European Parliament legislative resolution of 3 May 2022 on the proposal for a Council Regulation on the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, repealing Council Decision (76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom) and the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage annexed to that Decision (2020/2220(INL) – 2022/0902(APP))

P9_TA(2022)0129 A9-0083/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Declaration of 9 May 1950 that proposed the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as a first step in the federation of Europe,

–  having regard to the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage ("the Electoral Act") annexed to Council decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976, as amended by Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom, of 25 June and 23 September 2002(1), and by Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2018/994 of 13 July 2018(2),

–  having regard to the Treaties and in particular to Articles 2, 3, 9, 10, 14 and 17(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to Articles 8, 20, 22, 223(1) and 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and to Article 2 of Protocol No 1 on the role of national parliaments in the European Union,

–  having regard to Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union,

–  having regard to Council Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals(3),

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on the European Parliament’s electoral procedure, and in particular its resolution of 15 July 1998 on a draft electoral procedure incorporating common principles for the election of Members of the European Parliament(4), its resolution of 22 November 2012 on the elections to the European Parliament in 2014(5), its resolution of 4 July 2013 on improving the practical arrangements for the holding of the European elections in 2014(6), and its resolution of 11 November 2015 on the Reform of the electoral law of the EU(7),

–  having regard to its resolutions of 13 March 2013(8) and 7 February 2018(9) on the composition of the European Parliament,

–  having regard to its resolution of 26 November 2020 on stocktaking of European elections(10),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations(11), and in particular Articles 13, 21 and 31 thereof,

–  having regard to the Framework Agreement of 20 October 2010 on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission,

–  having regard to the European Economic and Social Committee information report on real rights of persons with disabilities to vote in European Parliament elections adopted in its plenary session on 20 March 2019(12) and its additional opinion on the need to guarantee real rights for persons with disabilities to vote in European Parliament elections adopted on 2 December 2020(13),

–  having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), ratified by the EU in 2010, and by all Member States, and Article 29 thereof on participation in political and public life,

–  having regard to Commission Communication of 3 March 2021 entitled "Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030" (COM(2021)0101),

–  having regard to Commission Communication of 3 December 2020 on the European democracy action plan (COM(2020)0790),

–  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter), and in particular Articles 11, 21, 23 and 39 thereof,

–  having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights, and in particular its principle 1,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and in particular Article 25 thereof,

–  having regard to the work of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) on gender equality, in particular its action plan for gender-sensitive parliaments,

–  having regard to the State of the Union 2021 speech in which Ursula von der Leyen announced that the year 2022 will be the year of youth,

–  having regard to the Commission's proposal for the European Year of Youth 2022,

–  having regard to Rules 46 and 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A9-0083/2022),

A.  whereas since 1976, when the Electoral Act paved the way for the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage for the first time, the European Parliament has continuously requested the reform of European electoral law and moves towards a more genuine, uniform and European electoral procedure;

B.  whereas the Lisbon Treaty has offered a positive step forward by confirming the right of the European Parliament to initiate a proposal on the Electoral Act as well as on its composition;

C.  whereas other important changes in the Lisbon Treaty concerned in particular the wording of Article 14 TEU, stating that the Parliament is to be composed of representatives of the citizens of the Union and not peoples of the Member States, as well as the reference to the Parliament’s role in the election of the President of the Commission, who should be elected taking into account the results of the European Parliament elections;

D.  whereas the procedure for the 2014 elections set a precedent for the role of the Parliament in the selection of the President of the Commission; whereas it was not possible for that procedure to become part of an overall reform of European electoral law, which contributed to creating the political background for the unexpected disapplication of the lead candidate principle following the European elections of 2019; whereas the lead candidate whose European political entity has received the overall highest number of seats should be tasked first with forming a coalition majority in the newly elected Parliament as regards the nomination of a candidate for President of the Commission; whereas in case a coalition majority cannot be reached, the task should be assigned to the next lead candidate; whereas Parliament expects the President of the European Council to consult the said leaders of the European political entities and parliamentary groups in order to inform the nomination process, and considers that this lead candidate process could be formalised by a political agreement between the European political entities and by an Interinstitutional Agreement between Parliament and European Council;

E.  whereas some existing common provisions in the current European Electoral Act show the way towards necessary improvements, including those which provide for candidates to be elected by proportional representation using a list system or a single transferable vote system; for the freedom to establish constituencies at national level; for the introduction of a maximum electoral threshold of 5% in the national constituencies as a means of guaranteeing that the Parliament is able to function; and for the prohibition of MEPs to hold a dual mandate in national and European Parliament;

F.  whereas, despite some steps forward in defining common standards of electoral procedures for the European Parliament, today European elections are still mostly governed by national laws and therefore more improvements are needed to establish a genuinely uniform procedure for European elections;

G.  whereas the turnout registered in the 2019 European elections was the highest of any elections to the European Parliament in the last 20 years; whereas the participation rate hides wide disparities between Member States; whereas increased turnout is a positive signal and shows that citizens, and in particular the youngest generations of the Union are taking an increasing interest in the development of the European integration, as indicated also by the results of the special Eurobarometer of 9 March 2021; whereas this rate still means that only half of the Union citizens took part; whereas increased interest in European elections signals that Union citizens demand swift action from the Union in the field of climate change, economic recovery, the protection of human rights and rule of law, migration, and the role of the European Union in international relations; whereas communication efforts must be made to increase citizen’s interest in European issues and the role of European political parties and foundations in that regard;

H.  whereas the trend of a growing voter turnout can be improved if the connection and accountability between voters and candidates are strengthened and the Union-wide dimension is fostered;

I.  whereas a functioning electoral system builds trust and support among the population and increases the confidence of citizens of the Union in their capacity to change society democratically by voting;

J.  whereas the approval by Member States of Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2018/994 of 13 July 2018 is still pending but does not preclude the necessary changes in the Union’s electoral systems;

K.  whereas growing political momentum across Europe could offer the possibility of introducing elements and provisions that strengthen the European dimension of the elections;

L.  whereas an appropriate approach to reforming the European electoral law should be based on respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the introduction of common minimum standards;

M.  whereas the reform of the European Parliament's electoral procedure should aim to enhance the democratic and transnational public debate and dimension of the European elections and the democratic legitimacy of the Union decision-making process, reinforce citizenship in the Union, improve the functioning of the European Parliament and the governance of the Union, make the work of the European Parliament more legitimate and legislative by giving it a genuine right of initiative, strengthen the principles of electoral equality and equal opportunities, especially between women and men, enhance the effectiveness of the system for conducting European elections, and bring Members of the European Parliament closer to their voters, and in particular the youngest amongst them;

N.  whereas Recommendation 16 of the European Citizens’ Panel 2 on European democracy / Values and rights, rule of law, security of the Conference on the Future of Europe calls for an electoral law for the European Parliament that harmonizes electoral conditions (voting age, election date, requirements for electoral districts, candidates, political parties and their financing), and for European citizens to have the right to vote for different European Union level parties that each consist of candidates from multiple Member States, and that during a sufficient transition period, citizens could still vote for both national and transnational parties;

O.  whereas the Youth Ideas Report released as the outcome of the European Youth Event (EYE) from 22 to -23 October 2021 suggests using transnational lists, where voters would be given a list of national candidates, and an additional list with candidates from all Member States; whereas that report also supports the enforcement of the lead candidate process;

P.  whereas the Third Interim Report of the multilingual digital platform of the Conference on the Future of Europe, considers that one of the more frequently discussed proposals, and a widely endorsed idea, concerns the creation of EU-wide transnational electoral lists;

Q.  whereas the midterm political agreement “Our priorities for Europeans” endorsed on 17 January 2022 by the leaders of the EPP, S&D and Renew Groups, called for a “lead candidate process combined with transnational lists with a sufficient number of seats to be in place for the next European elections”;

R.  whereas the principles of proportionality and equal opportunities have to be considered in regards to minorities, which are underrepresented in the European Parliament; whereas approximately 20 MEPs out of 705 declare that they belong to a minority (=2,8%)(14); whereas the Venice Commission acknowledges the role of guaranteed reserved seats for members of national minorities, lower electoral thresholds in proportional electoral systems for parties representing national minorities or the designation of electoral districts with the purpose to enhance the minorities' participation in the decision-making process(15);

S.  whereas the possibility of developing a uniform electoral procedure based on direct universal suffrage has been enshrined in the Treaties since 1957;

T.  whereas the right of all citizens of the Union to participate, on an equal basis, in the democratic life of the Union would be promoted by an increasing harmonisation of the procedure for elections to the European Parliament in all the Member States, which would also strengthen the political dimension of European integration;

U.  whereas European political parties contribute to forming European political awareness and should therefore play a stronger role in the campaigns for elections to the European Parliament in order to improve their visibility and to make clear the link between a vote for a particular national party and the impact it has on the size of a European political group in the European Parliament and on the nomination of the President of the Commission;

V.  whereas associations of voters or electoral entities which do not belong to a European political party are called to play a role in the campaigns for elections to the European Parliament in order to increase the involvement of citizens in the election process;

W.  whereas the procedure for nominating candidates for elections to the European Parliament varies considerably from Member State to Member State and from party to party, in particular as regards transparency, democratic and gender equality standards; whereas, however, open, transparent and democratic procedures respecting gender equality for the selection of candidates are essential for building trust in the political system;

X.  whereas the deadlines for finalising electoral lists ahead of European elections vary greatly among Member States, currently ranging from 17 days to 83 days; whereas this puts candidates and voters across the Union in an unequal position when it comes to the time they have to campaign or to reflect on their voting choice;

Y.  whereas the deadlines for finalising the electoral roll ahead of European elections vary greatly among Member States and could render the exchange of information between Member States on voters (which is aimed at the avoidance of double voting) difficult, if not impossible;

Z.  whereas the establishment of a Union-wide constituency in which lists are headed by each political family’s candidate for the post of President of the Commission would strengthen European democracy and further legitimise the election of the President of the Commission and his or her accountability; whereas this could contribute to the construction of a European political space and to make the elections to the European Parliament truly based on European issues and not on issues of exclusively national interest;

AA.  whereas at their informal meeting on 23 February 2018, the Heads of State and Government decided to continue their reflections, as well as the technical, legal and political work, on the issue of the transnational lists being set up for the 2024 elections;

AB.  whereas not all Member States give their citizens the possibility of voting from abroad, and among those that do, the conditions for granting them the right to vote vary greatly; whereas granting all citizens of the Union residing outside the Union the right to participate in elections would contribute to electoral equality; whereas, however, Member States need to coordinate their administrative systems better in order to prevent voters from voting in two different Member States;

AC.  whereas many people with disabilities want to vote at a polling station; whereas in 12 Member States national rules do not make it possible to switch from the polling station assigned on the basis of place of residence to another which is more suitable in the light of the voter's disability; whereas Article 29 of the UNCRPD explicitly stipulates that the States Parties undertake to ensure that persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in political and public life on an equal basis with others; whereas any barriers to the right to vote and to stand as candidate for persons with disabilities, especially legal barriers for adults with disabilities declared legally incapacitated should be removed, guaranteeing accessibility throughout the election process, including by providing additional participation systems to exercise the right to vote, in particular through postal voting;

AD.  whereas an electoral authority, acting as an independent body and ensuring the correct implementation of the European electoral law should be set up at Union level as a network of Member States' single contact authorities, as this would facilitate access to information on the rules governing the European elections, as well as streamlining the process, managing in particular the Union-wide constituency and enhancing the European character of those elections;

AE.  whereas postal voting could enable more voters to participate and make the conduct of European elections more efficient and more appealing for voters, whilst ensuring the highest possible standards of data protection and maintaining vote at polling stations as the norm; whereas Member States may provide complementary voting tools to enhance participation such as proxy voting, electronic or internet voting, in accordance with their national traditions; whereas many national bodies for the protection of digital freedoms have expressed reservations about online voting; whereas online voting presents increased difficulties with regard to the fundamental principles governing electoral operations (the secrecy of the ballot, the personal and free nature of the vote, the sincerity of electoral operations, effective monitoring of the vote and a posteriori control by the election judge) ; whereas those difficulties can be overcome by a common regulatory framework and procedure in which the highest standards of data protection, election integrity, transparency, reliability, secrecy of the vote are guaranteed;

AF.  whereas Article 7(1) of the Act concerning the election of members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976 establishes that “the office of member of the European Parliament shall be incompatible with that of member of the Commission”;

1.  Suggests the reform of its electoral procedure with the goal of shaping, in a concrete way, a European public sphere, by suggesting common minimum standards and legislative changes ahead of the 2024 European elections;

2.  Considers it essential to improve the transparency and democratic accountability of the Parliament, by strengthening the European dimension of the elections, notably by transforming the European elections into a single European election, especially through the establishment of a Union-wide constituency, as opposed to the collection of 27 separate national elections, which is the way that European elections are organised today;

3.  Believes that European political parties, associations of voters and other European electoral entities should play a more central role in the European elections process, should become clearly visible for voters, and should be given adequate support and funding allowing them to fulfil their role;

4.  Reminds that diverging electoral cultures have resulted in a range of different electoral systems and different voting rights across the Union; considers that common minimum democratic standards in the European electoral law can promote a genuine public European debate and ensure equality of the Union citizens, including as regards: the right to vote, the right to register a party, an association of voters or other electoral entities and to stand for elections; access to ballots; the fielding of candidates, including gender equality; accessibility of voting for all citizens, especially for persons with disabilities; or what happens on the day of the elections;

5.  Calls for the establishment of a common framework, with benchmarks and minimum standards for election rules across the Union, and suggests focusing on a strong coordination with national measures for implementing the core of its proposals;

6.  Calls on the Union institutions to take into account the priorities identified by Union citizens in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe;

7.  Notes the role of the Commission as facilitator in the institutional talks between the European Parliament and the Council on the reform of the European electoral law; considers it essential to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Commission inter alia in order to evaluate and take inspiration from the results of the European Cooperation Network on Elections, as established in 2019;

8.  Highlights the links between the suggested measures for the review of the Electoral Act, and Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 and the European Commission Democracy Action Plan of December 2020, notably on elements such as:

9.  Considers gender equality to be a key element for improving representation in elections; welcomes the overall improvement in gender equality in the last elections, but stresses that there are significant differences between Member States, with some not having elected to Parliament a single woman; calls for the introduction of measures that ensure equal opportunities for women and men to be elected without infringing the rights of non-binary people, through the use of zipped lists or quotas;

10.  Regrets that most national and linguistic minorities are not usually represented in the European Parliament; points out in this regard the effective barrier that electoral thresholds represent for parties representing minority communities running in single national constituencies or in large, densely populated constituencies; considers therefore that the European electoral law should provide for the possibility of exemptions from nationally provided thresholds for entities representing recognised national and linguistic minorities;

11.  Considers it essential that both European and national political parties and associations of voters and other European electoral entities adopt democratic, informed and transparent procedures for the selection of candidates to the European Parliament, including the lead candidate, ensuring the direct involvement of individual citizens who are party members, including, but not limited to, the election of delegates; considers that such democratic selection should be accompanied by the necessary information as regards the capacities and performance of the aspiring candidates;

12.  Believes that all European voters should be allowed to vote for their preferred candidate for the President of the Commission, and that lead candidates should be able to stand in all Member States on Union-wide lists, nominated by a European political party, by a European association of voters or by other European electoral entity, putting forward a common electoral programme;

13.  Calls on European political parties, European associations of voters and European electoral entities to nominate their candidates for the position of President of the Commission at least 12 weeks before the election day; considers that binding democratic procedures and transparency in the selection should be ensured; expects candidates to be placed in the first position of the corresponding list of the Union-wide constituency;

14.  Calls for enhancing the visibility of European political parties, European associations of voters and other European electoral entities through media campaigns and on ballot papers and all electoral materials; determines that national parties and associations of voters should indicate, where applicable, their affiliation to the European political parties, or other European electoral entities and to the corresponding lead candidate during the electoral campaign;

15.  Notes that a coordinated media strategy at European level to ensure coverage and monitoring of the European elections would help to increase citizens’ interest in them;

16.  Expects the leaders of the European political parties and parliamentary groups to agree on a common indication to the European Council on the basis of the outcome of the European elections as well as on a majority in the newly elected Parliament as regards the nomination of a candidate for President of the Commission; expects the President of the European Council to consult the said leaders of the European political entities and parliamentary groups in order to inform the nomination process; considers that this lead candidate process could be formalised by a political agreement between the European political entities and by an Interinstitutional Agreement between Parliament and European Council;

17.  Proposes establishing the practice for interested parliamentary groups to conclude a “legislature agreement” in order to ensure a political follow-up to the European elections and as a way to secure a majority within the Parliament ahead of the appointment of the Commission;

18.  Considers that the introduction of a Union-wide constituency, from which twenty-eight Members of the European Parliament are to be elected without affecting the number of representatives in the European Parliament elected in each Member State and in which lists are headed by each political family’s candidate for the post of President of the Commission, offers an opportunity to enhance the democratic and transnational dimension of the European elections; believes that the goal of establishing a Union-wide constituency is achievable if gender equality is ensured as well as geographical balance, by guaranteeing that smaller Member States are not put at a competitive disadvantage compared to the larger Member States; suggests in this respect introducing binding geographical representation in the lists for the Union-wide constituency, and encourages European political parties, European associations of voters and other European electoral entities to appoint candidates in the Union-wide lists coming from all Member States;

19.  Emphasises that the establishment of a Union-wide constituency in which Members are elected on the basis of transnational lists is compatible with the Treaties, and in particular with Article 14(2) TEU; considers that support for a uniform European electoral law with Union-wide lists, and a binding system of lead candidates has been gaining political momentum;

20.  Believes that Union-wide lists are a lever that can be used to bring about representativeness and the formation of effective European political parties and associations of voters;

21.  Suggests including common provisions governing expenditure linked to the European electoral campaign for each entity admitted for the purpose of tabling a list of candidates for Members of the European Parliament in the Union-wide constituency; calls for strong coordination with the upcoming revision of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 on this matter;

22.  Considers that funding of European political parties and other European electoral entities from the general budget of the European Union or from any other source may be used to finance campaigns conducted by the European electoral entities in the context of elections to the European Parliament in the Union-wide constituency in which they or their members participate; considers that funding and limitation of election expenses in the national constituencies, are to be governed in each Member State by its national provisions;

23.  Recalls that the minimum age for eligibility to stand as a candidate across the 27 Member States varies between 18 and 25 and the minimum age for eligibility to vote varies between 16 to 18; calls for the introduction of a single, harmonised age for, respectively, passive and active voting rights across Member States and recommends them to introduce a minimum voting age of 16, without prejudice to existing constitutional orders establishing a minimum voting age of 18 or 17 years of age; is of the opinion that giving the right to vote at the age of 16 would reflect current rights and duties that the European young people already have in some Member States;

24.  Proposes to introduce the possibility for temporary replacement of Members on maternity, paternity, parental and long sick leave;

25.  Considers transparency of the electoral process and access to reliable information to be essential elements for raising European political awareness and securing an election turnout that is high enough to constitute a mandate from the electorate; highlights that citizens should be informed well in advance - notably 12 weeks before the elections - about the candidates standing in the European elections and about the affiliation of national political parties or electoral associations to a European political party or European electoral association;

26.  Suggests that measures be taken and safeguards be put in place to avoid foreign interference in the electoral process;

27.  Highlights that the deadlines for finalising the electoral roll ahead of European elections vary greatly among Member States; suggests establishing a European electoral roll and setting a common standard for the establishment and finalisation of the national electoral roll no later than fourteen weeks before the election day, in order to render the information on voters more accurate and to make its exchange between Member States easier, as well as to facilitate the prevention of double voting, ensuring that such double voting, whether the result of an administrative mistake or of breaches of electoral law is subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties at national level, and results in corrective measures by the Member States;

28.  Proposes establishing a European Electoral Authority in charge of coordinating information on the European elections, monitoring the implementation of and resolving disputes on the common standards of the European electoral law, managing the European electoral roll, proclaiming the electoral results, and supervising the exchange of information on voting by citizens of the Union outside their home country; considers that such a body could facilitate an efficient exchange of information, and in particular the sharing of best practices, between national bodies; suggests that an essential task of the European Electoral Authority be the management of the register of electoral lists for the Union-wide constituency; calls on the budgetary authorities to ensure that the European Electoral Authority will have sufficient resources to fulfil its tasks;

29.  Suggests that common minimum standards should be defined to introduce uniform requirements for the establishment of electoral lists;

30.  Considers it essential to facilitate access to voting in European elections and to guarantee that all those who have the right to vote, including citizens of the Union living outside their country of origin, those without a permanent residence, those living in closed residential settings, those experiencing homelessness and prisoners, are able to exercise that right; calls on Member States to ensure access to information and voting on an equal basis for all citizens, including for persons with disabilities by allowing for instance the renting of adapted premises when public structures are not adapted;

31.  Calls on Member States to introduce measures to maximise the accessibility of the elections for citizens with disabilities covering, among others and where appropriate, voting information and registration, polling stations, voting booths and devices and ballot papers; recommends to implement appropriate arrangements tailored to national voting procedures to facilitate the vote of citizens with disabilities such as the possibility to choose polling stations, closed polling stations in key locations, and the use of assistive technologies, formats and techniques like Braille, large print, audio-based information, tactile stencils, easy to read information and sign language communication; calls on Member States to allow persons with disabilities to be assisted in voting by a person of their own choice, where necessary and at their request;

32.  Calls on Member States to introduce common requirements allowing all citizens of the Union living or working in a third country to be granted the right to cast their vote in elections to the European Parliament;

33.  Believes that the introduction of postal voting is needed for voters who are unable to go to the polling stations on Election day, and that this could make the conduct of European elections more efficient and more appealing for voters in specific or exceptional circumstances; calls on Member States to consider the possible introduction of complementary enhancing tools such as advance physical voting and proxy voting, as well as electronic and online voting, in accordance with their own national traditions, taking into account the Council of Europe's recommendations in those areas and with appropriate safeguards to ensure the reliability, the integrity, the secrecy of the vote, the accessibility for persons with disabilities, transparency in the design and deployment of electronic and internet systems, the possibility for manual or electronic recounts without compromising the secrecy of the vote, and the protection of personal data in accordance with applicable Union law;

34.  Believes that establishing a common European voting day would create a more coherent pan-European election and therefore suggests fixing 9 May as the European Election day, regardless of the day of the week on which it falls, with the possibility of that day becoming a public holiday; considers it important that the first official projections of the electoral results are announced simultaneously in all Member States on the election day at 21:00 hours CET;

35.  Considers it important to ensure that, following each election, an implementation report is drawn up with the aim of evaluating the functioning of the European elections as well as suggesting improvements, if needed;

36.  Suggests a reform of the Treaties to make the office of member of the European Commission and the office of Member of the European Parliament compatible in the period between the constitution of the Parliament and the election of the Commission;

37.  Calls for a reform of the Treaties, and in particular of Article 223 TFEU on the provisions necessary for the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, moving from Council’s unanimity and national ratifications to qualified majority decision-making in the Council;

38.  Adopts the annexed proposal and submits it to the Council;

39.  Instructs its President to forward this legislative resolution as well as the annexed proposal to the European Council, the Council, the Commission and the parliaments and governments of the Member States.

ANNEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

Proposal for a

Council Regulation

on the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, repealing Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom and the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage annexed to that Decision

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 223(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Parliament,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the consent of the European Parliament,

Acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1)  The Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage(16) (‘the Electoral Act’), annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom(17), entered into force on 1 July 1978 and was subsequently amended by Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom(18) and Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2018/994(19).

(2)  According to Article 223(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the provisions necessary for the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage are laid down by the Council acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament upon a proposal drawn up by the European Parliament.

(3)  Article 8 TFEU establishes the principle of gender mainstreaming by which the Union should aim to eliminate gender inequalities and to promote gender equality in all its activities.

(4)  The Treaty of Lisbon has not only conferred on the European Parliament the power of initiative regarding the provisions on the election of its Members, but has also changed the nature of the mandate of the Members of the European Parliament, making them direct representatives of the citizens of the Union. These constitute fundamental changes that should be reflected in a modernised European electoral law by inserting new elements that aim to enhance democratic legitimacy and to more accurately reflect the breadth of the role and competences of the European Parliament.

(5)  In spite of the provisions of the Electoral Act, elections to the European Parliament are largely organised in accordance with national rules, which differ considerably across Member States, resulting in a range of different electoral systems. Elections to the European Parliament take place on different days, and votes are cast for national parties with national candidates on the basis of national programmes. Approximation of those different electoral systems through the adoption of a more unified European electoral law based on clear common principles and rules would ensure equality for all citizens of the Union, and would strengthen the European public sphere.

(6)  Electoral thresholds are part of the political system in many Member States and contribute to the development of stable government and opposition dynamics within Parliaments. In order to safeguard fair political competition, such thresholds should not exceed 5% .

(7)  Electoral thresholds should not affect the chances of recognised national and linguistic minorities to participate in the political life of the Union and to be represented in the European Parliament. Recognised national or linguistic minorities should benefit from exemptions from any thresholds that are provided for at national level. Exemptions from national thresholds should also apply to political parties or associations of voters running in European elections in a quarter of Member States that include in their ballot papers the names and logos of the European entities to which they are affiliated.

(8)  According to Article 17(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the candidate for President of the Commission is to be proposed by the European Council, taking into account the European elections, and is then to be elected by the European Parliament. In order to give that right its appropriate expression, the European public sphere should be developed in such a way that all European voters are allowed to indicate their preferred candidate for the President of the Commission. For this to happen, the lead candidates nominated by European political parties, by European associations of voters or by other European electoral entities, need to be able to stand behind a common electoral programme in all Member States. With a view to securing a majority within the Parliament ahead of the appointment of the Commission, interested parliamentary groups should establish a practice of concluding “legislature agreements” ensuring a political follow-up of the European elections. Through a process that should be formalised on the basis of a political agreement between the European political entities, the lead candidate whose European political entity has received the overall highest number of seats should be tasked first with forming a coalition majority in the newly elected Parliament as regards the nomination of a candidate for President of the Commission. In the event that a coalition majority cannot be reached, the task should be assigned to the next lead candidate. In order to inform the nomination process, the President of the European Council should consult the said leaders of the European political entities and parliamentary groups. The lead candidate process could be formalised by a political agreement between the European political entities and by an Interinstitutional Agreement between Parliament and European Council.

(9)  A Union-wide constituency, in which lists are headed by each political family’s candidate for President of the Commission, should be created in addition to the national constituencies, in order to enhance the democratic and pan-European dimension of the European elections. That Union-wide constituency should be subject to detailed and clear rules that ensure that the list of candidates respects the principles of gender equality and geographical proportionality and representativeness, and in particular that the interests of small and medium-sized Member States are fully taken into account.

(10)  European political parties, European associations of voters and other European electoral entities have a key role to play in fostering a truly European political debate. According to Article 10(4) TEU, “[p]olitical parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union”. European political parties, European associations of voters and other European electoral entities should therefore play a more central role in the European elections’ process. They should therefore be given the possibility of fully participating in European election campaigns, and of tabling Union-wide lists, so that they become known by and more visible to electors, both on ballot papers and in campaign materials and publications.

(11)  The conditions for the selection of candidates and for submitting candidacies should be reasonable, fair, democratic, proportionate and should respect the principles laid down by the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Council of Europe's European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission). Furthermore, in the European democracy action plan(20), the Commission has committed itself to promoting access to democratic participation, which entails inclusiveness and equality in democratic participation, as well as gender balance in politics and decision-making. In its 2020-2025 gender equality strategy(21), the Commission stated that “equal opportunity in participation is essential for representative democracy at all levels”. Gender equality as well as democratic and transparent procedures and informed decisions for the selection of candidates to the elections to the European Parliament, including the lead candidate, are key elements for ensuring a level playing field for all European electoral entities and for reinforcing representativeness and democracy. For reasons of equality, those principles should apply to all lists of candidates in the elections to the European Parliament both in the national constituencies and in the Union-wide constituency.

(12)  Transparency of the electoral process and access to reliable and timely information on voters and on candidates are important for ensuring the reliability of the electoral process, for raising European political awareness and for securing a strong election turnout. It is important to facilitate the exchange of information between Member States on voters in order to avoid double voting. Moreover, citizens of the Union should be informed about the candidates standing in the elections to the European Parliament, and where applicable about the affiliation of national political parties to a European political party, well in advance of those elections. It is therefore necessary to establish a European electoral roll and mandatory time-limits for the establishment of the electoral roll at European and national level and of the lists of candidates.

(13)  A European Electoral Authority exercising an independent mandate and composed of members with the necessary expertise and experience is essential in order to manage the Union-wide constituency. The key tasks of the European Electoral Authority should include monitoring the implementation of this Regulation and resolving disputes in respect of the common standards of the European electoral law; managing the European electoral roll; proclaiming the electoral results; and ensuring an efficient exchange of information and best practices between national bodies.

(14)  In order to ensure that the European electoral entities have the sufficient funds to convey their messages and their political programmes to the Union citizens, the electoral campaign in the Union-wide constituency should receive adequate funding.

(15)  In order to encourage voter participation in elections to the European Parliament, Member States should provide for postal voting and could also allow advance physical and proxy voting. Taking into account the Council recommendations in that respect, and in order to take full advantage of the possibilities offered by technological developments, Member States could also permit electronic and internet voting, while ensuring the accessibility of the electronic and internet systems, the reliability of the results through a possibility for recounts, the secrecy of the vote, the protection of personal data, in accordance with applicable Union law, and full transparency in the design and deployment of the electronic and internet systems; as well as ensuring the accessibility for persons with disabilities and for all citizens.

(16)  Citizens of the Union have the right to participate in its democratic life, in particular by voting or standing as candidates in elections to the European Parliament. The right to vote and to stand as candidate, and access to information and voting should also be ensured on an equal basis for all citizens, including for persons with disabilities. Member States should take the measures necessary to allow all Union citizens to exercise the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament, including those who are residing or working in countries outside the Union, who are without a permanent residence, who are experiencing homelessness, who are serving a prison sentence in the Union or those who are living in closed residential settings such as hospitals, psychiatric institutions and other healthcare settings, retirement and nursing homes for old people or residential settings for persons with disabilities. In particular, Member States should introduce appropriate measures, so that people living in closed residential settings are able to exercise their right to vote. The special needs of persons with disabilities should be taken into account when ensuring access to information, voting materials and voting facilities.

(17)  The minimum age for the exercise of the right to vote and the right to stand as a candidate varies across the 27 Member States from 16 to 18. A single harmonised age for voting and for standing as a candidate should be introduced across the Union in order to ensure equality and to avoid discrimination in access to those most fundamental civic and political rights. Without prejudice to existing constitutional orders establishing a minimum voting age at 18 or 17 years of age, the minimum age for voting should be set at 16. The minimum age for standing as a candidate should be set at 18. Regardless of their legal capacity, all the persons with disabilities, should enjoy political rights on an equal basis with others.

(18)  The deadlines for tabling the lists of candidates for elections to the European Parliament and for establishing the electoral rolls before European elections vary greatly between Member States. In order to ensure that candidates and voters across the Union have the same time available for campaigning or for reflection, and to facilitate the exchange of information between Member States on voters, the deadlines for tabling the lists of candidates and for establishing the electoral rolls should be the same throughout the Union.

(19)  In order to ensure that European political parties, European associations of voters and other European electoral entities are sufficiently visible, clear and transparent rules on campaigning and on official electoral materials are needed. Such rules should enable European political parties, European associations of voters and other European electoral entities to use any forms of public communication and electoral campaign materials. Such rules should enable European political parties, European associations of voters and other European electoral entities to indicate their affiliations in any forms of public communication, electoral campaign materials and official electoral materials such as ballot papers. Member States should ensure that European political parties, European association of voters and other European electoral entities are given equal treatment and opportunities regarding the electoral campaign related to the Union-wide constituency.

(20)  The 1976 Electoral act established a common electoral period, giving the Member States the power to set the exact date and the time for the elections within that period. A truly pan-European election requires a common European voting day. The elections to the European Parliament should be held on 9 May, Europe Day, marking the anniversary of the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950. The election results should be proclaimed by the European Electoral Authority and published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(21)  In the event that a member of the European Parliament elected from the national constituencies, resigns, dies, or has his or her mandate withdrawn, the resulting vacancy should be filled in accordance with national legislation. Vacancies of seats of Members of the European Parliament elected in the Union-wide constituency should be filled by the next candidate in the relevant lists. Temporary replacements in cases of maternity, paternity, parental leave and severe illness of Members of the European Parliament should also be possible.

(22)  In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission in respect of the technical requirements, including the format and data to be provided, for the establishment of the European electoral roll. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council(22).

(23)  Since the objective of this Regulation, namely to establish the provisions necessary for the election of Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform electoral procedure as regards the Union-wide constituency and with principles common to all Member States, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Subject matter

This Regulation establishes the provisions necessary for the election of Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform electoral procedure as regards the Union-wide constituency referred to in Article 15 and with principles common to all Member States.

Article 2

Definitions

For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:

(1)  ‘political party’ means an association of citizens which pursues political objectives and which is either recognised by, or established in accordance with, the legal order of at least one Member State in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council(23), including those which intend to form or to join a European coalition of national political parties and/or national associations of voters in order to table a list of candidates for, and campaign in, the Union-wide constituency;

(2)  ‘association of voters’ means an association of citizens which pursues political objectives and which, rather than being established as a political party, is registered as an association of citizens in accordance with applicable national provisions, including those which intend to form or to join a European coalition of national political parties and/or associations of voters in order to table a list of candidates for, and campaign in, the Union-wide constituency;

(3)  ‘European coalition of national political parties and/or associations of voters’ means an electoral alliance of national political parties and/or national associations of voters which are registered in at least one quarter of the Member States, where necessary rounded up to the nearest whole number, that tables a list of candidates to, and campaigns in, the Union-wide constituency;

(4)  ‘European political party’ means a political alliance of national political parties which pursues political objectives and is registered with the Authority for European political parties and European political foundations in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 for the purposes of tabling a list of candidates for, and campaigning in, the Union-wide constituency;

(5)  ‘European association of voters’ means a transnational association of citizens registered in at least a quarter of the Member States, representing at least a number equal to 0.02% of the voting population in the relevant Member States, which pursues political objectives, but is not established as a European political party, and is recognised for the purposes of tabling a list of candidates for, and campaigning in, the Union-wide constituency;

(6)  ‘European electoral coalition’ means an electoral alliance of two or more European political parties and/or European associations of voters that fields a list of candidates for and campaign in the Union-wide constituency which may be joined by national political parties and/or national associations of voters, provided that they are not affiliated to a European political party;

(7)  ‘Political alliance’ means structured cooperation between political parties and/or citizens in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014;

(8)  ‘European electoral entity’ means a European coalition of national political parties and/or associations of voters, a European political party, a European association of voters, a European electoral coalition or a political alliance;

(9)  ‘Union-wide list’ means the list of candidates fielded in the Union-wide constituency by a European electoral entity.

Article 3

National provisions

The electoral procedure for the election of the Members of the European Parliament shall be governed by this Regulation. Matters not covered by this Regulation shall be governed in each Member State by its national provisions.

Those national provisions shall not affect the proportional nature of the voting system.

They shall in any event ensure respect for democratic standards, leading to democratic and proportionate requirements for registering a political party or an association of voters and for submitting a list of candidates for the national constituencies and the Union-wide constituency.

Article 4

The right to vote

1.  Every Union citizen from 16 years of age, including persons with disabilities regardless of their legal capacity, shall have the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament without prejudice to existing constitutional orders establishing a minimum voting age of 18 or 17 years of age.

2.  No Union citizen entitled to vote shall vote more than once in any election of Members of the European Parliament in the national constituencies or in the Union-wide constituency.

3.  Member States shall take measures necessary to ensure that double voting in elections to the European Parliament is subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties.

Article 5

The right to stand as a candidate

1.  Every Union citizen from 18 years of age shall have the right to stand as a candidate for the elections to the European Parliament in either a national constituency or in the Union-wide constituency, or in both.

2.  No Union citizen entitled to stand as a candidate shall stand as a candidate in more than one national constituency nor appear on more than one list for a national constituency or on more than one Union-wide list in any election to the European Parliament.

Article 6

Exercise of the right to vote

1.  Member States shall ensure that all Union citizens, including those living or working in a third country, those without a permanent residence, those living in closed residential settings, those experiencing homelessness or those serving a prison sentence in the Union, are able to exercise their right to vote in elections to the European Parliament.

2.  With regard to those citizens serving a prison sentence in the Union, the paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to national law or court decisions handed down in accordance with national law.

Article 7

Accessibility

1.  Member States shall ensure that all citizens, including persons with disabilities, have equal access to relevant materials, to voting facilities and to polling stations.

2.  Based on their national voting systems, Member States shall put in place appropriate arrangements with the aim of facilitating the exercise of the right to vote by persons with disabilities, independently and in secret.

3.  Member States shall ensure that persons with disabilities receive, at their request, assistance in voting by a person of their choice.

Article 8

Postal voting

1.  Member States shall provide for postal voting in elections to the European Parliament, including for citizens living in a third country, and shall adopt measures that ensure that postal voting is accessible, in particular for persons with disabilities. Member States shall adopt all necessary measures to ensure the reliability and secrecy of the vote, and the protection of personal data in accordance with applicable Union law.

2.  Member States may provide additional possibilities of voting by way of advance physical voting, proxy voting and voting by electronic and internet systems.

In the event of electronic, internet and proxy voting, Member States shall adopt all necessary measures to ensure the reliability, the integrity, the secrecy of the vote, transparency in the design and deployment of electronic and internet systems, the possibility for manual or electronic recounts without compromising the secrecy of the vote and the protection of personal data in accordance with applicable Union law.

Article 9

Establishment of the national electoral rolls and European electoral roll

1.  For the purpose of detecting and avoiding double voting in the elections to the European Parliament, the deadline for the establishment of the electoral roll in each Member State shall be no later than fourteen weeks before the Election day as referred to in Article 19(1). Errors in the electoral roll may be corrected until Election day.

2.  For the purpose of establishing the European electoral roll, the competent national authorities shall provide the European Electoral Authority with all necessary data in accordance with Article 18. The criteria to be registered in the national electoral roll shall be regulated by national provisions.

3.  The Commission shall adopt implementing acts laying down the technical requirements, including the format and data to be provided for the establishment of the European electoral roll for the implementation of paragraph 2 of this Article. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 29.

Article 10

Principles of selection of candidates

1.  All political parties, associations of voters, electoral alliances and European electoral entities participating in elections to the European Parliament shall observe democratic procedures, transparency and gender equality, through measures that aim to ensure that all eligible persons have an equal opportunity to be elected, and a composition of the European Parliament that reflects the diversity of the European Union, when selecting their candidates for election to the European Parliament. Gender equality shall be reached depending on the Member States electoral systems and in any event in the Union-wide constituency by the use of zipped lists or quotas, without infringing the rights of non-binary people.

2.  A member of a political party, an association of voters or a European electoral entity may file a reasoned complaint of non-compliance with the democratic procedures, transparency and gender equality criteria laid down in this Article with the responsible national authority or the European Electoral Authority.

Article 11

Tabling of the lists of candidates

1.  The deadline for tabling the lists of candidates for elections to the European Parliament shall be twelve weeks before the Election day referred to in Article 19(1).

2.  No later than 12 weeks before the Election day, the European electoral entities shall provide the European Electoral Authority with a document establishing that all the candidates consent to their inclusion in the Union-wide list. That document shall include the candidates’ full names and their identity card or passport numbers. It shall be signed by the candidates and shall indicate the date and place of signature.

Article 12

Electoral system

1.  Elections shall be by direct universal suffrage and shall be equal, free and secret. Each voter shall have two votes, one to elect the Members of the European Parliament in the national constituencies and one to elect Members of the European Parliament in the Union-wide constituency.

2.  Members of the European Parliament shall be elected as representatives of the Union citizens on the basis of proportional representation, in the national constituencies and in the Union-wide constituency.

3.  In the national constituencies, Members of the European Parliament shall be elected using any national system of proportional representation commonly used by the Member States.

4.  In the Union-wide constituency, Members of the European Parliament shall be elected using the closed list system.

Article 13

Electoral threshold

1.  Member States may set a minimum threshold for the allocation of seats. At national level, that threshold shall not exceed 5 % of the valid votes cast.

2.  For national constituencies, which comprise more than 60 seats a threshold shall be set and shall not be lower than of 3,5 % of the valid votes cast in the constituency concerned.

3.  The thresholds referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be without prejudice to exemptions made in national law for political parties or associations of voters that represent recognised national or linguistic minorities.

4.  An exemption from national thresholds set in paragraph 2 shall be made for political parties or associations of voters, registered in a quarter of Member States and obtaining at least one million votes across the Union, which include in their national ballot paper the single name and logo of the European electoral entity to which they are affiliated, and where appropriate, adapted to the languages of the Member States concerned.

5.  There shall be no minimum threshold for the allocation of seats in the Union-wide constituency referred to in Article 15.

Article 14

National constituencies

In accordance with its specific national situation and without prejudice to Article 15, each Member State may establish single constituencies for elections to the European Parliament or subdivide its electoral area in a different way, without affecting the proportional nature of the voting system in general.

Member States may form single-member constituencies representing linguistic or ethnic minorities, overseas nationals, outermost regions or overseas territories in accordance with national regulations, without affecting the proportional nature of the voting system.

Article 15

Union-wide constituency

1.  There shall be one constituency formed of the entire territory of the European Union from which 28 Members of the European Parliament shall be elected at the first election of Members of the European Parliament following the entry into force of this Regulation.

For elections of Members of the European Parliament thereafter, the size of the Union-wide constituency shall be determined by the European Council Decision establishing the composition of the European Parliament.

2.  The election in respect of the Union-wide constituency shall be without prejudice to the Members of the European Parliament elected in each Member State.

3.  All European electoral entities in accordance with Article 2 may submit to the European Electoral Authority Union-wide lists.

4.  No European electoral entity may submit more than one Union-wide list. National parties and national associations of voters may only support one Union-wide list.

5.  The ballots comprising the Union-wide lists shall bear the name and logo of the respective European electoral entity.

6.  For candidates living in a third country, the candidate’s place of residence for the purposes of drawing up the Union-wide list shall be their last one before leaving the European Union. For candidates born and resident in a third country, the place of residence for the purposes of drawing up the Union-wide list shall correspond to that of the candidate’s Member State of nationality.

7.  The Union-wide lists shall include a number of candidates equal to the number of mandates referred to in paragraph 1.

8.  The Union-wide lists shall be drawn up by the European electoral entities in accordance with the principles as laid down in Article 10(1).

9.  In order to ensure geographical balance, the Union-wide lists are divided in sections of three slots. Each of these three slots is to be filled with one candidate coming from each of the three groups of Member States as defined in Annex I and exemplified in Annex II.

10.  The order of candidates resident in any of the Member States in each of the three groups of Member States included in Annex I shall vary in each list section of three slots up to the list slot corresponding to the number resulting from dividing the total number of seats by two, where necessary rounding up to the next whole number.

11.  The total population of the Member States shall be calculated by the Commission (Eurostat) on the basis of the most recent data provided by the Member States, in accordance with a method established by means of Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(24).

12.  The apportionment of seats to the Union-wide lists based on the aggregated results in the Union-wide constituency shall be carried out in accordance with the D’Hondt system, as follows:

(a)  the numbers of votes obtained by the candidates are ordered from highest to lowest, in a column;

(b)  the number of votes obtained by each candidacy is divided by 1,2,3, etc., up to a number equal to the number of seats corresponding to the constituency, forming a table similar to the one that appears in Annex III. The seats are attributed to the candidates that obtain the highest ratios in the table, attending to a decreasing order;

(c)  when two seats corresponding to different candidacies coincide in the list of quotients, the seat is allocated to the list with the highest total number of votes obtained. If there are two candidates with the same number of votes, the first tie is resolved by lottery and the successive ones alternatively.

13.  European and national public broadcasters shall provide broadcasting time in proportion to the results of the preceding election to the Union-wide constituency, ensuring minimum broadcasting time for every Union-wide list.

Article 16

Financing of electoral campaigns of European electoral entities

The provisions of Chapters IV and V of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the financing of the electoral campaigns of European electoral entities.

Article 17

Common provisions related to electoral campaigns

1.  Electoral campaigning shall not start until eight weeks before the Election day.

2.  Electoral campaigning consists of asking voters for their votes in an election to the European Parliament by means of print or digital material and other formats of public communication, media advertising, and public events. Electoral campaign materials shall include the logo and a reference to the manifesto or programme of the European electoral entity to which the national party is affiliated.

3.  Electoral campaign materials shall be accessible to persons with disabilities.

4.  In the national constituencies, the ballot papers used in elections to the European Parliament shall be uniform, give equal visibility to the names, acronyms, symbols and logos, if any, of national political parties and/or national associations of voters, and to those of the European electoral entities when affiliated to any of them, and shall feature the list of names of the candidates and, where appropriate of the substitutes, in the order in which they appear on the relevant electoral lists.

5.  The rules concerning the posting of electoral materials to voters in elections to the European Parliament shall be the same as those applied for national, regional and local elections in the Member State concerned.

6.  Member States shall ensure that European electoral entities are given equal treatment and opportunities as national political parties and national associations of voters regarding the electoral campaign related to the Union-wide constituency.

7.  Member States shall implement a European electoral reserve period of 48 hours before the Election day, during which it shall not be permitted to ask electors about their voting intentions.

Article 18

Contact authorities

1.  Each Member State shall designate a contact authority responsible for exchanging, with its counterparts in the other Member States and with the European Electoral Authority established in accordance with Article 28, data on voters necessary for establishing the European electoral roll in accordance with Article 9(2), and on candidates.

2.  The contact authority referred to in paragraph 1 shall, in accordance with the applicable Union law concerning the protection of personal data, begin transmitting to those counterparts and to the European Electoral Authority, no later than six weeks before the Election day the data indicated in Articles 9 and 10 of Council Directive 93/109/EC(25) concerning citizens of the Union who have been entered on the national electoral rolls and European electoral roll or are standing as candidates, in a Member State of which they are not nationals.

Article 19

Election day

1.  Elections to the European Parliament shall be held on 9 May of the last year of a parliamentary term, as referred to in Article 20 (the “Election day”).

