European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the humanitarian consequences of the blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh (2023/2504(RSP))

P9_TA(2023)0012 RC-B9-0075/2023

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Armenia and Azerbaijan,

–  having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the only road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia and the outside world, the Lachin corridor, has been blocked by self-proclaimed environmentalists from Azerbaijan since 12 December 2022; whereas this has disrupted access to essential goods and services, including food, fuel and medication, for the 120 000 Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh, effectively placing them under a blockade;

B.  whereas the blockade has led to a severe humanitarian crisis, significantly affecting the most vulnerable populations; whereas the transfer of critically ill patients is nearly impossible, with one death resulting from this situation; whereas hundreds of families remain separated;

C.  whereas this humanitarian crisis was further aggravated by Azerbaijan’s disruption of the natural gas supply to Nagorno-Karabakh, which left houses, hospitals and schools without heating;

D.  whereas by sustaining the blockade of the Lachin corridor, Azerbaijan is breaching its international obligations under the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020, under which Azerbaijan must guarantee the security of persons, vehicles and cargo moving along the corridor in both directions;

E.  whereas the impediments to the use of the Lachin corridor set back the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan and undermine international confidence;

1.  Deplores the tragic humanitarian consequences of the blockade of the Lachin corridor and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict;

2.  Urges Azerbaijan to respect and implement the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020 and immediately reopen the Lachin corridor to enable freedom of movement and ensure access to essential goods and services, thus guaranteeing security in the region and safeguarding residents’ livelihoods;

3.  Underlines the need for a comprehensive peace agreement, which must guarantee the rights and security of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population; calls on Azerbaijan to protect the rights of Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh and refrain from its inflammatory rhetoric that calls for discrimination against Armenians and urges Armenians to leave Nagorno-Karabakh;

4.  Urges Azerbaijan to refrain from undermining the functioning of transport, energy and communication connections between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in future;

5.  Strongly condemns Azerbaijan’s scapegoating of human rights defenders and CSOs and calls on EU and Member State representations to support their work;

6.  Condemns the inaction of Russian ‘peacekeepers’; considers that their replacement with OSCE international peacekeepers, under a UN mandate, should be negotiated urgently;

7.  Calls for international organisations to be granted unimpeded access to Nagorno-Karabakh to assess the situation and provide the necessary humanitarian assistance;

8.  Calls for a UN or OSCE fact-finding mission to the Lachin corridor to assess the humanitarian situation on the ground;

9.  Calls for the urgent resumption, without preconditions, of negotiations based on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act;

10.  Urges the EU to be actively involved and ensure that the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh are no longer held hostage by Baku’s activism, Russia’s destructive role and the Minsk Group’s inactivity;

11.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe and the Presidents, Governments and Parliaments of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the storming of the Brazilian democratic institutions (2023/2505(RSP))

P9_TA(2023)0013 RC-B9-0058/2023

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas on 8 January 2023, thousands of far-right extremists and supporters of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro stormed and vandalised the National Congress, Supreme Court and Alvorada Palace in Brasília, calling for military intervention to overthrow President Lula da Silva; whereas ex-President Bolsonaro’s former Justice Minister, Anderson Torres, has been arrested and the Governor of the Federal District (which includes Brasília), Ibaneis Rocha, has been suspended;

B.  whereas violent attacks on democratic institutions by the far right are a global phenomenon; whereas the events in Brasília represent a flagrant attack on Brazilian democratic institutions and display clear similarities with the assault on the US Capitol in 2021; whereas former US President Donald Trump and ex-President Bolsonaro played an instrumental role in these respective events;

C.  whereas social media platforms continue to fail to moderate or constrain the diffusion of anti-democratic campaigns, transnational fascism and extremism, especially through algorithms promoting hateful content and disinformation and an unwillingness to remove illegal content, and played a fundamental role in these events by amplifying aggressive rhetoric and violence and facilitating mobilisation and the spread of disinformation;

1.  Condemns in the strongest terms the criminal actions perpetrated by supporters of ex-President Bolsonaro and supports the ongoing efforts to ensure a prompt, impartial, proper and effective investigation in order to identify, prosecute and hold accountable all those involved, including the instigators, organisers and financial backers, as well as state institutions that failed to act to prevent these attacks;

2.  Expresses solidarity with democratically elected President Lula da Silva, his government and Brazilian institutions;

3.  Deplores the attempts by ex-President Bolsonaro and some of his political supporters to discredit the voting system and the electoral authorities, despite there being no evidence of electoral fraud, and urges them to accept the democratic outcome of the elections;

4.  Acknowledges the connection between rising transnational fascism, racism, extremism and, among others, the events in Brasília, the storming of the US Capitol in January 2021 and the arrests in December 2022 concerning a planned attack on Germany’s Bundestag;

5.  Highlights that on 13 January 2023, the Supreme Court approved a request from federal prosecutors to investigate ex-President Bolsonaro as he ‘may have contributed, in a very relevant way, to the occurrence of criminal and terrorist acts’; expresses concern about the acts and omissions of public officials, in particular the Governor and Military Police of the Federal District;

6.  Stresses the importance of legislative frameworks, such as the Digital Services Act, regulating social media platforms and tech companies, to effectively combat and prevent the online spread of hate speech and misinformation and thereby avoid further radicalisation;

7.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of Brazil.

