European Parliament legislative resolution of 20 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down specific provisions for the 2014‑2020 cooperation programmes supported by the European Neighbourhood Instrument and under the European territorial cooperation goal, following programme implementation disruption (COM(2022)0362 – C9‑0289/2022 – 2022/0227(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0362),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9‑0289/2022),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 21 September 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure,

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 20 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/… of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down specific provisions for the 2014‑2020 cooperation programmes supported by the European Neighbourhood Instrument and under the European territorial cooperation goal, following programme implementation disruption

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2192.)

Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 20 October 2022 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the non-recognition of Russian travel documents issued in occupied foreign regions (COM(2022)0662 – C9‑0302/2022 – 2022/0274(COD))(1)

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

[Amendment 1]

AMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

to the Commission proposal

---------------------------------------------------------

Proposal for a
Decision (EU) 2022/… of the European Parliament and of the Council on the non-acceptance of Russian travel documents issued in Ukraine and Georgia

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 77(2)(a) and (b) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1)  In reaction to the illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation in 2014 and to its continued destabilising actions in eastern Ukraine, the European Union has already introduced economic sanctions in response to Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, linked to the incomplete implementation of the Minsk Agreements; sanctions in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine; and sanctions in response to the illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation.

(2)  As a signatory of the Minsk agreements, the Russian Federation has had a clear and direct responsibility to work towards finding a peaceful settlement of the conflict in line with these principles. With the decision to recognise the non-government controlled regions of eastern Ukraine as independent entities, the Russian Federation has clearly violated the Minsk agreements, which stipulate the full return of these areas to the control of the Ukrainian government.

(3)  That decision ▌and the ensuing decision to send Russian troops into these areas further undermines Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence, constitute a severe breach of international law and international agreements, including the UN Charter, Helsinki Final Act, Paris Charter and the Budapest Memorandum.

(3a)  On 24 February 2022, the European Council, together with its international partners, condemned in the strongest possible terms Russia's unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine and expressed full solidarity with Ukraine and its people. Furthermore, the European Council demanded that Russia immediately cease its military actions, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders(2). This position was reiterated by the European Council on 25 March 2022, 31 May 2022 and 24 June 2022(3).

(4)  A military aggression which takes place in a country bordering the European Union, such as that which has occurred in Ukraine and which has given rise to the restrictive measures, justifies measures designed to protect the essential security interests of the European Union and its Member States.

(5)  Since the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula on 18 March 2014, Russia has issued Russian international passports to residents of Crimea. On 24 April 2019, the President of the Russian Federation signed a decree simplifying the procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship by residents of the non-Government controlled areas of Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including the issuance of Russian international passports to those residents. By means of the decree of 11 July 2022, the Russian Federation has extended the practice of handing out ordinary Russian international passports to other non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine, notably the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. In May 2022, the Russian Federation introduced a simplified Russian naturalisation procedure for orphan children from the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the so-called “Luhansk People’s Republic”, as well as Ukraine. The decree also applies to children without parental care and legally incapable persons who are inhabitants of those two occupied regions. The systematic issuance of Russian passports in those occupied regions constitutes a further infringement of international law and Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. With regard to Georgia, the European Council on 1 September 2008, strongly condemned Russia’s unilateral decision to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and urged other countries not to recognise their independence.(4)

(5a)  The Union and its Member States as well as Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein have not recognised the illegal annexation and have condemned the illegal occupation of regions and territories of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. This concerns in particular the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but also further illegal occupation in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, namely the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. Russian travel documents issued in those regions are not recognised or in the process of not being recognised by Member States as well as Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. The same applies to travel documents issued in the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which are currently not under the control of the Georgian government (“breakaway territories”).

(6)  In order to ensure a common visa policy and a common approach to checks to which persons crossing the external borders are subject, all Russian travel documents issued in or to persons resident in occupied ▌regions or territories in Ukraine or breakaway territories in Georgia listed in the Annex to this Decision should not be accepted as valid travel documents for the purposes of issuing of a visa and of crossing the external borders. Member States should be able to make a derogation for persons who were Russian citizens on the date on which the Russian documents started to be issued in the respective occupied region or territory or in a breakaway territory or to descendants of such persons.

(6a)  This Decision does not affect Member States' competence for the recognition of travel documents.

(6b)  For reasons of legal certainty and transparency, the Commission should draw up, with the assistance of Member States, a list of not accepted Russian travel documents, per region or territory. The list to be drawn up by the Commission should include the dates from which those Russian travel documents started to be issued in those regions or territories and from which the travel documents issued after those dates should not be accepted.

The list should be adopted by means of an implementing act, be published in the Official Journal of the European Union and be incorporated in the list of travel documents established under Decision No 1105/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council(5), and set out in the accompanying table of travel documents issued by third countries and territorial entities and which is publicly available online.

▌

(10)  This Decision does not affect the right to free movement of Union citizens and their respective family members, including the possibility for such family members to enter the territory of the Member States without a valid travel document within the meaning in particular of Directive 2004/38/EC and the agreements on free movement of persons concluded by the Union and the Member States, of the one part, and certain third countries, of the other part. Directive 2004/38/EC permits, under the conditions specified therein, restrictions to free movement on grounds of public policy, public security and public health.

(11)  This Decision respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This Decision should not affect the right to asylum.

(12)  As recalled in the Communication from the Commission on Providing operational guidelines for external border management to facilitate border crossings at the EU-Ukraine borders, Member State are free to authorise entry of third-country nationals who do not fulfil one or more of the conditions laid down in Article 6(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (entry conditions for third country nationals) to their territory on humanitarian grounds, on grounds of national interest or because of international obligations. This wide derogation should be applied in the current crisis to allow entry to all those fleeing the conflict in Ukraine. Member States retain the possibility to allow holders of travel documents targeted by this Decision who have not exercised their right to apply for international protection to enter the territory of the Member States in individual cases, as provided for in Articles 25 and 29 of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 and Article 6(5) of Regulation (EU) No 2016/399.

(12a)  In order to take into account relevant legal and political developments, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission to amend this Decision by adding or removing regions or territories included in the Annex. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making(6). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

(12b)  In order to allow the Union to respond quickly in a rapidly evolving situation, it is appropriate to provide for the immediate application of the relevant delegated act amending the Annex to this Decision, where imperative grounds of urgency so require. Where the urgency procedure is followed, it is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including consultations at expert level.

(13)  The objective of this Decision is to strengthen the functioning of the common visa policy and the Schengen area. Those objectives cannot be achieved by Member States acting alone. Therefore, introducing an obligation to not accept certain travel documents for the purposes of issuing of a visa and of crossing the external borders at Union level is necessary. The Union may therefore adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Decision does not go beyond that what is necessary in order to achieve the objectives.

(14)  In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol No 22 on the Position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Decision and is not bound by it or subject to its application. Given that this Decision builds upon the Schengen acquis, Denmark shall, in accordance with Article 4 of that Protocol, decide within a period of six months after the Council has decided on this Decision whether it will implement it in its national law.

(15)  This Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in which Ireland does not take part(7); Ireland is therefore not taking part in the adoption of this Decision and is not bound by it or subject to its application.

(16)  As regards Iceland and Norway, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of those two States with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis(8) which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, points A and B of Council Decision 1999/437/EC(9).

(17)  As regards Switzerland, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis(10) which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, points A and B, of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/146/EC(11).

(18)  As regards Liechtenstein, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis(12) which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, points A and B, of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/350/EU(13).

(19)  As regards Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, Article 1, point (a) of this Decision constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the Schengen acquis within, respectively, the meaning of Article 3(2) of the 2003 Act of Accession, Article 4(2) of the 2005 Act of Accession and Article 4(2) of the 2011 Act of Accession, whereas Article 1, point (b) constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the Schengen acquis within, respectively, the meaning of Article 3(1) of the 2003 Act of Accession, Article 4(1) of the 2005 Act of Accession and Article 4(1) of the 2011 Act of Accession.

(20)  Due to the urgency of the situation and the ongoing illegal Russian presence in foreign regions, this Decision should enter into force on the first day following that of its publication,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Russian travel documents issued in or to persons resident in Russian-occupied ▌ regions or territories in Ukraine or breakaway territories in Georgia listed in the Annex shall not be recognised accepted as valid travel documents for the following purposes:

(a)  the issuing of a visa in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 810/2009;

(b)  the crossing of the external borders in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/399.

The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 2a to amend the Annex by adding or removing regions or territories, when this is necessary to take into account relevant legal and political developments.

Where, in the case of a rapidly evolving situation, imperative grounds of urgency so require, the procedure provided for in Article 2b shall apply to delegated acts adopted pursuant to this Article.

Article 1a

By way of derogation from Article 1, a Russian travel document referred to in Article 1 may be accepted:

—  if its holder was a Russian citizen before the dates indicated in the implementing act referred to in Article 2. This shall apply also to descendants of such Russian citizen;

—  if its holder was a child or legally incapacitated person at the time that holder obtained Russian citizenship through the simplified naturalisation procedure under Russian law.

Member States may allow holders of travel documents covered by this Decision to enter the territory of the Member States in individual cases, as provided for in Articles 25 and 29 of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 and Article 6(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399.

This decision shall not affect the Union asylum acquis and in particular the right to apply for international protection.

Article 2

The Commission shall draw up, with the assistance of the Member States, a list per region, territory or breakaway territory identified in the Annex of the travel documents referred to in Article 1. That list shall indicate the dates from which those travel documents started being issued in the occupied regions or territories including breakaway territories.

That list shall be adopted by means of an implementing act, be published in the Official Journal and be incorporated in the list of travel documents established by Decision No 1105/2011/EU.

Article 2a

1.  The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article.

2.  The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Article 1 shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of two years.

3.  The delegation of power referred to in Article 1 may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force.

4.  Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making.

5.  As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council.

6.  A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 1 shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or by the Council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council.

Article 2b

1.  Delegated acts adopted under this Article shall enter into force without delay and shall apply as long as no objection is expressed in accordance with paragraph 2. The notification of a delegated act to the European Parliament and to the Council shall state the reasons for the use of the urgency procedure.

2.  Either the European Parliament or the Council may object to a delegated act in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 2a(6). In such a case, the Commission shall repeal the act immediately following the notification of the decision to object by the European Parliament or by the Council.

Article 3

This Decision shall enter into force on the first day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels,

For the European Parliament For the Council

The President The President

ANNEX

Ukraine

Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol

Donetsk region

Luhansk region

Kherson region

Zaporizhzhia region

Georgia

Abkhazia

South Ossetia

(1) The matter was referred back for interinstitutional negotiations to the committee responsible, pursuant to Rule 59(4), fourth subparagraph (C9-0302/2022). (2) European Council conclusions 24 February 2022. (3) European Council conclusions of 25 March 2022, 31 May 2022 and 24 June 2022. (4) Presidency Conclusions of the extra ordinary European Council 1 September 2008 (12594/2/08 REV 2). (5) Decision No 1105/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the list of travel documents which entitle the holder to cross the external borders and which may be endorsed with a visa and on setting up a mechanism for establishing this list (OJ L 287, 4.11.2011, p. 9). (6) OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1. (7) This Decision falls outside the scope of the measures provided for in Council Decision 2002/192/EC of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland's request to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 64, 7.3.2002, p. 20). (8) OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 36. (9) Council Decision 1999/437/EC of 17 May 1999 on certain arrangements for the application of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of those two States with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 31). (10) OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 52. (11) Council Decision 2008/146/EC of 28 January 2008 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 1). (12) OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 21. (13) Council Decision 2011/350/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, relating to the abolition of checks at internal borders and movement of persons (OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 19).

European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2022 on the rule of law in Malta, five years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia (2022/2866(RSP))

P9_TA(2022)0371 B9-0470/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

–  having regard to Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Articles 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’),

–  having regard to its resolutions of 15 November 2017(1), of 28 March 2019(2), of 16 December 2019(3) and of 29 April 2021(4), on the rule of law in Malta,

–  having regard to the hearings, exchanges of views and delegation visits carried out by the Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs since 15 November 2017,

–  having regard to the exchanges of letters between the Chair of the Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group and the Prime Minister of Malta,

–  having regard to Resolution 2293 (2019) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 26 June 2019 entitled ‘Daphne Caruana Galizia’s assassination and the rule of law in Malta and beyond: ensuring that the whole truth emerges’,

–  having regard to the report on the follow-up to Resolution 2293 (2019) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, endorsed by the Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on 8 December 2020,

–  having regard to Opinion No 993/2020 of the Venice Commission of 8 October 2020 on ten Acts and bills implementing legislative proposals subject of Opinion CDL-AD(2020)006,

–  having regard to the report of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe following her visit to Malta from 11 to 16 October 2021,

–  having regard to the letter of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe of 23 September 2022 to the Prime Minister of Malta, and the reply of the Prime Minister of Malta of 4 October 2022,

–  having regard to the Commission’s 2022 Rule of Law Report (COM(2022)0500),

–  having regard to the mission report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) following the visit of its Delegation on the Rule of Law to Valletta, Malta, from 23 to 25 May 2022,

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the Union is founded on the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities – values that are common to the EU Member States and to which candidate countries must adhere in order to join the Union as part of the Copenhagen criteria, which cannot be disregarded or reinterpreted after accession; whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values which, when undermined, may pose a systemic threat to the Union and the rights and freedoms of its citizens;

B.  whereas the rule of law, respect for democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms and the values and principles enshrined in the EU Treaties and international human rights instruments are obligations incumbent on the Union and its Member States and must be complied with;

C.  whereas the Charter is part of EU primary law; whereas freedom of expression and freedom and pluralism of the media are enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR);

D.  whereas the independence of the judiciary is enshrined in Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter and Article 6 of the ECHR, and is an essential requirement of the democratic principle of separation of powers;

E.  whereas journalists, notably but not exclusively investigative journalists, are increasingly targeted by so-called ‘strategic lawsuits against public participation’ (SLAPPs), both within and outside the EU, which are intended purely to frustrate their work, avoid public scrutiny and prevent authorities from being held to account; whereas this has a chilling effect on media freedom;

F.  whereas Member States should encourage the establishment of early warning and rapid response mechanisms to ensure that journalists and other media actors have immediate access to protective measures when they are threatened; whereas such mechanisms should be subject to meaningful civil society oversight and guarantee protection for whistle-blowers and sources who wish to remain anonymous;

G.  whereas in order to avoid impunity, Member States have an obligation to take all necessary steps to bring the perpetrators of crimes against journalists and other media actors to justice; whereas investigations and prosecutions should consider all of the different – actual and potential – roles in these crimes, such as authors, instigators, perpetrators and accomplices, and the criminal liability that arises from each of those roles;

H.  whereas the Maltese anti-corruption investigative journalist and blogger Daphne Caruana Galizia was assassinated in a car bomb attack on 16 October 2017; whereas she was the target of harassment and numerous threats in the form of threatening phone calls, letters and text messages, as well as an arson attack on her house; whereas the self-confessed hit man testified in court on 16 March 2021 that two years before Daphne Caruana Galizia was murdered there was a previous and separate plot to assassinate her using an AK-47 rifle; whereas on the first day of their trial on 14 October 2022, the two other accused hit men pleaded guilty in court and were sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment;

I.  whereas the murder investigations led by the Maltese authorities and assisted by Europol have led to the identification, arraignment and ongoing trial of several suspects and one of the potential masterminds behind the murder, the owner of the Dubai-based company 17 Black Ltd. and former member of the Board of Directors of ElectroGas Malta Ltd., responsible for generating the majority of Malta’s electricity, who was arrested on 20 November 2019 in an apparent attempt to escape Malta; whereas the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation was also involved in the investigations;

J.  whereas the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was used to conceal transactions allegedly linked to corruption that Daphne Caruana Galizia was exposing at the time of her assassination;

K.  whereas the Dubai-based company 17 Black Ltd. was listed as a company from which Panama-based companies owned by the former chief of staff to the former prime minister of Malta and by the former minister for tourism, formerly the minister for energy, were set to receive funds; whereas links between 17 Black Ltd. and numerous public projects in Malta continue to be exposed;

L.  whereas the chief of staff to the former prime minister of Malta and the former minister for tourism, formerly the minister for energy, and their families have been designated by the US Department of State due to their involvement in significant corruption and have thus been barred from entering the United States;

M.  whereas Pilatus Bank was exposed by Daphne Caruana Galizia as being the bank of choice for suspicious transactions involving Maltese and Azeri politically exposed persons; whereas Malta’s police commissioner publicly declared in August 2020 that charges against those involved in criminal activity at Pilatus Bank were imminent; whereas 26 months later, charges have only been brought against one person and investigations appear to have stalled; whereas those implicated were allowed in and out of the country freely despite arrest warrants having been issued; whereas a former compliance officer at the Malta Gaming Authority was allowed to leave Malta while travelling on holiday with the former prime minister of Malta despite a European arrest warrant being in force against him, and was subsequently apprehended on arrival in Italy;

