The European Parliament,

– having regard to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol thereto,

– having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

– having regard to the 26th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP26), the 16th session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP16), and the third session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA3), held in Glasgow, UK, from 31 October to 13 November 2021, and to the Glasgow Climate Pact adopted on 13 November 2021,

– having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

– having regard to its resolution of 21 October 2021 on the 2021 UN Climate Change Conference in Glasgow, UK (COP26),

– having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency,

– having regard to the special report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on global warming of 1.5 °C, its special report on climate change and land, its special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate, and its sixth assessment report (AR6),

– having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the EU strategy on adaptation to climate change,

1 OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 118.
having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/591 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030,

having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 on the European Year of Greener Cities 2022,


having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal,

having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2020 on the EU’s role in protecting and restoring the world’s forests,

having regard to the UNFCCC synthesis report on nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement of 17 September 2021,


having regard to the IEA report of May 2021 entitled ‘Net Zero by 2050 – A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector’ and its Energy Technology Perspectives report 2020,

having regard to the United Nations Forum on Forests Secretariat Global Forest Goals Report 2021,

having regard to the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage,

having regard to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030,

having regard to the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) reports of April 2021 on the state of the global climate in 2020 and of May 2022 on the state of the global climate in 2021,

having regard to the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) 2022 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR2022),

1 OJ L 114, 12.4.2022, p. 22.
5 OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 10.
– having regard to the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance’s First report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement 2021 (NDR),

– having regard to the Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) of 31 May 2019, as well as to its workshop report of 29 October 2020 on biodiversity and pandemics,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 February 2022 on ‘EU climate diplomacy: accelerating the implementation of Glasgow outcomes’,

– having regard to its resolution of 28 April 2021 on soil protection\(^1\),

– having regard to the UN Women Commission on the Status of Women (CSW66) agreed conclusions entitled ‘Achieving gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls in the context of climate change, environmental and disaster risk reduction policies and programmes 2022’,


– having regard to the Council conclusions of 4 October 2022 on climate finance in view of the UNFCCC 27th Conference of the Parties (COP 27) in Sharm El-Sheikh on 6-18 November 2022,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of the 19 November 2021 on water in the EU’s external action,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘Forging a climate-resilient Europe – the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change’ (COM(2021)0082),

– having regard to the UNEP report of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Making Peace with Nature: a scientific blueprint to tackle the climate, biodiversity and pollution emergencies’,


– having regard to its resolution of 22 June 2022 on implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals\(^2\),

– having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives\(^3\),

\(^1\) OJ C 506, 15.12.2021, p. 38.
\(^2\) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0263.
\(^3\) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 25.
having regard to the Commission communication of 14 October 2020 on an EU strategy to reduce methane emissions (COM(2020)0663),

having regard to the co-sponsored IPBES-IPCC workshop report on biodiversity and climate change of 10 June 2021,

having regard to the questions to the Commission and to the Council on the 2022 UN Climate Change Conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt (COP27) (O-000041/2022 – B9-0027/2022 and O-000042/2022 – B9-0028/2022),

having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016; whereas by September 2022, 193 of the 197 Parties to the UNFCCC had filed their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the UN;

B. whereas the UN has declared a climate and environmental emergency and has committed to urgently take the concrete action needed to fight and contain this threat before it is too late; whereas biodiversity loss and climate change are interlinked and exacerbate each other, representing equal threats to life on our planet, and as such, should be urgently tackled together;

C. whereas on 17 December 2020, the EU and its Member States submitted their updated nationally determined contribution (NDC) to the UNFCCC, which commits the EU to a binding target of an economy-wide net domestic reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of at least 55 % by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, without a contribution from international credits; whereas this target was enshrined in Union law by Regulation (EU) 2021/1119;

D. whereas according to the UNEP emissions gap report 2021 the commitments made so far by the signatories to the Paris Agreement will not be sufficient to achieve its common goal and will result in global temperature rise of 2,7 °C by the end of the century, indicating as well that the world is still dangerously off track to meet the aspirations of the Paris Agreement; whereas natural feedback loops could exacerbate global heating even further; whereas more frequent heatwaves, droughts and floods are already exceeding plants’ and animals’ tolerance thresholds, driving mass mortalities, e.g. of trees and corals; whereas these weather extremes are occurring simultaneously, causing cascading impacts that are increasingly difficult to manage1; whereas many national climate plans delay action until after 2030 and many Parties to the UNFCCC have not yet taken sufficient action to even be on the path to meeting their NDCs;

E. whereas, according to the IPCC’s 6th Assessment, limiting warming to around 1,5 °C with no overshoot requires global GHG emissions to peak before 2025 at the latest and be reduced by 43 % below 2019 levels by 2030, while at the same time methane should also need to be reduced by about a third; whereas even the optimistic scenario of limiting the average global temperature to 1,5 °C would have irreversible adverse impacts on human systems and ecosystems and would significantly outpace and reduce their adaptive capacities, thus leading to losses and damages; whereas, according to the World Meteorological Organization, there is now a nearly 50 % risk of temporarily

1 IPCC adaptation report, 2022.
whereas the increase in global CO$_2$ emissions by over 2 billion tonnes in 2021 was the largest year-on-year increase in history in absolute terms, more than offsetting the previous year’s pandemic-induced decline in emissions arising from the reduction in economic activities; whereas coal accounted for over 40 % of the overall growth in global CO$_2$ emissions in 2021;

whereas most emissions from synthetic nitrogen fertilisers occur after they are applied to the soil and enter the atmosphere as nitrous oxide (N$_2$O) – a persistent GHG with 265 times more global warming potential than CO$_2$, whereas synthetic nitrogen fertiliser production accounted for 35,2 % of total synthetic nitrogen fertiliser-associated emissions, while field emissions accounted for 62,4 % and transportation accounted for the remaining 2,4 %; whereas the top four emitters (China, India, USA and the EU) jointly accounted for 63 % of the total emission generated;

whereas according to the IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives report, achieving net zero emissions requires a major acceleration in the development and deployment of clean technologies (‘cleantech’); whereas half of the decarbonisation needed to get to net zero by 2050 will come from technologies currently under development in the laboratory or in demonstration phase;

whereas the energy crisis has put into focus the issue of energy security and the need for energy demand reduction and a diversified energy system, creating greater demand for existing and soon available renewable energy and energy efficiency solutions; whereas the illegal Russian military invasion of Ukraine and subsequent impacts have added even greater urgency to the need for rapidly transform the global energy system; whereas the overreliance on fossil fuels and the instability in global energy markets underline the need to prioritise investments, both in Europe and worldwide, in energy efficiency and sufficiency, decarbonisation, long-duration energy storage, innovative clean technology deployment, renewable energy, smart grid solutions and zero-emissions sustainable technologies, and to develop a socioeconomic model that is compatible with a healthy environment for future generations and within planetary boundaries; whereas the research to support innovation and the development of new, green technologies should be supported, as they can play a role in climate change mitigation as well as in a sustainable economic growth and EU competitiveness;

whereas IPCC has urged the world to keep global warming below 1,5º C, yet in 2020 warming was already approximately 1,2º above pre-industrial levels; whereas according to the IPCC, human influence has unequivocally warmed the atmosphere, ocean and land and the impacts of human-induced climate change are being felt in the increased frequency of extreme weather events including heatwaves, droughts, flooding, winter storms, hurricanes and wildfires; whereas between 2000 and 2019, floods, droughts, and storms alone affected nearly 4 billion people worldwide, costing over 300 000 lives; whereas the occurrence of these extreme events represents a drastic change since the period 1980-99, with the frequency of floods increasing by 134 %, storms by 40 %, and droughts by 29 %

J. whereas there are scientifically proven interlinkages between health, environmental and climate crises; whereas extreme weather events, biodiversity loss, land degradation and water scarcity are displacing people and having a dramatic impact on their health; whereas according to the World Health Organization, climate change is the single biggest health threat facing humanity, and it will cause approximately 250 000 additional deaths a year between 2030 and 2050\(^1\), whereas approximately 7 million premature deaths worldwide are caused by air pollution, and whereas the costs of direct damage to health, including mental health, are estimated to rise to between USD 2 and 4 billion per year by 2030;