2.  During the opening hours of the polling stations and from half an hour before polling stations open, any political activities at the polling stations or in their proximity shall be prohibited, without prejudice to any activity organised to celebrate Europe Day in the Member States.

3.  The elections shall end in all Member States by 21:00 local time on Election day. To take into account the time difference, elections to the European Parliament may be held on 8 May of the last year of a parliamentary term in the Union’s overseas countries and territories.

4.  Member States shall not make public the results of their count officially or on a provisional basis until after the close of polling, in accordance with paragraph 3, in the Member State whose electors are the last to vote.

5.  Member States may declare Election day a national holiday.

Article 20

Determination and publication of the election results

1.  The election results in the Union-wide constituency and in the national constituencies shall be proclaimed, in that order, by the European Electoral Authority, on the basis of the information provided by the contact authorities.

2.  The official election results shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 21

Parliamentary term and mandate

1.  The five-year term for which Members of the European Parliament are elected shall begin at the opening of the first session following each election (the “parliamentary term”).

2.  The term of office of each Member of the European Parliament shall begin and end in accordance with the parliamentary term (the “mandate”).

Article 22

Convening of Parliament

In addition to the obligation set out in Article 229 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the European Parliament shall meet, without requiring to be convened, on the first Tuesday after expiry of an interval of one month from Election day.

Article 23

Verification of credentials

The European Parliament shall verify the credentials of Members of the European Parliament.

For this purpose, it shall take note of the results declared officially by the Member States and proclaimed by the European Electoral Authority.

Article 24

Incompatibilities

1.  The office of Member of the European Parliament shall be incompatible with the following offices:

–  member of the government of a Member State,

–  member of a national or regional parliament or assembly vested with legislative powers,

–  member of the European Commission,

–  Judge, Advocate-General or Registrar of the Court of Justice of the European Union,

–  member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank,

–  member of the Court of Auditors,

–  European Ombudsman,

–  member of the Economic and Social Committee,

–  member of the Committee of the Regions,

–  member of committees or other bodies set up pursuant to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community for the purposes of managing the Union's funds or carrying out a permanent direct administrative task,

–  member of the Board of Directors, Management Committee or staff of the European Investment Bank,

–  active official or servant of the institutions of the European Union or of the specialised bodies attached to them or of the European Central Bank.

2.   Each Member State may adopt additional national rules concerning incompatibility with the office of Member of the European Parliament.

3.  Members of the European Parliament to whom paragraphs 1 and 2 become applicable in the course of the parliamentary term, shall be replaced in accordance with Article 27.

Article 25

External parliamentary activities

Upon election, Members of the European Parliament shall designate the municipality and, where applicable, region, within their Member State of residence, from which they will conduct external parliamentary activities.

Article 26

Personal and independent vote

1.  Members of the European Parliament shall vote on an individual and personal basis. They shall not be bound by any instructions and shall not receive a binding mandate.

2.  Members of the European Parliament shall enjoy the privileges and immunities applicable to them by virtue of Protocol No 7 on the privileges and immunities of the European Union, annexed to the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, from the moment when their election to the European Parliament is officially declared.

Article 27

Vacancies

1.  A seat shall fall vacant when the mandate of a Member of the European Parliament ends as a result of that Member’s resignation or death, or due to the withdrawal of his or her mandate.

2.  In the event of death, resignation, or withdrawal of the mandate of a Member of the European Parliament elected in the Union-wide constituency, the President of the European Parliament shall immediately inform the European Electoral Authority.

The vacancy shall be filled by the next candidate in the list of candidates in which the Member who has died, resigned or withdrawn was originally elected.

3.  Subject to the other provisions of this Regulation, each Member State shall lay down appropriate procedures for filling any seat which falls vacant during the parliamentary term, for the remainder of that period.

4.  Where the law of a Member State makes explicit provision for the withdrawal of the mandate of a Member of the European Parliament, that mandate shall end pursuant to those legal provisions. The competent national authorities shall inform the European Parliament thereof.

5.  Where a seat falls vacant as a result of resignation or death, the President of the European Parliament shall immediately inform the competent authorities of the Member State concerned and the European Electoral Authority thereof.

6.  Where Parliament declares a vacancy of a seat of a member elected from the Union-wide constituency, the President shall inform the European Electoral Authority thereof and invite it to fill the seat for the remainder of the mandate without delay.

Vacancies of seats of members of the European Parliament elected from the Union-wide constituency shall be filled by the next candidate in the relevant list, according to the order of precedence.

7.  The Parliament may, at the request of the Member concerned, and with the agreement of the Member State concerned or the European Electoral Authority, propose a temporary replacement of the Member concerned in case of maternity, paternity or parental leave or in case of leave due to a severe illness.

When a seat falls temporarily vacant for any of the reasons set out in the first subparagraph the Member concerned shall be temporarily replaced for a period of sixteen weeks by the next candidate on the relevant list, who may decide whether or not to fill the vacancy. A refusal to fill the vacancy does not entail the loss of the position in the relevant list for future vacancies. The sixteen-week period may be renewed.

Article 28

European Electoral Authority

1.  A European Electoral Authority (the “European Electoral Authority”) is hereby established for the purpose of :

(a)  ensuring the correct implementation of this Regulation as well as conducting and monitoring the electoral process in the Union-wide constituency;

(b)  defining the procedure applicable to complaints under Article 10(2) as regards the Union-wide constituency;

(c)  exercising all the functions related to the electoral process in the Union-wide constituency and liaise with the contact authorities referred to in Article 18;

(d)  verifying that the European electoral entities meet the conditions for submitting Union-wide lists in accordance with Article 15;

(e)  managing the European electoral roll established in Article 9;

(f)  proclaiming the electoral results in accordance with Article 20 ;

(g)  ruling on any disputes which may arise out of the provisions of this Regulation other than those arising out of the national provisions to which this Regulation refers.

The European Electoral Authority may also provide assistance in case of difficulties related to the interpretation of the lists submitted by the national authorities.

2.  The European Electoral Authority shall be independent and shall exercise its functions in full compliance with this Regulation.

3.  The European Electoral Authority shall proclaim the Union-wide lists eleven weeks before Election day.

It shall establish and manage a Register of the different Union-wide lists submitted by the European electoral entities. The information on the Register shall be made public.

In its decisions, the European Electoral Authority shall give full consideration to the fundamental rights to vote and to stand as a candidate.

4.  Each Member State shall appoint one member of the European Electoral Authority, selected from professors of law or political science and other experts in electoral systems on the basis of their professional qualities and respecting gender balance. The members of the European Electoral Authority shall elect its president, vice-president, and secretary by simple majority, in separate votes. The European Electoral Authority shall endeavour to take decisions by consensus. If it is not possible to take a decision by consensus, the European Electoral Authority shall decide by a simple majority vote.

All members of the European Electoral Authority shall be independent in the performance of their duties. They shall neither seek nor take instructions from any institution or government or from any other body, office or agency. They shall not be members or former members of the European Parliament, national parliaments or national governments. In addition, they shall not hold any electoral mandate, or be officials or other servants of any Union institution or of any European political party or European association of voters, or of any European political foundation.

The members of the European Electoral Authority shall be appointed for a five-year term renewable once.

5.  The European Electoral Authority shall be represented by its president who shall ensure the implementation of all decisions of the European Electoral Authority on its behalf.

The president of the European Electoral Authority shall refrain from any act which is incompatible with the nature of his or her duties.

If a member of the European Electoral Authority, including the president no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his or her duties, he or she may be dismissed by a vote supported by at least three fifths of the members of the European Electoral Authority on the basis of a report setting out a reasoned proposal of dismissal.

The five-year term of the European Electoral Authority shall begin two and a half years after the beginning of the parliamentary term. The European Electoral Authority’s first mandate shall begin as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Regulation.

A vacancy in the European Electoral Authority caused by resignation, retirement, dismissal or death shall be filled in accordance with the same procedure as that applicable to the initial appointment.

6.  The European Electoral Authority shall enjoy legal personality and shall have the necessary offices, staff, services and administrative support facilities to carry out its functions.

7.  The European Electoral Authority shall submit a report to the European Parliament on the organisation of the European elections and on the implementation of this Regulation and the attainment of its aims, within nine months after the European elections.

8.  The costs of the European Electoral Authority, including the remuneration of its members, shall be financed by appropriations from the general budget of the Union.

Budget appropriations shall be sufficient to ensure the full and independent operation of the European Electoral Authority. A draft budgetary plan for the European Electoral Authority shall be submitted to the European Parliament by its president, and shall be made public. The European Parliament shall delegate the duties of Authorising Officer with respect to those appropriations to the president of the European Electoral Authority.

Article 29

Committee procedure

1.  The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

2.  Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

Article 30

Repeal

1.  The Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, as well as Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom laying down that Act, is repealed.

2.  References to the repealed Act shall be construed as references to this Regulation.

Article 31

Review Clause

No later than one year after each European election, the European Parliament shall, after consultation with the European Electoral Authority, present a report on the overall functioning of this Regulation accompanied, if appropriate, by a legislative proposal to amend this Regulation.

Article 32

Entry into force

1.  This Regulation shall take effect on the first day of the month following that of its approval by the Member States, in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

2.  Member States shall notify the General Secretariat of the Council of the completion of their national procedures.

ANNEX I.

TABLE - 27 EU MEMBER STATES BY POPULATION CATEGORIES

Source: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00001/default/table?lang=en

ANNEX II

Practical example of Union-wide list using the three categories group with 28 seats.

A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B7, B8, B9, B10, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C10, C11, C12 are examples of candidates from the Member States by population category

ANNEX III

Practical example - D’Hondt Method

Practical example: 1 000 000 valid votes cast in a constituency that elects 5 Members.

A (350 000 votes), B (300 000 votes), C (150 000 votes), D (100 000 votes), E (70 000 votes), F (30 000 votes)

Division 1 2 3 4 5

A 350 000 175 000 116 666 87 500 70 000

B 300 000 150 000 100 000 75 000 60 000

C 150 000 75 000 50 000 37 500 30 000

D 100 000 50 000 33 333 25 000 20 000

E 70 000 35 000 23 333 17 500 14 000

F 30 000 15 000 10 000 7 500 6 000

In consequence, A obtains 2 seats, B obtains 2 seats and C obtains 1 seat.

(1) OJ L 283, 21.10.2002, p. 1. (2) OJ L 178, 16.7.2018, p. 1. (3) OJ L 329, 30.12.1993, p. 34. (4) OJ C 292, 21.9.1998, p. 66. (5) OJ C 419, 16.12.2015, p. 185. (6) OJ C 75, 26.2.2016, p. 109. (7) OJ C 366, 27.10.2017, p. 7. (8) OJ C 36, 29.1.2016, p. 56. (9) OJ C 463, 21.12.2018, p. 83. (10) OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 98. (11) OJ L 317, 4.11.2014, p. 1. (12) https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-reports/information-reports/real-right-persons-disabilities-vote-european-parliament-elections-information-report. (13) https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/need-guarantee-real-rights-persons-disabilities-vote-european-parliament-elections-additional-opinion. (14) Based on data from the European Parliament’s Intergroup for Traditional Minorities, National Communities and Languages. (15) Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions and Reports Concerning Electoral Systems and National Minorities CDL-PI(2019)004, in particular its Report on Electoral Law and National Minorities CDL-INF (2000). (16) OJ L 278, 8.10.1976, p. 5. (17) Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976 (OJ L 278, 8.10.1976, p. 1). (18) Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom of 25 June and 23 September 2002 amending the Act concerning the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom (OJ L 283, 21.10.2002, p. 1). (19) Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2018/994 of 13 July 2018 amending the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976 (OJ L 178, 16.7.2018, p. 1), not in force. (20) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European democracy action plan (COM(2020)0790). (21) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025” (COM(2020)0152). (22) Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by the Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13). (23) Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations (OJ L 317, 4.11.2014, p. 1). (24) Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on European demographic statistics (OJ L 330, 10.12.2013, p. 39). (25) Council Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals (OJ L 329, 30.12.1993, p. 34).

Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 3 May 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 of the European Parliament and of the Council on persistent organic pollutants (COM(2021)0656 – C9-0396/2021 – 2021/0340(COD))(1)

P9_TA(2022)0130 A9-0092/2022

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

Text proposed by the Commission   Amendment Amendment 1 Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2)  At the seventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention, held from 4 to 15 May 2015, it was agreed to include pentachlorophenol, its salts and esters (‘pentachlorophenol’) in Annex A to the Convention. At the ninth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention, held from 29 April to 10 May 2019, it was agreed to include dicofol as well as perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), its salts and PFOA-related compounds in Annex A to the Convention. In view of those amendments to the Convention and to ensure that waste containing those substances is managed in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, it is necessary to also amend Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 by including pentachlorophenol, dicofol and perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), its salts and PFOA-related compounds in the Annexes and indicating their corresponding concentration limits. (2)  At the seventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention, held from 4 to 15 May 2015, it was agreed to include pentachlorophenol, its salts and esters (‘pentachlorophenol’) in Annex A to the Convention. At the ninth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention, held from 29 April to 10 May 2019, it was agreed to include dicofol as well as perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), its salts and PFOA-related compounds in Annex A to the Convention. In view of those amendments to the Convention and to ensure that waste containing those substances is managed in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, it is necessary to also amend Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 by including pentachlorophenol, dicofol and perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), its salts and PFOA-related compounds in the Annexes and also indicating their corresponding concentration limits. Amendment 2 Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 (3)  Pentachlorophenol had been previously listed in Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EC) No 850/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council23 by Commission Regulation (EU) 2019/63624 , with an Annex IV value of 100 mg/kg and an Annex V value of 1 000 mg/kg. Regulation (EC) No 850/2004 was repealed by Regulation (EU) 2019/1021, but pentachlorophenol was unintentionally omitted from that Regulation. It is therefore necessary to amend Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 to include pentachlorophenol. (3)  Pentachlorophenol had been previously listed in Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EC) No 850/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council23 by Commission Regulation (EU) 2019/63624 , with an Annex IV value of 100 mg/kg and an Annex V value of 1 000 mg/kg. Regulation (EC) No 850/2004 was repealed by Regulation (EU) 2019/1021, but pentachlorophenol was unintentionally omitted from that Regulation. It is therefore necessary to amend Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 to now include pentachlorophenol. _________________ _________________ 23 Regulation (EC) No 850/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on persistent organic pollutants and amending Directive 79/117/EEC (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 7). 23 Regulation (EC) No 850/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on persistent organic pollutants and amending Directive 79/117/EEC (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 7). 24 Commission Regulation (EU) 2019/636 of 23 April 2019 amending Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EC) No 850/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on persistent organic pollutants (OJ L 109, 24.4.2019, p. 6). 24 Commission Regulation (EU) 2019/636 of 23 April 2019 amending Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EC) No 850/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on persistent organic pollutants (OJ L 109, 24.4.2019, p. 6). Amendment 3 Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 (4)  Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 already contain concentration limits for the following substances or substance groups: a) the sum of the concentrations of tetrabromodiphenyl ether, pentabromodiphenyl ether, hexabromodiphenyl ether, heptabromodiphenyl ether and decabromodiphenyl ether (with the exception of the latter, which is not listed in Annex V to that Regulation); b) Hexabromocyclododecane; c) Alkanes C10-C13, chloro (short-chain chlorinated paraffins) (SCCPs); and d) Polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins and dibenzofurans (PCDD/PCDF). Pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1021, it is appropriate to amend the concentration limits in Annex IV for those substances to adapt their limit values to scientific and technical progress. To be consistent with the list of polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs) listed in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021, the substance decabromodiphenyl ether should be included among the PBDEs listed in the third column of Annex V to that Regulation. (4)  Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 already contain concentration limits for the following substances or substance groups: a) the sum of the concentrations of tetrabromodiphenyl ether, pentabromodiphenyl ether, hexabromodiphenyl ether, heptabromodiphenyl ether and decabromodiphenyl ether (with the exception of the latter, which is not listed in Annex V to that Regulation); b) Hexabromocyclododecane; c) Alkanes C10-C13, chloro (short-chain chlorinated paraffins) (SCCPs); and d) Polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins and dibenzofurans (PCDD/PCDF). Pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1021, it is appropriate to amend the concentration limits in Annex IV for those substances to adapt their limit values according to scientific and technical progress. To be consistent with the list of polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs) listed in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021, the substance decabromodiphenyl ether should be included among the PBDEs listed in the third column of Annex V to that Regulation. Amendment 4 Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 a (new) (5a)   Perfluorohexane sulfonic acid (PFHxS), its salts and PFHxS-related compounds have been proposed by the Persistent Organic Pollutants Review Committee (POPRC) for listing under Annex A of the Convention without specific exemptions5a after completing the risk profile and risk management evaluation for those substances. A decision to include PFHxS, its salts and PFHxS-related compounds is envisaged to take place in Stockholm Convention COP-10, which was initially scheduled in July 2021, and is now scheduled to take place in June 2022 as a result of the negative evolution in many European countries of the COVID-19 pandemic. With respect to the objectives of the Convention, it is therefore appropriate, based on the current impact assessment5b and to ensure that waste containing those substances is managed in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, to already amend Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 by including perfluorohexane sulfonic acid (PFHxS), its salts and PFHxS-related compounds in the Annexes and indicating their corresponding concentration limits. The Commission should reflect those amendments to Annex IV and V in other Annexes of the Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 to ensure consistency. _________________ 5a POPRC-15/1 5b SWD(2021)0300 Amendment 5 Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6)  The proposed concentration limits in Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 have been set applying the same methodology that was used to establish the concentration limits in previous amendments of Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EC) No 850/2004. The proposed concentration limits should achieve the objective of a high level of protection of human health and the environment associated to the destruction or irreversible transformation of the substances concerned. Those limits should also take into consideration the broader policy objective of achieving a climate-neutral and circular economy, enshrined in the European Green Deal26 . (6)  The proposed concentration limits in Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 have been set applying the same methodology that was used to establish the concentration limits in previous amendments of Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EC) No 850/2004. The proposed concentration limits should be underpinned by the precautionary principle as set forth in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and aim to eliminate, where feasible, the release of POPs into the environment, in order to achieve the objective of a high level of protection of human health and the environment associated to the destruction or irreversible transformation of the substances concerned. Those limits should also take into consideration the broader policy objective of achieving the zero-pollution ambition for a toxic-free environment, increasing recycling, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, developing non-toxic material cycles where banned substances should not be reintroduced on the EU market through recycling activities, and a circular economy, enshrined in the European Green Deal26. __________________ __________________ 26 COM(2019)0640 26 COM(2019)0640 Amendment 6 Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 a (new) (6a)  The concentration limits specified in Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 should be coherent and contribute to the implementation of the communication of the Commission of 14 October 2020 entitled ‘Chemicals Strategy for Sustainability - Towards a Toxic-Free Environment’ that proposes a comprehensive set of actions to address the use of and contamination with per- and polyfluoroalkoxy alkyl substances. Amendment 7 Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 b (new) (6b)   To prevent mixing of contaminated waste with other waste or materials and to ensure better traceability and effective treatment of waste containing persistent organic pollutants, there is a need to avoid inconsistency between the provisions regarding waste which contains persistent organic pollutants originally set out in Regulation (EC) No 850/2004, now repealed by Regulation (EU) 2019/1021, and those set out thereafter. The Commission should therefore assess whether it is be appropriate to recognise that waste which contains any persistent organic pollutants exceeding the concentration limits specified in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 is to be classified as hazardous and put forward, if appropriate, a legislative proposal to amend Directive 2009/98/EC or Decision 2014/955/EU , or both, accordingly. Amendment 8 Proposal for a regulation Article 1 a (new) Article 1a The Commission shall assess whether it would be appropriate to amend the Directive 2008/98/EC on waste or Commission Decision 2014/955/EU1a, or both, to recognize that waste containing any persistent organic pollutants exceeding the concentration limits indicated in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 is to be classified as hazardous, and, if appropriate, based on that assessment and not later than 18 months after entry into force of this legislation, put forward a legislative proposal to amend the Directive or the Decision, or both, accordingly. _________________ 1a Commission Decision of 18 December 2014 amending Decision 2000/532/EC on the list of waste pursuant to Directive 2008/98/EC Amendment 9 Proposal for a regulation Annex I – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point a – table Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 Annex IV – table Text proposed by the Commission ‘Pentachlorophenol, its salts and esters 87-86-5 and others 201-778-6 and others 100 mg/kg Dicofol 115-32-2 204-082-0 50 mg/kg Perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), its salts and PFOA-related compounds 335-67-1 and others 206-397-9 and others 1 mg/kg       (PFOA and its salts),       40 mg/kg       (PFOA-related compounds)’ Amendment ‘Pentachlorophenol (PCP), its salts and esters 87-86-5 and others 201-778-6 and others 100 mg/kg Dicofol 115-32-2 204-082-0 50 mg/kg Perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), its salts and PFOA-related compounds 335-67-1 and others 206-397-9 and others 0,1 mg/kg       (PFOA and its salts),       20 mg/kg       (sum of PFOA-related compounds)’ Perfluorohexane sulfonic acid (PFHxS), its salts and PFHxS-related compounds 355-46-4 and others 355-46-4 and others 0,1 mg/kg       (PFHxS and its salts),       20 mg/kg       (PFHxS-related compounds)’ Amendment 10 Proposal for a regulation Annex I – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b – table Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 Annex IV – table Text proposed by the Commission ‘Alkanes C10-C13, chloro (short-chain chlorinated paraffins) (SCCPs) 85535-84-8 287-476-5 1 500 mg/kg Amendment ‘Alkanes C10-C13, chloro (short-chain chlorinated paraffins) (SCCPs) 85535-84-8 287-476-5 420 mg/kg Amendment 11 Proposal for a regulation Annex I – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point c – table Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 Annex IV – table Text proposed by the Commission Tetrabromodiphenyl ether C12H6Br4O 40088-47-9 and others 254-787-2 and others Sum of the concentrations of tetrabromodiphenyl ether, pentabromodiphenyl ether, hexabromodiphenyl ether, heptabromodiphenyl ether and decabromodiphenyl ether: Pentabromodiphenyl ether C12H5Br5O 32534-81-9 and others 251-084-2 and others Hexabromodiphenyl ether C12H4Br6O 36483-60-0 and others 253-058-6 and others Heptabromodiphenyl ether C12H3Br7O 68928-80-3 and others 273-031-2 and others Bis(pentabromophenyl) ether (decabromodiphenyl ether; decaBDE) C12Br10O 1163-19-5 and others 214-604-9 and others       (a)  until [OP, please introduce the date of the day before the date in the following point], 500 mg/kg       (b)  from [OP, please introduce the date of 5 years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation], 200 mg/kg or, if higher, the sum of the concentration of those substances where they are present in mixtures or articles, as set out in Annex I, fourth column, point 2 for the substances tetrabromodiphenyl ether, pentabromodiphenyl ether, hexabromodiphenyl ether, heptabromodiphenyl ether and decabromodiphenyl ether.’ Amendment Tetrabromodiphenyl ether C12H6Br4O 40088-47-9 and others 254-787-2 and others Sum of the concentrations of tetrabromodiphenyl ether C12H6Br4O, pentabromodiphenyl ether C12H5Br5O, hexabromodiphenyl ether C12H4Br6O, heptabromodiphenyl ether C12H3Br7O and decabromodiphenyl ether C12Br10O: Pentabromodiphenyl ether C12H5Br5O 32534-81-9 and others 251-084-2 and others Hexabromodiphenyl ether C12H4Br6O 36483-60 and others 253-058-6 and others Heptabromodiphenyl ether C12H3Br7O 68928-80-3 and others 273-031-2 and others Bis(pentabromophenyl) ether (decabromodiphenyl ether; decaBDE) C12Br10O 1163-19-5 and others 214-604-9 and others       (a)  until [OP, please introduce the date of the day before the date in the following point], 200 mg/kg The Commission shall review that concentration limit and shall, where appropriate and in accordance with the Treaties, adopt a legislative proposal to lower that value no later than [OP, please introduce the date of 5 years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation].       (b)  deleted Amendment 12 Proposal for a regulation Annex I – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point d – table Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 Annex IV – table Text proposed by the Commission ‘Polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins and dibenzofurans (PCDD/PCDF) and dioxin-like polychlorinated biphenyls (dl-PCBs)     5 µg/kg (2) ________________ (2)  The limit is calculated as the sum of PCDD, PCDF and dl-PCBs according to the toxic equivalency factors (TEFs) set out in Part 2, in the third subparagraph, in the table, of Annex V.’ Amendment ‘Polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins and dibenzofurans (PCDD/PCDF) and dioxin-like polychlorinated biphenyls (dl-PCBs)     1 µg/kg (2) _______________ (2)   The limit is calculated as the sum of PCDD, PCDF and dl-PCBs according to the toxic equivalency factors (TEFs) set out in Part 2, in the third subparagraph, in the table, of Annex V.’ Amendment 13 Proposal for a regulation Annex I – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e – table Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 Annex IV – table Text proposed by the Commission ‘Hexabromocyclododecane(4) 25637-99-4, 3194-55-6, 134237-50-6, 134237-51-7, 134237-52-8 247-148-4 221-695-9 500 mg/kg Amendment ‘Hexabromocyclododecane(4) 25637-99-4, 3194-55-6, 134237-50-6, 134237-51-7, 134237-52-8 247-148-4 221-695-9 (a)  until [OP, please introduce the date of the day before the date in the following point], 200 mg/kg       The Commission shall review that concentration limit and shall, where appropriate and in accordance with the Treaties, adopt a legislative proposal to lower that value to 100 mg / kg no later than [OP, please introduce the date of 5 years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation]. Amendment 14 Proposal for a regulation Annex I – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point a – point iv (new) Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 Annex V – Part 2 – Table Perfluorohexane sulfonic acid (PFHxS), its salts and PFHxS-related compounds: 50 mg/kg (PFHxS and its salts), 2 000 mg/kg (PFHxS-related compounds).

(1) The matter was referred back for interinstitutional negotiations to the committee responsible, pursuant to Rule 59(4), fourth subparagraph (A9-0092/2022).

European Parliament legislative resolution of 3 May 2022 on the proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards the extension of the application period of the optional reverse charge mechanism in relation to supplies of certain goods and services susceptible to fraud and of the Quick Reaction Mechanism against VAT fraud (COM(2022)0039 – C9-0053/2022 – 2022/0027(CNS))

P9_TA(2022)0131 A9-0128/2022

(Special legislative procedure – consultation)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2022)0039),

–  having regard to Article 113 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C9‑0053/2022),

–  having regard to Rule 82 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A9-0128/2022),

1.  Approves the Commission proposal;

2.  Asks the Commission to carry out an assessment of the effects of the reverse charge mechanism before any further extension of its application period;

3.  Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

4.  Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;

5.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 3 May 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision on the application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in the area of the Schengen Information System in the Republic of Cyprus (COM(2021)0472 – C9-0350/2021 – 2021/0266(NLE))

P9_TA(2022)0132 A9-0082/2022

(Consultation)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2021)0472),

–  having regard to Article 3(2) of the 2003 Act of Accession, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C9‑0350/2021),

–  having regard to Rule 82 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0082/2022),

1.  Approves the Commission proposal;

2.  Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

3.  Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;

4.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and the Commission.

European Parliament decision of 3 May 2022 on the nomination of Lefteris Christoforou as a Member of the Court of Auditors (C9-0042/2022 – 2022/0802(NLE))

P9_TA(2022)0133 A9-0132/2022

(Consultation)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Article 286(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C9‑0042/2022),

–  having regard to Rule 129 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0132/2022),

A.  whereas, by letter of 10 February 2022, the Council consulted Parliament on the nomination of Lefteris Christoforou as a Member of the Court of Auditors;

B.  whereas Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control then proceeded to evaluate the credentials of the nominee, in particular in view of the requirements laid down in Article 286(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; whereas in carrying out that evaluation, the committee received a curriculum vitae from the nominee as well as the nominee’s replies to the written questionnaire that he had been sent;

C.  whereas the committee subsequently held a hearing with the nominee on 21 April 2022, at which the nominee made an opening statement and then answered questions put by the members of the committee;

1.  Delivers a favourable opinion on the Council’s nomination of Lefteris Christoforou as a Member of the Court of Auditors;

2.  Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Council and, for information, to the Court of Auditors, the other institutions of the European Union and the audit institutions of the Member States.

European Parliament decision of 3 May 2022 on the nomination of George Marius Hyzler as a Member of the Court of Auditors (C9-0043/2022 – 2022/0803(NLE))

P9_TA(2022)0134 A9-0130/2022

(Consultation)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Article 286(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C9‑0043/2022),

–  having regard to Rule 129 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0130/2022),

A.  whereas, by letter of 10 February 2022, the Council consulted Parliament on the nomination of George Marius Hyzler as a Member of the Court of Auditors;

B.  whereas Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control then proceeded to evaluate the credentials of the nominee, in particular in view of the requirements laid down in Article 286(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; whereas in carrying out that evaluation, the committee received a curriculum vitae from the nominee as well as the nominee’s replies to the written questionnaire that he had been sent;

C.  whereas the committee subsequently held a hearing with the nominee on 21 April 2022, at which the nominee made an opening statement and then answered questions put by the members of the committee;

1.  Delivers a favourable opinion on the Council’s nomination of George Marius Hyzler as a Member of the Court of Auditors;

2.  Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Council and, for information, to the Court of Auditors, the other institutions of the European Union and the audit institutions of the Member States.

European Parliament resolution of 3 May 2022 toward a sustainable blue economy in the EU: the role of the fisheries and aquaculture sectors (2021/2188(INI))

P9_TA(2022)0135 A9-0089/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 17 May 2021 on a new approach for a sustainable blue economy in the EU – transforming the EU’s Blue Economy for a Sustainable Future (COM(2021)0240),

–  having regard to Articles 3, 4, 13, 38, 43 and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy(1),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1004(2) (EMFAF),

–  having regard to Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive)(3),

–  having regard to the seventh Environmental Action Programme (EAP) and the concepts enshrined therein, such as planetary boundaries and ecological limits,

–  having regard to Directive 2014/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning(4),

–  having regard to Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks(5),

–  having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources(6),

–  having regard to the political agreement between Parliament and the Council of 11 March 2021 on the 2021-2027 Connecting Europe Facility,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 - Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380), and to its resolution of 9 June 2021 thereon(7),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ (COM(2020)0381), and to its resolution of 20 October 2021 thereon(8),

–  having regard to the Commission report entitled ‘The EU Blue Economy Report 2021’(9),

–  having regard to the Commission report of March 2021 on ‘Sustainability criteria for the blue economy’(10),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 12 May 2021 entitled "Strategic guidelines for a more sustainable and competitive EU aquaculture for the period 2021 to 2030’ (COM(2021)0236),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 23 July 2020 entitled ‘A new approach to the Atlantic maritime strategy – Atlantic action plan 2.0: An updated action plan for a sustainable, resilient and competitive blue economy in the European Union Atlantic area’ (COM(2020)0329),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 December 2020 entitled ‘Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy – putting European transport on track for the future’ (COM(2020)0789),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 November 2020 entitled ‘An EU Strategy to harness the potential of offshore renewable energy for a climate neutral future’ (COM(2020)0741),

–  having regard to its resolution of 8 September 2015 on untapping the potential of research and innovation in the blue economy to create jobs and growth(11),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2018 entitled ‘International ocean governance: an agenda for the future of our oceans in the context of the 2030 SDGs’(12),

–  having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the impact on fisheries of marine litter(13),

–  having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2021 on a new approach to the Atlantic maritime strategy(14),

–  having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on the impact on the fishing sector of offshore wind farms and other renewable energy systems(15),

–  having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2021entitled ‘Towards a stronger partnership with the EU outermost regions’(16),

–  having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

–  having regard to the global guidelines and international standards for fisheries and aquaculture as developed by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in cooperation with the EU as a member,

–  having regard to the FAO report entitled ‘The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2020: Sustainability in Action’,

–  having regard to the Blue Fishing Ports Network initiative launched in July 2018 by the FAO,

–  having regard to the Port of Vigo Blue Growth Strategies for 2016-2020 and 2021-2027(17),

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Commission communication on a new approach for a sustainable blue economy in the EU – transforming the EU’s blue economy for a sustainable future (COM(2021)0240),

–  having regard to the opinion by the Committee of the Regions of 2 December 2021 on the sustainable blue economy and aquaculture (NAT-VVI/020),

–  having regard to the competence of its Committee on Transport and Tourism on maritime programming and an integrated maritime policy,

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Development and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries (A9-0089/2022),

A.  whereas the EU’s blue economy provides 4.5 million direct jobs and encompasses all industries and sectors related to oceans, seas and coasts, whether they are based in the marine environment (such as shipping, seagoing passenger transport, fisheries and energy generation) or on land (such as ports, shipyards, coastal tourism and land-based aquaculture); whereas it is a broad, fast-moving segment of our economy, which has taken significant steps to modernise and diversify over the past decade, and which will play an important role in improving environmental, social and economic development;

B.  whereas if the global blue economy were compared to a national economy, it would be the seventh largest in the world, and the ocean as an economic entity would be a member of the G7; whereas it operates in the planet’s largest ecosystem, as oceans hold 80 % of all life forms; whereas the ocean surrounds and sustains us and provides critical resources for human health, not to mention a web of economic interactions;

C.  whereas developing the blue economy could greatly boost growth and economic development, as well as job creation, especially in coastal and island countries and regions and in the outermost regions;

D.  whereas the fisheries sector, particularly small-scale, coastal and artisanal fisheries , have not been sufficiently taken into account in the EU’s strategy for the blue economy;

E.  whereas the blue economy will further provide new prospects and create jobs, particularly in areas such as renewable ocean energy, the blue bio-economy, biotechnology and desalination;

F.  whereas the sectoral priorities for the development of the blue economy may differ from Member State to Member State, depending, on the one hand, on the development record of traditional or established sectors and, on the other hand, on current resources and the development potential of emerging sectors in each Member State;

G.  whereas the harnessing the potential of the blue economy must not serve as a pretext for subjecting the seas and oceans to forms of resource exploitation and growth models which have already shown themselves to be unsustainable; whereas marine and ocean resources must be used strictly in accordance with the need for their sound management and conservation, without altering marine ecosystem balances;

H.  whereas the Maritime Spatial Planning Directive states that Member States must take into account the interactions of activities and uses such as aquaculture, fishing and installations and infrastructures for the production of energy from renewable sources, as well as submarine cables, and promote the coexistence of relevant activities and apply an ecosystem-based approach;

I.  whereas a blue economy that develops within ecological limits, and hence not only the fisheries and aquaculture sectors, but all marine sectors concerned, must equally respect the environmental, social and economic pillars across the board in order to be considered sustainable;

J.  whereas the common fisheries policy (CFP) seeks to guarantee the proper conservation and management of marine biological resources and that fishing and aquaculture activities are environmentally sustainable in the long term and are managed in a way that is consistent with the objectives of achieving economic, social and employment benefits, and of contributing to the availability of food supplies;

K.  whereas the CFP should contribute to productivity growth and a decent standard of living in the fisheries sector, including the small-scale fisheries sector, as well as stable markets, and should ensure the availability of food;

L.  whereas, under SDG 14, it is imperative to conserve oceans, seas and marine resources and promote their sustainable use, while under SDG 2, it is imperative to guarantee food security; whereas sub-target 14.1 sets the objective of preventing and significantly reducing marine pollution of all kinds by 2025, in particular from land-based activities, including marine debris and nutrient pollution;

M.  whereas the ocean is crucial for life on earth, producing 50 % of the oxygen in the atmosphere, absorbing about 25% of human-produced carbon dioxide emissions and 90 % of excess heat in the climate system, and for regulating the global climate;

N.  whereas the restoration, preservation, conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity is fundamental to the health of the oceans, which contain millions of species, to protecting the health of the planet and providing the basis for marine and maritime economic activities;

O.  whereas the collection of data for scientific monitoring and assessment of stocks in the seas and oceans, including the evaluation of whether these stocks are within the safe biological limits, is fundamental to their sustainable management;

P.  whereas significant parts of the oceans and sea floor remain unexplored, in particular the deep sea, and whereas further research is needed to ensure that any activities under the blue economy will be fully sustainable;

Q.  whereas fisheries and aquaculture are key sectors in the blue economy and are an important source of protein and micronutrients that are essential for food security and human health;

R.  whereas marine biodiversity in Europe is under pressure, with a high proportion of assessed marine species and habitats as being in ‘unfavourable’ or ‘unknown’ conservation status; whereas the loss of marine biodiversity is having a major environmental, social and economic impact on the EU fisheries sector, on coastal and island territories and on the outermost regions, and must therefore be reversed; whereas biodiversity must restored in cooperation with all stakeholders, and in particular with the fisheries sector and the scientific community;

S.  whereas coastal and island communities are key stakeholders in the debate on the potential of the blue economy and ways to harnessing it;

T.  whereas the EU’s fishers and fish farmers play an essential role throughout the EU in protecting and promoting territorial identity, cultural traditions, food security, employment and incomes;

U.  whereas small-scale artisanal fisheries have specific characteristics and needs;

V.  whereas the recreational fisheries sector can contribute to the diversification of coastal communities’ income as a high-value and sustainable tourism activity;

W.  whereas women play an important role in the fisheries and aquaculture sectors; whereas there is a need to increase their visibility and ensure equal access to employment in the sector, as well as appropriate legal recognition;

X.  whereas the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 3, 6, 9 and 12 underline the importance of animal health, good water quality, sustainable innovation and sustainable consumption and production in the blue economy;

Y.  whereas the health and wellbeing of aquatic animals is linked to the quality of food products; whereas poor animal welfare and husbandry can increase the risk of disease and illness;

Z.  whereas land agriculture has a significant impact on marine ecosystems and fisheries, in particular the use of nitrogen-based fertilisers and the eutrophication of aquatic environments;

AA.  whereas fishers play a very important role in the collection of abandoned marine litter in the sea, whether by carrying out targeted campaigns or by collecting litter accidentally during fishing operations;

AB.  whereas the 2020 objectives of achieving good environmental status for European seas and to end overfishing have not been achieved;

AC.  whereas, in 2018 the EU fisheries sector accounted for around 163 600 jobs, with fleets catching around 4.1 million tonnes of live fish in 2019; whereas, in the EU 27, 1.1 million tonnes of aquatic organisms valued at EUR 3.7 billion were produced in 2018(18);

AD.  whereas the EU is a net importer of fisheries and aquaculture products and remains dependent on imports for most of its aquatic food consumption, accounting for 34 % of the global value of imports in 2018; whereas EU fisheries imports must at least respect similar sustainability standards as those in the EU; whereas EU fisheries imports must be directly linked to sustainable jobs in the import, processing and retail sectors;

AE.  whereas EU fisheries, aquaculture and coastal communities have already been impacted by the effects of climate change; whereas the climate crisis has had a significant impact on the health of Europe's seas with detrimental effects on the resilience of the blue economy, in particular fisheries and aquaculture;

AF.  whereas several sectors in the blue economy have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular coastal and maritime tourism; whereas the blue economy could help repair the economic and social damage caused by the current crisis;

AG.  whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant economic impact on those employed in the fisheries and aquaculture sectors owing to the combined effects of waning demand and lack of conditions on many vessels to enable health safety; whereas market disruptions caused by the pandemic have negatively affected fishers all over the EU; whereas the fishers still managed to provide a high-quality food supply and for that very reason, special attention must be paid to fishers due to their importance for the security of food supply in the EU;

AH.  whereas the pandemic situation has demonstrated the importance of a resilient environment, supported by sustainable practices in the management of its resources, for the global health and for the future of food systems;

AI.  whereas coastal communities need to diversify their sources of income in order to withstand economic and social shocks;

AJ.  whereas, when diversifying their sources of income, coastal and remote communities need to build resilience to shocks such as those caused by climate change;

AK.  whereas maritime and coastal tourism are a pillar of the blue economy, with over half of the EU’s tourist accommodation located in coastal areas and 30 % of overnight stays occurring at beach resorts; whereas the Commission communication on tourism and transport in 2020 and beyond (COM(2020)0550) underscores the importance of protecting and restoring Europe´s land and marine natural capital;

AL.  whereas maritime and coastal tourism account for 60 % of employment in the blue economy; whereas a competitive, resilient and socially fair blue economy needs highly qualified and skilled professionals; whereas ‘blue jobs’ can promote growth and career opportunities;

AM.  whereas angling tourism as a sector has the potential to be a new source of income for coastal communities while ensuring the sustainability and good status of fish stocks and providing social and health benefits;

AN.  whereas recreational fisheries is already a sustainable and high-value tourism option and complementary activity for many communities across Europe; whereas there has been growing interest in recreational fishing in many countries, particularly following the COVID-19 pandemic;

AO.  whereas developing sustainable infrastructure in coastal regions will help preserve biodiversity, coastal ecosystems and landscapes, which will strengthen the sustainable development of tourism and coastal economies;

AP.  whereas the blue economy plays a vital role in the prosperity of outermost regions, which, due to their isolation, are especially dependent on blue economy-based activities, such as maritime transport, shipping and tourism;

AQ.  whereas ports play an essential role in achieving the objectives of the sustainable blue economy, and whereas increasing the sustainability of ports will promote the sustainable development of coastal communities; whereas ports are an important hub for the transport of goods and passengers in outermost regions;

AR.  whereas ports are crucial to the connectivity and economy of regions and countries and play an important role in the promotion of sustainable development, which contributes to tackling biodiversity loss, as stated in the new EU biodiversity strategy for 2030; whereas the role of ports will also evolve as Europe’s industrial landscape changes (for example, with the expansion of offshore renewable energy);

AS.  whereas EU shipyards could seize the opportunities arising from the fast-growing innovative market for energy-efficient service vessel;

AT.  whereas different blue economy-related activities in one space generate competition, pollution and sea space management conflicts that mainly affect fishing activities, in particular small-scale fisheries and coastal communities; whereas maritime spatial planning is crucial to avoid increasing competition and sea space management conflicts;

AU.  whereas, through their maritime spatial plans, Member States should aim to contribute to the sustainable development of energy sectors at sea, maritime transport, the fisheries and aquaculture sectors, and the preservation, protection and improvement of the environment, including resilience to climate change impacts; whereas, in this regard, fisheries and aquaculture interests should receive special attention and should not be marginalised as Member States continue their work and subsequent revisions of national maritime spatial plans;

AV.  whereas the Paris Agreement’s goal is to limit global warming to well below 2, preferably to 1.5 degrees Celsius, compared to pre-industrial levels;

AW.  whereas the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate provides evidence of the benefits of combining scientific knowledge with local and indigenous knowledge to improve resilience;

AX.  whereas the EU is aiming to become climate neutral by 2050 at the latest, in line with the Green Deal objectives; whereas the EU has proposed the target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030; whereas offshore renewable energy is one of the options that Member States can choose to achieve this target; whereas it should play a key role in achieving these objectives through an integrated approach taking into account the three pillars of sustainability;

AY.  whereas a proposal for legally binding nature restoration targets needs to be drawn up under the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030 in line with the objective of protecting 30 % of the EU maritime area, of which 10 % should be subject to strict conservation measures;

AZ.  whereas there is a need for specific guidelines and sound planning for each of the EU’s maritime regions on the objectives to be attained in marine conservation areas;

BA.  whereas the outermost regions are genuine natural laboratories, rich in biodiversity and are real natural sanctuaries that need urgent protection, especially because of their mostly archipelagic nature and with significant coastal areas;

BB.  whereas the management of ecosystems requires a holistic approach that takes into account all the causes of biodiversity loss, such as climate change, ocean acidification, appearance of alien species, coastal erosion, etc.; whereas it is necessary to have a global vision, framework and an ecosystem-based approach for the management and conservation of marine resources;

BC.  whereas climate change is increasingly changing the distribution and migratory patterns of various fish species and affects small-scale fisheries in developing countries, which are more vulnerable to its effects;

BD.  whereas illegal fishing is a major threat to marine resources, depleting fish stocks, destroying marine habitats creating unfair competition and putting the livelihoods of coastal communities and islands fisheries at risk;

BE.  whereas it is essential for Member States to implement an EU fisheries control regime that is simple, transparent and effective in order to ensure the sector's sustainability targets are met;

BF.  whereas, when diversifying consumption, improved traceability with access to information about nutritional values, provenance and place of production is fundamental to consumer behaviour;

Global approach to the EU blue economy

1.  Welcomes the Commission’s new sustainable EU blue economy strategy; regrets, however, the lack of specific objectives for different sectors, in particular fisheries and aquaculture as important sectors in the blue economy; points out that new legislative proposals and action plans must always be based on the best available scientific knowledge and on environmental, social and economic impact assessments;

2.  Calls for a broad definition of the blue economy that encompasses all sectoral and intersectoral activities relating to oceans, seas and coastal areas, including direct and indirect support activities, and in which the fisheries sector is appropriately taken into account; draws attention to the cross-cutting importance of innovation for all these activities, whether traditional or emerging;

3.  Draws attention to the need to promote an integrated approach to different sectors of the blue economy, recognising and respecting the priorities of the Member States and supporting them in developing these priorities;

4.  Highlights the fact that the blue economy sector overall plays a crucial role, particularly in the outermost regions, and can contribute to attenuating the impacts of climate changes, promoting nature-based solutions and improving the use of maritime and aquatic resources;

5.  Draws attention to the negative trends and clear decline in some more traditional sectors of the blue economy (such as fisheries, shipbuilding and ship repair, among others), especially in regions where they function as true anchor activities, driving economic activities both upstream and downstream, creating jobs and promoting growth; considers that any blue economy strategy should not omit these activities and regions, and should emphasise the potential for innovation to reverse the decline recorded;

6.  Highlights that fostering the blue economy is key to reviving the economy as a whole and restoring the economic and social aspects of several sectors, such as transport and tourism, that have been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic;

7.  Calls for an improved and more coordinated implementation of all available financial instruments, including the structural and investment funds, to better promote the blue economy strategy;

8.  Calls on the Commission, in close coordination with Member States, to gauge the specific needs of the fisheries sector in the context of the financing of the blue economy (at sectoral, regional, national, and European level) with a view to realising its growth and job-creation potential;

9.  Stresses that the development of the blue economy requires greater investment in knowledge and that in order to improve understanding of the marine environment the EU and the Member States must provide substantial funding under arrangements making for continuity and predictability over the long term;