N.  whereas two partners at Mossack-Fonseca-linked firm Nexia BT, now defunct, exposed by Daphne Caruana Galizia and the Panama Papers as having designed the money laundering structures to facilitate corruption, have been charged for only some of the allegations made against them, excluding the ElectroGas scandal;

O.  whereas the liquefied natural gas security of supply agreement between ElectroGas Malta Ltd. and the Government of Malta, signed by the former minister for tourism, who was at the time, in 2015, the minister for energy, was kept secret for years and only exposed in September 2022 by the Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation and a media outlet; whereas the current attorney general has been criticised for facilitating the signing of this contract without any further approval from cabinet or parliament in her former role as deputy attorney general; whereas at the time of her assassination, Daphne Caruana Galizia was investigating a large cache of internal documents from ElectroGas Malta Ltd.;

P.  whereas one of the alleged accomplices and certain recordings exhibited in court proceedings have implicated the former chief of staff to the former prime minister of Malta in the planning and funding of the murder; whereas he was arrested and charged with money laundering, fraud, corruption and forgery on 20 March 2021 in a separate case, which was the subject of Daphne Caruana Galizia’s work, along with several of his business associates;

Q.  whereas a public independent inquiry into the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia was initiated in late 2019 and concluded on 29 July 2021; whereas the board of the public inquiry published a report with a set of conclusions and recommendations on strengthening the rule of law, the respect of press freedom, freedom of expression and the protection of journalists, on legal reform at constitutional level, and on legislative proposals regarding media freedom; whereas the Board also established that ‘whilst there was no evidence that the State as such had any role in the assassination of Mrs Caruana Galizia, (...), the State should bear the responsibility for the assassination by creating a climate of impunity, generated from the highest levels at the core of the administration at Castille(5) and spreading its tentacles to other entities such as regulatory institutions and the Police which led to the collapse of the rule of law’;

R.  whereas the Government of Malta has proposed a number of reforms to address some of those recommendations, including draft legislation to strengthen media freedom and a proposal for an anti-SLAPP law; whereas the reforms of the Maltese justice system that started in 2020 have continued to be implemented;

S.  whereas the latest Media Pluralism Monitor rated the overall risk to media pluralism in Malta as ‘medium’, but rated the risk for editorial autonomy and political independence as ‘high’;

T.  whereas Maltese news outlet The Shift News has been faced with 40 separate legal appeals from public authorities against freedom of information requests concerning public expenditure vis-a-vis the independent media;

U.  whereas the judicial reform undertaken by Maltese authorities was mentioned in the 2021 State of the Union speech;

V.  whereas the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval) has acknowledged Malta’s significant progress in the level of compliance with the Financial Action Task Force Standards, deemed Malta to be compliant and removed Malta from the grey list after 12 months;

W.  whereas in its mission report following the visit of the LIBE Delegation on the Rule of Law to Malta from 23 to 25 May 2022, the Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group of Parliament’s LIBE Committee expressed concerns over the slow progress in the follow-up to the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia and the implementation of the recommendations by the public inquiry, among others, while recognising that the judicial proceedings are still ongoing;

1.  Pays tribute to Daphne Caruana Galizia five years after her assassination and to her essential work in exposing corruption, organised crime, tax fraud and money laundering, and in holding those involved in such illegal activities accountable; strongly condemns the criminalisation of, attacks on and killings of journalists for doing their job, including the killings of Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová on 21 February 2018, of Viktoria Marinova on 6 October 2018, of Greek journalist George Karaivaz on 9 April 2021, and of Dutch journalist Peter R. de Vries on 15 July 2021, and stresses the crucial role they play in unveiling the truth, protecting democracy and ending the culture of impunity; pays further tribute to all the journalists killed in Europe in recent years; reiterates the paramount importance of an independent media and active civil society as fundamental pillars of justice, democracy and the rule of law; notes that the murder of journalists affects not just a Member State, but the European Union as a whole; firmly believes that the protection of the democratic rule of law is a common responsibility that transcends national and party boundaries;

2.  Acknowledges the progress made in the ongoing judicial proceedings on the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia, while deeply regretting that they have led to only three convictions related to the execution of the assassination, following the hit men’s guilty plea; reiterates, therefore, its call for finalising the investigation into the core motives behind the murder and closing the criminal judicial proceedings as quickly as possible, bringing those involved in the murder, at any level, to justice; reiterates its call for the full and continuous involvement of Europol in all aspects of the murder investigation and all related investigations;

3.  Acknowledges that the current prime minister of Malta publicly apologised for the state’s shortcomings that could have contributed to the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia;

4.  Is concerned that one year after the publication of the report of the public inquiry, the process of implementation of its recommendations is deficient; notes that the Maltese Government has put forward a number of reforms, including legislative proposals in order to address some of these recommendations; notes that the Council of Europe’s commissioner for human rights indicated that the Maltese authorities must ensure that legislative work launched pursuant to the public inquiry report complies with international standards and is fully open to public scrutiny and participation; calls on the Maltese Government to implement all the recommendations of the public inquiry report without further delay;

5.  Welcomes the efforts of the Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit and stresses that it is essential that high-profile financial and economic crimes, especially corruption and money laundering, are prosecuted rigorously; is appalled, however, about the lack of progress in prosecuting the corruption and money laundering that Daphne Caruana Galizia had been investigating at the time of her murder, which involved suspects at the highest political levels; is also alarmed by the institutional failure of law enforcement and justice in Malta and strongly urges the authorities responsible to bring to justice every individual implicated in one or more of the numerous cases currently being investigated or reported; is highly concerned about the recent revelations of repeated inaction on European Arrest Warrants against those connected with high political officials; calls on the Maltese authorities to address challenges related to the length of investigations into high-level corruption cases, including by establishing a robust track record of final judgments; stresses the importance of institutional independence for the proper functioning of the rule of law; calls on the Maltese authorities to make progress on investigations into cases of possible attempts by then public officials to conceal evidence and obstruct investigations and judicial proceedings;

6.  Is alarmed by the lack of progress of the investigative and judicial proceedings against Pilatus Bank officials and the efforts by the Maltese authorities to stall proceedings; takes note of the provisional measures of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes of 14 September 2022(6) delaying the Maltese authorities’ inquiries; calls on the Maltese authorities to provide additional resources to investigate the reasons for the delay and to ensure that justice runs its course; calls on the relevant European bodies to closely monitor progress on the Pilatus Bank case; is also alarmed by the lack of progress against the two Nexia BT partners and calls on the Commission and Moneyval to monitor the case; expresses further concerns about the allegations of money laundering and corruption in relation to the ElectroGas deal and calls on the Commission to use all tools at its disposal to assess whether the applicable European law was adhered to;

7.  Welcomes the additional capacities that are being made available for the investigation and prosecution of crime in general, the reformed appointment procedure for judges, and the reform of the Attorney General’s office and role; calls on the Maltese parliament to reach an agreement on depoliticising the appointment of the chief justice involving the judiciary in the procedure, taking into account European standards on judicial appointments and the opinion of the Venice Commission;

8.  Regrets the deterioration of the efficiency of the Maltese justice system and calls for solutions to be found to reduce the length of proceedings;

9.  Notes the importance of the information that the UAE possesses concerning transactions carried out by companies linked to corruption and their significance to ongoing investigations; notes that the UAE has since been grey listed by the Financial Action Task Force ; commits to monitoring the ongoing cooperation between the UAE and Malta to ensure that the necessary information for prosecutions is properly requested and transmitted, and notes that this cooperation should have implications for the UAE’s standing with anti-money laundering regulatory bodies; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Maltese authorities to use all tools at their disposal to ensure cooperation and proper legal assistance in all investigations; calls on the UAE to cooperate swiftly with the Maltese authorities in order to facilitate investigations, and with the EU in general;

10.  Welcomes the recent referrals of cases from the Maltese Government to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); believes, however, that the overall number of cases remains relatively low in comparison to other Member States and that the Maltese system to detect, investigate, and prosecute crimes remains opaque;

11.  Expresses grave concern with the reported lack of cooperation from Maltese authorities with the EPPO in ongoing cases; notes in particular allegations regarding the ongoing investigation of an EU-funded project in which the alleged mastermind of Daphne Caruana Galizia’s assassination and owner of the Dubai-based company 17 Black Ltd. is implicated;

12.  Expresses concern about the impunity afforded to key figures in the former prime minister’s administration, including the former prime minister himself, his chief of staff, and the former minister for tourism, formerly the minister for energy;

13.  Acknowledges the several proposals put forward by the Maltese Government to improve the situation of media freedom; urges the Maltese authorities to ensure that the proposed reforms meet the European and international standards on the protection of journalists, in particular as regards preventing and sanctioning threats against and harassment of journalists, publicly and online, and to swiftly implement them; urges the Maltese authorities also to introduce additional measures and other safeguards to improve the environment for critical and independent journalism in Malta, and the accountability of politicians and officials;

14.  Is concerned that obstacles to media freedom and pluralism persist, for instance with regard to access to information requests to the government, as well as potentially discriminatory funding of media outlets; regrets that governmental entities have lodged a series of appeals against the 40 positive decisions made by the data protection commissioner in favour of freedom of information requests made by The Shift News and believes that the appeals could send a chilling message to media actors and citizens; calls on the Maltese Government to immediately withdraw these appeals;

15.  Expresses concerns at reports indicating that while the Committee of Experts on the Media was tasked with providing advice on changes to the media sector did include some representatives of the media, the Maltese Government did not conduct a public consultation; calls on the Maltese authorities to secure a broad public consultation concerning the media sector, as committed to by the prime minister of Malta on 13 October 2022 following advocacy efforts by international civil society, the media community in Malta and the Council of Europe, and in particular the restriction on the use of SLAPPs; calls on the Maltese parliament to adopt relevant legislation, including amendments to the Constitution, as a matter of priority;

16.  Deplores the fact that journalists, as well as family members of Daphne Caruana Galizia, are currently still the target of SLAPPs, and reiterates its urgent call on the individuals who initiated the cases, including former government officials, to drop them;

17.  Welcomes the current proposals establishing that defamation court tariffs will not be paid upon initial presentation of a reply by the defendant journalist, and the possibility for Maltese courts to deem defamation suits ‘manifestly unfounded’ and thus to dismiss them; calls on the Maltese authorities to implement the Commission Recommendation and enact effective policies for the protection of journalists; welcomes the Commission proposal for a directive to combat SLAPPs (COM(2022)0177);

18.  Calls on the Maltese Government to further address existing concerns related to media freedom and the independence of public media from political interference, including a framework to ensure transparency in state advertising, and the increasing use of hate speech on social media;

19.  Welcomes the amendment in 2021 of Malta’s 2013 Protection of the Whistleblower Act, and its commitment to create a database for collecting information on whistle-blowing by the end of 2024;

20.  Expresses its concern that no solution has been found for the appointment of a new Ombudsman and that no women have been appointed as commissioners for administrative investigations; calls on the Maltese authorities to create an anti-deadlock mechanism for parliamentary appointments and to adopt as a matter of priority and work towards the establishment of the Human Rights and Equality Commission in line with the Paris Principles and EU equality acquis;

21.  Reiterates its call on the Maltese authorities to fully implement all outstanding recommendations by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Venice Commission, the Group of States against Corruption and Moneyval; calls on the Maltese authorities to request the Venice Commission’s opinion on compliance with its recommendations;

22.  Stresses that the Maltese Citizenship by Investment (CBI) programme remains a source of major concern; recalls its position that EU citizenship is not for sale and calls for an immediate ban of the programme in Malta and throughout the EU; welcomes the Commission’s actions in referring the infringement case to the Court of Justice of the EU and awaits the Court’s final ruling;

23.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Government and Parliament of the United Arab Emirates and the President of the Republic of Malta.

(1) OJ C 356, 4.10.2018, p. 29. (2) OJ C 108, 26.3.2021, p. 107. (3) OJ C 255, 29.6.2021, p. 22. (4) OJ C 506, 15.12.2021, p. 64. (5) The Auberge de Castille has been the office of the Prime Minister of Malta in Valletta since March 1972. (6) https://icsid.worldbank.org/cases/case-database/case-detail?CaseNo=ARB/21/36

European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2022 on growing hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people across Europe in light of the recent homophobic murder in Slovakia (2022/2894(RSP))

P9_TA(2022)0372 B9-0477/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’),

–  having regard to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union,

–  having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights and the related case-law of the European Court of Human Rights,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

–  having regard to Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA(1) (‘Victims’ Rights Directive’),

–  having regard to the evaluation of the implementation of the Victims’ Rights Directive in the Commission Staff Working Document – Evaluation (SWD(2022)0180)(2), and its Executive Summary(3) of 28 June 2022,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 12 November 2020 entitled ‘Union of Equality: LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0698),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 December 2021 entitled ‘A more inclusive and protective Europe: extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime’ and its respective annex (COM(2021)0777),

–  having regard to the results of the EU LGBT Survey launched by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in 2019,

–  having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2021 on declaring the EU an ‘LGBTIQ Freedom Zone’(5),

–  having regard to the Council of Europe’s Recommendation of 20 May 2022 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on combating hate speech (CM/Rec(2022)16)(6),

–  having regard to the Council of Europe’s Recommendation of 31 March 2010 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity (CM/Rec(2010)5)(7) and to its 2020 report on implementation(8),

–  having regard to General Policy Recommendation No 15 of the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) on combatting hate speech(9),

–  having regard to the ECRI’s Country Monitoring Report on the Slovak Republic(10),

–  having regard to the Human Rights Comment of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, entitled ‘Pride vs. indignity: political manipulation of homophobia and transphobia in Europe’(11),

–  having regard to report by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe following his visit to the Slovak Republic from 15 to 19 June 2015,

–  having regard to the Commission’s 2022 Rule of Law Report,

–  having regard to the study by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies of 20 May 2022 entitled ‘Right-wing extremism in the EU’(12),

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas on Wednesday, 12 October 2022, in central Bratislava, Slovakia, a far-right radicalised gunman, inspired by white supremacist terrorists, brutally murdered two young persons, Matúš Horváth and Juraj Vankulič, and injured one other person; whereas the shooting took place outside the well-known gay bar Tepláreň, one of the very few LGBTIQ+ spots in the city; whereas the shooting was a deliberate and planned attack explicitly targeting the LGBTIQ+ community and he intended to kill more people, including high officials; whereas the Slovak police classified the act as a terrorist attack and investigations are still ongoing; whereas if confirmed as a terrorist attack, it would be the first terrorist attack against the LGBTIQ+ community in the EU;

B.  whereas the murderer, a radicalised 19-year-old student from Bratislava, was on the run hours after the attack; whereas he actively communicated about the incident before, during and after the shooting via various different social media channels; whereas an anti-Jewish and anti-LGBTIQ+ manifesto appeared on his account a few hours before the shooting; whereas the same account shows the alleged murderer outside the bar Tepláreň in mid-August 2022; whereas half an hour after the killings, the account owner tweeted ‘hatecrime’, ‘gaybar’ and ‘feeling no regrets’; and shortly before midnight, the account said: ‘bye, see you on the other side’; whereas the radicalised 19-year-old student appeared on photographs linking him to the international anti-feminist and misogynist ‘incel’ ideology and movement;

C.  whereas the LGBTIQ+ community in Slovakia has been subjected to hate-fuelled rhetoric and violence, also driven by many Slovak politicians; whereas verbal and physical attacks on the LGBTIQ+ community in Slovakia are often widespread, preventing them from feeling safe and accepted by society; whereas hateful comments justifying or mocking the murders appeared on social media following the tragic event;

D.  whereas the climate of hate, intolerance and intimidation towards LGBTIQ+ community in Slovakia has been cultivated not only by far-right and extremist movements, but also by representatives of the church and political elites, who have often called for further restrictions on LGBTIQ+ people in their statements; whereas in June 2014, the National Council amended the country’s constitution to expressly deny same-sex couples the right to marry and subsequent legal protections; whereas an anti-LGBTIQ+ referendum took place in February 2015 after the conservative church-backed group Alliance for Family gathered 400 000 signatures calling for a vote on stricter legislation against LGBTIQ+ people; whereas in May 2022 a member of the ruling coalition party proposed a law aiming to ban the rainbow flag from state-owned and public buildings; whereas another legislative proposal was introduced by members of parliament in September, seeking to ban all mentions of the queer community from schools, advertising and television; whereas there is no compulsory, age-appropriate comprehensive relationship and sex education in Slovak schools;

