European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2022 on the human rights situation in Xinjiang, including the Xinjiang police files (2022/2700(RSP))

P9_TA(2022)0237 RC-B9-0310/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions and reports on the situation in China, in particular those of 17 December 2020 on forced labour and the situation of the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region(1) and of 19 December 2019 on the situation of the Uyghurs in China (China Cables)(2),

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966,

–  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998(3) and to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 of 7 December 2020(4) concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses,

–  having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989,

–  having regard to Article 36 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which guarantees all citizens the right to freedom of religious belief, and to Article 4 thereof, which upholds the rights of ethnic minorities,

–  having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the promotion of and respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law should be at the centre of the EU’s relations with China, in line with the EU’s commitment to uphold these values in its external action and China’s commitment to adhere to them in its own development and international cooperation;

B.  whereas the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and a number of international media outlets, including the BBC, Spain’s El Pais, France’s Le Monde and Germany’s Der Spiegel, were able to examine the Xinjiang police files;

C.  whereas the responsible Chinese authorities have denied the allegations of massive and structural human rights violations in Xinjiang;

D.  whereas the Xinjiang police files document in detail – and, for the first time, with numerous photographs – the dimensions of the systematic, brutal and arbitrary repression in the Uyghur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang;

E.  whereas this material demonstrates the informed role, active support and direct involvement of the Central Government in Beijing, including Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, and of leading Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region officials in directing the mass internment policy in Xinjiang; whereas the documents also point to President Xi Jinping’s informed and active support for Xinjiang’s ‘re-education’, ‘strike hard’ and ‘de-extremification’ campaigns, as well as for continued spending on additional detention facilities and staff to manage the influx of detainees;

F.  whereas the Uyghur Tribunal and other credible, independent investigative bodies and research organisations have concluded that China’s serious and systemic human rights violations against the Uyghurs and other ethnic Turkic peoples amount to torture, crimes against humanity and genocide(5); whereas the US Government and legislative bodies in the US, Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Lithuania, Czechia and Ireland have made similar determinations;

G.  whereas since 2017, various NGOs have repeatedly reported that China has been pursuing the mass detention of Uyghurs, Kazakhs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic groups in Xinjiang;

H.  whereas the atrocities against the Uyghurs have to be seen in the context of China’s wider repressive and aggressive internal and external policies;

1.  Condemns in the strongest possible terms the fact that the Uyghur community in the People’s Republic of China has been systematically oppressed by brutal measures, including mass deportation, political indoctrination, family separation, restrictions on religious freedom, cultural destruction and the extensive use of surveillance;

2.  States that the credible evidence about birth prevention measures and the separation of Uyghur children from their families amount to crimes against humanity and represent a serious risk of genocide; calls on the Chinese authorities to cease all government-sponsored programmes of forced labour and mass forced sterilisation and to put an immediate end to any measures aimed at preventing births in the Uyghur population, including forced abortions or sanctions for birth control violations;

3.  Expresses its serious concerns about the excessive and arbitrary prison sentences handed down as a result of allegations of terrorism or extremism which, according to the Xinjiang police files, meant that 22 000 persons were being detained in 2018, representing 12 % of the adult Uygur population of Konasheher County(6); expresses its concerns over the alleged accusations of the systematic rape, sexual abuse and torture of women in China’s re-education camps;

4.  Urges the Chinese Government to put an immediate end to the practice of arbitrary detention without charge, trial or conviction for criminal offences targeted against Uyghurs and other ethnic Turkic peoples, to close all camps and detention centres, and to immediately and unconditionally release those detained, and to reunite the Uyghur children who are forcibly placed in state-run boarding facilities, with their parents;

5.  Recalls that China has ratified the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which provides for the absolute and non-derogable prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment;

6.  Calls on the Chinese authorities to immediately and unconditionally release the Uyghur scholar and 2019 Sakharov Prize Laureate Ilham Tohti, and to ensure, in the meantime, that he has regular and unrestricted access to his family and the lawyers of his choice;

7.  Reiterates its call on the Chinese authorities to allow free, meaningful and unhindered access to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and unrestricted access to the internment camps for independent journalists, international observers and investigative bodies, including, in particular, the mandate holders of the UN Human Rights Council Special Procedures and the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, as well as to the detention centres, in order to assess the Chinese allegations that these are no longer operational;

8.  Recalls the proposals to hold a UN Human Rights Council special session or urgent debate on the deteriorating human rights situation in China and on the adoption of a resolution to create a monitoring and reporting mechanism, in line with a global call by hundreds of civil society organisations from all regions;

9.  Deplores the fact that, in the framework of her visit to China and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Chinese authorities did not allow the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to have full access to independent civil society organisations, human rights defenders and to the detention centres, which prevented her from witnessing the full scale of the political re-education camps in Xinjiang; regrets the fact that UN Human Rights Commissioner Bachelet failed to clearly hold the Chinese Government accountable for human rights abuses against the Uyghurs during her visit;

10.  Urges the High Commissioner to immediately publish the long-awaited report on human rights abuses in Xinjiang, based on the available, broad and ever-increasing body of evidence of the scale and gravity of the human rights violations being committed by the Chinese authorities;

11.  Urges the Member States and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to swiftly adopt additional sanctions targeting high-ranking Chinese officials, such as Chen Quanguo, Zhao Kezhi, Guo Shengkun and Hu Lianhe, as well as others identified in the Xinjiang police files, and other individuals and entities, who are involved in the systematic human rights violations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;

12.  Calls on the Council to address the human rights violations in Xinjiang at the next European Council and to urge the G7 and G20 member states likewise to address the topic;

13.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to take all necessary steps, in accordance with the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, to put an end to these atrocities and ensure responsibility for the crimes committed, including through international accountability mechanisms;

14.  Acknowledges that EU-China relations are increasingly characterised by economic competition and systemic rivalry; acknowledges the fact that EU leaders raised the grave violations in Xinjiang at the recent EU-China summit and stresses the importance of continuing to raise the issue on every occasion and at the highest levels;

15.  Encourages the EU and the Member States to urgently identify and mitigate the risks related to Chinese foreign interference; strongly condemns all forms of transnational repression or attempts to repress Chinese dissidents or Uyghur community representatives residing abroad;

16.  Calls for the EU and the Member States to suspend their extradition treaties with China and Hong Kong;

17.  Calls on the Chinese authorities to allow all Uyghurs wishing to leave the People’s Republic of China to do so;

18.  Calls on the Commission to propose an import ban on all products produced by forced labour and on products produced by all Chinese companies listed as exploiting forced labour; reiterates its position in favour of an ambitious corporate sustainability due diligence directive;

19.  Reiterates its call for the EU and the Member States to check whether entities operating in the EU internal market are directly or indirectly involved in creating mass surveillance systems in Xinjiang, in running or building detention facilities for minority groups in Xinjiang or in conducting transactions with any person sanctioned for the abuse of Uyghurs and other minority groups in Xinjiang; stresses that the determination of these facts should trigger trade-related measures, exclusion from public procurement and sanctions;

20.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and to the Government and Parliament of the People’s Republic of China.

(1) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 114. (2) OJ C 255, 29.6.2021, p. 60. (3) OJ L 410 I, 7.12.2020, p. 1. (4) OJ L 410 I, 7.12.2020, p. 13. (5) https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Uyghur-Tribunal-Summary-Judgment-9th-Dec-21.pdf;https://14ee1ae3-14ee-4012-91cf-a6a3b7dc3d8b.usrfiles.com/ugd/14ee1a_3f31c56ca64a461592ffc2690c9bb737.pdf; https://newlinesinstitute.org/uyghurs/the-uyghur-genocide-an-examination-of-chinas-breaches-of-the-1948-genocide-convention/ https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/reports-and-resources/the-chinese-governments-assault-on-the-uyghurs (6) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/24/xinjiang-michelle-bachelet-china-uyghur/

European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2022 on the instrumentalisation of justice as a repressive tool in Nicaragua (2022/2701(RSP))

P9_TA(2022)0238 RC-B9-0293/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Nicaragua, in particular those of 16 December 2021(1), 8 July 2021(2), 8 October 2020, 19 December 2019(3), 14 March 2019(4) and 31 May 2018(5),

–  having regard to the statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU of 15 August 2021, 8 November 2021 and 14 March 2022,

–  having regard to the statements by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at the 48th and 49th sessions of the Human Rights Council and to her annual report on the situation of human rights in Nicaragua of 7 March 2022,

–  having regard to the statements by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of 23 June 2021, 20 November 2021 and 11 February 2022,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

–  having regard to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders of June 2004, as updated in 2008,

–  having regard to the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and Central America on the other (Association Agreement between the EU and Central America),

–  having regard to the Council regulations and decisions concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses in Nicaragua,

–  having regard to the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969 (Pact of San José),

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules), the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders (Bangkok Rules) and the Vienna Convention,

–  having regard to Resolution A/HRC/49/L.20 on the promotion and protection of human rights in Nicaragua adopted on 31 March 2022 by the UN Human Rights Council,

–  having regard to the Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua,

–  having regard to Rule 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas since April 2018, a framework of state repression has been installed in Nicaragua by the Ortega-Murillo regime, marked by systemic impunity for human rights violations, the deterioration of institutions and the rule of law, and the implementation of an orchestrated strategy with the clear connivance of the judiciary, which aims to silence any dissenting voices;

B.  whereas since 2018, the Nicaraguan authorities have carried out systematic and targeted incarceration, harassment and intimidation of political opponents, the opposition, student and rural leaders, journalists, human rights defenders, business representatives, and artists, who have repeatedly faced death threats, intimidation, online defamation campaigns, harassment, surveillance, assault, judicial persecution and arbitrary deprivation of liberty; whereas, despite these numerous risks, journalists and other human rights defenders continue to perform an essential role in monitoring the situation of human rights and freedoms in Nicaragua;

C.  whereas, in recent years, the Ortega-Murillo regime has adopted and applied an increasingly repressive regulatory framework;

D.  whereas to date at least 182 political opponents are being held in prison in inhumane conditions that do not comply with international human rights obligations such as the Nelson Mandela rules, according to the Special Follow-up Mechanism for Nicaragua (MESENI); whereas seven of these political prisoners were presidential pre-candidates for the 2021 elections; whereas critics of the Nicaraguan regime have been subjected to systematic abuses during detention, including inhumane, humiliating and degrading treatment amounting to torture, which has led to the death of political prisoner and former rebel leader Hugo Torres, among others; whereas the Nicaraguan authorities have also harassed the families and relatives of political prisoners, who have suffered persecution and threats;

E.  whereas the lack of separation of powers and the complete control of the institutions by the Nicaraguan regime has resulted in the subjugation of the judiciary and the Office of the Public Prosecutor to the regime’s will, obliterating the rule of law, judicial independence and civil society organisations, and therefore democracy, in order to establish a dictatorship in Nicaragua;

F.  whereas Nicaraguan courts have handed down guilty verdicts and harsh sentences to any dissenting voices after closed-door trials which failed to uphold basic fair trial guarantees;

G.  whereas the judges and prosecutors in these trials have consistently violated due process; whereas the presumption of innocence was violated by the Office of the Public Prosecutor in a public note;

H.  whereas the continued crackdown and repression has forced thousands of Nicaraguans to flee the country; whereas similar patterns of repression are being observed where attacks on freedom of expression have intensified; whereas threats by the Public Prosecutor’s Office against several journalists and media workers have prompted many of them to leave Nicaragua to seek protection;

I.  whereas in 2022, the Ortega-Murillo regime banned almost 400 non-profit organisations, depriving them of their legal status; whereas the Catholic Church has also been the victim of the Ortega-Murillo regime, as have the Nicaraguan Academy of Language, members of indigenous communities and other minority groups, among others;

J.  whereas the Ortega-Murillo regime violated international law, especially the Vienna Convention, by storming the headquarters and occupying the premises of the Organization of American States, which was expelled from Nicaragua on 25 April 2022;