10.  Highlights the need for appropriate financial support for the blue economy to enable large-scale investments in research, technology and infrastructure at the EU and Member State level; calls on the Commission and industry, therefore, to evaluate the benefit of establishing EU partnerships for maritime transport, including with the private sector, at the EU and international level in order to address current international trade and supply chain challenges, foster innovation and competitiveness within the sector, contribute to decarbonisation, create infrastructure for shore-side electricity, loading and supplying alternative fuels in ports and cargo terminals, and develop waste management plans for Atlantic, Mediterranean and Baltic ports; welcomes therefore the establishment of the European Partnership for a climate neutral, sustainable and productive blue economy, which aims to align national, regional and EU research and innovation priorities;

11.  Urges the Commission and the Member States to put in place new projects and new instruments for all blue economy stakeholders to base their activities on the responsible and sustainable use of natural resources, decarbonisation and circular economy; emphasises that the sustainable blue economy must develop within ecological limits, be based on scientific advice and foster a healthy marine environment;

12.  Stresses the need to implement an integrated ecosystem-based approach to all sectors of the blue economy;

13.  Calls on the Commission to propose legislative and non-legislative initiatives, based on carrying out proper impact assessments of these initiatives on the fisheries and aquaculture sectors, and ensuring that the blue economy becomes the basic pillar for delivering the overall objectives of the European Green Deal and related subsequent EU strategies; stresses that the transformation the blue economy needs to undergo will drive innovation and stimulate job creation and economic opportunities;

14.  Highlights that coastal and ocean-dependent communities can contribute to the development of a sustainable blue economy sector that considers their specific circumstances and needs; highlights that they can lead varied pilot projects, such as on offshore renewable energy technologies, the development of nature-based activities and the contribution of sustainable fisheries and aquaculture to healthy, resilient and safe food systems;

15.  Considers that coastal and island communities, particularly those involved in fisheries, should be fully involved at every stage in the development of the blue economy, this being a sine qua non for realising its potential in terms of innovation, jobs, prosperity, and sustainable development;

16.  Underlines that a holistic approach to all sectors of the blue economy that takes into due account their interplays is required to ensure that the activities of one sector do not hamper or create conflicts with the activities of another; notes that this is also relevant for the protection of the marine environment; stresses the need for collaborative, inclusive and cross-sectoral maritime spatial planning; stresses in this regard the importance of effective ecosystem-based maritime spatial planning for achieving ecological, social and economic objectives, inter alia in the context of the transition to a climate neutral society; is of the view that maritime spatial planning will create synergies between sectors and safeguard the livelihoods of fishers; regrets that the majority of Member States have delayed the establishment of maritime spatial plans as required under Directive 2014/89/EU; invites the Commission to ensure that the review of the Directive in 2022 is presented in a timely manner and to accompany it with corrective initiatives, where needed;

17.  Underlines that the initiatives that will deliver the new vision of the sustainable blue economy in the EU must take into account land-sea interactions;

18.  Highlights the importance of establishing bilateral partnership arrangements with third countries, in particular agreements for sustainable fishing partnerships and the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing; stresses that bilateral partnership arrangements should seek to comply with the highest environmental, economic and social sustainability criteria and be based on the best available scientific advice;

19.  Is concerned about cases of IUU fishing outside EU waters; recalls that IUU fishing, facilitated by the practice of flying a flag of convenience, damages food security and the livelihoods of people in coastal countries, while creating fertile ground for piracy; calls for a strong global system of deterrent sanctions and a multi-pronged approach to fighting IUU fishing; stresses the need to limit the use of flags of convenience and reflagging and to address trans-shipment at sea, as these are important tools for closing IUU loopholes; calls on the EU, more broadly, to strengthen anti-corruption capacity-building by fostering cooperation between national agencies, increasing international cooperation, improving oversight of fishery agents in developing countries with support from the EU, and supporting regional monitoring, control and surveillance centres and task forces;

20.  Stresses the need to fight against IUU fishing in a way that is continuous, effective and comprehensive; invites the Commission to review its discussions with yellow-card states; highlights the importance of product traceability 33and of banning the importation of sea products obtained from illegal fishing; calls on Member States to take a genuinely hard-line approach to landings of boats from suspect third countries;

21.  Stresses the importance of enhancing dialogue with countries bordering the Mediterranean, particularly those on its southern shore, and of boosting funding for project lines that target international cooperation in blue economy sectors (Interreg Next Med, Interreg Euro-MED Programme 2021-2027, Switch Med, etc.);

22.  Stresses that some fleets from outside the EU, fishing in the same areas and exporting fisheries products to the European market have lower sustainability standards, which negatively affects the competitiveness of European fishers;

23.  Stresses the need to establish a level playing field with products imported from third countries, ensuring that all fisheries and aquaculture products consumed in the EU are produced by sustainable food systems and comply with the objectives of the Green Deal; Calls on the Commission to adopt all the necessary measures to guarantee a general fair competition environment within the framework of the World Trade Organization and specifically in EU trade agreements;

24.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue strengthening the rights and working conditions of third country nationals working on EU vessels, as well as to ensure decent pay for all those working in the fisheries and aquaculture sectors and all other sectors of the blue economy;

25.  Underlines the need to strengthen collaboration and coordinate actions with ongoing multilateral forums, such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, as well as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and other related international and multilateral processes, to promote the protection, conservation, sustainable management and restoration of marine and freshwater biodiversity, while contributing to other SDGs; stresses that COP15 in Kunming, China, offers a good opportunity to agree on global measures in this regard;

26.  Takes note of the objective of protecting 30 % of the world’s oceans by 2030, but warns that it should not be at the expense of food security, fishers and aquaculture producers, indigenous peoples and local communities;

27.  Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to the designation of three vast marine protected areas in the Southern Ocean; regrets that the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) once again failed to reach agreement on these protected areas in 2021;

28.  Highlights the role of local and regional authorities as responsible for helping to identify and designate, with Member States, additional marine protected areas;

29.  Recalls that a growing body of research, notably from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, shows that objectives on biodiversity and climate change mitigation and adaptation are better achieved when fishers and local communities have direct control over the management of the resources on which they rely; stresses that ecosystems managed by coastal communities are among the richest and most productive, and also contribute to the adaptation of coastal areas to the consequences of climate change; highlights the risks of ocean-grabbing on maritime spatial planning; stresses, therefore, the need to secure small-scale fisheries, ensure the responsible governance of tenure, and hold the beneficiaries of EU undertakings operating in the blue economy sector to account if their activities violate human rights;

30.  Calls on the EU and partner countries to rely on indigenous know-how in their climate mitigation strategies and to actively promote participatory management, which has proved to be effective in increasing the resilience of coastal communities;

31.  Considers that international ocean governance should adopt an intersectoral approach to the blue economy, ensuring equal treatment for all maritime economic activities; supports the ocean being recognised as a shared asset of humanity, and calls for sustainable fisheries partnership agreements (SFPAs) to always be in line with the 2030 SDGs, with EU environmental obligations and objectives and with the CFP obligations and objectives;

32.  Expresses concern that sectoral support provided by SFPAs often does not directly benefit local fisheries and coastal communities in third countries and, therefore calls on the Commission to link SFPAs closely with EU sustainable development programming;

33.  Highlights that SFPAs must become a tool for the development of local blue economies; considers that insufficient data makes it difficult to evaluate the contributions of SFPAs towards the attainment of the SDGs in partner countries; urges the EU to increase the transparency, data collection (particularly on catches, vessel registrations and labour conditions) and reporting requirements in SFPAs and to establish a centralised socio-economic database for all EU vessels regardless of where they operate;

34.  Stresses the need to include all stakeholders in SFPA negotiations and during their implementation period, and to ensure that the needs of the communities most affected by these partnerships are taken into account;

35.  Deplores the lack of monitoring of the implementation and proper use of funding; is worried that sectoral support under SFPAs often does not directly benefit small-scale fishers; calls on the Commission to link SFPAs closely with EU development aid with the aim of improving added value for coastal communities; calls on the Commission, furthermore, to proactively publish annual reports on the ways sectoral support is utilised in order to better track the use of EU public money;

36.  Welcomes the role of regional sea conventions and regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs); calls on the Commission to come forward with ambitious mandates for RFMOs in order to protect fishery resources in developing countries and international waters, in particular by improving stock management for species such as tropical tuna, reducing discards, applying the precautionary approach to ensure the conservation of endangered species and vulnerable marine ecosystems, and improving the available data, compliance and the transparency of decision-making;

37.  Calls, more broadly, for the improvement of fisheries management practices and monitoring and for the development of eco-labelling and new technologies such as blockchain, in order to improve product traceability;

38.  Calls on the EU to provide technical assistance to developing country producers, especially small-scale producers;

39.  Recalls that all states involved in fisheries in West Africa should establish an RFMO – particularly for the exploitation of shared stocks, such as small pelagic fish – as required under international law, relevant national laws, Pan-African and regional fisheries policies, and other instruments; believes that this management regime should comply with a precautionary and ecosystem-based approach, ensuring that total allowable catches are within safe biological limits;

40.  Urges the EU to effectively promote and protect small-scale fisheries in Africa, which are the main providers of ocean livelihoods, as a cornerstone of the future EU-Africa blue task force, such as by funding the implementation of FAO international guidelines on sustainable small-scale fisheries;

41.  Stresses that the production of fishmeal and fish oil, among other factors, can contribute to overfishing in developing countries, in particularly in West Africa; calls for mandatory due diligence measures to ensure that the whole seafood industry supply chain is fair, fully traceable, does not use products from IUU fishing and is not linked to human rights violations, including human trafficking and slavery;

42.  Welcomes the role of regional sea conventions and RFMOs in strengthening governance based on the best available scientific knowledge, which should be easily available to all operators;

43.  Calls on the Commission to come forward with ambitious mandates in RFMOs in order to protect fisheries resources in developing countries and international waters, in particular by in relation to improving stock management for species such as tropical tuna, for reducing discards, in applying the precautionary approach to protect the conservation of endangered species, vulnerable marine ecosystems (VMEs) as well as improving data availability, compliance and transparent decision-making;

44.  Calls on the Commission to actively pursue and promote the integration of climate adaptation and mitigation goals in its SFPAs and in RFMO decision-making;

45.  Calls for EU and Member State measures to step up efforts to improve global fisheries governance, notably through mechanisms such as the Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI);

46.  Recalls that the sustainable management of resources based on the best available scientific advice and best socio-economic impact assessments must be a key priority for attaining EU strategic agenda goals and must also be included in bilateral partnership arrangements;

47.  Emphasises that the blue economy comprises multiple activities over and above the traditional activities, that the development of new activities should always be accompanied by impact studies, and that a transparent scientific approach, as well as effective consultations and equal participation from all the affected sectors, must be adopted to facilitate the sustainable organisation of these activities within the blue economy;

48.  Highlights that the maritime sector is a key link for international connectivity, the global trading system, the EU economy, its competitiveness and for EU regions; stresses the importance of enhancing the role of ports, the need for investments in smart infrastructure and the development and management of ports, which should further increase their capacity to accommodate trade growth;

49.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to invest in ports located on EU coasts so as to focus on missing connections with the hinterland, with the overall objectives of making transport more resilient and turning ports into logistic platforms and strategic clusters for multimodal transport, energy generation, storage and distribution, and tourism; stresses the importance of including a market-based measure as a goal of the International Maritime Organization for the reduction of greenhouse gases from maritime transport in order to implement a carbon offsetting scheme in international shipping and ensure a realistic path to emissions reductions;

50.  Highlights that the Commission’s communication on a sustainable and smart mobility strategy aims to bring the first zero-emission vessels to market by 2030, and that the EU has already financed substantial research into the hybridisation and electrification of vessels through Horizon 2020; calls on the Commission to further boost its support for electric vessels for short routes;

51.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to complete priority projects included in the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) for the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Baltic Sea areas, especially in cross border areas and as part of future TEN-T guidelines and the 2021-2027 Connecting Europe Facility, in order to promote, simplify and invest adequate funding in the full development of the TEN-T motorways of the sea to better integrate short sea shipping to distribute goods more widely via ports connecting islands to the mainland and a comprehensive multimodal transport system; stresses that it is essential to create seamless and sustainable transport chains for passengers and cargo in all transport modes, and in particular rail, maritime and inland waterways transport; believes that projects should pay particular attention to the connectivity and accessibility needs of peripheral, island and outermost regions in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Baltic Sea areas;

52.  Highlights that ports can be used to boost the blue economy, as they have a key role in the economic activities of this sector, and ensure its transition towards sustainable and smart mobility in line with the principles of the European Green Deal; calls on the Commission to reallocate more EU funding for the improvement of transport efficiency, TEN-T core port accessibility and for the reduction of costs, including investment in continuous dredging, channel deepening and other capacity-building measures in selected ports; reminds the Commission and the Member States that further investment in sustainable and intelligent port infrastructure is needed to enable ports to become multimodal mobility and transport hubs, as well as energy hubs for integrated electricity systems, hydrogen and other alternative fuels, and test sites for waste reuse and the circular economy;

53.  Congratulates the Port of Vigo on being the pioneering EU port that first implemented the European Blue Growth Strategy;

54.  Welcomes the FAO Blue Fishing Ports Network initiative, which aims to draw up guidelines on best international practice for fishing ports that are in the process of transitioning to blue economy models, in order to improve their sustainability by protecting the environment and promoting the social and economic benefits; supports the FAO establishing a permanent office in the Port of Vigo to develop and manage a Global Blue Ports Network;

Resilience, competitiveness and jobs

55.  Recognises that the EU’s recovery efforts must be centred on sustainability, competitiveness and growth objectives; stresses the need for sustainable financing instruments to drive this transition, including through strengthening public and private investment;

56.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to support the sustainable development of small-scale fishing and aquaculture value chains, from fisher to consumer, by promoting the harmonisation of selective, non-destructive and energy-efficient fishing and aquaculture methods, by facilitating the exchange of knowledge with the EU research community and by promoting sustainable commercialisation methods for fishery products, while decreasing administrative burdens;

57.  Emphasises the need to recognise the socio-economic value of recreational fishing and its contribution to a sustainable blue economy in the EU; highlights the need for more and better data about recreational fisheries, including its contribution to the tourism sector, its interactions with small-scale fishers, its environmental impacts, as well as its socio-economic importance;

58.  Highlights the importance of small-scale coastal fishing for the blue economy and for the cultural identity of communities in coastal regions and islands;

59.  Calls on Member States to fully implement transparent and objective criteria as laid out in Article 17 of the CFP when allocating fishing opportunities;

60.  Urges the Commission and the Member States to take the necessary measures to improve the collection of data on recreational fishing in the sea and in inland freshwater and brackish waterways, bearing in mind the environmental impact and socio-economic value of this activity, in order to ensure fair and balanced management of the fisheries and aquaculture sectors, and to encourage greater investment in the development of coastal community activities;

61.  Stresses the importance of inclusive maritime spatial planning in minimising competition for space at the expense of other activities, such as fishing when developing new blue economy activities; highlights that fisheries and aquaculture play a central role and that these sectors must be given proper visibility in the blue economy, and therefore calls for a strategy to promote interaction between the different maritime and terrestrial blue economy activities in a way that will benefit them all;

62.  Urges the Commission to support the development of community-led energy production schemes, which allow coastal communities, including fishers, to participate fully in the planning and development of renewable energy production while reinvesting profits back into the local community;

63.  Calls on Member States, in line with maritime spatial planning provisions, to designate specific historical and traditional fishing grounds of fishers as areas that are to remain free of offshore renewables;

64.  Stresses that offshore wind farms should only be built if it can be guaranteed that there will be no negative environmental and ecological impacts, or economic, socio-economic and socio-cultural consequences on fishers and aquaculture producers, in line with the objectives of the blue economy and the European Green Deal;

65.  Welcomes initiatives such as the Marine Wind Power Observatory, a forum launched by the Regional Government of Galicia to identify opportunities and balance uses of the sea that might compete with each other, incorporating the industrial sector, the maritime fisheries sector and associated entities and organisations;

66.  Takes note of the fact that the extractive industry is a growing sector in the blue ocean economy; emphasises the duty of states to refrain from taking measures, including large-scale development projects, that may adversely affect the livelihoods of inland and marine small-scale fishers, their territories or access rights, and their duty to conduct ex ante assessments of extractive industry projects operated by private entities in order to evaluate their possible negative human rights impacts on local fishing communities;

67.  Calls for the creation of an EU forum for dialogue that is transparent and ensures participation of all stakeholders and a balance of power between them in order to foster intersectoral cooperation, experience-sharing and conflict resolution;

68.  Urges the Commission and the Member States to take specific actions to boost, facilitate access to and fully use available investment possibilities for sustainable fishing and aquaculture practices under the new European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF), together with other EU programmes such as the Recovery and Resilience Mechanism or Horizon Europe, for sustainable fishing practices and for sustainable aquaculture activities, as well as to ensure that coastal, remote and overseas communities can diversify their economies;

69.  Calls on the Commission to build on EMFAF best practices to develop recreational fisheries tourism projects and continue funding these projects through the EMFAF;

70.  Stresses the need to develop more comprehensive strategies to adapt the fisheries and aquaculture sectors and coastal territories to the consequences of climate change and its impact on communities and their livelihoods; stresses the need for all sectors to contribute to climate change mitigation in line with the European Green Deal and the seventh and eighth Environmental Action Programmed;

71.  Believes that the CFP should include a social conditionality, similar to the one created in the new common agriculture policy, that may provide for sanctions on owners of fishing vessels, aquaculture producers and other EMFAF beneficiaries, if they do not ensure adequate working conditions for all their workers, seasonal and migrant workers included; highlights that this social conditionality is fundamental for the protection of the dignity in the workplace and social rights of fishery and aquaculture workers, contributing to the achievement of social justice for all;

72.  Considers that greater job security, occupational safety, healthy oceans providing better earnings and social security in the fisheries and aquaculture sectors are essential to attracting women and younger generations, thereby ensuring its rejuvenation and continued survival;

73.  Welcomes the role of women in sustainable fishing and aquaculture value chains and therefore calls for them to be guaranteed decent working conditions, equal salaries, social security, as well as visibility and representation in decision-making structures and processes;

74.  Stresses that fishing and aquaculture play a key role in creating jobs and sustaining the economy in many parts of the EU, accounting for over half of local jobs in many coastal and island communities, particularly in the outermost regions;

75.  Stresses that, in order to improve the sustainability, competitiveness and economic performance of the fisheries and aquaculture sectors, it is necessary to guarantee a level playing field for EU operators in a global economy, and to focus on vocational training, lifelong learning, European-level recognition of this training, counselling services and the dissemination of technical and scientific knowledge and innovative practices, recognising the contribution that the trade associations make in this regard;

76.  Stresses the need to add value to fisheries products at first sale, especially those from small-scale artisanal fishing in order to increase the income and wages of fishers;

77.  Calls on the Commission to develop new forms of sustainable maritime and coastal tourism, boost new forms of tourism activities, provide additional income streams and increase year-round employment to enhance the value of maritime and coastal areas, while protecting the environment and blue cultural heritage and preserving marine and coastal habitats; highlights the importance of the circular economy in the tourism sector in developing more sustainable practices that benefit local development; recognises that the tourism sector should engage with coastal communities and needs support to boost the efficiency and sustainability of infrastructure and the competitiveness of marine and tourism resorts;

78.  Recognises that coastal tourism can have positive impacts on developing countries, but can be detrimental when mass tourism strategies are developed, leading to reduced food access and consumption for local consumers and to the destruction of the marine environment and cultural identities; calls for the EU to promote fair and low-impact models of tourism;

79.  Stresses the necessity of preserving our natural capital and heritage in order to encourage sustainable tourism (such as ecotourism), and calls on the Member States to protect biodiversity by urgently carrying out marine conservation actions, including cross-border actions, to protect, restore and promote marine and coastal ecosystems, including through the marine Natura 2000 networks;

80.  Calls on the Commission to include sustainable maritime, island and coastal tourism in related actions and programmes, to support initiatives that encourage the diversification of coastal, maritime and marine tourism, and to make tourist activities and employment less seasonal; highlights the need to collect better data on the contribution of recreational angling tourism to the coastal and island economy;

81.  Stresses the importance of the blue economy in the outermost regions, specifically for their the tourism sectors; calls on the Commission, therefore, to create a transport programme with options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI Transport) in order to address the needs of the islands and outermost regions more directly and to support the operation of some commercial routes to them;

82.  Supports sustainable practices in coastal and maritime tourism, since they are essential for the competitiveness of the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Baltic Sea areas and the creation of high-value jobs in blue education and vocational training; stresses that specific training on blue economy activities would contribute to raising awareness of marine ecosystems and the need to protect them;

83.  Calls on the Commission to conduct broad consultation with regional and local authorities and all related stakeholders in order to identify tailor-made solutions for local and regional communities;

84.  Asks the Commission to assess possible solutions to promote the resilience of the tourism sector against the impacts of future pandemics or other disruptive events that pose a risk to tourism activities, and to come up with appropriate initiatives to improve the working and employment conditions of workers in the sector so as to increase its attractiveness and help realise the full potential of the blue economy;

85.  Underlines the importance of yachting and sailing for maritime tourism; underlines the role of local culture and gastronomy in the development of European coastal tourism and the importance of beach and underwater tourism, angling tourism, ecotourism, water sports and the cruise industry;

86.  Stresses the importance of marine protected areas as an instrument for protecting the oceans; believes that these areas constitute an opportunity for the development of scientific tourism;

87.  Welcomes the Commission’s focus on sustainable and ‘slow’ tourism and the aim to develop support packages (Blueprint for Local Green Deals) to support a green transition for cities and regions; notes the potential for remote islands and coastal communities to play a leading role in this transition;

88.  Calls on the Commission and Member States to recognise the contribution made by marine recreational fishing and the tourism it generates to the blue economy, as well as this sector’s potential to provide further economic opportunities in coastal communities;

89.  Regrets the fact that the potential of the blue economy has not been sufficiently taken into account when drawing up and evaluating national recovery and resilience plans funded by NextGenerationEU;

90.  Calls for the creation of an appropriate financial framework to stimulate the development of the blue economy and job creation, which integrates and coordinates the various financial instruments available – the structural and investment funds (EMFAF, ERDF, ESF, Cohesion Fund), Horizon Europe 2021-2027 and others; draws attention to the need to promote better matching of these instruments to the needs of stakeholders and wide dissemination of current opportunities;

91.  Calls for an in-depth EU-level discussion with the sector, taking into account the serious socio-economic effects of the rules on measuring fishing capacity, on the impact of these rules on fisheries and fishers’ life, while maintaining at the same time a strict control on fishing capacity;

92.  Stresses the strategic importance of shipbuilding and ship repair activities and their interrelation with other sectors, such as the maritime tourism sector; considers that a commitment to technological innovation and a high degree of specialisation, which could lead to gains in added value, could create contexts less exposed to international competition and might help to reverse the downturn that the sector has been undergoing; maintains that specific support should be provided to revitalise and modernise the shipbuilding industry in the Member States in its different forms;

93.  Notes that EU artisanal and small-scale fleets are very old, particularly in the outermost regions, that their vessels have a very high average age and that they are unsafe both for the people working on them and for the catches themselves, reiterating the need for EMFAF support for the purchase of new vessels, without this resulting in an increase in catches, respecting maximum sustainable yields, and thus improving their environmental performance;

94.  Recalls that fishing fleets in the outermost regions are, in certain cases, in very poor condition and constitute a danger for fishers’ safety and for the environment; considers it necessary, in this context, to find solutions to improve safety and working conditions for fishers, to reduce CO2 emissions and to improve range and conservation conditions of catches; highlights the need to ensure that there is continuity in the provision of healthy and high-quality proteins, in conditions that are completely safe and secure, with less environmental impact and without increasing the fishing capacity;

95.  Calls on the Commission and the Council to create a support instrument similar to POSEI for fisheries in order to mitigate the effects of insularity on the outermost regions;

96.  Highlights the potential for sustainable use of the EU’s maritime dimension in the Atlantic, which requires more balanced investment in its islands, outermost regions and coastal ports, as well as the expansion of many of their berths and an increase in their storage capacity and cargo-handling equipment, which are very important for fisheries and aquaculture products;

Blue transition

97.  Calls for the development of instruments to utilise maritime resources in a sustainable way and diversify the ocean economy, including through support for new products connected to and derived from fishing activities, which can add value to our cultural and natural heritage, specifically by providing high-quality tourism options;

98.  Stresses the need to achieve an integrated EU maritime policy framework that ensures consistency between EU biodiversity strategy, the Farm to Fork strategy, climate policy and the CFP;

99.  Considers that the aquaculture sector should continue to monitor and improve several parameters based on evidence-based actions, including fish welfare and fish stocking densities; considers, further, that environmental impact assessment studies should be carried out to improve fish welfare, including but not limited to enriching their environment, maintaining water quality within welfare-relevant limits as a way of reducing diseases and their spread, diminishing the need for antibiotics, and to continue reducing pollution, achieving better climate and environmental results, and increasing climate change resilience;

100.  Notes that diversification of fish species in EU aquaculture, including low trophic and non-carnivorous species, is necessary to improve the sustainability of the sector;

101.  Highlights the potential role of aquaculture, particularly for job creation and security of the food supply, as well as in easing the transition to sustainable food systems; considers it fundamental to reduce the pressure on marine resources through the development and increasing use of alternatives and sustainably managed feed sources other than wild caught fish, reversing the loss of biodiversity in the oceans and seas; stresses that the use of marine space for aquaculture purposes must be properly regulated; underlines, in this regard, the importance of a clear and reliable legal framework that promotes access to water with all the necessary guarantees;

102.  Notes that the increased use of fishmeal and fish oil in EU aquaculture can threaten the sustainability of wild fish stocks in EU and third country waters;

103.  Stresses the need to implement all measures to ensure the competitive development of fisheries and aquaculture due to their importance for the security of food supply;

104.  Stresses the importance of the fisheries and aquaculture sectors for the supply of protein, which is essential for food security, as well as the socio-economic development of local communities and job creation worldwide; recalls, in particular, that nearly one billion people, mostly in developing countries, rely on fish and seafood for their primary source of animal protein; notes that more than 90 % of the world’s capture fishers and fisheries workers rely on small-scale fisheries; regrets that the COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on people employed in the fisheries and aquaculture sectors;

105.  Stresses that sustainable food from the oceans, seas and freshwater sources must be produced by responsible fishing and sustainable aquaculture alone, and that all fisheries and aquaculture products consumed in the EU must come from sustainable food systems, with full respect for the planetary boundaries; calls on the Commission to draw up sustainability indicators for fisheries and aquaculture products from the EU based on scientific advice, and to require similar sustainable standards for products imported into the EU market;

106.  Highlights that the EU is responsible for 1 % of global algae production, and therefore considers that sea algae production should be encouraged by Member States and the EMFAF; stresses that algae is one of the future solutions for achieving the objectives of the Green Deal, such as either using algae for carbon dioxide capture, substituting other materials in various economic sectors, or using it as a nutritional product for human consumption, as it could be a major source of protein and quality micronutrients;

107.  Invites the Commission to consider all solutions for developing possibilities for algae production and use, and also to consider the financing options for accelerating algae production; calls on the Commission to act quickly to enable the authorisation of algae as a new foodstuff by reducing the associated application costs and allowing easier access to the market, while ensuring product quality and safety;

108.  Believes it necessary to promote sustainable aquaculture models that could contribute to the conservation of ecosystems affording protection against the effects of climate change; underlines the importance of differentiating between production and protein-processing aquaculture, particularly when the latter involves practices that put pressure on the sustainability of marine resources; considers that feedstuffs intended for fisheries and aquaculture should be produced by sustainable agriculture and fishing, and should therefore exclude any product obtained from IUU fishing or overfishing;

109.  Considers that the production of microalgae can reduce the use of non-sustainable fishmeal in fisheries; underlines the need to further develop and promote organic aquaculture, as it has a great growth potential, and EU tools and finance can be harnessed for this purpose; calls for improved collection, processing and dissemination of statistics on organic aquaculture production;

110.  Calls for the CFP to be applied across the board to all EU fishing fleets in order to ensure that fisheries and aquaculture activities are managed in a way that can generate socioeconomic benefits, contributing to the availability of food products, as well as minimising the impact of their particular activities on habitats and marine ecosystems, while restoring and maintaining populations of harvested species above levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield; considers that it must be applied taking into account the specific characteristics of the various sea basins;

111.  Highlights the role of the fisheries and aquaculture sectors and their professionals in the energy transition and mitigating climate change through decarbonisation and the promotion of activities such as marine litter collection that are conducive to a circular economy;

112.  Warns that the dumping at sea of waste and all types of pollutants, especially from all types of plastics, is harmful to the environment, results in serious economic losses to the fisheries sector and other activities, and affects human health through the entire food chain; welcomes the EMFAF decision to provide funding for fishers to recover and collect, reuse and recycle lost fishing gear, as well as other marine litter; regrets, however, the delay in achieving the objectives of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive and stresses, in this regard, that further awareness campaigns and training for fishers should be promoted;

113.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide more active support to the modernisation and sustainable development of the fisheries sector, in particular small-scale fisheries, seeking to make fishing gear more selective, and to reduce the environmental impact of fishing;

114.  Highlights the role of Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on the conservation of fisheries resources and the protection of marine ecosystems through technical measures(19), which sets out the conservation measures governing on how, where and when fishing may take place, in order to protect sensitive species and habitats at both the national and regional levels, increasing fishing yield, while reducing impacts on marine ecosystems, especially through increased selectivity;

115.  Considers it important to continuously collect data in order to better assess sustainability criteria and to prevent the establishment of fishing areas where VMEs have been identified;

116.  Calls for the EU to urgently tackle the detrimental impacts on the climate, seabed integrity, fish populations and sensitive species (as bycatch) of fishing techniques such as bottom-contacting gear, drift nets, demersal seines or fish aggregating devices, including by limiting their use;

117.  Calls, in particular, for the EU to prohibit the use of detrimental techniques in its strictly protected marine areas, following the best available scientific advice; calls for the EMFAF to be used to provide effective support for the transition to more selective and less damaging fishing techniques for EU fishing fleets;

118.  Calls for the EU to launch and fund scientific research programmes to map carbon-rich marine habitats in EU waters to serve as a basis for designating such areas as strictly protected marine protected areas, in order to protect and restore marine carbon sinks in line with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and to protect and restore ecosystems, in particular those on the seabed, in line with the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, protecting them from human activities that could disturb and release carbon into the water column, such as bottom-contacting fishing operations;

119.  Calls for the EU to prohibit all environmentally damaging extractive industrial activities such as mining and fossil fuel extraction in marine protected areas;

120.  Stresses that the deep sea is home to the greatest diversity of species and ecosystems on earth, providing critical environmental goods and services, including long-term carbon sequestration, and that it is characterised by environmental conditions that make it highly vulnerable to human disturbance; calls on the Commission and Member States, therefore, to support an international moratorium on deep seabed mining;

121.  Calls for legislative and non-legislative tools for the implementation of the Biodiversity Strategy, and for the reinforcement of the actions aimed at meeting the objectives of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, in order to conserve marine biodiversity and restore degraded ecosystems and promote competitiveness in fisheries, aquaculture and other related sectors;

122.  Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to reviewing the Maritime Strategy Framework Directive; calls on the Commission, when revising the Directive, to align it with the objectives of the European Green Deal, the Biodiversity Strategy to 2030 and the eighth Environment Action Programme;

123.  Calls for urgent measures to combat IUU fishing, which is still one of the most serious threats to the health of ecosystems and the economic competitiveness of the fisheries sector itself; calls for greater consistency between EU trade and fisheries policies in order to ensure that IUU fishing is tackled effectively;

Cooperation, knowledge and innovation

124.  Calls for greater cooperation between academia, research and innovation centres, public authorities and industry to promote the use of equipment, methods, techniques and practices based on the best available scientific knowledge, capable of improving efficiency and safety at work, economic growth and competitiveness, as well as environmental sustainability; recalls the importance of ocean literacy to alerting society and to encouraging all citizens and stakeholders to adopt informed and responsible attitudes about the ocean and its resources;

125.  Notes that reliable, high-quality and harmonised ocean data is an important factor in the sustainable transformation of the blue economy;

126.  Highlights that the potential of a blue economy strategy can only be achieved through the cooperation of all stakeholders; notes the increasing use of data and artificial intelligence in maritime transport; calls on the Commission to assess the socioeconomic impact of the automation and digitalisation of the sector;

127.  Calls on the Commission to further develop and enhance scientific knowledge hubs such as the Copernicus Marine Service and the European Marine Observation and Data Network, which offer invaluable knowledge on Europe’s seas and oceans; points out that recreational fishing increases knowledge about the aquatic environment as well as the commitment to protect such environment;

128.  Welcomes the establishment of the ocean mission as part of the Horizon 2030 programme; calls for more clarity and communication on the schedule for calls for tender associated with this mission;

129.  Stresses the need to harmonise data collection on socio-economic monitoring and environmental monitoring, as well as the monitoring of living ecosystems and fish stocks; stresses that the data collected should also be factored in so as to regulate the impact of other maritime activities;

130.  Believes that the gross tonnage limitation, as a criterion for measuring fishing capacity, needs to be adapted to reflect the reality of the sector and to the necessity of using more modern, less polluting and more energy-efficient engines; urges the Commission, in this context, to review these criteria with the goal of improving safety and working and living conditions, as well as allowing the changes needed to improve environmental sustainability, attract more young workers to the sector and ensure less environmental impact and that fishing capacity does not increase;

131.  Calls on the Commission to collect consistent data that would enable the smart management of coastal tourism and avoid pressure on ecosystems and local communities, as well as competition with traditional activities, such as artisanal and coastal fishing;

132.  Highlights the importance of the management and adaptation measures necessary to protect coastal communities, habitats and biodiversity, and which would mean funds are well spent given the enormous impacts of climate change and their resulting costs; calls on the Commission to set up an alert and observation system on more frequent storms and floods, provide adequate environmental and health monitoring and conduct research into early warnings; calls on the Commission to assess different scenarios and measures to address possible sea level rises and the intensification of severe weather events;

133.  Recalls the existence of tools such as the European CleanSeaNet programme, which aims to monitor oil pollution; emphasises that regional cooperation, including with non-EU countries, is essential, especially in the Mediterranean Sea; calls on the Commission, therefore, to improve the exchange of information and cooperation between countries; underlines the importance of collaborative, inclusive and cross-sectoral maritime spatial planning that takes socioeconomic, environmental and biodiversity concerns into account; stresses the importance of the energy transition, in which the blue economy sector can promote renewable offshore power generation technologies, such as tidal, wave, solar and wind energy; underlines the importance of supporting the decarbonisation of the shipping and maritime transport industries, developing sustainable technologies and increasing the use of low-emission and renewable energy sources;

134.  Supports the principle of sustainable development within the blue economy as a driver of economic growth in the EU, in particular in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Baltic Sea areas as a way to support all sectoral and intersectoral activities related to oceans, seas and coastal areas, including maritime transport, shipbuilding and ship repair, biotechnology, sustainable tourism, offshore wind, commercial and recreational fishing, aquaculture and wave and tidal energy; calls on the Commission to promote research, development and innovation that contribute to sustainable tourism, resource efficiency and renewable energy; stresses in particular that offshore renewable energy has the potential to become an important component of Europe’s energy system by 2050; and calls for the creation of incentives and funding for investments in port infrastructure in order to facilitate the servicing of the offshore renewable energy industry;

135.  Calls on the Commission to ensure that the EU is achieving and maintaining its role as a technological leader, retaining talent and producing energy, while reducing any potential impacts on the marine environment;

136.  Stresses the importance of innovation in fishing to improve both its environmental and economic performance, and calls for a new approach to innovation whereby innovation and modernisation do not mean increasing fishing capacities;

137.  Urges the Commission, Member States and regions to work together in order to promote and support local initiatives to preserve livelihoods and traditions and cultural heritage associated with fisheries and aquaculture;

138.  Calls on the Commission, in view of the fragile position of the outermost regions, to provide robust support for innovation and research, with the aiming of developing innovative, environmentally, socially and economically sustainable practices and techniques in fisheries and aquaculture in these regions, thus giving these regions a leading role in ocean governance;

139.  Highlights that marine litter has a great environmental and socioeconomic impact in these regions, and therefore calls on the Commission to set up a centre for combating marine plastic pollution, preferably in an outermost region, with expertise in innovation, development and cooperation with fisheries and aquaculture stakeholders and associations, tasked with the adoption of sustainability strategies and policies which could be replicated in other regions;

140.  Considers it important to raise positive consumer awareness on the nutritional value of fisheries and aquaculture products; points out that it is essential to give consumers appropriate information in order to effect changes in consumption habits and promote the consumption of lesser known sea products from European waters;

141.  Highlights the necessity to raise consumer awareness about algae-based products, increase their acceptance by consumers, and raise consumer awareness about food waste; reiterates that consumer information must be enhanced through effective labelling, including sustainability labelling;

o
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142.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee.

(1) OJ L 354, 28.12.2013, p. 22. (2) OJ L 247, 13.7.2021, p. 1. (3) OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19. (4) OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 135. (5) OJ L 288, 6.11.2007, p. 27. (6) OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 82. (7) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 25. (8) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0425. (9) https://blueindicators.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2021_06_BlueEconomy_Report-2021.pdf (10) https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-05/Sustainability%20criteria%20for%20the%20blue%20economy%20.pdf (11) OJ C 316, 22.9.2017, p. 64. (12) OJ C 458, 19.12.2018, p. 9. (13) OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 14. (14) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 30. (15) OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 88. (16) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 18. (17) http://bluegrowthvigo.eu/ (18) https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Fishery_statistics#Fisheries:_the_factors_of_production (19) OJ L 198, 25.7.2019, p. 105.

European Parliament resolution of 3 May 2022 on an EU action plan for organic agriculture (2021/2239(INI))

P9_TA(2022)0136 A9-0126/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and in particular Articles 39, 192(1) and 349 thereof,

–  having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

–  having regard to the Paris Agreement reached at the 21st Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 25 March 2021 on an action plan for the development of organic production (COM(2021)0141),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal(1),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2018/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on organic production and labelling of organic products and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives(3),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2021 on a farm to fork strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system(4),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the Common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013(5),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2117 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 amending Regulations (EU) No 1308/2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products, (EU) No 1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, (EU) No 251/2014 on the definition, description, presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical indications of aromatised wine products and (EU) No 228/2013 laying down specific measures for agriculture in the outermost regions of the Union(6),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 July 2021 on the action plan for the development of organic agriculture,

–  having regard to its resolution of 17 April 2018 on a European strategy for the promotion of protein crops – encouraging the production of protein and leguminous plants in the European agriculture sector(7),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 October 2020 on the farm to fork strategy,

–  having regard to the European Economic and Social Committee opinion of 22 September 2021 on the Action Plan for the development of EU organic production,

–  having regard to the European Committee of the Regions opinion of 2 December 2021 on the EU action plan for organic farming,

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (A9-0126/2022),

A.  whereas the Commission communication on an action plan for the development of organic production (organic action plan, OAP) emphasises that the Green Deal, and the farm to fork and biodiversity strategies under its umbrella, is the key to managing the transition towards a more sustainable food system, in particular strengthening farmers’ efforts to protect the environment, preserve biodiversity and tackle climate change; whereas a key role in attaining this objective is played by agriculture in general, and organic agriculture in particular;

B.  whereas after 12 months, the list of almost all of the secondary legislation needed for the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2018/848 is now ready, although this is not the case for the delegated regulation regulating organic salt production;

C.  whereas the delegated regulation will have to give priority to the natural processes, without additives or carbon emissions during preparation, that characterise sea salt for it to be given organic certification;

D.  whereas Europe’s food system must deliver sustainably produced and nutritious food at affordable prices and ensure food security in a way that ensures a healthy society and a healthy planet, contributes to social and economic well-being, protects the health of both ecosystems and European citizens, and ensures the profitability of agricultural production and therefore a fair living for farmers; whereas it is essential to ensure that the increase in the amount of land used for organic farming matches the market’s ability to absorb organic products;

E.  whereas Regulation (EU) 2018/848 on organic production and labelling of organic products obliges farmers to comply with a conversion period during which they have to apply all rules on organic production;

F.  whereas this period may last up to three years; whereas during this period, farmers have to bear higher costs of production without benefiting from higher market prices for organic products;

G.  whereas organic agriculture offers various environmental benefits, including reduced greenhouse gas emissions, and has the potential to help the agricultural sector play its part in the fight against climate change, in adaptation to climate change and in addressing key challenges such as the loss of jobs in rural areas, soil fertility and biodiversity loss, as well as promoting resilience in the face of economic challenges;

H.  whereas agricultural diversity and shorter chains between farmer and consumer are important elements for a healthy and sustainable food system;

I.  whereas organic farming can contribute to striking an ambitious balance in terms of sustainability from an economic, social and environmental perspective, fostering soil, water and biodiversity protection and animal welfare, and offers young people opportunities to enter the farming profession;

J.  whereas environmental and animal welfare standards in the EU are among the highest in the world; whereas organic farmland has 30 % more biodiversity, is beneficial to pollinators and limits the use of artificial fertilisers and plant protection products;

K.  whereas organic farming can also contribute to the revitalisation of rural areas, the creation of employment, the sustainability of small farms, bringing consumers and producers closer, enhancing the connections with the local economy and stimulating positive economic multipliers; whereas the new common agricultural policy (CAP) introduces new ambitious measures to encourage sustainable production, including organic farming;

L.  whereas it is essential to ensure that consumers, who are attaching increasing importance to the quality of what they eat, and the catering sector, are in a position to make informed and conscious choices when purchasing food;

M.  whereas it is necessary to ensure that consumers are properly informed about the benefits of consuming organic products and that they are protected against deliberately misleading labels, packaging and advertising;

N.  whereas in 2019, the EU’s total agricultural area under organic farming grew to 13.8 million hectares; whereas it currently accounts for 8.5 % of the EU’s total utilised agricultural area; whereas between 2010 and 2019, the value of the EU’s organic market more than doubled;

O.  whereas the retail sales of organic products increased from EUR 18 billion to EUR 41 billion in the period 2009-2019; whereas the increase of organic production outpaces the development of the organic market in parts of the EU, with significant differences in organic consumption across the Member States; whereas the production of organic products is very low or non-existent in certain parts of the EU, with great disparities between the Member States, varying from 0.5 % to 26.5 % of the available area devoted to the sector;

P.  whereas the OAP includes 23 actions, providing a solid basis for developing the organic sector in a sustainable manner; whereas a mid-term review of the OAP in 2024 is envisaged and an annual ‘EU Organic Day’ has been established, which represents an opportunity to improve the visibility and the recognition of organic farming and raise awareness of the benefits of organic production, as organic farmers are considered ‘pioneers of sustainable agriculture’;

Q.  whereas Regulation (EU) 2018/848, which will apply from 1 January 2022, aims in particular to increase consumers’ trust in organic products through more stringent controls and rules for imports;

R.  whereas the strategic guidelines for a more sustainable and competitive EU aquaculture for the period 2021 to 2030 were published in May 2021 and will be developed in the National Strategic Plans;

General comments

1.  Welcomes the Commission communication on an action plan for the development of organic production, the objective of increasing the EU’s agricultural area under organic farming by 2030 through the development of supply and demand, and the Commission’s recognition of organic farming as one of the main components on the EU’s path towards more sustainable food systems, using more sustainable agricultural practices, more efficient use of renewable sources, ensuring higher standards for animal welfare and helping to ensure higher revenues for European farmers;

2.  Calls on the Commission to carry out an impact assessment with regard to the share of the EU’s agricultural area under organic farming; considers that the development of organic farming, which delivers many positive externalities and benefits for climate change mitigation, biodiversity and soil protection, and will contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the farm to fork and biodiversity strategies; recognises, at the same time, the potential for other sustainable production models and farming methods, such as integrated production and biological control, to contribute to the Green Deal’s objectives;

3.  Underlines that the share of agricultural land under organic farming varies significantly among the Member States; stresses that this must be taken into account when developing policies and instruments aimed at enhancing organic production and urges the Commission to pay particular attention to supporting the Member States which are lagging behind;

4.  Insists that all measures and instruments proposed in this regard should be based on thorough analyses and impact assessments; is of the opinion that legislation and the OAPs must provide sufficient room for flexibility to take into account the differences in the nature and conditions of organic agriculture in the Member States;

5.  Points out that, with the introduction of the new Regulation (EU) 2018/848 on organic production in 2022, the Commission must ensure an orderly and measured transition from the old EU organic legislation so that the organic sector can familiarise itself with the new rules quickly and reliably; calls on the Commission to carry out an impact assessment of the new regulation five years after its implementation, with a view to making any necessary adjustments;

6.  Underlines that the development and growth of the organic sector and organic areas, as foreseen in the farm to fork strategy, with a key role in revitalising and maintaining vibrant rural areas, must be market-driven and accompanied by holistic supply chain developments, including processing, as well as policy measures to stimulate further supply and demand for organic food and to ensure consumer trust;

7.  Emphasises that the combination of these approaches should allow balanced development, in line with the market’s ability to absorb organic production, in order to safeguard the future profitability of the organic market and organic farming in the EU;

8.  Underlines the need, in this context, to remove excessive administrative burdens; stresses that the environmental benefits of organic farming should not only be supported by consumers of organic products willing to pay a higher price, but the CAP budget should also properly reward organic farmers for the specific public goods that they deliver through the protection of the environment and of natural resources, through the reduction of inputs and through supporting higher animal welfare standards;

9.  Highlights that stimulating the agricultural sustainability and resilience of the EU food system should be a priority, and that organic farming is a key element for achieving environmental and climate objectives; considers that sustainable innovation in practices such as organic farming and, more broadly, agroecology can lead to greater diversity within farming systems;

10.  Underlines that the co-existence of different farming systems is important, as diversity is key to food system security and resilience, and benefits sustainable development; points out that there is no single farming model that fits all countries and regions, and stresses that the benefits of the different sustainable farming models should be recognised;

11.  Points out the importance of continuing to increase organic yields in order to prevent an increased ecological footprint from food production in non-EU countries while more conversion to the organic farming model takes place in EU regions;

12.  Points out that for an EU action plan to succeed, it must stimulate and mobilise the Member States, as well as regional and local authorities, taking into account their specificities and different starting points; believes that regional and local OAPs, where relevant, should also play a role in the development of the organic sector;