E.  whereas on Friday, 14 October 2022 a large number of people, including the Slovak President and the Prime Minister, gathered in Bratislava for the march to condemn hatred against LGBTIQ+ people; whereas similar events were organised all over the country and in several other Member States to campaign for the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community in Slovakia; whereas the Slovak President repeated her long-standing call upon politicians not to spread hate; whereas for the first time the Presidential Palace displayed a rainbow flag next to the Slovak and the European flags and the Office of the Parliament lit up Bratislava castle to commemorate the victims of the murder;

F.  whereas crime motivated by prejudice, known as hate crime or bias-motivated crime, affects not only the individuals targeted but also communities and societies as a whole; whereas Member States have a positive obligation to ensure that the rights to human dignity, to integrity, prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are protected and enforced in practice;

G.  whereas there is a growing normalisation of exclusionary and stigmatising rhetoric against LGBTIQ+ people based on prejudice, which leads to additional violence and dehumanisation and to offenders feeling guilt-free and uninhibited;

H.  whereas the 2019 EU LGBTI Survey II showed a bleak picture in the EU as regards discrimination of LGBTIQ+ people, with little progress in the years since the first LGBTI Survey in 2012; whereas in 2019 there had already been a decrease since 2012 in the number of people reporting the most frequent hate-motivated incident of physical or sexual attacks to the police; whereas in the Slovak Republic the percentage of respondents who experienced a hate-motivated assault amounted to 1 in every 10 persons; whereas in its 2020 country monitoring report on the Slovak Republic, ECRI stated that studies suggest that around 1-8 % of the population in the Slovak Republic is LGBTI; whereas ECRI recognised the role of politics in bolstering anti-LGBTIQ+ rhetoric, namely through anti-LGBTIQ+ campaigns, a constitutional change that prevents equal marriage and other political initiatives openly discriminating against LGBTIQ+ people; whereas ECRI noted with regret the negative dynamic in recent years, concomitant with the limited progress on LGBTIQ+ equality;

I.  whereas the European Court of Human Rights has delivered a number of recent judgements in cases related to hate crime against LGBTIQ+ people: the Stoyanova v. Bulgaria case, pertaining to the gruesome murder of a 26 year old gay man in a public park, requiring Bulgaria to reform its Criminal Code to acknowledge such violent crimes (motivated by perceived or actual sexual orientation) as being ‘aggravated’(13); in the case of Sabalić v. Croatia concerning a hate crime against a lesbian woman, recognising that, unless the authorities take a firm line, prejudice-motivated incidents would be met with an indifference that was tantamount to official acquiescence to or even connivance with hate crimes(14); and in the Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, recognising a positive obligation on behalf of the state to investigate homophobic comments online which constituted incitement to hatred and violence(15);

J.  whereas in 2022, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a recommendation on combating hate speech and is currently preparing a recommendation on combating hate crime for 2023; whereas the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted in 2010 a landmark recommendation to Member States on measures to combat discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity;

K.  whereas in 2021 the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe warned of the scapegoating of LGBTIQ+ minorities as a tactic applied by ultra-conservative and nationalist politicians posing as defenders of so-called ‘traditional values’ to strengthen their base and gain or stay in power; whereas this raises strong concerns over politicians’ legitimisation of hatred in exchange for potential political gain; whereas according to the Commissioner for Human Rights, the scapegoating of LGBTIQ+ people is a symptom of widespread opposition to, and an assault on, human rights and the rule of law, both of which are core EU values;

L.  whereas the 2022 rule of law report published in July 2022 by the European Commission expresses continued concerns over the financing of civil society organisations activities on issues related to gender equality and LGBTIQ+ rights and over verbal attacks on human rights defenders in these areas, as well as over the disbursement of funding through public subsidy schemes that continue to exclude organisations working on these issues;

M.  whereas the Victims’ Rights Directive requires that victims of hate crime should receive an individual assessment and that it should identify specific protection and support needs, for example regarding their sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, and identifies victims of hate crime as especially vulnerable victims;

N.  whereas in December 2021, the Commission published a Council decision proposal to add hate speech and crime to the list of EU crimes as codified in Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which requires unanimity in the Council; whereas Hungary, Poland and Czechia are still withholding their support for this decision;

O.  whereas in 2020, the United Nations Independent Expert on sexual orientation and gender identity noted in the context of the pandemic that ‘hate speech inciting violence against LGBT persons has been on the rise’ and urged states to protect LGBTIQ+ people from violence and discrimination and prosecute perpetrators(16); whereas in 2019, the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech identified hate speech as ‘a menace to democratic values, social stability and peace’(17);

1.  Condemns in the strongest possible terms the cowardly act of terror against the LGBTIQ+ community and the murder of Matúš Horváth and Juraj Vankulič committed in Slovakia; deplores this ideologically motivated far-right attack; expresses its sincere regret to the families of the victims;

2.  Commends the immediate, massive and positive response of Slovak civil society and citizens to the murders, as expressed by the marches across the country and abroad, and stands in solidarity with the LGBTIQ+ community in the country;

3.  Strongly condemns all forms of hate and violence, as well as any physical or verbal attacks, against persons based on their gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression and sex characteristics in both Slovakia and the EU; recalls that there is no place for LGBTIQ+ hatred, racism and discrimination in our societies; asks the Commission, the European Council and the Council to take a strong and decisive stand against hate, violence and injustice in Europe;

4.  Calls on the Slovak Government and the National Council of the Slovak Republic to show genuine commitment to making meaningful progress in the protection of LGBTIQ+ people from any form of hate crime and homophobia in close cooperation with the LGBTIQ+ community and to take a strong public position against violations of the human rights of LGBTIQ+ people;

5.  Urges the Slovak authorities to effectively fight against the disinformation campaigns against LGBTIQ+ people, to encourage factual, objective and professional reporting by the media on LGBTIQ+ persons and issues related to sexual orientation, gender identity or expression and sex characteristics and to investigate the hate crime and hate speech against the members of LGBTIQ+ community living in Slovakia;

6.  Expresses grave concern over the frequent use of offensive, aggressive and homophobic language towards the LGBTIQ+ community in Slovakia, including by former and current members of the government and the National Council of the Slovak Republic, as well as by some former prime ministers; calls for a halt to the further polarisation of society in Slovakia and a rejection of any form of cooperation with far-right extremist forces;

7.  Calls on the Slovak Government and the National Council of the Slovak Republic to secure equal rights for LGBTIQ+ people living in Slovakia based on the Charter, guaranteeing the respect of all rights, in particular private and family life, including legal recognition of same-sex couples; calls for the finalisation of the ongoing discussions to reform legal gender recognition respecting international and European standards and calls for its swift adoption;

8.  Expresses its deepest concerns regarding the discrimination suffered by rainbow families and especially their children in Slovakia, deprived of fundamental human rights on the grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or the sex characteristics of parents or partners; calls on the government to overcome this discrimination and to remove all obstacles LGBTIQ+ people face when exercising the fundamental right to freedom of movement within the EU; urges the government to respect its obligations under international and European law and guarantee fundamental rights to all persons;

9.  Takes note of ECRI’s country monitoring report on the Slovak Republic; recalls that ECRI made several recommendations to the Slovak authorities, such as developing and implementing an action plan for LGBTI persons, in close consultation with civil society, adopting a new action plan to prevent and combat racism, homophobia and transphobia, particularly in the form of hate speech, ensuring that internet service providers and social network operators swiftly and systematically remove hate speech from their systems and forward the evidence to the judicial authorities and revising the Criminal Code to ensure racist, homophobic or transphobic motives are ‘aggravating circumstances’ for any ordinary offence; fully supports ECRI’s recommendations and calls on the Slovak authorities to immediately implement the measures;

10.  Is deeply concerned by the impunity with which anti-LGBTIQ+ groups, in particular far-right extremist groups, operate in some Member States and stresses that this sense of impunity is among the reasons underlying the alarming rise in violent actions by certain far-right organisations, and the increase in threats against minorities, including the LGBTIQ+ community;

11.  Is deeply worried that the younger generations in Europe and elsewhere feel less and less concerned about the history of fascism, including the embedded hate and discrimination against LGBTIQ+ people, ethnic minorities and the Jewish population; emphasises that an awareness of history is one of the preconditions for preventing such crimes from occurring in the future and needs to be an important feature of the education of younger generations; stresses the need to set aside more space on history curricula for objective and factual learning about different ideologies, their forms and their origins, including fascism, as well as their consequences and remnants in present times;

12.  Underlines that hate speech and hate crime are widespread across Europe and have been increasing in recent years; underlines that hate speech by public figures, notably politicians, is perceived as legitimising hatred by those who perpetrate it; deems it necessary to tackle these forms of expression, which incite, spread or promote hatred, and are contrary to the principles of a democratic and pluralist society; is concerned by the increasing prevalence of LGBTIQ+-phobic rhetoric emanating from far right, alt-right and ultraconservative parties; calls on the public authorities and, in particular, local authorities to help stop the tide of intolerance that surrounds these and other types of attacks;

13.  Believes that the EU should launch campaigns against anti-LGBTIQ+ narratives, including right-wing extremism at EU level and develop and fund long-term programmes supporting local grassroots organisations and citizens’ initiatives at local level to help develop the population’s resistance to right-wing extremism; calls on the Commission to also prioritise the follow-up of anti-LGBTIQ+ narratives in their disinformation efforts;

14.  Calls on the Member States to step up efforts to ensure education promotes the civic values of acceptance, tolerance, diversity, equality and respect on issues related to sexual orientation, gender identity and expression and sex characteristics, for example through systematic human rights education and awareness-raising campaigns; stresses the need to address the root causes of extremism through tailored preventive measures, in cooperation with schools and families;

15.  Strongly condemns governments in Europe relying on active or passive support by far-right and other LGBTIQ+-phobic political parties to access and maintain themselves in power and legitimise their narratives;

16.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to support civil society at European, national, regional and local levels to strengthen democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, as they play an important role, especially in those Member States where we see a rise in far-right ideology and hate speech;

17.  Calls on the Commission to widen the scope of the annual Rule of Law report to cover fundamental rights systematically, including LGBTIQ+ rights;

18.  Stresses the need for Member States to combat hatred against LGBTIQ+ persons by all means possible, including by implementing the recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which call on its member states to ensure effective prompt and impartial investigations, as well as the prosecution of those responsible for such crimes, to recognise that a bias motive related to sexual orientation or gender identity may be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance, to ensure victims and witnesses are encourage to report hate-motivated incidents and that law enforcement structures have the necessary knowledge and skill to provide assistance to them; further calls on the Member States to take appropriate measures to combat the incitement of hatred online;

19.  Recalls that the lack of implementation of court judgements amounts to erosion of the rule of law;

20.  Urges the Council to adopt as soon as possible the Council decision on the extension of the list of EU crimes to include speech and hate crimes in Article 83(1) TFEU and urges Hungary and Poland to stop blocking its adoption, and urges Czechia, as the current holder of the rotating Council Presidency, to take further steps in this matter and reach an agreement on it as soon as possible;

21.  Underlines the individual responsibility of Member States in combating hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people and commends those that have unilaterally decided to improve the level of protection by explicitly recognising as ‘aggravating circumstances’ the grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity and expression and sex characteristics, as well as developing victim support, training or legal professionals and dedicated law enforcement services to address such crimes; encourages all Member States to exchange best practices and lead by example in the matter;

22.  Stresses that the Victims’ Rights Directive is a useful tool in providing assistance to survivors of hatred and violence; notes with concern that LGBTIQ+ victims often do not report crimes owing to lack of assurances or openness from law enforcement, lack of trained staff or fear of reprisals, and recognises that more can be done to build trust in public authorities;

23.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council, the Commission, the Committee of Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Council of Europe.

(1) OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57. (2) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/law/swd_2022_179_evaluation_rep_en.pdf (3) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/law/swd_2022_180_resume_evaluation_rep_en.pdf (4) OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 2. (5) OJ C 474, 24.11.2021, p. 140. (6) https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=0900001680a67955#_ftnref1 (7) https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=09000016805cf40a (8) https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=09000016809f9ba0#_Toc2764960 (9) https://rm.coe.int/ecri-general-policy-recommendation-no-15-on-combating-hate-speech/16808b5b01 (10) https://rm.coe.int/ecri-6th-report-on-the-slovak-republic/1680a0a088 (11) https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/pride-vs-indignity-political-manipulation-of-homophobia-and-transphobia-in-europe?inheritRedirect=true (12) Study - ‘Right-wing extremism in the EU’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C – Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 20 May 2022. (13) https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-217701, 79. (14) https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-207360, 95. (15) https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-200344, 129. (16) https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2020/10/statement-victor-madrigal-borloz-un-independent-expert-protection-against (17) https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/hate-speech-strategy.shtml

European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2022 on the 2022 UN Climate Change Conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt (COP27) (2022/2673(RSP))

P9_TA(2022)0373 B9-0461/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol thereto,

–  having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

–  having regard to the 26th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP26), the 16th session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP16), and the third session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA3), held in Glasgow, UK, from 31 October to 13 November 2021, and to the Glasgow Climate Pact adopted on 13 November 2021,

–  having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

–  having regard to its resolution of 21 October 2021 on the 2021 UN Climate Change Conference in Glasgow, UK (COP26)(1),

–  having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency(2),

–  having regard to the special report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on global warming of 1,5 °C, its special report on climate change and land, its special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate, and its sixth assessment report (AR6),

–  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the EU strategy on adaptation to climate change(3),

–   having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/591 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030(4),

–   having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 on the European Year of Greener Cities 2022(5),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’)(6),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal(7),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2020 on the EU’s role in protecting and restoring the world’s forests(8),

–  having regard to the UNFCCC synthesis report on nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement of 17 September 2021,

–  having regard to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) emissions gap report 2021 of 26 October 2021 entitled ‘The Heat Is On’, its adaptation gap report 2021 of 1 November 2021 entitled ‘The Gathering Storm’ and its production gap report of 20 October 2021,

–  having regard to the International Energy Agency (IEA) flagship report of March 2022 entitled ‘Global Energy Review: CO2 Emissions in 2021’,

–   having regard to the IEA report of May 2021 entitled ‘Net Zero by 2050 – A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector’ and its Energy Technology Perspectives report 2020,

–  having regard to the United Nations Forum on Forests Secretariat Global Forest Goals Report 2021,

–  having regard to the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage,

–   having regard to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030,

–  having regard to the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) reports of April 2021 on the state of the global climate in 2020 and of May 2022 on the state of the global climate in 2021,

–   having regard to the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) 2022 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR2022),

–  having regard to the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance’s First report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement 2021 (NDR),

–   having regard to the Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) of 31 May 2019, as well as to its workshop report of 29 October 2020 on biodiversity and pandemics,

–   having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 February 2022 on ‘EU climate diplomacy: accelerating the implementation of Glasgow outcomes’,

–   having regard to its resolution of 28 April 2021 on soil protection(9),

–   having regard to the UN Women Commission on the Status of Women (CSW66) agreed conclusions entitled ‘Achieving gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls in the context of climate change, environmental and disaster risk reduction policies and programmes 2022’,

–   having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 entitled ‘A new Circular Economy Action Plan for a cleaner and more competitive Europe’ (COM(2020)0098),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 4 October 2022 on climate finance in view of the UNFCCC 27th Conference of the Parties (COP 27) in Sharm El-Sheikh on 6-18 November 2022,

–   having regard to the Council conclusions of the 19 November 2021 on water in the EU’s external action,

–   having regard to the Commission communication of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘Forging a climate-resilient Europe – the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change’ (COM(2021)0082),

–   having regard to the UNEP report of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Making Peace with Nature: a scientific blueprint to tackle the climate, biodiversity and pollution emergencies’,

–   having regard to the UNEP report of 6 May 2021 entitled ‘Global Methane Assessment: Benefits and Costs of Mitigating Methane Emissions’,

–   having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals(10),

–   having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives(11),

–   having regard to the Commission communication of 14 October 2020 on an EU strategy to reduce methane emissions (COM(2020)0663),

–   having regard to the co-sponsored IPBES-IPCC workshop report on biodiversity and climate change of 10 June 2021,

–  having regard to the questions to the Commission and to the Council on the 2022 UN Climate Change Conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt (COP27) (O-000041/2022 – B9-0027/2022 and O-000042/2022 – B9-0028/2022),

–  having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016; whereas by September 2022, 193 of the 197 Parties to the UNFCCC had filed their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the UN;

B.   whereas the UN has declared a climate and environmental emergency and has committed to urgently take the concrete action needed to fight and contain this threat before it is too late; whereas biodiversity loss and climate change are interlinked and exacerbate each other, representing equal threats to life on our planet, and as such, should be urgently tackled together;

