lasting reduction in unethical behaviour;

P.  whereas the balance of powers assigned to the institutions is a fundamental guarantee afforded by the Treaties to EU citizens;

Q.  whereas the Meroni doctrine developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) allows for the delegation of EU institutions’ competences to external bodies, including competences that are not yet exercised; whereas according to the CJEU, any delegation of competences must be limited and can only relate to clearly defined powers, the use of which must be entirely subject to the supervision of the delegating institutions and cannot concern discretionary powers involving any political judgement in order not to jeopardise the balance of powers between the institutions;

R.  whereas according to the principle of conferral, institutions cannot delegate by means of an interinstitutional agreement powers which they themselves do not have, for instance where such powers are conferred by the Treaties on the Court of Auditors or have remained with the Member States;

S.  whereas in their examination of potential conflicts of interest of Commissioner-designates in 2019, the members of the Committee on Legal Affairs highlighted the profound limitations of the current procedure; whereas these limitations include access to only a limited range of information, the lack of time for examination, the absence of investigative powers and the absence of support from experts; whereas Article 17(3) TEU provides that the members of the European Commission are to be chosen ‘from persons whose independence is beyond doubt’;

T.  whereas the existing strict ethical framework for Commissioners needs to be further developed in order to close existing legislative gaps such as the non-existence of a Commissioners statute; underlines that this process is closely linked with parliamentary scrutiny and oversight and is of the opinion that a Commissioners statute needs to be drawn up in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and calls on the Commission to present a proposal;

U.  whereas all lead candidates in the 2019 European elections supported the creation of an independent ethics body common to all EU institutions; whereas the President of the Commission supported it in her political guidelines;

V.  whereas the freedom of mandate of the Members of the European Parliament is in the interest of the citizens they represent;

W.  whereas one of Parliament’s primary functions as laid down in the TEU is to exercise political control;

X.  whereas staff in the institutions are covered by the EU Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union;

1.  Believes that a single independent EU ethics body could better ensure the consistent and full implementation of ethics standards across the EU institutions to guarantee that public decisions are taken with a view to the common good and citizens’ trust in the EU institutions; proposes the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement (IIA) based on Article 295 TFEU to set up an independent EU ethics body for Parliament and the Commission and open to the participation of all EU institutions, agencies and bodies, and that this body also provide the participating institutions, agencies and bodies with training and active guidance;

Principles

2.  Considers that the provisions of this IIA must respect the following provisions and principles:

3.  Believes that in the scope of its duties, including regarding monitoring and investigating, the body should rely on the existing powers of institutions to ask their members for information or on the agreement of national authorities to share information; underlines that Parliament’s President, the Commission’s College or the respective authority of a participating institution will remain in charge of the final decision-making power until a possible revision of the rules;

4.  Considers that the procedure followed by the independent EU ethics body should ensure the appropriate level of transparency while protecting procedural guarantees as stipulated in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and that the IIA should include procedural rules and an adequate data protection protocol, referring to the existing acquis of principles of the existing EU ethics bodies, as well as to the EU’s common values (Article 2 TEU), the rights of the concerned individual to be heard and to appeal, the obligation to collaborate, and publication requirements;

Scope and mandate

5.  Considers that the new EU ethics body should be delegated a list of agreed tasks to propose and advise on ethical rules for Commissioners, Members of the European Parliament and staff of the participating institutions before, during and in some cases after their term of office or service in line with the applicable rules, including:

6.  Believes that the members and staff of the participating institutions should be covered by the agreement before, during and after the term of office or service in line with the applicable rules; considers that this should apply to Members of the European Parliament, Commissioners and all EU staff falling under the scope of the Staff Regulations;

7.  Recalls that with regard to individuals covered by the Staff Regulations, the competence could be delegated to the independent EU ethics body by making use of the enabling clauses in Articles 2(2) or 9(1), or both, and would concern the monitoring and enforcement of the ethical obligations while other professional obligations would continue to be enforced by the appointing authorities;