13.  Expresses the view, therefore, that Member States should be encouraged to establish their own national strategies for organic farming and to develop their own national and/or regional OAPs, in coordination with the National Strategic Plans, which should have a high level of ambition for the development of organic farming, with realistic and concrete objectives, actions, time frames and budgets, including incentives for farmers, that facilitate choice and support bottom-up initiatives;

14.  Calls on the Commission to ensure that these conditions are fully respected when approving the National Strategic Plans submitted by the Member States and to ensure that sufficient financial resources, together with the most effective tools, are made available to achieve the relevant objectives in terms of the development of the sector; highlights the need to exchange know-how and best practices, as some Member States have more experience in designing and implementing ambitious national plans;

15.  Calls on the Commission to include such exchanges in the framework of the planned public follow-up meetings; highlights that the national OAPs should create predictability and clarity for farmers and industry, thereby encouraging the development of the organic sector and the commercialisation of organic products;

16.  Welcomes the extension of the scope of the organic farming regulation to include certain products closely linked to agriculture, which are not listed in Annex I of the TFEU, such as salt; expresses its concern, however, about the report on organic salt published on 6 August 2021 by the Expert Group for Technical Advice on Organic Production (EGTOP), as it is in favour of extending the EU organic label to production methods that do not comply with the principles of Regulation (EU) 2018/848; therefore calls on the Commission not to follow the advice of EGTOP;

17.  Stresses that Member States should engage all stakeholders, especially organic farmers and associations, cooperatives, local and regional authorities, the agri-food industry along the value chain, agri-food wholesalers, consumer and private sector representatives and the hospitality industry, including large-scale caterers and food education associations, as well as citizens, in a consultative process when designing, adopting, reviewing and implementing their national and/or regional OAPs in order to achieve the best possible synergies and to reach the objective of increased area under organic farming as determined in their National Strategic Plan;

18.  Acknowledges that organic production offers better economic returns for farmers, but often involves higher production costs and, therefore, requires market prices and direct support to be sufficient to recover those costs in order to allow fair earnings for farmers;

19.  Points out that higher consumer prices may represent a barrier to expansion, but that they are currently needed to sustain the organic sector; recalls that in some cases there is no market for organic agricultural products, forcing farmers to sell them as conventional agricultural products at a lower price;

20.  Recalls that organic farming involves very high production standards; stresses the need to address the affordability and thus accessibility of organic products; strongly emphasises that producers must be supported in the process of conversion to organic production and must benefit from the added value of organic farming; notes that, as is the case for conventional products, a better distribution of the value between the actors in the organic food chain would benefit both farmers and consumers;

21.  Recognises that the development of the organic sector will allow economies of scale in processing and logistics that will increase efficiency and lead to lower costs; stresses the importance of the Unfair Trading Practices Directive for the development of the sector and to ensure that retailers do not have excessively high profit margins on organic products; considers also that organic products could be included in the programmes within the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived, as long as a sufficient supply is available;

22.  Welcomes the fact that the Commission is working on improving overall animal welfare and points out that the 2020 Eurobarometer survey on agriculture and the CAP found that 80 % of EU citizens associate organic farming with higher respect for animal welfare; underlines, in this context, the importance of supporting organic livestock farming;

23.  Underlines the importance of speeding up the development of organic aquaculture and its market in the EU, as well as strengthening consumers’ demand for and trust in these products; highlights that one in four fishery products comes from aquaculture; points out, however, that as most of the consumption of these products is supplied by imports, representing 60 % of total supply, there is huge growth potential that we must take advantage of in order to develop European aquaculture in general and organic aquaculture in particular;

24.  Underlines the need to coordinate the measures on organic aquaculture with the new strategic guidelines for a more sustainable and competitive EU aquaculture for the period 2021 to 2030 and the development of the sector in the Member States and the regions;

Stimulating demand and ensuring consumer trust

25.  Supports the Commission in further promoting and sharing information about the EU organic logo among consumers, including through school schemes, which should give a larger share to organic products when the school schemes are revised, as well as in other institutions such as nursing homes; supports the promotion of the local organic logos that exist in several Member States and which offer at least the same guarantees as the EU organic logo and are used together with it; notes that school schemes should be the basis for a pedagogical discussion on nutrition and sustainable food and be accompanied by measures aimed at informing and educating children about better diets;

26.  Emphasises that it is of paramount importance that consumer surveys on organics are followed by actions to further raise awareness of the benefits of organic farming for health, well-being and a high quality of life, while ensuring that consumer trust in the safety and sustainability of conventional farming methods in the Union is not undermined; stresses the need to provide accurate information to ensure that the new initiatives which are being developed on sustainable food labelling do not weaken the EU organic logo or create confusion for the consumer regarding their respective scope and meaning;

27.  Expresses its concern about misleading labels, packaging and advertising that makes it difficult for consumers to distinguish conventional products from organic products; notes that Regulation (EU) 2018/848 and frequent independent controls are the basis for consumers’ trust in organic products and calls on the Member States to communicate clearly on the EU organic logo;

28.  Emphasises the role to be played by supermarkets and the various food supply chains in promoting and supporting the EU organic logo; awaits the Commission’s future initiatives aimed at better guiding consumers in their choice of food through labelling, promotion and information campaigns, based on sound, independent and operational scientific foundations and complete and coherent methodologies; notes that mandatory labelling indicating the origin of all EU food products has the potential to significantly increase transparency and traceability, thereby combating fraud and illegal production methods, as well as improving consumer confidence;

29.  Recalls that the requirements of professional kitchens differ from those of households; stresses the importance of creating added value for the supply chain and increasing the processing level of organic products to respond to the needs of professional kitchens;

30.  Believes that the green public procurement (GPP) review of 2019 should be better publicised in the Member States in order to improve awareness and serve as a strong stimulus for action aimed at the promotion of organic production and to support a healthier, more environmentally friendly diet in institutions such as schools, hospitals, retirement homes and prisons, and can also reduce the amount of waste of organic products in the Member States with surpluses; believes that the EU institutions should lead by example in their own facilities; considers that in order to increase the use of GPP, it is essential to coordinate with the sector through its representative organisations with a view to ensuring that procurement runs smoothly;

31.  Calls on the Commission to continue its investigations into the current structural and logistical barriers and to promote the use of GPP criteria in the Member States, as well as actions to improve information, education and the promotion of organics in order to make this measure more effective; points out that the increase in the use of GPP should be decided at national level in accordance with national demand and the targets set in national OAPs; believes that GPP must place strong emphasis on EU organic products, which would stimulate production and help the EU in reaching its climate targets;

32.  Stresses that organic production and processing must be developed in an appropriate way at regional and local levels, involving local organic farmers; supports the development of regional sustainable food systems based on cooperation involving all food stakeholders; regrets the lack of verified data about the uptake of organic products in public canteens and restaurants;

33.  Points out that local, regional and national authorities, together with farmers’ associations and agri-food wholesalers play an important role in supporting the structuring of the organic sector in terms of production, collective processing, logistics and trade, easing access to land for organic farmers, facilitating cooperation between producers themselves, between producers and consumers and with food services;

34.  Highlights, furthermore, the role to be played by local, regional and national authorities in raising public awareness about all types of sustainable farming methods, in supplying organic products in canteens and when developing educational programmes for preschools and schools;

35.  Points out, in this context, that farmers’ markets at local and regional level are an effective tool in bridging the gap between producers and consumers and should be promoted; recalls also that highly valuable technical assistance is provided by local and regional authorities and farmers’ associations to organic farmers and those in the process of converting, which is crucial for the implementation of these practices, and which require adequate funding from the CAP and other sources;

36.  Highlights that all authorities must ensure that the regulatory framework continues to enable and stimulate the sector’s development, while keeping administrative burdens at a minimum; recalls that local and regional authorities in many Member States have long been involved in supporting the development of organic farming, in particular through the management and implementation of rural development programmes;

37.  Emphasises that, when involving local and regional authorities, a place-sensitive approach is required, in line with the precepts of the Territorial Agenda 2030, to address the differing needs of rural, peri-urban and urban areas across Europe;

38.  Highlights that the success of the OAP will depend on stronger involvement of the private sector to stimulate demand and deliver fair incomes for farmers, especially in countries with less developed organic markets and production; calls on the Commission to identify a set of instruments to enable the Member States to encourage retail chains to actively help to promote and provide information on the importance of organic consumption, and to create local organic supply chains; underlines that an increase in organic production must primarily come from higher private demand and not exclusively from political incentives;

39.  Highlights the importance of improving transparency in the organic food supply chain and of better traceability in all production and distribution processes in line with the demands from European consumers to have more information on the origin and production methods of the foodstuffs they consume; welcomes the voluntary initiatives by retailers to buy conversion products at a higher price and believes such initiatives should be promoted;

40.  Takes due note of the difficulties retailers are facing in marketing these conversion products to consumers owing to the lack of harmonised marketing rules and calls on the Commission to assess measures to facilitate their marketing, such as through harmonised labelling;

41.  Underlines that it is essential for the Commission, the Member States and stakeholders to engage actively in identifying ways in which the existing certification and control mechanisms can be made more robust to prevent fraud in organic production and trade;

42.  Believes that the certification and control mechanisms must be more suited to the reality on the ground for organic farmers and the process must be simplified, including through IT solutions;

43.  Emphasises that special attention must be paid to the procedures for authorising certification bodies; stresses that the certification process in the conversion to organic farming continues to be cumbersome and difficult to implement and should be facilitated, especially for small farmers; considers that farmers should be supported in covering certification costs;

44.  Highlights the need for harmonised European systems for the certification of inputs for organic farming in order to prevent the proliferation of private certifications with different requirements and control systems; calls on the Commission to accelerate its EU-wide harmonisation through the OAP;

45.  Urges the Commission to strengthen customs checks by means of direct, unified control mechanisms in coordination with the Member States and in full compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, in order to prevent food fraud, adulteration and imports of products which do not comply with EU organic production standards, as well as to avoid the risk of putting the EU organic sector at a competitive disadvantage owing to a lack of global convergence of standards and increased costs for consumers; highlights, in this context, the need for greater involvement of the relevant customs authorities in order to guarantee the quality and safety of organic products and ensure fair competition between producers inside and outside the EU;

46.  Regrets the absence in the organic action plan of any reference to the difficulties and heavy costs created for the sector by the necessity of putting in place suitable measures during cultivation, harvest, transport, storage and processing to keep non-authorised products such as, for example, GMOs out of the organic production chain;

47.  Stresses that agricultural products of EU origin are internationally recognised for their high quality; considers that positive and trade-promoting actions are needed to further promote EU organic products internationally; acknowledges, in this regard, the potential role to be played by the EU’s promotion policy for organic production; underlines that it should recognise the wide range of sustainable production methods, practices and products in the EU;

48.  Points out that geographical indications, which are supported by the EU’s promotion policy, strongly contribute to economic growth in many rural areas and are a flagship of European agriculture; requests that the Commission inform Parliament about the potential for expansion of the organic market and that it speed up the ongoing negotiations to achieve the shift from equivalence to compliance with EU standards for imports of organic products;

49.  Supports the global transition to sustainable food systems; takes the view that action at EU level, including in particular the Green Deal strategy, should aim to regularly raise environmental awareness on a global scale; regrets the fact that free trade agreements sometimes do not pay sufficient attention to major differences in agricultural production standards between the EU and third countries with regard to environmental protection and animal welfare, which discourages EU farmers from further environmental investments, including in organic production;

Stimulating conversion and reinforcing the entire value chain

50.  Considers that, in order to fulfil the ambitions of the National Strategic Plans, an adequate CAP budget, as well as compatibility with other European funds or programmes, is essential to create incentives to encourage farmers to convert to and maintain organic farming practices, through adequately resourced rural development measures or financially attractive eco-schemes, or a combination of the two;

51.  Calls for eco-schemes to be accessible for both conventional and organic farmers and to be designed in a manner that renders them compatible with and complementary to agri-environment-climate measures (AECMs); recalls the importance of supporting organic farmers beyond the conversion phase; calls on the Member States to support generational renewal in organic farming through the relevant public policies, to promote farming entrepreneurship among women and to support the development of viable small and medium-sized organic farms;

52.  Regrets the decline in the CAP budget over the past two decades at the same time as the requirements imposed on the agricultural sector have grown; notes that under the current CAP, only 1.8 % of the budget is being spent on measures to support organic farming and welcomes the fact that the new CAP, in particular through eco-schemes and rural development measures, allows the Member States more flexibility to increase the amounts devoted to the organic sector;

53.  Notes the potential of short, local and seasonal, and smart food supply chains and direct marketing opportunities, including farmers’ markets, for organic producers and rural economies to deliver environmental and animal welfare benefits, while also securing incomes, preserving and creating employment, ensuring the vitality of rural areas and bridging the gap between EU producers and consumers; points out that market development is essential for the sustainable development of the organic sector;

54.  Calls on the Member States to allocate sufficient resources to investments easing the development of short food chains, such as through increasing the number of mobile slaughterhouses or on-farm processing facilities; considers that the use of local supply chains should be promoted in public procurement procedures; emphasises that the focus on local production and short chains should not lead to additional barriers in the EU internal market;

55.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to play an active role in improving the structure of organic supply chains and building the capacity of organic producers’ organisations; urges the Member States to use ‘sectoral interventions’ and all available measures to improve the organisation of organic producers in all relevant sectors and to assist them in the event of temporary overproduction;

56.  Points out that organic farms, whose production is smaller in terms of volume and thus more costly, may have less bargaining power in commercial contracts and may therefore be particularly vulnerable to unfair commercial practices, especially in the form of delayed payments for perishable goods, last-minute cancellations or forcing suppliers to pay for unsold and wasted products; underlines the need for clear contractual conditions and fair recognition of the work of organic agricultural producers and believes that tools such as supply chain contracts should be promoted;

57.  Welcomes the Commission’s support for the development of bio-districts, also referred to as eco-regions, within Member States, as they are multifunctional in nature, promote short supply chains and create synergies, inter alia, between farmers, consumers, processing companies, retailers, the hospitality industry and catering, and cultural enterprises; calls on the Commission to provide the Member States with information on the instruments they could use to promote the development of bio-districts, paying special attention to urbanised areas; notes that their success depends on strong regional integration and the involvement of local and regional authorities;

58.  Stresses the fundamental importance of expanding the structured exchange of knowledge and best practices on organic farming among Member States and farmers; highlights the benefits of intensifying collaboration between scientists, agricultural science universities and the wider education sector, advisory services or consultants, farmers and their associations and organisations, and society; highlights the important role to be played in the development of organic production by the independent farm advisory services that Member States must include in their CAP Strategic Plans and emphasises the need to allocate sufficient financial resources to them;

59.  Notes that the Joint Research Centre’s report entitled ‘Modelling environmental and climate ambition in the agricultural sector with the CAPRI model’(8) has indicated that there is a need for productivity gains with respect to organic farming and nutrient management, which can be enhanced, inter alia, by precision farming, new digital technologies and other innovative techniques;

60.  Notes that innovative digital tools have the potential to significantly increase transparency and traceability, thereby combating fraud and illegal production methods, as well as improving consumer confidence; therefore encourages the Commission, including through the CAP Strategic Plans, to ensure greater deployment of digital technologies, such as precision farming and blockchain in organic farming; stresses, however, that these technologies complement the systemic sustainability approach of organic farming and that the privacy, profitability and independence of farmers when it comes to data must be ensured;

Improving the contribution of organic farming to sustainability

61.  Reiterates the importance of research and innovation for the sustainability of the organic farming sector and in meeting societal expectations on biodiversity, climate change and climate adaptation, animal welfare and efficient resource use, and welcomes the Commission’s intention to earmark Horizon Europe funding to support these aims; stresses, in this context, the need for research and innovation to encourage the conversion to organic agriculture, including livestock production, to find alternatives for certain inputs both in farming and processing so as to increase yields and to ensure the availability of the necessary protein feed, vitamins, plant protection products, in particular biocontrol solutions, fertilisers and genetic resources to further develop robust farming systems and increase tolerance to drought, pests and disease; calls on the Commission to stimulate and foster cooperation between research communities working on organic and conventional food and farming, in particular through the agricultural European Innovation Partnership (EIP-AGRI);

62.  Encourages a science-based approach regarding soil fertility and the need to develop, accept and incentivise innovations in novel plant nutrient sources in organic farming, including increased nutrient recycling through adequate processing and nutrient separation and, where suitable and appropriate, fertilising products produced from renewable sources, such as biomass waste and animal manure to avoid long-term nutrient deficits; recalls the importance of livestock manure as an organic fertiliser and encourages its sustainable use in the cultivation cycle; calls on the Commission to assess new recycled materials containing essential plant nutrients (phosphorus, potassium and nitrogen) for their future addition to the list of input materials in Regulation (EU) 2018/848, in line with the principles of organic farming and ensuring quality, safety and consumer confidence;

63.  Calls for more research into and information on the potential benefits of using plant biostimulants and bio-based soil improvers in organic farming systems and how they contribute to nutrient absorption and better performance in this production model, in order to allow their wider uptake and help reduce the gap between organic and conventional yields; points out that the promotion of the use of an adequate farm-specific combination of different external nutrients, on top of biological nitrogen fixation, could address the challenge of the imbalances in nutrient budgets in organic farming systems;

64.  Highlights the urgent need for the production of organic plant proteins to be developed and the production of organic legumes, including in forage systems, to be stimulated in the European Union, in order to decrease the dependency of the organic sector on imports; urges the Commission to draw up a dedicated strategic plan in this regard;

65.  Welcomes the contribution of organic farming to the reduction of the use of synthetic pesticides and calls on the Commission, when drafting the new legislation on the sustainable use of pesticides, to define biocontrol products and to increase the availability of biocontrol solutions and natural substances, which have scope for much wider use, by improving and speeding up the evaluation and authorisation process;

66.  Reminds the Commission and the Member States of Parliament’s resolution of 15 February 2017 on low-risk pesticides of biological origin(9) and stresses the need to support the development of safe, effective and affordable alternative plant protection products, and to encourage their wider use, in particular by easing both the authorisation procedure for basic substances and the extension of their use, as an important component in the development of organic production; highlights the need to create the conditions for equal access to organic plant protection products and fertilisers in the Member States; stresses that pesticide residues, which are present in the environment, may potentially affect organic products as well;

67.  Points out that organic farmers, who guarantee high environmental standards in production, must not be held responsible for risks outside of their control and calls on the Commission to further promote harmonisation in the handling of pesticide residue findings;

68.  Highlights the importance of sufficiently available, high-quality organic seeds, heterogeneous material and high-yielding plant varieties, native varieties and locally adapted varieties; points out their potential in strengthening resilience against plant diseases and the impact of climate change; encourages the Commission and the Member States to step up efforts, including through specific actions, to improve the functioning of the organic seed market and believes that transitional periods would be helpful in achieving this; calls on the Commission to ensure that sufficient financial resources are allocated to research into organic seeds and animal breeding;

69.  Highlights the importance of supporting programmes for the preservation and selection of local breeds which, given their robustness, are particularly suited to organic farming; stresses the need to support traditional crop breeding for the development of healthy and resilient varieties and also the need for modern, sustainable and innovative methods when developing new organic seeds and agricultural practices, maintaining a high level of protection of human health and the environment;

70.  Highlights, in this context, the role that scientific innovations in plant breeding can play, in particular in improving the resistance of varieties, in fostering the diversity of genetic resources and in strengthening food production systems, while recalling that the use of genetically modified (GMO) seeds is not permitted in organic agriculture;

71.  Supports the Commission’s intention to extend the EU Market Observatories’ analysis to organic products; stresses the importance of intensifying the collection and improving the availability of accurate and timely data, including at regional level, on the organic sector so as to better appreciate its environmental, economic and social effects;

72.  Believes that this should include data on the sector’s contribution to environmental sustainability, together with data on production, processing, consumption, including in the hospitality sector and in public canteens, on trade within the EU and with non-EU countries and on farm gate and retail prices, consumer preferences, supply chain structures, added value and farmers’ share in supply chains; is convinced that this data is essential in order to shape and monitor EU policy on organic production and take action to remedy supply and demand imbalances, evaluate consumption and production trends and increase transparency and confidence in the sector;

73.  Recognises the potential of a common European agriculture data space to increase consumer knowledge and trust, as well as to improve traceability in the organic supply chain; emphasises that in order to stimulate demand, it is essential to identify consumer needs through relevant assessments; calls on the Member States to better communicate on the organic sector’s economic results; calls on the Commission to conduct comprehensive studies and analyses of the impact that an increase in organic farming would have in terms of both climate change and food security in the European Union;

o
o   o

74.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ C 270, 7.7.2021, p. 2. (2) OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 1. (3) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 25. (4) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0425. (5) OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 1. (6) OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 262. (7) OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 2. (8) Barreiro Hurle, J., Bogonos, M., Himics, M., Hristov, J., Perez Dominguez, I., Sahoo, A., Salputra, G., Weiss, F., Baldoni, E. and Elleby, C., Modelling environmental and climate ambition in the agricultural sector with the CAPRI model, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2021. (9) OJ C 252, 18.7.2018, p. 184.

European Parliament resolution of 3 May 2022 on the persecution of minorities on the grounds of belief or religion (2021/2055(INI))

P9_TA(2022)0137 A9-0071/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Articles 2, 18 and 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

–  having regard to Articles 2, 4, 18, 24, 26 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

–  having regard to Articles 2 and 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

–  having regard to Articles 6 and 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

–  having regard to Article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Articles 10, 14, 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

–  having regard to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to Article 2 of the first Protocol thereto, and to Article 12 of Protocol No 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

–  having regard to the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

–  having regard to the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women,

–  having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

–  having regard to the Declaration of 25 November 1981 of the UN General Assembly on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,

–  having regard to the Declaration of 18 December 1992 of the UN General Assembly on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,

–  having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 24 March 2011 on combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatisation of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on religion or belief,

–  having regard to the Rabat Plan of Action of 5 October 2012, on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence,

–  having regard to the decision of the UN General Assembly designating 22 August as the International Day Commemorating the Victims of Acts of Violence Based on Belief or religion, adopted on 28 May 2019,

–  having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 21 January 2021 on promoting a culture of peace and tolerance to safeguard religious sites,

–  having regard to the reports of 15 July 2019 and 3 March 2021 of the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues to the UN Human Rights Council, addressing in particular respectively the concept of a ‘minority’ and the widespread targeting of minorities through hate speech in social media,

–  having regard to the report of 12 October 2020 of the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, addressing the importance of safeguarding freedom of religion or belief for all for the successful implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and how persons belonging to religious or belief minorities are at risk of ‘being left behind’,

–  having regard to the annual report of 28 December 2020 of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities,

–  having regard to the Marrakesh Declaration of 27 January 2016 on the Rights of Religious Minorities in Predominantly Muslim Majority Communities,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 November 2009 on freedom of religion or belief,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 February 2011 on intolerance, discrimination and violence on the basis of religion or belief,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 February 2021 on EU priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2021,

–  having regard to the EU Guidelines of 24 June 2013 on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief,

–  having regard to the EU Human Rights Guidelines of 18 March 2019 on non-discrimination in external action,

–  having regard to the reports from the Special Envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU,

–  having regard to the 2020-24 EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, to be funded under the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework,

–  having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (COM(2018)0460), and to the amended proposal thereon (COM(2020)0459),

–  having regard to the awarding of the European Parliament's Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to Raif Badawi in 2015, Nadia Murad and Lamiya Aji Bashar in 2016 and Ilham Tohti in 2019,

–  having regard to its resolution of 10 October 2013 on caste-based discrimination(1), in particular paragraph 6 thereof on religion as an intersectional factor in discrimination and abuse,

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2019 on EU Guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 4 February 2016 on the systematic mass murder of religious minorities by the so-called ‘ISIS/Daesh’(3),

–  having regard to its resolution of 4 July 2017 on addressing human rights violations in the context of war crimes, and crimes against humanity, including genocide(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 March 2018 on the situation in Syria(5),

–  having regard to its resolution of 4 October 2018 on mass arbitrary detention of Uyghurs and Kazakhs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region(6), 18 April 2019 on China, notably the situation of religious and ethnic minorities(7), 19 December 2019 on the situation of the Uyghurs in China (China Cables)(8) and 17 December 2020 on forced labour and the situation of the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region(9),

–  having regard to its resolutions of 7 July(10) and 15 December 2016(11), 14 September(12) and 14 December 2017(13), and 19 September 2019(14) on Myanmar and the situation of the Rohingya people,

–  having regard to its resolutions of 28 November 2019 on the situation of freedoms in Algeria(15) and 26 November 2020 on the deteriorating situation of human rights in Algeria, in particular the case of journalist Khaled Drareni(16),

–  having regard to its resolution of 19 December 2019 on violations of human rights including religious freedoms in Burkina Faso(17),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2020 on Nigeria, notably the recent terrorist attacks(18),

–  having regard to its resolution of 29 April 2021 on blasphemy laws in Pakistan, in particular the case of Shagufta Kausar and Shafqat Emmanuel(19), and in which the case of Asia Bibi is also cited, 14 April 2016 on Pakistan, in particular the attack in Lahore(20), and 13 December 2018 on Iran, notably the case of Nasrin Sotoudeh(21),

–  having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2020 on the foreign policy consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak(22),

–  having regard to its recommendation of 29 April 2021 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning EU-India relations(23),

–  having regard to its recommendation of 9 June 2021 to the Council on the 75th and 76th sessions of the United Nations General Assembly(24),

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2018(25), in particular paragraphs 42, 43 and 45 thereof,

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2019(26), in particular paragraphs 103, 104, 106 and 107 thereof,

–  having regard to the activities of the European Parliament Intergroup on Freedom of Religion or Belief and Religious Tolerance,

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Development,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0071/2022),

A.  whereas UN human rights treaties, together with international and EU laws, provide standards for the protection of the rights of persons belonging to belief or religious minorities as an integral part of human rights;

B.  whereas the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion includes the freedom to choose what to believe or not to believe, the freedom to found, adhere to, change or abandon a religion or belief without any constraints, and the freedom, either individually or within a community and either privately or publicly, to express one’s religion or belief with regard to worship, teaching, practice and observance; whereas this freedom also entails the right for religious, secular and non-confessional organisations to have recognised legal personality; whereas freedom of religion or belief also includes the right to express critical or satirical opinions on religions and religious authorities as a legitimate expression of freedom of thought or artistic creation;

C.  whereas according to Article 21 TEU, the EU promotes and defends respect for human dignity and the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as part of the guiding principles of its foreign policy;

D.  whereas freedom of religion or belief is violated in a considerable number of countries worldwide; whereas a large number of people live in countries that impose or tolerate severe violations of freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief;

E.  whereas discrimination against and persecution of minorities on the grounds of belief or religion is carried out by different actors – whether by states, non-states actors or a combination of both – and can take different forms, such as killings, torture, physical attacks, mass incarceration, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, coercion, forced conversions, kidnappings, early and forced marriages, gender-based violence, rape, physical and mental abuse, forced birth control use and abortions, forced labour and displacement, human trafficking, threats, exclusion, discriminatory and unfair treatment, harassment, expropriation, limitations on access to citizenship, elected office, employment, education, health and administrative services, the destruction of places of worship, cemeteries and cultural heritage, and offline and online hate speech;

F.  whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated persecution and violence against belief and religious minorities in some countries; whereas furthermore the health crisis has provided some countries with a pretext to adopt persecutory measures for purposes unrelated to the pandemic; whereas belief and religious minorities have become particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 infections and deaths due to unequal access to adequate medical care;

G.  whereas women belonging to belief or religious minorities are particularly at risk of increased discrimination and violence, both of which are linked to intersectional factors such as gender, religion, caste, ethnic background, power imbalances and patriarchy, and in some cases are justified by religious or belief motivations; whereas they face more difficulties in exercising their right to leave a religious or belief community due to lack of social or economic independence, threats of violence or loss of custody of their children;

H.  whereas gender-based violence and discrimination grounded in religious justifications persist; whereas women and LGBTIQ+ people continue to experience discrimination and violence inflicted in the name of religion by both state and non-state actors; whereas sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), including abortion, are being banned in the name of religion by both state and non-state actors;

I.  whereas any persecution on the basis of religion or belief deserves the utmost condemnation and swift reactions from national governments and international actors;

J.  whereas the practices relating to indigenous beliefs or religions are part of a people's cultural identity; whereas indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures and practices according to international human rights standards;

K.  whereas in almost every region in the world, religious minorities appear to be at risk of being designated ‘terrorist groups’ and of having members arrested under charges of ‘extremism’ or ‘illegal activity’; whereas some governments are using national security imperatives and counter-terrorism measures to criminalise membership in or the activities of certain religious or belief groups; whereas such approaches severely undermine the exercise of the right to freedom of religion or belief;

L.  whereas belief or religious minorities often lack adequate national representation; whereas legislation often excludes the needs and interests of these minorities, with governments employing a range of extra-legal measures that persecute, delegitimise or stigmatise these minorities;

M.  whereas in numerous conflicts and crises around the world, attacks on cultural heritage have been an instrument of symbolic violence and the politicisation of cultural heritage; whereas the religious aspects of these conflicts have directly contributed to humanitarian crises, displacement, migration and the violation of religious and cultural rights and human dignity; whereas these conflicts and crises can polarise societies, countries, regions, ethnic groups and communities and increase the risk of violent conflict; whereas therefore the destruction and looting of cultural heritage can be a weapon of war and a warning sign of future mass atrocities; whereas, furthermore, this destruction and looting represent major obstacles to dialogue, peace and reconciliation;

N.  whereas the destruction of cultural heritage renders communities, especially religious communities, vulnerable, as they are deprived of an important part of their identity; whereas extremist groups and other parties to conflict can easily spread their influence in areas where identities and social cohesion have been weakened and divisions in communities have been reinforced;

O.  whereas in cases of international crimes based on religion or belief, perpetrators have enjoyed impunity, with some minor exceptions, and therefore, atrocities have been able to continue;

P.  whereas, in accordance with the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, states and public authorities have the obligation to not only punish the perpetrators of genocides, but also to prevent such crimes in the first place;

1.  Affirms its unwavering commitment to promoting and protecting the rights of persons belonging to belief or religious minorities everywhere in the world, including their right to adopt, change, choose, manifest, exercise or abandon their belief or religion, in respect of the principles of equality and non-discrimination; condemns in the strongest terms all persecution, violence, incitements to violence and acts of terrorism targeting any minority on the grounds of belief or religion, or the lack thereof; stresses that in some cases, violations of these human rights may amount to genocide or crimes against humanity; condemns the denial of or efforts to minimise such violations and reaffirms its commitments to their eradication and its support for victims;

2.  Stresses that states have the primary responsibility to promote and safeguard the human rights of persons belonging to belief or religious minorities, including their right to exercise their religion or beliefs and their right not to believe freely, and to protect them against the violations of those rights, in particular, crimes against humanity and genocide;

3.  Takes the view that, regardless of belief, religion, thought or conscience, it is essential to promote and ensure the inclusion of all people in their societies and in political, socioeconomic and cultural life, as well as to ensure that their dignity, citizenship, individual rights and freedom are respected;

4.  Stresses that freedom of thought, conscience, belief and religion, including the freedom to worship, observe, practise and teach, the freedom to believe or not believe, the freedom to espouse theistic, non-theistic, agnostic or atheistic views, and the right to apostasy are human rights protected under international law; stresses that the promotion and protection of these rights have contributed to the advancement of human rights and democracy in a number of settings, including in repressive environments; recognises that violations of these rights often exacerbate or give rise to intolerance, which often constitute early indicators of potential violence and conflict;

5.  Recalls that combating discrimination against all minorities, regardless of their traditions, beliefs or religion, and promoting and protecting their rights, contributes vastly to social and political stability, poverty reduction, democratic governance and conflict prevention;

6.  Emphasises that the persecution of minorities on the grounds of belief or religion is often intertwined with other distinct grounds, in particular those linked to national or ethnic origin, gender or caste; highlights the cases in which belief or religious groups suffer persecution, including when they have a strong presence in the territory of a state or are not demographically in the minority, but find themselves in a vulnerable situation that makes them easy targets of violence and repression; also highlights that converts who leave a majority faith may experience severe violations of their human rights, including imprisonment, forced divorce, abduction, physical violence and murder;

7.  Is deeply concerned about the high levels of coercion, discrimination, harassment, violence and repression against people belonging to belief or religious minorities as a global phenomenon that is intensifying in certain regions; notes that it affects many religious communities, such as Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism among other religions, as well as groups of people who are atheists, humanists, agnostics or who do not identify with any belief or religion;

8.  Strongly deplores that non-religious, secular and humanist organisations are facing growing persecution, including unprecedented waves of incitement to hatred and killings, in a number of countries worldwide; denounces that countless individuals and civil society organisations are under assault for peacefully questioning, criticising or satirising religious beliefs; stresses that this ongoing violation of freedom of thought and expression is occurring across geographic and cultural borders, including within EU Member States;

9.  Emphasises that the perpetrators of acts of persecution include authoritarian regimes, governments inclined to impose the supremacy of dominant ethnic or religious populations over minorities, terrorist organisations, political and religious extremist parties or groups, and also, sometimes, family members, friends and neighbours of victims, for instance when victims change or abandon their religious allegiance;

10.  Welcomes the positive role of some belief and religious communities and faith-based non-governmental organisations in humanitarian activities in conflict zones, in the fight against environmental degradation, in advocating for peace and reconciliation and in contributing to development;

11.  Acknowledges that churches, faith-based organisations (FBOs) and other belief and religious institutions and associations play a significant role in the social fabric of developing countries;

12.  Underlines that certain FBOs play a strategically important role in influencing and impacting members of their communities to come to a position of understanding and advocacy on crucial issues such as HIV, sexual and reproductive healthcare and the empowerment of girls and women;

13.  Notes that churches and other belief and religious institutions, as well as FBOs, are frequently the only providers of healthcare and other social services in remote areas of certain developing countries and in conflict-prone settings;

14.  Is of the opinion that humanitarian actors should be trained in the particular sensitivities of religious and belief minority groups in settings where people have been displaced to provide more inclusive aid and protection for a range of refugee populations;

Tackling key challenges posed by persecution against religious minorities

15.  Stresses the paramount importance of holding accountable perpetrators of human rights abuses against persons belonging to belief or religious minorities; stresses the paramount importance of conducting comprehensive investigations into human rights abuses, of ensuring that victims and their families have effective access to justice and remedies, and of providing them with adequate reparations; calls on the EU and its Member States to urgently work with relevant UN mechanisms and committees to step up their investigations into ongoing human rights violations against belief or religious minorities around the world; reaffirms, in this regard, its support for the International Criminal Court and underlines the importance of its role in prosecuting the most serious crimes; notes that the Rome Statute covers both crimes against humanity and genocide against groups on the basis of belief or religion and establishes a fundamental international legal framework to fight impunity; calls on the EU and its Member States to increase their financial support to the International Criminal Court and calls on the UN member states to commit to the fight against impunity in this context through the ratification of the Rome Statute; emphasises the need to work towards preventing acts of violence based on belief or religion, in particular international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; stresses the need for the EU and its Member States to implement mechanisms that enable them to monitor early warning signs and risk factors for international crimes, as per the UN Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, analyse them and provide comprehensive responses, including in accordance with the duty to prevent and punish the crime of genocide;

16.  Notes with concern that most belief and religious-based hate crimes remain under-reported and unprosecuted worldwide; calls on the Council, the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU Member States to work with third countries on the adoption of measures to prevent and fight hate crimes, and on the adoption of legislation that is fully compliant with international standards on the freedom of expression, belief and religion; also calls on governments to establish comprehensive data collection systems on hate crimes and other discriminatory acts against belief or religious communities;

17.  Calls on the Council and EU Member States to apply sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for or involved in serious or systematic abuses or violations of freedom of religion or belief, as provided for by the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime;

18.  Is appalled by the exacerbation of persecution against belief or religious minorities during the COVID-19 pandemic; denounces the fact that persons belonging to belief or religious minorities have been scapegoated, blamed for spreading the COVID-19 virus, and have faced discrimination in or been denied access to public healthcare, food or humanitarian aid on the basis of belief or religious criteria;

19.  Underlines that the delivery of humanitarian assistance must be free from any kind of discrimination and strongly condemns any discrimination based on religious affiliation in the distribution of humanitarian assistance;

20.  Calls on the EU and its Member States to recognise the rights, beliefs and values of indigenous peoples, and commit to addressing the specific discrimination that indigenous populations face based on their beliefs in a comprehensive manner through EU external action;

21.  Is concerned about the application of blasphemy and religious laws that prevail over national laws in some countries; deplores that women and girls belonging to belief or religious minorities have been specifically and increasingly targeted with the purpose of inflicting harm on their community as a whole; stresses that they are particularly exposed to violent attacks, kidnappings, rape, sexual and gender-based violence, forced conversion, forced sterilisation and abortions, female genital mutilation, forced and early marriage and domestic incarceration; strongly condemns all of these human rights violations against them and stresses that lockdown measures taken during the COVID-19 pandemic have made their human rights situation even more precarious and have further restricted their access to information;

22.  Condemns all acts of or incitements to violence, persecution, coercion and discrimination against individuals on the basis of gender or sexual orientation, including by religious leaders or based on religious or belief motivations; stresses that the defence of ‘tradition’ or ‘public morality’ cannot contradict, in any instance, international human rights provisions to which states must adhere; highlights, in particular, discrimination in employment, education, access to justice and effective remedies, housing and healthcare; expresses deep concern about the misuse and instrumentalisation of belief or religion to impose discriminatory policies, laws, including criminal laws, or restrictions that contradict and undermine the rights of LGBTIQ people, women and girls and restrict access to basic services, such as education and health, including sexual and reproductive rights, criminalise abortion in all cases, criminalise adultery or facilitate religious practices that violate human rights; calls for the repeal of the relevant policies, laws or restrictions that are often translated into national legislation as secular restrictions;

23.  Condemns the religious cults whose activities target diaspora populations from developing countries through schemes to profit financially from the vulnerabilities of these migrant communities in Europe and which promote biased worldviews, often integrating homophobia, transphobia and misogyny;

24.  Condemns the human rights violations, sexual abuse, sectarianism and financial misconduct carried out by religious missions and leaders in several developing countries;

25.  Condemns the use of legislation on security, sedition, disturbance of public order, incitement to violence and the fight against terrorism and extremism as an instrument to persecute or criminalise persons belonging to belief or religious minorities, outlaw or restrict the practice or expression of their belief or religion, close places of worships and deter the membership in or registration of belief or religious associations; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to monitor the implementation of such legislation carefully, and to consistently raise this issue in bilateral dialogues with the governments concerned; urges EU Member States to reject any request by foreign authorities for judicial and police cooperation in individual judicial cases if they are based on such legislation;

26.  Strongly condemns any practice of coercive detention in state-run re-education camps, forced labour or exploitation of persons belonging to belief or religious minorities, where the objectives include compelling them to abandon their religion and assimilate to the dominant culture, language or ways of thinking; also condemns the extensive use of digital surveillance technologies to monitor, control and repress persons belonging to belief or religious minorities;

27.  Deplores restrictions on access to legal documentation and registration for organisations and individuals that belong to religious and belief minorities, and recalls that legal identity is a right that must be guaranteed for all people in an equal manner;

28.  Deplores the fact that in more than 70 countries in the world, authorities enforce criminal laws or seek to introduce new legislation that provide for punishments for blasphemy, heresy, apostasy, defamation of or insults against religions, and conversion, including the death sentence; notes that laws already in place are used disproportionately against people belonging to belief or religious minorities, and foment a climate of violence, discrimination and religious intolerance, which may include mob violence against minority communities and the destruction of places of worship; calls for the EU to intensify its political dialogue with all countries concerned, with a view to repealing those laws; stresses that the EU’s external action in support of the promotion of freedom of religion or belief would benefit from efforts by the EU and the Member States working together to abolish blasphemy laws worldwide; calls for the EU to lead by example by addressing its internal situation, in this regard;

29.  Stresses the need to protect the human rights defenders, lawyers, non-governmental organisations and civil society activists who support and defend those who are persecuted on the grounds of belief or religion; denounces the recourse to denunciations of blasphemy, apostasy or other accusations based on religious grounds, in order to crack down on these people and organisations in relation to their legitimate activities, including on the internet and social media;

30.  Stresses that states that have compulsory military service should allow for conscientious objection, including on the grounds of religion or belief, and provide for an alternative national service;

31.  Considers that the lack of knowledge and recognition of the diversity of religions and beliefs for individuals and communities could fuel bias and stereotypes that contribute to increased tensions, misunderstandings, discriminatory attitudes and disrespect between individuals; recalls that, as stated by the UN Human Rights Committee, public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, unless provisions are made for non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of affected persons and their guardians;

32.  Underlines the importance of strategic approaches and educational initiatives that encompass education and intercultural, interfaith and inter-religious dialogues, including those of religious leaders and civil society organisations, in tackling the persecution of and intolerance and hate speech towards minorities on the ground of belief or religion; highlights that intercultural, interfaith and inter-religious dialogues can serve as a catalyst to developing a sense of trust, respect and understanding and to building mutual respect and reconciliation, so as to learn to live together peacefully and constructively in a multicultural context;

33.  Notes that young people in developing countries are particularly vulnerable to extremist ideologies, and quality education is one of the key steps to combat radicalisation; notes that extremist movements often exploit the weak presence of the state in rural areas;

34.  Deplores that social media platforms and networks are being increasingly exploited as spaces for intimidation and incitement to hatred and violence; highlights that belief or religious minorities continue to be subject to online and offline hate speech from individuals and organised groups across the political and religious spectrum and calls on governments to address and counter this;

Strengthening EU human rights foreign policy and external actions to protect the freedom of belief and religion of persons belonging to minority groups

35.  Takes note that the post of the EU Special Envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU has remained vacant for more than a year; reiterates its call for the Council and the Commission to carry out a transparent and comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness and added value of the position of the Special Envoy, to provide the Special Envoy with adequate resources, and to adequately support the Special Envoy’s institutional mandate, capacity and duties; reiterates its calls for the Commission to guarantee transparency in the nomination, mandate, activities and reporting obligations of the Special Envoy; stresses that the Special Envoy’s duties should focus on promoting freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, and the rights to non-belief, apostasy and the espousal of atheistic views, while also paying attention to the situation of non-believers at risk; recommends that the Special Envoy work closely and in a complementary manner with the EU Special Representative for Human Rights and the Council Working Group on Human Rights (COHOM);

36.  Calls on the Council, the Commission, EEAS and EU Member States to address persecutions based on belief or religion as one of the priorities of EU human rights foreign policy, in line with the EU action plan for human rights and democracy for 2020-2024; stresses that a multi-layered and multi-actor approach is needed to protect and promote freedom of belief or religion, encompassing human rights, dialogue, mediation and conflict resolution and prevention in cooperation with multiple state and non-state actors, such as FBOs, religious leaders, non-believer's groups, civil society organisations and human rights defenders; calls for enhanced cooperation with UN initiatives on this matter; reiterates its call for a regular and public review of the EU Guidelines on freedom of religion or belief, allowing for the assessment of their implementation and of proposals for their update; notes that the EU Guidelines provide for an evaluation of their implementation by COHOM after a period of three years, and that no such evaluation has been shared or made public; considers that such an evaluation should highlight best practices, identify areas for improvement and provide concrete recommendations on the implementation of the Guidelines, in accordance with a specified timeline and milestones; calls for the evaluation to be included in the EU Annual Reports on Human Rights and Democracy in the World; also calls for progress reports on the implementation of the Guidelines to be communicated regularly to Parliament;

37.  Calls on the EU and its Member States to strengthen legal and institutional protection mechanisms to secure the human rights of members of belief and religious minorities and of any person in a vulnerable situation, including women and girls, persons of different ethnicities or castes, elderly and disabled people, migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons, and LGBTIQ persons, so that they are fully protected on the basis of their fundamental rights and are not subjected to discrimination because of their belief or religion;

38.  Underlines that the instrumentalisation of religion and belief constitutes an important driver of conflict worldwide; stresses that persecution and discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief forces many individuals and communities to migrate or become internally displaced persons; calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to assist all displaced persons, including those belonging to belief or religious minorities, who wish to voluntarily return to their homelands when material and security conditions allow for it and the circumstances that led to their departure no longer exist, in particular by contributing to their livelihoods and the reconstruction of their housing and basic infrastructure, such as schools and hospitals;

39.  Calls for the EU and its partners to consider mapping the role of religion in specific conflicts, identifying and engaging with existing positive actions by religious leaders in peace-building endeavours and conflict analysis and prevention, and listening to and assessing multiple voices representative of both majority and minority religious groups;

40.  Points out that violence against religious minorities during conflict can also make them vulnerable to further attacks in refugee settings due to misinterpretations of the humanitarian principles of neutrality and universality and widespread assumptions held about religion as either non-essential or divisive;

41.  Urges the EEAS and EU delegations to include objectives specifically related to the persecution of minorities on the grounds of belief or religion for all relevant situations, as part of the human rights and democracy country strategies for 2021-2024; calls on the EEAS and EU delegations to consistently raise general issues and specific cases relating to the persecution of or discrimination against belief or religious minorities during human rights dialogues with partner countries and at UN human rights fora, while following a result-oriented approach and including a gender perspective; reiterates its call for Members of Parliament to be given access to the content of these country strategies; observes that atheism and non-religious groups are growing rapidly and should be treated equally under the EU policy framework;

42.  Points out that in some countries, the main sources of discrimination against minorities come from non-state actors; calls on the Commission and Member States not to focus exclusively on government-based discrimination and to work with partner countries in tackling the causes of societal discrimination against minorities, with special regard to hate speech;

43.  Calls on the EU delegations and the representations of the Member States to support human rights defenders and journalists active in relation to belief or religious minorities, and, where appropriate, to facilitate the issuance of emergency visas and provide temporary shelter in EU Member States when these individuals are at risk;

44.  Calls on the Commission to support civil society organisations and social campaigns that promote understanding and awareness of non-majority belief and religious groups, especially humanists and atheists in countries where they face particularly serious forms of discrimination;

45.  Calls on the Commission and EEAS to closely scrutinise the human rights situations of belief or religious minorities in third countries and the implementation of those countries’ related commitments under bilateral agreements with the EU; calls on the Commission to review, in particular, the eligibility of third countries under the generalised scheme of preferences in this regard; advocates a system that gradually grants preferences to a third country based on its compliance with its human rights commitments, including with respect to freedom of religion or belief;

46.  Stresses that the EU should take into account the concrete challenges that religious, ethnic and linguistic minorities often face when accessing humanitarian assistance due to marginalisation, active targeting or weak socioeconomic positioning; calls on the Commission to assess minorities’ effective access to humanitarian assistance and ensure that its humanitarian policy does not overlook minorities;

47.  Deplores destruction of and damage to religious sites, which constitute an integral part of cultural heritage, and calls for their protection and restoration; recommends that the EU include the protection of cultural heritage as an element of its foreign policy external actions with the aims of preserving peace, promoting reconciliation and preventing conflict; recommends that the EU use cooperation on cultural heritage as part of confidence building measures in peace processes;

48.  Calls on the Commission to ensure adequate funding for issues related to the protection of persons belonging to belief or religious minorities, under the human rights thematic programme of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe; calls for the EU to ensure respect for the principles of pluralism, neutrality and fairness and to refrain strictly from strengthening policies or legislation that favour one belief or religious group over others when allocating funds for this purpose;

49.  Recommends strengthening EU multilateral engagement with a view to promoting and mainstreaming the respect for belief or religious minorities in human rights policies worldwide; calls for the EU and its Member States to enhance cooperation with the UN, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to intensify open and constructive dialogues with the African Union, the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and other regional organisations, and forge alliances with third countries or groups of like-minded states in order to provide international responses to human rights issues faced by belief or religious minorities, in particular those who are most vulnerable or targeted in conflict areas; recommends that the EU continue to be the lead sponsor of resolutions on freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief at the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council; calls for EU-UN joint initiatives to tackle persecution and discrimination against belief or religious minorities and non-believers; calls for the EU to step up cooperation with the UN Human Rights Council, notably through the UN Human Rights Council’s special procedures, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief; also recommends that special envoys for freedom of religion or belief throughout the EU Member States share their best practices and work closely together;

50.  Underlines the importance of 22 August as the International Day Commemorating the Victims of Acts of Violence Based on Religion or Belief; calls on the Council, the Commission and the EU Member States to pay special attention to this day in their planning and actively engage with belief or religious minorities in order to show commitment to promoting and protecting their freedoms and work towards preventing future acts of violence and intolerance against them;

o
o   o

51.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the United Nations.