C.  whereas on 17 December 2020, the EU and its Member States submitted their updated nationally determined contribution (NDC) to the UNFCCC, which commits the EU to a binding target of an economy-wide net domestic reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of at least 55 % by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, without a contribution from international credits; whereas this target was enshrined in Union law by Regulation (EU) 2021/1119;

D.  whereas according to the UNEP emissions gap report 2021 the commitments made so far by the signatories to the Paris Agreement will not be sufficient to achieve its common goal and will result in global temperature rise of 2,7 °C by the end of the century, indicating as well that the world is still dangerously off track to meet the aspirations of the Paris Agreement; whereas natural feedback loops could exacerbate global heating even further; whereas more frequent heatwaves, droughts and floods are already exceeding plants’ and animals’ tolerance thresholds, driving mass mortalities, e.g. of trees and corals; whereas these weather extremes are occurring simultaneously, causing cascading impacts that are increasingly difficult to manage(12); whereas many national climate plans delay action until after 2030 and many Parties to the UNFCCC have not yet taken sufficient action to even be on the path to meeting their NDCs;

E.  whereas, according to the IPCC’s 6th Assessment, limiting warming to around 1,5 °C with no overshoot requires global GHG emissions to peak before 2025 at the latest and be reduced by 43 % below 2019 levels by 2030, while at the same time methane should also need to be reduced by about a third; whereas even the optimistic scenario of limiting the average global temperature to 1,5 °C would have irreversible adverse impacts on human systems and ecosystems and would significantly outpace and reduce their adaptive capacities, thus leading to losses and damages; whereas, according to the World Meteorological Organization, there is now a nearly 50 % risk of temporarily exceeding 1,5 °C in the period 2022-2026; whereas according to the IEA the global economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis has not been the desired sustainable recovery; whereas the increase in global CO2 emissions by over 2 billion tonnes in 2021 was the largest year-on-year increase in history in absolute terms, more than offsetting the previous year’s pandemic-induced decline in emissions arising from the reduction in economic activities; whereas coal accounted for over 40 % of the overall growth in global CO2 emissions in 2021;

F.   whereas most emissions from synthetic nitrogen fertilisers occur after they are applied to the soil and enter the atmosphere as nitrous oxide (N2O) – a persistent GHG with 265 times more global warming potential than CO2, whereas synthetic nitrogen fertiliser production accounted for 35,2 % of total synthetic nitrogen fertiliser-associated emissions, while field emissions accounted for 62,4 % and transportation accounted for the remaining 2,4 %; whereas the top four emitters (China, India, USA and the EU) jointly accounted for 63 % of the total emission generated;

G.  whereas according to the IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives report, achieving net-zero emissions requires a major acceleration in the development and deployment of clean technologies (‘cleantech’); whereas half of the decarbonisation needed to get to net-zero by 2050 will come from technologies currently under development in the laboratory or in demonstration phase;

H.  whereas, the energy crisis has put into focus the issue of energy security and the need for energy demand reduction and a diversified energy system, creating greater demand for existing and soon available renewable energy and energy efficiency solutions; whereas the illegal Russian military invasion of Ukraine and subsequent impacts have added even greater urgency to the need for rapidly transform the global energy system; whereas the overreliance on fossil fuels and the instability in global energy markets underline the need to prioritise investments, both in Europe and worldwide, in energy efficiency and sufficiency, decarbonisation, long-duration energy storage, innovative clean technology deployment, renewable energy, smart grid solutions and zero-emissions sustainable technologies, and to develop a socioeconomic model that is compatible with a healthy environment for future generations and within planetary boundaries; whereas the research to support innovation and the development of new, green technologies should be supported, as they can play a role in climate change mitigation as well as in a sustainable economic growth and EU competitiveness;

I.   whereas IPCC has urged the world to keep global warming below 1,5º C, yet in 2020 warming was already approximately 1,2º C above pre-industrial levels; whereas according to the IPCC, human influence has unequivocally warmed the atmosphere, ocean and land and the impacts of human-induced climate change are being felt in the increased frequency of extreme weather events including heatwaves, droughts, flooding, winter storms, hurricanes and wildfires; whereas between 2000 and 2019, floods, droughts, and storms alone affected nearly 4 billion people worldwide, costing over 300 000 lives; whereas the occurrence of these extreme events represents a drastic change since the period 1980-99, with the frequency of floods increasing by 134 %, storms by 40 %, and droughts by 29 %(13);

J.  whereas there are scientifically proven interlinkages between health, environmental and climate crises; whereas extreme weather events, biodiversity loss, land degradation and water scarcity are displacing people and having a dramatic impact on their health; whereas according to the World Health Organization, climate change is the single biggest health threat facing humanity, and it will cause approximately 250 000 additional deaths a year between 2030 and 2050(14), whereas approximately 7 million premature deaths worldwide are caused by air pollution, and whereas the costs of direct damage to health, including mental health, are estimated to rise to between USD 2 and 4 billion per year by 2030;

K.   whereas the UNDRR Global Assessment Report (GAR 2022) reveals that between 350 and 500 medium- to large-scale disasters took place every year over the past two decades, with the number of disaster events projected to reach 560 a year by 2030 – or 1,5 disasters a day;

L.  whereas climate change is a main driver of environmental degradation, having a negative impact on food and water security, access to natural resources and harming human health; whereas water scarcity, flooding and droughts are key risks in Europe and water shortages impact several sectors across the EU through cascading and spillover effects; whereas water efficiency improvements are key adaptation options; whereas digital solutions should be deployed in order to ensure a resilient and green society in Europe and beyond; whereas all stakeholders and sectors should be mobilised to achieve a water-smart society by simultaneously addressing climate change adaptation, food and water security, protection of biodiversity and a resource-efficient and competitive economy; whereas the EU and the Member States should also develop this approach through the European neighbourhood policy, the EU’s external action and in the UN agendas;

M.  whereas climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply and economic growth are projected to be much higher with global warming of 2 °C; whereas limiting global warming to 1,5 °C compared to 2 °C is projected to reduce the impacts on terrestrial, freshwater and coastal ecosystems and to retain more of their services to humans; whereas it is therefore imperative to pursue efforts to limit the temperature rise to 1,5 °C above pre-industrial levels;

N.  whereas the preamble to the Paris Agreement recognises the ‘importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, including oceans’ and whereas Article 4(1)(d) of the UNFCCC stresses that the Parties thereto must promote sustainable management, and the conservation and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of all GHGs, including biomass, forests and oceans, as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems; whereas the IPBES global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services underlines that the sustainable use of nature will be vital for adapting to and mitigating dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system;

O.  whereas the preservation of oceans is crucial for their role within the climate system, such as the uptake and redistribution of natural and anthropogenic CO2 and heat, as well as ecosystem support; whereas the IPCC 2019 Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate shows that since 1970 oceans have progressively warmed and absorbed more than 90 % of the excess heat in the climate system; whereas ocean warming is affecting coastal ecosystems, leading to intensified marine heatwaves, acidification, loss of oxygen, salinity intrusion and sea level rise;

P.  whereas the Glasgow Climate Pact recognises the ‘important role of non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, indigenous peoples, local communities, youth, children, local and regional governments and other stakeholders, in contributing to progress towards the objective of the goals of the Paris Agreement’ and highlights the ‘urgent need for multilevel and cooperative action’;

Q.  whereas climate change is directly or indirectly threatening the full exercise of human rights, including the rights to life, water and sanitation, food, health and housing; whereas the ability of people to adapt to climate change is inextricably linked to their access to basic human rights and to the health of the ecosystems they depend on for their livelihoods and well-being; whereas, according to the International Organisation for Migration, more than 200 million people could be forced to migrate due to impact of climate change; whereas the scale of internal climate migration will be largest in the poorest and most climate-vulnerable regions; whereas global action to reduce GHG emissions could dramatically slow the rise in internal climate migrants by as much as 80 % by 2050(15);

R.  whereas the past seven years (2015 to 2021) were the warmest years on record; whereas sea levels also reached a new record high in 2021; whereas globally the sea level rose 4,5 mm a year on average between 2013 and 2021, and in several region, the sea level is rising ‘substantially faster’ than the global average, according to the WMO; whereas rainfall was recorded for the first time ever on the highest point on Greenland’s ice sheet in 2021;

S.  whereas the richest 1 % of the global population are set to generate per capita consumption emissions in 2030 that are still 30 times higher than the global per capita level, while the footprints of the poorest half of the world population are set to remain several times below that level(16);

T.  whereas most developing countries contribute minimally to GHG emissions in the atmosphere causing climate change; whereas climate change impacts in developing countries have increased; whereas the resources they can mobilise for adaptation action to address the negative effects of climate change and achieve climate resilience and sustainable development are clearly insufficient;

U.  whereas the UNFCCC First Report on the Determination of the Needs of Developing Country Parties states that the costed needs of developing countries for implementing NDCs amount to between USD 5,8 and 5,9 trillion, of which USD 502 billion is identified as needs requiring international sources of finance;

V.  whereas in 2020 Global Witness recorded the murders of 227 land and environmental defenders, 71 % of whom were working to defend the world’s forests from deforestation and industrial development, while others died for their work protecting rivers, coastal areas and oceans; whereas in 2020 violence against land and environmental defenders was overwhelmingly concentrated in countries in the Global South and less than 1 % of all recorded lethal attacks were documented in the Global North; whereas between 2015 and 2019 over a third of all fatal attacks targeted indigenous people, even though indigenous communities make up only 5 % of the world’s population(17);

1.  Recalls that the climate and biodiversity crises are among the most important challenges facing humanity and that all governments and actors worldwide must do their utmost to overcome them urgently, treating the two crises as closely intertwined; underlines that international cooperation, the involvement of regional and local governments, businesses as well as other non-state actors, solidarity, a just transition, coherent action underpinned by science and an unwavering commitment to ramping up ambition and aligning policies with this ambition are necessary to fulfil our collective responsibility of limiting global warming and preventing biodiversity loss, and thus safeguard the entire planet and the well-being of current and future generations;

2.  Expresses concern at the findings of the UNEP’s emissions gap report 2021 and of its addendum published on 4 November 2021, in particular that, despite more ambitious climate pledges announced ahead of and during COP26, predicted emissions leave the world on a path to a 2,7 °C temperature rise if announced national 2030 climate targets are fully implemented in combination with other mitigation measures, far beyond the Paris Agreement goals of limiting global warming to well below 2 °C and pursuing 1,5° C; is alarmed that emissions are still rising and the emissions gap is widening; stresses that limiting global warming to 1,5 °C requires rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global GHG emissions, including reducing global CO2 emissions by 43 % by 2030 compared to 2019 levels; recalls that by adopting the Glasgow Climate Pact all Parties recognised that limiting the increase in the global average temperature to 1,5 °C above pre-industrial levels would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;

3.  Underlines that according to the UNEP’s emissions gap report 2021 the reduction of methane emissions from the fossil fuel, waste and agriculture sectors could help close the emissions gap and reduce warming in the short term, but emphasises that in order for that to happen there is an urgent need for rules that are clearly defined and aim to achieve actual reductions in emissions, while being supported by arrangements to track progress and provide transparency;

4.  Highlights the growing number of countries committing to net zero emissions goals by mid-century but underlines that these commitments must be urgently translated into robust short-term targets, policies and actions, backed by financial resources and reflected in revised NDCs in the form of increased 2030 climate targets in order for global emissions to peak as soon as possible; concurs with the UNEP in its assessment that many national climate plans delay action until after 2030 and that many of the long-term net-zero emissions pledges contain large ambiguities and lack of transparency;

5.  Notes with deep concern the WMO’s latest State of the Climate report, which shows that four key climate indicators – sea level rise, ocean heat, ocean acidification and GHG concentrations – broke new records in 2021;

The Glasgow Climate Pact and COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh

6.  Takes note of the progress made during COP26 and in the Glasgow Climate Pact; stresses, however, that limiting global warming to 1,5 °C will only be achieved if urgent action is taken in this critical decade before 2030; underlines that COP26 requested Parties to revisit and strengthen the 2030 targets in their NDCs as this is necessary to align with the Paris Agreement temperature goal by the end of 2022, taking into account different national circumstances; strongly urges all Parties to the UNFCCC to increase their NDCs by COP27 in order to close the ambition gap, and to align their policies to a pathway compatible with this ambition; calls on the EU and all G20 nations to show global leadership in this regard;

7.  Welcomes the COP26 decision to produce a work programme to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade, in a manner that complements the global stocktake, to annually update the synthesis report on NDCs ahead of each COP, and to convene an annual high-level ministerial roundtable on pre-2030 ambitions; urges COP27 to adopt this work programme and to ensure an annual review of ambition reflecting best available scientific knowledge and the Parties’ highest possible level of ambition; stresses that Parties will need to revise and increase their NDCs until they are in line with a pathway compatible with limiting global warming to 1,5° C;

8.  Welcomes the completion in Glasgow of the Paris Agreement Rulebook, underlines that the implementation of the rulebook must ensure strong environmental integrity and deliver the highest level of ambition;

9.  Welcomes the fact that the Glasgow Climate Pact underlines the importance of adaptation and the need to scale up action to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change; notes in this regard that 47 countries submitted Adaptation Communications or National Adaptation Plans in the last year, and expects other countries to submit their Communications in line with the Paris Agreement; welcomes the creation of a new Glasgow Dialogue on Loss and Damage which should focus on funding arrangements to avert, minimise and address loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change;

10.  Takes note of the climate finance pledges made during COP26, but regrets that the 2021 Climate Finance Delivery Plan showed that the current global USD 100 billion goal is only likely to be achieved in 2023, three years after the original deadline; points to the growing finance gap, particularly for adaptation; urges developed countries, including the EU and its Member States, to ensure that the USD 100 billion climate finance goal can be met and disbursed already as of 2022 and on average over the time period 2020-2025, and to further detail the way forward for the new post-2025 climate finance goal; stresses that financing from the developed countries responsible for a large share of historical emissions will also be crucial to build trust for a more ambitious dialogue on climate mitigation targets;

11.  Highlights that the country of COP27 belongs to one of the regions in the world most affected by climate change; notes that the Mediterranean basin is warming 20 % faster than the global average, and that the region is one of the main climate change hotspots in the world, where 250 million people are projected to be considered ‘water poor’ within 20 years(18); underlines that the Mediterranean is turning into the fastest warming sea in the world(19) with consequences for important economic sectors and the whole sea ecosystem, suffering irreversible changes to the ecosystem and species; calls on the Commission and Member States to act with urgency and cooperate with its Mediterranean partners to work on an ambitious adaptation measures and to lead mitigation action;

12.  Supports the initiative by the Ukrainian Government to create a global platform for assessing the environmental damage caused during armed conflicts;

13.  Recalls the importance of the full involvement of all Parties in the UNFCCC decision-making processes; stresses that the current decision-making process under the UNFCCC could be improved to better allow for the full participation of developing countries and least developed country (LDC) delegates and civil society representatives; considers it essential for the perspectives of countries suffering most from climate change to be heard and acted on; calls therefore on the COP27 presidency and future presidencies to explore additional ways to ensure effective and meaningful participation of developing countries and to allocate additional resources to this; recalls its previous positions on the human rights situation in Egypt; takes note of a number of civil society organisations who have raised concerns about the marginalisation of civil society at the COP in Egypt and the barriers to protests and civil society participation; calls on the UNFCCC and the Egyptian authorities to ensure equitable access and full participation of citizens and civil society organisations in COP27;

14.  Reiterates its call for the release of all persons held in arbitrary detention in Egypt and stresses the particularly urgent case of human rights defender Alaa Abd El-Fattah; calls on the Egyptian authorities to use the momentum from COP27 to improve the human rights situation in the country and to uphold fundamental freedoms throughout and beyond COP27, notably in relation to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; strongly supports the call by UN experts for the UNFCCC Secretariat to develop human rights criteria that countries hosting future COPs must commit to meeting as part of the host agreement;

15.  Welcomes the fact that the Glasgow Climate Pact recognises the important role of non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, indigenous peoples, local communities, youth, children, local and regional governments and other stakeholders, in contributing to progress towards the objectives of the Paris Agreement; recognises the important role played by youth in the fight against climate change; urges Parties and stakeholders, therefore, to ensure meaningful youth participation and representation in multilateral, national and local decision-making processes; recalls in particular the key role of cities in reducing GHG emissions and welcomes the growing number of cities and regions around the world committing to net zero emissions goals and, in particular, the commitments of the 100 European cities participating in the EU Mission for Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities to become climate-neutral by 2030 and to become innovation hubs that will allow all EU cities and their neighbourhood peers to follow suit by 2050;