K. whereas the UNDRR Global Assessment Report (GAR 2022) reveals that between 350 and 500 medium- to large-scale disasters took place every year over the past two decades, with the number of disaster events projected to reach 560 a year by 2030 – or 1.5 disasters a day;

L. whereas climate change is a main driver of environmental degradation, having a negative impact on food and water security, access to natural resources and harming human health; whereas water scarcity, flooding and droughts are key risks in Europe and water shortages impact several sectors across the EU through cascading and spillover effects; whereas water efficiency improvements are key adaptation options; whereas digital solutions should be deployed in order to ensure a resilient and green society in Europe and beyond; whereas all stakeholders and sectors should be mobilised to achieve a water-smart society by simultaneously addressing climate change adaptation, food and water security, protection of biodiversity and a resource-efficient and competitive economy; whereas the EU and the Member States should also develop this approach through the European neighbourhood policy, the EU’s external action and in the UN agendas;

M. whereas climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply and economic growth are projected to be much higher with global warming of 2 °C; whereas limiting global warming to 1.5 °C compared to 2 °C is projected to reduce the impacts on terrestrial, freshwater and coastal ecosystems and to retain more of their services to humans; whereas it is therefore imperative to pursue efforts to limit the temperature rise to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels;

N. whereas the preamble to the Paris Agreement recognises the ‘importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, including oceans’ and whereas Article 4(1)(d) of the UNFCCC stresses that the Parties thereto must promote sustainable management, and the conservation and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of all GHGs, including biomass, forests and oceans, as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems; whereas the IPBES global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services underlines that the sustainable use of nature will be vital for adapting to and mitigating dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system;

O. whereas the preservation of oceans is crucial for their role within the climate system, such as the uptake and redistribution of natural and anthropogenic CO\(_2\) and heat, as well as ecosystem support; whereas the IPCC 2019 Special Report on the Ocean and

\(^{1}\) https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health#text=Climate%20change%20affects%20the%20social,malaria%2C%20diarrhoea%20and%20heat%20stress
Cryosphere in a Changing Climate shows that since 1970 oceans have progressively warmed and absorbed more than 90% of the excess heat in the climate system; whereas ocean warming is affecting coastal ecosystems, leading to intensified marine heatwaves, acidification, loss of oxygen, salinity intrusion and sea level rise;

P. whereas the Glasgow Climate Pact recognises the ‘important role of non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, indigenous peoples, local communities, youth, children, local and regional governments and other stakeholders, in contributing to progress towards the objective of the goals of the Paris Agreement’ and highlights the ‘urgent need for multilevel and cooperative action’;

Q. whereas climate change is directly or indirectly threatening the full exercise of human rights, including the rights to life, water and sanitation, food, health and housing; whereas the ability of people to adapt to climate change is inextricably linked to their access to basic human rights and to the health of the ecosystems they depend on for their livelihoods and well-being; whereas, according to the International Organisation for Migration, more than 200 million people could be forced to migrate due to impact of climate change; whereas the scale of internal climate migration will be largest in the poorest and most climate-vulnerable regions; whereas global action to reduce GHG emissions could dramatically slow the rise in internal climate migrants by as much as 80% by 20501;

R. whereas the past seven years (2015 to 2021) were the warmest years on record; whereas sea levels also reached a new record high in 2021; whereas globally the sea level rose 4.5 mm a year on average between 2013 and 2021, and in several region, the sea level is rising ‘substantially faster’ than the global average, according to the WMO; whereas rainfall was recorded for the first time ever on the highest point on Greenland’s ice sheet in 2021;

S. whereas the richest 1% of the global population are set to generate per capita consumption emissions in 2030 that are still 30 times higher than the global per capita level, while the footprints of the poorest half of the world population are set to remain several times below that level2;

T. whereas most developing countries contribute minimally to GHG emissions in the atmosphere causing climate change; whereas climate change impacts in developing countries have increased; whereas the resources they can mobilise for adaptation action to address the negative effects of climate change and achieve climate resilience and sustainable development are clearly insufficient;

U. whereas the UNFCCC First Report on the Determination of the Needs of Developing Country Parties states that the costed needs of developing countries for implementing NDCs amount to between USD 5.8 and 5.9 trillion, of which USD 502 billion is identified as needs requiring international sources of finance;

V. whereas in 2020 Global Witness recorded the murders of 227 land and environmental defenders, 71 % of whom were working to defend the world’s forests from deforestation and industrial development, while others died for their work protecting rivers, coastal areas and oceans; whereas in 2020 violence against land and environmental defenders was overwhelmingly concentrated in countries in the Global South and less than 1 % of all recorded lethal attacks were documented in the Global North; whereas between 2015 and 2019 over a third of all fatal attacks targeted indigenous people, even though indigenous communities make up only 5 % of the world’s population;

1. Recalls that the climate and biodiversity crises are among the most important challenges facing humanity and that all governments and actors worldwide must do their utmost to overcome them urgently, treating the two crises as closely intertwined; underlines that international cooperation, the involvement of regional and local governments, businesses as well as other non-state actors, solidarity, a just transition, coherent action underpinned by science and an unwavering commitment to ramping up ambition and aligning policies with this ambition are necessary to fulfil our collective responsibility of limiting global warming and preventing biodiversity loss, and thus safeguard the entire planet and the well-being of current and future generations;

2. Expresses concern at the findings of the UNEP’s emissions gap report 2021 and of its addendum published on 4 November 2021, in particular that, despite more ambitious climate pledges announced ahead of and during COP26, predicted emissions leave the world on a path to a 2,7 °C temperature rise if announced national 2030 climate targets are fully implemented in combination with other mitigation measures, far beyond the Paris Agreement goals of limiting global warming to well below 2 °C and pursuing 1,5° C; is alarmed that emissions are still rising and the emissions gap is widening; stresses that limiting global warming to 1,5 °C requires rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global GHG emissions, including reducing global CO$_2$ emissions by 43 % by 2030 compared to 2019 levels; recalls that by adopting the Glasgow Climate Pact all Parties recognised that limiting the increase in the global average temperature to 1,5 °C above pre-industrial levels would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;

3. Underlines that according to the UNEP’s emissions gap report 2021 the reduction of methane emissions from the fossil fuel, waste and agriculture sectors could help close the emissions gap and reduce warming in the short term, but emphasises that in order for that to happen there is an urgent need for rules that are clearly defined and aim to achieve actual reductions in emissions, while being supported by arrangements to track progress and provide transparency;

4. Highlights the growing number of countries committing to net zero emissions goals by mid-century but underlines that these commitments must be urgently translated into robust short-term targets, policies and actions, backed by financial resources and reflected in revised NDCs in the form of increased 2030 climate targets in order for global emissions to peak as soon as possible; concurs with the UNEP in its assessment

that many national climate plans delay action until after 2030 and that many of the long-
term net-zero emissions pledges contain large ambiguities and lack of transparency;

5. Notes with deep concern the WMO’s latest State of the Climate report, which shows
that four key climate indicators – sea level rise, ocean heat, ocean acidification and
GHG concentrations – broke new records in 2021;

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6. Takes note of the progress made during COP26 and in the Glasgow Climate Pact;
stresses, however, that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C will only be achieved if urgent
action is taken in this critical decade before 2030; underlines that COP26 requested
Parties to revisit and strengthen the 2030 targets in their NDCs as this is necessary to
align with the Paris Agreement temperature goal by the end of 2022, taking into account
different national circumstances; strongly urges all Parties to the UNFCCC to increase
their NDCs by COP27 in order to close the ambition gap, and to align their policies to a
pathway compatible with this ambition; calls on the EU and all G20 nations to show
global leadership in this regard;

7. Welcomes the COP26 decision to produce a work programme to urgently scale up
mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade, in a manner that
complements the global stocktake, to annually update the synthesis report on NDCs
ahead of each COP, and to convene an annual high-level ministerial roundtable on pre-
2030 ambitions; urges COP27 to adopt this work programme and to ensure an annual
review of ambition reflecting best available scientific knowledge and the Parties’
highest possible level of ambition; stresses that Parties will need to revise and increase
their NDCs until they are in line with a pathway compatible with limiting global
warming to 1.5°C;

8. Welcomes the completion in Glasgow of the Paris Agreement Rulebook, underlines that
the implementation of the rulebook must ensure strong environmental integrity and
deliver the highest level of ambition;