8.  Insists that the IIA should be open to the participation of all EU institutions and bodies; and points out that the co-legislators may decide to bind agencies through their founding regulations; believes that the IIA should allow the ethics body to exchange information with national authorities where necessary for the performance of its tasks, while treating such information with the same confidentiality as the originating authority, for example tax information, land registers and data held by national ethics bodies, and to explore best practices and peer reviews; considers that, without prejudice to the general principles set out in paragraph 2, and where it is relevant for the performance of its duties, the independent ethics body should have the possibility to engage in cooperation and information exchange with relevant EU bodies such as OLAF, EPPO, the Ombudsman and the European Court of Auditors, within their respective mandates;

Competences and powers

9.  Considers that, without prejudice to the balance between the institutions as established by the Treaties, all the participating institutions should entrust, within the framework of their respective procedural autonomy, the EU ethics body with, on the one hand, a preventive role via awareness-raising and ethical guidance, and, on the other hand, a compliance and advisory role with the ability to issue recommendations on ethical matters, including conflicts of interest; considers that the decision-making powers should remain within the respective institution until the EU ethics body is entrusted with decision-making powers on a proper legal basis; recalls that the tasks of the EU ethics body would be limited to the agreed list of tasks delegated by the participating institutions and would therefore be without prejudice to and in full respect of the competences of OLAF, EPPO and national jurisdictions related to any breach of laws falling under their competences; stresses that in order to monitor integrity, Parliament should regularly commission studies that define integrity with a set of well-defined objectives and performance indicators and report on the progress made;

10.  Considers that this monitoring capacity should include, among other aspects, the possibility to check the veracity of the declaration of financial interests, which should be submitted by covered individuals directly to the EU ethics body, in addition to Parliament with respect to Commissioners-designate, to ensure that they arrive the fastest way possible to all those responsible for democratic and/or public scrutiny as stipulated by the applicable rules, the handling of conflicts of interest, rules related to lobbying activities, checks on transparency obligations, including in the legislative procedure, and the verification of compliance with revolving door rules and more generally verification of compliance with all provisions of codes of conduct and applicable rules on transparency, ethics and integrity;

11.  Notes that within the EU institutions different legislative and other provisions aimed at preventing conflicts of interest contain varying definitions of the term ‘conflict of interest’; notes that a definition has a contextual and an evolving nature and that full transparency does not necessarily guarantee the absence of any conflict of interest, nor does it guarantee that public trust will be won or increased; notes that the enforcement of ethical rules and public accountability for conflicts of interest are a precondition for citizens’ trust in public institutions;

12.  Recalls the importance of distinguishing between a conflict of interest arising during the exercise of a function and one arising after, and between acts that authorised if declared and acts that are not authorised at all;

13.  Points out that the European Parliament established the Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members as the body responsible for giving Members guidance on the interpretation and implementation of the Code of Conduct; notes further that the Advisory Committee also assesses alleged breaches of the Code of Conduct and advises the President on possible action to be taken; considers that the European Parliament should lead by example with regard to rules on ethics and their enforcement;

14.  Takes the view that the EU ethics body could also be given authority over the obligations imposed by the Transparency Register, and should envisage a better protection of whistleblowers and better management of conflicts of interest in the case of corruption and fraud cases;

15.  Considers that the EU ethics body should be given the task of developing an EU public portal with relevant information on ethical rules, reports on best practices, studies, and statistics, as well as a database containing the declarations of financial interests of all the participating institutions;

16.  Insists that the independent EU ethics body should have the right to start an investigation on its own initiative and to conduct on-the-spot and records-based investigations based on the information it has collected or that it has received from third parties, such as journalists, the media, NGOs, whistleblowers, civil society or the European Ombudsman; insists that any third party referring in good faith a matter to the independent ethics body must be protected and their identity kept anonymous; considers that when it starts an investigation on its own initiative the body must notify, by confidential message, the person concerned and the authority responsible for applying sanctions in the respective institutions; believes that in such a case, the respective authority of this institution, agency or body can demand that an explanation be provided by the body;