16.  Stresses that the effective participation of all Parties is needed to pursue the goal of limiting the increase in the global average temperature to 1,5° C, which requires addressing the issue of vested or conflicting interests; expresses concerns in particular over the fact that some big polluters have used their presence at COPs to undermine the objectives of the Paris Agreement; is seriously concerned by the lack of action by the UNFCCC to finally address the issue of conflicts of interest with regard to engagement with non-Party stakeholders; urges the Commission and the Member States to take the lead in this process to protect the UNFCCC decision-making process from interests that run counter the goals of the Paris Agreement;

17.  Welcomes the improvement of the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action as a space to encourage non-state actors and subnational governments to take immediate climate action and welcomes the adoption of its work programme for 2022; recognises the Race to Zero and the Race to Resilience initiatives as key platforms for supporting bottom-up governance, facilitating reporting and stocktaking at the subnational level;

An ambitious EU climate policy

18.  Expects the Fit for 55 legislative package and the policies under the European Green Deal to deliver the measures for achieving the EU’s 2030 target and to put the EU and its Member States on a path to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest and underlines Parliament’s positions on these; recalls that in line with the EU Climate Law and the Paris Agreement as well as best available science, the EU should step up its climate action both on mitigation, to contain global warming to 1,5 °C compared to pre-industrial levels, and on adaptation to foster resilience; calls for the EU to update its NDC and increase its GHG reduction target by COP27 based on the best available science; calls for the highest level of ambition in the Fit for 55 package so as to send a clear signal to all other Parties that the EU stands ready to contribute to closing the gap necessary to limit global warming to 1,5° C, in a just, socially balanced, fair and cost-effective way, while taking into account aspects of global fairness and equity and the EU’s historical and current responsibility for the emissions causing the climate crisis;

19.  Highlights the fact that the EU’s overall 2030 emissions target established in the European Climate Law and the Fit for 55 legislative proposals will reduce the EU’s emissions by more than its current NDC of a 55 % reduction in net emissions; underlines, furthermore, that Parliament’s positions on these proposals and the targets included in the REPowerEU Plan will further raise the EU’s climate ambition beyond that level, and calls on the Council to endorse the Parliament’s positions in this respect; calls for the EU to update its emissions pledges accordingly to reflect this, in light of the decision in the Glasgow Climate Pact to revisit the 2030 targets;

20.  Stresses that the current geopolitical situation highlights the urgency of cutting dependence on fossil fuels and the need to boost the deployment of renewables, and offers the opportunity of stepping up EU leadership in this regard;

21.  Reiterates the need to mainstream climate ambition into all EU policies and the measures transposing them, and underlines that Article 6(4) of the European Climate Law obliges the Commission to assess the consistency of any draft measure or legislative proposal, including budgetary proposals, with the EU’s climate targets; urges the Commission to fully implement this provision in the way it conducts impact assessments on all EU policy areas; emphasises the need to also re-evaluate and align existing policies of the Union and its Member States with these objectives, and expects the newly created European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change to contribute to this assessment; welcomes the appointment of the 15 members of the newly established European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change; calls on the Advisory Board to publish their assessment of an EU GHG budget compatible with the objective of limiting global warming below 1,5 °C as soon as possible, and expects the Commission to take fully on board the advice of the Advisory Board when drawing up the indicative Union GHG budget and the Union post-2030 climate targets;

22.  Recalls a recent ruling by a Member State’s constitutional court that climate protection is not a matter of political discretion and that the constitution’s provision on environmental protection imposes a constitutional duty on the state to achieve climate neutrality;

23.  Emphasises EU citizens’ strong support for stepping up climate action as almost every second European (49 %) sees climate change as the main global challenge for the future of the EU according to the latest Eurobarometer;

24.  Emphasises that all climate policies should be pursued in line with the principle of a just transition towards climate neutrality and in close cooperation with civil society and social and economic partners; considers, therefore, that more transparency, stronger social partnerships and civil society engagement at local, regional, national and EU level are fundamental to achieving climate neutrality across all sectors of society in a fair, inclusive and socially sustainable manner;

Adaptation and loss and damage

25.  Welcomes the new financial pledges made in Glasgow to the Adaptation Fund and to the least developed countries Fund; notes however that support for mitigation remains greater than support for adaptation, and strongly supports the call for developed nations to at least double their collective provision of adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025, in line with the Glasgow Climate Pact, in order to achieve a better balance; regrets that seven years after the Paris Agreement, the global goal on adaptation remains undefined; welcomes the Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation, adopted and launched at COP26; underlines the importance of grants-based adaptation finance; urges the EU to increase the proportion of finance for adaptation provided through the Global Europe Instrument year by year from 2021 to 2027; highlights the need to step up efforts to translate the global goal on adaptation into measurable outcomes that should, inter alia, provide a comprehensive understanding of climate and disaster risks and associated adaptation needs and costs at multiple levels, increase the availability of consistent and comparable data, determine and enhance the provision and accessibility of means of implementation, including finance and technology support, and draw up a common set of quantitative and qualitative metrics, methodologies and approaches to track progress towards achieving the goal over time; highlights in this context the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and its monitoring and reporting system;

26.  Reiterates that adaptation action in the short, medium and long term, is an inevitable necessity for all countries if they are to minimise the negative effects of the climate and biodiversity crises and achieve climate resilience and sustainable development, noting the particular vulnerabilities to climate change impacts of developing countries, especially the least developed countries and small island developing states; highlights that adaptation action can generate multiple benefits such as improving agricultural productivity, innovation, health and well-being, food security, livelihoods and biodiversity conservation, as well as the reduction of risks and damages; calls on the EU and the Member States to step up adaptation action through mandatory adaptation plans, climate vulnerability assessments and climate stress tests at local, regional, and national levels and through support for locally-led approaches and engagement with local authorities and local civil society in order to fully honour the adaptation goal of the Paris Agreement and ensure that EU adaptation policies sufficiently protect communities and ecosystems in the EU from the effects of climate change; calls for further progress on the new EU Adaptation Strategy and stresses the importance of its linkages with the EU Biodiversity Strategy and the new regulatory framework on adaptation stemming from the European Climate Law; reiterates calls for their ambitious implementation, including of their international components;

27.  Underlines that, while climate change is a global problem, each region is already being affected differently, and that local governments, being closer to populations, are key actors for facilitating climate change adaptation; underlines that better channelling of financial resources to the local level is needed for efficient, targeted solutions and, in this sense, welcomes the Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change, which will support at least 150 European regions and communities towards climate resilience by 2030; calls for support for a regional and decentralised approach in the response to climate change effects and in the access to climate finance in developing countries in order to give local authorities, local civil society organisations and environmental defenders a greater role in tackling the effects of climate change and to reach the most vulnerable;

28.  Stresses that the EU Adaptation Strategy adopted by the Commission on 24 February 2021 expresses the Commission’s aim of scaling up resources and further mobilising larger-scale adaptation finance, and that particular attention is needed to ensure that financial resources reach the most vulnerable communities in developing countries;

29.  Stresses that early warning systems are critical to effective adaptation but are only available to less than half of WMO members; supports the WMO’s proposal to be approved at the COP27 to make early warning systems reach everyone in the next five years; hopes that this Early Warning Services initiative will be implemented rapidly particularly with the aim of saving as many lives as soon as possible;

30.  Emphasises that green infrastructure contributes to adaptation to climate change and the reduction of disaster risk through the protection of nature and ecosystems, the conservation and restoration of natural habitats and species, good ecological status, water management and food security; notes that the development of green infrastructure is among the most effective climate adaptation measures that can be implemented in cities, as it mitigates the negative impacts of climate change and increasingly frequent extreme weather phenomena, such as heatwaves, forest fires, extreme rainfall, flooding and drought, evens out extreme temperatures and improves the quality of life of residents living in urban areas, including their mental and physical health;

31.  Highlights the devastating environmental, social and economic impacts of desertification in the medium and long term, its triggering of depopulation in some areas, and the need for common approaches to properly prevent and adapt to this phenomenon and overcome it; recalls therefore the crucial importance of water management for climate change mitigation and adaptation, but also to protect water and food security, protect biodiversity and support healthy soils; stresses therefore the need for speedy and full implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive in order to achieve its objectives and better manage Europe’s water resources; emphasises that water reuse and water efficiency through circular processes must be fully implemented across the economy and society in order to make use of the value in water and ensure water security in terms of quantity and quality; emphasises that digital solutions can contribute to adaptation to climate change by improving the ability to predict water scarcity, floods and water pollution and supports the deployment of these tools;

32.  Stresses that climate change and environmental degradation are major drivers of human displacement and threat multipliers impacting human security and socio-political stability; stresses that insufficient mitigation and adaptation capacities can drive armed conflicts, food shortages, natural catastrophes and climate-induced displacement; calls on the Commission and the Member States to recognise the needs and vulnerability of people affected by climate displacement and calls for a reinforcement of EU development cooperation and humanitarian policies and their respective financial instruments to support climate change adaptation in developing countries, build resilience, reinforce disaster risk reduction and respond to humanitarian emergencies in times of growing needs;

33.  Notes that Article 8 of the Paris Agreement (on loss and damage) states that the Parties should take a cooperative approach to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change; highlights, therefore, the importance of supportive global action in areas especially vulnerable to climate change impacts, such as coastal areas and islands, and where adaptive capacity is limited; calls on the Commission and the Member States to act as bridge-builders between developed, developing and least developed countries, and aim to step up the work of the High Ambition Coalition on both mitigation and adaptation finance and loss and damage; recognises that these are essential components of global climate justice;

34.  Expresses its gratitude to the IPCC and greatly appreciates the work carried out on its 6th Assessment Report; welcomes the robust assessment of losses and damages featured in the recent IPCC Working Group II report and points to how it acknowledges loss and damage as an area of increasing importance in both international climate policy and climate science; invites the IPCC to build on this work and produce a special report dealing specifically with losses and damages;

35.  Reiterates that international institutions need to strengthen their organisations, cooperation and crisis management in order to be better prepared for climate change on a local and global level as a next step towards institutional climate adaptation;

The climate and biodiversity crisis

36.  Emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring nature and ecosystems in order to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement; recalls, further, the crucial role played by biodiversity in enabling humans to combat and adapt to global warming and increase their level of resilience; believes that nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based approaches are key tools for supporting climate change mitigation and adaptation, as well as protecting and restoring biodiversity and forests and reducing the risk of disasters; stresses that by restoring degraded ecosystems as quickly as possible and effectively and equitably conserving 30 to 50 % of the Earth’s land, freshwater and ocean habitats, while safeguarding and strengthening human rights and the rights of indigenous peoples, society can benefit from nature’s capacity to absorb and store carbon; stresses the need to accelerate progress towards sustainable development, but that for this to happen adequate finance and political support are essential;

37.  Emphasises the critical and interdependent roles of forests, biodiversity and sustainable land use in enabling the world to meet the SDGs; stresses, therefore, the urgent need to halt and reverse deforestation and land degradation as a way to contribute for the reduction of annual net GHG emissions;

38.  Reiterates the pledge by the governments of 141 countries with more than 3,6 billion hectares of forest to end and reverse deforestation by 2030;

39.  Reiterates that the strict conservation and restoration of high-carbon ecosystems is a response option with an immediate impact and wide range of mitigation and adaptation benefits; recognises the key role of forests in protecting the climate and biodiversity; highlights that forests contribute to efforts to mitigate and adapt to the negative impacts of climate change;

40.  Stresses that sectoral policies and the climate policy for land use sector, including for important primary production activities in agriculture and forestry, need to adequately work in synergy with the natural adaptation capacities of natural and semi-natural ecosystems, and improve as much as possible the adaptation capacity of predominantly cultural landscapes; highlights the recent court ruling in a case where the plaintiffs were foresters who brought a case against the state for its national forest policy, which has effectively disallowed them to improve the resilience of managed forests, including by disincentivising natural regeneration(20);

41.  Recalls that, according to the fifth assessment report of the IPCC, indigenous, local and traditional forms of knowledge are a major resource for the sustainable management of natural resources, the conservation of biodiversity and adaptation to climate change; stresses the need to strengthen their community rights on land and resources in order to mitigate climate change, as set out in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and ILO Convention 169, and to comply with the principle of free, prior and informed consent;

42.  Highlights in the context of business the need to protect land and environmental defenders by ensuring effective and robust regulatory protection of the environment, labour rights, land rights, indigenous peoples’ rights, livelihoods and cultures, including the principle to free, prior and informed consent; welcomes in this regard the EU initiatives on corporate sustainability due diligence and the proposed regulation on the making available on the Union market as well as export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation; calls on the Parties to ensure that commitments made at COP27 to implement the Paris Agreement align with existing international human rights obligations and standards applicable to business operations;

43.  Recalls that climate change is one of the main direct drivers of biodiversity loss and land degradation; underlines that the negative effects of climate change on nature and biodiversity, ecosystems, oceans, health and food security are projected to become critical in future decades; underlines that a stronger, binding and more ambitious international framework is needed in order to protect global biodiversity, to stop its current decline and to restore it as much as possible; acknowledges in this context the importance of the Biodiversity Conference in Montreal, Canada, of December 2022; calls on the IPCC and IPBES to continue and strengthen their cooperation and joint work to provide policy-makers with the latest science on the twin climate and biodiversity crises and how to address them; calls also on the UNFCCC to work in partnership with the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) towards a consistent framework for climate neutrality and resilience, biodiversity protection and sustainable development;

44.  Encourages the Parties, in line with the Glasgow Climate Pact, to take an integrated approach to addressing biodiversity in national, regional and local policy and planning decisions; calls on the UNFCCC, in this regard, to work in partnership with UNCBD and UNDP towards a consistent framework for climate neutrality and resilience, biodiversity protection and sustainable development; welcomes the Edinburgh Declaration on the post-2020 global biodiversity framework, which provides an example of an inclusive ‘whole of government’ approach;

45.  Calls on the Parties to continue the work on the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue by setting concrete, action-oriented goals, addressing the most relevant and pressing issues of the ocean-climate nexus and encouraging countries, especially coastal countries, to include corresponding commitments in their updated NDCs, National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), Long-Term Strategies (LTEs) and Global Stocktake (GST) submissions, among other actions;

Sustainable climate finance

46.  Highlights that the EU and its Member States are the largest providers of public climate finance; recognises the importance of climate finance for successful climate actions, particularly as many developing countries have conditional NDCs, the achievement of which depends on sufficient financial support; welcomes, therefore, that by 2025, a new collective quantified goal on climate finance will be set which should go well beyond the 2020 USD 100 billion annual goal and take into account the needs and priorities of developing countries for additional and adequate climate finance; is of the view that stand-alone targets for mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage should be explored as part of this new collective quantified goal on climate finance; underlines that future climate finance goals should take account of the needs of developing countries, as well as the Paris Agreement’s equity principle, in determining Parties’ contributions; stresses, in this regard, the need to clearly prioritise grants-based climate finance to ensure that climate finance does not contribute to unsustainable debt levels in developing countries; reiterates its call for a dedicated EU public finance mechanism that provides additional and adequate support towards delivering the EU’s fair share of international climate finance goals; also recalls its position of 22 June 2022 on the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)(21), according to which the Union should finance least developed countries’ efforts towards the de-carbonisation of their manufacturing industries with an annual amount corresponding at least to the level of revenues generated by the sale of CBAM certificates;

47.  Stresses the importance of operationalising the global goal on adaptation and of mobilising major new funds for adaptation in developing countries; notes with concern that adaptation costs and needs are rising, and that they are five to ten times greater than current international public adaptation finance flows, leading to a widening adaptation finance gap; notes the inherent difficulties in directing private finance towards adaptation; highlights that current global financial flows are insufficient for the implementation of necessary adaptation action, especially in developing countries, including because a substantial part of adaptation finance is provided in the form of loans; notes that 50 % of the EU’s total climate finance in 2020 was provided in the form of grants and urges the EU and all Member States to increase grants-based finance, particularly for adaptation and especially for least developed countries and small island developing states; calls for the EU and its Member States to commit to a significant increase in the adaptation finance they provide and to bring to COP27 a clear plan on how to achieve the goal agreed in the Glasgow Climate Pact to double adaptation finance by 2025 compared to 2019 levels;

48.  Recognises the need for progress on the issue of finance to address loss and damage; calls on Parties to agree on new, adequate and additional sources of public finance clearly prioritising grants in order to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change; notes the inherent difficulties in directing private finance towards loss and damage; urges the EU to constructively engage ahead of COP27, including by examining modalities for such a facility, taking into account existing institutional arrangements in developing countries’ proposals to establish a loss and damage finance facility at COP27; calls for loss and damage to be a standing agenda item for future COPs, so that there is clear negotiating space to monitor and make progress on this issue, and for the full operationalisation of the Santiago Network in order to effectively catalyse technical assistance for adequately addressing loss and damage;