9. Welcomes the fact that the Glasgow Climate Pact underlines the importance of
adaptation and the need to scale up action to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen
resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change; notes in this regard that 47
countries submitted Adaptation Communications or National Adaptation Plans in the
last year, and expects other countries to submit their Communications in line with the
Paris Agreement; welcomes the creation of a new Glasgow Dialogue on Loss and
Damage which should focus on funding arrangements to avert, minimise and address
loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change;

10. Takes note of the climate finance pledges made during COP26, but regrets that the 2021
Climate Finance Delivery Plan showed that the current global USD 100 billion goal is
only likely to be achieved in 2023, three years after the original deadline; points to the
growing finance gap, particularly for adaptation; urges developed countries, including
the EU and its Member States, to ensure that the USD 100 billion climate finance goal
can be met and disbursed already as of 2022 and on average over the time period 2020-
2025, and to further detail the way forward for the new post-2025 climate finance goal;
stresses that financing from the developed countries responsible for a large share of
historical emissions will also be crucial to build trust for a more ambitious dialogue on climate mitigation targets;

11. Highlights that the country of COP27 belongs to one of the regions in the world most affected by climate change; notes that the Mediterranean basin is warming 20% faster than the global average, and that the region is one of the main climate change hotspots in the world, where 250 million people are projected to be considered ‘water poor’ within 20 years; underlines that the Mediterranean is turning into the fastest warming sea in the world with consequences for important economic sectors and the whole sea ecosystem, suffering irreversible changes to the ecosystem and species; calls on the Commission and Member States to act with urgency and cooperate with its Mediterranean partners to work on an ambitious adaptation measures and to lead mitigation action;

12. Supports the initiative by the Ukrainian Government to create a global platform for assessing the environmental damage caused during armed conflicts;

13. Recalls the importance of the full involvement of all Parties in the UNFCCC decision-making processes; stresses that the current decision-making process under the UNFCCC could be improved to better allow for the full participation of developing countries and least developed country (LDC) delegates and civil society representatives; considers it essential for the perspectives of countries suffering most from climate change to be heard and acted on; calls therefore on the COP27 presidency and future presidencies to explore additional ways to ensure effective and meaningful participation of developing countries and to allocate additional resources to this; recalls its previous positions on the human rights situation in Egypt; takes note of a number of civil society organisations who have raised concerns about the marginalisation of civil society at the COP in Egypt and the barriers to protests and civil society participation; calls on the UNFCCC and the Egyptian authorities to ensure equitable access and full participation of citizens and civil society organisations in COP27;

14. Reiterates its call for the release of all persons held in arbitrary detention in Egypt and stresses the particularly urgent case of human rights defender Alaa Abd El-Fattah; calls on the Egyptian authorities to use the momentum from COP27 to improve the human rights situation in the country and to uphold fundamental freedoms throughout and beyond COP27, notably in relation to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; strongly supports the call by UN experts for the UNFCCC Secretariat to develop human rights criteria that countries hosting future COPs must commit to meeting as part of the host agreement;

15. Welcomes the fact that the Glasgow Climate Pact recognises the important role of non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, indigenous peoples, local communities, youth, children, local and regional governments and other stakeholders, in contributing to progress towards the objectives of the Paris Agreement; recognises the important role played by youth in the fight against climate change; urges Parties and stakeholders,

therefore, to ensure meaningful youth participation and representation in multilateral, national and local decision-making processes; recalls in particular the key role of cities in reducing GHG emissions and welcomes the growing number of cities and regions around the world committing to net zero emissions goals and, in particular, the commitments of the 100 European cities participating in the EU Mission for Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities to become climate-neutral by 2030 and to become innovation hubs that will allow all EU cities and their neighbourhood peers to follow suit by 2050;

16. Stresses that the effective participation of all Parties is needed to pursue the goal of limiting the increase in the global average temperature to 1,5°C, which requires addressing the issue of vested or conflicting interests; expresses concerns in particular over the fact that some big polluters have used their presence at COPs to undermine the objectives of the Paris Agreement; is seriously concerned by the lack of action by the UNFCCC to finally address the issue of conflicts of interest with regard to engagement with non-Party stakeholders; urges the Commission and the Member States to take the lead in this process to protect the UNFCCC decision-making process from interests that run counter the goals of the Paris Agreement;

17. Welcomes the improvement of the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action as a space to encourage non-state actors and subnational governments to take immediate climate action and welcomes the adoption of its work programme for 2022; recognises the Race to Zero and the Race to Resilience initiatives as key platforms for supporting bottom-up governance, facilitating reporting and stocktaking at the subnational level;

An ambitious EU climate policy

18. Expects the Fit for 55 legislative package and the policies under the European Green Deal to deliver the measures for achieving the EU’s 2030 target and to put the EU and its Member States on a path to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest and underlines Parliament’s positions on these; recalls that in line with the EU Climate Law and the Paris Agreement as well as best available science, the EU should step up its climate action both on mitigation, to contain global warming to 1,5 °C compared to pre-industrial levels, and on adaptation to foster resilience; calls for the EU to update its NDC and increase its GHG reduction target by COP27 based on the best available science; calls for the highest level of ambition in the Fit for 55 package so as to send a clear signal to all other Parties that the EU stands ready to contribute to closing the gap necessary to limit global warming to 1,5°C, in a just, socially balanced, fair and cost-effective way, while taking into account aspects of global fairness and equity and the EU’s historical and current responsibility for the emissions causing the climate crisis;

19. Highlights the fact that the EU’s overall 2030 emissions target established in the European Climate Law and the Fit for 55 legislative proposals will reduce the EU’s emissions by more than its current NDC of a 55 % reduction in net emissions; underlines, furthermore, that Parliament’s positions on these proposals and the targets included in the REPowerEU Plan will further raise the EU’s climate ambition beyond that level, and calls on the Council to endorse the Parliament’s positions in this respect; calls for the EU to update its emissions pledges accordingly to reflect this, in light of the decision in the Glasgow Climate Pact to revisit the 2030 targets;
20. Stresses that the current geopolitical situation highlights the urgency of cutting dependence on fossil fuels and the need to boost the deployment of renewables, and offers the opportunity of stepping up EU leadership in this regard;

21. Reiterates the need to mainstream climate ambition into all EU policies and the measures transposing them, and underlines that Article 6(4) of the European Climate Law obliges the Commission to assess the consistency of any draft measure or legislative proposal, including budgetary proposals, with the EU’s climate targets; urges the Commission to fully implement this provision in the way it conducts impact assessments on all EU policy areas; emphasises the need to also re-evaluate and align existing policies of the Union and its Member States with these objectives, and expects the newly created European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change to contribute to this assessment; welcomes the appointment of the 15 members of the newly established European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change; calls on the Advisory Board to publish their assessment of an EU GHG budget compatible with the objective of limiting global warming below 1.5 °C as soon as possible, and expects the Commission to take fully on board the advice of the Advisory Board when drawing up the indicative Union GHG budget and the Union post-2030 climate targets;

22. Recalls a recent ruling by a Member State’s constitutional court that climate protection is not a matter of political discretion and that the constitution’s provision on environmental protection imposes a constitutional duty on the state to achieve climate neutrality;

23. Emphasises EU citizens’ strong support for stepping up climate action as almost every second European (49 %) sees climate change as the main global challenge for the future of the EU according to the latest Eurobarometer;

24. Emphasises that all climate policies should be pursued in line with the principle of a just transition towards climate neutrality and in close cooperation with civil society and social and economic partners; considers, therefore, that more transparency, stronger social partnerships and civil society engagement at local, regional, national and EU level are fundamental to achieving climate neutrality across all sectors of society in a fair, inclusive and socially sustainable manner;

Adaptation and loss and damage

25. Welcomes the new financial pledges made in Glasgow to the Adaptation Fund and to the least developed countries Fund; notes however that support for mitigation remains greater than support for adaptation, and strongly supports the call for developed nations to at least double their collective provision of adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025, in line with the Glasgow Climate Pact, in order to achieve a better balance; regrets that seven years after the Paris Agreement, the global goal on adaptation remains undefined; welcomes the Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation, adopted and launched at COP26; underlines the importance of grants-based adaptation finance; urges the EU to increase the proportion of finance for adaptation provided through the Global Europe Instrument year by year from 2021 to 2027; highlights the need to step up efforts to translate the global goal on adaptation into measurable outcomes that should, inter alia, provide a comprehensive understanding of climate and disaster risks and associated adaptation needs and costs at multiple levels, increase the availability of consistent and comparable data, determine and enhance the
provision and accessibility of means of implementation, including finance and technology support, and draw up a common set of quantitative and qualitative metrics, methodologies and approaches to track progress towards achieving the goal over time; highlights in this context the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and its monitoring and reporting system;