K.  whereas, following a strongly supported initiative organised by civil society, the UN Human Rights Council established a Group of Human Rights Experts to conduct thorough and independent investigations into all alleged human rights violations and abuses committed since April 2018, including their gender dimension; whereas both the EU and the US have imposed sanctions on Nicaragua;

1.  Condemns in the strongest possible terms the systematic crackdown on political opposition parties, the suppression of civil society actors, human rights defenders and media, other media workers, journalists, as well as their family members, students and members of the Catholic Church, among others, and the persistent corruption of Nicaraguan regime officials;

2.  Strongly condemns the death of Mr Hugo Torres in detention;

3.  Condemns the arrest of Father Manuel Salvador García on 1 June 2022, who remains in pre-trial detention, and calls for his immediate release;

4.  Reiterates its call for the immediate extradition of Alessio Casimirri to Italy;

5.  Condemns the abusive detention, the lack of trial guarantees and the illegal convictions of political prisoners that have been taking place in Nicaragua; urges the Nicaraguan authorities to restore guarantees for the full exercise of the civil and political rights of all Nicaraguans, cease the persecution of the democratic opposition, the press and civil society, immediately and unconditionally release those detained since April 2018, annul the legal proceedings against them and allow the safe return of all refugees and exiles to their homes;

6.  Calls for the re-establishment of the rule of law, the separation of powers and the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and for the public authorities to respect the criminal code and the presumption of innocence and to stop the criminalisation of the opposition;

7.  Condemns the illegitimate judicial rulings that only confirm the repressive drift of the Nicaraguan regime and that judges have become an arm of repression responsible for human rights violations;

8.  Urges the European Union to hold the Nicaraguan regime accountable, in particular its judges, for repression in the country and the judicial proceedings initiated against opposition figures and other critics; calls on the Council to immediately start the proceedings to include the following judges on the list of individuals sanctioned by the EU: Nadia Camila Tardencilla, Angel Jeancarlos Fernández González, Ulisa Yaoska Tapia Silva, Rosa Velia Baca Cardoza, Veronica Fiallos Moncada, Luden Martin Quiroz García, Karen Vanesa Chavarría, Felix Ernesto Salmerón Moreno, Nancy Aguirre Gudiel, William Irving Howard López, Erick Ramón Laguna Averruz, Melvin Leopoldo Vargas García, Irma Oralia Laguna Cruz and Rolando Sanarrusia, among others, as well as the judges of the Managua Appeals Court who have also been involved in the deprivation of the procedural and substantive rights of those illegally convicted: Octavio Rothschuh Andino, Ángela Dávila and Argentina Solís;

9.  Calls on the Member States and the UN Security Council, in accordance with Articles 13 and 14 of the Rome Statute, to open a formal investigation through the International Criminal Court into Nicaragua and Daniel Ortega for crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute;

10.  Expresses its support to the Nicaraguan citizens protesting peacefully against the Ortega-Murillo regime; deeply regrets that no judicial action has been taken to ensure justice and reparation for the victims of serious human rights violations since the 2018 crackdown;

11.  Urges Nicaragua to repeal legislation passed since 2018 that unduly restricts civic and democratic space, in particular the Special Law on Cybercrimes (Law 1042), Law 1040 on the Regulation of Foreign Agents, and Law 1055 on the Defence of the Rights of the People to Independence, Sovereignty and Self-Determination for Peace, as well as the reform of the Code of Criminal Procedures; recalls that in the light of the Association Agreement between the EU and Central America, Nicaragua must respect and consolidate the principles of the rule of law, democracy and human rights; reiterates its demand that, in the light of the current circumstances, the democratic clause of the Association Agreement should be triggered;

12.  Stresses that international human rights bodies must be allowed to return to Nicaragua, including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; regrets the lack of cooperation of Nicaraguan authorities with regional and international human rights mechanisms; calls for the EU to support the mandate of the three independent members of the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua recently established by the UN Human Rights Council and to closely collaborate with them with a view to promoting accountability for human rights violations and abuses in Nicaragua;

13.  Condemns the fact that almost 400 NGOs have been forced to stop working in Nicaragua, including the Nicaraguan Academy of Language; calls on the Nicaraguan authorities to stop unduly closing NGOs and restore the legal personality of all organisations, political parties, universities and media outlets that have been arbitrarily shut down, as well as returning all the assets, documents and equipment that were illegally seized;

14.  Expresses its deep concern over the repression of free and independent media in the country, which has forced more than 100 journalists into exile;

15.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to closely monitor the situation on the ground through their local representatives and embassies in Nicaragua; calls on the EU delegation and the Member States with diplomatic missions in the country to fully implement the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, to provide all appropriate support to human rights defenders who have been detained, including prison visits and trial monitoring, to publicly denounce abuses against human rights defenders and independent media and to support their work; calls on the EU delegation and the Member States to use all available instruments to increase their support for human rights defenders’ work, to facilitate the issuing of emergency visas where appropriate, and to provide temporary shelter in the EU Member States for humanitarian reasons;

16.  Deeply regrets that Nicaraguan representatives voted against expelling Russia from the UN Human Rights Council for atrocities committed by its forces during the war in Ukraine and that Nicaragua abstained on UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 of 2 March 2022 deploring Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and demanding a full withdrawal of Russian forces;

17.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, the Central American Parliament, the Lima Group, and the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Nicaragua.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0513. (2) OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 204. (3) OJ C 255, 29.6.2021, p. 65. (4) OJ C 23, 21.1.2021, p. 126. (5) OJ C 76, 9.3.2020, p. 164.

European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2022 on violations of media freedom and the safety of journalists in Georgia (2022/2702(RSP))

P9_TA(2022)0239 RC-B9-0300/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia, in particular that of 16 September 2020 on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Georgia(1),

–  having regard to the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media’s recent visit to Georgia of 28 and 29 April 2022,

–  having regard to the agreement reached between Georgian political forces on 19 April 2021, mediated by the President of the European Council,

–  having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, which fully entered into force on 1 July 2016(2),

–  having regard to Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index for 2021 and 2022,

–  having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas in their Association Agreement, which has been in force since 1 July 2016, Georgia and the EU committed to developing political dialogue with the aim of strengthening respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including media freedom;

B.  whereas Georgia submitted its application for EU membership on 3 March 2022, thereby demonstrating the people of Georgia’s European aspirations, which enjoy vast support among the public and across the political spectrum, including the opposition;

C.  whereas freedom of expression, freedom of the media and the safety of journalists are essential elements of a vibrant democracy and their protection by the authorities is an important indicator for the consolidation of democracy; whereas a pluralistic, free and independent media is a fundamental cornerstone of democracy and one of the main pillars in the fight against disinformation;

D.  whereas the Agreement of 19 April 2021, mediated by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, underlined the need to address perceptions of politicised justice, inter alia, by adopting and implementing an ambitious reform of the judiciary to increase the independence, transparency and accountability of the judicial system;

E.  whereas on 5 July 2021 over 50 journalists, media representatives and peaceful demonstrators were violently attacked by mainly far-right activists when covering Tbilisi Pride’s March for Dignity, which was ultimately forcibly cancelled; whereas Alexander Lashkarava, a cameramen for TV Pirveli, died soon after this assault due to the injuries he sustained;

F.  whereas the media environment of Georgia, after several years of improvement, has rapidly deteriorated over the past few years and an unprecedentedly high number of violent physical attacks against journalists have occurred in Georgia since the mass violence against the Tbilisi Pride march on 5 July 2021, leading to statements of concern by several international organisations in defence of media freedom and to the significant downgrading of Georgia in the World Press Freedom Index (from a score of 71.36 and a rank of 60 out of 180 in 2021 down to a score of 59.9 and a rank of 89 out of 180 in 2022);

G.  whereas the number of verbal assaults on journalists and the number of defamation lawsuits, including those launched by government officials and individuals associated with the ruling party, against critical media representatives and companies have been increasing; whereas as Transparency International Georgia has observed, the change of judicial practice puts the burden of proof on journalists, despite an unambiguous provision stating the contrary in Georgian law; whereas journalists, particularly those from media channels critical of the government, face difficulties in accessing information that should be publicly available;

H.  whereas there has been a lack of transparency and effectiveness in investigations, which has led to a widespread impression of impunity for those guilty of crimes against journalists;

I.  whereas on 4 April 2022, Tbilisi City Court sentenced six people to five years of imprisonment over the attack of two cameramen and a journalist during the violent attacks against the Tbilisi Pride march on 5 July 2021;

J.  whereas on 16 May 2022, Nika Gvaramia, director of the TV channel Mtavari, was sentenced to three-and-a-half years in prison under Article 220 of the Criminal Code on dubious charges of money laundering, bribery and document forgery related to his past activities as director of Rustavi 2 TV, a sentence that has been widely perceived in Georgia as an attempt to silence a voice critical of the current government; whereas this case was already negatively assessed by the Public Defender of Georgia in 2019;

K.  whereas selective investigations and prosecutions targeting those in opposition to the current government undermine public trust not only in judicial institutions, but also in the government itself, while the repetition of similar cases against media owners linked to the opposition undermines the efforts aimed at increasing the independence of the judiciary;

L.  whereas former President Mikheil Saakashvili, whose health has been constantly deteriorating, has finally been relocated to a civilian hospital following opinions from independent doctors that his condition would not improve otherwise;

M.  whereas the reform of the law on electronic communications gives the Georgian National Communications Commission (GNCC) the right to appoint special managers at the telecommunications companies that enforce GNCC decisions;

N.  whereas court cases have been initiated against owners of other major critical media outlets, or their close family members, namely David Kezerashvili of Formula TV and Vakhtang Tsereteli, the founder of the independent station TV Pirveli; whereas in January 2022 Tbilisi City Court judged the founders of TBC Bank and the political party Lelo for Georgia, Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze, as well as Avtandil Tsereteli, Vakhtang Tsereteli’s father, to be guilty of fraud and sentenced them to seven years of imprisonment; whereas their sentence was however commuted, as the statute of limitations for fraud had expired;

O.  whereas Georgia has been experiencing a surge in Russian disinformation and anti-EU propaganda in recent years and especially since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, targeting women, the LGBTQI+ community, human rights activists and ethnic minorities, in particular;

P.  whereas many journalists have been confirmed to be among the members of Georgian society whose conversations had been recorded, as shown by the revelations about widespread illegal wiretapping in September 2021;

Q.  whereas investigations into the case of Azerbaijani journalist Afgan Mukhtarli, who was kidnapped in Georgia in May 2017 and illegally transported over the border with Azerbaijan to face trial in Baku, allegedly with collusion from Georgian security officials, have not yet led to any tangible results;

1.  Expresses its concern over the significant deterioration of the media situation and the safety of journalists in Georgia in recent years, despite Georgia’s solid legal framework for guaranteeing freedom of expression and freedom of the media;

2.  Condemns the increasing number of cases of intimidation, threats and violence against and the persecution of journalists, including an increasing number of criminal investigations into media workers and owners; calls on the Georgian authorities to thoroughly investigate any case of violence and to prosecute those responsible for inciting and carrying out violent attacks against journalists and other media workers, which would thereby remedy the impression of impunity for such crimes; calls on Georgia to restrict the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation that target human rights defenders and media representatives, which serve to inhibit their critical and independent work;

3.  Calls on Georgia to ensure media freedom, which should entail editorial independence, transparent media ownership and pluralistic, impartial and non-discriminatory coverage of political views in programming by private and, in particular, public broadcasters, especially during electoral campaigns; calls on Georgia to guarantee unhindered access to information that is supposed to be publicly available and to ensure the safety, protection and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals;

4.  Condemns the sentencing of Nika Gvaramia, the director of the main pro-opposition TV channel Mtavari, on 16 May 2022, which has highlighted the persistent mistrust in Georgia’s judiciary system; endorses the call by Reporters Without Borders for a review of Nika Gvaramia’s conviction; emphasises, once more, the urgent need for the government to genuinely advance reform of the judiciary through a broad and inclusive cross-party process with the aim of increasing the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, in line with commitments taken as an associated partner of the EU;