17.  Stresses that requesting tax documents and bank records are interventions in private law, for which there must be serious allegations that fall within the competence of OLAF;

18.  Stresses the need for the body to protect whistleblowers, in particular European public officials, so that they can express their concerns about possible violations of rules without fear of reprisals; suggests, in this connection, that the body should supervise the internal and confidential complaint mechanisms under the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and Conditions of Employment of Other Servants; stresses that only a safe and protective working environment will enable public officials to express their concerns and thereby help to make the work of the independent ethics body effective;

19.  Believes that in order to be fully effective, the body would merge the functions of existing organs responsible for ethics; considers that the body should advise Members of the European Parliament or Commissioners when they ask for guidance on ethical issues; considers that the body should issue recommendations for sanctions to the Appointing Authority in dealing with ethical obligations for staff, and that in relation to Members of the European Parliament or Commissioners, the body should issue recommendations to the responsible authorities of the respective participating institutions; recommends that the ethics body issue recommendations that can serve as precedents in identical or similar cases; considers that this will ensure efficiency, consistency and predictably and significantly reduce the workload, especially for staff matters in the event of numerous similar cases;

20.  Considers that the EU ethics body should promote integrity and be entrusted with advisory tasks in order to provide reliable and trustworthy advice to any individual and/or institution covered by its scope who wishes to request interpretation of an ethical standard in relation to appropriate conduct in a specific case; considers that, in order to ensure consistent application of the ethical standards and predictability, advice should be binding for the independent EU ethics body in its position on the same matter;

21.  Recalls that the confirmation by the Committee on Legal Affairs of the absence of any conflict of interest is an essential precondition for the appointment of Commissioners-designate and that the Committee on Legal Affairs possesses clear powers to reject Commissioners-designate if a conflict of interest has been established;

22.  Recalls that Parliament may withdraw confidence in an individual Member of the Commission, after which the President of the Commission must either require the resignation of that Member or explain their refusal to do so before Parliament in the following part-session, in line with point 5 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 November 2010;

23.  Is of the opinion that the examination of the declarations submitted by Commissioners-designate with a view to inferring a conflict of interest is of fundamental institutional and democratic importance and should be undertaken with the utmost attention, commitment and sense of responsibility, by means of a fully objective, democratic and independent interpretation; believes that the rules on the examination of potential conflicts of interest should also apply to the declaration of the President-elect of the European Commission;

24.  Underlines that the decision on conflicts of interest of Commissioners-designate prior to hearings remains a democratic and institutional competence of Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs; stresses in this regard that the future independent EU ethics body should be given appropriate investigative powers, as well as the power to request and have access to administrative documents, in order to allow it to carry out well-reasoned and well-documented assessments; stresses the need for full compliance with the rules on confidentiality, privacy and personal data protection in verifying the implications of a conflict of interest; is of the opinion that the Committee on Legal Affairs should be given more time and that, while fully keeping its competence on the matter, the Committee on Legal Affairs should decide on the existence of a conflict of interest of Commissioners-designate after having received non-binding, precise and reasoned recommendations by the independent EU ethics body, which would have the effect of strengthening its action; considers that the Committee on Legal Affairs should ultimately hold a debate on the recommendations issued by the independent EU ethics body; considers that the recommendations should be published along with the declarations of financial interests of Commissioners-designate; considers that, beyond the scrutiny of the declarations of Commissioners-designate by the Committee on Legal Affairs, the examination of conflicts of interest should be carried out, in general, prior to, during and after public office or employment, for all Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies; further believes that it should be provided with sufficient resources, tools and skills to cross-check and locate necessary information, as well as to ask for complementary information where necessary;