(1) OJ C 181, 19.5.2016, p. 69. (2) OJ C 411, 27.11.2020, p. 30. (3) OJ C 35, 31.1.2018, p. 77. (4) OJ C 334, 19.9.2018, p. 69. (5) OJ C 162, 10.5.2019, p. 119. (6) OJ C 11, 13.1.2020, p. 25. (7) OJ C 158, 30.4.2021, p. 2. (8) OJ C 255, 29.6.2021, p. 60. (9) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 114. (10) OJ C 101, 16.3.2018, p. 134. (11) OJ C 238, 6.7.2018, p. 112. (12) OJ C 337, 20.9.2018, p. 109. (13) OJ C 369, 11.10.2018, p. 91. (14) OJ C 171, 6.5.2021, p. 12. (15) OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 12. (16) OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 126. (17) OJ C 255, 29.6.2021, p. 45. (18) OJ C 270, 7.7.2021, p. 83. (19) OJ C 506, 15.12.2021, p. 77. (20) OJ C 58, 15.2.2018, p. 151. (21) OJ C 388, 13.11.2020, p. 127. (22) OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 63. (23) OJ C 506, 15.12.2021, p. 109. (24) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 150. (25) OJ C 270, 7.7.2021, p. 25. (26) OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 94.

European Parliament resolution of 3 May 2022 toward an EU strategy to promote education for children in the world: mitigating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (2021/2209(INI))

P9_TA(2022)0138 A9-0058/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989,

–  having regard to Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 13 and 14 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Article 10 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,

–  having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in 2015 and the UN Sustainable Development Goals Report 2021,

–  having regard to the General Comments of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child(1),

–  having regard to the UN guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children of 18 December 2009,

–  having regard to the UN Global Study on Children Deprived of Liberty of 11 July 2019,

–  having regard to the UN policy brief of 15 April 2020 entitled ‘The impact of COVID‑19 on children’, and to the positive response thereto co-led by the EU and the Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries and signed by 173 countries,

–  having regard to the policy response of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development of 19 October 2020 entitled ‘What is the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on immigrants and their children?’,

–  having regard to the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, adopted on 14 December 1960,

–  having regard to the UNICEF, UNESCO and World Bank brochure entitled ‘Mission: Recovering Education in 2021’,

–  having regard to Article 49 of the Charter of the Organization of American States of 1967,

–  having regard to Article 11 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child of 1990,

–  having regard to Articles 17 and 25 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981,

–  having regard to Article 31 of the Human Rights Declaration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations of 2012,

–  having regard to Article 14 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU,

–  having regard to Articles 3(5) and 21 of the Treaty on European Union,

–  having regard to the UN Development Programme report of April 2021 entitled ‘Leaving No One Behind: Impact of COVID-19 on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)’,

–  having regard to the European Child Guarantee,

–  having regard to the International Year for the Elimination of Child Labour 2021 and the Commission’s zero tolerance approach towards child labour,

–  having regard to its resolution of 26 November 2019 on children’s rights on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of UN Convention on the Rights of the Child(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2021 on the Syrian conflict – 10 years after the uprising(3),

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Development and the Committee on Culture and Education,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0058/2022),

A.  whereas almost five million people globally have died because of the COVID-19 pandemic, prompting governments all over the world to enact extraordinary measures to contain the spread of the COVID-19 virus, including closing schools and limiting access to educational facilities;

B.  whereas new variants are intensifying the COVID-19 health crisis, while conflicts and other crises, including the climate crisis, continue to put children around the world at an increased risk of falling below minimum proficiency levels;

C.  whereas access to education is an internationally recognised fundamental human right that is indispensable for the exercise of other human rights; whereas the right to education entails that primary education is compulsory and universal and is accessible to all;

D.  whereas UNICEF estimates that more than 168 million children have lost a full year of education because of school closures due to the COVID-19 lockdowns, while UNESCO data shows that education has been significantly disrupted for 800 million students worldwide, who lost two thirds of an academic year on average;

E.  whereas since March 2020, around 194 countries have been forced to close schools nationwide because of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has affected more than 1,8 billion school learners globally and cut off their access to education and other vital benefits provided by schools; whereas schools in some regions are still closed; whereas the closure of schools has increasingly exposed children to violence, abuse and exploitation, including in a domestic setting; whereas partial or total school closures impact vulnerable and marginalised children the most by increasing the existing disparities within education systems and disrupting all aspects of their daily lives;

F.  whereas according to UNICEF, one third of children worldwide do not have access to the internet, which creates a barrier to access to remote/digital learning; whereas the need for remote learning and teaching programmes will remain after the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in countries affected by natural disasters and conflict; whereas e‑learning has created new challenges for teachers in terms of facilitating student learning and maintaining social interaction; whereas the COVID-19 pandemic and the fast-tracked innovative measures taken to ensure continuous learning for children represent an opportunity to reimagine education as more forward-looking, inclusive, flexible and resilient; whereas remote learning programmes must be accessible for all children, taking into account the socioeconomic challenges children may face, as well as their lack of access to the internet, broadcasts or digital media;

G.  whereas the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on parents have in turn impacted the health, well-being and access to education of their children; whereas school closures have found parents unprepared for remote and home schooling; whereas some working parents without financial means or alternatives have been forced to leave their children home alone, and others, mostly women, have been forced out of work, thereby pushing families into poverty;

H.  whereas more than 90 % of countries introduced some form of remote learning during the emergency school closures; whereas remote learning mostly benefited children in primary and secondary education, leaving children at pre-primary level at risk of being unprepared for primary school;

I.  whereas schoolchildren around the world have already lost around 1,8 trillion hours of in-person learning since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic and more than 39 billion in-school meals have been missed globally because of school closures(4);

J.  whereas well before the COVID-19 pandemic, the world was already facing a global learning crisis caused not only by hampered access to education due to poverty, long commutes to the nearest school, harmful gender norms, discrimination against vulnerable groups, environmental risks and conflicts, but also by schooling that does not necessarily lead to learning; whereas the pandemic has compounded the critical situation of children in a number of conflict regions, which is often characterised, inter alia, by increasing insecurity, greater vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and attacks on educational institutions, leaving children at a heightened risk of being recruited into conflict, which constitutes a serious violation of children’s rights and international humanitarian law; whereas 617 million children and adolescents worldwide are unable to reach minimum proficiency levels in reading(5) and mathematics, even though two thirds of them are at school;

K.  whereas COVID-19 has wiped out 20 years of education gains; whereas an additional 101 million children – 9 % of those in grades 1-8 – fell below minimum reading proficiency levels in 2020(6);

L.  whereas an estimated additional 825 million children will not reach adulthood with the secondary-level skills they need for work and life by 2030; whereas millions of children and young people who regularly attended schools are not developing the knowledge and skills they need to successfully enter the job market, achieve their full potential and contribute to their communities;

M.  whereas school closures have a large economic impact as they prevent children and young people from developing necessary skills, reaching their full potential and preparing for life, which frequently gives rise to unemployment and, consequently, increases in inequality, thereby resulting in fewer opportunities;

N.  whereas according to the UN, there are 11 million primary and secondary school learners worldwide – 5,2 million of whom are girls – at risk of not returning to education following COVID-19-related school closures(7); whereas the longer children are out of school, the higher the likelihood that they will drop out of education altogether; whereas this situation risks undermining the results obtained in the area of education and towards the achievement of the SDGs, and in particular those related to poverty reduction, health and well-being, and quality education;

O.  whereas school closures have distinct gendered impacts and carry risks of widening inequalities; whereas it is estimated that school closures during crises may lead to increases in teenage pregnancy; whereas girls out of school are disproportionally exposed to the risk of early and forced marriage and sexual exploitation; whereas it is estimated that two million more cases of female genital mutilation could occur over the next decade; whereas a significant number of girls may be blocked from returning to schools once they reopen given the existence of certain discriminatory policies that ban pregnant girls and young mothers from school;

P.  whereas 129 million girls worldwide are out of school, including 32 million of primary-school age, 30 million of lower-secondary-school age, and 67 million of upper-secondary-school age; whereas fewer than half of countries worldwide have achieved gender parity in participation in primary education; whereas the shift to remote learning puts children, in particular girls, from the poorest and most vulnerable households at a significant risk of dropping out of school permanently or for extended periods;

Q.  whereas 9 of the top 10 most difficult nations for girls to be educated in are in Sub‑Saharan Africa and the other is Afghanistan, where the Taliban have effectively deprived girls of education past primary school by ordering secondary schools to reopen only for boys; whereas the Taliban’s unclear policy and vague and unfulfilled promises about girls’ education makes millions of Afghan girls understandably fearful for their education; whereas several international initiatives by universities and private individuals emerged offering remote education for Afghan girls and women;

R.  whereas according to several national and regional law enforcement authorities, children out of school – in particular girls and children from disadvantaged backgrounds, such as children of minorities, rural, indigenous and migrant children, including refugees, children with disabilities, children in care and children who have lost their parents and/or grandparents due to the COVID-19 pandemic, among others – are disproportionally vulnerable to exploitation, child labour and domestic violence, including the witnessing of violence, online bullying and other crimes such as sexual exploitation and abuse(8);

S.  whereas in addition to the enormous social costs, the World Bank estimates that a global school shutdown of five months could generate learning losses that have a present value of USD 10 trillion; whereas loss of learning may cost economies up to USD 161 million per day;

T.  whereas school closures have unfortunately been essential to limit the spread of COVID-19; whereas schools are more than places where children can learn, as they also constitute meeting places and hubs for mental health and psychosocial support; whereas according to UNESCO and UNICEF, school closures do not only affect the right to education but also the right to health, with more than 80 million children missing primary vaccinations as a result of school closures; whereas school closures mean that teachers are not able to look out for signs of abuse or a lack of proper care on the part of parents; whereas according to the UNICEF Office of Research – Innocenti and the World Food Programme, school closures also impact the right to good nutrition and access to a daily meal; whereas school food programmes can provide incentives for the most vulnerable children to return to school; whereas school closures seriously affect children’s mental well-being as children can be exposed to violence and stress in the home; whereas school closures may have acute and long-lasting psychosocial consequences, including depression, increased anxiety and suicide, as children are deprived of social contact;

U.  whereas dropping out of school reinforces social inequality and may affect a country’s stability and prosperity, thereby jeopardising the futures of millions of the world’s children and severely impacting a whole generation; whereas education has proven essential to countering extremism and the radicalisation of children and young people;

V.  whereas according to the UNHCR Education Report 2021 half of all refugee children remain out of school; whereas refugee children are excluded from remote learning opportunities; whereas the overcrowded living conditions of child refugees, especially those living in refugee camps, often facilitate the spread of the virus and hamper compliance with sanitary rules; whereas the COVID-19 situation in the camps constitutes a crisis for children, as many children often already have weakened immune systems or underlying health conditions during their formative years, which puts them at higher risk of developing more severe cases when coping with this deadly virus; whereas most refugee camps do not have suitable health services to adequately respond to children’s and their families’ needs;

W.  whereas the unequal distribution of COVID-19 vaccines worldwide disproportionately affects low-income countries;

1.  Acknowledges and expresses appreciation for the work of teachers, educators of all kinds and support staff, who rapidly adjusted to the COVID‑19 pandemic and ensured the continuation of the learning process for children and adolescents; commends initiatives by international and local civil society organisations, private citizens and businesses to provide children with information and communication technology, remote learning courses and other learning materials, especially in countries where children have limited access to remote learning or no access to learning at all; urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Member States to promote a children’s rights-based approach to global efforts to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on access to education for children, and one which is based on the principles of non-discrimination, acting in the best interests of the child and child participation;

2.  Acknowledges that education is a cross-cutting issue relevant to all dimensions of sustainable development;

3.  Welcomes the commitments made at the 2021 UNESCO World Conference on Education for Sustainable Development and the adoption of the Berlin Declaration; insists on ensuring quality education for all children as an enabler for all SDGs and underscores the importance of integrating sustainable development into all levels of education and training from early childhood to tertiary and adult education, including vocational education and training, non-formal education and informal learning;

4.  Insists that the EU lead the way as an educational power that enables Member States to fully exercise their capacity to support education for children the world over and assert their convictions on this issue; underlines the key role of the future European Education Area in providing an important opportunity for more international cooperation to build synergies on education beyond Europe in order to develop common approaches and solutions to common challenges; urges the Commission to redouble its efforts to define a strategy to that end, including a clear outline and objectives;

5.  Stresses the key importance of guaranteeing children’s right to education and giving every child the opportunity to go back to school and calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to support the authorities of third countries in prioritising school reopening in their recovery plans, including support for teachers to help children catch up with lost learning and support for children’s well‑being, as schools are critical for children’s learning, safety, health, nutrition and overall well-being; calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to support third-country authorities in ensuring that all children can enjoy their right to primary education and to take action to ensure that secondary education is available and accessible; calls, furthermore, on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to support third-country authorities in developing and implementing digital teaching and learning methods and to facilitate internet access for all;

6.  Considers that improving domestic resource mobilisation, protecting and strongly increasing domestic expenditure on social sectors, notably education and health, and improving the quality of this expenditure must be prioritised in national recovery plans and assistance programmes run by EU and international financial institutions; insists, in this context, on ensuring equitable allocation and financing so that disadvantaged, impoverished and marginalised children – with a particular focus on girls – young people and families are not left behind; highlights that the best interests of the child must guide all efforts to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on access to education and that such measures must respect children’s rights to be informed, empowered and given the opportunity to have their voices heard;

7.  Stresses that it is essential to take into account the social situation of parents and to support families whose income has been reduced as a result of the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic;

8.  Acknowledges that achieving quality education must be a priority for the official development assistance of the EU and the Member States;

9.  Notes that forced displacement leads to rising numbers of people living in refugee settings; calls on the Commission to support skill transmission in refugee camps and strong education support for refugees and displaced people in order to support their integration and engagement in income generating activities;

10.  Is concerned by the lasting financial impact of the pandemic on funding for education, as the majority of UNESCO member states have not yet reached the threshold of 4–6 % of GDP or 15–20 % of public expenditure;

11.  Highlights the inequity in efforts to tackle the pandemic owing to unequal access to vaccines, resulting in unequal protection capabilities; emphasises that the pandemic can only be brought to an end if it is done so globally and that vaccines must be accessible to all; calls on the Member States to increase their contributions to and the overall efficiency of the UN COVAX programme to guarantee sufficient access to COVID-19 vaccines for third countries in order to allow them to put national COVID-19 vaccination campaigns in place that are in line with the guidelines set by competent national public health authorities and the World Health Organization, so as to ensure a speedy return to schools; urges the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to work closely with their transatlantic allies and international partners in order to boost the global supply of COVID-19 vaccines, ensuring fair distribution to the countries and populations that are most in need, and aiming to enhance global access to affordable COVID-19-related medical products and to address global production constraints and supply shortages;

12.  Urges the EU, in conjunction with the US and other members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to scale up the production and range of supply options to ensure equitable access to diagnostics, vaccines, therapeutics and other relevant health products needed to contain, prevent and treat COVID-19 and to ensure that these objectives are achieved by the 12th Ministerial Conference of the WTO;

13.  Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to support the authorities of third countries in financing and implementing ‘safe school’ operations, including providing hygiene supplies and sharing information on handwashing and other hygiene measures, as well as on maintaining the continuity of nutrition services for school-age children and adolescents; stresses that school meals and clean water are vital in ensuring children’s nutrition, growth and development as they provide a strong incentive for children – especially girls and those from the poorest and most marginalised communities – to return to school once restrictions are lifted; highlights, in this regard, the key role that teachers and civil society actors, including faith-based organisations, religious communities and NGOs, can play in health promotion and in combating the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as in supporting children and their families in overcoming the challenges and difficulties posed by the health crisis, improving their well-being and providing training and education programmes;

14.  Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to support the authorities of third countries in establishing education risk mitigation and management plans through resilience planning; highlights the importance of developing and guaranteeing contingency planning and crisis response plans now to reduce the risk of COVID-19 transmission in schools and to minimise the impact of school closures on children and their families, especially on the poorest and most marginalised children, as well as those with severe disabilities; highlights, in this regard, the need to prioritise children in conflict-affected areas and their access to quality education;

15.  Underlines the impact that school closures could have on parents’ professional responsibilities while they simultaneously take care of their children; stresses the importance of providing working parents with proper resources and guidance on distance education, extracurricular activities, and psychological support methods for balancing working from home and home schooling;

16.  Stresses the importance of providing educational and psychosocial support to children and families who must self-isolate to minimise the risk of contagion, with a view to reducing stress and anxiety in the home;

17.  Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to support the authorities of third countries in proactively issuing guidance on best practices in remote learning, and in ensuring that appropriate and safe tools, curricula and technology are used and are made accessible to children from low-income families, rural, indigenous and migrant children, marginalised children and children with disabilities or learning difficulties, children in alternative care, children in places of detention, and children living in remote areas or in environments where they are deprived of liberty or where internet access is not ubiquitous; highlights the potential for digital learning to enable educational institutions to reach all children at speed and scale, while at the same time fostering partnerships and working with a wide range of actors from civil society as well as the public and private sectors; insists, however, that investment in digital learning must seek to reduce the digital divide and must be context-specific, consistent with the best interests of the child and not to the detriment of supporting basic education infrastructure and staff, as well as in-person learning; recalls, however, that access to digital technologies has still not been equitable or widespread during the pandemic; considers that heavy investment is needed in this sector, in terms of both training and funding; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue to provide accessible educational resources and open access to digital tools for teachers, parents and students; stresses, in this regard, that children’s privacy and the protection of personal data must be guaranteed in connection with all digital tools and that due account must be taken of gender-responsive content and the different realities of children’s lives;

18.  Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to maintain robust funding for education through all EU financial instruments available, in line with the 10 % benchmark on education in the Global Europe instrument, and to make more funding available in order to increase resilience to ongoing and future crises;

19.  Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to support the authorities of third countries in ensuring appropriate care for children, including by putting in place a contingency plan for the care of children orphaned or left without appropriate care because of severe cases of COVID-19 that require hospitalisation of adult caregivers;

20.  Calls on the Commission to establish a link between possible investment de-risking activities and financial support for access to education and vocational training, particularly to establishing proper infrastructure and training for teachers, under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe;

21.  Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to support the governments of third countries in building and further developing stronger gender-responsive and inclusive education systems accompanied by the eradication of all forms of gender-based violence against women and girls; recalls that women’s access to education has been established as a fundamental right by the UN; believes that increasing girls’ education and supporting women’s participation in education and careers in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) as a matter of priority should be a central policy target for the EU and the international development community; insists, in this regard, on the need for girls to be able to complete their education and have access to age-appropriate information and services, free from discrimination and gender bias and with equal opportunities to fulfil their potential; stresses the urgent need to address gender-related barriers to education, such as laws, policies and harmful socio-cultural norms that prevent girls from continuing education in the event of pregnancy, marriage or motherhood; encourages the tackling of gender stereotypes and harmful socio-cultural norms through education, and the prevention of violence through gender-sensitive education programming;

22.  Condemns the fact that millions of girls worldwide do not have access to education, thus leaving them exposed to dependence and at a higher risk of violence and exploitation, especially in cases where women and girls are systematically denied access to education, work and public life by the authorities in power; rejects the misuse and instrumentalisation of any practice that discriminates in access to education and imposes the closing of schools; calls for an end to these practices and urges the reopening of all schools for girls and women;

23.  Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to preserve and further strengthen the achievements of the past 20 years in education for women and girls in Afghanistan; urges that the requisite funding be allocated within the EU humanitarian aid package for Afghanistan to enable international and local organisations to facilitate the reopening of educational facilities for women and girls and to develop remote learning programmes as a temporary measure; calls for similar attention to be paid to the education of Afghan children and young people in countries hosting Afghan refugees;

24.  Underlines that the right to education and information on sexual and reproductive health, family planning, modern contraceptive methods, safe and legal abortion, and maternal, prenatal and postnatal healthcare must be guaranteed for all people;

25.  Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States, as well as the national governments of third countries, to develop specific programmes to manage and mitigate the mental health and psychosocial impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on children, teachers and their communities, and to design specific preventive campaigns aimed at children, parents and teachers on the risks when using the internet, such as harassment, trafficking, sexual abuse and online bullying as well as promote special plans to assist children who have been a victim of these practices, and their parents;

26.  Underlines the need for age-appropriate, evidence-based, comprehensive sexuality education programmes to reduce the vulnerability of girls and young women to early childbirth and unintended pregnancy, child marriage, prostitution, HIV transmission and gender-based violence;

27.  Notes that the ratio of pupils to trained professionals in the Sub-Saharan region remains high, despite the EU’s various efforts and the assistance it provides; highlights the regional averages of 58 pupils per trained teacher at primary level, and 43 pupils per trained teacher at secondary level; points out that many developing countries struggle to make efficient use of resources and that very often, increased education spending does not translate into more learning and improved human capital; stresses the role of teachers at all levels in facilitating learning, the importance of technology for learning and efficient management of schools and education systems in these countries; recalls that according to UNESCO, there is a need to hire at least 15 million teachers to reach the education-related goals in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2030, in line with SDG 4;

28.  Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to support the authorities of partner countries in addressing the challenges in their education systems with the aim of making them capable of withstanding future crises, and making systems more resilient and inclusive, implementing learning recovery programmes and protecting educational budgets, with dedicated investments in high-quality, affordable and inclusive education, including investments in education technology tools, teacher training and other resources to ensure that children and young people reach their full potential, are prepared for life and do not miss out on opportunities to enter the labour market later in life, while respecting the education needs and rights of every child; highlights that remote learning programmes designed to address future crises must encompass different learning materials, including printed material, in order to be accessible to the most disadvantaged and marginalised children;

29.  Welcomes the UNESCO Paris Declaration: a Global Call for Investing in the Futures of Education; urges countries around the world to consider education as an investment rather than an expense; believes that adequate and effective financial assistance in education is a prerequisite to eliminate poverty and enhance well-being, especially at a time when public resources are increasingly constrained with competing demands in badly affected sectors such as health and education; urges the Commission and the Member States to substantially increase funding for education in their international development and assistance strategies;

30.  Underlines that young people are the most valuable assets for boosting developing countries’ economic development;

31.  Recalls that the global community is committed to improving the quality of education by 2030 (SDG 4);

32.  Calls for international educational exchanges between young people in Africa and the EU to be increased, through programmes such as Erasmus and Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs, aimed at helping new entrepreneurs to acquire the relevant skills for managing businesses;

33.  Calls on the Member States to take account of the fact that the COVID-19 health crisis has exacerbated the situation of those detained in camps in Syria and to immediately repatriate all European children held in those camps, ensuring that the best interest of the child prevails as the primary consideration;

34.  Stresses the importance of including vocational training and ‘second chance programmes’ in the recovery plans to help children and young people enter the labour market; calls on the Commission, the EEAS, the Member States and third countries to offer desirable future prospects for young people;

35.  Stresses the importance of accompanying investment in training and education with support for job creation to provide a better future outlook for the next generation of young people in Africa and other developing regions; notes the particular importance of public-private partnership in achieving SDG 8 on access to decent work; stresses the importance of secondary education and vocational training, which are essential for youth employability and sustainable development; further notes that the increasing youth population of Africa requires first and foremost the support of quality education and the advancement of vocational skills training to increase mobility and access to markets and rights;

36.  Calls for the EU to foster investment in vocational training and lifelong learning and the strengthening of educational structures, in cooperation with the private sector, to harness human capital;

37.  Highlights the importance of continuous professional development and enhanced financial support for teachers, empowering them to address learning losses among their students so as to be able to respond to their individual social, family and mental health conditions, and to incorporate digital technology into their teaching; stresses the urgent need to seize the opportunity and employ COVID-19 recovery funds and fast-tracked innovative measures used to ensure remote learning during the pandemic to reimagine education and build systems that are more forward-looking, inclusive, flexible and resilient; believes that these new approaches must address learning losses, prevent dropouts, and ensure the social and emotional welfare of students, teachers and staff;

38.  Emphasises the role of non-formal and informal education, citizenship education and volunteering; calls on the Commission to support third countries in improving the recognition of soft skills; insists on the promotion of practices of intergenerational solidarity and mentoring to reduce inequalities, exclusion or early school leaving;

39.  Calls for the acceleration of global knowledge exchanges and mobility at all levels of education and between and within countries and regions, while acknowledging the complex and contested history of global relationships and emphasising the importance of promoting heritage, cultural identity, history, art and global citizenship through education; notes the potential of combining online exchanges and travel to this end;

40.  Stresses the importance of developing and strengthening awareness-raising activities related to climate change and environmental protection and their impact on children and future generations; calls for environmental education to be made a core component of school curricula;

41.  Emphasises the important role of physical education in schools, as physical activity and a healthy lifestyle are key to improving learners’ health; calls on the Commission and the EEAS, therefore, to support national authorities in ensuring sufficient and safe sports facilities in schools and the training of qualified sports teachers;

42.  Draws attention to the need to harness the synergies between culture and education in order to shape sustainable, inclusive and resilient societies; calls on the Commission and the EEAS, in this regard, to support national authorities in including arts and culture in school curricula and extracurricular activities in order to enrich the educational and learning experiences of learners in third countries;

43.  Considers that national governments – and their competent national, regional or local authorities – must communicate with children in a child-friendly manner to explain the measures taken to limit the spread of COVID-19 in order to raise awareness about the impact, risks and threats of COVID-19 and to inform children of their rights;

44.  Stresses the importance of the acquisition of skills, notably through face-to-face learning, that will enable children to progress throughout their lives, such as on personal relationships, study skills, empathy and cooperation; highlights the importance of children being able to engage in play and leisure activities as a key element of their development, as recognised in Article 31 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; calls for steps to be taken to enhance the enjoyment of leisure and cultural activities for children, both as rights in and of themselves and as a means to improve their mental health and general well-being;

45.  Reiterates its call for all UN member states which have not done yet done so to ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, while stressing the importance of making this core human rights instrument effective worldwide;

46.  Stresses the need to properly evaluate, follow up on and monitor the impact of initiatives introduced during the crisis, in order to identify the gaps and shortfalls and determine how they can be remedied;

47.  Commits to making education a key topic of discussions in parliamentary delegation work, notably through joint parliamentary assemblies such as the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly;

48.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) In particular General Comment No 5 on general measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; No 6 on the treatment of unaccompanied and separated children outside their country of origin; No 10 on children’s rights in juvenile justice; No 12 on the right of the child to be heard; No 13 on the right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence; No 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration; No 15 on the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health; and No 16 on State obligations regarding the impact of the business sector on children’s rights. (2) OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 2. (3) OJ C 474, 24.11.2021, p. 130. (4) UNICEF Office of Research, COVID-19: Missing More Than a Classroom – The impact of school closures on children’s nutrition, January 2021. (5) UNESCO, Fact Sheet No 46, More Than One-Half of Children and Adolescents Are Not Learning Worldwide, September 2017. (6) UN Sustainable Development Goals Report 2021, 15 July 2021. (7) UNESCO, How many students are at risk of not returning to school?, 30 July 2020. (8) Press release of 19 June 2020 by Europol entitled ‘Exploiting isolation: sexual predators increasingly targeting children during COVID pandemic’.

European Parliament resolution of 3 May 2022 on reaching women’s economic independence through entrepreneurship and self-employment (2021/2080(INI))

P9_TA(2022)0139 A9-0096/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Articles 2 and 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Articles 21(1), 23 and 33(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0152),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 10 March 2020 entitled ‘An SME Strategy for a sustainable and digital Europe’ (COM(2020)0103),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 1 July 2020 entitled ‘European Skills Agenda for sustainable competitiveness, social fairness and resilience’ (COM(2020)0274),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2021 entitled ‘Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030’ (COM(2021)0101),

–  having regard to the study by the Commission’s Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology of 2020 entitled ‘Women in the Digital Age’,

–  having regard to its resolution of 19 January 2016 on external factors that represent hurdles to European female entrepreneurship(1),

–  having regard to its resolution of 28 April 2016 on gender equality and empowering women in the digital age(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2017 on women’s economic empowerment in the private and public sectors in the EU(3),

–  having regard to its resolution of 17 April 2018 on empowering women and girls through the digital sector(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 entitled ‘Closing the digital gender gap – women’s participation in the digital economy‘(5),

–  having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the gender perspective in the COVID-19 crisis and post-crisis period(6),

–  having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the EU Strategy for Gender Equality(7),

–  having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on promoting gender equality in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education and careers(8),

–  having regard to the study entitled ‘The Professional Status of Rural Women in the EU’ published by the Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs in its Directorate-General for Internal Policies in May 2019,

–  having regard to the study entitled ‘Enhancing Women’s Economic Empowerment through Entrepreneurship and Business Leadership in OECD Countries’ published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs in 2014,

–  having regard to the study entitled ‘International Survey of Adult Financial Literacy’ published by the OECD in 2020,

–  having regard to Chapter 2 of the study entitled ‘The Missing Entrepreneurs 2019: Policies for Inclusive Entrepreneurship’ published by the OECD in December 2019,

–  having regard to the European Institute for Gender Equality’s (EIGE) Gender Equality Index,

–  having regard to Article 6 of the United Nations Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities,

–  having regard to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

–  having regard to the Women in Digital scoreboard,

–  having regard to the study entitled ‘Women’s entrepreneurship and self-employment, including aspects of gendered Corporate Social Responsibility’ published by the Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs in its Directorate-General for Internal Policies in May 2020,

–  having regard to the study entitled ‘Funding women entrepreneurs – How to empower growth’ published by the European Investment Bank’s Innovation Finance Advisory in June 2020,

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (A9-0096/2022),

A.  whereas gender equality is a fundamental value and key objective of the EU and a basic precondition for the full enjoyment of human rights by women and girls, and is essential for their empowerment, the development of their full potential and the achievement of a sustainable and inclusive society; whereas gender-based discrimination based on stereotypes and inequalities, combined with intersectional discrimination due, among others, to their sex, race, ethnic or social origin or disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or gender expression has negative social and economic consequences and impacts the way women experience challenges, including in pursuing entrepreneurship and becoming self-employed;

B.  whereas female entrepreneurship boosts women’s emancipation and empowerment; whereas in the 2014-2018 period the median annual income for full-time entrepreneurs was equal for men and women(9); whereas women’s economic independence and empowerment is central to realising women’s rights and gender equality and includes the ability to participate equally in labour markets, access to and control over productive resources, control over their own time, lives and bodies, self-fulfilment and meaningful participation in economic decision-making at all levels; whereas the promotion of economic independence requires boosting women’s entrepreneurship and self-employment and be accompanied by appropriate measures to ensure women’s equal participation in labour markets, equal pay for equal work or work of equal value, access to decent work and sharing and recognition of domestic and care responsibilities;

C.  whereas women are the most valuable and largest untapped source of entrepreneurial and leadership potential in Europe; whereas from 2014-2018 women across the OECD were twice as likely to start their own businesses as those in the EU(10); whereas women entrepreneurs and self-employed women are an under-utilised source of sustainable economic growth, job creation and innovation potential, whereas the promotion of this source of growth is an important tool for fostering women’s economic empowerment and independence; whereas women’s economic empowerment boosts productivity and increases economic diversification and income equality; whereas self-employment needs to be recognised as a form of work which helps to create jobs and reduce unemployment; whereas studies show that women often have a different management and leadership style than men and that gender diversity in teams is beneficial for society and the economy(11); whereas supporting women entrepreneurs and women self-employed would also strengthen EU competitiveness and, therefore, all entrepreneurial activity that creates jobs and incomes, and thus added value for business and society should be promoted by the EU and its Member States;

D.  whereas women in rural and disadvantaged regions are more likely to engage in entrepreneurship and self-employment than those in urban and economically prosperous regions(12); whereas the employment opportunities for women in rural areas in the EU are worse than those for men in rural areas and women in urban areas; whereas the share of self-employed women in rural areas is slightly higher than that in total areas; whereas 30 % of farms in the EU are run by women, as self-employed(13);

E.  whereas the relative scarcity of women entrepreneurs should be considered an untapped source for innovation and development, especially in the context of Europe’s green and digital transformations and its economic recovery following the COVID-19 crisis: whereas the COVID-19 crisis has disproportionately affected women, particularly those working in precarious employment, feminised sectors and the informal economy, having significant economic and employment impacts on them because of an increase in care and domestic responsibilities, restricted access to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) as well as in gender-based violence and harassment; whereas the European economy has the potential to benefit from GDP growth of EUR 16 billion by encouraging more women to enter the digital jobs market; whereas improving gender equality and empowering female entrepreneurship are key to accelerating and fortifying European recovery;

F.  whereas the European Union is lagging behind the US and China on the development of technologies in, for example, artificial intelligence and blockchain technologies; whereas in April 2021 the highest-valued start-ups in the world were mainly Chinese and US companies; whereas the European Union should recognise and support European women’s innovation capabilities for developing technologies;

G.  whereas women only account for 34.4 % of the self-employed in the EU and 30 % of its start-up entrepreneurs, confirming that the largest gender gaps in entrepreneurial activity are found in Europe and North America(14); whereas only 34 % of managerial positions in the EU are held by women(15); whereas previous experience in management positions provides individuals with the necessary skills and confidence to own businesses themselves(16); whereas the lack of social protection such as paid sick, maternity, paternity and parental leave can be problematic for self-employed women in several Member States; whereas self-employed women are more likely to fall into poverty;

H.  whereas starting and running a business is complex in the EU because of the different bureaucratic and administrative requirements and procedures, which is an obstacle to encouraging more women to become entrepreneurs; whereas women face different barriers, particularly of an economic, legislative and social nature, to pursuing entrepreneurship than men; whereas these barriers are constructed around gender stereotypes which contribute to gender segregation in education, a lack of specific training, a lower level of entrepreneurial confidence, less access to information, financial and government support and less tools for social and business networks, gender biases and difficulties in reconciling work and family life, due to the lack of care infrastructures, specially childcare and because of the stereotype that women carry out most care and domestic work; whereas women are more likely than men to report flexible working hours as their motivation to engage in entrepreneurship and self-employment(17); whereas female entrepreneurship and self-employment can also be a valuable instrument for reconciling work and personal life; whereas from 2014 to 2018 only 34.5 % of women in the EU and 37.7 % of women in the OECD felt they had the necessary skills and knowledge to start their own business; whereas women are nearly 10 % more likely to report a fear of failure than men(18); whereas there is a financial literacy gap between men and women; whereas this gap acts as a barrier for women when accessing funding, and overall impedes them from participating confidently in economic and financial activities(19);

I.  whereas harmful structures and stereotypes perpetuate inequality; whereas traditional gender roles and stereotypes still influence the division of labour at home, in education, at the workplace and in society; whereas unpaid care and domestic work is mostly carried out by women, impacting employment and career progression and contributing to the gender pay and pension gap; whereas work-life balance measures, such as the Work-Life Balance Directive, need to be urgently and properly transposed by the Member States and complemented by further measures in order to involve more men in unpaid work;

J.  whereas access to networks, mentoring and promoting women entrepreneurs as role models are important in encouraging women to consider entrepreneurship as a career and in increasing women’s economic empowerment; whereas the diversity of role models can appeal to women from diverse backgrounds;

K.  whereas some private companies have included actions such as mentoring, networking and support to increase women's access to finance and technology to support women's entrepreneurship as part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies;

L.  whereas statistics show that women entrepreneurs face more difficulties than men in raising finance and capital; whereas women-led companies still account for a very small proportion of investment recipients; whereas all-men founding teams received 93 % of all capital invested in European technology companies in 2018(20); whereas only 32 % of venture capital funding was allocated to companies with at least one female executive(21); whereas women’s innovations are less often identified and acknowledged as innovations and promising ideas; whereas despite receiving lower financial backing women-led businesses in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) Region outperform male-founded companies in capital productivity by 96 %(22);

M.  whereas data shows that women entrepreneurs generate more revenue despite receiving lower financial backing;

N.  whereas only 10 % of business angels in Europe are women(23), and women are especially under-represented among private equity investors in digitalisation; whereas only 10 % of all senior positions in private equity and venture capital firms globally(24) are occupied by women; whereas several studies show that investment managers tend to provide capital and to hire those who are similar to themselves, leaving women and especially those from diverse backgrounds and facing intersectional discrimination, among other reasons due to their racial, ethnic or socio economic backgrounds, at a clear disadvantage; whereas venture capital firms with women partners are two to three times more likely to invest in female-led businesses(25); whereas the lack of women in decision-making roles at venture capital firms is one of the primary sources of the persistent funding gap for women-driven enterprises in the EU(26); whereas another major cause for the persistent funding gap for women-driven enterprises in the EU is that women are less likely than men to seek external funding such as bank loans, venture capital or funding from state programmes, and instead resort to self-funding through personal savings or funding from family members(27); whereas implementing measures to achieve a fair representation of women and develop a gender-balanced financial ecosystem, creating a more favourable environment at the EU level and providing sufficient budgetary resources is fundamental to creating both the necessary funding conditions and the essential network of women investors for women-led companies to thrive;

O.  whereas six Member States have created 11 private funds to fill the gap in funding for women entrepreneurs, and these funds use gender considerations that support diversity in their investment criteria; whereas some of these funds have received national or EU support, which shows the important role of public policies in promoting entrepreneurship(28);

P.  whereas there are challenges in effectively measuring entrepreneurship in the EU;

Q.  whereas less than 8 % of top companies’ CEOs are women;

R.  whereas 59 % of scientists and engineers in the EU in 2018 were men and only 41 % were women, representing a gap of 18 %(29); whereas social norms, stereotypes, cultural discouragement and gendered expectations about career choices, which are often reinforced through educational content and curricula, are two of the main drivers of gender segregation in higher education and in the labour market;

S.  whereas it is crucial for Europe to have an equal number of women and men as entrepreneurs to ensure diversification of content and products; whereas between 2014 and 2018 female-led start-ups were as likely to offer new products and services as those led by men in the EU(30), showing that women and men must been seen as performing equally well in innovation; whereas encouraging more women to become entrepreneurs can improve the quality and diversity of innovations, products and services;

T.  whereas the European Network of Female Entrepreneurship Ambassadors has so far organised more than 650 national meetings and reached over 61 000 would-be women entrepreneurs; whereas its ambassadors have supported the creation of more than 250 new women-led enterprises as well as several more networking and business support clubs for women(31);

U.  whereas in 2020, there were more people who knew someone who had stopped a business than knew someone who had started one(32), which recalls the importance of nurturing fertile ground for every kind of entrepreneurship, and of staying connected to other economies, to remain alert to new opportunities, and to safeguard the jobs of the future;

V.  Whereas the gender pay gap in the EU stands at 14.1 % and has only changed minimally over the last decade; whereas 24 % of the gender pay gap is related to the overrepresentation of women in relatively low-paying sectors, such as care, health and education;

W.  whereas entrepreneurship requires knowledge and skills; whereas increasing women’s and girls’ educational attainment contributes to their economic empowerment and more inclusive economic growth; whereas lifelong education, upskilling and reskilling, especially to keep pace with rapid technological and digital transformations increases their professional opportunities and is important for women and girls’ health, well-being and quality of life;

X.  whereas entrepreneurship should be accessible for all women including women with disabilities, older women and those with a minoritised racial or ethnic background; whereas women with disabilities can find it more difficult to start their own businesses; whereas entrepreneurship among older women is not being promoted although they should be seen as a valuable and unused potential for economic growth; whereas the promotion of entrepreneurship among migrant women can offer great opportunities for their integration in the labour market and foster their economic independence and empowerment;

Entrepreneurship programmes, education and competence building

1.  Underlines that women’s entrepreneurship contributes to increasing women’s economic independence and their empowerment, which is an essential precondition for reaching gender-equal societies and should be encouraged and promoted across the EU; notes that women’s economic independence reinforces their equal participation in the labour market, offers control over productive resources and enhanced participation in economic decision-making at all levels, as well as economic empowerment and self-determination, which is crucial to realising women’s rights and gender equality; highlights that every woman who wants to pursue entrepreneurial activity should be encouraged to take this step, since the running of a business creates jobs and incomes and thus added value for business and the whole of society; calls on the Commission to step up its efforts to increase the employment rate of women in Europe and facilitate their access to the labour market, including by providing more incentives to promote women’s entrepreneurship; welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a pay transparency directive;

2.  Regrets the fact that women do not start and run businesses as much as men; urges the Member States to introduce business-friendly reforms to promote equality and increase female entrepreneurship; calls for women’s needs and participation in the labour market, as well as horizontal and vertical labour market segregation, to be closely examined at EU level;

3.  Welcomes Commission initiatives such as Women TechEU and the European Innovation Council Women Leadership Programme and the creation of various European networks for women entrepreneurs; urges the Commission and the Member States to promote such initiatives more actively by focusing on the EU’s sustainable growth potential and to support the achievements of women entrepreneurs in all their diversity; encourages the Commission to strengthen networks focusing on women’s entrepreneurship on European level to boost innovation and cooperation between national, EU and international networks; notes that further cross-border cooperation between women entrepreneurs can strengthen the internal market of the European Union;

4.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to include public-private partnerships in their initiatives because private companies can play a valuable role as advisers and impart relevant and specialised skills to women entrepreneurs; urges the Commission to facilitate pan-European networking of women entrepreneurs and to support their cooperation; calls on the Commission to establish programmes that foster creativity in innovation, to ensure entrepreneurship in the labour market, and to ensure that women can bring added value to society;

5.  Highlights that mentoring-relationships between experienced and novice entrepreneurs can be beneficial to both sides and help raise awareness about entrepreneurship, combat doubts about venturing into the entrepreneurial sector and foster exchange of information and advice among female entrepreneurs;

6.  Highlights the necessity and importance of recognising and promoting women entrepreneurs and investors as role models and mentors, and to ensure that these role models represent women in all their diversity; notes, in this regard, the EU Prize for Women Innovators 2021 and the European Network of Female Entrepreneurship Ambassadors, which encourages women to consider entrepreneurship as a career; calls on the Commission to highlight prominent women entrepreneurs and investors as role models by launching a Europe-wide campaign raising awareness about the potential of entrepreneurship targeting predominantly women and to conduct case studies of women entrepreneurs;

7.  Calls on the Commission to develop a strategy with Member States to ensure the meaningful representation of all women from diverse backgrounds in decision-making roles and with specific actions and policies to promote their economic empowerment; calls for it to be ensured that all measures for women’s entrepreneurship include an intersectional perspective to ensure that all women receive the relevant help and support and that no woman is left behind;

8.  Welcomes public and private women’s entrepreneurship programmes in the Member States that include aspects of networking, mentoring, training, coaching and consultancy services and professional advice on legal and fiscal matters to support and advise women entrepreneurs, and promote their economic independence; notes that publicly available reports and testimonials in seven Member States suggest the positive impact of these programmes; urges the Commission and the EIGE to collect gender-disaggregated data from all Member States and analyse the impact of women’s entrepreneurship programmes; calls on the Commission and Member States to share best practices to strengthen and increase the share of women entrepreneurs and self-employed within the EU; calls on the Member States to promote a well-developed training strategy to provide different levels of training, from awareness-raising and information to specialised and advanced training, and to recognise the various opportunities and constraints of specific business environments and the wide range of characteristics and needs of women entrepreneurs, with specific attention to work-life balance; highlights the need for one stop shops that offer for instance. courses and training within a wide range of disciplines, such as accounting and marketing, to entrepreneurs with little or no experience or qualifications; notes that this initiative can encourage more women to become entrepreneurs;

9.  Calls on the Commission and the EIGE to make up-to-date and comparable statistics available for the purpose of analysing the economic significance of entrepreneurs and the self-employed, and the various categories within entrepreneurship and self-employed with respect to industry, and gender to identify the share of women entrepreneurs and self-employed; reiterates its calls on the Commission and the Member States to improve the collection of gender-disaggregated data, statistics, research and analysis, in particular on women’s participation in the labour market and in areas such as informal employment, entrepreneurship, access to financing and to healthcare services, unpaid work, poverty and the impact of social protection systems; recalls the role of EIGE in this regard, and calls on the Commission to use these data to effectively implement gender impact assessments of its policies and programmes, and those of other EU agencies and institutions;