5.  Calls on all the representatives of the Georgian Government to refrain from using aggressive rhetoric and discriminatory treatment towards media representatives in Georgia and to advocate for a tolerant approach that is respectful of human rights in their public statements;

6.  Strongly denounces the persistent lack of diligent investigations or prosecutions of those responsible for the violence against journalists and peaceful demonstrators at the Tbilisi Pride march on 5 July 2021; insists that impunity for the perpetrators of such acts cannot be tolerated under any circumstances, as they are in breach of Georgia’s national legislation and international and European commitments alike, and calls for effective investigations into the incidents of 5 July 2021; condemns the continued discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons; urges the Georgian authorities to fully implement human rights and anti-discrimination legislation in practice;

7.  Calls on the Georgian authorities to conduct effective investigations into the wiretapping scandal and to put in place proper mechanisms for democratic oversight of surveillance and data collection by state institutions;

8.  Emphasises the need to guarantee a safe and conducive working environment for journalists, media workers and media outlets, both in legislation and in practice, including for those journalists seeking refuge from Russia, Belarus and other authoritarian regimes; encourages Georgia, therefore, to make use of international cooperation to improve the media environment and relevant legislation in line with best international practices;

9.  Commends Nino Lomjaria, the Public Defender of Georgia, for her actions in safeguarding freedom of the media, despite regular attacks by the government;

10.  Acknowledges the diverse and pluralistic media landscape in Georgia, but regrets the extremely tense relationship between the ruling party and critical media outlets, as well as between the opposition parties and pro-government media; deeply deplores the polarisation of the media landscape, which reflects the increasing and damaging polarisation of the political landscape;

11.  Reiterates its call on the Georgian authorities to refrain from interfering in media freedom or pursuing politically motivated judicial cases against media owners or representatives;

12.  Calls on the Georgian authorities to release former president Mikhail Saakashvili from prison on humanitarian grounds in order to allow him to undergo proper medical treatment abroad;

13.  Expresses its concern over the steady rise in Russian disinformation and information manipulation in Georgia, in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and urges the Georgian Government to develop media literacy education programmes for its citizens, to support civil society in the creation of fact-checking mechanisms, and to take active steps to prevent disinformation campaigns by foreign or domestic actors against the country, vulnerable groups or persons, such as those living in ethnic minority communities or conflict-affected areas, and political parties;

14.  Urges all Georgian political actors to refrain from exploiting Russian disinformation attempts to target their respective political opponents, as this only contributes to the further spread of disinformation and endangers social cohesion and democracy;

15.  Encourages Georgia to make the best possible use of all the instruments and initiatives dedicated to strengthening resilience under the Eastern Partnership and calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to provide political, technical and financial support to independent media and civil society in Georgia;

16.  Expresses its concern over the destructive role played by the sole oligarch, Bidzina Ivanishvili, in Georgia’s politics and economy, and the level of control he exerts over the government and its decisions, including those on the politically motivated persecution of journalists and political opponents; is deeply worried by Ivanishvili’s exposed personal and business links to the Kremlin, which determine the position of the current Government of Georgia towards sanctions on Russia; calls on the Council and democratic partners to consider imposing personal sanctions on Ivanishvili for his role in the deterioration of the political process in Georgia;

17.  Welcomes Georgia’s participation in the 2021-2027 Creative Europe programme; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support actions that monitor and assess risks to media pluralism and freedom, defend journalists under threat and facilitate the transformation and competitiveness of the news media sector in Georgia;

18.  Calls on the Georgian authorities to resolutely uphold the highest standards of democracy, the rule of law, judicial independence, fair trials and fundamental freedoms, including in the area of media freedom, and thereby unambiguously demonstrate their political determination to actualise the ambitious European aspirations of the people of Georgia, as witnessed by the country’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022; expresses its belief that the legitimate aspirations of the people of Georgia deserve to be fulfilled and therefore calls for the EU institutions to work towards granting EU candidate status to Georgia, in line with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, on the basis of merit and on the condition that the Georgian authorities fulfil all criteria;

19.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of Georgia.

(1) OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 40. (2) OJ L 261, 30.8.2014, p. 4.

European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF) (2022/2703(RSP))

P9_TA(2022)0240 RC-B9-0317/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Articles 1, 2, 7(1) and 19 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

–  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(1) (RRF Regulation),

–  having regard to the Commission’s reasoned proposal of 20 December 2017 in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU regarding the rule of law in Poland: proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835),

–  having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland(2),

–  having regard to the Commission recommendation of 23 May 2022 for a Council Recommendation on the 2022 National Reform Programme of Poland and delivering a Council opinion on the 2022 Convergence Programme of Poland (COM(2022)0622) (hereinafter ‘the 2022 European Semester country-specific recommendations’),

–  having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 on the proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law(3),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

–  having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law report(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the creation of guidelines for the application of the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(5),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on media freedom and further deterioration of the rule of law in Poland(6),

–  having regard to its resolution of 21 October 2021 on the rule of law crisis in Poland and the primacy of EU law(7),

–  having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling(8),

–  having regard to its resolution of 5 May 2022 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Poland and Hungary(9),

–  having regard to the case‑law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),

–  having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council implementing decision of 1 June 2022 on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and resilience plan for Poland (COM(2022)0268),

–  having regard to the statement by the Council and the Commission of 7 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF),

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as set out in Article 2 TEU, and as reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas those values, which are common to the Member States and to which all Member States have freely subscribed, constitute the foundation of the rights enjoyed by those living in the Union;

B.  whereas any clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU does not concern solely the individual Member State where the risk materialises, but also has an impact on the other Member States, on the mutual trust between them and on the very nature of the Union and the functioning of its institutions as well as its citizens’ fundamental rights under Union law;

C.  whereas changes initiated by the Polish Government, in particular in the justice system, have led to a serious erosion of democracy and the rule of law;

D.  whereas the decision taken on 1 June 2022 by the College of Commissioners on a proposal for a Council implementing decision on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and resilience plan for Poland was reportedly not unanimous;

E.  whereas during the October 2021 plenary session, Commission President von der Leyen outlined three criteria for the approval of the Polish recovery and resilience plan: dismantling the disciplinary chamber of the supreme court; reforming the disciplinary proceedings for judges; and reinstating the judges suspended by the disciplinary chamber;

F.  whereas Parliament has repeatedly called for the Commission and the Council to refrain from approving Poland’s draft recovery and resilience plan until the Government of Poland implements the judgments of the CJEU and international courts fully and properly, and to ensure that the assessment of the plan guarantees compliance with the relevant country-specific recommendations, in particular on safeguarding judicial independence;

G.  whereas reforms in Poland in the field of justice are still ongoing and recent bills being put to the vote and proposals being discussed have not effectively addressed all concerns regarding the independence of the judicial bodies and disciplinary procedures at stake; whereas the Polish Senate is trying to amend these proposals to bring them into line with the principle of judicial independence; whereas several judges are still facing disciplinary procedures and/or have not been reinstated;

H.  whereas the Polish authorities have recently taken a number of measures in direct contradiction with the three conditions set by the Commission President, among others, the suspension of a judge in February 2022 for applying European law and the judgments of the European courts; whereas, furthermore, the President of Poland appointed more than 200 new, defectively nominated (at the request of the National Council of the Judiciary (neo-NCJ)) so-called ‘neo judges’, including 4 appointments to the Supreme Court; whereas, moreover, on 10 March 2022, at the request of the Minister of Justice; the politicised and fully subordinated ‘Constitutional Tribunal’ (with the participation of so-called ‘stand-in judges’) undermined the validity of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in Poland by questioning the ability of the ECtHR and Polish courts to examine the correctness of the appointment of judges and the independence of the neo-NCJ;

I.  whereas the RRF Regulation clearly lays down the necessary conditions for the preparation, approval and implementation of a national plan, and in particular, in Article 19 and Annex V, the 11 criteria for the Commission to assess, and notably whether the arrangements proposed by the Member State concerned are expected to prevent, detect and correct corruption, fraud and conflicts of interests when using the funds provided under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF); whereas the RRF Regulation requires that the bodies tasked with control and supervision have the legal empowerment and administrative capacity to exercise their tasks independently and whereas the draft Council implementing decision itself emphasises that effective judicial protection is a prerequisite for the functioning of an internal control system;

J.  whereas in the 2022 European Semester country-specific recommendations, the Commission stated that the independence, efficiency and quality of the justice system are essential components in this respect and that in Poland, the rule of law has deteriorated and judicial independence remains a serious concern, which has also been noted in several rulings from the CJEU and the ECtHR;

K.  whereas in the 2022 European Semester country-specific recommendations, the Commission recommended that Poland take action in 2022 and 2023, inter alia, to enhance its investment climate, in particular by safeguarding judicial independence and ensuring effective public consultations and the involvement of social partners in the policymaking process;

L.  whereas the RRF is expected to cushion EU economies and citizens from the most acute impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and is expected to contribute positively to the EU’s recovery and resilience and to catalyse the green and digital transitions if implemented effectively while strictly observing the rule of law and the sound financial management of EU funds;

M.  whereas the Commission considers that Poland’s plan includes milestones related to the independence of the judiciary to improve the investment climate and put in place the conditions for an effective implementation of the recovery and resilience plan; whereas no disbursement under the RRF can be made until the fulfilment of those milestones is demonstrated;

N.  whereas in accordance with Article 13(1) of the RRF Regulation, no plan adopted after 31 December 2021 is eligible for pre-financing;

1.  Expresses its grave concerns about the Commission’s positive assessment, on 1 June 2022, of Poland’s recovery and resilience plan, which was submitted by Poland on 3 May 2021, considering the country’s existing and continued breaches of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, including of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; reiterates that the existence of such breaches has been properly documented by many court judgments, assessments and positions of EU institutions, including in Parliament’s resolutions and in the ongoing procedure under Article 7(1) TEU, as well as by other international organisations; recalls that compliance with CJEU and ECtHR rulings and compliance with the primacy of EU law are non-negotiable and cannot be treated as a bargaining chip;

2.  Regrets that the conditions set in the RRP do not envisage the immediate reinstatement of all the unlawfully suspended judges to their former positions and urges the Government of Poland to significantly accelerate the process of their reinstatement to their former positions and the Commission to monitor and facilitate this process; considers that a judicial review of the decision on suspension can proceed while the judges are in office; deplores and condemns the current practices against some judges, who have been transferred to another department and/or forced to go on leave upon their return or who have been affected by similar tactics in violation of various Polish and European Court rulings;

3.  Strongly urges the Council to only approve Poland’s national plan under the RRF once it has fully complied with the requirements of the RRF Regulation, and in particular Article 22 thereof , notably with a view to safeguarding the Union’s financial interests against conflict of interest and fraud, and with all the European Semester country-specific recommendations in the field of the rule of law, and once it has implemented all the relevant judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR; recalls that cooperation based on mutual recognition and mutual trust between the Member States, the European Union and their authorities cannot function if there are deficiencies in respect for the rule of law;

4.  Recalls that compliance with the rule of law and with Article 2 TEU are prerequisites to gaining access to the fund, that the rule of law conditionality mechanism is fully applicable to the RRF and that no measures should be financed under the RRF that are contrary to the EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; recalls that the Commission must constantly monitor very carefully the risks to EU financial interests in the implementation of the RRF and any breaches or potential breaches of the principles of the rule of law and take immediate action if the financial interests of the EU could be harmed, in accordance with Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and the RRF Regulation;

5.  Insists that the milestones and targets related to the protection of the financial interests of the Union, the establishment of an adequate control system, the independence of the judiciary, and the prevention and detection of and fight against fraud, conflicts of interest and corruption are pre-conditions and must be fulfilled before the submission of a first payment request and recalls that no payment under the RRF can be made before their fulfilment;

6.  Considers that no payments can be made to Poland under the RRF until the full implementation of all relevant judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR; stresses that the Commission and the Council are politically accountable to Parliament for their actions;