Composition

25.  Believes that the ethics body should be composed of nine members, three selected by the Commission, three elected by Parliament, and three assigned de jure from among the former judges of the CJEU, the Court of Auditors and former EU Ombudsmen; believes that where staff matters are concerned, staff representatives from the institution of the person concerned should be included; points out that Annex II to the Staff Regulations should be amended accordingly;

26.  Considers that its members must be independent, chosen on the basis of their competence, experience and professional qualities, as well as their personal integrity, have an impeccable record of ethical behaviour and provide a declaration of the absence of conflicts of interest; is of the opinion that the composition of the body should be gender-balanced; underlines that all members must be independent in the performance of their duties; considers that the members should be chosen for a period of six years and be renewed by a third every two years;

27.  Calls for an ethics officer to take charge of the verification of candidates’ declarations; considers that the members should work in a spirit of collaboration and consistency in their analyses and recommendations; calls for a guarantee of gender balance in the composition of the body;

28.  Considers that the composition of the ethics body should be accompanied by a framework for the exercise of the mandate, as well as a procedure to end the mandate;

29.  Suggests, in order to ensure broad support, that Parliament elect the members of the body with the support of a large majority, possibly similar to the procedure for members of the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations or decisions regarding the Sakharov Prize;

30.  Suggests that each institution choose these members in particular from among former judges of the CJEU, former presidents of OLAF and the Court of Auditors, former or current members of the highest courts of Member States, former Members of the European Parliament, former staff of the participating institutions and bodies, former EU Ombudsmen, and members of the ethics authorities in Member States; suggests further that the body elect a President and two Vice-Presidents from among its members; stresses that this is without prejudice to the right of staff to self-organise their representatives when staff matters are concerned;

31.  Stresses the need to ensure diversity in the members’ backgrounds and independent expertise; suggests limiting the participation of former MEPs and Commissioners to a third of the composition of the body;

32.  Recommends that the college be supported by a secretariat with the human, material and financial resources commensurate with its mandate and tasks, including an ethics officer, responsible for ethical training and offering advice within the independent EU ethics body; considers that the pooling of budgets and personnel currently allocated to the various EU ethics bodies when merging them would improve efficiency in the use of resources and might reduce costs;

Procedures

33.  Believes that the creation of an EU ethics body should contribute to building an institutional culture fundamentally based on prevention, support and transparency; proposes, to this end, a two-step approach whereby, in the event that the EU ethics body becomes aware of a breach or possible breach of ethical rules, it first recommends, by a deadline, actions to put an end to the breach; considers that this first preventive step should ensure confidentiality and secrecy and the right of the person to be heard and to refute the accusations; suggests that in the event that the individual concerned refuses to take the appropriate actions and the breach persists, the EU ethics body should make a reasoned recommendation for sanctions measures and transmit all relevant information about the case to the competent authority, which will decide how to follow-up on the recommendation within 20 working days;

34.  Believes that at the end of this period the reasoned recommendation of the independent ethics body, without prejudice to the General Data Protection Regulation and personal rights, should be made public, together with the decision of the competent authority who should provide an explanation if the recommendations are not fully followed; considers as a first measure that the publication or forwarding of recommendations and decisions could constitute a sanction in itself; stresses that such a body cannot replace the CJEU; suggest that, in exceptional cases, when the competent authority duly justifies that more time is needed to investigate the case, it can ask the ethics body to extend its deadline for making a decision by up to 20 working days; considers that this two-step approach should apply whenever the individual had reasonable grounds to believe that the information was true at the time of disclosure, and recommends that any intentional breach, gross negligence, concealment of evidence, non-compliance or non-cooperation should be considered aggravating factors with respect to recommendations for sanctions, even when the breach itself has ceased;

35.  Calls for clear provisions giving the person concerned a right of appeal against any such decision taken by the President in full respect of the basic principles of rule of law;

36.  Believes that as a general rule, the EU ethics body should decide by a simple majority of its members;

37.  Insists that the procedures laid down in the Treaties must be applied, such as the transfer of investigations by the European Court of Auditors to OLAF and to the CJEU;