49.  Recalls that all Parties must make financial flows – public and private, domestic and international – compatible with the path towards the 1,5 °C target in the Paris Agreement; reiterates the need to urgently end fossil fuel subsidies and other environmentally harmful subsidies in the EU and worldwide; highlights the Glasgow Climate Pact commitment to accelerate efforts to phase down unabated coal power and inefficient fossil fuel subsidies: is concerned by the lack of a definition of what an ‘inefficient fossil fuel subsidy’ is and that it seriously endangers the credibility of such commitments; notes that fossil fuels subsidies in the EU still amount to some EUR 55-58 billion annually; reminds the Commission and the Member States of their obligations under the 8th Environmental Action Programme to set a deadline for the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies consistent with the ambition of limiting global warming to 1,5 °C, as well as to develop a binding Union framework to monitor and report on Member States’ progress towards phasing out fossil fuel subsidies based on an agreed methodology; calls on the Commission and all Member States to implement concrete policies, timelines and measures to phase out all direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies as soon as possible, and by 2025 at the very latest; encourages other Parties to undertake similar measures and to work on developing a fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty; welcomes the G7’s commitment to stop funding fossil fuel development overseas by the end of 2022, while stressing that this commitment should also apply domestically; highlights the need to ensure that the EU’s carbon pricing framework does not incentivise industrial pollution; highlights the role of the Innovation Fund;

50.  Considers it essential for major international financial institutions to swiftly adopt and develop green finance in order to bring about a successful decarbonisation of the global economy; recalls the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) as the EU’s climate bank and its recently adopted Climate Bank Roadmap and updated Energy Lending Policy and the additional efforts of the European Investment Fund (EIF) to spearhead climate investments; welcomes the fact that the European Central Bank has committed to integrating climate change considerations into its monetary policy framework; urges multilateral development banks, including the EIB, and development finance institutions, which typically provide financial support in the form of debt-generating instruments, to implement responsible lending and borrowing principles, and to align their portfolios with the Paris Agreement and gather and use high-quality climate risk, vulnerability and impacts data to guide the direction of investments towards 1,5° C-aligned investments; acknowledges the importance of the establishment of the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero and its commitment to supporting emerging economies to transition to net zero; welcomes in this context the EU agreement on Corporate Sustainability Reporting, which is crucial to building financial support;

51.  Supports the work of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action and encourages all governments to adopt the coalition’s commitments to align all policies and practices in the remit of finance ministries with the goals of the Paris Agreement and to adopt effective carbon pricing, as laid down in the Helsinki Principles;

52.  Welcomes the work of the International Sustainability Standards Board to develop a global baseline of sustainability disclosures for capital markets in order to direct more capital towards clean technologies and climate investments;

Efforts across all sectors

53.  Recalls that the European Climate Law includes a commitment to facilitating sector-specific climate dialogues and partnerships by bringing together key stakeholders in an inclusive and representative manner so as to encourage sectors themselves to draw up indicative voluntary roadmaps and to plan their transition towards achieving the Union’s climate neutrality objective by 2050; highlights that these roadmaps could make a valuable contribution to assisting sectors with planning the necessary investments in the transition to a climate-neutral economy and could also serve to strengthen sectoral engagement with the pursuit of climate-neutral solutions;

54.  Calls on all Parties to urgently take action against methane emissions; welcomes the Global Methane Pledge that the EU, the US and a number of other countries signed up to at COP26, which aims to reduce all methane emissions caused by human action by 30 % by 2030 compared to 2020 levels, which is the first step towards the reduction of 45 % recommended by UNEP(22); urges all signatories to ensure they reduce methane emissions within their territories by at least 30 % by 2030 and to adopt national measures to achieve this aim; notes that approximately 60 % of the world’s methane is emitted by sources such as agriculture, landfill sites, waste water facilities and the production and pipeline transport of fossil fuels; recalls that methane is a potent GHG which is 28 times more powerful than CO2 in terms of its climate impact over a 100-year timeframe, and 80 times more potent over a 20-year timeframe; highlights in this regard that stronger action to reduce methane emissions is one of the most cost-effective measures for cutting GHG emissions in the short term; notes that many technologies and practices are already available for mitigating methane emissions cost-effectively, at low cost or negative cost; notes that methane emissions in agriculture are primarily driven by increasing livestock numbers and that livestock emissions from manure and enteric fermentation account for roughly 32 % of anthropogenic methane emissions; takes note, in this context, of the proposal to reduce methane emissions in the energy sector presented by the Commission in December 2021; calls for the adoption of additional binding legislative measures to tackle emissions in other emitting sectors, for binding Union methane emissions reduction targets as well as the inclusion of methane among the regulated pollutants in the National Emission Reduction Commitments Directive; reiterates its call to address livestock densities in the EU to ensure ambitious reductions of GHG emissions in this sector; reiterates its position that a shift is needed in consumption patterns towards more healthy foods, diets and lifestyles, including increased consumption of sustainably and regionally produced plants and plant-based foods, and that the overconsumption of meat and ultra-processed products needs to be addressed;

55.  Considers that sustainable agricultural production models require global standard setting using a cross-sectoral, multidisciplinary ‘One Health’(23) approach to ensure the transition toward sustainable food systems as well as meeting the commitments of the Paris agreement and the Glasgow Climate Pact;

56.  Recognises that climate change will contribute to increased antibiotic resistance and therefore calls for a global agreement by the Parties to reduce the use of antimicrobials and combat the risk of resistance;

57.  Highlights that the transport sector is the only sector in which emissions have risen at EU level since 1990 and that this is not compatible with the EU’s climate goals, which require greater and faster reductions in emissions from all sectors of society, including the aviation and maritime sectors; considers that in order to ensure the consistency of NDCs with the economy-wide commitments required by the Paris Agreement, the Parties should be strongly encouraged to include emissions from international shipping and aviation in their NDCs and to agree on and implement measures at international, regional and national level to reduce emissions from these sectors, including non-CO2 impacts from aviation; recalls, further, that according to the IEA all new passenger cars placed on the market globally need to be zero emission by 2035 in order to reach net zero emissions by 2050;

58.  Highlights the inclusion of maritime and aviation emissions in the EU emissions trading system (ETS), which could also serve as a model for other countries and will support greater ambition at international level, including in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); is concerned by the slow progress achieved in the IMO and the ICAO in addressing emissions from international shipping and aviation; calls on the Commission and the Member States to do their utmost to strengthen the carbon offsetting and reduction scheme for international aviation (CORSIA) while safeguarding the EU’s legislative autonomy in implementing the ETS Directive; welcomes the ongoing work of the IMO to update its GHG strategy and its emissions reduction target, and to adopt concrete measures; urges the IMO, however, to move forward rapidly in adopting targets and measures in the short and medium term that are aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement;

59.  Points to the huge climate impact of the use of private jets, with one single private jet able to emit two metric tonnes of CO2 in just one hour(24); underlines the importance of leaders leading by example, and thus regrets that some world leaders and delegates travelled to COP26 by private jet; urges all participants at COP27 to choose the least polluting mode of transport to get to their destination; notes with concern that private jet use in Europe is estimated to have increased by 30 % compared to pre-pandemic levels(25), and thus calls on the Member States to take measures to curtail the use of private jets in their territories without delay;

60.  Welcomes the launch of the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA) at COP26 and stresses the imperative of its objective to limit the supply of fossil fuels and set an end for oil and gas production; recalls that fossil fuels are the largest contributor to climate change, responsible for over 75 % of all GHGs and that current plans would lead to the production of around 240 % more coal, 57 % more oil, and 71 % more gas than would be consistent with limiting global warming to 1,5° C; supports a socially just and equitable global transition to align oil and gas production with the objectives of the Paris Agreement; calls on all Member States and other Parties to the Paris Agreement to join this initiative;

61.  Expresses concern at fossil fuel investors suing governments before investment tribunals, within the context of investment agreements, for pursuing policies on climate, the phasing out of fossil fuels or the just transition; calls for consistency between bilateral and multilateral investment agreements and internationally agreed upon climate objectives by excluding the protection of fossil fuel investments;

62.  Recalls that according to IPCC AR6, mitigation options costing USD 100 per tonne of CO2 or less could reduce global GHG emissions by at least half of the 2019 level by 2030; stresses, therefore, that putting in place an effective carbon price, as part of a broader policy mix, can contribute to significantly reducing GHG emissions and stimulating clean technology innovation; encourages the EU to take a leading role in promoting carbon pricing in combination with effective and socially inclusive use of the revenues to promote a more rapid and just transition; also encourages the EU to explore links and other forms of cooperation with existing carbon pricing mechanisms in third countries and regions, to accelerate cost-efficient and socially fair emissions reductions worldwide and to reduce at the same time the risk of carbon leakage, all of which should contribute to ensuring a global level playing field; calls on the Commission to put in place safeguards to ensure that any links with the EU ETS will continue to deliver additional and permanent mitigation contributions and will not undermine the EU’s domestic GHG emissions commitments;

63.  Calls on the Commission to engage with other major CO2 emitters to create an international climate club open to all countries committed to leading the way on high climate ambition and effective carbon pricing, with common goals on the reduction of GHG emissions and the achievement of climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest;

Climate change and gender

64.  Alerts that people are impacted by climate change in different ways depending on factors such as gender, age, disability, ethnicity and poverty; believes that the transition to a sustainable society has to be undertaken in an inclusive, fair and equal manner, and that gender equality is key to that transition; welcomes, therefore, the adoption at COP26 of the decision recommended by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on gender and climate change to better integrate the gender dimension into NDCs and that climate finance should be gender-responsive; regrets, however, that roughly half of Parties have yet to appoint and provide support for a national gender and climate change focal point for climate negotiations, implementations and monitoring;

65.  Highlights the UNFCCC enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender and its Gender Action Plan, which acknowledges the continuing need to promote and advance gender equality as a crosscutting priority in climate change; reiterates its call on the Commission to design a concrete action plan to deliver on the commitments of the renewed Gender Action Plan and to create a permanent EU gender and climate change focal point with sufficient budgetary resources to implement and monitor gender-responsible climate action in the EU and globally(26); calls for the EU to mainstream gender into all climate and environmental policy-making; reiterates its call on the EU and its Member States to ensure gender-just national climate action plans and the meaningful involvement of all genders in their design and implementation, as well as to enhance the role of women and women’s organisations in governance and decision-making, their access to finance and to programmes which support the role of women in climate governance;

66.  Stresses that under the Paris Agreement developed countries are expected to report on how gender-responsive finance is and whether finance provided takes gender considerations into account; expresses concern that gender-tagging of projects is still clearly insufficient and calls on the EU to step up efforts in this regard; recommends the use of gender analyses to help determine different needs and interests in society, as well as the different levels of access to finance mechanisms within societies; reiterates its call on the Commission to design a concrete action plan to deliver on the commitments of the renewed Gender Action Plan agreed at COP25, with sufficient budgetary resources to implement and monitor gender-responsive climate action in the EU and globally; believes this could set an example for other Parties to adopt similar measures;

Industry, SMEs and competitiveness

67.  Considers the COP27 to be a very important step since the signature of the Paris Agreement in 2015, as the Union has launched its Fit for 55 package, RePowerEU package and other measures, in order not only to reduce its GHG emissions and reach climate neutrality at the latest by 2050 but also to transform its energy system; believes that economic prosperity, social cohesion, job creation, sustainable industrial development and climate policy should be mutually reinforcing; highlights that combating climate change should aim to reducing energy poverty, increasing resilience and competitiveness, and provides opportunities for EU industry and SMEs that can be taken up if legislators commit to timely, tailor-made, solidarity-based and adequate policy response; deems it of the utmost importance for the Union to ensure it obtains a first mover advantage and to lead by example while protecting the internal market from unfair competition by third countries and ensuring a level playing field for European industries globally;

68.  Stresses that the Union should do its utmost to keep its industries’ and SMEs’ leading position and global competitiveness in the transition towards a net-zero GHG emissions economy; points out that available and innovative policy tools should be employed to maintain and expand the areas of EU leadership; underlines the need to rapidly decarbonise European industry further and to continue the Union’s support for this endeavour, in particular for proportionate solutions for take-up by SMEs; welcomes the initiatives undertaken for strategic value chains; recognises the positive effects on European industries, including SMEs, stemming from adopting early strategies to fight climate change, as well as from the Union setting an example in achieving climate neutrality, which paves the path for less advanced or ambitious countries and could safeguard a highly beneficial competitive advantage for EU industries and SMEs; stresses the need to draw up enforceable multilateral and bilateral agreements between the EU and its partners aimed at exporting the Union’s environmental standards and ensuring a level playing field in trade and investments; stresses the need to prevent the relocation of production and investments of European industries and SMEs due to less ambitious climate measures outside the Union, and thus encourages international partners to align efforts to fight climate change; considers, on the other hand, that production and investments in Europe would strengthen the industrial value chain and strategic autonomy of the EU in an unstable global context;

69.  Recognises the essential role of SMEs, in particular micro enterprises and start-ups, in driving and delivering on employment and growth as well as in leading the way on the digital and green transitions; recalls that SMEs are an essential part of the European economic and social fabric and must be supported and incentivised in this transition by legislators, in particular by ensuring access to finance for sustainable technologies, services and processes, and simplifying administrative procedures; is concerned that SMEs’ opportunities and vulnerabilities are not sufficiently taken into account in all EU policies relative to the single market, including in the drive to promote digitalisation and the green transition;

70.  Welcomes the commitment, efforts and progress made so far by European citizens, communities, municipalities, cities, regions, industries and institutions towards meeting the obligations of the Paris Agreement;

71.  Welcomes the fact that several EU trading partners have introduced carbon trading or other carbon pricing mechanisms and invites the Commission to further promote this and similar policies on the global scale; looks forward to a speedy agreement with the Council on the proposal for a socially just EU carbon border adjustment mechanism that includes an effective carbon leakage mechanism and to its effect of pushing a global carbon price, which will contribute to reducing global carbon emissions and to the achievement of the Paris Agreement goals;

72.  Considers that the transition towards a sustainable economy needs to be combined with preserving Europe’s competitiveness and creating jobs, as it is crucial to the success of the European Green Deal that the single market remains cost-efficient when adjusting to a new regulatory environment;

73.  Emphasises the need for the promotion of competitive markets for the commodities and rare metals that are essential for the green transition, as the world’s commodity resources are owned by very few countries; highlights that continued dependency on a few suppliers will counteract some current policy measures, such as the RePowerEU plan, and sacrifices made by the Union’s citizens;

74.  Highlights the need for qualification programmes to retrain the workforce to meet the increasing demand for labour in energy efficiency, renewables and green tech solutions; calls on all Member States to take steps to ensure that the current and future European workforce acquires all the necessary skills to manage, implement and innovate the green transition;

Energy policy

75.  Welcomes all initiatives to reduce the EU’s dependency on fossil fuels, including to reduce and ultimately eliminate dependency on all Russian fossil fuels and related products, as Russia is using its natural resources as a weapon and due to its invasion of Ukraine; urges the Commission and the Council. in this regard, to develop an investment plan for energy efficiency measures and renewables in order to strengthen energy autonomy; recalls that the Commission estimates that EUR 300 billion are needed to phase out our energy dependency on Russia by 2030; notes the EU’s ongoing work with international partners to diversify energy supplies; notes that the Commission’s analysis supporting the RePowerEU forecasts that due to new circumstances some fossil-based capacities regrettably might be used longer than initially expected;

76.  Underlines the ongoing revision of energy legislation under the Fit for 55 package to align it with the Union’s increased target of reducing emissions by at least 55 % by 2030 in order to reach climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; calls, however, for continuing work on setting more ambitious targets, e.g. for renewable energies and energy efficiency, especially given that the Union should continue to lead by example;

77.  Highlights the central role of energy efficiency and renewable energy in the transition towards a climate-neutral economy; recalls that the greenest possible energy is the energy we do not use, and especially the role that energy efficiency tools can play in the promotion of this; recognises the progress achieved in the build-out of renewable energy sources; calls at the same time for further build-out of energy efficient actions such as sector integration and reuse of excess heat; points out that heating accounted for 50 % of global energy consumption in 2018(27) and that, in line with the energy efficiency first principle, it can be advantageously reused and reintegrated as a sustainable heating source that would benefit all countries, as excess heat is generated in all countries; acknowledges, however, the importance of aligning renewable energy and energy efficiency targets to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest and to comply with the Paris Agreement as well as with the objectives of RepowerEU, seizing the opportunity of the current decrease in the costs of renewable energy and storage technologies; recognises that increased ambition in the Union’s 2030 energy efficiency target should be compatible with the increase and uptake of electrification, hydrogen, e-fuels and other clean technologies needed for the green transition;