7.  Acknowledges the decision of the Commission to set the closure of the illegal Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court and transfer of disciplinary functions to another chamber of the Supreme Court as one of the key conditions for the release of funds under the RRF; urges the Commission to apply a robust verification mechanism as well as a probation period to ensure that the new chamber meets the criteria of an independent and impartial court established by law as required under Article 19 TEU before the release of any funds; underlines the need to strictly keep to the timetable envisaged in the RRP;

8.  Recalls that Poland is bound by the order of the CJEU and still has to pay a daily penalty of EUR 1 million until it addresses the rulings related to the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court; calls therefore on the Commission to scrutinise the reform of the disciplinary system in order to ensure that it is strictly in line with the rulings of the CJEU;

9.  Regrets that the issues regarding the illegitimate ‘Constitutional Tribunal’ and the illegitimate ‘National Council of the Judiciary’ (NCJ) undermining the impartiality and independence of the NCJ are not addressed in the ‘milestones’; calls on the Commission to open an infringement procedure on this matter without delay;

10.  Deplores the lack of information, especially towards Parliament, regarding the negotiations between the Commission and the Polish authorities; expects the Commission to inform Parliament swiftly and regularly of any relevant developments;

11.  Recalls, furthermore, that adherence to the rule of law and the sound financial management of EU funds are to be continuously evaluated throughout the lifecycle of the RRF and that the satisfactory fulfilment of milestones and targets and the related payments presuppose that there has been no reversal of measures related to milestones and targets that have already been satisfactorily fulfilled; stresses that the Commission must refrain from disbursing funding and, where applicable, recover funds in the event that such conditions are no longer fulfilled;

12.  Recalls that the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, should use all tools at its disposal to ensure compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU and the primacy of EU law;

13.  Recalls that the purpose of the RRF is to boost the recovery and resilience of the EU and its Member States, including Poland; deplores that, because of the Polish Government’s actions, the RRF funding has not yet reached the people and regions of Poland;

14.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17. (2) OJ C 129, 5.4.2019, p. 13. (3) OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 317. (4) OJ C 81, 18.2.2022, p. 27. (5) OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 146. (6) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 151. (7) OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 154. (8) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0074. (9) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0204.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 9 June 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access of third-country goods and services to the Union’s internal market in public procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union goods and services to the public procurement markets of third countries (COM(2016)0034 – C9-0018/2016 – 2012/0060(COD))

P9_TA(2022)0241 A9-0337/2021

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2012)0124) and the amended proposal (COM(2016)0034),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9‑0018/2016),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 27 April 2016(1),

–  after consulting the Committee of the Regions,

–  having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 30 March 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rules 59 and 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A7‑0454/2013),

–  having regard to the Decision of the Conference of Presidents of 16 October 2019 on unfinished business from the eighth parliamentary term,

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection,

–  having regard to the letter from the Committee on Legal Affairs,

–  having regard to the second report of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0337/2021),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out(2);

2.  Approves the joint statement by Parliament and the Council annexed to this resolution, which will be published in the L series of the Official Journal of the European Union together with the final legislative act;

3.  Takes note of the statements by the Commission annexed to this resolution; one on the review of the International Procurement Instrument Regulation, which will be published in the L series of the Official Journal of the European Union together with the final legislative act, and one on the exclusive competence, which will be published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union;

4.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

5.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 9 June 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/… of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access of third-country economic operators, goods and services to the Union’s public procurement and concession markets and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union economic operators, goods and services to the public procurement and concession markets of third countries (International Procurement Instrument - IPI)

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/1031.)

ANNEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

Joint statement of the European Parliament and the Council IN RESPEct oF REGULATION (EU) 2022/1031(3)

The European Parliament and Council recognise that the rules on comitology agreed in this instrument do not prejudge the outcome of other ongoing or future legislative negotiations and are not to be seen as precedent for other legislative files.

STATEMENT BY THE COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT REGULATION (REGULATION (EU) 2022/1031)

When conducting a review of the scope, functioning and efficiency of Regulation (EU) 2022/1031, in line with its Article 14, the Commission will also assess the need to exempt from its application any of the developing countries that are beneficiaries of the general arrangement referred to in point (a) of Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, and in particular the beneficiaries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance as defined in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 978/2012. In the review, the Commission will pay particular attention to sectors that are considered strategic in respect of EU public procurement.

STATEMENT BY THE COMMISSION on the exclusive competence IN RESPECT OF REGULATION (eu) 2022/1031

As confirmed in the Opinion 2/15 of the Court of Justice, the participation of third-country economic operators, goods and services in the Union’s procurement procedures falls within the scope of the common commercial policy for which, as explicitly stated in Article 3(1)(e) TFEU, the Union has exclusive competence. Therefore, Member States and their contracting authorities and contracting entities shall not adopt or maintain any legislative or other generally applicable measures governing access by third-country economic operators, goods and services beyond those applied in accordance with this Regulation and other Union legislation.

(1) OJ C 264, 20.7.2016, p. 110. (2) This position replaces the amendments adopted on 14.12.2021 (Texts adopted P9_TA(2021)0497). (3) Regulation (EU) 2022/1031 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2022 on the access of third-country economic operators, goods and services to the Union’s public procurement and concession markets and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union economic operators, goods and services to the public procurement and concession markets of third countries (International Procurement Instrument – IPI) (OJ L 173, 30.6.2022, p. 1).

European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2022 on Parliament’s right of initiative (2020/2132(INI))

P9_TA(2022)0242 A9-0142/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to the Framework Agreement of 20 October 2010 on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission, as amended(1) (2010 Framework Agreement),

–  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making(2) (Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty(3),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 February 2017 on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 13 February 2019 on the state of the debate on the future of Europe(5),

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Parliament’s position on the Conference on the Future of Europe(6),

–  having regard to its resolution of 18 June 2020 on the European Parliament’s position on the Conference on the Future of Europe(7),

–  having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2019- 2024 presented by its President, Ursula von der Leyen, on 16 July 2019 entitled ‘A Union that strives for more – My agenda for Europe’,

–  having regard to the study of July 2020 commissioned by Parliament and entitled ‘The European Parliament’s right of initiative’,

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A9-0142/2022),

A.  whereas Article 15 TEU specifies that the European Council must not exercise legislative functions;

B.  whereas Parliament is the only EU institution democratically and directly elected by the citizens; whereas, contrary to the constitutional systems of Member States, Parliament has no general direct right of legislative initiative, which, pursuant to Article 17(2) TEU, lies with the Commission, except where the Treaties state otherwise;

C.  whereas the Treaties grant an indirect right of legislative initiative as, pursuant to Article 225 TFEU, ‘the European Parliament may, acting by a majority of its component Members, request the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters on which it considers that a Union act is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’;

D.  whereas Article 225 TFEU also stipulates that ‘if the Commission does not submit a proposal, it shall inform the European Parliament of the reasons’;

E.  whereas Parliament’s own-initiative reports and resolutions constitute an important tool for setting the EU political agenda;

F.  whereas, under the 2010 Framework Agreement, the Commission committed to reporting on the concrete follow-up on any Parliament request to submit a proposal pursuant to Article 225 TFEU within three months following adoption of the relevant resolution in plenary; whereas, when the Commission does not comply with this obligation, it could constitute failure to act pursuant to Article 265 TFEU;

G.  whereas only one third of Parliament’s legislative and non-legislative initiative procedures up to 2019 can be considered successful and most legislative own-initiative reports (INLs) adopted since 2011 were not followed up by the Commission through the submission of any appropriate proposals until 2019(8);

H.  whereas the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making stipulates that the Commission must adopt a specific communication on the follow-up to such requests and that if it ‘decides not to submit a proposal in response to such a request, must ‘provide, where appropriate, an analysis of possible alternatives and respond to any issues raised by the co-legislators in relation to analyses concerning “European added value” and concerning the “cost of non-Europe”’;

I.  whereas the Treaties grant Parliament direct rights of initiative on its own composition, the election of its Members and their Statute, the Statute of the European Ombudsman and Parliament’s right of inquiry, for which a special procedure applies, and on initiating procedures related to respect for the rule of law and Treaty revisions;

J.  whereas Parliament’s direct rights of initiative are far from sufficient to allow it to represent the voice of citizens, civil society and the social partners within the European institutions, effectively leaving the Commission with a monopoly on the exercise of legislative initiative;

K.  whereas a more prominent role for Parliament in setting the Union’s agenda by strengthening Parliament’s right of initiative also requires an extension of the ordinary legislative procedure to other policy fields and reinforcing interinstitutional cooperation;

L.  whereas Parliament produced a particularly ambitious legislative initiative on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, adopted in October 2016(9) and 2020(10) by inviting the Commission and the Council to enter into negotiations with Parliament on an interinstitutional agreement in accordance with Article 295 TFEU; whereas the rule of law is one of the areas where Parliament’s right of initiative could be developed;

M.  whereas granting Parliament a direct right of initiative would rebalance the Union's legislative process;

N.  whereas empirical evidence shows that the success of Parliament’s initiatives depends essentially on the decision-making procedure followed by the Council (qualified majority or unanimity)(11);

O.  whereas in its resolution on the state of the debate on the future of Europe, Parliament recalled that ‘in the event of a possible future revision of the Treaties, the right of legislative initiative could also be attributed to Parliament as the direct representative of EU citizens’; whereas the Conference on the Future of Europe has been, among other things, a historic opportunity to promote the reform of European democracy and the Treaties with the involvement of citizens;

P.  whereas on the digital platform of the Conference on the Future of Europe, European democracy was one of the issues which obtained the most contributions from citizens;

Q.  whereas in its resolution on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union, Parliament proposed ‘that in line with the common practice in a number of Member States, both chambers of the EU legislature, the Council and, in particular, the Parliament, as the only institution directly elected by citizens, should be given the right of legislative initiative, without prejudice to the basic legislative prerogative of the Commission’;

R.  whereas Parliament’s Rules of Procedure determine the rules for drafting and adopting resolutions under Article 225 TFEU; whereas a distinction in practice exists between own-initiative (INI) and INL reports; whereas the 2010 Framework Agreement and the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making do not make such a distinction;

The direct right(s) of initiative of Parliament established by the Treaties

1.  Emphasises and regrets that Parliament, despite being the only directly elected EU institution, does not have a general direct right of initiative;

2.  Underlines that the Treaty of Lisbon already bestows direct rights of initiative on Parliament, acknowledging its competence to self-organise, its scrutiny function and its democratic legitimacy as the only directly elected EU institution;

3.  Highlights that in an institutional set-up where Parliament does not yet have a general direct right of initiative, the special legislative procedures that it initiates have special constitutional dignity and primacy over ordinary legislative procedures;

4.  Recalls that in the past 20 years, Parliament has repeatedly made use of such special legislative rights, insufficient as they are; regrets, however, that these special legislative procedures have too seldom been successfully concluded due to the lack of agreement by the Commission and the Council(12);

5.  Highlights that Parliament made use of its right of initiative by launching a rule of law procedure under Article 7 TEU; condemns the Council’s lack of follow-up to this procedure and to Parliament’s subsequent, repeated calls for action and points out that the Council’s failure to make effective use of Article 7 TEU continues to undermine the integrity of common European values, mutual trust and the credibility of the Union as a whole; deems it essential to ensure a full and immediate implementation of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(13) while respecting Parliament’s role as co-legislator; considers that the Union remains structurally unprepared to counter backsliding on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights and their violation in the Member States; believes that the deterioration on these issues in various Member States has shown the need for genuine interinstitutional cooperation; deeply regrets the lack of proper response to Parliament’s initiative on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights and reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to enter without delay into negotiations with Parliament on an interinstitutional agreement;

6.  Reiterates its reasoned proposal on the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded; reiterates its deep concern that the standard procedures for hearings do not ensure equal treatment of Parliament, on the one hand, and the Commission and one third of the Member States, on the other, when it comes to presenting a reasoned proposal and in terms of access to information; expresses its regret that the hearings have not yet resulted in any significant progress on addressing clear risks of a serious breach of EU values;

7.  Regrets that three Member States have not yet ratified the amended European Union electoral law adopted in 2018;

8.  Regrets, further, that the Council has to date refused to negotiate with Parliament on its right of inquiry, although this contradicts Article 226 TFEU and the principle of sincere cooperation, leaving a provision of the Treaty unimplemented despite a duty to do so;