10.  Calls, in particular, for greater women-focused promotion of and awareness-raising about STEM subjects, digital education and financial literacy in order to combat prevailing stereotypes in education, training, school curricula and career guidance; calls for it to be ensured that more women enter these sectors, which would allow for more diverse management and leadership styles that would bring an added value to these sectors and contribute to their development; stresses the importance of broadening the horizon of women’s entrepreneurship to include more sectors than STEM and IT and to promote different forms of entrepreneurship; calls on the Commission and Member States to implement measures to improve the diversification of entrepreneurship and to promote social and collective forms of women’s entrepreneurship; welcomes specific training, research and studies in entrepreneurship; highlights the importance of promoting education and careers in finance to women to support the development of a reliable network of women investors and emphasises at the same time the need to empower women to be economically independent and thrive as entrepreneurs;

11.  Regrets the fact that women are under-represented in leadership positions, and highlights the need to promote equality between men and women at all levels of decision-making in business and management; calls for a swift negotiation process of the Women on Boards Directive; highlights the necessity to provide more and better information about entrepreneurship as an attractive career option, both for young women in school and for women outside the labour force who are considering starting or getting back into work; calls on the Commission to promote entrepreneurship support programmes for older people, and notes that this can reach women who are left out of the labour market; emphasises the necessity to promote policies for stimulating high-growth firms as well as growth and development in medium-sized and larger businesses to ensure more women become entrepreneurs and support sustainable growth; calls on Member States and the Commission to further increase awareness of support policies among women entrepreneurs and to decrease bureaucratic and administrative barriers to accessing programmes aimed at fostering entrepreneurship; welcomes the efforts to promote support from experts and consultants who as mentors can build up women entrepreneurs’ confidence and guide them through all stages of the entrepreneurship process, taking account of all the aspects involved, including issues relating to legislation, tax, administration, economics, and accounting, as well as legal, formal, labour and recruitment issues;

12.  Calls for the need to recognise the entrepreneurial potential of women in all sectors and education fields, including those that are female-dominated, such as for example in healthcare and teaching; highlights the need to provide further training and retraining opportunities to employees and those moving from employment to self-employment; calls on the Commission to promote lifelong learning for all; highlights that the entrepreneurial dimension must also be recognised in all youth programmes at the European level; encourages Member States and regional and local authorities to invest in reskilling and upskilling programmes targeted at self-employed women and female entrepreneurs with a specific focus on financial literacy reskilling;

Access to capital

13.  Emphasises the need to recognise women entrepreneurship and self-employment as profitable investment cases and as sources of economic growth and job creation;

14.  Calls on Member States and the Commission to boost awareness and facilitate easier access to finance for women entrepreneurs and self-employed including alternative forms of financing, making sure finance is available and reaches them; notes that women entrepreneurs are more likely to use alternative sources such as crowd lending and funding platforms; notes that in certain cases microcredits have proven to be successful in motivating more women to start their own business; acknowledged the impact of funding policies and the positive impact they can bring to women; encourages Member States and regional and local authorities to make use of the current European Structural Funds to target and promote women entrepreneurs and self-employed women; urges the Commission to establish a European network of gender-conscious investors; considers that such a network will be able to provide women-led companies with relevant connections, networks and funding opportunities; stresses the need for awareness-raising and information campaigns on current and future EU funding possibilities for women entrepreneurs in order to provide tailored support to women business owners and women entrepreneurs and increase the visibility of women leaders so they can provide stronger role models and break current stereotypes; urges the Commission to establish a women’s entrepreneurship action plan as part of small business act and, as a part of it, a pan-European entrepreneurship, innovation and investment event bringing together scientists, entrepreneurs, start-ups and above all, private equity investors, in order to boost new female business opportunities;

15.  Welcomes the efforts by the dedicated private investment funds that incorporate gender criteria in their investment assessments to address the underfunding of women-led enterprises; calls on the Commission to support co-investment programmes with venture capital funds and business angels that have an investment focus on women and mentorship programmes for women entrepreneurs; considers that this would be a powerful action to nurture the ecosystem from the ground up;

16.  Welcomes public and private funds that implement gender equality, diversity and inclusion policies; notes, in this regard, the Diversity Commitment initiative, which is the first initiative in the world where private funds have committed to measuring and tracking gender representation and to reporting annually and in public on their findings;

17.  Highlights the important role of microcredits in improving women’s financial inclusion by overcoming market and social barriers in the financial markets; notes that the advantage of microfinance is that it offers women entrepreneurs the possibility for strong incentives to create a sustainable business since they must repay the loan, and this instrument is designed specifically for the needs of people who experience difficulties in obtaining access to conventional credit;

18.  Calls on the Commission and Member States to systematically track and monitor gender-disaggregated data across the whole Union to ensure high-quality data on EU and national funding programmes; recalls, further, the importance of collecting equality data in order to obtain information on intersecting experiences of discrimination, and highlights that this could serve as a basis for more informed policy decisions in the future and for enhancing of women’s economic independence; notes that a women’s entrepreneurial dimension has to be recognised in the formulation of business- and SME-related policies to ensure an adequate policy framework that supports more female entrepreneurship and innovation by diversity;

Better framework for women entrepreneurs

19.  Calls on Member States to implement the 2019 Council recommendation on ensuring effective access to social protection systems and entitlements, including pension and leaves for all self-employed workers and to implement all the principles set out in the European Pillar of Social Right as a way to ensure non-discrimination and foster gender equality;

20.  Calls on Member States and the Commission to introduce gender mainstreaming at all stages of the design process of support measures for women entrepreneurs and to consult with a diverse group of potential and current women entrepreneurs in order to ensure these support measures are aligned and match their expectations and needs;

21.  Emphasises the need to remove administrative barriers to starting a business in order to make becoming an entrepreneur or self-employed more attractive to women, including also immigrant women; calls on Member States to consider developing standardised administrative packages for entrepreneurs to follow in the early stages of starting a business; believes that this will ease the administrative burden in interactions with local authorities such as tax authorities, municipalities, etc.;

22.  Highlights the need to develop Europe’s innovation ecosystem to empower more women to create sustainable and profitable businesses and innovation to strengthen EU competitiveness, economic growth and job creation;

23.  Calls on the Commission to implement the measures laid out in its Better Regulation communication as well as in its SME strategy without delay;

24.  Emphasises the need for guidance and simplified forms, procedures and processes to help self-employed women entrepreneurs navigate the regulatory landscape, for example in order to export; notes that microbusinesses and SMEs in particular already struggle with a lack of resources for navigating and managing compliance obligations across Member States; encourages the Commission and Member States to evaluate and where necessary improve guidance and administration;

25.  Welcomes the Commission’s better regulation agenda; believes that the Commission’s willingness to implement the ‘one in, one out’ approach is an important step towards minimising administrative burdens on businesses, including start-ups and SMEs, making it more attractive for women to become entrepreneurs or self-employed;

26.  Calls on Member States to consider enhanced tax incentives or flexible tax structures to improve framework conditions for entrepreneurship and self-employment; points as an example to the taxation of entrepreneurs in their early stages, when taxing only revenue or delaying tax payments in order to secure capital can make it more attractive for women to become entrepreneurs or self-employed;

27.  Highlights the importance of work-life balance and good quality, affordable social services as prerequisites for women entrepreneurs and self-employed; recognises that female entrepreneurship and self-employment provide the flexibility to achieve a better work-life balance; recognises the importance of making equal sharing of domestic and care responsibilities possible in order to achieve the work-life balance necessary for women to engage in entrepreneurship and self-employment; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure a better work-life balance through better maternity, paternity, parental and carer’s leave, flexible working hours and on-site childcare facilities, and by promoting telework; highlights that working hours and working patterns in rural areas differ considerably from those in urban areas and that it is important to offer childcare adapted to the specific needs of women in different areas; calls on Member States and regional and local authorities to support social frameworks, such as for the elderly, dependents and to provide more flexible childcare provisions and opportunities for parental leave, as they are essential to encouraging and enabling more women to become entrepreneurs; calls on Member States to implement the Barcelona targets, ensuring the coverage of these needs through investment in accessible and affordable high-quality care services and to modernise them so that women do not have to choose between family and participation in the labour market; emphasises that further enabling and improving women’s possibilities to become entrepreneurs can play a vital role in closing the gender pay gap in Member States; welcomes actions already taken by some Member States on this matter, and urges them to ensure access to quality childcare and long-term care services, to promote access for the self-employed and to swiftly and fully transpose and implement the Work-Life Balance Directive, and calls on the Commission to monitor it effectively; recognises national differences in social policy and respect for subsidiarity; highlights it is in the interest of Member States to promote family-friendly working models;

28.  Is concerned that the Court of Auditors, in its Special report No 10/21 on gender mainstreaming in the EU budget, found that the Commission had not adequately implemented gender mainstreaming and had made insufficient use of sex-disaggregated data and indicators; calls on the Commission to implement gender-responsive budgeting to ensure women and men benefit equally from public spending, including in NextGenerationEU and all the economic recovery measures;

o
o   o

29.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ C 11, 12.1.2018, p. 35. (2) OJ C 66, 21.2.2018, p. 44. (3) OJ C 346, 27.9.2018, p. 6. (4) OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 28. (5) OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 232. (6) OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 191. (7) OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 208. (8) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 137. (9) OECD, The Missing Entrepreneurs - Policies for Inclusive Entrepreneurship, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2019. (10) OECD, The Missing Entrepreneurs - Policies for Inclusive Entrepreneurship, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2019. (11) Bajcar, B. and Babiak, J., ‘Gender Differences in Leadership Styles: Who Leads more Destructively?’, 34th IBIMA Conference, Madrid, November 2019. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337534934_Gender_Differences_in_Leadership_Styles_Who_Leads_more_Destructively. (12) European Parliament Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, ‘The professional status of rural women in the EU’, Brussels, May 2019. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/608868/IPOL_STU(2019)608868_EN.pdf. (13) Ibid. (14) Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Women’s Entrepreneurship 2020/21: Thriving Through Class, London, 2021, https://gemconsortium.org/report/gem-202021-womens-entrepreneurship-report-thriving-through-crisis. (15) Eurostat, Women in Management , Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020. (16) Foss, L., Henry, C., Ahl, H. and Mikalsen, G., ‘Women’s entrepreneurship policy research: a 30-year review of the evidence’, Small Business Economics, 53(2), pp.409-429. (17) OECD, The Missing Entrepreneurs - Policies for Inclusive Entrepreneurship, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2019. (18) Ibid. (19) OECD, OECD/INFE 2020 International Survey of Adult Financial Literacy, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2020. (20) Skonieczna, A. and Castellano, L., ‘Gender Smart Financing. Investing In and With Women: Opportunities for Europe’, European Economy Discussion Papers, No 129, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, July 2020. (21) European Commission and European Investment Bank, Funding women entrepreneurs: How to empower growth, 2018. (22) Women in VC, Experior Venture Fund and Unvconventional, Funding in the CEE Region Through the Lens of Gender Diversity and Positive Impact, 2021. (23) EBAN, Statistics Compendium – European Early Stage Market Statistics, EBAN, Brussels, 2019. (24) International Finance Corporation, Moving Towards Gender Balance in Private Equity and Venture Capital, International Finance Corporation, Washington DC, 2019. (25) Women in VC, Experior Venture Fund and Unconventional Ventures, ‘Funding in the CEE Region Through the Lens of Gender Diversity and Positive Impact’, online. (26) European Commission, Gender Smart Financing. Investing In and With Women: Opportunities for Europe, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020. (27) OECD, The Missing Entrepreneurs - Policies for Inclusive Entrepreneurship, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2021. (28) Eurofound, Female entrepreneurship: Public and private funding, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2019. (29) Eurostat, ‘Women in science and technology’, Products Eurostat News, 2 October 2020. (30) OECD, The Missing Entrepreneurs - Policies for Inclusive Entrepreneurship, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2019. (31) https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/supporting-entrepreneurship/women-entrepreneurs/support-tools-and-networks-women_en (32) Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2021/2022 Global Report - Opportunity Amid Disruption, GEM, London, 2022, https://www.gemconsortium.org/reports/latest-global-report.

European Parliament resolution of 3 May 2022 on artificial intelligence in a digital age (2020/2266(INI))

P9_TA(2022)0140 A9-0088/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Articles 4, 16, 26, 114, 169, 173, 179, 180, 181 and 187 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

–  having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and General Comment No 25 of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child of 2 March 2021 on children’s rights in relation to the digital environment,

–  having regard to the recommendation of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on the ethics of artificial intelligence adopted by the UNESCO General Conference at its 41st session on 24 November 2021,

–  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making(1) and the Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 March 2021 on the EU strategy on the rights of the child (COM(2021)0142),

–  having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the state of EU cyber defence capabilities(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on the challenges and prospects for multilateral weapons of mass destruction arms control and disarmament regimes(3),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation – GDPR)(4),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240(5),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013(6),

–  having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2021 laying down harmonised rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and amending certain Union legislative acts (COM(2021)0206),

–  having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on European data governance (Data Governance Act) (COM(2020)0767),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2018/1807 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on a framework for the free flow of non-personal data in the European Union(7),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092(8),

–  having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services(9),

–  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 of 13 July 2021 on establishing the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1488(10),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 25 April 2018 entitled ‘Artificial Intelligence for Europe’ (COM(2018)0237),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 7 December 2018 on a coordinated plan on artificial intelligence (COM(2018)0795),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 April 2019 on building trust in human-centric artificial intelligence (COM(2019)0168),

–  having regard to the Commission White Paper of 19 February 2020 entitled ‘Artificial Intelligence – A European approach to excellence and trust’ (COM(2020)0065),

–  having regard to the Commission Green Paper of 27 January 2021 on ageing – fostering solidarity and responsibility between generations (COM(2021)0050),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2020 on a European strategy for data (COM(2020)0066),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2020 on shaping Europe’s digital future (COM(2020)0067),

–  having regard to the Commission communications of 10 March 2020 on a new industrial strategy for Europe (COM(2020)0102) and of 5 May 2021 entitled ‘Updating the 2020 New Industrial Strategy: Building a stronger Single Market for Europe’s recovery’ (COM(2021)0350),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 September 2020 entitled ‘Digital Education Action Plan 2021-2027 – Resetting education and training for the digital age’ (COM(2020)0624),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 March 2021 entitled ‘2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade’ (COM(2021)0118),

–  having regard to the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the 2030 Policy Programme ‘Path to the Digital Decade’ (COM(2021)0574),

–  having regard to the Commission study of 28 July 2020 entitled ‘European enterprise survey on the use of technologies based on artificial intelligence’,

–  having regard to the Commission study of 26 November 2020 entitled ‘Energy-efficient cloud computing technologies and policies for an eco-friendly cloud market’,

–  having regard to the Commission report to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee of 19 February 2020 on the safety and liability implications of artificial intelligence, the internet of things and robotics (COM(2020)0064),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 March 2021 on the EU’s cybersecurity strategy for the digital decade,

–  having regard to the report of the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence of 8 April 2019 entitled ‘Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI’,

–  having regard to the report of the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence of 8 April 2019 entitled ‘A definition of AI: main capabilities and disciplines’,

–  having regard to the report of the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence of 26 June 2019 entitled ‘Policy and investment recommendations for trustworthy AI’,

–  having regard to the UNESCO publication of March 2019 entitled ‘I’d blush if I could: closing gender divides in digital skills through education’,

–  having regard to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights report of 14 December 2020 entitled ‘Getting the future right – Artificial intelligence and fundamental rights’,

–  having regard to the recommendation of the Council of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of 22 May 2019 on artificial intelligence,

–  having regard to the UN platform for dialogue on artificial intelligence: AI for Good Global Summit,

–  having regard to the G20 AI Principles of 9 June 2019,

–  having regard to the World Health Organization report of 28 June 2021 on artificial intelligence in health and six guiding principles for its design and use,

–  having regard to the European Economic and Social Committee own-initiative opinion of 31 May 2017 entitled ‘Artificial Intelligence – The consequences of artificial intelligence on the (digital) single market, production, consumption, employment and society’(11),

–  having regard to the report of the Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies – New Technologies Formation of 21 November 2019 entitled ‘Liability for Artificial Intelligence and other emerging digital technologies’,

–  having regard to the publication of the Ad hoc Committee on Artificial Intelligence (CAHAI) of the Council of Europe of December 2020 entitled ‘Towards Regulation of AI systems – Global perspectives on the development of a legal framework on Artificial Intelligence systems based on the Council of Europe’s standards on human rights, democracy and the rule of law’,

–  having regard to the European University Institute working paper of October 2020 entitled ‘Models of Law and Regulation for AI’,

–  having regard to the joint report by Trend Micro Research, the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and Europol of 19 November 2020 entitled ‘Malicious Uses and Abuses of Artificial Intelligence’,

–  having regard to the Commission’s political guidelines for 2019-2024 entitled ‘A Union that strives for more: my agenda for Europe’,

–  having regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 16 July 2020 in case C-311/18 (Schrems II),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on civil law rules on robotics(12),

–  having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2017 on digitising European industry(13),

–  having regard to its resolution of 6 October 2021 on the EU Road Safety Policy Framework 2021-2030 – Recommendations on next steps towards ‘Vision Zero’(14),

–  having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on autonomous weapon systems(15),

–  having regard to its resolution of 12 February 2019 on a comprehensive European industrial policy on artificial intelligence and robotics(16),

–  having regard to its resolution of 12 February 2020 entitled ‘Automated decision-making processes: ensuring consumer protection and free movement of goods and services’(17),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence(18),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2020 on intellectual property rights for the development of artificial intelligence technologies(19),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a framework of ethical aspects of artificial intelligence, robotics and related technologies(20),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 on artificial intelligence: questions of interpretation and application of international law in so far as the EU is affected in the areas of civil and military uses and of state authority outside the scope of criminal justice (21),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 entitled ‘Shaping the digital future of Europe: removing barriers to the functioning of the digital single market and improving the use of AI for European consumers’(22),

–  having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on a European strategy for data(23),

–  having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on artificial intelligence in education, culture and the audiovisual sector(24),

–  having regard to its resolution of 6 October 2021 on artificial intelligence in criminal law and its use by the police and judicial authorities in criminal matters(25),

–  having regard to the study by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies (DG IPOL) of June 2021 entitled ‘Artificial Intelligence diplomacy – Artificial Intelligence governance as a new European Union external policy tool’,

–  having regard to the DG IPOL study of May 2021 entitled ‘Challenges and limits of an open source approach to Artificial Intelligence’,

–  having regard to the DG IPOL of May 2021 entitled ‘Artificial Intelligence market and capital flows – AI and the financial sector at crossroads’,

–  having regard to the DG IPOL study of June 2021 entitled ‘Improving working conditions using Artificial Intelligence’,

–  having regard to the DG IPOL study of May 2021 entitled ‘The role of Artificial Intelligence in the European Green Deal’,

–  having regard to the DG IPOL study of July 2021 entitled ‘Artificial Intelligence in smart cities and urban mobility’,

–  having regard to the DG IPOL study of July 2021 entitled ‘Artificial Intelligence and public services’,

–  having regard to the DG IPOL study of July 2021 entitled ‘European Union data challenge’,

–  having regard to the DG IPOL study of June 2020 entitled ‘Opportunities of Artificial Intelligence’,

–  having regard to the DG IPOL study of October 2021 entitled ‘Europe’s Digital Decade and Autonomy’,

–  having regard to the DG IPOL study of January 2022 entitled ‘Identification and assessment of existing and draft EU legislation in the digital field’,

–  having regard to the European Parliament Research Service (EPRS) study of September 2020 entitled ‘Civil liability regime for artificial intelligence – European added value assessment’,

–  having regard to the EPRS Scientific Foresight Unit study of December 2020 entitled ‘Data subjects, digital surveillance, AI and the future of work’,

–  having regard to the EPRS study of September 2020 entitled ‘European framework on ethical aspects of artificial intelligence, robotics and related technologies’,

–  having regard to the EPRS study of March 2020 entitled ‘The ethics of artificial intelligence: Issues and initiatives’,

–  having regard to the EPRS study of June 2020 entitled ‘Artificial Intelligence: How does it work, why does it matter, and what can we do about it?’,

–  having regard to the EPRS study of July 2020 entitled ‘Artificial Intelligence and Law enforcement – Impact on Fundamental Rights’,

–  having regard to the EPRS study of June 2020 entitled ‘The impact of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on artificial intelligence’,

–  having regard to the EPRS study of April 2020 entitled ‘The White Paper on Artificial Intelligence’,

–  having regard to the EPRS study of September 2021 entitled ‘Regulating facial recognition in the EU’,

–  having regard to the EPRS study of February 2021 entitled ‘The future of work: Trends, challenges and potential initiatives’,

–  having regard to the EPRS study of June 2021 entitled ‘Robo-advisors: How do they fit in the existing EU regulatory framework, in particular with regard to investor protection?’,

–  having regard to the EPRS study of September 2021 entitled ‘China’s ambitions in artificial intelligence’,

–  having regard to the EPRS study of June 2021 entitled ‘What if we chose new metaphors for artificial intelligence?’,

–  having regard to the EPRS study of January 2018 entitled ‘Understanding artificial intelligence’,

–  having regard to the EPRS study of July 2021 entitled ‘Tackling deepfakes in European policy’,

–  having regard to the working paper of the Special Committee on Artificial Intelligence in a Digital Age (AIDA) of February 2021 entitled ‘Artificial Intelligence and Health’,

–  having regard to the AIDA working paper of March 2021 entitled ‘Artificial Intelligence and the Green Deal’,

–  having regard to the AIDA working paper of March 2021 entitled ‘The External Policy Dimensions of AI’,

–  having regard to the AIDA working paper of May 2021 entitled ‘AI and Competitiveness’,

–  having regard to the AIDA working paper of June 2021 entitled ‘AI and the Future of Democracy’,

–  having regard to the AIDA working paper of June 2021 on ‘AI and the Labour Market’,

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Special Committee on Artificial Intelligence in a Digital Age (A9-0088/2022),

1.Introduction

1.  Notes that the world stands on the verge of the fourth industrial revolution; points out that in comparison with the three previous waves, initiated by the introduction of steam, electricity, and then computers, the fourth wave draws its energy from an abundance of data combined with powerful algorithms and computing capacity; stresses that today’s digital revolution is shaped by its global scale, fast convergence, and the enormous impact of emerging technological breakthroughs on states, economies, societies, international relations and the environment; recognises that radical change of this scale has differing impacts on various parts of society depending on their objectives, geographical location or socio-economic context; emphasises that the digital transition must be shaped with full respect for fundamental rights and in such a way that digital technologies serve humanity;

2.  Observes that the digital revolution has, at the same time, triggered a global competition as a result of the tremendous economic value and technological capabilities that have accumulated in economies that commit the most resources to the research, development and marketing of artificial intelligence (AI) applications; notes that digital competitiveness and open strategic autonomy have become a central policy objective in several countries; stresses the growing realisation among decision makers that emerging technologies could affect the geopolitical power status of entire countries;

3.  Points out that Europe, which for centuries set international standards, dominated technological progress and led in high-end manufacturing and deployment, has therefore fallen behind, developing and investing far less than leading economies like the US or China in the digital market, while remaining relatively competitive in AI thematic research output; recognises the risk of European actors being marginalised in the development of global standards and advancements of technology and of European values being challenged;

4.  Highlights, firstly, that digital tools are increasingly becoming an instrument of manipulation and abuse in the hands of some corporate actors as well as in the hands of autocratic governments for the purpose of undermining democratic political systems, thus potentially leading to a clash between political systems; explains that digital espionage, sabotage, low-scale warfare and disinformation campaigns challenge democratic societies;

5.  Stresses that the nature of digital business models allows for great degrees of scalability and network effects; points out that many digital markets are characterised by a high degree of market concentration, allowing a small number of tech platforms, most of which are currently US-based, to lead the commercialisation of groundbreaking technological innovations, attract the best ideas, talent and companies and achieve extraordinary profitability; warns that dominant market positions in the data economy are likely to be extended into the emerging AI economy; points out that only eight of today’s top 200 digital companies are domiciled in the EU; stresses that the completion of a true digital single market is of the highest importance in that regard;

6.  Emphasises that as a result, the global competition for tech leadership has become a priority in the EU; stresses that if the EU does not act swiftly and courageously, it will end up having to follow rules and standards set by others and risks damaging effects on political stability, social security, fundamental rights, individual liberties and economic competitiveness;

7.  Argues that AI is one of the key emerging technologies within the fourth industrial revolution; notes that AI fuels the digital economy, as it allows for the introduction of innovative products and services, has the power to increase consumer choice and can render production processes more efficient; states that by 2030, AI is expected to contribute more than EUR 11 trillion to the global economy; stresses, at the same time, that AI technologies risk reducing human agency; highlights that AI should remain a human-centric, trustworthy technology and should not substitute human autonomy nor assume the loss of individual freedom; stresses the need to ensure that this fourth industrial revolution is inclusive and leaves no one behind;

8.  Suggests that there is a global contest for AI leadership; points out that AI technologies promise to deliver immense economic value to those economies which profitably develop, produce and adopt such technologies, as well as to those countries in which such value creation takes place; underlines that AI is not an omnipotent technology, but an efficient set of tools and techniques that can be put to the benefit of society; explains that how technologies function depends on how we design them; points out that the EU has declared its intention to pioneer a regulatory framework on AI; stresses, nonetheless, that it is crucial for the EU to be able to define the regulatory approach, including the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and to act as a global standard-setter; stresses, therefore, the importance of European competitiveness in AI and the ability of the EU to shape the regulatory landscape at international level; stresses that certain uses of AI may pose individual and societal risks that can endanger fundamental rights and should therefore be addressed by policymakers, thereby allowing AI to effectively become an instrument that serves people and society, pursuing the common good and general interest;

9.  Notes that a clear regulatory framework, political commitment and a more forward-leaning mindset, which are often lacking at present, are needed for European actors to be successful in the digital age and to become technology leaders in AI; concludes that based on such an approach, both EU citizens and businesses can benefit from AI and the great opportunity it offers to boost competitiveness, including with regard to prosperity and well-being; underlines that regulatory frameworks must be shaped in such a way as not to impose unjustified barriers to prevent European actors from being successful in the digital age, in particular for start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); highlights that private and public investments should be substantially increased to create a climate in which more European success stories emerge and develop on our continent;

10.  Highlights that rapid technological progress introduced by AI is increasingly inextricable from most areas of human activity and will also affect the livelihoods of everyone who does not possess the skills they need to adapt fast enough to these new technologies; points out that while achieving digital literacy through upskilling and reskilling can help to address many of the resulting socio-economic concerns, these impacts should also be addressed in the context of social welfare systems, urban and rural infrastructure, and democratic processes;

11.  Emphasises the need to reflect the objectives and interests of women and vulnerable groups in the digital transition; highlights, in this context, that women only accounted for 22 % of global AI professionals in 2018, a problem that serves only to perpetuate and entrench stereotypes and bias; recognises the need to preserve the rights to equality before the law, privacy, freedom of expression, and participation in cultural and political life when using AI technologies, especially for minority communities;

2. Potential opportunities, risks and obstacles in the use of AI: six case studies examined by the AIDA Committee

12.  Recalls that AI is based on software that uses probabilistic models and algorithmic prediction for a set of specific objectives; points out that the term AI is an umbrella term covering a wide range of old and new technologies, techniques and approaches better understood as ‘artificial intelligence systems’, which refers to any machine-based systems that often have little more in common than being guided by a given set of human-defined objectives, with varying degrees of autonomy in their actions, and engaging in predictions, recommendations or decision-making based on available data; notes that while some of these technologies are already in widespread use, others are still under development or are even just speculative concepts that may or may not exist in the future;

13.  Points out that there is a significant difference between symbolic AI, the main approach to AI from the 1950s to the 1990s, and machine-learning, data-driven AI, which has dominated since the 2000s; clarifies that during the first wave, AI was developed by encoding the knowledge and experience of experts into a set of rules that was then executed by a machine;

14.  Notes that in the second wave, the automated learning processes of algorithms based on the processing of large amounts of data, the ability to bring together inputs from multiple different sources and form complex representations of a given environment, and the identification of patterns made AI systems more complex, autonomous and opaque, which can lead to less explainable outcomes; stresses that current AI can therefore be broken down into many different sub-domains and techniques, whereby deep learning is for instance a subfield of machine learning, which itself is a subfield of AI;

15.  Notes that although today’s AI has become much more effective and powerful than symbolic AI, thanks to the significant increases in computing capacities, it can still only solve clearly defined tasks in domain-specific niches such as chess or image recognition and its programming is not designed to fully recognise the actions that the AI system performs; highlights that AI systems – contrary to what their name suggests – do not have ‘intelligence’ in a human sense; points out that it is therefore referred to as ‘narrow’ or ‘weak’ AI and is still no more than a tool that provides recommendations and predictions; notes, for instance, that self-driving cars operate through a combination of various one-task AI systems that together are able to provide a three-dimensional map of the surroundings of the vehicle so that its operating system can make decisions;

16.  Highlights that many fears linked to AI are based on hypothetical concepts such as general AI, artificial superintelligence and singularity which could, in theory, lead to machine intelligence outperforming human intelligence in many areas; stresses that there are doubts as to whether this speculative AI can even be achieved with our technologies and scientific laws; believes, nevertheless, that the risks currently posed by AI-based decision-making need to be addressed by the legislators as it is demonstrably clear that harmful effects such as racial and sex discrimination are already attributable to particular instances where AI has been deployed without safeguards;

17.  Underlines that the majority of AI systems currently in use are low-risk; refers, for instance, to automatic translation, ‘Eureka machines’, gaming machines and robots that carry out repetitive manufacturing processes; concludes that some use cases can be categorised as risky and that such cases require regulatory action and effective safeguards, should these not already be in place;

18.  Encourages a public debate on how to explore the enormous potential of AI based on fundamental European values, the principles of transparency, explainability, fairness, accountability, responsibility and trustworthiness, as well as the principle that AI and robotics should be human-centred and developed to complement humans; stresses that in a significant number of areas of human life, from sustainability to healthcare, AI can provide benefits as an auxiliary tool for users and professionals, augmenting the capabilities of humans without impeding their ability to freely act and decide; stresses that the agreed AI ethical principles and requirements should be operationalised in all domains of AI application, building in the necessary safeguards, which will increase citizens’ trust, thereby making them embrace the benefits of AI;

19.  Underlines that the level of risk of a particular AI application varies significantly depending on the likelihood and severity of harm; highlights, therefore, that legal requirements should be adjusted to this, in line with a risk-based approach and taking into due account, when justified, the precautionary principle; stresses that in such present or future instances where, in a particular use case, AI systems pose high risks to fundamental and human rights, full human oversight and regulatory intervention are needed and that, given the speed of technological development, regulation for high-risk AI systems needs to be flexible and future-proof;

20.  Illustrates that the present report addresses six AI case studies in detail, outlining the opportunities offered by AI in the respective sector, the risks to be addressed and the obstacles preventing Europe from fully harnessing the benefits of AI; highlights that the case studies represent some of the most important AI use cases today and, at the same time, reflect some of the main topics of the public hearings held by the AIDA Committee during its mandate, namely health, the Green Deal, external policy and security, competitiveness, the future of democracy and the labour market;

a) AI and health

21.  Finds that the methodological analysis of large amounts of data, including through AI, can unlock new solutions or improve existing techniques in the health sector that could speed up scientific research enormously, save human lives and improve patient care by offering innovative treatments and better diagnosis and fostering supportive environments for healthy lifestyles; highlights that AI systems can also contribute to the accessibility, resilience and sustainability of health systems, while at the same time bringing a competitive edge to the European ICT and healthcare sectors if the inherent risks are managed appropriately;

22.  Highlights that the use of AI in the health sector should be anchored in strong ethical requirements such as equitable access to healthcare, privacy, liability, transparency, explainability, reliability, inclusiveness and representability of data sets, and constant human oversight; stresses that the design of AI-based systems must address the risk of resources being wrongly allocated to individuals based on faulty or biased categorisation, prioritisation or malfunctioning technology, leading to misdiagnosis, maltreatment or no treatment at all; believes that the highest ethical standards should apply to all healthcare applications and that ethical rules should be established at a very early stage in their development and design, i.e. ethics by design; underlines that automated decision-making in healthcare applications may pose risks to patients’ well‑being and fundamental rights and stresses that AI must therefore have a supportive role in healthcare, where professional human oversight should always be maintained; calls for AI in medical diagnoses in public health systems to preserve the patient-doctor relationship and to be consistent with the Hippocratic oath at all times; notes, however, that AI improves the accuracy of screening and is already outperforming doctors’ diagnoses in several instances; finds that the existing liability frameworks do not provide sufficient legal certainty and do not uphold the right of patients to legal redress in the event of misdiagnosis and incorrect treatment through AI; welcomes, in this regard, the upcoming legislative proposal on AI liability; notes that it is important to protect health professionals as users of AI systems, as well as patients as end recipients, providing them with sufficient and transparent information;

23.  Underlines that AI-based solutions are already being used or tested in clinical settings with the aim of supporting diagnosis, prognosis, treatment and patient engagement, thus speeding up and improving treatment and reducing unnecessary interventions; notes, moreover, that AI can enhance personalised medicine and patient care; notes that AI is currently covering a wide range of health areas, including public health, care services, self-care and health systems; remarks that data plays an important role; finds that there are promising applications for AI in extracting information from images and in other medical devices to inform downstream analysis and notes that it is also expected that deep learning algorithms can deliver a quantitative leap in a variety of clinical tasks;

24.  Highlights that AI technologies can be applied to the research, development and mass production of pharmaceuticals and have the potential to speed up the development of new drugs, treatments and vaccines at a lower cost; finds that AI can help predict the outcome of responses to treatments and can allow doctors to adjust therapeutic strategies according to individual genetic or physiological characteristics with increasing levels of accuracy when based on high-quality data and sound assumptions, thereby increasing the effectiveness of preventive care, provided that all ethical requirements are met with regard to professional oversight over AI clinical validation, privacy, data protection and informed consent; notes that big data in health can be analysed with the aid of AI to accelerate its processing; underlines the importance of ensuring that high-performance computing is interoperable with AI, as major economic sectors including manufacturing, health and pharmaceuticals rely on high-performance computing;

25.  Underlines that AI-based solutions have the potential to tailor treatments and drug development to patients’ specific needs and enhance engagement with stakeholders and participants in the healthcare system; finds that AI and access to relevant, updated and high-quality anonymised and representative data sets, in line with the EU rules on personal data protection, supports healthcare professionals to help them provide better care for their patients and more personalised feedback, guidance and support, promoting patient safety and making therapy more effective; highlights that this may be particularly helpful in selecting and reviewing the growing body of scientific knowledge for the purposes of extracting relevant insights for health professionals; highlights that citizens from all Member States should be able to share their health data with healthcare providers and authorities of their choice; underlines, in this regard, the need to create incentives for upskilling, reskilling and outskilling for workers in health careers;

26.  Finds that the fight against COVID-19 has both accelerated research into and the deployment of new technologies, notably AI applications, in the quest for improved case detection, clinical care and therapeutics research, and highlighted the usefulness of AI as well as the importance of funding and high-quality data for the purpose of the efficient monitoring and modelling of the spread of infectious disease outbreaks, in accordance with data protection law; notes, however, that experiences with AI applications during COVID-19 have revealed some of the limitations in the use of AI in medical diagnostics(26);

27.  Highlights the potential of AI systems to alleviate the burden on health systems and health professionals in particular and to contribute to solutions to provide care to rapidly ageing populations in Europe and the world and protect them from dangerous diseases;

28.  Highlights that the use of safe and efficient AI applications for administrative tasks that do not require human action can save a lot of time for healthcare workers that can be devoted to patient visits instead;

29.  Stresses that consumer health applications based on AI can help track an individual’s health status through everyday devices such as smartphones, allowing users to voluntarily provide data which can be the basis for early warnings and alerts regarding life-threatening illnesses such as strokes or cardiac arrests; stresses that health applications based on AI may also encourage healthy behaviour and empower responsible self-care for individuals by equipping patients with additional means to monitor their own health and lifestyle and by improving the accuracy of screening by healthcare professionals; points out, however, the particular sensitivity of personal health data and the risk of data breaches or misuses in this regard, and underlines the need to apply strong cybersecurity standards for any health application;

30.  Stresses that AI in the health sector is particularly dependent on large amounts of personal data, data sharing, high data quality, data accessibility and data interoperability to realise the full potential of AI and health; stresses the need to facilitate the linking of electronic health records with e-prescribing systems in order to allow health professionals involved in patient care to access the necessary information on the patient, subject to his or her consent;

31.  Welcomes the creation of a European health data space in order to build in data of very high quality for use in the health sector; considers that the interconnection and interoperability of high-performance computing infrastructure with the European health data space would ensure the availability of large, high-quality health data sets, which are important for researching and treating pathologies, especially rare diseases and paediatric conditions;

32.  Stresses the need to build trust by promoting interoperability and more collaboration between different healthcare professionals serving the same patients; stresses the need to offer training to healthcare professionals on AI techniques and approaches; stresses the need to combat mistrust, such as by tapping into the full potential of data anonymisation and pseudonymisation, and to better inform citizens, health professionals and decision makers about the uses, benefits and risks of AI in the field of health, as well as AI developers about the challenges and risks of processing sensitive data in this domain;

33.  Believes, moreover, that binding and robust ethical and legal standards and enforceable rights of redress are necessary to promote an ecosystem of trust among citizens and to adequately protect health data from potential misuse and unlawful access; agrees with the Commission that citizens should have secure access to a comprehensive electronic record of data concerning their health and should retain control over personal data concerning their health and be able to share it securely, with effective protection for personal data and strong cybersecurity, with authorised third parties; highlights that unauthorised access and dissemination should be prohibited and that the protection of patients’ personal data must be guaranteed in compliance with data protection legislation;

34.  Underlines, in this regard, the risk of biased decisions leading to discrimination and violations of human rights; stresses the need, therefore, for impartial checks on the algorithms and data sets used, and for the promotion of further research on the methods and bias embedded in trained AI systems in order to prevent unethical and discriminatory conclusions in the field of human health data;

35.  Stresses that an efficient and uniform application of the GDPR across the EU is needed in order to overcome challenges such as legal uncertainty and a lack of cooperation in the health sector; stresses that such challenges lead in some cases to delays in scientific discoveries and a bureaucratic burden in health research; stresses that the creation of a European health data space that guarantees patients’ rights and data portability could increase cooperation and stimulate data sharing for research and innovation in the European health sector;

36.  Notes that AI can contribute to the rapid progress of new technologies, such as brain imaging, which already have important applications in medicine but also entail substantial risks to human agency and the expression of fundamental rights without requiring consent; is concerned about the lack of legislation concerning neurological data and believes that the EU should strive to become a world leader in the development of safe neurological technologies;

b) AI and the Green Deal

37.  Highlights that the Commission’s two key priorities for the years to come are a Europe fit for the digital age and the Green Deal; underlines the need to ensure that the digital transition contributes to the achievement of sustainable development and promotes the green transition; finds that this requires an acceleration of innovation compatible with the EU’s climate targets and environmental standards; highlights that AI applications may be able to bring environmental and economic benefits and strengthen predictive capabilities that can contribute to the fight against climate change and to achieving the objectives of the European Green Deal and the EU’s target of becoming the first climate-neutral continent by 2050; finds that the use of AI has the potential to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by up to 4 % by 2030(27); finds that according to some estimates, ICT technologies may reduce 10 times more greenhouse gas emissions than their own footprint(28), but recognises that this requires conscious design choices and regulatory action; warns, at the same time, that the increasing energy consumption in storing the large data sets needed to train AI systems can also have a negative effect; recalls that data traffic and ICT infrastructure consume about 7 % of the world’s electricity today, a figure which, without the right safeguards, is projected to increase to 13 % by 2030; adds that the intensive use of raw materials to build microprocessors and high-tech devices using AI can also contribute to this negative impact; underlines that in order to guarantee the ‘large handprint but small footprint’ of AI on the environment and climate, these direct and indirect negative environmental impacts need to be considered and AI systems need to be designed to promote sustainable consumption, limit resource usage and energy consumption, avoid unnecessary processing operations and prevent damage to the environment; emphasises that addressing the environmental impact of the ICT sector requires relevant information and data;

38.  Is concerned that only six Member States have included a strong focus on AI applications in their efforts to meet the Green Deal objectives; finds that AI can be used to collect and organise information relevant to environmental planning, decision-making and the management and monitoring of the progress of environmental policies, for instance for cleaner air, where AI applications can monitor pollution and warn of hazards; highlights that such AI and digital solutions could be used across several sectors to scale up resource-efficient solutions;

39.  Emphasises the importance of AI-based systems in developing smart cities and villages by optimising resource use and increasing the resilience of infrastructure, including through traffic prediction and reduction, smart energy management, emergency assistance and waste, as is already the case in several cities and municipalities across the EU; stresses that AI-based solutions can further assist in urban planning, architecture, construction and engineering processes to reduce emissions, construction time, costs and waste;

40.  Stresses that the energy transition will not take place without digitalisation; highlights that AI can monitor, optimise and reduce energy consumption and production, as well as support the integration of renewable energies into existing electricity grids; underlines that smart meters, efficient lighting, cloud computing and distributed software together with an AI component have the potential to transform energy use patterns and promote responsible usage;

41.  Highlights that the growing complexity of an energy transition system, with increased volatile renewable generation and changes in load management, makes increasing automated control necessary for energy supply security; stresses that AI has the potential to benefit security of supply, especially in the operation, monitoring, maintenance and control of water, gas and electricity networks; notes, however, that AI-enhanced grid technologies will introduce millions of intelligent components with common vulnerabilities, adding a large number of potential attack points to the energy networks and increasing the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure, if the appropriate cybersecurity provisions are not in place; finds that smart grids require further investment and research;

42.  Finds that AI and other digital applications for mobility and transport have the potential to optimise traffic flows and enhance road safety, including by increasing the efficiency of transport systems; points out that AI can inform the design and energy management of energy-efficient vehicles; highlights that the options for app-based ride services, ride pooling and car sharing have considerably increased and that AI is often used in such mobility services through efficient route planning and pick-up point selection;

43.  Believes that AI can have a transformative role in the agricultural sector, supporting the emergence of new harvesting methods, including harvest prediction and agricultural resource management; stresses that agriculture is a key sector in which AI can help cut emissions and the use of pesticides, fertilisers, chemicals and water by focusing their use on the exact amount and in a narrower area; further stresses that AI can contribute to the restoration of biodiversity by monitoring endangered species or tracking deforestation activities; highlights the need to develop deployment guidelines and standardised assessment methodologies to support ‘green AI’ in areas such as smart grids, precision farming, and smart and sustainable cities as well as communities; is of the opinion that AI in the form of precision farming has the potential to optimise the on‑farm production of food as well as broader land management by improving land use planning, predicting land use change and monitoring crop health, as well as the potential to transform predictions of extreme weather events;

44.  Stresses that AI can contribute to the circular economy by rendering production, consumption and recycling processes and behaviour more resource-efficient and increasing the transparency of material use, for example with regard to the ethical sourcing of raw materials and reduced waste; highlights that AI has the potential to increase businesses’ understanding of their emissions, including in value chains, thus helping them to adjust and achieve individual emissions targets; underlines that digital tools can help businesses to implement the necessary steps towards more sustainable conduct, especially SMEs which otherwise may not have the resources to do so;

45.  Highlights that it is not currently possible to use AI to fully measure environmental impacts; finds that there is a need for more studies on the role of AI in reducing environmental impacts; stresses that more environmental data is needed in order to gain more insight and induce more progress through AI solutions; underlines that using AI to systematically connect data on CO2 emissions with data on production and consumption patterns, supply chains and logistics routes could ensure that activities that have a positive or negative impact are detected;

c) External policy and the security dimension of AI

46.  Reiterates that the EU is pushing for a global agreement on common standards for the responsible use of AI, which is of paramount importance; believes, as a matter of principle however, in the potential of like-minded democracies to work together to jointly shape the international debate on an AI framework that is respectful of human rights and the rule of law, to work together towards certain common norms and principles, technical and ethical standards, and guidelines for responsible state behaviour, especially under the umbrella of intergovernmental organisations such as the UN and OECD, thereby promoting multilateralism, sustainable development, interoperability and data sharing on the international stage; supports the work of the UN Open-Ended Working Group on ICT and international security; underlines that confidence-building measures are essential to increase the level of dialogue and trust; calls, therefore, for more transparency in the use of AI in order to ensure better accountability;

47.  Welcomes the recent multilateral initiatives to develop guidelines and standards for an ethically responsible use of AI such as the OECD principles on AI, the Global Partnership on AI, the UNESCO recommendation on the ethics of AI, the AI for Good Global Summit, the Council of Europe’s recommendations for a possible legal framework on AI, and UNICEF’s policy guidance on AI for children; welcomes the work ongoing at international level on AI standards and the progress made with the International Organization for Standardization standards on the governance implications of AI;

48.  Welcomes, furthermore, the establishment and operationalisation of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC); salutes the outcome of the TTC’s first meeting in Pittsburgh; sees the TTC as a potential forum for global coordination between the European Union and the United States for setting global rules for AI and global technological standards that safeguard our common values, for boosting joint investment, research and development, and for closer political coordination in international institutions on issues related to technology and AI;

49.  Highlights the key role the EU can play in setting global standards, as the first bloc in the world to introduce legislation on AI; stresses that the Union’s legal framework on AI could make Europe a world leader in the sector and should therefore be promoted worldwide by cooperating with all international partners while continuing the critical and ethics-based dialogue with third countries that have alternative governance models and standards on AI;

50.  Observes that the Chinese Government has signed standards and cooperation agreements with 52 countries through its Belt and Road Initiative; warns that since several of these standards, including on AI technologies and in particular in relation to government surveillance and individual liberties, are not in line with human rights and EU values, China’s standards activism poses a challenge for the EU;