26. Reiterates that adaptation action in the short, medium and long term, is an inevitable necessity for all countries if they are to minimise the negative effects of the climate and biodiversity crises and achieve climate resilience and sustainable development, noting the particular vulnerabilities to climate change impacts of developing countries, especially the least developed countries and small island developing states; highlights that adaptation action can generate multiple benefits such as improving agricultural productivity, innovation, health and well-being, food security, livelihoods and biodiversity conservation, as well as the reduction of risks and damages; calls on the EU and the Member States to step up adaptation action through mandatory adaptation plans, climate vulnerability assessments and climate stress tests at local, regional, and national levels and through support for locally-led approaches and engagement with local authorities and local civil society in order to fully honour the adaptation goal of the Paris Agreement and ensure that EU adaptation policies sufficiently protect communities and ecosystems in the EU from the effects of climate change; calls for further progress on the new EU Adaptation Strategy and stresses the importance of its linkages with the EU Biodiversity Strategy and the new regulatory framework on adaptation stemming from the European Climate Law; reiterates calls for their ambitious implementation, including of their international components;

27. Underlines that, while climate change is a global problem, each region is already being affected differently, and that local governments, being closer to populations, are key actors for facilitating climate change adaptation; underlines that better channelling of financial resources to the local level is needed for efficient, targeted solutions and, in this sense, welcomes the Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change, which will support at least 150 European regions and communities towards climate resilience by 2030; calls for support for a regional and decentralised approach in the response to climate change effects and in the access to climate finance in developing countries in order to give local authorities, local civil society organisations and environmental defenders a greater role in tackling the effects of climate change and to reach the most vulnerable;

28. Stresses that the EU Adaptation Strategy adopted by the Commission on 24 February 2021 expresses the Commission’s aim of scaling up resources and further mobilising larger-scale adaptation finance, and that particular attention is needed to ensure that financial resources reach the most vulnerable communities in developing countries;

29. Stresses that early warning systems are critical to effective adaptation but are only available to less than half of WMO members; supports the WMO’s proposal to be approved at the COP27 to make early warning systems reach everyone in the next five years; hopes that this Early Warning Services initiative will be implemented rapidly particularly with the aim of saving as many lives as soon as possible;

30. Emphasises that green infrastructure contributes to adaptation to climate change and the reduction of disaster risk through the protection of nature and ecosystems, the conservation and restoration of natural habitats and species, good ecological status,
water management and food security; notes that the development of green infrastructure is among the most effective climate adaptation measures that can be implemented in cities, as it mitigates the negative impacts of climate change and increasingly frequent extreme weather phenomena, such as heatwaves, forest fires, extreme rainfall, flooding and drought, evens out extreme temperatures and improves the quality of life of residents living in urban areas, including their mental and physical health;

31. Highlights the devastating environmental, social and economic impacts of desertification in the medium and long term, its triggering of depopulation in some areas, and the need for common approaches to properly prevent and adapt to this phenomenon and overcome it; recalls therefore the crucial importance of water management for climate change mitigation and adaptation, but also to protect water and food security, protect biodiversity and support healthy soils; stresses therefore the need for speedy and full implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive in order to achieve its objectives and better manage Europe’s water resources; emphasises that water reuse and water efficiency through circular processes must be fully implemented across the economy and society in order to make use of the value in water and ensure water security in terms of quantity and quality; emphasises that digital solutions can contribute to adaptation to climate change by improving the ability to predict water scarcity, floods and water pollution and supports the deployment of these tools;

32. Stresses that climate change and environmental degradation are major drivers of human displacement and threat multipliers impacting human security and socio-political stability; stresses that insufficient mitigation and adaptation capacities can drive armed conflicts, food shortages, natural catastrophes and climate-induced displacement; calls on the Commission and the Member States to recognise the needs and vulnerability of people affected by climate displacement and calls for a reinforcement of EU development cooperation and humanitarian policies and their respective financial instruments to support climate change adaptation in developing countries, build resilience, reinforce disaster risk reduction and respond to humanitarian emergencies in times of growing needs;

33. Notes that Article 8 of the Paris Agreement (on loss and damage) states that the Parties should take a cooperative approach to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change; highlights, therefore, the importance of supportive global action in areas especially vulnerable to climate change impacts, such as coastal areas and islands, and where adaptive capacity is limited; calls on the Commission and the Member States to act as bridge-builders between developed, developing and least developed countries, and aim to step up the work of the High Ambition Coalition on both mitigation and adaptation finance and loss and damage; recognises that these are essential components of global climate justice;

34. Expresses its gratitude to the IPCC and greatly appreciates the work carried out on its 6th Assessment Report; welcomes the robust assessment of losses and damages featured in the recent IPCC Working Group II report and points to how it acknowledges loss and damage as an area of increasing importance in both international climate policy and climate science; invites the IPCC to build on this work and produce a special report dealing specifically with losses and damages;
35. Reiterates that international institutions need to strengthen their organisations, cooperation and crisis management in order to be better prepared for climate change on a local and global level as a next step towards institutional climate adaptation;

The climate and biodiversity crisis

36. Emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring nature and ecosystems in order to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement; recalls, further, the crucial role played by biodiversity in enabling humans to combat and adapt to global warming and increase their level of resilience; believes that nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based approaches are key tools for supporting climate change mitigation and adaptation, as well as protecting and restoring biodiversity and forests and reducing the risk of disasters; stresses that by restoring degraded ecosystems as quickly as possible and effectively and equitably conserving 30 to 50% of the Earth’s land, freshwater and ocean habitats, while safeguarding and strengthening human rights and the rights of indigenous peoples, society can benefit from nature’s capacity to absorb and store carbon; stresses the need to accelerate progress towards sustainable development, but that for this to happen adequate finance and political support are essential;

37. Emphasises the critical and interdependent roles of forests, biodiversity and sustainable land use in enabling the world to meet the SDGs; stresses, therefore, the urgent need to halt and reverse deforestation and land degradation as a way to contribute for the reduction of annual net GHG emissions;

38. Reiterates the pledge by the governments of 141 countries with more than 3.6 billion hectares of forest to end and reverse deforestation by 2030;

39. Reiterates that the strict conservation and restoration of high-carbon ecosystems is a response option with an immediate impact and wide range of mitigation and adaptation benefits; recognises the key role of forests in protecting the climate and biodiversity; highlights that forests contribute to efforts to mitigate and adapt to the negative impacts of climate change;

40. Stresses that sectoral policies and the climate policy for land use sector, including for important primary production activities in agriculture and forestry, need to adequately work in synergy with the natural adaptation capacities of natural and semi-natural ecosystems, and improve as much as possible the adaptation capacity of predominantly cultural landscapes; highlights the recent court ruling in a case where the plaintiffs were foresters who brought a case against the state for its national forest policy, which has effectively disallowed them to improve the resilience of managed forests, including by disincentivising natural regeneration1; 

41. Recalls that, according to the fifth assessment report of the IPCC, indigenous, local and traditional forms of knowledge are a major resource for the sustainable management of natural resources, the conservation of biodiversity and adaptation to climate change; stresses the need to strengthen their community rights on land and resources in order to mitigate climate change, as set out in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of

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Indigenous Peoples and ILO Convention 169, and to comply with the principle of free, prior and informed consent;

42. Highlights in the context of business the need to protect land and environmental defenders by ensuring effective and robust regulatory protection of the environment, labour rights, land rights, indigenous peoples’ rights, livelihoods and cultures, including the principle to free, prior and informed consent; welcomes in this regard the EU initiatives on corporate sustainability due diligence and the proposed regulation on the making available on the Union market as well as export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation; calls on the Parties to ensure that commitments made at COP27 to implement the Paris Agreement align with existing international human rights obligations and standards applicable to business operations;