9.  Welcomes the adoption of the new Statute of the European Ombudsman, following Parliament’s initiative, which ensures that the Statute is consistent with the Treaty of Lisbon;

The rights of initiative of the Council and the European Council established by the Treaties

10.  Regrets that in the area of economic and monetary policy, Article 121 TFEU merely provides for Parliament to be informed; also notes that the Council has exercised Article 121 TFEU as a de facto right of initiative in this area, and demands further responsibilities for Parliament as the only EU institution representing the voice of the citizens;

11.  Acknowledges, furthermore, that Article 68 TFEU has been exercised as a de facto right of initiative by the European Council in the area of freedom, security and justice; highlights the fact that the European Council is not a co-legislator, and that the adoption by the European Council of multiannual operational programmes in this area without any obligation to consult Parliament or the Commission should be revised given the particularly serious impact of these policies on citizens’ fundamental rights; calls for Parliament and the Council to be given this competence on equal terms in an upcoming Treaty revision;

12.  Notes that pursuant to Article 76 TFEU, the Council, through a quarter of its Member States, has a right of initiative that is concurrent with that of the Commission on cooperation on administrative law and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters;

13.  Notes that these developments are part of a wider trend toward an increasing imbalance between the Council, the European Council and the Commission in decision-making power across all policy fields, to varying degrees; stresses that this practice erodes the institutional architecture of the EU as established by the Treaties; believes that the balance should be restored in favour of democratic legitimacy through equivalent rights for Parliament;

14.  Notes with concern the lack of transparency in the use of Council’s indirect right of initiative laid down in Article 241 TFEU; calls on the Council to publish, in a user-friendly manner and in all the official languages of the European Union, all requests made using this legal basis and insists on its call for the Council to ensure the highest possible level of transparency in all its acts(14), with full adherence to the EU rules on access to documents;

Parliament’s indirect right of initiative established by the Treaties

15.  Recalls that since the Maastricht Treaty, Parliament, in an acknowledgement of its unique democratic legitimacy, has had the right to ask the Commission to submit legislative proposals;

16.  Notes that in accordance with Article 225 TFEU, requests must be within the remit of competence of the Union and that currently the Commission’s sole obligation is to inform Parliament of its reasons for not presenting a proposal;

17.  Recalls that Parliament and the Commission agreed to further enhance this right through the 2010 Framework Agreement; notes that the Commission committed to report on its follow-up on Parliament requests within three months and, if so decided by the college, present a legislative proposal;

18.  Believes that the time has come to show more ambitious political will and therefore calls for consideration to be given to a review of the 2010 Framework Agreement with the goal of ensuring stronger rights of initiative for Parliament;

19.  Regrets that, until 2019, in its follow-up on Parliament’s legislative initiative reports adopted pursuant to Article 225 TFEU the Commission had only submitted legislative proposals following Parliament requests in a minority of cases(15); further regrets that the deadlines for the Commission to respond to Parliament requests and to put forward legislative proposals were not met in most cases;

20.  Considers that the sole obligation of the Commission to inform Parliament of its reasons not to follow up on an INL adopted by a majority of Parliament’s component Members to be far too weak, and therefore welcomes in the strongest terms Commission President von der Leyen’s support for Parliament’s right of initiative and the commitment made to always respond with a legislative act to Parliament requests under Article 225 TFEU, with full respect for the principles of proportionality, subsidiarity and better law-making; expects the Commission to uphold this commitment to initiate legislation following the adoption of any such request by Parliament adopted by the majority of its component Members in an INL; considers that this commitment should be enhanced and Parliament’s power to influence the EU agenda should be strengthened;

21.  Commends the current College of Commissioners on replying to all of Parliament’s requests in a timely manner(16), except in one case(17); highlights, furthermore, that only in one case did a request not result in a legislative proposal; considers this to demonstrate that an interinstitutional precedent has been established and expects the Commission to continue to honour its commitment to reply to all requests;

22.  Believes that reflection about Parliament’s right of initiative has to go hand in hand with wider reflection on political initiative in the EU decision-making process;

23.  Suggests that the follow-up on European Citizens’ Initiatives (ECIs) should be improved and stresses that if the Commission has failed to publish its intentions within the given deadlines, or has set out in a communication that it intends not to take action on an ECI which has met the procedural requirements and is in line with the Treaties, in particular the core values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU, Parliament could decide to follow up the ECI with an INL;

The future of Parliament’s right(s) of initiative

24.  Is deeply convinced that a general and direct right of initiative would further strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Union, empower Union citizens and would reflect the evolution over time of the competences of the Union and its institutions towards a stronger European democracy;

25.  Is of the opinion that Parliament, as the only directly elected EU institution, should be granted the right to propose legislation;

26.  Strongly believes that the Treaties should be revised so that Parliament, as the only directly elected EU institution and hence the institution that represents the voice of the citizens in the EU decision-making process, is granted a general and direct right to initiate legislation; stresses that Parliament should initiate the procedure under Article 48 TEU to establish such right of legislative initiative; takes the view that Parliament’s right of initiative should at least apply in those policy fields in which Parliament is empowered to enact legislation as co-legislator;

27.  Stresses that the Conference on the Future of Europe was an unprecedented opportunity to address current shortcomings and give new impetus to European democracy and strongly encourages following the recommendation of the participants in the Conference in favour of a genuine right of initiative for Parliament;

28.  Reiterates the special and reinforced constitutional dignity of the matters which Parliament currently has the right of initiative on, and considers therefore that such an exclusive right should be extended to matters where democratic legitimacy and sovereignty of the Union are especially relevant;

29.  Notes that Parliament’s current rights of initiative encompass different special legislative procedures, such as in the case of regulations relating to its own composition, the election of its Members and their Statute, the Statute of the European Ombudsman as well as Parliament’s right of inquiry;

30.  Considers that the Treaties barely regulate such procedures and calls for a new interinstitutional agreement between the three institutions devoted exclusively to this matter, with full respect for its special constitutional dignity and enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the European Union; considers that this new interinstitutional agreement could contemplate measures to avoid files being institutionally blocked;

31.  Considers that Parliament’s internal rules should better reflect the special nature of these legislative procedures; recommends, in particular, that where the adoption of an act by Parliament requires the approval or consent of the Council and the opinion or consent of the Commission, Parliament should, following the vote on the proposed act, enter into a consultation procedure with these institutions; is also of the opinion that Parliament should streamline the procedures for changing these proposed acts following such consultations;

32.  Believes that the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure and defining an ordinary legislative procedure where Parliament enjoys the right of initiative should be seen as complementary processes;

33.  Considers that the recognition of a direct right of initiative of Parliament would not exclude the possibility of the Commission retaining a concurrent right or keeping a monopoly of initiative such as in the area of the budget; could also envisage that the Council would have a direct right of initiative in strictly defined areas; calls on the three institutions to reflect on how concurrent rights of initiative could effectively co-exist and be implemented in practice;

34.  Commits to fully use, develop and further strengthen the potential of Parliament’s indirect right of initiative as provided for in the Treaties and further developed in interinstitutional agreements and through Commission President von der Leyen’s commitment;

35.  Considers that the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making plays an essential role in securing sincere and transparent cooperation throughout the entire legislative cycle and allows for a better and mutual understanding to be achieved on the respective positions of the different institutions;

36.  Calls for a joint assessment of the functioning of the 2010 Framework Agreement and the need for a targeted revision to ensure that its provisions and timeframes related to Parliament’s indirect right of initiative can be effectively upheld; also calls on the Council and the Commission to assess jointly with Parliament the extent to which the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making should be revised with the purpose of eliminating possible barriers to Parliament’s powers to propose legislative initiatives;

37.  Considers it appropriate to review its internal rules, procedures and requirements, including with regard to the drafting of legislative initiative reports under Article 225 TFEU to ensure that proposals are focused and well-substantiated; suggests streamlining the procedures outlined in Parliament’s Rules of Procedure for drafting and adopting resolutions under Article 225 TFEU to ensure that any request to the Commission for a legislative initiative is adequately taken into account, always respecting the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, regardless of the parliamentary resolution that includes the request;

38.  Commits to favouring these instruments as the primary means to request the submission of legislative proposals by the Commission; points, in this regard, to the need to address requests to the Commission alone and to ensure that the content of legislative initiative reports remains within the scope of the subject matter of the report as decided; underlines that the adoption of focused and well-substantiated reports under Article 225 TFEU by Parliament requires that the necessary technical and administrative capacity is ensured;

39.  Stresses the importance of ensuring close cooperation with the Commission throughout the life cycle of legislative initiative reports so as to ensure that the process is as effective, transparent and inclusive as possible; highlights the roles of the Conference of Committee Chairs and the Conference of Presidents in this regard;

40.  Emphasises that Parliament fully respects the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, which stresses the necessity of a prior European added value analysis, as well as a cost of non-Europe assessment, and that it has a structure for impact assessment activities to be undertaken, to the extent that it is possible to do so, before presenting an INL report in order to enhance the European added value assessment provided for in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making;

41.  Believes that the Commission, when assessing the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and better law-making as part of its follow-up on Parliament requests for legislative proposals under Article 225 TFEU, should take due account of the accompanying analyses concerning European added value and the cost of non-Europe produced by Parliament; points out that under the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, the Commission is already obliged to respond to any issues raised by the co-legislators in relation to such analyses;

42.  Believes, furthermore, that the Commission should clearly link draft proposals adopted following a proposal by Parliament pursuant to Article 225 TFEU to relevant INL reports, providing a clear ‘legislative influence footprint’;

43.  Commits to fostering stronger coordination with the Committee of the Regions and with the Economic and Social Committee by taking due account of their opinions within the framework of Article 225 TFEU;

44.  Reiterates that accessibility, ethics and transparency are paramount and must guide the activities of all the EU institutions; calls for all the relevant information on legislative initiative reports, such as internal procedural steps or the Commission’s follow-up, to be made easily available online in all the official languages of the European Union;

45.  Reiterates the importance of the pre-legislative phase and recalls the role of Parliament as provided for in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making and the 2010 Framework Agreement; calls for work on the establishment of a joint legislative database to be sped up, as stipulated in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making;

46.  Recalls the importance of citizens’ and civil society participation for the democratic legitimacy of the EU; calls on all EU institutions to involve them in a meaningful way in decision-making at all stages of the policy cycle;

o
o   o

47.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 304, 20.11.2010, p. 47. (2) OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1. (3) OJ C 252, 18.7.2018, p. 215. (4) OJ C 252, 18.7.2018, p. 201. (5) OJ C 449, 23.12.2020, p. 90. (6) OJ C 270, 7.7.2021, p. 71. (7) OJ C 362, 8.9.2021, p. 6. (8) European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, study entitled ‘The European Parliament’s right of initiative’, Brussels, 2020, pp. 55 and 57. (9) Resolution of 25 October 2016 with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights (OJ C 215, 19.6.2018, p. 162). (10) Resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights (OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 2). (11) European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, study entitled ‘The European Parliament’s right of initiative’, Brussels, 2020, p. 12. (12) Ibid., pp. 34-35. (13) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 1. (14) Resolution of 17 January 2019 on the Ombudsman’s strategic inquiry OI/2/2017 on the transparency of legislative discussions in the preparatory bodies of the Council of the EU (OJ C 411, 27.11.2020, p. 149). (15) European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, study entitled ‘The European Parliament’s right of initiative’, Brussels, 2020, p. 54. (16) ––––––– Replies from the Commission to the following Parliament resolutions:resolution of 8 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission entitled ‘Digital Finance: emerging risks in crypto-assets – regulatory and supervisory challenges in the area of financial services, institutions and markets’ (OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 72);resolution of 22 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on an EU legal framework to halt and reverse EU-driven global deforestation (OJ C 404, 6.10.2021, p. 175);resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission entitled ‘Digital Services Act: adapting commercial and civil law rules for commercial entities operating online’ (OJ C 404, 6.10.2021, p. 31);resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on entitled ‘Digital Services Act: Improving the functioning of the Single Market’ (OJ C 404, 6.10.2021, p. 2);resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a framework of ethical aspects of artificial intelligence, robotics and related technologies (OJ C 404, 6.10.2021, p. 63);resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence (OJ C 404, 6.10.2021, p. 107);resolution of 21 January 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on the right to disconnect (OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 161). (17) Reply from the Commission to Parliament’s resolution of 13 May 2020 with recommendations to the Commission entitled ‘A safety net to protect the beneficiaries of the EU programmes: setting up an MFF contingency plan’ (OJ C 323, 11.8.2021, p. 2).