General provisions

38.  Believes that the EU ethics body should conduct studies and compile annual statistics on financial interest declarations, revolving door cases and other relevant information and should publish an annual report containing information about the fulfilment of its tasks and, where appropriate, recommendations for improving ethical standards, which is to be presented to Parliament; recommends that the annual report include the number of cases that were investigated, the institutions the individuals were coming from, the type of breaches concerned, the time the procedures took, the timeframe in which the breach was ended, the proportion of sanctions decided and the recommendations;

39.  Believes that a review clause should be included in the IIA ensuring that two years after its establishment, at the latest, participating institutions are able to adopt an assessment of its activities, including an analysis of the functioning of the rules and procedures and the experience acquired in applying them; stresses, in particular, that this review clause should focus on the assessment of the effectiveness of the implementation of the mandate of the EU ethics body, and that Parliament’s assessment should take into account input from the ethics body itself;

40.  Considers that the new EU ethics body should have competence to contribute by way of proposals to the development and periodic update of a common ethical framework for the EU institutions, including common rules and a common model for declarations of financial interests in a machine-readable format and a proposal to amend its competences and to present it to the European Parliament; considers that the ethical standards of all the institutions, agencies and bodies should be harmonised as soon as possible; is of the opinion that a Commissioners statute needs to be drawn up in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure;

41.  Suggests that the independent ethics body should work on establishing a common definition of conflict of interest for the EU institutions on the basis of the highest standards; stresses that many Member States have demanding rules; notes the OECD definition of conflict of interest: ‘when an individual or a corporation (either private or governmental) is in a position to exploit his or their own profession or official capacity in some way for personal or corporate benefit’;

42.  Calls for full transparency regarding all meetings organised by and involving the ethics body with private actors and their representatives, including both for-profit and non-profit organisations;

43.  Insists that, without prejudice to Parliament’s competences referred to in paragraph 24, the recommendations of the EU ethics body should be properly justified, well documented and available for the member or member of staff and the institution concerned; believes that the participating institutions should commit to fully cooperate in all procedures falling under the scope of the agreed IIA, and in particular to communicate to the independent EU ethics body all information and documents necessary for the proper scrutiny of ethical rules; points out that the activities of the ethics body would be subject to possible complaints to the EU Ombudsman, and that the participating institutions’ decisions based on the recommendations would continue to be reviewable before the CJEU;

44.  Believes that the improvement of integrity, transparency and accountability as well as the highest standards of ethical behaviour in the EU institutions and EU decision-making processes should be part of the topics discussed in the framework of the Conference on the Future of Europe; stresses that this is an opportunity for EU citizens to debate Treaty revision and that this would ensure a clear legal basis to introduce such an independent EU ethics body for all institutions through the ordinary legislative procedure;

45.  Calls for the independent ethics body to lead by example on transparency by publishing all recommendations, annual reports, decisions and spending in a machine-readable open data format available to all citizens, and in accordance with the applicable data protection rules; strongly recommends that any software developed for upholding the ethical standards in EU public administration should be made available under a free and open-source software licence and should be shared with any institution in Europe wishing to use it; calls for close cooperation with the European Data Protection Supervisor in this regard;

46.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that criminal cases related to breaches of integrity rules, especially those involving Members of the European Parliament and national politicians playing a role in EU policy-making, are dealt with in an efficient manner and without undue delay;

47.  Regrets, with concern, that there has been a lack of consideration of prevention and enforcement measures to avoid conflicts of interest in the Commission’s procedure on public tenders;

48.  Notes that the application of the existing rules to Commissioners, Members of the European Parliament and EU officials has shown too many weaknesses; recalls that, according to a report by Transparency International EU, in early 2017, more than 50 % of former Commissioners and 30 % of former Members of the European Parliament who had left politics were working for organisations registered in the EU Transparency Register; stresses, in particular for elected Members, the need for transparency and accountability on personal and financial commitments; underlines that transparency and integrity issues at EU and national level are strongly interlinked; supports, therefore, the work of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), and calls on the Member States to implement its recommendations, specifically those regarding the creation of a strict code of conduct for national politicians and the introduction of rules for post-public employment;