78.  Recalls the need for a massive scaling up and acceleration of permit-granting procedures for renewable energy projects, taking into account EU nature legislation, including on biodiversity, and involving all relevant stakeholders in the mapping and planning process;

79.  Recalls the Union’s commitment to the energy efficiency first principle, which takes into account cost efficiency, system efficiency, storage capacity, demand side flexibility and security of supply; underlines the importance of mainstreaming and implementing the principle in all relevant legislation and initiatives and across all sectors where appropriate; points out the untapped potential of energy efficiency in sectors such as industry(28), information technology, transport and buildings, including heating and cooling; welcomes the Renovation Wave Strategy and related and concrete regulatory, financing and enabling measures with the objective of at least doubling the annual energy renovation rate of buildings by 2030, fostering deep renovations and facilitating e-mobility, in the Fit for 55 package, in order to mitigate energy poverty; recalls the crucial role that SMEs in the construction and renovation sector will play throughout the Renovation Wave, which will allow reductions in the energy and climate impact of buildings;

80.  Welcome the RePowerEU strategy and calls on all EU Member States to consider the IEA’s 10-point plan, which if implemented correctly has the potential to bring down gas imports from Russia by well over half, thereby reducing the Union’s reliance on Russian natural gas;

81.  Stresses the importance of phasing out fossil fuels as soon as possible; notes that this objective must be achieved while maximising its positive effect on the Union’s energy security, industrial competitiveness and citizens’ welfare; calls on the G7 countries to lead by example on the energy transition and to halt all new investments in fossil fuel extraction; welcomes the G7 countries’ pledge to decarbonise their energy sectors by 2035 and to end the financing of most overseas fossil fuel projects by the end of this year; highlights the importance of international cooperation to phase out fossil fuels, such as BOGA and Powering Past Coal Alliance;

82.  Regrets that fossil energy subsidies in the Union have remained stable since 2008 totalling around EUR 55-58 billion per year, corresponding to around one third of all energy subsidies in the Union, and that currently 15 Member States subsidise fossil fuels more than renewable energy; believes that fossil fuel subsidies undermine the goals of the European Green Deal and the obligations of the Paris Agreement; believes that it is critical to provide more consistent price signals across energy sectors and the Member States, and to avoid external costs from being internalised; notes the recent adoption by some Member States of measures to shield consumers from the direct impact of rising energy prices, in particular on households, and insists that such practices must remain exceptional and temporary; calls on the Member States and the other Parties to COP26 to prioritise investments in green energy and infrastructure and to phase out direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies;

83.  Believes that for the Union to achieve climate neutrality its energy system should be integrated and based on a cascading priority system starting from implementing the energy efficiency first principle, based on cost efficiency, system efficiency, storage capacity, security of supply and demand side flexibility supported by smart grids, leading to energy savings, followed by direct electrification of end-use sectors from renewable sources, use of renewable and renewable-based fuels, including hydrogen, for end-use applications and, during a transitional phase, sustainable and safe low-carbon fuels for applications that do not have another alternative, while maintaining energy accessibility, affordability and security of supply through the development of a circular, highly energy efficient, integrated, interconnected, resilient, and multi-modal energy system;

84.  Recalls the importance of taking into account the diversity of national energy systems and challenges; highlights the need for a just transition and reiterates the promise outlined in the new Green Deal that no one should be left behind; is concerned by the fact that around 50 million households in the Union still live in conditions of energy poverty and believes that the EU should increase its efforts to prevent and minimise this; stresses the importance of the social dimension of a higher climate ambition; underlines that building renovations are key for reducing the energy consumption of buildings, bringing down emissions and reducing energy bills; stresses that energy policies should be pursued in line with the principle of a fair and just transition as well as in close cooperation with civil society and social partners; considers, therefore, that public policies, stronger social partnerships and civil society engagement at both local, national and EU level are fundamental to achieving climate neutrality across all sectors of society in a fair, inclusive and socially sustainable way;

85.  Welcomes the adoption of the European Hydrogen Strategy requiring the installation of at least 6 GW of renewable hydrogen electrolysers in the Union by 2024 and 40 GW of renewable hydrogen electrolysers by 2030; calls on the Union and the Member States, in this context, to facilitate hydrogen integration in hard-to-abate sectors;

86.  Welcomes the EU Offshore Strategy and its ambition of at least 60 GW by 2030 and 340 GW by 2050, which Parliament asked to be increased to up to 450 GW of capacity(29), as well as the Solar Strategy aiming to install 320 GW of solar photovoltaic by 2025 and 600 GW by 2030; stresses the need to ensure that the implementation of the strategy benefits the whole Union, including landlocked Member States; highlights that European companies are world leaders and industrial first-movers in offshore renewable energy and that the sector holds an untapped potential for further job creation (both directly and indirectly), growth and exports; calls for European leadership in the renewable industry and its supply chains as part of the EU’s industrial policy; notes with great satisfaction the joint declaration signed in May 2022 by Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands at the North Sea Summit in Esbjerg (Denmark), which will make the North Sea a green powerhouse for Europe;

87.  Is convinced of the need to create the conditions for consumers to gain more knowledge and have more incentives to choose more sustainable forms of energy and be more active; calls on the Commission to assess the grid capacity needed for the integration of renewable energy and electrical heating solutions and to identify the remaining barriers to facilitating the development of renewable self-consumption and renewable energy communities, in particular for low-income or vulnerable households;

88.  Encourages the ongoing work to revise the Directive on Energy Taxation with the aim of aligning taxation policies to the energy and climate targets for 2030 and 2050, while assessing its impacts, including on consumers, energy poverty and transportation poverty;

89.  Stresses that although Europe is working towards meeting its ambitious goals, achieving global net-zero emissions by 2050 at the latest will require coordinated global action; highlights that developing countries will require international assistance in order to achieve their green transition; stresses the importance of enhancing close cross-border cooperation and the sharing of best practices with international partners in the fields of policy-making and science, including technology transfer, in order to promote energy efficiency and investments in sustainable energy technologies and infrastructure; notes the Commission’s recent adoption of its communication on the EU external energy engagement, which includes its determination to engage with third countries across the globe and ‘to encourage partner countries to enhance their climate ambition and define their pathways to climate neutrality, but also to establish long-term relationships that are mutually beneficial, in particular in the area of energy’;

90.  Welcomes the Commission’s intention to adopt an action plan in 2022 for the digitalisation of the energy sector in order to position the EU as a technological leader and to enable a more integrated energy system with intelligent solutions in specific sectors and with improved funding for the 2021-2027 period; recalls the importance of addressing cybersecurity risks in the energy sector in order to ensure the resilience of the energy systems;

Research, innovation, digital technologies and space policy

91.  Welcomes the role of the Horizon Europe programme and its contribution to climate neutrality; is of the opinion that the partnerships under Horizon Europe, including the Joint Undertakings, will foster the collaboration between the public and the private sectors with the goal of contributing to the achievement of the green transition, while ensuring that innovations are sustainable, available, accessible and affordable; underlines the importance of improving SME access and participation to Horizon Europe calls and of better communication to and involvement of citizens about the results of European R&D projects and new technologies, including lighthouse projects, in order to increase public uptake and make the role of the Union more visible to its citizens;

92.  Welcomes the role of the Copernicus programme and new EU Knowledge Centre on Earth Observation for land, atmosphere and marine environment monitoring Service; underlines the importance of satellite observation capacities for monitoring, modelling, predicting and supporting policy-making on climate change;

93.  Highlights the need to attract more investment, both public and private, in the research, innovation and deployment of new sustainable technologies, including in labour-intensive industries, in necessary new infrastructure networks and projects contributing to the goals of the European Green Deal and the Paris Agreement; stresses that future research and technology should take into account sustainability and circularity; emphasises at the same time the importance of basic research, as well as of collaborative and transdisciplinary approaches in research and innovation (R&I), in addressing climate challenges; points, further to the need for supporting the social innovation that is essential to addressing unmet societal needs and challenges while empowering people during the green transition;

94.  Underlines the importance of ensuring coherence and consistency in incentives to foster innovative technologies to achieve the 2030 and 2050 targets, addressing the deployment of already mature technologies as well as investments in new technologies that need to be developed to reach the Union’s goal of climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest;

95.  Stresses the need for a twin transition, where the digital and green transitions go hand in hand; underlines the fundamental role that digital technologies can play in the Union’s green transition; recalls that the Union’s recovery requires the creation of a stable regulatory framework conducive to progress, including market-driven progress, in research, innovation and development of sustainable technologies, and the appropriate conditions for their financing;

96.  Underlines that digitalisation is one of the key factors driving energy system integration as it can enable dynamic and interlinked flows of energy carriers, allow for more diverse markets to be interconnected, and provide the necessary data to match supply and demand; highlights the potential of digital technologies to increase energy efficiency and thus reduce overall GHG emissions; highlights the need to ensure a secure regulatory framework with non-discriminatory and transparent procedures for access and transmission of energy data; recalls that the Commission estimates that the environmental footprint of ICT accounts for between 5 % and 9 % of global electricity use and more than 2 % of global GHG emissions; stresses that, according to a 2018 study on artificial intelligence by the Commission’s Joint Research Centre, data centres and data transmission could account for between 3 % and 4 % of the Union’s total electricity consumption; highlights that the Commission expects a 28 % increase in data centre consumption between 2018 and 2030; underlines that 47 % of digital carbon emissions are due to consumer equipment such as computers, smartphones, tablets and other connected objects; calls therefore for measures to reduce the carbon footprint of the ICT sector by ensuring energy and resource efficiency at network, data centre and consumer device level, and reiterates the goal of making data centres climate-neutral and highly energy efficient by no later than 2030, as stated in the digital strategy;

97.  Recalls the importance of R&I’s contribution to achieving the goals set out in the Paris Agreement and the objectives of the European Green Deal; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support research and innovation and an overall increase in EU and national budgets devoted to R&I in sustainable and safe energy technologies and innovation; calls on the Commission to consider further supporting technologies and innovative solutions that will contribute to a climate-proof and integrated energy system, including those where Europe has global leadership and domestic-based value chains; considers it is essential to have key segments of renewable energy value chains within the Union in order to achieve the climate goals and to bring significant economic benefits to Europeans, and calls for adequate measures to support the role of Europe-based content in the renewable energy sources supply chain and legislation;

Climate change and development

98.  Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to the implementation of policy coherence for development, especially in industrial, agricultural, fisheries, trade and investment policies; insists on a coherent approach to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in both internal and external policies;

99.  Calls on the Commission, the Member States and other G7 countries to develop and adopt Just Energy Transition Partnerships with developing countries and deliver new and additional investments to ensure a just transition in phasing out fossil fuels in developing countries; believes that these partnerships should mostly rely on non-debt-generating financing instruments;

100.  Stresses the importance of a human rights approach in climate action to ensure that all measures respect and support human rights of all people; urges the Parties to the UNFCCC to integrate the human rights dimension in their NDCs, their Adaptation Communication and their NAPs;

101.  Calls for development and climate policy to address inequality, pre-existing debt challenges and poverty, which are exacerbated by the negative impact of climate change;

Role of the European Parliament

102.  Believes, since it must give its consent to international agreements and plays a central role in the domestic implementation of the Paris Agreement as co-legislator, that it should be an integral part of the EU delegation; expects, therefore, to be allowed to attend EU coordination meetings at COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh and to be guaranteed access to all preparatory documents from the moment negotiations begin;

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o   o

103.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, with the request that it be circulated to all non-EU Parties to the Convention.

(1) OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 118. (2) OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 28. (3) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 156. (4) OJ L 114, 12.4.2022, p. 22. (5) OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 167. (6) OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1. (7) OJ C 270, 7.7.2021, p. 2. (8) OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 10. (9) OJ C 506, 15.12.2021, p. 38. (10) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0263. (11) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 25. (12) IPCC adaptation report, 2022. (13) UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, ‘The human costs of disasters: an overview of the last 20 years 2000–2019’, https://www.undrr.org/media/48008/download (14) https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health#:~:text=Climate%20change%20affects%20the%20social,malaria%2C%20diarrhoea%20and%20heat%20stress (15) International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, ‘Groundswell, Acting on Internal Climate Migration, Part II’, 2021 https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/36248 (16) Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP) and Oxfam, ‘Carbon Inequality in 2030’, November 2021 https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/621305/bn-carbon-inequality-2030-051121-en.pdf (17) Global Witness, ‘Last Line of Defence, The industries causing the climate crisis and attacks against land and environmental defenders’, September 2021 https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/last-line-defence/ (18) Mediterranean experts on climate and environmental change, ‘Risks associated to climate and environmental changes in the Mediterranean region’, 2019, https://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MedECC-Booklet_EN_WEB.pdf (19) WWF Mediterranean Marine Initiative, ‘The Climate Change Effect in the Mediterranean — Six stories from an Overheating Sea’, Rome, Italy, 2021. (20) https://www.klimazaloba.cz/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Klimaticka%CC%81-z%CC%8Caloba.pdf (21) Texts Adopted, P9_TA(2022)0248. (22) UNEP Global Methane Assessment 2021. (23) https://www.who.int/health-topics/one-health#tab=tab_1 (24) Transport & Environment, ‘Private jets: can the super-rich supercharge zero-emission aviation?’, April 2021. (25) Idem. (26) Resolution of 21 January 2021 on the EU Strategy for Gender Equality (OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 208). (27) IEA, ‘Market analysis and forecast from 2019 to 2024’, https://www.iea.org/reports/renewables-2019/power (28) Recalls that it is estimated that the economic potential of reducing final energy consumption for industry by 2030 is 23,5 % compared to business as usual. (29) Resolution of 16 February 2022 on a European strategy for offshore renewable energy (OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 66).

European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2022 on cultural solidarity with Ukraine and a joint emergency response mechanism for cultural recovery in Europe (2022/2759(RSP))

P9_TA(2022)0374 B9-0473/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular the Preamble thereto, Article 3 thereof and Protocol (No 2) thereto on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,

–  having regard to the Preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

–  having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine(1),

–  having regard to its recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine(2),

–  having regard to the statements on Ukraine by Parliament’s leaders of 16 and 24 February 2022,

–  having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 on the cultural recovery of Europe(3),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2021 on the situation of artists and the cultural recovery in the EU(4),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 May 2021 on the recovery, resilience and sustainability of the cultural and creative sectors,

–  having regard to the question to the Commission on cultural solidarity with Ukraine and a joint emergency response mechanism for cultural recovery in Europe (O‑000030/2022 – B9‑0026/2022),

–  having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Culture and Education,

A.  whereas Russia’s war against Ukraine is an attempt to eradicate the identity and culture of a sovereign nation, also through strategic and targeted acts of destruction on cultural heritage sites(5), constituting a war crime under the 1954 Hague Convention(6) to which both countries are signatories;

B.  whereas the attack against Ukraine is also an attack against our common European identity, our values and way of life, characterised by open societies based on democracy, respect for human rights, dignity, the rule of law and cultural diversity; whereas the extremely damaging consequences are being felt by millions of people across the world, ranging from loss of life to food shortages, shrinking global energy supplies and increasing inflation and migration flows; whereas Russia is using these intended consequences as political and strategic threats;

C.  whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine also puts at risk artists and cultural workers, journalists and academics, spreading a climate of fear and disbelief to the detriment of freedom of the arts, quality news, media independence and access to information, academic freedom and freedom of expression in the wider sense;

D.  whereas the illicit destruction of cultural heritage and the looting and smuggling of cultural property and artefacts represent a major threat to the identity of all Ukrainians and minorities within the country, and will hamper post-conflict national reconciliation;

E.  whereas the wide-ranging impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic took a considerable toll on all aspects of our life and living environment, especially on the entire cultural ecosystem, already characterised by fragile organisational and financial structures, and often precarious working conditions, as well as threats to freedom of artistic expression; whereas the cultural and creative sectors and industries (CCSI) have still not fully recovered from the COVID-19 crisis;

F.  whereas these major crises have not only challenged the Union’s strategic autonomy, but have also revealed its great potential to forge a strong sense of belonging to Europe, to come up with joint responses to pressing needs and consolidate support behind European integration;