European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2022 on global threats to abortion rights: the possible overturning of abortion rights in the US by the Supreme Court (2022/2665(RSP))

P9_TA(2022)0243 B9-0299/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966,

–  having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979,

–  having regard to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965,

–  having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989,

–  having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984,

–  having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 2006,

–  having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agreed upon in 2015 and, in particular, to goals 1, 3 and 5 on ending poverty, on good health and well-being, and on gender equality respectively,

–  having regard to the Beijing Platform for Action of 1995 and the outcomes of its review conferences,

–  having regard to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, its Programme of Action, and the outcomes of its review conferences,

–  having regard to the Nairobi Summit of 2019 on ICPD+25 – Accelerating the Promise, and to the commitments of stakeholders regarding sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR),

–  having regard to the Information Series on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of 2020,

–  having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950,

–  having regard to the World Health Organization (WHO) guidance of 2015 entitled ‘Safe abortion: technical and policy guidance for health systems’,

–  having regard to the WHO guidance of 8 March 2022 entitled ‘Abortion care guideline’,

–  having regard to the statement by the OHCHR of 14 September 2021 entitled ‘UN experts denounce further attacks against right to safe abortion and Supreme Court complicity’,

–  having regard to the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) state of world population report of March 2022 entitled ‘Seeing the Unseen: The case for action in the neglected crisis of unintended pregnancy’,

–  having regard to the Pew Research Center report of 6 May 2022 entitled ‘America’s Abortion Quandary’,

–  having regard to the Constitution of the United States of America,

–  having regard to Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973),

–  having regard to the initial draft majority opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States No 19-1392(1) written by Justice Samuel Alito on Thomas E. Dobbs, State Health Officer of the Mississippi Department of Health, et al. v Jackson Women’s Health Organization, et al., dated February 2022 and leaked to the press in May 2022,

–  having regard to Senate Bill 8 (SB 8) and the associated House Bill 1515 (HB 1515) in Texas ‘Relating to abortion, including abortions after detection of an unborn child’s heartbeat; authorizing a private civil right of action’ of September 2021,

–  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence of 2014,

–  having regard to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union,

–  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 2009 (the ‘Charter’),

–  having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the state law relating to abortion in Texas, USA(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the situation of sexual and reproductive health and rights in the EU, in the frame of women’s health(3),

–  having regard to its resolution of 11 November 2021 on the first anniversary of the de facto abortion ban in Poland(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 13 February 2019 on experiencing a backlash in women’s rights and gender equality in the EU(5),

–  having regard to the EU action plan on gender equality and women’s empowerment in external action 2021–2025 (GAP III),

–  having regard its resolution of 11 February 2021 on challenges ahead for women’s rights in Europe: more than 25 years after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action(6),

–  having regard to its resolution of 5 May 2022 on the impact of the war against Ukraine on women(7),

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas according to the WHO, abortion is an essential element of comprehensive healthcare services and around 45 % of all abortions are unsafe, of which 97 % take place in developing countries(8); whereas according to the UNFPA(9), an estimated 121 million unintended pregnancies occur each year, and over 60 % of these end in abortion; whereas in recent years, opponents of SRHR and women’s autonomy have had a significant influence on national law and policy, with retrogressive initiatives taken at global level, including in several Member States; whereas the rise of the far right is also contributing to this backsliding in women’s right to abortion, which is manifesting itself across the world;

B.  whereas the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has observed that criminalising abortion services has no deterrent value; whereas, as noted by the UN Working Group on discrimination against women and girls, where abortion is criminalised and subject to legal restrictions, the safe termination of pregnancy is not possible for all women, due to their socio-economic situation, and thus becomes a privilege of socio-economically advantaged women, while women with limited resources are compelled to resort to unsafe and clandestine abortions putting their life and health at risk; whereas, according to the WHO, ‘the proportion of unsafe abortions are significantly higher in countries with highly restrictive abortion laws than in countries with less restrictive laws’(10);

C.  whereas unsafe abortion is the main but preventable cause of maternal deaths and morbidities; whereas the lack of access to safe and legal abortion care is a critical public health and human rights issue; whereas prohibiting abortion and thus forcing women to seek unsafe and clandestine abortions results in increased maternal mortality and morbidity;

D.  whereas the United States Supreme Court established a precedent in the landmark case of Roe v Wade (1973), later affirmed in Planned Parenthood v Casey (1992) and Whole Woman’s Health v Hellerstedt (2016), guaranteeing the constitutional right to legal pre-viability abortion in the US; whereas the recent leak of an initial draft majority opinion of the Supreme Court written by Justice Samuel Alito in the case of Thomas E. Dobbs, State Health Officer of the Mississippi Department of Health v Jackson Women’s Health Organization would overturn Roe v Wade and roll back constitutional rights in the US; whereas the Supreme Court is expected to issue a final ruling before the end of June 2022; whereas the leaked draft opinion represents the most detrimental outcome for abortion rights in terms of what the Supreme Court could decide, by allowing states to ban abortion at any point in pregnancy and opening up the possibility of complete bans on abortion, which would in turn remove the protections conferred by their existing rights for women and girls in the US;

E.  whereas the lives of women and girls across the US would be impacted by a Supreme Court decision that could overturn Roe v Wade, and the harmful consequences would be experienced most acutely by individuals in vulnerable situations; whereas other SRHR could also be negatively impacted if Roe v Wade were to be overturned; whereas restrictions or a ban on the right to abortion in the US would have a disproportionate impact on women in poverty, in particular racialised women, including Black women, Hispanic women and Indigenous women, as well as women from rural areas, LGBTIQ people, women with disabilities, adolescents, migrant women, including irregular migrants, and single-parent households headed by women; whereas public abortion services can provide universal access to safe and legal abortion for all women, including those in vulnerable socio-economic situations;

F.  whereas the leaked draft opinion of the Court follows the recent relentless efforts at state level to curtail and ban abortion rights in the US, and whereas since 2011, nearly 500 laws restricting abortion access have been passed by US states; whereas restrictions on access to abortion will force people, notably those lacking resources or information, to travel long distances, to carry pregnancies to term against their will, or to resort to unsafe self-managed abortions at home, also making them vulnerable to criminal investigation and prosecution;

G.  whereas Texas has recently passed so-called Senate Bill 8 (SB 8), which bans abortion after the commencement of foetal cardiac impulses, i.e. after approximately six weeks of pregnancy, with no exceptions for rape, incest or foetal health conditions that are incompatible with sustained life after birth; whereas the US Supreme Court has allowed the law to go into effect and Texas has been able to evade a court review of its constitutionality by absolving government officials from enforcing the law and creating a legal pathway for citizens, for a USD 10 000 reward, to sue anyone who provides abortion care or assists someone in obtaining an abortion in violation of the ban, as without one single entity responsible for its enforcement, the law is more difficult to contest; whereas the provision allowing citizens to sue anyone who provides abortion services opens the floodgates for harassment;

H.  whereas at least 12 states have enacted, introduced or notified of their intention to introduce laws copying Texas SB 8; whereas the legislatures of Idaho and Oklahoma have recently passed laws banning abortion with bills modelled on SB 8, including from the moment of fertilisation in the case of Oklahoma;

I.  whereas if the Supreme Court decided to overturn Roe v Wade, the decision about the legality of abortions would return to the states; whereas 13 states have already enacted so-called trigger laws outlawing abortion, which are intended to ban or limit access to abortion immediately if Roe v Wade is overturned; whereas, including these 13 states, 26 States overall are certain or likely to restrict or ban abortion if the constitutional protection is overturned, as other states could attempt either to reinstate laws passed before 1973, such as Michigan, Wisconsin and West Virginia, or to enact recently passed abortion restrictions that were blocked by the courts, such as Alabama, Georgia, Iowa, Ohio and South Carolina;

J.  whereas almost all deaths stemming from unsafe abortions occur in countries where abortion is severely restricted; whereas it is estimated that the annual number of maternal deaths in the US due to unsafe abortions would increase by 21 %(11) by the second year after a ban takes effect; whereas such deaths are entirely preventable;

K.  whereas among adolescent girls aged 15-19, pregnancy and childbirth complications are the leading cause of death globally; whereas the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child(12) has urged States to decriminalise abortion and ensure that girls have access to legal and safe abortion services; whereas the possible bans on abortion could reverse the declining rates of teenage pregnancy in the US; whereas teenage mothers are significantly more likely to discontinue their studies and face unemployment, thereby exacerbating the cycle of poverty;

L.  whereas there is a growing concern about data protection in the context of Roe v Wade possibly being overturned; whereas through menstrual tracking apps or geolocation tools and search engines, data can be collected on people having approached an abortion clinic, purchased an abortion pill or searched for information; whereas people can potentially be flagged for this or the information collected used against them(13);

M.  whereas non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and conservative think tanks belonging to the US Christian right have been funding the anti-choice movement globally; whereas this funding has been significant; whereas if Roe v Wade is overturned, it could prompt a surge in the flow of money with renewed pressure from anti-choice groups around the world;

N.  whereas if the Supreme Court overturns Roe v Wade it may embolden or encourage anti-choice movements to put pressure on governments and courts outside the US to roll back abortion rights and jeopardise the important gains made over recent decades, where more than 60 countries(14) have reformed their laws and policies on abortion to remove restrictions and barriers;

O.  whereas despite general progress in SRHR protection around the world, including in Europe, backsliding on the right to access safe and legal abortion is a grave concern; whereas the overturning of Roe v Wade could embolden the anti-abortion movement in the European Union; whereas Poland is the only EU Member State to have removed a ground for abortion from its laws, as the illegitimate Constitutional Tribunal ruled on 22 October 2020 to reverse long-established rights of Polish women entailing a de facto abortion ban; whereas abortion is banned in Malta; whereas medical abortion in early pregnancy is not legal in Slovakia and is not available in Hungary; whereas access to abortion is also being eroded in Italy(15); whereas access to abortion care is being denied in other EU Member States, such as recently in Croatia(16); whereas it is imperative for the EU and its Member States to defend SRHR and to stress that women’s rights are inalienable, and that they cannot be removed or watered down; whereas it is critical for the EU and its Member States to continue to make progress in guaranteeing access to safe, legal and timely abortion care in accordance with WHO recommendations and evidence;

P.  whereas sexual and reproductive rights (SRR), including safe and legal abortion, constitute a fundamental right; whereas criminalising, delaying and denying access to safe and legal abortion care constitutes a form of violence against women and girls; whereas several human rights bodies have asserted that the denial of safe and legal abortion may amount to torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; whereas unsafe abortions that lead to death in the context of abortion bans should be understood as ‘gender-arbitrary killings, only suffered by women, as a result of discrimination enshrined in law’(17);

Q.  whereas international human rights bodies have repeatedly and consistently affirmed that the criminalisation of and restrictions on abortion are contrary to States’ international human rights obligations that are protected in international and European human rights law, such as in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas forcing women to seek clandestine abortions, to travel to other countries for this procedure or to carry their pregnancy to term against their will is a violation of women’s and girls’ human rights to life, physical and mental integrity, equality, non-discrimination and health; whereas the international law principle of non-retrogression prohibits States from taking steps that undermine, restrict or remove existing rights or entitlements in the area of gender equality and SRHR;

R.  whereas the UN experts’ statement issued in September 2021(18) stresses that ‘women’s human rights are fundamental rights that cannot be subordinated to cultural, religious or political considerations’, and that ‘adding that the influence of ideologically and religiously motivated interference in public health matters has been particularly detrimental to the health and well-being of women and girls’;