43. Recalls that climate change is one of the main direct drivers of biodiversity loss and land degradation; underlines that the negative effects of climate change on nature and biodiversity, ecosystems, oceans, health and food security are projected to become critical in future decades; underlines that a stronger, binding and more ambitious international framework is needed in order to protect global biodiversity, to stop its current decline and to restore it as much as possible; acknowledges in this context the importance of the Biodiversity Conference in Montreal, Canada, of December 2022; calls on the IPCC and IPBES to continue and strengthen their cooperation and joint work to provide policy-makers with the latest science on the twin climate and biodiversity crises and how to address them; calls also on the UNFCCC to work in partnership with the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) towards a consistent framework for climate neutrality and resilience, biodiversity protection and sustainable development;

44. Encourages the Parties, in line with the Glasgow Climate Pact, to take an integrated approach to addressing biodiversity in national, regional and local policy and planning decisions; calls on the UNFCCC, in this regard, to work in partnership with UNCBD and UNDP towards a consistent framework for climate neutrality and resilience, biodiversity protection and sustainable development; welcomes the Edinburgh Declaration on the post-2020 global biodiversity framework, which provides an example of an inclusive ‘whole of government’ approach;

45. Calls on the Parties to continue the work on the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue by setting concrete, action-oriented goals, addressing the most relevant and pressing issues of the ocean-climate nexus and encouraging countries, especially coastal countries, to include corresponding commitments in their updated NDCs, National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), Long-Term Strategies (LTEs) and Global Stocktake (GST) submissions, among other actions;

**Sustainable climate finance**

46. Highlights that the EU and its Member States are the largest providers of public climate finance; recognises the importance of climate finance for successful climate actions, particularly as many developing countries have conditional NDCs, the achievement of which depends on sufficient financial support; welcomes, therefore, that by 2025, a new collective quantified goal on climate finance will be set which should go well beyond the 2020 USD 100 billion annual goal and take into account the needs and priorities of...
developing countries for additional and adequate climate finance; is of the view that stand-alone targets for mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage should be explored as part of this new collective quantified goal on climate finance; underlines that future climate finance goals should take account of the needs of developing countries, as well as the Paris Agreement’s equity principle, in determining Parties’ contributions; stresses, in this regard, the need to clearly prioritise grants-based climate finance to ensure that climate finance does not contribute to unsustainable debt levels in developing countries; reiterates its call for a dedicated EU public finance mechanism that provides additional and adequate support towards delivering the EU’s fair share of international climate finance goals; also recalls its position of 22 June 2022 on the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)\(^1\), according to which the Union should finance least developed countries’ efforts towards the de-carbonisation of their manufacturing industries with an annual amount corresponding at least to the level of revenues generated by the sale of CBAM certificates;

47. Stresses the importance of operationalising the global goal on adaptation and of mobilising major new funds for adaptation in developing countries; notes with concern that adaptation costs and needs are rising, and that they are five to ten times greater than current international public adaptation finance flows, leading to a widening adaptation finance gap; notes the inherent difficulties in directing private finance towards adaptation; highlights that current global financial flows are insufficient for the implementation of necessary adaptation action, especially in developing countries, including because a substantial part of adaptation finance is provided in the form of loans; notes that 50 % of the EU’s total climate finance in 2020 was provided in the form of grants and urges the EU and all Member States to increase grants-based finance, particularly for adaptation and especially for least developed countries and small island developing states; calls for the EU and its Member States to commit to a significant increase in the adaptation finance they provide and to bring to COP27 a clear plan on how to achieve the goal agreed in the Glasgow Climate Pact to double adaptation finance by 2025 compared to 2019 levels;

48. Recognises the need for progress on the issue of finance to address loss and damage; calls on Parties to agree on new, adequate and additional sources of public finance clearly prioritising grants in order to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change; notes the inherent difficulties in directing private finance towards loss and damage; urges the EU to constructively engage ahead of COP27, including by examining modalities for such a facility, taking into account existing institutional arrangements in developing countries’ proposals to establish a loss and damage finance facility at COP27; calls for loss and damage to be a standing agenda item for future COPs, so that there is clear negotiating space to monitor and make progress on this issue, and for the full operationalisation of the Santiago Network in order to effectively catalyse technical assistance for adequately addressing loss and damage;

49. Recalls that all Parties must make financial flows – public and private, domestic and international – compatible with the path towards the 1,5 °C target in the Paris Agreement; reiterates the need to urgently end fossil fuel subsidies and other environmentally harmful subsidies in the EU and worldwide; highlights the Glasgow Climate Pact commitment to accelerate efforts to phase down unabated coal power and

\(^1\) Texts Adopted, P9_TA(2022)0248.
inefficient fossil fuel subsidies: is concerned by the lack of a definition of what an ‘inefficient fossil fuel subsidy’ is and that it seriously endangers the credibility of such commitments; notes that fossil fuels subsidies in the EU still amount to some EUR 55-58 billion annually; reminds the Commission and the Member States of their obligations under the 8th Environmental Action Programme to set a deadline for the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies consistent with the ambition of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C, as well as to develop a binding Union framework to monitor and report on Member States’ progress towards phasing out fossil fuel subsidies based on an agreed methodology; calls on the Commission and all Member States to implement concrete policies, timelines and measures to phase out all direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies as soon as possible, and by 2025 at the very latest; encourages other Parties to undertake similar measures and to work on developing a fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty; welcomes the G7’s commitment to stop funding fossil fuel development overseas by the end of 2022, while stressing that this commitment should also apply domestically; highlights the need to ensure that the EU’s carbon pricing framework does not incentivise industrial pollution; highlights the role of the Innovation Fund;  

50. Considers it essential for major international financial institutions to swiftly adopt and develop green finance in order to bring about a successful decarbonisation of the global economy; recalls the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) as the EU’s climate bank and its recently adopted Climate Bank Roadmap and updated Energy Lending Policy and the additional efforts of the European Investment Fund (EIF) to spearhead climate investments; welcomes the fact that the European Central Bank has committed to integrating climate change considerations into its monetary policy framework; urges multilateral development banks, including the EIB, and development finance institutions, which typically provide financial support in the form of debt-generating instruments, to implement responsible lending and borrowing principles, and to align their portfolios with the Paris Agreement and gather and use high-quality climate risk, vulnerability and impacts data to guide the direction of investments towards 1.5°C-aligned investments; acknowledges the importance of the establishment of the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero and its commitment to supporting emerging economies to transition to net zero; welcomes in this context the EU agreement on Corporate Sustainability Reporting, which is crucial to building financial support;  

51. Supports the work of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action and encourages all governments to adopt the coalition’s commitments to align all policies and practices in the remit of finance ministries with the goals of the Paris Agreement and to adopt effective carbon pricing, as laid down in the Helsinki Principles;  

52. Welcomes the work of the International Sustainability Standards Board to develop a global baseline of sustainability disclosures for capital markets in order to direct more capital towards clean technologies and climate investments;  

Efforts across all sectors  

53. Recalls that the European Climate Law includes a commitment to facilitating sector-specific climate dialogues and partnerships by bringing together key stakeholders in an inclusive and representative manner so as to encourage sectors themselves to draw up indicative voluntary roadmaps and to plan their transition towards achieving the Union’s climate neutrality objective by 2050; highlights that these roadmaps could make a valuable contribution to assisting sectors with planning the necessary
investments in the transition to a climate-neutral economy and could also serve to strengthen sectoral engagement with the pursuit of climate-neutral solutions;

54. Calls on all Parties to urgently take action against methane emissions; welcomes the Global Methane Pledge that the EU, the US and a number of other countries signed up to at COP26, which aims to reduce all methane emissions caused by human action by 30% by 2030 compared to 2020 levels, which is the first step towards the reduction of 45% recommended by UNEP\(^1\); urges all signatories to ensure they reduce methane emissions within their territories by at least 30% by 2030 and to adopt national measures to achieve this aim; notes that approximately 60% of the world’s methane is emitted by sources such as agriculture, landfill sites, waste water facilities and the production and pipeline transport of fossil fuels; recalls that methane is a potent GHG which is 28 times more powerful than CO\(_2\) in terms of its climate impact over a 100-year timeframe, and 80 times more potent over a 20-year timeframe; highlights in this regard that stronger action to reduce methane emissions is one of the most cost-effective measures for cutting GHG emissions in the short term; notes that many technologies and practices are already available for mitigating methane emissions cost-effectively, at low cost or negative cost; notes that methane emissions in agriculture are primarily driven by increasing livestock numbers and that livestock emissions from manure and enteric fermentation account for roughly 32% of anthropogenic methane emissions; takes note, in this context, of the proposal to reduce methane emissions in the energy sector presented by the Commission in December 2021; calls for the adoption of additional binding legislative measures to tackle emissions in other emitting sectors, for binding Union methane emissions reduction targets as well as the inclusion of methane among the regulated pollutants in the National Emission Reduction Commitments Directive; reiterates its call to address livestock densities in the EU to ensure ambitious reductions of GHG emissions in this sector; reiterates its position that a shift is needed in consumption patterns towards more healthy foods, diets and lifestyles, including increased consumption of sustainably and regionally produced plants and plant-based foods, and that the overconsumption of meat and ultra-processed products needs to be addressed;