51.  Stresses that AI technologies, especially those that have not been designed and developed with the explicit control procedures in place and are used improperly and without oversight in military command centres or in missile launch facilities, entail particularly significant risks and could escalate an automated reciprocal conflict;

52.  Notes that the use of AI systems in defence-related developments is considered a game changer in military operations through the analysis of data, the ability to reflect greater situational complexity, the potential to improve target accuracy, optimise logistics and engage in armed conflicts with a reduced risk of physical harm to civilian populations and one’s own military personnel, as well as using data for the development of modes of action such as wargaming; cautions, however, that this could lead to a lower threshold for the use of force and therefore more conflicts; affirms that machines cannot make human-like decisions involving the legal principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution; affirms that humans should be kept in control of the decision to deploy and use weapons and remain accountable for the use of lethal force and for decisions over life and death; is of the opinion that AI-based weapons systems should be subject to global standards and an international ethical code of conduct to underpin the deployment of AI technologies in military operations, with full respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law and in compliance with Union law and values;

53.  Is concerned about the military research and technological developments being pursued in some countries with regard to lethal autonomous weapons systems without meaningful human control; observes that lethal autonomous weapons systems are already used in military conflicts; recalls that Parliament has repeatedly called for an international ban on the development, production and use of lethal autonomous weapons systems and for effective negotiations to begin on their prohibition; stresses that AI-enabled systems can under no circumstances be allowed to replace human decision-making involving the legal principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution;

54.  Notes, in particular, that AI technology may entail potential risks as a means of pursuing various forms of hybrid warfare and foreign interference; specifies that it could for instance be mobilised to trigger disinformation, by using bots or fake social media accounts, to weaponise interdependence, by gathering valuable information or denying network access to adversaries, to create disturbances in the economic and financial systems of other countries, to pollute the political debate and favour extremist groups, or to manipulate elections to destabilise democracies;

55.  Highlights that AI technologies could also include AI-powered malware, identity theft, data poisoning or other forms of adversarial machine learning that cause other AI systems to misinterpret input; points, in particular, to the rise in deepfakes, which are not necessarily cyberattacks but lead to doubts over the authenticity of all digital content, including videos, and therefore require particular attention in terms of transparency requirements; warns that deepfakes could contribute to a broad climate of public mistrust in AI, as well as a deeper socio-political polarisation within our societies;

56.  Elaborates that the use of AI systems in a significant amount of key critical infrastructure such as energy and transport grids, the space sector, the food chain, banking and financial infrastructure, and hospital facilities has created new vulnerabilities that require robust cybersecurity measures to prevent threats; points out, in this regard, the importance of cooperation and information sharing and action both at EU level as well as among Member States; underlines the importance of fostering the resilience of critical entities to hybrid threats;

57.  Warns that the capabilities of AI may also pose security risks, as they may lead humans to place such confidence in AI that they trust it more than their own judgement; notes that using a human-in-the-loop approach as a corrective mechanism is not feasible in all cases; notes that experiments have shown that this can elevate the level of autonomy of AI beyond the supporting role for which it was originally designed and means that humans miss opportunities to gain experience and refine their skills and knowledge of AI systems; stresses, therefore, that safety by design and meaningful human oversight based on appropriate training as well as appropriate security and privacy safeguards are required in high-risk AI systems in order to overcome such automation bias;

58.  Highlights, however, that AI can be used to predict power failures and identify maintenance needs with great accuracy; specifies, in addition, that it can be used to synthesise large amounts of data via automated information extraction or automated information classification, and to detect specific patterns; stresses that these elements would allow for better prediction and assessment of the threat level and system vulnerabilities, faster decision-making processes, improved reactivity and securing endpoint devices more effectively;

59.  Underlines, in particular, the inherent potential in enabling law enforcement agencies to identify and counter criminal activity, which is aided by AI technology; underlines that such AI-related law enforcement activities do, however, require full respect for fundamental rights, strict democratic oversight, clear transparency rules, a powerful IT infrastructure, human oversight, highly skilled employees and access to relevant and high-quality data;

d) AI and competitiveness

60.  Notes that more and more products and services along the value chain will be interconnected in the near future, with AI and automation playing an important role in many manufacturing processes, operations and business models; underlines the paramount importance of basic research for the development of AI industrial ecosystems as well as substantial investment to promote digital public administration and upgrade digital infrastructure;

61.  Observes that despite the significant increase in venture capital and other early-stage funding in the last two years, many European industries are lagging behind and the current funding levels in the EU are still insufficient and should be substantially ramped up in order to match the dynamism of leading AI ecosystems like Silicon Valley and elsewhere; highlights the peculiar cluster-network structure of the EU innovation ecosystem, as opposed to centralised (and state-supported) innovation ecosystems;

62.  Underlines that AI can be a game changer for the competitiveness of EU industry and has the potential to increase productivity, accelerate innovation, improve manufacturing processes and help to monitor the resilience of European supply chains;

63.  Points to the risk of supply chains being disrupted due to economic decoupling or catastrophic events such as pandemics or climate change-related phenomena; stresses that using AI can help to detect patterns of disruption in supply chains and inform predictive maintenance, which could support the diversification of suppliers;

64.  Notes that companies that have initiated digital disruption have often been rewarded with significant gains in market share; notes that recent studies indicate that this pattern is likely to repeat itself with even more intensity as companies that adopt AI often collect large amounts of data, which tends to enhance their competitive position; is concerned about the resulting risks of market concentration to the detriment of SMEs and start-ups;

65.  Emphasises that this outlook is particularly concerning since the largest incumbent tech companies that will likely also dominate AI technologies are gatekeepers to markets, while capturing most of the value that is generated; stresses that because the data that drives the AI sector is overwhelmingly collected from the very same large tech companies, which offer users access to services in exchange for data and exposure to targeted advertisements, their existing market dominance is likely to, in itself, become a driver of further market dominance; points out that many of these tech companies are headquartered outside the EU yet manage to capture the value generated by data on European customers, thus gaining a competitive advantage;

66.  Welcomes the recent Commission communication calling for competition rules to be updated to make them fit for the digital age(29) and stresses the key role of ex ante measures, including the future Digital Markets Act, in counterbalancing concentration before it arises; underlines, moreover, the role that standardisation and regulatory cooperation can play in addressing this issue, by facilitating the global development of products and services irrespective of their physical location;

67.  Underlines that SMEs and start-ups are playing a central role in the introduction of AI technologies within the EU as they represent the bulk of all companies and are a critical source of innovation; observes, however, that promising AI start-ups face significant barriers to expanding across Europe due to the incomplete digital single market and regulatory divergence in many Member States, or, when they do scale up, are acquired by large tech companies; regrets that SMEs often face a lack of funding, complex administrative procedures and a lack of adequate skills and access to information; notes that EU competition authorities have in the past allowed most foreign takeovers of European AI and robotics companies;

68.  Stresses that the intensive use of algorithms, e.g. for price-setting, could also create completely new AI-specific problems within the single market; notes that antitrust authorities might, for instance, find it difficult to prove price collusion between AI-driven price-setting systems; adds, moreover, that the few AI providers that are already participating in stock trading could present a systemic risk to the financial markets, including through collusion; stresses that algorithmic collusion can be very hard to identify, since AI-based systems do not need to communicate with each other in the way that humans do for collusive practices, which can make it impossible to prove collusive intent; underlines the risk that this poses for market stability and the need for EU and national competition authorities to develop appropriate strategies and tools; highlights, in addition, the systemic risk to financial markets from the widespread use of algorithmic trading models and systems without any human interaction, which have in the past greatly amplified market movements, and are likely to do so again in the future;

69.  Observes that many AI companies within the EU currently face legal uncertainty regarding how they can develop their products and services in an assured manner as a result of bureaucratic hurdles, an overlap between existing sector-specific legislation and the absence of established AI standards and norms;

70.  Highlights the challenge for AI companies in terms of quality control and consumer protection; concludes that transparency and trustworthiness are essential to ensure that EU companies have a competitive advantage, as such considerations will decide in the future whether a product or service is eventually accepted by the market;

71.  Notes that although 26 % of high-value research publications on AI come from Europe, only four out of the top 30 applicants (13 %) and 7 % of businesses engaged in AI patenting worldwide are European;

72.  Considers that the EU’s intellectual property laws require harmonisation and clear and transparent enforcement, and a balanced, enforceable and predictable framework to allow European businesses, and in particular SMEs and start-ups, to secure intellectual property protection;

73.  Is concerned that SME use of IP protection remains low, as SMEs often do not use IP protection as they are not fully aware of their rights nor do they have enough resources to uphold them; highlights the importance of information and statistics on IP protection among SMEs active in knowledge-intensive sectors and welcomes efforts, including simplified registration procedures and lower administrative fees, to provide SMEs and start-ups with better knowledge and to facilitate their access to IP protection; notes that in order to help EU companies protect their AI IP rights, the EU’s position as a global standard-setter should be strengthened; stresses that international competitiveness and attractiveness is rooted in a strong and resilient single market, including in IP protection and enforcement;

74.  States that data analytics, as well as access to, sharing and re-use of non-personal data, are already essential for many data-driven products and services today, but will be important for the development and deployment of upcoming AI systems; stresses, however, that most of the non-personal data generated in the EU so far goes unused, while a single market for data is still in the making;

75.  Points out the importance of facilitating access to data and data sharing, and open standards and open source technology as a way to enhance investments and boost innovation in AI technologies in the EU; specifies that better harmonisation on the interpretations by national data protection authorities as well as on guidance on mixed data and on depersonalisation techniques would be useful for AI developers;

76.  Highlights the role AI can play in assisting enforcement action by European and national authorities, particularly in the fields of customs and market surveillance; is of the opinion that trade and customs procedures can be made more efficient and more cost-effective through AI, by increasing compliance and ensuring that only safe products enter the single market; points to the example of the Canada Border Services Agency Assessment and Revenue Management (CARM) system, which greatly simplifies import and export procedures using qualified AI risk assessment and streamlined digitalised information management to reduce the need for lengthy inspections;

e) AI and the labour market

77.  Notes that AI is increasingly influencing the labour market, the workplace and the social domain and that the impacts of technological change on work and employment are multifaceted; emphasises that the use of AI in this area gives rise to a number of ethical, legal and employment related challenges; is concerned that in terms of the labour market, digitalisation could lead to workforce reorganisation and the potential disappearance of certain sectors of employment; believes that the adoption of AI, if combined with the necessary support infrastructure, education and training, could increase capital and labour productivity, innovation, sustainable growth and job creation;

78.  Stresses that although AI may replace some tasks, including repetitive, heavy, labour-intensive or dangerous ones, it could also help to improve skills, raise the quality of work and create new, higher value-added employment, leaving more time for stimulating tasks and career development; stresses that AI is currently already substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable significant aggregate labour market consequences(30); stresses, however, the potential for an increase in income inequality if AI increases high-skill occupations and replaces low-skill occupations; adds that any resulting economic and social implications need to be mitigated by appropriate measures, research and foresight and prepared for by investing in reskilling and upskilling of the workforce with a focus on underrepresented groups such as women and minorities, who are likely to be most affected by this transition, and by promoting diversity in all phases of development of AI systems; is concerned that AI could produce processes of deskilling and create and embed low-paid, low-autonomy work and extend atypical, flexible (or ‘gig’) work; underlines that algorithmic management could lead to power imbalances between management and employees and obscurity about decision-making;

79.  Highlights that AI uptake offers an opportunity to foster significant cultural change within organisations, including through improved workplace safety, better work-life balance, and offering the right to disconnect and more effective training opportunities and guidance to employees; points, in this regard, to the recommendations of the OECD stressing that automation could also give rise to a reduction of working time, thus improving workers’ living conditions and health; is of the opinion that human-empowering AI applications could also create new job opportunities, in particular for those who, because of restrictions such as disabilities or living circumstances, have until now been bound to less qualified jobs; stresses the need to use AI assistance in the workplace to provide time for humans to improve the quality of their output instead of just increasing the workload;

80.  Condemns the increased recourse to AI-fuelled surveillance in the workplace, often occurring without the workers’ knowledge, let alone their consent, particularly also in the context of teleworking; sustains that this practice should not be allowed, as it is extremely abusive of the fundamental right to privacy, data protection and the human dignity of the worker and to social and labour rights, and also has negative effects on the mental health of workers due to the degree of intrusion, its blanket or indiscriminate effect, and lack of safeguards for affected individuals;

81.  Is concerned that a similar risk of surveillance is present also in the school environment, with the increasing adoption of AI systems in schools, undermining the fundamental rights of children; notes that the implications AI has for children’s privacy, safety and security fall across a wide spectrum, from benefits related to the ability to understand threats facing children with greater specificity and accuracy, to risks around unintended privacy infringements; underlines that both the positive and negative implications for children’s privacy, safety and security call for close examination and corresponding safeguards; further stresses that special consideration and protection need to be given to children when developing AI systems because of their particularly sensitive nature and specific vulnerabilities;

82.  Stresses that it is paramount to provide individuals with comprehensive skills development programmes in all stages of life, in order to enable them to remain productive in a continuously evolving workplace and avoid their exclusion from the labour market; considers that the adaptation of the workforce in terms of AI education, lifelong learning and reskilling is of vital importance; highlights that current concepts of learning and working are still overly defined by the pre-digital world, which is contributing to a growing skills gap and a new digital divide for citizens who do not have access to a secure digital space; stresses that enhancing digital literacy contributes to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals, in particular those on education, human capital and infrastructure; highlights the gain in knowledge of new forms of working and learning due to the COVID-19 crisis which could further be explored;

83.  Underlines that to reap the full benefits of digitalisation, the Union must address digital literacy and skills for all; believes that digital literacy is a precondition for citizens’ trust in and public awareness of the impacts of AI; highlights the importance of including basic training in digital skills and AI in national education systems; believes that the implementation and development of AI technology in the field of minority languages might lead to a boost in their knowledge and use; stresses that more than 70 % of businesses report a lack of staff with adequate digital and AI skills as an obstacle to investment; is concerned that as of 2019, there were 7.8 million ICT specialists in the EU, with a prior annual growth rate of 4.2 %, which is far short of the 20 million experts that are needed for key areas such as data analysis as projected by the Commission;

84.  Is concerned about the extensive gender gap in this area, with only one in six ICT specialists and one in three science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) graduates being women(31); notes with concern that the gender divide is persisting, especially in the area of start-ups, where in 2019, USD 92 of every USD 100 invested in European tech companies went to founding teams that were entirely comprised of men; recommends targeted initiatives to support women in STEM in order to close the overall skills gap in this sector; stresses that this gap inevitably results in biased algorithms; emphasises the importance of empowering and motivating girls towards STEM careers and eradicating the gender gap in this area;

f) AI and the future of democracy

85.  States that AI has, on the one hand, the potential to assist in building a more transparent and efficient public sector, but on the other hand, that the technical developments in the field of AI, often driven by a logic of growth and profits, are very rapid and dynamic, making it difficult for policymakers to have a sufficient understanding of how new AI applications work and what kind of outcomes those applications can produce, although they have a duty to provide a framework to ensure that AI complies with fundamental rights and can be used for the benefit of society; highlights that expert forecasts on the future impact of AI also vary, suggesting it might be difficult even for them to predict the outcomes of deploying new AI technologies; argues, therefore, that this uncertainty makes it necessary for legislators to take due account of the precautionary principle in regulating AI; believes it is crucial to consult experts with different expertise and backgrounds in order to create solid, workable and future-proof legislation; cautions that legal uncertainty can be one of the biggest impediments to innovation; notes, in this regard, the importance of promoting AI literacy among citizens, including elected representatives and national authorities;

86.  Warns that legislative cycles are therefore often out of sync with the pace of technological progress, forcing policymakers to play catch up and favour the regulation of use cases already in the market; points out that a sound regulatory approach to AI must be preceded by an exhaustive analysis of proportionality and necessity, to avoid hampering innovation and the competitiveness of EU companies;

87.  Stresses that using AI to acquire biometric data could be both intrusive and damaging or beneficial for the individual, as well as for the general public;

88.  Notes with concern that such AI technologies pose crucial ethical and legal questions; notes that certain AI technologies enable the automation of information processing to an unprecedented scale, which paves the way for mass surveillance and other unlawful interference and poses a threat to fundamental rights, in particular the rights to privacy and data protection;

89.  Stresses that many authoritarian regimes use AI systems to control, exert mass surveillance over, spy on, monitor and rank their citizens or restrict freedom of movement; stresses that any form of normative citizen scoring by public authorities, especially within the field of law enforcement, border control and the judiciary, as well as its use by private companies or individuals, leads to loss of autonomy and privacy, brings risks of discrimination and is not in line with European values; recalls that technologies such as cyber-surveillance and biometric recognition, which can be used to these ends, are subject to the EU Export Control Regulation; is highly concerned about and condemns cases of EU companies selling biometric systems which would be illegal to use within the EU to authoritarian regimes in non-EU countries;

90.  Notes that dominant tech platforms nowadays not only have significant control over access to information and its distribution, but they also use AI technologies to obtain more information on a person’s identity, behaviour and knowledge of decisional history; believes that such profiling poses risks to democratic systems as well as to the safeguarding of fundamental rights and the autonomy of citizens; stresses that this creates an imbalance of power and poses systemic risks that could affect democracy;

91.  Points out that digital platforms can, including through AI-driven marketing applications, be used for foreign interference and to spread disinformation and deepfakes, acting as networks for propaganda, trolling and harassment with the aim of undermining electoral processes; stresses that machine learning enables, in particular, the targeted use of personal data to manipulate unaware voters by creating personalised and convincing messages; stresses the importance of strong transparency obligations that are effectively enforced;

92.  Underlines that AI could, however, also be used to reduce anti-democratic and unethical activities on platforms, and as a means to limit the distribution of fake news and hate speech, even though tests of its abilities to understand context-specific content have so far shown poor results; is concerned that divisive language may lead to greater user engagement, which is why removal of such language would be in direct conflict with such platforms’ business model which is based on maximising user engagement; is of the opinion that AI-powered solutions must be based on full respect for freedom of expression and opinion, and on strong evidence in their favour, before their eventual use;

93.  Stresses that bias in AI systems, especially when it comes to deep learning systems, often occurs due to a lack of diverse and high-quality training and testing data, for instance where data sets are used which are not sufficiently representative of vulnerable groups, or where the task definition or requirement settings themselves are biased; notes that bias can also arise due to a possible lack of diversity in developer teams, reiterating intrinsic biases, due to a limited volume of training and testing data, or where a biased AI developer has compromised the algorithm; points out that reasoned differentiation is also intentionally created in order to improve the AI’s learning performance under certain circumstances;

94.  Stresses that structural biases present in our society should not be repeated or even increased through low quality datasets; specifies, in this regard, that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the data they are working with, and, as a result of low quality training data or biases and discrimination observed in society, might suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory, which exacerbates discrimination within society; notes, however, that AI biases can sometimes be corrected; concludes that it is therefore necessary to apply technical means and establish different control layers on AI systems, including the software, algorithms and data used and produced by them, in order to minimise this risk; argues that AI can and should be used to reduce biases and discrimination and promote equal rights and positive social change in our societies, including through normative requirements on data sets used to train AI systems; stresses that one of the most efficient ways of reducing bias in AI systems is to ensure, to the extent possible under Union law, that the maximum amount of non-personal data is available for training purposes and machine learning;

g) Recurring findings in all six case studies

95.  Notes that there are clear societal benefits and opportunities associated with adopting AI technologies, which can only be reaped if transversal obstacles are addressed in the EU, in accordance with fundamental rights, values and legislation; states that overlap of legislation, market fragmentation, bureaucratic hurdles, a lack of accessible digital infrastructure and digital skills in the broader society, and insufficient investment in research and development can be observed in particular as barriers to the successful application of trusted AI in all fields analysed;

96.  Concludes from the case studies examined, furthermore, that there are certain use cases that are risky or harmful, but that it is not necessarily specific AI technologies themselves but their areas of application; recognises that future regulation needs to address legitimate concerns related to these risks in order for AI technologies to find broad application in the EU;

97.  States that while it is important to examine and categorise potential risks posed by AI, the case studies illustrated that AI technologies can provide us with effective countermeasures that are able to mitigate or eliminate these risks; underlines that as AI is still in its early stages of development within a wider context of emerging technologies, its full potential as well as its risks are not certain; points out that there is a need to look not only at risks to individuals, but also at the broader societal and non-material individual harms; highlights the significant imbalances of market power present in data markets and the adjacent AI economy; stresses that fair competition and removing obstacles to competition for start-ups and SMEs are essential to fairly distribute the potential benefits of AI in economic and societal terms, which appear to be significant both in the EU and globally;

3.The EU’s place in global AI competition

98.  Observes fierce global AI competition, where the EU has not yet met its aspirations; examines in the following sections the EU’s global competitiveness with regard to AI by comparing it with that of China and the US, focusing on three core elements: regulatory approach, market position and investments; recognises, however, that transnational markets and corporations cannot easily be delineated across national borders, as most tech companies have customers, shareholders, employees and suppliers in many different countries;

a) Regulatory approach

99.  Notes that the US has not yet introduced horizontal legislation in the digital field, and has so far focused on sector-specific laws and facilitating investments, including through tax measures on private sector innovation, in particular among its tech giants and leading universities; observes that, despite recent developments showing a more active policymaking role, the US approach has so far mostly reflected a focus on providing legal guidance to businesses, investing in research projects and removing perceived barriers to innovation;

100.  Stresses that the 2019 American AI Initiative Act ushered in a slight realignment, as besides redirecting funding, retraining workers and strengthening digital infrastructure, the US Government announced the development of common standards for trustworthy AI; notes, however, that the resulting 10 principles were very broadly formulated in order to allow each government agency to create sector-specific regulations; expects that although the current US administration plans to bring forward a new bill of rights to limit AI harms in 2022, the US approach will remain market-driven;

101.  Highlights that the Chinese President Xi Jinping underlined in as early as 2013 the importance of technologies in geopolitics, the role of public policies in defining long-term objectives and the fact that AI technologies offer an opportunity to relaunch its military power; stresses further that the Chinese Government subsequently put forward the Made in China 2025 plan in 2015 and the Next Generation AI Development Plan in 2017, both of which had the clear targets of making China the global leader in AI by 2030; notes that the 2018 Chinese AI standardisation white paper further outlined how the socialist market economy can develop international standards and strategically engage in international standardisation organisations; notes the introduction of rules on recommender systems as well as an ethics code on AI in China;

102.  Observes that on the global stage, China actively promotes international AI partnerships as a way to export its own AI-based surveillance practices, social scoring system and censorship strategies; emphasises that heavy investment abroad under the Digital Silk Road initiative is also used as a means to spread Chinese influence and its AI technology globally, which could have far-reaching implications beyond imposing technological standards or maintaining technological competitiveness; concludes that the Chinese Government’s approach is therefore built upon deploying AI domestically as well as exporting AI technologies based on predetermined standards that are in line with the ideology of the Chinese Government;

103.  Notes that the Commission started its work on regulating AI in 2018 by publishing the European AI strategy, setting up a High-Level Expert Group and introducing a coordinated plan(32) to foster ‘AI made in Europe’; notes that the 2020 white paper on AI proposed numerous measures and policy options for future AI regulation and eventually resulted in the horizontal AI Act(33), which was presented along with a revised coordinated plan on AI(34) in May 2021; points out that as of June 2021, 20 Member States have published national AI strategies, while seven more are in the final preparatory stages of adopting theirs;

104.  Emphasises that central to the EU regulatory approach is a strong attention to the development of a European digital single market as well as ethical considerations in line with core human rights values and democratic principles; acknowledges that establishing the world’s first regulatory framework for AI could give the EU leverage and a first-mover advantage in setting international AI standards based on fundamental rights as well as successfully exporting human-centric, ‘trustworthy AI’ around the world; underlines that this approach needs to be supported by regulatory coordination and convergence with international partners;

b) Market situation

105.  Notes that many of the 100 leading AI companies globally are headquartered in the US, whereas only few are in the EU; notes that the US also leads in the total number of AI start-ups;

106.  Points out that in recent years, several European digital companies have been acquired by US tech giants; welcomes the Commission’s ambition of tackling acquisitions that may have a significant impact on effective competition in the digital market and of limiting killer acquisitions; points out, however, that in some cases, acquisition may be a primary objective of start-up creators and their funders, as one legitimate method to derive benefits from their ideas;

107.  Stresses that while the US and China are trying to accelerate the use of AI technologies in the public and private sectors, the adoption of AI within the EU lags behind; states that in 2020, only 7 % of EU companies with at least 10 employees were using AI technologies, with significant differences among Member States as well as among different business sectors;

108.  Is concerned that while the US and China each have a unified digital market with a coherent set of rules, the EU’s digital single market is still not complete and unjustified barriers remain; stresses that the development of AI products and services could be further slowed down by the ongoing work on 27 different national AI strategies;

109.  Points also to the fact that inconsistencies in EU law, overlap of different legislative initiatives, contradictions between EU and national laws, different legal interpretations and a lack of enforcement among Member States all prevent a level playing field and risk creating legal uncertainty for European companies as they may find it difficult to determine whether their AI innovations are compliant with EU law;

110.  Notes that the market fragmentation for AI companies is further exacerbated by a lack of common standards and norms in some sectors, including on data interoperability;regrets the regulatory risk resulting from the delay of legislation, such as the ePrivacy Regulation; highlights as an example the fact that EU AI developers face a data challenge that neither their US nor Chinese counterparts do due to the incomplete European digital single market; observes that they often do not have enough high-quality data to train and test their algorithms, and struggle with a lack of sectoral data spaces and cross-sectoral interoperability, as well as constraints on cross-border data flows;

c) Investments

111.  Observes that European companies and governments invest far less in AI technologies than the US or China; points out that although private investments in the EU AI industry are rising significantly, the EU is still substantially underinvesting in AI compared to other leading regions, as the US and China account for more than 80 % of the EUR 25 billion annual equity investments in AI and blockchain, while the EU’s share only amounts to 7 % or about EUR 1.75 billion; stresses that the liquidity of EU financing markets for tech companies still lacks the scale of comparable markets in the US; notes that the US is also leading in venture capital and private equity funding, which is particularly important for AI start-ups, with EUR 12.6 billion in 2019, against EUR 4.9 billion for China and EUR 2.8 billion for the EU; notes that as a consequence, European AI entrepreneurs are crossing the Atlantic to scale up their businesses in the US;

112.  States that together with national initiatives, the estimated annual public investment of the EU in AI of EUR 1 billion(35) is much lower than the EUR 5.1 billion invested annually in the US and up to EUR 6.8 billion in China(36); states, however, that between 2017 and 2020, EU public funding for AI research and innovation increased by 70 % compared to the previous period, and in 2019, the EU invested between EUR 7.9 and 9 billion in AI, which was 39 % more than in the previous year; acknowledges and welcomes the Commission’s plans to increase investment further through the digital Europe programme, Horizon Europe, InvestEU, the European Structural and Investment Funds, the European Investment Fund, the Connecting Europe Facility in Telecom and various cohesion policy programmes, which will be further complemented and leveraged by the 20 % minimum expenditure target for digital transition in the national recovery and resilience plans, as agreed by the Commission and the Member States under the Recovery and Resilience Facility; underlines, however, the recent report by the European Investment Bank which quantifies the EU investment gap in AI and blockchain technologies at EUR 5-10 billion per year;

113.  Stresses that AI companies within the EU face strong competition for qualified employees, which is made worse by 42 % of the EU population lacking basic digital skills; stresses the need to train and attract a substantially higher number of well-educated graduates, including women, to work in the digital sector;

114.  Observes that although the EU has an excellent community of researchers on AI, the brain drain of EU researchers remains an issue; stresses that measures are needed to appeal to leading researchers; notes that the EU only spent 2.32 % of its GDP on research and development in 2020, while the US spent 3.08 %; recalls that the Member States must uphold their commitment to invest 3 % of their GDP in research and development in order to ensure the Union’s strategic autonomy in the digital field;

115.  Notes that the EU’s digital infrastructure needs substantial updating, with just 25 % of people in the EU being able to connect to a 5G network, compared to 76 % of people in the US; observes that the EU lacks sufficient high-performance digital infrastructure with interoperable data spaces, high transmission rates and volumes, reliability and short delays; stresses the need to support European AI ecosystems with excellence clusters;

d) Conclusion

116.  Concludes that the US is the overall leader in AI as it is ahead in many categories, with US-headquartered companies leading technology development in areas such as cloud computing and high-performance computing capabilities, and also when it comes to investment, attracting AI talent, research and infrastructure; highlights, however, that China, which a few years ago was still significantly lagging behind the US in all indicators, is quickly catching up; recognises that both countries have the advantage of a unified single market and stronger commitment to remaining a leader in AI;

117.  Stresses that despite the EU’s strong position on industrial software and robotics, EU actors are still behind their US and Chinese peers in many categories; underlines that the EU should develop an ambitious plan for human-centric European AI; notes that the EU is, however, ahead on regulatory approaches; points out that a viable EU strategy for becoming more competitive on AI involves focusing on research and innovation, skills, infrastructure and investment, while at the same time trying to establish a future-oriented, horizontal and innovation-friendly regulatory framework for AI development and use, and simultaneously ensuring that fundamental rights of EU citizens and the rule of law are safeguarded;

118.  Underlines that Brexit had a negative impact on the EU’s efforts to strengthen its global AI footprint, as the UK was one of the leading EU countries in AI; stresses, however, that the UK should remain a valued partner of the EU, bolstering the competitiveness of both partners and the promotion of shared regulatory outlooks in global standard setting;

119.  Concludes that the EU is currently still far from fulfilling its aspiration of becoming competitive in AI on a global level, and could risk falling further behind in some categories; maintains that swift action on the EU Roadmap for AI outlined below poses an opportunity to change this situation;

120.  Specifies that as the EU does not have the legislative power to address all the points listed in the EU Roadmap for AI, the special committee recommends pursuing further high-level discussions and political processes among EU institutions and Member States in order to push for a more harmonised approach to AI and help Member States to coordinate their efforts; refers, in this regard, to the EU 2000 Lisbon agenda, which, despite the criticism, played an important part in guiding the EU’s policy orientation over 20 years and in keeping up the pressure on Member States to reform;

4. ‘Europe fit for the digital age’ – Roadmap for becoming a global leader

a) Favourable regulatory environment

i. Law-making

121.  Calls on the Commission to only propose legislative acts in the form of regulations for new digital laws in areas such as AI, as the digital single market needs to undergo a process of genuine harmonisation; is convinced that due to rapid technological development, digital legislation should always be flexible, principle-based, technology-neutral, future-proof and proportionate, while adopting a risk-based approach where appropriate, based on respect for fundamental rights and preventing unnecessary additional administrative burden for SMEs, start-ups, academia and research; stresses, furthermore, the importance of a high degree of legal certainty and, consequently, the need for robust, practical and unambiguous applicability criteria, definitions and obligations in all legal texts regarding the sale, use or development of AI technologies;

122.  Believes that the better regulation agenda is key to making the EU AI strategy a success; stresses the need to focus on the review, adaptation, implementation and enforcement mechanisms of already existing laws before proposing new legislative acts;

123.  Urges the Commission to perform in-depth ex ante impact assessments with adequate foresight and risk analysis prior to issuing new digital proposals in areas such as AI; emphasises that impact assessments should systematically map and evaluate relevant existing legislation, preventing any overlaps or conflicts;

124.  Suggests that new laws in areas such as AI should be complemented with the promotion of stakeholder-developed European standards; is of the opinion that the EU should strive to avoid fragmentation and that international standards can serve as a useful reference, but that the EU should prioritise developing its own standards; highlights that such standards should result from fair competition for the best standards within the EU, which should be responded to by the EU and standardisation organisations; notes that technical standards and design instructions could then be combined with labelling schemes as a way to build consumer trust by providing trustworthy services and products; stresses the role of EU standardisation organisations in developing state-of-the-art technical standards; calls on the Commission to accelerate issuing standardisation mandates to the European standardisation organisations according to Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation(37);

125.  Explains that an open certification platform could establish an ecosystem of trust that involves governments, civil society, businesses and other stakeholders;

126.  Calls for Parliament, the Commission and the Council to improve their abilities to deal with internal competence conflicts when it comes to overarching topics such as AI, as such conflicts risk delaying the legislative procedure, with knock-on effects in terms of the entry into force of the legislation;

ii. Governance and enforcement

127.  Calls for consistent EU-wide coordination, implementation and enforcement of AI-related legislation;

128.  Explains that stakeholder-based consultation forums such as the Data Innovation Board, to be established by the Data Governance Act, or the European AI Alliance, which includes private-public partnerships, such as the European Alliance for Industrial Data, Edge and Cloud, are a promising governance approach; elaborates that this approach enables the EU’s AI ecosystem to operationalise its principles, values, objectives and reflect societal interests at the level of software code;

129.  Highlights that the ‘pacing problem’ requires special focus on effective ex post enforcement by courts and regulatory agencies as well as ex ante approaches to deal with legal challenges posed by emerging technologies; supports, therefore, the use of regulatory sandboxes, which would give AI developers the unique chance to experiment in a fast, agile and controlled manner under the supervision of competent authorities; notes that these regulatory sandboxes would be experimental spaces in which to test AI systems and new business models under real world conditions in a controlled environment before they enter the market;

iii. Legal framework for AI

130.  Highlights that an underlying objective of the EU’s digital strategy, as well as that of the AI strategy, is creating a ‘European Way’ in a digitalised world; clarifies that this approach should be human-centric, trustworthy, guided by ethical principles and based on the concept of the social market economy; underlines that the individual and the protection of their fundamental rights should always remain at the centre of all political and legislative considerations;

131.  Agrees with the conclusion drawn by the Commission in its 2020 White Paper on artificial intelligence that there is a need to establish a risk-based legal framework for AI, notably covering high-level ethical standards based on transparency, auditability and accountability, combined with product safety provisions, appropriate liability rules and sector-specific provisions, while at the same time providing businesses and users with enough flexibility and legal certainty and a level playing field to foster AI uptake and innovation;

132.  Points out the guiding added value of taking the concepts, terminology and standards developed by the OECD as inspiration for the definition of AI in legislation; stresses that doing so would give the EU an advantage in shaping a future international AI governance system;

133.  Is convinced that it is not always AI as a technology that should be regulated, but that the level of regulatory intervention should be proportionate to the type of individual and/or societal risk incurred by the use of an AI system; underlines, in this regard, the importance of distinguishing between ‘high-risk’ and ‘low-risk’ AI use cases; concludes that the former category needs strict additional legislative safeguards while ‘low-risk’ use cases may, in many cases, require transparency requirements for end users and consumers;

134.  Specifies that the classification of AI systems as ‘high-risk’ should be based on their concrete use and the context, nature, probability, severity and potential irreversibility of the harm that can be expected to occur in breach of fundamental rights and health and safety rules as laid down in Union law; stresses that this classification should be accompanied by guidance and the promotion of the exchange of best practices for AI developers; stresses that the right to privacy must always be respected and that AI developers should guarantee full compliance with the rules on data protection;

135.  Underlines that AI systems that are likely to interact with or otherwise affect children must take their rights and vulnerabilities into account and meet the highest available standards of safety, security and privacy by design and default;

136.  Notes that the environments in which AI systems operate may differ in a business-to-business (B2B) environment compared to a business-to-consumer (B2C) environment; points out that consumer rights need to be legally protected through consumer protection legislation; stresses that while companies can solve liability and other legal challenges quickly and cost-effectively by contractual means with business partners directly, legislation may be necessary to protect smaller businesses from market power abuse by dominant actors through commercial or technological lock-in, barriers to market entry or asymmetric information problems; highlights that there is also a necessity to take into account the needs of SMEs and start-ups with complex requirements, to avoid putting them at a disadvantage compared to larger companies, which have the resources to maintain sizeable legal and compliance departments;

137.  Underlines the need to apply a principles-based approach to open ethical questions raised by new technological possibilities resulting from the sale and use of AI applications, including through the use of fundamental, mandatory principles such as the non-maleficence principle, the principle of respecting human dignity and fundamental rights, and the protection of the democratic process; notes that good practices in AI development such as human-centric AI, responsible governance and the principles of transparency and explainability, as well as principles of sustainable AI that are fully aligned with the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, are other important components in shaping the AI economy;

138.  Acknowledges that it is not always possible to completely ‘de-bias’ AI algorithms as the ideal objective of error-free data is very difficult or near impossible to achieve; notes that even an AI system that has been tested will inevitably encounter real world scenarios that might produce biased results when deployed in a setting that differs from the composition of its training and testing data; stresses that the EU should strive to improve the transparency of data sets and algorithms, cooperate very closely with AI developers to counterbalance and reduce structural societal biases and consider mandatory human rights due diligence rules at an early stage of development;

139.  Elaborates that meaningful transparency or explainability obligations for AI systems, while helpful in many cases, may not be possible to implement in every instance; notes that intellectual property rights and trade secrets must be protected from illegal practices such as industrial espionage;

140.  States that the legislative framework on intellectual property must continue to incentivise and protect AI innovators by granting them patents as a reward for developing and publishing their creations; finds that existing laws are mostly future-proof, but proposes certain adjustments, including the integration of open source elements, as well as the use of public procurement to mandate, where appropriate, open source software for AI solutions; proposes new forms of patent licensing to ensure that tools are available to regions and initiatives that could not otherwise afford them;

141.  Considers that obligatory ex ante risk self-assessments based on clear rules and standards, as well as data protection impact assessments, complemented by third-party conformity assessments with relevant and appropriate CE marking, combined with ex post enforcement by market surveillance, could be useful to ensure that AI systems on the market are safe and trustworthy; believes that in order to prevent SMEs from being pushed out of the market, standards and guidance on complying with AI legislation should be developed with the close involvement of small businesses, internationally aligned to the greatest extent possible and available free of charge;

142.  Notes that in order to increase product safety and improve the identification of faults, the developers of high-risk AI should ensure that accessible logs of algorithmic activity are maintained securely; considers that, where relevant, developers should design high-risk AI systems with embedded mechanisms – ‘stop buttons’ – for human intervention to safely and efficiently halt automated activities at any moment and ensure a human-in-the-loop approach; considers that the AI system’s output and reasoning should always be comprehensible by humans;

143.  Recognises the legal challenges caused by AI systems, and that there is a need to consider a revision of specific parts of the existing liability rules; looks forward, in this regard, to the presentation of the Commission’s legislative proposal on AI liability; stresses that the Product Liability Directive(38) and the national fault-based liability regimes can, in principle, remain the centrepiece legislation for countering most harm caused by AI; underlines that in some cases there could be inappropriate outcomes, but warns that any revision should take the existing product safety legislation into account and should be based on clearly identified gaps, while being future-proof and capable of being effectively implemented and of ensuring the protection of individuals in the EU;

144.  Underlines that the legal framework should not subject children to the same level of personal responsibility as adults for understanding risk;

145.  Notes that certain changes to the legal definitions of ‘product’, including integrated software applications, digital services and inter-product dependency, and ‘producer’, including backend operator, service provider and data supplier, may be considered to ensure that compensation is available for harm caused by these technologies; stresses, however, that an overly broad or excessively narrow approach to the definition of ‘product’ should be avoided;

146.  Points out that, due to the characteristics of AI systems, such as their complexity, connectivity, opacity, vulnerability, capacity of being modified through updates, capacity for self-learning and potential autonomy, as well as the multitude of actors involved in their development, deployment and use, there are significant challenges to the effectiveness of Union and national liability framework provisions; considers, therefore, that although there is no need for a complete revision of well-functioning liability regimes, specific and coordinated adjustments to European and national liability regimes are necessary to avoid a situation in which persons who suffer harm or whose property is damaged end up without compensation; specifies that while high-risk AI systems should fall under strict liability laws, combined with mandatory insurance cover, any other activities, devices or processes driven by AI systems that cause harm or damage should remain subject to fault-based liability; believes that the affected person should nevertheless benefit from a presumption of fault on the part of the operator, unless the latter is able to prove that it has abided by its duty of care;

iv. EU data challenge

147.  Takes note of the conclusions drawn by the Commission in its 2020 communication entitled ‘A European strategy for data’ and by Parliament in its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the same topic, which state that the creation of a single European data space accompanied by the development of sectoral data spaces and a focus on common standards is key to ensuring fast scalability of AI solutions in the EU and beyond, as well as to ensure the EU’s open strategic autonomy and economic prosperity; recalls the essential link between the availability of high-quality data and the development of AI applications; stresses, in this regard, the need to deploy robust, reliable and interoperable cloud services within the EU, as well as solutions that leverage decentralised data analytics and edge architecture; calls on the Commission to clarify rights to access, use and share data by holders of co-created non-personal data; stresses that data access must be made technically possible, including through interoperable standardised interfaces and interoperable software; stresses that barriers to data sharing lead to less innovation, diminished competition and the furthering of oligopolistic market structures, which face a strong risk of perpetuating themselves into the adjacent market for AI applications;

148.  Stresses the key importance of opening data silos and fostering access to data for AI researchers and companies as outlined in Parliament’s resolution on the European data strategy; stresses that market imbalances deriving from increased data restriction by private companies increase market entry barriers and diminish wider data access and use, making it especially difficult for start-ups and researchers to acquire or licence the data they need to train their algorithms; underlines the need to establish the required legal certainty and interoperable technical infrastructure, while also motivating data holders in Europe to make their large amounts of unutilised data available; considers that voluntary data sharing between businesses based on fair contractual arrangements contributes to achieving this goal; acknowledges, however, that B2B contractual agreements do not necessarily guarantee adequate access to data for SMEs owing to disparities in negotiation power or expertise; highlights that open data marketplaces facilitate data sharing by helping AI companies and researchers to acquire or licence data from those who wish to make data available on such marketplaces, which include data catalogues, and allow data holders and users to negotiate data sharing transactions; welcomes in this context the rules on data intermediation services in the Data Governance Act;

149.  Welcomes the initiatives of the European cloud federation, such as the European Alliance for Industrial Data, Edge and Cloud, as well as the GAIA-X project, which aim to develop a federated data infrastructure and create an ecosystem that allows scalability, interoperability and self-determination of data providers; notes that an EU cloud rulebook that compiles existing legislation and self-regulatory initiatives would also help to translate common EU principles and values into actionable processes and checks for technical practitioners;

150.  Recommends that data interoperability be further strengthened and that common standards be established in order to facilitate the flow of data between different machines and entities, to enhance the sharing of data across countries and sectors and to enable the large-scale creation of high-quality datasets; notes that encouraging open standards, open source software, creative commons licences, and open application programming interfaces (APIs) could also play a key role in accelerating data sharing; highlights the role of common European data spaces in facilitating the free movement of data in the European data economy;

151.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to guarantee that fair contractual conditions are more strongly enforced within the scope of competition rules, with the aim of addressing imbalances in market power without unjustifiably interfering with contractual freedom, and that antitrust authorities are equipped and resourced to counter data concentration tendencies; underlines that European data spaces would allow companies to cooperate more closely with each other, and therefore considers that more guidance and legal clarity for businesses on competition law and cooperation on data sharing and pooling is needed; stresses that data cooperation, including for the training of AI applications or in the internet of things (IoT) industry, should under no circumstances facilitate the forming of cartels or create barriers to new entrants into a market; emphasises the importance of clarifying the contractual rights of AI developers and companies which contribute to the creation of data through the use of algorithms or IoT machines, and in particular the rights to access data, to data portability, to urge another party to stop using data, and to correct or delete data;

152.  Calls on Member States, with regard to government-held data, to quickly implement the Open Data Directive(39) and to properly apply the Data Governance Act, making high-value datasets available ideally free of charge and supplying them in machine readable formats and APIs; stresses that this initiative would reduce the costs for public bodies to disseminate and re-use their data and would help EU researchers and companies enormously in improving their digital technologies in areas such as AI;

153.  Calls for a uniform implementation of the GDPR across the EU by effectively and swiftly applying the consistency mechanism and by aligning the diverse national interpretations of the law; finds that there is also a need to better equip data protection authorities, including with technical expertise;

154.  Takes note of the Commission’s 2019 practical guidance on how to process mixed data sets; points out that not sharing data sets continues to often be the best option for AI researchers and companies due to uncertainty as to whether data is sufficiently anonymised;

155.  Considers that Opinion 05/2014 of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party of 10 April 2014 on anonymisation techniques offers a useful overview, which could be further developed; calls on the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) to adopt guidelines based on specific use cases and relevant situations for different types of data controllers and processors and different processing situations, including a checklist with all the requirements that have to be fulfilled to make data sufficiently anonymous; notes, however, that anonymisation techniques are currently not able to guarantee full and complete protection of privacy, as experiments have shown that modern AI systems nevertheless manage to re-identify a person;

156.  Asks the EDPB to issue more guidance for researchers and companies in areas such as AI on how to effectively process personal data outside the EU in a GDPR-compliant way;

157.  Suggests the funding of more research on standardising ‘privacy by design’ approaches, as well as promoting cryptographic solutions and privacy-preserving machine learning, as it is crucial to ensure that high-quality data can be used to train algorithms and perform AI tasks without breaching privacy; notes that data trusts, certifications for high-risk AI applications, personal information management systems and the use of synthetic data also show promise;

158.  Encourages the EU and its Member States to leverage the recently established OECD project on trusted government access to personal data held by the private sector as a reference point for policymakers globally to work towards an international solution and regulatory convergence of best practices in this area; stresses, in this regard, that the free flow of data and metadata across international borders, while fully respecting the EU data protection acquis, is a crucial enabler for digital innovation in Europe; calls on the Commission to therefore refrain from imposing data localisation requirements, except where required to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, or in limited, proportionate and justified cases where such a policy is in the interest of the EU or necessary to uphold European standards;

159.  Calls on the Commission to respond to the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that the EU-US Privacy Shield is invalid by taking all the measures necessary to ensure that any new adequacy decision with regard to the US fully complies with the GDPR, with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and every aspect of the CJEU judgment, while also simplifying transatlantic data flows; calls on the Commission to continue pursuing data adequacy talks with other non-EU countries, as this is the best way to promote the EU’s data protection policies and allow the international exchange of data;

b) Completing the digital single market

i. National AI strategies

160.  Calls on the Member States to review their national AI strategies, as the several of them still remain vague and lack clear goals, including regarding digital education for society as a whole as well as advanced qualifications for specialists; recommends that the Member States formulate concrete, quantifiable and specific actions, while trying to create synergies between them;