S.  whereas guaranteeing access to comprehensive SRHR, age-appropriate, comprehensive sexuality and relationship education and services, including family planning, contraceptive methods and safe, legal and free abortion, as well as respect for every person’s autonomy and ability to make free and informed decisions about their bodies and lives, are preconditions to attain gender, social and economic equality; whereas equitable access to abortion care allows women to exercise greater agency over their bodies and enhances their ability to improve their economic well-being;

T.  whereas gender equality, ending poverty and exploitation everywhere, and ensuring healthy lives and well-being for all are fundamental goals set out in SDGs 5, 1 and 3 respectively; whereas more specifically, ensuring universal access to sexual and reproductive health, and eliminating all forms of violence and of harmful practices against women and girls are targets under SDGs 3 and 5; whereas all UN member states, including the US and the EU Member States, have assumed duties, commitments and obligations to respect and promote these SDGs and their targets;

1.  Strongly condemns the backsliding in women’s rights and SRHR taking place globally, including in the US and in some EU Member States; recalls that SRHR are fundamental human rights which should be protected and enhanced and cannot in any way be watered down or withdrawn; is deeply concerned in particular about the extent to which such prohibitions will contribute to the trauma of rape and incest victims;

2.  Expresses its firm solidarity with and support for women and girls in the US, as well as to those involved in both the provision of and advocacy for the right and access to legal and safe abortion care in such challenging circumstances;

3.  Reminds the United States Supreme Court of the importance of upholding the landmark case of Roe v Wade (1973) and the resulting constitutional protections of the right to abortion in the US;

4.  Strongly condemns any roll-back of human rights and constitutional rights; calls for action to safeguard the right to safe and legal abortion in the US and for the US to refrain from any backward steps; calls on the relevant US authorities at all levels, in line with the WHO abortion care guideline, to fully decriminalise access to and the provision of abortion services, to guarantee safe, legal, free and high-quality sexual and reproductive health services in their territories and to make them easily accessible to all women and girls;

5.  Calls on the Government of the State of Texas to swiftly repeal Senate Bill 8; calls on the Governments of the States of Idaho and Oklahoma to repeal their similar laws, including Bill HB 4327 (Oklahoma); calls on all 26 states of the US with trigger laws, laws on the books and other measures concerning bans and restrictions on abortion to repeal them and to ensure that their legislation is in line with internationally protected women’s human rights and international human rights standards;

6.  Is deeply concerned about the fact that bans and other restrictions on abortion disproportionately affect women in poverty, in particular racialised women, including Black women, Hispanic women and Indigenous women, as well as women from rural areas, LGBTIQ people, women with disabilities, adolescents, migrant women, including irregular migrants, and single-parent households headed by women; stresses that women who, due to financial or logistical barriers, cannot afford to travel to reproductive health clinics in neighbouring states or countries, are at greater risk of undergoing unsafe and life-threatening procedures, and of being forced to carry their pregnancy to term against their will, which is a violation of human rights and a form of gender-based violence(19);

7.  Welcomes the fact that the Women’s Health and Protection Act (WHPA) federal legislation, aimed at protecting the right to abortion care throughout the US, passed in the House of Representatives, but deeply regrets the fact that it failed to pass in the Senate; calls on the US Government and/or other relevant US authorities to respect, fulfil and protect the human rights of women and girls, including their rights to life, privacy, health and equality, and non-discrimination, as well as their freedom from discrimination, violence and torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, by establishing and supporting federal legal protections for access to safe, legal and high-quality sexual and reproductive health services, including abortion, for all women and girls;

8.  Encourages President Joe Biden and his administration to strengthen their efforts and to continue to support abortion rights, and urges him to ensure access to safe and legal abortion; encourages the US Government to make further efforts in order to ensure that abortion and contraception are integrated within the provision of age-appropriate and comprehensive SRHR information, education and services, and that they are accessible to all; welcomes the fact that US funding has been restored to the UNFPA, the UN’s sexual and reproductive health agency, and calls on the US Government and/or other relevant US authorities to continue supporting SRHR and to do so at the UN and in other multilateral forums;

9.  Urges the US Government and/or other relevant US authorities to ensure adequate federal, constitutional and statutory protections for the right to terminate a pregnancy and further urges the US Government to fully decriminalise abortion, which requires not only putting an end to the penalisation of women and girls and other pregnant persons, healthcare providers and others assisting with abortion services, but also removing abortion from state criminal law statutes and abolishing all other punitive laws, policies and practices;

10.  Strongly encourages the US Government and/or other relevant US authorities also to remove all barriers to abortion services, including third party consent or notification, mandatory waiting periods and authorisation by judges or medical panels, and to guarantee timely access to abortion care across the country; calls on the US Government to ensure that the service is provided without discrimination, harassment, coercion, fear or intimidation, with due respect for women’s privacy and for confidentiality, and with due protection and respect for healthcare providers;

11.  Calls on the US Government and/or other relevant US authorities to regulate refusals to provide lawful abortion services by healthcare providers, including on the basis of ‘conscience’ clause, in a manner that does not deny access to abortion to women;

12.  Is concerned about the collection and misuse of data on individuals seeking abortion services; call on the US Government to ensure that laws and policies on data protection are in line with international human rights standards and to guarantee that the processing of sensitive personal information, such as health-related data and information, respects the rights of individuals and is based on their free, specific, informed and explicit consent to the collection and processing of personal data; calls on digital distribution services to ensure that all apps respect data use and protection laws;

13.  Acknowledges the role played by NGOs as service providers and as advocates for SRHR in the US, and encourages them to continue with their work; affirms that these NGOs need proper funding in order to operate; underlines that the services provided by these NGOs respond to the needs and human rights of women and girls; underlines that their work cannot replace the responsibility of the state to guarantee access to public, legal and safe abortion services;

14.  Calls on the US Government to take the necessary measures to ensure social support, in particular in the cases of single-mother households and teenage pregnancy, including through universal childcare and healthcare;

15.  Calls on the US Government to sign and ratify all remaining(20) UN and regional human rights conventions and protocols, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979;

16.  Is deeply concerned about the potential consequences for women’s rights worldwide, should the US Supreme Court overturn Roe v Wade; is deeply worried about the possibility of a chilling effect on prioritising and funding for SRHR services, which have already been massively deprioritised and underfunded both within the US and globally; highlights with concern that in countries heavily dependent on US aid for public health programmes, its overturning could have an impact on those governments’ commitment to abortion provision and other reproductive rights;

17.  Welcomes the recent positive developments on abortion rights in Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia and Chile that mark important steps forward in South America on women’s rights, as well as in other countries around the world, such as Angola, India, Kenya, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, South Korea and Thailand;

18.  Stresses the importance of ensuring the participation of women and girls in the formulation of laws and policies that affect them and pertain to their human rights, including SRHR, in particular abortion care, and that they are afforded justice and legal redress when their rights are violated;

19.  Stresses the lack of access to contraception and the existing unmet needs(21); highlights that women bear a disproportionate responsibility for contraception, which should be shared with men; stresses the need, in this regard, to develop and promote contraceptives for men with a view to reducing the number of unintended pregnancies; stresses that priority should be given to combating sexual violence and to comprehensive, age-appropriate and evidence-based sexuality and relationship education for all, a range of high-quality, accessible, safe, affordable and, where appropriate, free contraceptive methods and supplies, and family planning counselling, as well as health services;

20.  Calls for the EU and the Member States to offer all possible support, including financial support, to US-based civil society organisations protecting, promoting and providing SRHR in the country, as an expression of its unwavering commitment to these rights; calls further on the Member States to offer a safe haven for all medical professionals who might be at risk of legal persecution or other forms of harassment as a result of their legitimate work in providing abortion care;

21.  Calls on the European External Action Service, the Commission and all EU Member States to use all instruments at their disposal to strengthen their actions to counteract the backsliding in women’s rights and SRHR, including by compensating for any possible reduction in US funding to SRHR globally, and by strongly advocating and prioritising universal access to safe and legal abortion and other SRHR in their external relations;

22.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to urge the US Government to establish federal legal protections for the right to abortion, and to raise these human rights issues in their relations with the US at all levels and at all relevant international forums, pointing out that they constitute a form of violence against women and girls; further calls on the EU Delegation to the US to prioritise SRHR in its engagement with the relevant US authorities and in its local implementation of GAP III;

23.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to strongly support SRHR for all, including by promoting strengthened legal protections within the EU’s borders and the removal of barriers to the enjoyment of these rights;

24.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to include the right to abortion in the Charter;

25.  Calls on the European External Action Service, the EU delegations and Member States’ embassies around the world to proactively reach out to and protect human rights defenders working on SRHR, especially in countries where restrictions are placed on the right and access to abortion;

26.  Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights and the Commissioner in charge of gender equality to consider, in the event that the Roe v Wade ruling is overturned, to condemn and denounce this violation of women’s SRHR and their right to healthcare, as well as the legal uncertainty this will cause in their exchanges with US officials;

27.  Underlines that, in keeping with the Beijing Platform for Action and the ICPD Programme of Action, the right of all individuals to bodily integrity and autonomy needs to be protected, and access to the essential services which give effect to this right needs to be ensured; stresses that access to healthcare is a human fundamental right, and that it is the obligation of the state to provide and guarantee healthcare for all; calls for a comprehensive global approach in the essential sexual and reproductive health package, including measures for preventing and avoiding unsafe and clandestine abortions, as well as the provision of post-abortion care, to be integrated into the universal health coverage strategies, policies and programmes; deplores the fact that healthcare is not accessible to everyone in the US; recalls that poverty is closely linked to the forced and coerced continuation of pregnancy and to the lack of safe and legal abortion;

28.  Reaffirms that abortion must always be a voluntary decision based on a person’s request, and given of free will, in accordance with medical standards and availability, accessibility, affordability and safety based on WHO guidelines; calls on the Member States to ensure universal access to safe and legal abortion, and respect for the right to freedom, privacy and the best attainable healthcare;

29.  Urges the Member States to decriminalise abortion and remove and combat obstacles to safe and legal abortion and access to sexual and reproductive healthcare and services; calls on the Member States to guarantee access to safe, legal and free abortion services, to pre-natal and maternal healthcare services and supplies, voluntary family planning, contraception, youth-friendly services, as well as to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support, without discrimination;

30.  Condemns the fact that women cannot access abortion services due to the practice common in some Member States for medical practitioners, and, on some occasions, entire medical institutions, to refuse to provide health services on the basis of the ‘conscience’ clause, which leads to the denial of abortion care on grounds of religion or conscience, and which endangers women’s lives and rights; notes that this clause is also often used in situations where any delay could endanger the patient’s life or health;

31.  Urges the Commission to make full use of its competence in health policy, and to provide support to Member States in guaranteeing universal access to SRHR in the framework of the EU4Health Programme for 2021-2027; in promoting health information and education; in strengthening national health systems and the upward convergence of healthcare standards in order to reduce health inequalities within and between Member States; and in facilitating the exchange of best practices among Member States with regard to SRHR; calls on the Member States to progress towards universal health coverage, for which SRHR is essential;

32.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the President of the United States of America and his administration, the US Congress, and the US Supreme Court.