55. Considers that sustainable agricultural production models require global standard setting using a cross-sectoral, multidisciplinary ‘One Health’\(^2\) approach to ensure the transition toward sustainable food systems as well as meeting the commitments of the Paris agreement and the Glasgow Climate Pact;

56. Recognises that climate change will contribute to increased antibiotic resistance and therefore calls for a global agreement by the Parties to reduce the use of antimicrobials and combat the risk of resistance;

57. Highlights that the transport sector is the only sector in which emissions have risen at EU level since 1990 and that this is not compatible with the EU’s climate goals, which require greater and faster reductions in emissions from all sectors of society, including the aviation and maritime sectors; considers that in order to ensure the consistency of NDCs with the economy-wide commitments required by the Paris Agreement, the Parties should be strongly encouraged to include emissions from international shipping and aviation in their NDCs and to agree on and implement measures at international level.

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\(^1\) UNEP Global Methane Assessment 2021.
\(^2\) [https://www.who.int/health-topics/one-health#tab=tab_1](https://www.who.int/health-topics/one-health#tab=tab_1)
regional and national level to reduce emissions from these sectors, including non-CO\textsubscript{2} impacts from aviation; recalls, further, that according to the IEA all new passenger cars placed on the market globally need to be zero emission by 2035 in order to reach net zero emissions by 2050;

58. Highlights the inclusion of maritime and aviation emissions in the EU emissions trading system (ETS), which could also serve as a model for other countries and will support greater ambition at international level, including in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); is concerned by the slow progress achieved in the IMO and the ICAO in addressing emissions from international shipping and aviation; calls on the Commission and the Member States to do their utmost to strengthen the carbon offsetting and reduction scheme for international aviation (CORSIA) while safeguarding the EU’s legislative autonomy in implementing the ETS Directive; welcomes the ongoing work of the IMO to update its GHG strategy and its emissions reduction target, and to adopt concrete measures; urges the IMO, however, to move forward rapidly in adopting targets and measures in the short and medium term that are aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement;

59. Points to the huge climate impact of the use of private jets, with one single private jet able to emit two metric tonnes of CO\textsubscript{2} in just one hour\textsuperscript{1}; underlines the importance of leaders leading by example, and thus regrets that some world leaders and delegates travelled to COP26 by private jet; urges all participants at COP27 to choose the least polluting mode of transport to get to their destination; notes with concern that private jet use in Europe is estimated to have increased by 30 % compared to pre-pandemic levels\textsuperscript{2}, and thus calls on the Member States to take measures to curtail the use of private jets in their territories without delay;

60. Welcomes the launch of the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA) at COP26 and stresses the imperative of its objective to limit the supply of fossil fuels and set an end for oil and gas production; recalls that fossil fuels are the largest contributor to climate change, responsible for over 75 % of all GHGs and that current plans would lead to the production of around 240 % more coal, 57 % more oil, and 71 % more gas than would be consistent with limiting global warming to 1,5\(^{\circ}\) C; supports a socially just and equitable global transition to align oil and gas production with the objectives of the Paris Agreement; calls on all Member States and other Parties to the Paris Agreement to join this initiative;

61. Expresses concern at fossil fuel investors suing governments before investment tribunals, within the context of investment agreements, for pursuing policies on climate, the phasing out of fossil fuels or the just transition; calls for consistency between bilateral and multilateral investment agreements and internationally agreed upon climate objectives by excluding the protection of fossil fuel investments;

62. Recalls that according to IPCC AR6, mitigation options costing USD 100 per tonne of CO\textsubscript{2} or less could reduce global GHG emissions by at least half of the 2019 level by 2030; stresses, therefore, that putting in place an effective carbon price, as part of a

\textsuperscript{1} Transport & Environment, ‘Private jets: can the super-rich supercharge zero-emission aviation?’, April 2021.

\textsuperscript{2} Idem.
broader policy mix, can contribute to significantly reducing GHG emissions and stimulating clean technology innovation; encourages the EU to take a leading role in promoting carbon pricing in combination with effective and socially inclusive use of the revenues to promote a more rapid and just transition; also encourages the EU to explore links and other forms of cooperation with existing carbon pricing mechanisms in third countries and regions, to accelerate cost-efficient and socially fair emissions reductions worldwide and to reduce at the same time the risk of carbon leakage, all of which should contribute to ensuring a global level playing field; calls on the Commission to put in place safeguards to ensure that any links with the EU ETS will continue to deliver additional and permanent mitigation contributions and will not undermine the EU’s domestic GHG emissions commitments;

63. Calls on the Commission to engage with other major CO₂ emitters to create an international climate club open to all countries committed to leading the way on high climate ambition and effective carbon pricing, with common goals on the reduction of GHG emissions and the achievement of climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest;

**Climate change and gender**

64. Alerts that people are impacted by climate change in different ways depending on factors such as gender, age, disability, ethnicity and poverty; believes that the transition to a sustainable society has to be undertaken in an inclusive, fair and equal manner, and that gender equality is key to that transition; welcomes, therefore, the adoption at COP26 of the decision recommended by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on gender and climate change to better integrate the gender dimension into NDCs and that climate finance should be gender-responsive; regrets, however, that roughly half of Parties have yet to appoint and provide support for a national gender and climate change focal point for climate negotiations, implementations and monitoring;

65. Highlights the UNFCCC enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender and its Gender Action Plan, which acknowledges the continuing need to promote and advance gender equality as a crosscutting priority in climate change; reiterates its call on the Commission to design a concrete action plan to deliver on the commitments of the renewed Gender Action Plan and to create a permanent EU gender and climate change focal point with sufficient budgetary resources to implement and monitor gender-responsible climate action in the EU and globally; calls for the EU to mainstream gender into all climate and environmental policy-making; reiterates its call on the EU and its Member States to ensure gender-just national climate action plans and the meaningful involvement of all genders in their design and implementation, as well as to enhance the role of women and women’s organisations in governance and decision-making, their access to finance and to programmes which support the role of women in climate governance;

66. Stresses that under the Paris Agreement developed countries are expected to report on how gender-responsive finance is and whether finance provided takes gender considerations into account; expresses concern that gender-tagging of projects is still clearly insufficient and calls on the EU to step up efforts in this regard; recommends the use of gender analyses to help determine different needs and interests in society, as well

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as the different levels of access to finance mechanisms within societies; reiterates its call on the Commission to design a concrete action plan to deliver on the commitments of the renewed Gender Action Plan agreed at COP25, with sufficient budgetary resources to implement and monitor gender-responsive climate action in the EU and globally; believes this could set an example for other Parties to adopt similar measures;

**Industry, SMEs and competitiveness**

67. Considers the COP27 to be a very important step since the signature of the Paris Agreement in 2015, as the Union has launched its Fit for 55 package, RePowerEU package and other measures, in order not only to reduce its GHG emissions and reach climate neutrality at the latest by 2050 but also to transform its energy system; believes that economic prosperity, social cohesion, job creation, sustainable industrial development and climate policy should be mutually reinforcing; highlights that combating climate change should aim to reducing energy poverty, increasing resilience and competitiveness, and provides opportunities for EU industry and SMEs that can be taken up if legislators commit to timely, tailor-made, solidarity-based and adequate policy response; deems it of the utmost importance for the Union to ensure it obtains a first mover advantage and to lead by example while protecting the internal market from unfair competition by third countries and ensuring a level playing field for European industries globally;