161.  Calls on the Commission to help Member States to set priorities and align their national AI strategies and regulatory environments as much as possible in order to ensure coherence and consistency across the EU; points out that, while a diversity of national approaches is a good way to establish best practices, AI developers and researchers would face major obstacles if they were subject to different operating parameters and regulatory obligations in each of the 27 Member States;

ii. Market barriers

162.  Urges the Commission to continue its work on removing unjustified barriers to the full completion of the digital single market, including undue country-based discrimination, incomplete mutual recognition of professional qualifications, overly burdensome market access procedures, unnecessarily high regulatory compliance costs and diverging conformity assessment procedures, and to address the frequent use of derogations which results in diverging rules among different Member State jurisdictions; highlights that for companies operating in a cross-border environment, EU-wide rules on AI, in contrast to a fragmented country-by-country approach, are a welcome development that will help foster European leadership on AI development and deployment;

163.  Calls on the Commission to accelerate the establishment of a real capital markets union; stresses the need to improve access to financial resources, especially for SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups;

164.  Underlines the need to swiftly conclude the negotiations on pending legislative files aimed at the completion of the digital single market;

165.  Calls on the Commission to ensure consistent enforcement of the rules of the single market;

166.  Notes that the new legislative framework should be carefully updated and aligned with digital products and services; proposes that the focus be placed on modernising and simplifying compliance procedures by introducing digital alternatives to existing analogue and paper-based means allowing companies, for instance by using digital CE marking, electronic labelling or digitalised safety instructions;

167.  Encourages the Commission to support offline businesses wishing to go online; encourages further information campaigns targeting SMEs and start-ups in anticipation of new and future EU legislation in this regard, as well as increased enforcement of market surveillance rules as a means to increase the trust of European consumers;

iii. Level playing field

168.  Is convinced that the current national and European competition and antitrust frameworks need to be reformed in order to better target abuses of market power and algorithmic collusion in the digital economy, and issues related to data accumulation, as well as to better address the risks of new emerging monopolies without compromising innovation; welcomes the upcoming approval of the Digital Markets Act; calls for specific consideration of potential competition issues in the field of AI;

169.  Notes that such a reform should strengthen an evidence-based approach and take the value of data and the implications of network effects more into account, introducing clear rules for market-dominant platforms and increasing legal certainty for cooperation in the digital economy;

170.  States, in this regard, that the Commission should adapt its market definition practices to define markets more accurately and in line with modern market realities in the digital sector, carrying out dynamic analysis and adopting a long-term view to assess the existence of competitive pressures;

171.  Calls on the Commission and national competition authorities to increase their efforts to monitor digital markets on an ongoing basis, and thus identify competitive constraints and competition bottlenecks, and subsequently impose correctives more frequently on companies that abuse their dominant position or that engage in anti-competitive behaviour;

172.  Calls on the Member States to substantially increase funding for and the technical capacity of competition authorities in order to ensure the effective and swift enforcement of competition rules in the fast-paced and complex digital economy; underlines that competition authorities should speed up abuse proceedings and, where necessary, apply interim measures to preserve and promote fair competition, while at the same time guaranteeing the procedural defence rights of companies;

c) Digital green infrastructure

i. Connectivity and computing power

173.  Calls on the Commission to follow up on its ambition of incentivising 75 % of European enterprises to take up cloud computing services, big data and AI by 2030 in order to remain globally competitive and accelerate its climate neutrality targets to ensure they are achieved by 2050; finds that the allocation of EUR 2.07 billion in funding for digital infrastructure under the Connecting Europe Facility is insufficient;

174.  Stresses that the shift in the volume and processing of data for AI also requires the development and deployment of new data processing technologies encompassing the edge, thereby moving away from centralised cloud-based infrastructure models towards an increased decentralisation of data processing capabilities; urges the strengthening of investment and research in distributed computing clusters, edge nodes and digital microcontroller initiatives; notes that moving to a wide use of edge solutions may be more resource intensive, as benefits of pooling optimisation are lost and stresses that the environmental cost/benefit of edge infrastructures should be looked into at a systemic level in a European cloud strategy, including to optimise energy consumption of AI;

175.  Stresses that AI requires powerful hardware to make sophisticated algorithms useable, including high-performance and quantum computing and the IoT; calls for continued increases in targeted public and private funding for innovative solutions that reduce energy consumption, including software eco-design; calls for the development of standards on measuring the use of resources by digital infrastructure at EU level, based on best practices; is concerned about the global microprocessor crisis and welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s proposal for a Chips Act to reduce the EU’s current dependence on external suppliers; warns, however, of the future risks of overcapacity in the market and cautions careful consideration of the investment cycle;

176.  Highlights that a functioning and fast infrastructure for AI must be based on fair and safe digital high-speed connectivity, which requires 5G roll-out in all urban areas by 2030, as well as wide access to ultra-fast broadband networks and spectrum policy with licence conditions that ensure predictability, foster long-term investment and do not distort competition; urges the Member States to continue to implement the 5G toolbox; calls for the Broadband Cost Reduction Directive(40) to be put into practice to facilitate network deployment; calls on the Commission to conduct environmental impact assessments on 5G; stresses the importance of counteracting the spread of disinformation related to 5G networks with an EU communication strategy; points out, in this regard, that a broad and inclusive debate will ultimately contribute to creating trust among citizens regarding the actions towards continuous development of mobile networks;

177.  Calls on the Commission to establish timetables for the Member States, cities, regions and industry and improve the administrative approval processes for 5G; requests that in regions where roll-out is carried out by the public sector, more funds be made available to bring high-speed connectivity to remote communities and contribute to bridging the digital gap; calls for support for broadband and connectivity projects under the multiannual financial framework, with easier access for local authorities to avoid the underutilisation of public funds;

178.  Calls on the Commission to assess the interplay between AI and the next wave of digital infrastructure, enabling Europe to take the lead in next generation networks, including 6G;

179.  Calls for a clear strategy on fibre-optic network deployment and broadband roll-out in rural areas, which is also key for data-intensive technologies such as AI; calls, in this regard, for increased support by the European Investment Bank for connectivity projects in rural areas;

180.  Stresses that the significant investment required for network deployment and a swift roll-out in order to achieve the targets set by the Digital Compass requires infrastructure-sharing agreements, which are also key to promoting sustainability and reducing energy consumption; stresses that these efforts are still at their beginning and need to be further expanded;

ii. Sustainability

181.  Urges the EU to take the lead in making green digital infrastructure climate neutral and energy efficient by 2030 in line with the Paris Agreement targets and integrated with the European Green Deal policy programme; including by assessing the environmental impact of large-scale deployments of AI-based systems, taking into account the increased energy needs of AI development and use; calls for coordinated global multilateral action to utilise AI in the fight against climate change and environmental and ecological degradation, as well as biodiversity loss;

182.  Urges the use of AI to monitor energy consumption in municipalities and develop energy efficiency measures;

183.  Recognises the data- and resource-intensive character of some large-scale AI applications and their respective impacts on the environment; recalls that for European AI to be sustainable and environmentally responsible, AI systems should be designed, developed and deployed with achieving the green transition, climate neutrality and a circular economy in mind;

184.  Calls on the Commission to incentivise the use of energy-efficient data centres that can support carbon neutrality;

185.  Highlights that data centres’ current lack of information sharing hinders the possibility of taking adequate public action and having a comparative overview of the environmental performance of data centres; calls for a significant increase in the number of environmental impact assessments carried out on AI development; calls for requirements to be developed to ensure that appropriate evidence is available to measure the environmental footprint of large-scale AI applications; points to the need for clear rules and guidelines for environmental impact assessments on AI, including multi-criteria life cycle assessments; calls for open access to data centres’ environmental key performance indicators, the development of EU standards and the creation of EU green cloud computing labels;

186.  Calls for a circular economy plan for digital technologies and AI and emphasises that the EU should secure a strong ICT recycling chain;

187.  Recommends fostering the use of AI-based solutions, in line with the green and digital twin transitions in all sectors, to coordinate sustainable standards for businesses and enable the monitoring of energy efficiency and the collection of information on emissions and product lifecycles;

188.  Calls on the Commission to launch competitions and missions for AI solutions tackling specific environmental problems and to strengthen this component in Horizon Europe and the digital Europe programme; recalls that projects relating to AI’s potential for addressing environmental concerns should be carried out on the basis of responsible and ethical research and innovation;

189.  Calls on the Commission to develop environmental criteria and tie the allocation of the EU budget, funding and public procurement procedures for AI to their environmental performance;

190.  Calls on the Commission to foster smart cities, covering smart buildings, smart grids, connected cars, mobility platforms, public services and logistics; supports the development of a common collection of best practices for projects and applications; stresses that smart cities require good cooperation between state and local governments, as well as among their agencies and private parties;

191.  Stresses the need to define principles to ensure that relevant climate and sustainability data can be integrated when setting up new sustainability data spaces;

192.  Calls on the Commission to cooperate with the Member States and the private sector in setting up and support testing facilities where AI applications can be tested on their sustainability performance and to offer guidance on how to improve the environmental footprint of these application; encourages adapting existing testing facilities to focus on use cases in circular production;

193.  Calls on the Commission to promote sustainable transport infrastructure that uses AI to increase efficiency, decrease pollution and promote adaptability to user needs;

d) Ecosystem of excellence

i. Talent

194.  Calls on the Commission to create an AI skills framework for individuals, building on the digital competence framework, to provide citizens, workers and businesses with relevant AI training and learning opportunities and improve the sharing of knowledge, best practices, and media and data literacy between organisations and companies at both EU and national level; asks the Commission to move quickly in creating such a competence framework by building on existing AI education schemes; recommends the establishment of a European AI skills data space to support European skills training on sectoral and regional levels in all Member States; stresses that the acquisition and teaching of digital and AI skills needs to be accessible to all, in particular to women and vulnerable groups; urges the Commission and the Member States to support free online courses that enhance basic training in AI;

195.  Urges investment in research to better understand the structural AI-related trends in the labour market, including which skills are in higher demand or at risk of shortage in the future to inform employee transition schemes;

196.  Notes with concern the lack of targeted and systematic measures in professional training for adults; calls on the Commission and the Member States, to develop policies including appropriate investment in the reskilling and upskilling of the workforce, including informing citizens on how algorithms operate and their impact on daily life; calls for special attention to be paid to those who have lost their jobs or are at risk of losing them due to the digital transition, with the aim of preparing them to work with AI- and ICT-related technologies; calls on the Commission to incentivise and invest in multi-stakeholder skills partnerships to test best practices; recommends monitoring the creation of quality jobs linked to AI in the EU;

197.  Stresses that existing digital gaps can only be closed with targeted and inclusive measures towards both women and the elderly and therefore calls for substantial investments in targeted upskilling and educational measures to close such digital gaps; calls on the Commission and the Member States to foster a gender-equal culture and working conditions in this regard;

198.  Calls for the Commission to promote gender equality in companies working on AI- and ICT-related activities, including through financing women-led projects in the digital sector and promoting a minimum number of women researchers participating in AI- and ICT-related research funding calls;

199.  Stresses the need to address the talent shortage by ensuring the growth, attraction and retention of top talent; urges the Commission to follow up on its goal of having 20 million ICT specialists employed in the EU; stresses that in order to retain top AI talent and prevent brain drain, the EU needs to enable competitive salaries, better working conditions, cross-border cooperation and competitive infrastructure;

200.  Emphasises the added value of having a simplified and streamlined Union framework for attracting international talent in the technology sector in order to enable talent flow and mobility within the EU and from abroad, improve international talent’s access to the Union’s labour market and attract workers and students on demand; highlights that new innovative tools and legislation are needed to help match employers with prospective ICT workers, address labour market shortages and facilitate the recognition of international qualifications and skills; recommends creating an EU talent pool and matching platform to serve as a one-stop shop for international talent who wish to apply for work in the EU, as well as for employers who search for potential employees abroad; calls on the Commission to expand the scope of the application of the EU Blue Card to ensure that Europe remains open to global talent;

201.  Calls on the Commission to address the increased demand for remote work across Member State borders to allow EU and international employees to work remotely in a different Member State than the one they are residing in; recommends, in this context, a comprehensive review of legislative and other hurdles to remote work and addressing these in subsequent legislative proposals;

202.  Emphasises the need to strengthen innovation cohesion among EU regions and across Member States, as talent can be unevenly distributed;

203.  Calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure appropriate protection of workers’ rights and well-being, such as non-discrimination, privacy, autonomy and human dignity in the use of AI and algorithmic management, including as regards undue surveillance practices; stresses that when AI is used at work, employers must be transparent about the way it is used and its influence on working conditions and stresses that workers should always be informed and consulted prior to the use of AI-based devices and practices; emphasises the fact that algorithms must always have human oversight and that their decisions must be accountable, contestable and, where relevant, reversible; believes that the training of algorithm developers in ethical, transparency and anti-discriminatory issues should be encouraged;

204.  Calls for a European strategy for safe AI use as regards children that is designed to inform children about interacting with AI with the aim of protecting them from risks and potential harm;

205.  Calls on the Member States to make digital skills and literacy a component of basic education and lifelong learning; calls for a high-performing AI education system that fosters digital literacy, skills and digital resilience from an early stage, starting with primary education; emphasises that the development of effective curricula for digital education requires political will, sufficient resources and scientific research; calls on the Commission to promote the introduction of AI and computational competence courses in all European schools, universities and educational institutions; highlights that such skills development is needed in adult education as much as in primary or secondary education; calls for a comprehensive and consistent policy initiative from the Commission and the Member States on AI skills and education at EU level, as well as for a legislative initiative on AI in the workplace;

206.  Draws attention to the need for multidisciplinary university curricula that focus on digital and AI skills, including in health, and for cross-disciplinary research centres; believes that pathways towards further education to specialise in AI (e.g. Master’s and PhD degrees and part-time study) should also be emphasised;

207.  Calls upon the Member States to prioritise the development of innovative teaching methods and curricula in STEM fields and programming, in particular to strengthen the quality of mathematics and statistical analysis for the purpose of understanding AI algorithms; calls on the Commission and Member States to promote STEM academic disciplines to increase the number of students in these fields; stresses that other disciplines that interact with the STEM disciplines will also be crucial for promoting digital skills;

208.  Encourages the Member States to promote women’s participation in STEM, ICT and AI-related studies and careers to achieve gender equality, including by defining a target for the participation of women researchers in STEM and AI projects;

209.  Stresses that digital education should also raise awareness on aspects of daily life potentially affected by machine learning, including recommendation engines, targeted advertising, social media algorithms and deep fakes; stresses that digital resilience requires additional media education to help contextualise new digital and AI skills and hence calls for support towards and endorsement on new and already-existing accessible AI literacy courses for all citizens;

210.  Calls for measures to ensure that every education facility has broadband access, as well as strong digital learning infrastructure; stresses the need to provide European universities and their networks with the adequate computational resources needed to train AI models, which are becoming increasingly expensive; stresses the need to ensure that teachers have necessary AI skills and tools; calls for an increased focus on technical training for teachers and the development of innovative teaching and learning tools;

211.  Requests investment in youth coding skills initiatives to foster youth AI skills and high-level qualifications, including coding academies, summer school programmes and AI-specific scholarships; is of the opinion that the EU’s Digital Opportunity Traineeships should be further expanded to vocational training;

ii. Research

212.  Calls for the EU to increase investment in research into AI and other key technologies, such as robotics, quantum computing, microelectronics, the IoT, nano-technology and 3D printing; calls on the Commission to develop and maintain a European strategic research roadmap for AI that addresses major interdisciplinary challenges in which AI can be a part of the solution; underlines that investments should be directed to use cases that are likely to increase sustainable solutions, well-being, and inclusion in society;

213.  Encourages all Member States to spend a higher proportion of their GDP on research on digital technologies; urges the continued strengthening of the Horizon Europe programme, notably its AI, data and robotics partnership and the European Innovation Council; urges the expansion of the digital Europe programme and considers that its allocated funding of EUR 7.6 billion should be increased;

214.  Stresses the need to prioritise research at EU level in the field of AI; calls on the Commission to simplify the structure of research funding, including grant application requirements and processes; stresses the need to improve the quality and consistency of proposal reviews and increase the predictability of funding instruments and their timing to support long-term planning, using the European AI research roadmap; calls on the Commission to fund more applications in the field of AI by combining different instruments, such as the European Research Council, the Marie Curie Actions, the European Innovation Council and the European Institute of Innovation & Technology;

215.  Calls on the Commission and Member States to prioritise funding AI research that focuses on sustainable and socially responsible AI, contributing to finding solutions that safeguard and promote fundamental rights, and avoid funding programmes that pose an unacceptable risk to these rights, including funding systems of mass surveillance, social scoring and other systems that have the potential to lead to negative social impacts, as well as technologies that contribute to environmental harm;

216.  Encourages the creation of more teaching posts on AI at European universities, adequate salaries for AI research and the provision of more public funding in order to properly train and retain the current and next generation of researchers and talent and prevent brain drain; stresses the need to reduce the bureaucratic hurdles for university researchers in accessing funds easily and calls on the Commission to provide tools to increase digital interconnectivity among universities within and across Member States; urges the development of cross-cutting networks for AI across European universities, research institutions and the private sector, as well as dedicated AI multidisciplinary research centres;

217.  Recommends that universities strengthen funding for applied research projects in which AI dimensions are taken into account;

218.  Calls on the Commission to improve knowledge transfers between AI research and the public by setting up business networks and contact points with legal professionals and business consultants in universities, as well as by setting up citizen panels, science and society platforms and engaging the public in the framing of AI research agendas; underlines the importance of a smooth transition from academia to industry and the added value of proximity between the two for successful and dynamic AI ecosystems and industrial centres;

219.  Stresses the need to accelerate knowledge transfers in the EU from research and science to AI applications in industry and the public sector; welcomes the creation of a dedicated public-private partnership on AI; calls on the Commission to establish European AI data centres, jointly developed with industry and civil society; stresses the importance of testing sites for AI; makes specific reference to the High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, the Key Digital Technology Joint Undertaking and the Smart Networks and Systems Joint Undertaking;

220.  Calls for the establishment of AI lighthouses under the Horizon Europe framework, building on the existing and future networks of regional AI excellence centres, with the aim of building an alliance of strong European research organisations that will share a common roadmap to support excellence in basic and applied research, align national AI efforts, foster innovation and investments, attract and retain AI talent in Europe, and create synergies and economies of scale; believes that the lighthouse concept has the potential to attract the best and brightest minds from abroad, as well as bring substantial private investment into Europe;

221.  Adds that the AI lighthouses, in cooperation with other research institutions and industry, should be sufficiently funded; highlights the benefits of well-contained regulatory sandboxes for the testing of AI products, services and approaches in a controlled real world environment before putting them on the market;

222.  Points out that the designation of European Digital Innovation Hubs (EDIHs) under the digital Europe programme is another important step in building up an AI ecosystem of excellence based on university-industry clusters; criticises, however, that criteria for EDIH designation remain vague and thus EDIHs across Europe differ in their capabilities and development, and that the interplay with other digital hubs designated by the European Institute of Innovation & Technology and under the Horizon Europe framework remains unclear; suggests, consequently, that more coordination and effort expenditure are needed, as is the establishment of a cooperating overall cluster of decentralised AI hubs based on an EU-wide framework for legal expertise, data, funding, and incentives; welcomes the Commission’s initiatives to establish start-up networks across the EU and also beyond, such as Start-up Europe and Start-up Europe Mediterranean in order to foster exchanges of ideas, business, and networking opportunities;

223.  Proposes scaling up and aligning existing initiatives, such as the European Laboratory for Learning and Intelligent Systems and the Confederation of Laboratories for Artificial Intelligence Research in Europe, and flagship projects, such as the HumanE AI Network and AI4EU, in order to promote ambitious, collaborative and EU-wide research and development goals and projects;

e) Ecosystem of trust

i. Society and AI

224.  Proposes that, on top of the suggested AI training, the EU and its Member States create awareness raising campaigns, including public discussions at local level, as an additional means to reach, inform and empower citizens to understand better the opportunities, risks and the societal, legal and ethical impact of AI to further contribute to AI trustworthiness and democratisation; is convinced that this, in parallel with the creation of a clear and sound legal framework on human-centric and trustworthy AI, would contribute to reducing citizens’ concerns that may be associated with widespread AI use in Europe;

225.  Calls for the EU to ensure that AI development, deployment and use fully respect democratic principles, fundamental rights and uphold the law in a manner that is able to counter surveillance mechanisms and does not improperly interfere with elections or contribute to the dissemination of disinformation;

226.  Stresses that governments and businesses should only deploy and procure trustworthy AI systems that are designed, where relevant, to uphold worker’s rights and promote quality education and digital literacy and that do not increase the gender gap or discrimination by preventing equal opportunities for all;

227.  Supports adjustments to consumer protection laws as another way to build trust in AI, for instance by giving consumers the right to know whether they are interacting with an AI agent, which would allow them to insist upon human review of AI decisions, and by giving them means to counter commercial surveillance or personalised pricing;

228.  Stresses that the introduction of certain AI technologies in the workplace, such as those that use workers' data, should take place in consultation with workers’ representatives and social partners; points out that workers’ and their representatives should be able to request information from employers about what data is collected, where this data is stored, how this data is processed and the safeguards that are in place to protect it;

229.  Calls for the EU to ensure that AI systems reflect its cultural diversity and multilingualism to prevent bias and discrimination; highlights that in order to address bias in AI, there is a need to promote diversity in the teams that develop, implement, and assess the risks of specific AI applications; stresses the need for gender-disaggregated data to be used to evaluate AI algorithms and for gender analysis to be part of all AI risk assessments;

230.  Underlines the importance of continuous research and monitoring on the impacts of AI on various aspects of society, both at national and EU level; suggests that Eurostat and other EU agencies be involved in this;

231.  Highlights that, based on the results of the monitoring system, a European transition fund could be considered to help manage, for example, job losses in vulnerable sectors or across regions;

ii. eGovernance

232.  Calls on the Member States to deliver on the Tallinn Declaration on eGovernment, put citizens at the centre of services and put mechanisms in place to provide borderless, interoperable, personalised, user-friendly and end-to-end digital public services based on AI to all citizens at all levels of public administration; is of the opinion that the objective should be to establish the provision of digitalised and AI-based eGovernment services to citizens over the next five years, while still providing human interaction; recalls that Recovery and Resilience Facility funds and the national recovery and resilience plans will play a key role in this regard; calls on public bodies to support and develop AI in the public sector; welcomes the revision of the eIDAS Regulation(41) and its role in boosting the provision of digital public services; stresses that no one should be left behind and that offline alternatives should always be available;

233.  Calls on the Commission to renew the eGovernment action plan and create synergies with the digital Europeprogramme to support public administrations in adopting AI in line with the European open-source software strategy;

234.  Highlights that eGovernment plays a significant role in the development of the data economy and digital innovation in the digital single market; notes that collaboration and the sharing of good practices throughout public administrations and across borders are vital parts of the deployment of eGovernment across the EU; calls for standardised, streamlined public administration procedures for more efficient exchanges across EU Member States and all levels of administration;

235.  Notes that skilled experts are needed for the development of high-quality online services; stresses the need to increase government recruitment and training policies for digitally skilled people with knowledge of AI;

236.  Calls for the implementation of the single digital gateway to be sped up and for the development of interoperable platforms that offer cross-border services in the EU to be promoted, while meeting common security standards in all Member States; stresses that a possible expansion beyond the limited set of services currently included in Regulation (EU) 2018/1724(42) establishing a single digital gateway should be considered;

237.  Stresses that the public consultation platforms of EU and Member State institutions increase engagement and access to digital information; recommends investing in improvements to usability and accessibility, such as the provision of summaries and information in multiple languages, as well as in dedicated marketing and targeted outreach for digital public engagement platforms;

238.  Recommends intensifying interactive and personal dialogues with EU citizens through online citizens’ consultations, stakeholder dialogue formats or digital functions for commenting on EU legislation and initiatives;

iii. eHealth

239.  Calls for human-centred design and an evidence-based approach to AI in health that focuses on personalised, patient-centred, cost-efficient and high-quality healthcare, developed in close cooperation with health professionals and patients, while upholding human oversight and decision-making; urges the prioritisation of funding, the setting of strategic goals, the fostering of cooperation and the adoption of AI applications in healthcare as a critical sector in which the opportunities offered by AI can bring enormous benefits to citizen health and well-being, as long as the inherent risks are appropriately managed;

240.  Highlights that the uptake of AI in healthcare settings should be promoted as a tool to assist and reduce the burden on healthcare professionals, allowing them to focus on clinical tasks, and not as a replacement for healthcare professionals or as an independent actor within health systems; stresses the need to ensure a level of quality, safety and security on par with the regulatory approval process for medicines, vaccines and medical devices; asks for a clinical trial-like method to test the adequacy and monitor the deployment of AI in clinical settings; finds that it would be beneficial to evaluate which healthcare services can be ethically and responsibly automated;

241.  Considers that equitable access to healthcare as a principle should be extended to health-related AI applications, including systems for the detection of diseases, the management of chronic conditions, the delivery of health services and drug discovery; emphasises the necessity of adopting appropriate measures to tackle health-related risks concerning the digital divide, algorithmic bias and discrimination, and the marginalisation of vulnerable persons or cultural minorities, who have limited access to healthcare;

242.  Recalls the Parliament position that insurance companies or any other service provider entitled to access information stored in e-health applications should not be allowed to use that data for the purpose of discriminating in the setting of prices;

243.  Is convinced that current EU projects and initiatives, such as EU4 Health, the European health data spaces and the European Platform on Rare Disease Registration, are steps in the right direction, as they allow Member States to pool resources, increase beneficial cooperation between health systems and enable the secure and privacy-preserving exchange of high-quality data for research and innovation;

244.  Calls for the proper legal anchoring and positioning of an ‘AI in Health’ framework at Union level; underlines that many levels of risk evolve over time through the advancement of AI technologies;

245.  Stresses the need for more guidance on the processing of health data under the GDPR in order to harness the full potential of AI for the benefit of individuals, while respecting fundamental rights; calls on the Commission for faster and better harmonisation of standards governing the processing, including the sharing, anonymising and interoperability, of health data across Member States;

246.  Calls on the Commission to promote the integration of ethical rules at every step of the development, design and use of AI applications; stresses the need to promote further research on the methods and biases embedded in a trained AI system so as to avoid unethical and discriminatory conclusions when applied to human health data; recommends the creation of an EU Code of Conduct for processing health data in full compliance with the GDPR;

247.  Calls on the Commission to consider an initiative on neurorights with the aim to guard the human brain against interference, manipulation and control by AI-powered neurotechnology; encourages the Commission to champion a neurorights agenda at the UN level in order to include neurorights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, concretely as regards the rights to identity, free will, mental privacy, equal access to brain augmentation advances and protection from algorithmic bias;

248.  Calls on the Commission to consider a legal framework for online medical consultations;

249.  Stresses the need for measures that promote equal access to healthcare and enhance healthcare providers’ uptake of AI solutions;

250.  Calls on the Commission to support the establishment of a cooperation mechanism in the context and operation of a European health data space in order to foster the sharing of health data and support the development of electronic health records in line with applicable laws and regulations; urges an improvement in the quality of available data for each EU citizen by enabling digital tools to work properly (e.g. based on self-learning algorithms or big data analysis); recommends that the data stored in line with the GDPR be available for further research, as well as for the development of new drugs and individualised treatments;

251.  Underlines that digital and AI skills need to be included in the education of healthcare professionals, as well as knowledge on EU data protection legislation and dealing with sensitive data, including the promotion of data anonymisation;

252.  Calls for guidance regarding the applicability of liability frameworks and harmonised approval regimes for AI-based medical applications and medicines developed or tested via AI and machine learning; stresses that harm resulting from an insufficient allocation of resources or lack of care provision by means of AI recommender systems in the healthcare sector should be addressed in any future regulatory reform; emphasises that appropriate best practices, standards and criteria are needed to certify and approve healthcare applications in line with liability risks;

253.  Calls on the Commission to provide and make use of human-centric predictive models for pandemics, wherein diverse data sets come together in real time to inform decision-making;

f) Industrial strategy

i. Strategic planning and investments

254.  Is convinced that the EU should place AI and the data economy at the centre of an ambitious digital industrial strategy, with the aim of empowering innovative companies and entrepreneurs to compete for the best technological and business model innovations in Europe and the world and to reinforce the EU’s open strategic autonomy while establishing sound legal, ethical, technological and security standards for all AI systems and components that are intended to be used in the EU single market;

255.  Encourages the Commission to use big data AI analysis to assist in performing stress tests to assess the resilience of value chains and map dependencies;

256.  Urges the Commission to conduct a comprehensive strength-weakness analysis to determine the EU’s vulnerabilities, identify critical areas and high-risk dependencies, establish realistic technical and economic expectations with regard to AI and assess effects across all sectors of European industry; underlines that the Commission should cooperate with relevant stakeholders to this end;

257.  Suggests that the EU should, on the basis of this analysis, formulate and adopt a long-term AI industry strategy with a clear vision for the next 10 years as an extension of the Digital Compass; explains that this strategy should be complemented by a monitoring system with key performance indicators and yearly updates; stresses, however, the need to consolidate and streamline the vast number of individual initiatives that have been launched by the Commission to support the EU AI industry before incorporating them into this new AI industry strategy;

258.  Calls on the Commission to consider how the overall industrial strategy can be complemented through targeted public investment; points out, however, that excessive undirected investment programmes for complex technologies may, in some cases, risk distorting the efficient allocation of capital and may lead to stranded investment; stresses, in this context, that empowering businesses, entrepreneurs and researchers to develop and market AI technology solutions based on private enterprise is a core part of the EU industrial strategy, including by enforcing a level playing field and completing the digital single market and the capital markets union; suggests facilitating access to finance, especially risk finance instruments, in particular for early-stage financing; is of the opinion that the proportion of resources devoted to AI through InvestEU and the digital Europe programme should be reviewed and, where appropriate, significantly increased;

259.  Stresses the need for the swift implementation of the recently adopted EU framework for screening of foreign direct investment(43) and the recently revised regulation on the EU regime for the export control of dual-use items(44); states that AI, as well as robotics and other digital infrastructure, should be considered a critical sector; notes that the protection of intellectual property rights and the outflow of critical technologies should be subject to stronger enforcement;

260.  Stresses that it is crucial for Europe to equip itself with adequate digital infrastructure; welcomes initiatives such as the European Processor Initiative, the newly proposed Chips Act and the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking;

ii. SMEs and start-ups

261.  Proposes that EU and government level support be provided to AI start-ups through access to private capital and skilled employees, the ability to procure high-quality data sets to train algorithms and the ability to scale across Member State borders; stresses further that a very effective public policy tool to support a start-up economy is the effective enforcement of competition law to prevent abuses of dominant market power and to counter barriers to market entry; underlines, in this regard, that the EU should amplify its efforts to offer SMEs and start-ups development paths and services; finds that this could also include the introduction of a ‘buddy’ system that connects experienced AI-oriented businesses with smaller businesses looking to implement the technology; stresses that the inability to afford sizeable legal teams often poses an entry barrier to complex regulatory environments for start-ups and entrepreneurs; underlines the need for SMEs to access specific legal and technical support; highlights, as well, the need to foster partnerships where AI-driven companies and those entering the market could cooperate; urges the Commission and the Member States to provide better counselling and more concrete support through networks, digital hubs, AI trainers, business mentoring, site visits and legal clinics; underlines the importance of people-to people exchange programmes, such as Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs, and that they should be further developed and encouraged;

262.  Suggests easing the administrative burden for SMEs and start-ups in AI, for instance by streamlining reporting, information or documentation obligations, and by providing guidance on common procedural civil law standards to be adopted at national level; calls for the swift implementation of the single digital gateway to establish a single EU online portal in different languages containing all necessary procedures and formalities to operate in another EU country; stresses that all points of single contact established at national level should be easily accessible through the single digital gateway and should provide information and offer administrative services in the Member States, including with regard to rules on VAT and information on requirements for the provision of services, using accessible terminology and with full availability, with trained help desk staff providing effective user-friendly support;

263.  Notes that potential ways in which the EU Member States can support SMEs and start-ups include: tax breaks for deep research, better access to computer capacities and high-quality data sets and support for technology scouting and AI education, training and reskilling for employees;

264.  Underlines that SMEs and start-ups in AI need better access to public procurement; urges the Commission to redesign application procedures for public tenders and EU programme funding to allow start-ups and SMEs to have a fair chance of being awarded public procurement projects and research and development grants; recalls, in this regard, the successful GovTech programmes that have supported small business engagement in digital public procurement; stresses that stock option schemes for AI start-ups across Europe should also be promoted;

iii. International stage

265.  Points out that the EU should forge and lead by example on a strong international core value-based technology alliance, working together with like-minded partners in order to establish common regulatory standards, benefit from best practices in the fields of AI, privacy rights, data flows and competition rules, and remedy strategic vulnerabilities by building on each other’s assets and pooling resources in areas where it is mutually beneficial to do so; underlines that the EU should also actively support strengthened international cooperation on ethical, trustworthy and human-centric AI in relevant multilateral and bilateral forums, for example within the UN system, the OECD, the Council of Europe, the World Trade Organization, the World Economic Forum and the G20; welcomes, in particular, the establishment of the EU-US TTC, which lists cooperation on AI standards as a key priority and argues that, given its strategic potential, the TTC needs to be reinforced by an interparliamentary dimension, involving the European Parliament and the US Congress;

266.  Suggests that a specific transatlantic working group on AI also be established, including representatives from governments, standardisation organisations, the private sector and civil society, to work on common standards and ethical guidelines for AI; proposes setting up a long-term platform for exchange on AI and other important digital and trade issues based on the current TTC, together with other like-minded partners;

267.  Underlines that the EU should promote a socially responsible and ethical use of AI and cooperate with international standardisation bodies to further improve standards on ethics, safety, reliability, interoperability and security; welcomes recent standardisation initiatives launched by actors such as the Joint Technical Committee of the International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission aiming to globally harmonise divergent AI codes; stresses, moreover, that Europe should promote and develop standards, including in the fields of smart manufacturing, the IoT, robotics and data analytics; proposes providing better support for academics, civil society and SMEs for participating in standardisation forums;

268.  Supports the World Trade Organization’s eCommerce initiative to develop an inclusive, high-standard, commercially meaningful, evidence-based and targeted policy to better tackle barriers to digital trade; underlines that the agreement should also reflect the principles of good governance and provide governments with the ability to counter digital protectionism, while protecting and promoting consumer trust and creating real value for the global economy;

269.  Suggests that the Commission continue to address unjustified trade barriers, in particular non-tariff barriers or market access restrictions for European AI companies in third countries; stresses that trade, neighbourhood and development policy should also be actively used to shape the international debate on AI and promote European ethical AI principles;

g) Security

i. AI and law enforcement

270.  Stresses the importance of law enforcement agencies’ ability to identify and counter criminal activity, aided by AI technology;

271.  Stresses the potential for misuse of AI in law enforcement to cause harm, including automated discrimination and unlawful treatment of citizens, while providing few means of recourse; urges the Member States to implement meaningful human oversight requirements and guarantee means of recourse for those subject to decisions carried out by AI;

272.  Suggests that the EU should participate in the soft law approaches established by the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, which has developed operational AI toolkits and started a partnership with Interpol, serving as a unique forum for dialogue and cooperation on AI between law enforcement agencies, industry, academia and civil society, fully in line with the EU data protection and privacy acquis;

273.  Notes Europol’s role in developing, training and validating AI tools to fight organised crime, terrorism and cybercrime in partnership with the European Data Protection Supervisor and in full respect for EU fundamental values, in particular non-discrimination and the presumption of innocence;

274.  Calls on the Commission to strengthen the financial and human resources of the EU Innovation Hub for Internal Security; welcomes the efforts of Eurojust, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights and Europol to develop a toolkit of universal accountability principles for the use of AI by justice and internal security practitioners (the AP4AI framework); calls on the Commission to provide dedicated financial support for this initiative to promote EU accountability standards and values in the field of AI;

ii. Cybersecurity

275.  Asks the Member States to enhance cooperation in the field of cybersecurity at the European level in order to enable the EU and the Member States to better pool resources, more efficiently coordinate and streamline national cybersecurity policies, further increase cybersecurity capacity building and awareness raising, and swiftly provide cybersecurity knowledge and technical assistance to SMEs, as well as to other more traditional sectors;

276.  Encourages the EU to take the lead in developing strong cryptography and other security standards that enable trust in and interoperability of AI systems; highlights that, to create international convergence in the area of ICT risk oversight, existing international standards should be built upon and taken into account as much as possible;

277.  Proposes the introduction of horizontal cybersecurity requirements based on existing legislation and, where appropriate, on new horizontal legislative acts in order to prevent fragmentation and ensure a consistent cybersecurity approach across all product groups; notes that AI products on the digital single market that carry the CE marking could, in the future, stand for both a high level of physical safety and a risk-adequate level of cyber resilience and signal compliance with relevant EU legislation;

278.  Proposes that Member States incentivise cybersecurity requirements for AI systems through public procurement policies, including by making certain ethical, security and safety principles mandatory for the procurement of AI applications, in particular in critical sectors;

279.  Requests that the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) carry out sectoral security risk assessments, starting with sectors, both public and private, engaged in the most high-risk and sensitive uses of AI, and with the highest potential for negative impacts on human health, safety, security and fundamental rights; stresses that ENISA, together with the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centres, should assess cybersecurity incidents with the objective of identifying gaps and new vulnerabilities and advising the EU institutions in a timely manner on adequate corrective actions;

280.  Encourages companies that use, develop or deploy AI-enabled systems active in the digital single market to develop a clear and independently evaluated cybersecurity strategy, based on its individual risk situation; encourages the inclusion of AI systems in threat modelling and security risk management; suggests that the Commission, ENISA and national authorities support this process;

281.  States that cyber security requirements for AI products should cover their entire lifecycle; highlights that it has to be also clear that each company in the supply chain has to play its role in contributing to the creation of resilient AI products; points out that the new requirements should be based on the associated risk in the specific product group and the degree of influence on the risk level in order to avoid disproportionate burdens for SMEs and start-ups;

282.  Proposes that existing initiatives in certain Member States, such as the German AI Cloud Service Compliance Criteria Catalogue or the Maltese AI certification programme, be taken into account for the development of an EU-wide certification scheme for trustworthy AI;

iii. Cyber defence

283.  Urges the Member States to pursue an active policy of European cyber diplomacy by denouncing and attributing foreign-supported cyberattacks, including AI-powered ones, while leveraging the full toolbox of EU diplomacy; welcomes that the EU cyber toolbox includes the termination of financial aid and sanctions against those countries or proxies that engage in malicious cyber activities or hybrid, attacks including disinformation campaigns, or that sponsor cybercrimes; recognises that, to a certain degree, AI-powered cyber defence is more effective if it also contains some offensive means and measures, provided that their use is compliant with international law;

284.  Suggests, furthermore, strengthening cybersecurity capabilities within the European Defence Agency, including by using AI-based systems to support a coordinated and quick reaction to cyberattacks; recommends monitoring the implementation of cyber defence policies in each Member State and assessing the allocation of relevant resources within the EU;

285.  Stresses the need to analyse the impact of AI on European security and develop recommendations on how to address the new security challenges at EU level, in cooperation with the Member States, the private sector, researchers, scientists and civil society;

286.  Encourages the Member States to take measures to reward vulnerability and discovery and support audits of AI-based products, systems and processes;

iv. Military use of AI

287.  Notes that any use of military AI must be subject to strict human control and oversight mechanisms, ethical principles and full respect for international human rights and humanitarian law; notes, moreover, that the EU should work with its like-minded partners on an international framework for secure research, development and use of AI-assisted weaponry that reinforces international humanitarian law, including in the context of the law of armed conflict; recalls the international norms and principles, such as proportionality in force, that have to be respected when developing and using new military technologies;

288.  Notes that AI-based technologies are an increasingly important component of military equipment and strategy; stresses that exclusive military and national security uses of AI should be treated as strictly distinct from civilian use cases; recalls that issues related to emerging technologies in the military field are dealt with in the Group of Governmental Experts on emerging technologies in the in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, including issues related to AI, and in which EU Member States are represented;

289.  Welcomes the future EU Strategic Compass that is due to provide a framework and a certain level of ambition in addressing security and defence aspects of AI; recalls that the Permanent Structured Cooperation under the common security and defence policy and the European Defence Fund will allow Member States and the Union to enhance investments, capabilities and interoperability in the field of new technologies, including AI;

290.  States that the EU should consider AI a crucial component of European technological sovereignty;

291.  Concludes that the Member States should continue to train their military staff to ensure that they have the necessary digital skills to use AI in control, operational and communication systems; welcomes the European Defence Fund’s approach to lethal autonomous weapons systems and its Article 10(6); highlights the importance of the European Defence Fund in supporting cross-border cooperation between EU countries in military AI research, developing state-of-the-art defence technologies and constructing the necessary infrastructure, namely data centres with strong cyber capabilities;

292.  Calls on the Council to adopt a joint position on autonomous weapons systems that ensures meaningful human control over their critical function; insist on the launch of international negotiations on a legally binding instrument that would prohibit fully autonomous weapons systems; states that such an international agreement should determine that all lethal AI weapons must be subject to meaningful human oversight and control, meaning that human beings remain in the loop, and are therefore ultimately responsible for the decision to select a target and take lethal action;

293.  Calls for closer cooperation with NATO in the cyber defence field and calls on NATO allies to support the multilateral efforts to regulate the military use of AI;

5.Conclusion: an urgent call for action!

294.  Believes that the ongoing digital transformation, in which AI plays the key role, has triggered a global competition for tech leadership; stresses that the EU has so far fallen behind with the result that future technological standards risk being developed without sufficient EU contributions, oftentimes by non-democratic actors, which presents a challenge to political stability and economic competitiveness; concludes that the EU needs to act as a global standard-setter on AI;

295.  Highlights that AI, while often portrayed as an unpredictable threat, can be a powerful digital tool and a game changer on many important aspects, including by offering innovative products and services, increasing consumer choice and rendering production processes more efficient; notes that there are clear benefits and opportunities from the adoption of AI technologies for the entirety of society, including in the fields of healthcare, sustainability, security and competitiveness; points out that, at the same time, AI technologies carry the risk of reducing human agency and substituting for human autonomy; stresses that both these benefits and risks should guide and inform regulation and public communication on AI;

296.  Highlights that the EU has the potential to shape the international debate on AI and develop globally leading common rules and standards, promoting a human-centric, trustworthy and sustainable approach to AI, fully in line with fundamental rights; highlights, however, that the opportunity for consolidating such a distinctive European approach to AI on the international stage requires swift action, which is why the EU needs to agree on a joint AI strategy and regulatory framework soon; stresses that shaping international technology norms and standards requires closer coordination and cooperation with like-minded democratic partners;

297.  Stresses that currently, the EU is still far from fulfilling its aspiration to become competitive in AI on a global scale; emphasises, in this context, the importance of providing harmonised rules and standards, legal certainty and a level playing field to foster AI uptake and innovation, including by removing unnecessary administrative barriers for start-ups, SMEs and civil society; recognises that radical change of this scale impacts various parts of society differently and emphasises that the digital transition must be in full respect for fundamental rights; calls on the Commission, the Member States and Parliament, including its relevant committees, to follow up on the recommendations issued in the EU Roadmap for AI;

298.  Calls for a regulatory environment for AI that provides effective governance and protection of fundamental rights, while facilitating competitive access to digital markets for actors of all size to promote innovation and economic growth for the benefit of all; underlines that a competitive, accessible and fair data economy, based on common standards, is a prerequisite for the adequate development and training of AI; points, in this context, to the risk of market concentration in the data economy extending into the economy for AI applications;

299.  Concludes that advances in the EU’s digital ambitions in fields such as AI require a much stronger degree of integration and harmonisation in the digital single market to promote cross-border exchange and guarantee that the same rules and standards apply across the EU; stresses, in this regard, that EU institutions need to combat abuses of market power in order to level the playing field;

300.  Concludes that that necessary steps must be taken to ensure that the digital transition promotes and does not hamper the green transition; concludes that AI systems require robust infrastructure and connectivity capabilities; stresses that digital infrastructure in line with the Green Deal will target all sectors and value chains and should follow the principles of a circular economy; stresses that AI will not, however, be functional without the adequate deployment of digital infrastructure, including broadband, fibre, edge nodes and 5G; stresses the importance of mitigating increasing energy consumption and resource use to achieve climate neutral digital infrastructure by 2030;

301.  Highlights that rapid technological progress introduced by AI will also affect the livelihoods of all those who do not possess the skills to adapt fast enough to these new technologies; remarks that upskilling and reskilling can help address many of the resulting socioeconomic concerns, but stresses that these impacts should also be addressed in the context of social welfare systems, urban and rural infrastructure and democratic processes; concludes that in order to promote the adoption of innovations in AI, increase the acceptance of AI-based applications and avoid leaving anyone behind, it is necessary to provide people with the means to acquire digital skills; stresses that in order to increase digital literacy and resilience, ICT- and STEM-based education needs to start at an early stage and remain accessible throughout all stages of life; finds that initiatives to establish AI ecosystems of excellence, attract AI talent to the EU and counter brain drain are of vital importance;

302.  Stresses the importance of addressing AI-driven challenges to fundamental rights, thus allowing AI to effectively become an instrument that serves people and society and pursues the common good and general interest; concludes that in order to build trust in AI among citizens, their fundamental rights need to be protected in all aspects of life, including in the context of the use of AI in the public sphere and the workplace; emphasises, in particular, the need to reflect the rights, objectives and interests of women and minority communities in the digital transition; stresses that public services and their administrative structures need to lead by example; stresses that the EU needs to accelerate the uptake of AI-based systems and eGovernance in order to facilitate the secure use of AI in public administrations; stresses furthermore that AI can unlock new solutions in the healthcare sector, if the risks are appropriately managed and equitable access to healthcare as a principle fully extends to health-related AI applications;

303.  Concludes that the EU’s AI strategy should not overlook military and security considerations and concerns that arise with the global deployment of AI technologies; stresses that international cooperation with like-minded partners needs to be increased in order to safeguard fundamental rights and at the same time cooperate to minimise new technological threats;

o
o   o

304.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

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