49.  Calls for a strengthening of the existing regulatory and enforcement framework for both pre-public and post-public employment conflicts of interest, in order to establish appropriate, clear, binding and proportionate boundaries between the public sector and the private and non-profit sectors and thus to improve the credibility of EU decision-making in the eyes of the wider public;

50.  Highlights that post-public employment and revolving door conflict of interest situations are recurring concerns of a systematic nature and a problem common to institutions, bodies, offices and agencies across the EU; recommends the adoption of harmonised and adequate cooling-off periods by all EU institutions and that their enforcement be strengthened; considers that conflict of interest situations could jeopardise the integrity of the EU institutions and agencies, thereby damaging citizens’ trust in them; underlines the need to align and enforce the relevant EU legislation and codes of conduct, including with a view to requiring full transparency on the employment or projects taken up by high-ranking EU officials after leaving public office and on any side activities carried out by Members of the European Parliament; is of the opinion that the rules with regard to the prevention of conflicts of interest after public office or employment should be applicable within a reasonable time frame while respecting rules on appropriate compensation; stresses the need to learn from best practices in Member States which already have national ethical authorities with relevant expertise in place; underlines that different national practices exist in relation to the enforcement of ethical standards; notes that in some Member States elected representatives are required to refrain from voting on issues in which they have a personal interest and accordingly asks MEPs to refrain from being rapporteurs in similar cases; recalls, in this context, the provisions laid down in Articles 2 and 3 in the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament with respect to financial interests and conflicts of interest;

51.  Underlines that the European Ombudsman has been handling conflicts of interest complaints in the absence of a mechanism dedicated to this task on top of her other missions, and without having the proper means and power to enforce her decisions;

52.  Stresses that an independent EU ethics body will not be sufficient in itself to efficiently address conflict of interest situations within the EU institutions and agencies; considers that the review of the EU ethics and integrity rules could include measures such as extending notification and cooling-off periods for senior officials on a proportionate case-by-case basis, while ensuring equal treatment in line with Article 15 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the strengthening of Directive 2014/24/EU(4) on public procurement, mandatory divestment of interests in undertakings that are subject to the authority of the institution to which an official has been newly appointed or which have dealings with that institution, mandatory recusal when dealing with matters that affect a former private sector employer, or bans on individual stock ownership by Commissioners and senior officials of EU institutions and agencies while in office; reiterates its call on the Commission to consider proposing a review of the relevant legal framework;

53.  Is of the view that, if based on an objective procedure with clear criteria, longer ‘cooling-off’ periods for senior officials who leave an agency or institution are justified legal measures to protect the public interest and the integrity of public bodies;

54.  Expresses its concerns about the appointment procedures for senior EU officials, the handling of Commissioners’ conflicts of interest and breaches of the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament, and about checks on transparency obligations and the verification of compliance with revolving door rules;

55.  Considers that the EU institutions should apply the highest ethical standards to prevent any cases of revolving doors or conflicts of interest, including with regard to the appointments to senior positions in the EU institutions and agencies;

56.  Considers that the procedures for selecting candidates for senior positions should be carried out on the basis of fully objective criteria and be fully transparent for the general public; highlights that there should be a framework in place for questions and objections, along with open follow-up procedures and the power to cancel decisions that are proven to be of inadequate transparency and integrity; stresses that the procedures should be regularly evaluated in order to monitor their effectiveness and apply improvements where necessary;

57.  Stresses that Parliament must play a key role in the process of enhancing the current EU ethics oversight system applicable across all EU institutions, agencies and bodies, in order to increase public trust in the EU decision-making processes;

o
o   o

58.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ C 337, 20.9.2018, p. 120. (2) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0327. (3) OJ L 262, 7.10.2005, p. 1. (4) Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 65).