68. Stresses that the Union should do its utmost to keep its industries’ and SMEs’ leading position and global competitiveness in the transition towards a net-zero GHG emissions economy; points out that available and innovative policy tools should be employed to maintain and expand the areas of EU leadership; underlines the need to rapidly decarbonise European industry further and to continue the Union’s support for this endeavour, in particular for proportionate solutions for take-up by SMEs; welcomes the initiatives undertaken for strategic value chains; recognises the positive effects on European industries, including SMEs, stemming from adopting early strategies to fight climate change, as well as from the Union setting an example in achieving climate neutrality, which paves the path for less advanced or ambitious countries and could safeguard a highly beneficial competitive advantage for EU industries and SMEs; stresses the need to draw up enforceable multilateral and bilateral agreements between the EU and its partners aimed at exporting the Union’s environmental standards and ensuring a level playing field in trade and investments; stresses the need to prevent the relocation of production and investments of European industries and SMEs due to less ambitious climate measures outside the Union, and thus encourages international partners to align efforts to fight climate change; considers, on the other hand, that production and investments in Europe would strengthen the industrial value chain and strategic autonomy of the EU in an unstable global context;

69. Recognises the essential role of SMEs, in particular micro enterprises and start-ups, in driving and delivering on employment and growth as well as in leading the way on the digital and green transitions; recalls that SMEs are an essential part of the European economic and social fabric and must be supported and incentivised in this transition by legislators, in particular by ensuring access to finance for sustainable technologies, services and processes, and simplifying administrative procedures; is concerned that SMEs’ opportunities and vulnerabilities are not sufficiently taken into account in all EU policies relative to the single market, including in the drive to promote digitalisation and the green transition;
70. Welcomes the commitment, efforts and progress made so far by European citizens, communities, municipalities, cities, regions, industries and institutions towards meeting the obligations of the Paris Agreement;

71. Welcomes the fact that several EU trading partners have introduced carbon trading or other carbon pricing mechanisms and invites the Commission to further promote this and similar policies on the global scale; looks forward to a speedy agreement with the Council on the proposal for a socially just EU carbon border adjustment mechanism that includes an effective carbon leakage mechanism and to its effect of pushing a global carbon price, which will contribute to reducing global carbon emissions and to the achievement of the Paris Agreement goals;

72. Considers that the transition towards a sustainable economy needs to be combined with preserving Europe’s competitiveness and creating jobs, as it is crucial to the success of the European Green Deal that the single market remains cost-efficient when adjusting to a new regulatory environment;

73. Emphasises the need for the promotion of competitive markets for the commodities and rare metals that are essential for the green transition, as the world’s commodity resources are owned by very few countries; highlights that continued dependency on a few suppliers will counteract some current policy measures, such as the RePowerEU plan, and sacrifices made by the Union’s citizens;

74. Highlights the need for qualification programmes to retrain the workforce to meet the increasing demand for labour in energy efficiency, renewables and green tech solutions; calls on all Member States to take steps to ensure that the current and future European workforce acquires all the necessary skills to manage, implement and innovate the green transition;

**Energy policy**

75. Welcomes all initiatives to reduce the EU’s dependency on fossil fuels, including to reduce and ultimately eliminate dependency on all Russian fossil fuels and related products, as Russia is using its natural resources as a weapon and due to its invasion of Ukraine; urges the Commission and the Council, in this regard, to develop an investment plan for energy efficiency measures and renewables in order to strengthen energy autonomy; recalls that the Commission estimates that EUR 300 billion are needed to phase out our energy dependency on Russia by 2030; notes the EU’s ongoing work with international partners to diversify energy supplies; notes that the Commission’s analysis supporting the RePowerEU forecasts that due to new circumstances some fossil-based capacities regrettably might be used longer than initially expected;

76. Underlines the ongoing revision of energy legislation under the Fit for 55 package to align it with the Union’s increased target of reducing emissions by at least 55% by 2030 in order to reach climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; calls, however, for continuing work on setting more ambitious targets, e.g. for renewable energies and energy efficiency, especially given that the Union should continue to lead by example;

77. Highlights the central role of energy efficiency and renewable energy in the transition towards a climate-neutral economy; recalls that the greenest possible energy is the
energy we do not use, and especially the role that energy efficiency tools can play in the promotion of this; recognises the progress achieved in the build-out of renewable energy sources; calls at the same time for further build-out of energy efficient actions such as sector integration and reuse of excess heat; points out that heating accounted for 50% of global energy consumption in 2018\(^1\) and that, in line with the energy efficiency first principle, it can be advantageously reused and reintegrated as a sustainable heating source that would benefit all countries, as excess heat is generated in all countries; acknowledges, however, the importance of aligning renewable energy and energy efficiency targets to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest and to comply with the Paris Agreement as well as with the objectives of RepowerEU, seizing the opportunity of the current decrease in the costs of renewable energy and storage technologies; recognises that increased ambition in the Union’s 2030 energy efficiency target should be compatible with the increase and uptake of electrification, hydrogen, e-fuels and other clean technologies needed for the green transition;

78. Recalls the need for a massive scaling up and acceleration of permit-granting procedures for renewable energy projects, taking into account EU nature legislation, including on biodiversity, and involving all relevant stakeholders in the mapping and planning process;

79. Recalls the Union’s commitment to the energy efficiency first principle, which takes into account cost efficiency, system efficiency, storage capacity, demand side flexibility and security of supply; underlines the importance of mainstreaming and implementing the principle in all relevant legislation and initiatives and across all sectors where appropriate; points out the untapped potential of energy efficiency in sectors such as industry\(^2\); information technology, transport and buildings, including heating and cooling; welcomes the Renovation Wave Strategy and related and concrete regulatory, financing and enabling measures with the objective of at least doubling the annual energy renovation rate of buildings by 2030, fostering deep renovations and facilitating e-mobility, in the Fit for 55 package, in order to mitigate energy poverty; recalls the crucial role that SMEs in the construction and renovation sector will play throughout the Renovation Wave, which will allow reductions in the energy and climate impact of buildings;

80. Welcome the RePowerEU strategy and calls on all EU Member States to consider the IEA’s 10-point plan, which if implemented correctly has the potential to bring down gas imports from Russia by well over half, thereby reducing the Union’s reliance on Russian natural gas;

81. Stresses the importance of phasing out fossil fuels as soon as possible; notes that this objective must be achieved while maximising its positive effect on the Union’s energy security, industrial competitiveness and citizens’ welfare; calls on the G7 countries to lead by example on the energy transition and to halt all new investments in fossil fuel extraction; welcomes the G7 countries’ pledge to decarbonise their energy sectors by 2035 and to end the financing of most overseas fossil fuel projects by the end of this


\(^2\) Recalls that it is estimated that the economic potential of reducing final energy consumption for industry by 2030 is 23.5% compared to business as usual.
year; highlights the importance of international cooperation to phase out fossil fuels, such as BOGA and Powering Past Coal Alliance;

82. Regrets that fossil energy subsidies in the Union have remained stable since 2008 totalling around EUR 55-58 billion per year, corresponding to around one third of all energy subsidies in the Union, and that currently 15 Member States subsidise fossil fuels more than renewable energy; believes that fossil fuel subsidies undermine the goals of the European Green Deal and the obligations of the Paris Agreement; believes that it is critical to provide more consistent price signals across energy sectors and the Member States, and to avoid external costs from being internalised; notes the recent adoption by some Member States of measures to shield consumers from the direct impact of rising energy prices, in particular on households, and insists that such practices must remain exceptional and temporary; calls on the Member States and the other Parties to COP26 to prioritise investments in green energy and infrastructure and to phase out direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies;

83. Believes that for the Union to achieve climate neutrality its energy system should be integrated and based on a cascading priority system starting from implementing the energy efficiency first principle, based on cost efficiency, system efficiency, storage capacity, security of supply and demand side flexibility supported by smart grids, leading to energy savings, followed by direct electrification of end-use sectors from renewable sources, use of renewable and renewable-based fuels, including hydrogen, for end-use applications and, during a transitional phase, sustainable and safe low-carbon fuels for applications that do not have another alternative, while maintaining energy accessibility, affordability and security of supply through the development of a circular, highly energy efficient, integrated, interconnected, resilient, and multi-modal energy system;