(1) https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/02/supreme-court-abortion-draft-opinion-00029473 (2) OJ C 132, 24.3.2022, p. 189. (3) OJ C 81, 18.2.2022, p. 43. (4) OJ C 205, 20.5.2022, p. 44. (5) OJ C 449, 23.12.2020, p. 102. (6) OJ C 465, 17.11.2021, p. 160. (7) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0206. (8) https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/abortion (9) UNFPA state of world population report, Seeing the Unseen: The case for action in the neglected crisis of unintended pregnancy, March 2022. (10) https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/abortion (11) https://ncpolicywatch.com/2022/05/05/study-shows-an-abortion-ban-may-lead-to-a-21-increase-in-pregnancy-related-deaths/ (12) UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 20 of 6 December 2016 on the implementation of the rights of the child during adolescence, Paragraph 60. (13) https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7vzjb/location-data-abortion-clinics-safegraph-planned-parenthood (14) https://reproductiverights.org/maps/worlds-abortion-laws/ (15) https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=0900001680687bdc; http://www.refreg.ep.parl.union.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/608853/IPOL_BRI(2018)608853_EN.pdf (16) https://www.roda.hr/en/news/support-for-accessible-safe-and-legal-termination-of-pregnancy-in-croatia.html (17) https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ohchr.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FHRBodies%2FHRC%2FRegularSessions%2FSession35%2FDocuments%2FA_HRC_35_23_AUV.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK (18) https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2021/09/united-states-un-experts-denounce-further-attacks-against-right-safe-abortion (19) https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/SexualHealth/INFO_Abortion_WEB.pdf (20) Including, among others, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1999), the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1988), the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty (1990), the First and Second Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966 and 1989, respectively), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2008), the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (2002), the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure (2011), the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990), the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006). (21) UNFPA state of world population report, Seeing the Unseen: The case for action in the neglected crisis of unintended pregnancy’, 30 March 2022.

European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2022 on the call for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties (2022/2705(RSP))

P9_TA(2022)0244 B9-0307/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

⎯ having regard to the report of 9 May 2022 on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe (the Conference),

⎯ having regard to its resolution of 4 May 2022 on the follow-up to the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe(1),

⎯ having regard to its resolutions of 16 February 2017 on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union(2) and of 13 February 2019 on the state of the debate on the future of Europe(3),

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the current version of the Treaties entered into force on 1 December 2009 and whereas the European Union has faced several crises and unprecedented challenges since;

B.  whereas on 9 May 2022 the Conference finished its work and presented its conclusions, which contain 49 proposals and 326 measures;

C.  whereas in addition to legislative proposals, the opening of a process of institutional reforms is needed in order to implement the recommendations and meet the expectations of this citizens’ participation process;

D.  whereas new policies and, in some cases, Treaty amendments, are necessary not as a means in themselves, but in the interests of all EU citizens, as they aim to reshape the EU in a way that will enhance its capacity to act, as well as its democratic legitimacy and accountability;

1.  Welcomes the conclusions of the Conference of 9 May 2022;

2.  Points out that in line with the founding text of the Conference, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission have committed to following up effectively on the conclusions of the Conference, each within the remit of their competences and in accordance with the Treaties;

3.  Notes that several of the Conference proposals require amendments to the Treaties, and that Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs shall prepare proposals for Treaty amendments accordingly;

4.  Points out, especially following the most recent crises, that the Treaties need to be amended urgently to make sure the Union has the competence to take more effective action during future crises;

5.  Submits to the Council under the ordinary revision procedure laid down in Article 48 TEU, for those reasons, the following proposals for the amendment of the Treaties, inter alia:

6.  Proposes more specifically that the following Treaty articles be amended as follows:

“For the adoption of these decisions, the European Council shall act by a qualified majority as defined in Article 238(3), point (b), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, which shall be given by a majority of its component members.”

7.  Calls on the Council to submit these proposals directly to the European Council for examination, with a view to convening a Convention composed of representatives of the national parliaments, the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, Parliament and the Commission;

8.  Believes that representatives of the EU’s social partners, the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Committee of the Regions, EU civil society and candidate countries should be invited as observers to the Convention;

9.  Instructs its President to transmit this resolution to the Council and to forward it to the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0141. (2) OJ C 252, 18.7.2018, p. 201. (3) OJ C 449, 23.12.2020, p. 90.

European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2022 on a new trade instrument to ban products made by forced labour (2022/2611(RSP))

P9_TA(2022)0245 B9-0291/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the State of the Union address of 15 September 2021 by the President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal of 23 February 2022 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (COM(2022)0071),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 23 February 2022 on decent work worldwide for a global just transition and a sustainable recovery (COM(2022)0066),

–  having regard to the Commission and the European External Action Service guidance of 12 July 2021 on due diligence for EU businesses to address the risk of forced labour in their operations and supply chains,

–  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on forced labour and the situation of the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region(1),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 December 2021 on forced labour in the Linglong factory and environmental protests in Serbia(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability(3),

–  having regard to International Labour Organization (ILO) Forced Labour Convention of 1930 and to its Protocol of 2014,

–  having regard to the 1999 ILO Convention on Worst Forms of Child Labour,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

–  having regard to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,

–  having regard to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,

–  having regard to the question to the Commission on a new trade instrument to ban products made by forced labour (O-000018/2022 – B9-0015/2022),

–  having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on International Trade,

A.  whereas the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) defines forced labour as ‘all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily’; whereas the ILO uses 11 indicators to identify the existence of forced labour; whereas these indicators are: abuse of vulnerability, deception, restriction of movement, isolation, physical and sexual violence, intimidation and threats, retention of identity documents, withholding of wages, debt bondage, abusive working and living conditions and excessive overtime; whereas sometimes the presence of more than one of the listed indicators is needed to determine the presence of forced labour;

B.  whereas according to ILO estimates, 25 million people worldwide are currently in a situation of forced labour and, of these, 20,8 million are in privately imposed forced labour and 4,1 million in state-imposed forced labour; whereas women and girls comprise 61 % of those in forced labour; whereas migrant workers are especially vulnerable to forced labour; whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the situation;

C.  whereas the latest ILO global estimates indicate that 160 million children were in child labour globally at the beginning of 2020, accounting for almost 1 in 10 of all children worldwide; whereas 79 million children – nearly half of all those in child labour – are victims of the worst forms of child labour, in hazardous work that directly endangers their health, safety and moral development;

D.  whereas research has shown that forced labour impedes sustainable development and has a negative impact on inter-generational poverty, inequality and governance, and fuels corruption and illicit financial flows;

E.  whereas the EU economy is connected to millions of workers around the world through global supply chains; whereas EU consumers want to be certain that the goods they buy are produced in a sustainable and fair way that ensures decent work for those who produce them;

F.  whereas forced labour is an unpriced external factor which stifles innovation and productivity, and gives an unfair competitive advantage to the businesses and governments that support it;

G.  whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen affirmed in her 2021 State of the Union speech that the Commission will propose a ban on products in the EU market that have been made by forced labour;

H.  whereas in its proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, the Commission sets out due diligence obligations for large companies over a certain threshold and for certain other companies in particularly sensitive sectors, to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for actual and potential adverse impacts on human rights, including labour rights, and on the environment along global supply chains;

I.  whereas the Commission communication of 23 February 2022 on decent work worldwide for a global just transition and a sustainable recovery (COM(2022)0066) sets out the Commission’s plans to prepare a new legislative initiative, which will prohibit the placing on the EU market of products made by forced labour, including forced child labour; whereas this initiative will cover both domestic and imported products, and combine a ban with a robust, risk-based enforcement framework;

J.  whereas forced labour is a complex phenomenon and a ban on forced labour products will not be sufficient to eradicate forced labour and tackle the issue at its roots; whereas in order to deal with this global issue, the EU should also focus on dialogue with non-EU countries, technical assistance, capacity building and awareness raising; whereas the EU should also actively work at multilateral level to find collective solutions in order to eradicate forced labour;

K.  whereas a number of EU companies follow several voluntary and overlapping sets of guidelines on responsible business conduct, but the uptake thereof still needs improvement; whereas in order to address this, the EU already has mandatory due diligence rules in place in specific sectors such as timber and the sourcing of so-called conflict minerals;

L.  whereas the effectiveness of forced labour product exclusions will depend on several factors such as the percentage of global sectoral demand that participates in the boycott; the costs and viability for exporting firms of trade diversion, trade reallocation or product transformation; suppliers’ market power; and how the host government responds to external pressure;

M.  whereas several tools need to be combined to resolve different forced labour-related problems;

N.  whereas in order to be WTO compatible, any product exclusion needs to be structured so as to avoid violating free trade commitments not to discriminate against goods by geographical origin; whereas Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade provides the legal grounds to justify product exclusion decisions; whereas any such exclusion needs to be evidence-based and must follow consultation with the affected parties;

O.  whereas introducing a ban on products made by forced labour is a political priority of both Parliament and the EU as a whole;

1.  Calls for a new WTO-compatible trade instrument to complement the corporate sustainability due diligence rules, banning the import and export of products made or transported by forced labour and which should be complemented with measures for intra-EU trade; stresses that any future EU framework needs to be proportionate, non-discriminatory and effective, respecting the commitment to an open and rules-based trading system; underlines that the new proposal could be based on the best practices of countries with similar legislation in place such as the US and Canada;

2.  Stresses that the determination of whether forced labour has been used should be based on the ILO forced labour indicators, including its ‘Hard to see, harder to count – Survey guidelines to estimate forced labour of adults and children’;

3.  Considers that the new instrument should allow for bans on forced labour products from a particular site of production, a particular importer or company, those from a particular region in the case of state-sponsored forced labour and those from a particular transport vessel or fleet;

4.  Considers that, under the new EU instrument, public authorities, on their own initiative or acting on information they have received, should detain goods at the EU border when they consider that there is sufficient evidence that these goods were made or transported with forced labour; notes that the importer whose goods have been detained should then be given the opportunity to refute this accusation by proving that the goods were not made or transported with forced labour, which may then lead to the release of the goods; underlines that the evidence to prove an absence of forced labour must be based on ILO standards;

5.  Notes that products should be seized following findings by public authorities on the basis of sufficient evidence that forced labour has been used to produce or transport the goods, or if the goods have come from a particular region where state-imposed forced labour is prevalent; stresses that the seized cargo would be released if the company can prove that no forced labour had been used or that remediation had taken place and that indicators of forced labour are no longer present;

6.  Acknowledges that a number of EU companies are already making efforts to ensure that practices that breach human rights and labour rights do not take place in their supply chains; calls on the Commission to offer companies, specifically SMEs, technical and other appropriate support to comply with the new rules in order to avoid unnecessary burdens for SMEs; further calls on the Commission to assess the implementation of the instrument and its impact on EU companies;

7.  Believes that the Commission, particularly the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer, as well as national authorities, must be empowered to launch investigations; notes that public authorities should be able to act on the basis of information provided by stakeholders, NGOs or affected workers and through a formalised and secure complaints procedure such as through the Single Entry Point;

8.  Calls on the Commission to ensure that the new EU instrument requires the responsible companies to provide remediation to the affected workers prior to import restrictions being lifted; calls for the monitoring of remediation and corrective actions to be undertaken in cooperation with relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations and trade unions;

9.  Believes that the coordination system should be created at EU level to support the customs authorities of the Member States and ensure the transparency of all procedures launched;

10.  Stresses that companies may be requested by public authorities to disclose relevant information concerning subsidiaries, suppliers, sub-suppliers, contractors and business partners in the supply chain, with due regard for commercial confidentiality; to this end, invites the Commission to create guidelines to assist companies in the setting up of a supply chain mapping process in order to identify what constitutes relevant information; underlines that a public database containing information on individual suppliers, the risk they pose or, on the contrary, evidence of decent work, could reduce the administrative burden on companies;

11.  Calls for a public list of sanctioned entities, regions and products to be created and maintained;

12.  Stresses the importance of cooperating with like-minded partners to put an end to forced labour globally and to ensure that goods made by forced labour are not traded; notes that joint efforts are needed to ensure that the ban is not circumvented and that goods suspected of having been produced by forced labour cannot be re-routed;

13.  Believes that in order to effect change globally, the EU should work closely with its partners through joint action and investigations; calls for an active role for the EU Delegations to engage with non-EU countries and stakeholders on issues related to the new legislation;

14.  Notes that the new trade instrument to ban products made by forced labour should be coherent and complementary to other due diligence initiatives and human rights and sustainability provisions in force; notes that this should be taken into account in the review of the 15-point action plan on Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters and in the subsequent TSD chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements;

15.  Calls for the use of public and private investment to develop additional forced labour-free production capacity in affected supply-chains;

16.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to Commission, Council and the Member States.

(1) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 114. (2) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0511. (3) OJ C 474, 24.11.2021, p. 11.