G.  whereas culture remains an important vector of mutual understanding and peacekeeping among populations;

Reinforce support and solidarity towards the Ukrainian cultural ecosystem

1.  Welcomes the overall strong support by the EU and its Member States to the Ukrainian CCSI and the swift mobilisation of financial instruments by the Commission, government actors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society to support the artists and culture professionals who are fleeing the war, the cultural organisations of the countries receiving Ukrainian refugees, as well as the protection of cultural heritage; welcomes, in particular, the swift response initiatives such as the Culture of Solidarity Fund for Ukraine;

2.  Expresses its sincere solidarity with performers, artists, creators, authors, publishers, their companies and all other cultural creators and workers, including amateur creators, as art and culture will have a fundamental role to play in the healing and rebuilding of Ukraine; salutes in particular the action of the Ukrainian artists and creators who have acted in resistance to the Russian invasion by practising their art;

3.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to include the emergency needs of the culture and cultural heritage sectors within the EU’s humanitarian support to Ukraine; strongly believes that, in line with the historic decision of the European Council of 23 June 2022 to grant EU candidate status to Ukraine, dedicated support must also be allocated within the future Ukraine Trust Fund , endorsed by the Heads of State and Government in the European Council Conclusions of 24-25 March 2022;

4.  Urges the EU to offer targeted support to Ukrainian cultural actors, small and medium-sized enterprises, NGOs, local cultural activities, universities and civil society in designing and developing the country’s roadmap to reconstruction and recovery;

5.  Believes that the EU should offer its support to the Ukrainian authorities, in particular at the local and regional levels, together with civil society as a constructive partner in the reconstruction of the country and, in particular, in the restoration of cultural sites; in this regard, stresses that the EU should encourage those involved in the reconstruction to consider applying the highest quality standards; acknowledges that the New European Bauhaus has the potential to contribute to the post-war restoration with the involvement of the Ukrainian CCSI;

6.  Considers that special attention must be paid to the cultural and historical works present in Ukraine and the protection of the country’s cultural heritage; affirms the willingness of the European Union to participate in the preservation of works of art and cultural heritage through the application of all legal tools for the protection and the prevention of trafficking in or the illegal export of cultural heritage in times of war;

7.  Stresses the urgency of supporting Ukraine in documenting thoroughly all attacks on cultural heritage, especially those that constitute potential war crimes and are committed against cultural heritage protected by international conventions; recalls that in addition to the physical protection of monuments and artefacts, the EU should further strengthen support for the digitisation and digital documentation of cultural heritage;

8.  Considers that any financial support given to Ukraine in the cultural field should not jeopardise the funding made available to the CCSI in the European Union through the Creative Europe programme;

Supporting the resilience and post-crisis recovery of the EU’s cultural ecosystem as a whole

9.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to place a focus on culture in all key EU policies and priorities such as climate action, the digital transformation, economic recovery and international relations; invites the Commission to make further use of the multidimensional potential of the CCSI for the well-being of societies and citizens in Europe, and to proactively promote public cultural discourse with the aim of involving as many people as possible in the formation of public opinion and of fostering international cultural cooperation;

10.  Highlights the need to support and coordinate actions at all levels of governance and with both public and private stakeholders, including civil society and philanthropic actors, which include targeted support for the cultural, creative and cultural heritage ecosystems and for fair working conditions for their workers;

11.  Urges the Commission and the Member States to scale up their innovation capacity in terms of cooperation and public-private partnerships in order to increase resilience against future crises affecting the CCSI; in this context, urges the Commission and the Member States to further foster the digitalisation of the CCSI and ensure broad digital access to artistic and cultural creations;

12.  Calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of establishing or acting as a partner in a European emergency response and recovery mechanism dedicated specifically to the cultural, cultural heritage and creative ecosystems, based on a multi-stakeholder approach; invites the Commission to propose the legal and fiscal framework for such a mechanism and draw up a list of associate strategic partners from all sectors concerned, public or private and including philanthropic partnership models, in full compliance with the principle of additionality, in order to enable the strategic pooling of resources, thereby strengthening public funding and optimising support for the CCSI;

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13.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ C 125, 18.3.2022, p. 2. (2) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0235. (3) OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 152. (4) OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 88. (5) As of 21 September 2022, UNESCO has verified damage to 192 sites since 24 February 2022 – 81 religious sites, 13 museums, 37 historic buildings, 35 buildings dedicated to cultural activities, 17 monuments and 10 libraries. https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/damaged-cultural-sites-ukraine-verified-unesco (6) See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 8, paragraph 2(b) (ix).

European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2022 on the situation in Burkina Faso following the coup d’état (2022/2865(RSP))

P9_TA(2022)0375 RC-B9-0464/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions, in particular those of 19 December 2019 on violations of human rights including religious freedoms in Burkina Faso(1), of 16 September 2020 on EU-African security cooperation in the Sahel region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa(2), and of 17 February 2022 on the political crisis in Burkina Faso(3),

–  having regard to the statement by the Commissioner for International Partnerships, Jutta Urpilainen, on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 4 October 2022 in the European Parliament, Strasbourg, and the ensuing debate,

–  having regard to the statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 and 5 October 2022 on the coup d’état in Burkina Faso and the situation in the country,

–  having regard to the statements by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) of 30 September, 1 October and 2 October 2022 on the situation in Burkina Faso, and the ECOWAS mission to Burkina Faso of 4 October 2022,

–  having regard to the statement by the chairperson of the African Union Commission of 30 September 2022 condemning the second takeover of power by force in Burkina Faso,

–  having regard to the statement by the spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General of 1 October 2022 on the situation in Burkina Faso,

–  having regard to the UN Security Council statement of 7 October 2022 on the situation in Burkina Faso,

–  having regard to the ECOWAS protocol on democracy and good governance,

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 March 2020 entitled ‘Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa’ (JOIN(2020)0004),

–  having regard to the resolution of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and the EU of 11 March 2021 on democracy and the respect for constitutions in EU and ACP countries,

–  having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and in particular SDG 16 on the promotion of just, peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

–  having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,

–  having regard to the Constitution of the Republic of Burkina Faso,

–  having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000(4) (the Cotonou Agreement),

–  having regard to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,

–  having regard to the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa,

–  having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979,

–  having regard to the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas on 30 September 2022, members of the Burkina Faso military, led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, carried out a coup d’état, overthrowing President Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba; whereas former President Damiba had seized power in a coup on 24 January 2022 that overthrew President Roch Kaboré, who had been democratically elected in November 2020; whereas like former President Damiba before him, the current President Ibrahim Traoré justified the coup by citing the authorities’ inability to curb the deterioration of the security situation;

B.  whereas after the January 2022 coup, under the mediation of ECOWAS, the military agreed to a transition period until July 2024, when democratic elections are to be held; whereas the EU strongly supported ECOWAS in its mediation efforts and made considerable efforts to boost cooperation, including on defence and security; whereas ECOWAS has condemned the September 2022 coup in Burkina Faso and deems it inappropriate in the light of the progress that had been made in efforts to ensure an orderly return to constitutional order by 1 July 2024; whereas the September 2022 coup has also been denounced by the African Union, the EU and the UN;

C.  whereas according to a disinformation campaign, former President Damiba had taken shelter under French protection, which was immediately and strongly denied by the French authorities, as well as by both former President Damiba himself and the current President Ibrahim Traoré; whereas in the wake of the coup, demonstrations broke out against France and in favour of increased military cooperation with Russia; whereas the French embassy and consulate in Ouagadougou have been vandalised, alongside the Institut Français offices in Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso; whereas several other attacks have been witnessed in the country against European institutions and symbols;

D.  whereas on 2 October 2022, former President Damiba tendered his resignation as president after mediation with traditional chieftains; whereas he made his resignation subject to seven conditions, among them the need to uphold the agreement with ECOWAS during a transition period of 24 months; whereas the current President Ibrahim Traoré accepted all of these conditions;

E.  whereas on 4 October 2022, ECOWAS deployed a fact-finding mission into the September 2022 coup and held talks with the new leadership; whereas after a meeting with the ECOWAS delegation, President Traoré stated his intention to respect the transition timeline agreed between his predecessor and ECOWAS; whereas President Traoré also undertook to honour Burkina Faso’s international commitments, particularly regarding the protection of human rights;

F.  whereas on 15 October 2022, Captain Ibrahim Traoré was unanimously appointed as president by the ‘National Assises’ and the transitional charter was adopted;

G.  whereas the constitution, first suspended after 30 September 2022, was reinstated by the Fundamental Act adopted by the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR) on 5 October 2022, which ensures respect for international agreements to which Burkina Faso is a party and guaranteed the continuity of the state pending the subsequent adoption of the transitional charter;

H.  whereas on 7 October 2022, President Traoré met all of the diplomatic corps in Ouagadougou to reaffirm his willingness to cooperate with all of Burkina Faso’s partners; whereas President Traoré has made statements that Burkina Faso considers the EU just ‘one of many’ partners;

I.  whereas Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Russian private military company the Wagner Group, welcomed the September coup; whereas the Wagner Group continues to expand its activities in the Sahel region and Western Africa and is known to have perpetrated numerous war crimes in the region;

J.  whereas since 2015, Burkina Faso has been caught up in an escalating wave of violence attributed to fighters of groups such as the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), which is aligned with al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), killing thousands of people; whereas on 26 September 2022, 37 people were killed in an attack on a supply convoy near Gaskindé; whereas a group affiliated with al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack, which is considered one of the triggers of the recent coup, and in which 70 truck drivers went missing according to their trade union; whereas approximately 40 % of Burkina Faso’s territory is currently exposed to violence committed by armed rebel groups and a lack of food, water, electricity and basic healthcare as a result of the blockade imposed by such groups; whereas Operation Barkhane in the Sahel region has been called into question by parts of the population and some political leaders;

K.  whereas 1,9 million people have been displaced as a consequence of the worsening security situation in the country, more than half of whom are children; whereas among internally displaced people, threats to women and young people are particularly severe, including sexual and labour exploitation, gender-based violence, forced recruitment and trafficking; whereas the presence of internally displaced people and refugees may lead to conflict with the local population over scarce natural resources if no adequate measures are taken to provide housing, employment and food;

L.  whereas training of Burkinabe personnel was being carried out in the context of the EU Training Mission in Mali and EU Capacity-Building Mission in the Sahel, but was suspended after the September 2022 coup and has not achieved its primary objective;

M.  whereas as of October 2022, 4,9 million people are in need of humanitarian aid in Burkina Faso, including 3,4 million people who face severe food insecurity;

N.  whereas discontent and criticism had been growing over previous governments’ lack of capacity to tackle the enormous security, social and economic challenges in Burkina Faso caused by the spread of terrorist attacks;

O.  whereas more than EUR 1 billion was allocated to Burkina Faso for the period 2014‑2020 through all of the EU’s funding instruments; whereas under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), EU support is scheduled to amount to EUR 384 million for the period 2021-2024;

P.  whereas what happens in the Sahel region matters to and has consequences for both the rest of Africa and Europe; whereas Burkina Faso is of key regional importance, as it is strategically located as a bridge between the Sahel and the coastal states of Western Africa;

1.  Condemns the military coup of 30 September 2022 in Burkina Faso; regrets that this action undermines the recent progress made towards an orderly return to constitutional order;

2.  Calls on the next government to meet its undertaking to honour the country’s international commitments, including those related to the promotion and protection of human rights; urges the next government to allow people, including all minority groups, to exercise their civil and political rights, including their right to freedom of assembly, association and expression; is extremely concerned that allegations of human rights violations continue to be reported;

3.  Demands an urgent return to constitutional order, including an immediate return to civilian government; calls on the next government to meet its commitment to respect the timetable agreed upon for a rapid return to constitutional order and inclusive and transparent elections by 1 July 2024; expresses its full support to ECOWAS and the African Union for their mediation efforts and declares its readiness to support these efforts wherever possible; calls on the international community, including the EU, to back these efforts and to offer their support to ensure a safe transition; expresses its support for election observers in Burkina Faso and an EU electoral observation mission;

4.  Urges the next government to advance a true, honest, transparent and inclusive national dialogue, with the active and effective participation of all sectors of civil society, aimed at outlining a clear future vision for Burkinabe democracy and fostering a more inclusive and cohesive society; calls for the increased inclusion and active participation of women in decision-making and in peace-building and reconciliation efforts;

5.  Urges the next government to redefine its security response, in full partnership with the international community, in a manner that respects the rule of law, protects human rights and rebuilds public trust; underlines, in this regard, that the ongoing national consultation is an opportunity to implement substantial security sector reforms;

6.  Expresses its sympathy and condolences to the people of Burkina Faso, who have suffered too many violent attacks often committed by jihadist groups; underlines that the EU stands with Burkina Faso and its people and is ready to intensify its engagement; stresses that the Burkinabe leadership must create the conditions to allow for such an enhanced partnership;

7.  Condemns the attacks against the French embassy and consulate, the Institut Français and other European institutions and symbols across Burkina Faso during and after the coup; urges the next government to respect the country’s international legal obligations to protect diplomatic staff and premises, and to ensure the safety of foreign nationals living in the country; expresses its concern about the rise in Russian disinformation campaigns against EU missions and operations in Africa;

8.  Urges all the relevant parties to respect freedom of the press and the media and to allow journalists and media organisations to carry out their work freely and in safety, including documenting the situation of internally displaced people and security force operations;

9.  Urges the authorities to ensure the protection of human rights defenders and civil society organisations in the exercise of their mandate; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their protection and support for human rights defenders in Burkina Faso; condemns the use of sexual violence and all forms of intimidation in conflict situations;

10.  Urges the next government to conduct prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into all deaths and injuries related to the coup, including those that occurred during looting and demonstrations, and to ensure independent and impartial justice and accountability for victims and survivors;

11.  Is deeply concerned about the activities of the Wagner Group in the region; strongly advises the next government against pursuing any kind of partnership with the Wagner Group; firmly believes that the involvement of private security companies accused of gross human rights violations would run counter to the objective of bringing peace, security and stability to Burkina Faso; points to the very negative track record of Russian engagement in Mali where, as a result of impunity and failed military tactics, the population is now suffering from increased terrorist threats as well as human rights violations by mercenaries; urges the EU and African countries to ensure judicial actions, including criminal sanctions, for human rights violations resulting from the activities of private military and security companies;

12.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their financial support and humanitarian aid in order to meet the urgent needs of the people of Burkina Faso, and in particular the needs of displaced persons and refugees in neighbouring countries; calls on the next government to support and facilitate the work of humanitarian organisations in Burkina Faso by ensuring unhindered humanitarian access; expresses concern over the impact of security threats on the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation;

13.  Asks the EU and its Member States, when formulating their policies on the Sahel, to take account of the essential need to support good governance, civil society, development and investments for a more positive future for Sahelian communities, and to conduct an impact assessment into the G5 Sahel; calls for the EU and its Member States to work with ECOWAS, the transitional authorities and all stakeholders in Burkina Faso to strengthen security cooperation, development, education and climate change adaptation efforts in order to tackle poverty and prevent further radicalisation;

14.  Calls on the international community, including the EU, to urgently evaluate, in coordination with their international partners and the relevant international institutions, all the means available to avoid any default on debt payments by Burkina Faso;

15.  Observes a decrease in support for EU peace-building and development cooperation activities in the region; calls on the Commission to step up its engagement in support of human rights and humanitarian and development cooperation, and to increase the visibility of these activities;

16.  Calls on the Member States to comply with their international obligations and implement a thorough check and tracing system for their arms exports in order to avoid their misuse and the fuelling of human rights violations;

17.  Urges the EU to promote Burkina Faso’s right to food sovereignty as a means of achieving nutritional security and poverty reduction, devoting particular attention to women and family farming, with the aim of securing the supply of affordable and accessible food;

18.  Expresses its concern that the increasing political and security instability and the dire socio-economic and humanitarian situation in Burkina Faso has provided an opportunity for terrorist groups to wreak havoc and has profound international consequences; underlines that terrorism and instability across the Sahel region are challenging and undermining democratic consolidation and the rule of law; recalls that tackling the structural dynamics behind the current challenges is essential to reinforce the popular legitimacy of democratically elected governments; calls for the international community, including the EU, to increase cooperation and support in addressing all of these challenges;

19.  Acknowledges and pays tribute to the religious and traditional leaders in Burkina Faso, who have played a key mediating role and have been active players in denying violence and hatred during the various crises in the country; calls on the Burkinabe leadership to increase protection for minorities, including religious minorities;

20.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the authorities of the Republic of Burkina Faso, the Secretariat of the G5 Sahel, the Co-Chairs of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly and the Pan-African Parliament, the Economic Community of West African States, the UN Secretary-General, the UN General Assembly, and the African Union and its institutions.

(1) OJ C 255, 29.6.2021, p. 45. (2) OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 24. (3) OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 290. (4) OJ L 317, 15.12.2000, p. 3.