84. Recalls the importance of taking into account the diversity of national energy systems and challenges; highlights the need for a just transition and reiterates the promise outlined in the new Green Deal that no one should be left behind; is concerned by the fact that around 50 million households in the Union still live in conditions of energy poverty and believes that the EU should increase its efforts to prevent and minimise this; stresses the importance of the social dimension of a higher climate ambition; underlines that building renovations are key for reducing the energy consumption of buildings, bringing down emissions and reducing energy bills; stresses that energy policies should be pursued in line with the principle of a fair and just transition as well as in close cooperation with civil society and social partners; considers, therefore, that public policies, stronger social partnerships and civil society engagement at both local, national and EU level are fundamental to achieving climate neutrality across all sectors of society in a fair, inclusive and socially sustainable way;

85. Welcomes the adoption of the European Hydrogen Strategy requiring the installation of at least 6 GW of renewable hydrogen electrolysers in the Union by 2024 and 40 GW of renewable hydrogen electrolysers by 2030; calls on the Union and the Member States, in this context, to facilitate hydrogen integration in hard-to-abate sectors;

86. Welcomes the EU Offshore Strategy and its ambition of at least 60 GW by 2030 and 340 GW by 2050, which Parliament asked to be increased to up to 450 GW of
capacity\(^1\), as well as the Solar Strategy aiming to install 320 GW of solar photovoltaic by 2025 and 600 GW by 2030; stresses the need to ensure that the implementation of the strategy benefits the whole Union, including landlocked Member States; highlights that European companies are world leaders and industrial first-movers in offshore renewable energy and that the sector holds an untapped potential for further job creation (both directly and indirectly), growth and exports; calls for European leadership in the renewable industry and its supply chains as part of the EU’s industrial policy; notes with great satisfaction the joint declaration signed in May 2022 by Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands at the North Sea Summit in Esbjerg (Denmark), which will make the North Sea a green powerhouse for Europe;

87. Is convinced of the need to create the conditions for consumers to gain more knowledge and have more incentives to choose more sustainable forms of energy and be more active; calls on the Commission to assess the grid capacity needed for the integration of renewable energy and electrical heating solutions and to identify the remaining barriers to facilitating the development of renewable self-consumption and renewable energy communities, in particular for low-income or vulnerable households;

88. Encourages the ongoing work to revise the Directive on Energy Taxation with the aim of aligning taxation policies to the energy and climate targets for 2030 and 2050, while assessing its impacts, including on consumers, energy poverty and transportation poverty;

89. Stresses that although Europe is working towards meeting its ambitious goals, achieving global net-zero emissions by 2050 at the latest will require coordinated global action; highlights that developing countries will require international assistance in order to achieve their green transition; stresses the importance of enhancing close cross-border cooperation and the sharing of best practices with international partners in the fields of policy-making and science, including technology transfer, in order to promote energy efficiency and investments in sustainable energy technologies and infrastructure; notes the Commission’s recent adoption of its communication on the EU external energy engagement, which includes its determination to engage with third countries across the globe and ‘to encourage partner countries to enhance their climate ambition and define their pathways to climate neutrality, but also to establish long-term relationships that are mutually beneficial, in particular in the area of energy’;

90. Welcomes the Commission’s intention to adopt an action plan in 2022 for the digitalisation of the energy sector in order to position the EU as a technological leader and to enable a more integrated energy system with intelligent solutions in specific sectors and with improved funding for the 2021-2027 period; recalls the importance of addressing cybersecurity risks in the energy sector in order to ensure the resilience of the energy systems;

Research, innovation, digital technologies and space policy

91. Welcomes the role of the Horizon Europe programme and its contribution to climate neutrality; is of the opinion that the partnerships under Horizon Europe, including the Joint Undertakings, will foster the collaboration between the public and the private

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\(^1\) Resolution of 16 February 2022 on a European strategy for offshore renewable energy (OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 66).
sectors with the goal of contributing to the achievement of the green transition, while ensuring that innovations are sustainable, available, accessible and affordable; underlines the importance of improving SME access and participation to Horizon Europe calls and of better communication to and involvement of citizens about the results of European R&D projects and new technologies, including lighthouse projects, in order to increase public uptake and make the role of the Union more visible to its citizens;

92. Welcomes the role of the Copernicus programme and new EU Knowledge Centre on Earth Observation for land, atmosphere and marine environment monitoring Service; underlines the importance of satellite observation capacities for monitoring, modelling, predicting and supporting policy-making on climate change;

93. Highlights the need to attract more investment, both public and private, in the research, innovation and deployment of new sustainable technologies, including in labour-intensive industries, in necessary new infrastructure networks and projects contributing to the goals of the European Green Deal and the Paris Agreement; stresses that future research and technology should take into account sustainability and circularity; emphasises at the same time the importance of basic research, as well as of collaborative and transdisciplinary approaches in research and innovation (R&I), in addressing climate challenges; points, further to the need for supporting the social innovation that is essential to addressing unmet societal needs and challenges while empowering people during the green transition;

94. Underlines the importance of ensuring coherence and consistency in incentives to foster innovative technologies to achieve the 2030 and 2050 targets, addressing the deployment of already mature technologies as well as investments in new technologies that need to be developed to reach the Union’s goal of climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest;

95. Stresses the need for a twin transition, where the digital and green transitions go hand in hand; underlines the fundamental role that digital technologies can play in the Union’s green transition; recalls that the Union’s recovery requires the creation of a stable regulatory framework conducive to progress, including market-driven progress, in research, innovation and development of sustainable technologies, and the appropriate conditions for their financing;

96. Underlines that digitalisation is one of the key factors driving energy system integration as it can enable dynamic and interlinked flows of energy carriers, allow for more diverse markets to be interconnected, and provide the necessary data to match supply and demand; highlights the potential of digital technologies to increase energy efficiency and thus reduce overall GHG emissions; highlights the need to ensure a secure regulatory framework with non-discriminatory and transparent procedures for access and transmission of energy data; recalls that the Commission estimates that the environmental footprint of ICT accounts for between 5% and 9% of global electricity use and more than 2% of global GHG emissions; stresses that, according to a 2018 study on artificial intelligence by the Commission’s Joint Research Centre, data centres and data transmission could account for between 3% and 4% of the Union’s total electricity consumption; highlights that the Commission expects a 28% increase in data centre consumption between 2018 and 2030; underlines that 47% of digital carbon emissions are due to consumer equipment such as computers, smartphones, tablets and
other connected objects; calls therefore for measures to reduce the carbon footprint of the ICT sector by ensuring energy and resource efficiency at network, data centre and consumer device level, and reiterates the goal of making data centres climate-neutral and highly energy efficient by no later than 2030, as stated in the digital strategy;

97. Recalls the importance of R&I’s contribution to achieving the goals set out in the Paris Agreement and the objectives of the European Green Deal; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support research and innovation and an overall increase in EU and national budgets devoted to R&I in sustainable and safe energy technologies and innovation; calls on the Commission to consider further supporting technologies and innovative solutions that will contribute to a climate-proof and integrated energy system, including those where Europe has global leadership and domestic-based value chains; considers it is essential to have key segments of renewable energy value chains within the Union in order to achieve the climate goals and to bring significant economic benefits to Europeans, and calls for adequate measures to support the role of Europe-based content in the renewable energy sources supply chain and legislation;

**Climate change and development**

98. Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to the implementation of policy coherence for development, especially in industrial, agricultural, fisheries, trade and investment policies; insists on a coherent approach to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in both internal and external policies;

99. Calls on the Commission, the Member States and other G7 countries to develop and adopt Just Energy Transition Partnerships with developing countries and deliver new and additional investments to ensure a just transition in phasing out fossil fuels in developing countries; believes that these partnerships should mostly rely on non-debt-generating financing instruments;

100. Stresses the importance of a human rights approach in climate action to ensure that all measures respect and support human rights of all people; urges the Parties to the UNFCCC to integrate the human rights dimension in their NDCs, their Adaptation Communication and their NAPs;

101. Calls for development and climate policy to address inequality, pre-existing debt challenges and poverty, which are exacerbated by the negative impact of climate change;

**Role of the European Parliament**

102. Believes, since it must give its consent to international agreements and plays a central role in the domestic implementation of the Paris Agreement as co-legislator, that it should be an integral part of the EU delegation; expects, therefore, to be allowed to attend EU coordination meetings at COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh and to be guaranteed access to all preparatory documents from the moment negotiations begin;
103. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, with the request that it be circulated to all non-EU Parties to the Convention.