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the situation of journalists in Morocco, notably the case of Omar Radi (2023/2506(RSP))

P9_TA(2023)0014 RC-B9-0057/2023

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Rule 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas independent investigative journalist Omar Radi, who covered Hirak protests and state corruption scandals, has been detained since July 2020 and sentenced to six years in prison on trumped-up charges of espionage, as well as on rape charges in July 2021; whereas his sentence was upheld on appeal in March 2022; whereas numerous due process guarantees were violated, rendering the trial inherently unfair and biased; whereas these violations included prolonged pre-trial detention of one year without justification and prevention of access to his case file and two key defence witnesses, who were prevented from appearing in court; whereas Mr Radi has appealed to the Court of Cassation; whereas he was awarded the 2022 Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Prize;

B.  whereas journalist Taoufik Bouachrine has been detained since February 2018 and was sentenced on appeal in September 2021 to 15 years in prison for sexual offences; whereas there were major violations of due process guarantees in the case of Soulaimane Raissouni, who in February 2022 received a five-year prison sentence for sexual offences in an unfair trial;

C.  whereas press freedom in Morocco has been continuously deteriorating, dropping to 135th place in the 2022 World Press Freedom Index; whereas numerous journalists, e.g. Ignacio Cembrero, have been under digital surveillance, been intimidated and judicially harassed, and sentenced to long prison sentences, e.g. Maati Monjib;

D.  whereas in 2020 Reporters Without Borders raised concerns with the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls regarding the misuse of sexual assault charges to discredit journalists, a worrying practice also condemned by the feminist organisation Khmissa and Morocco’s Association for Human Rights;

1.  Urges the Moroccan authorities to respect freedom of expression and media freedom, guarantee imprisoned journalists, in particular Omar Radi, Soulaimane Raissouni and Taoufik Bouachrine, a fair trial with all due process guarantees, secure their immediate provisional release and cease the harassment of all journalists, their lawyers and families; urges the authorities to fulfil their international human rights obligations in line with the EU-Morocco Association Agreement;

2.  Strongly condemns the misuse of allegations of sexual assault to deter journalists from performing their duties; believes that this misuse endangers women’s rights;

3.  Is deeply concerned about allegations that the Moroccan authorities have corrupted Members of the European Parliament; calls for the application of the same measures as applied to representatives of Qatar; reiterates its commitment to fully investigate and address cases of corruption involving non-EU countries seeking to buy influence in the European Parliament;

4.  Underlines that its resolution of 15 December 2022 called for a special committee tasked with identifying potential flaws in the European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity and corruption and making proposals for reforms;

5.  Urges the Moroccan authorities to end their surveillance of journalists, including via NSO’s Pegasus spyware, and to enact and implement legislation to protect them; urges Member States to stop exporting surveillance technology to Morocco, in line with the Dual-Use Regulation;

6.  Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of 2018 Sakharov Prize finalist Nasser Zefzafi; calls for the release of all political prisoners; condemns the violations of the rights of peaceful protesters and diaspora activists; deplores the flawed trials and convictions of 43 Hirak protesters, as well as their torture in prison;

7.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue raising with the Moroccan authorities the cases of detained journalists and prisoners of conscience and attend their trials; calls for the EU to use its leverage towards concrete improvements in the human rights situation in Morocco;

8.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Government and Parliament of Morocco.

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine (2022/3017(RSP))

P9_TA(2023)0015 RC-B9-0063/2023

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia, in particular those of 19 May 2022 on the fight against impunity for war crimes in Ukraine(1) and of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism(2),

–  having regard to the London Declaration of 13 January 1942,

–  having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

–  having regard to UN General Assembly Resolutions 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 on the Definition of Aggression and 377 (V) (the Uniting for Peace resolution) of 3 November 1950,

–  having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in particular Article 8 bis thereof and the Kampala Amendments on the crime of aggression thereto, and to the 2006 Agreement between the ICC and the EU on cooperation and assistance,

–  having regard to Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolutions 2433 (2022), 2436 (2022), 2463 (2022) and 2473 (2022),

–  having regard to the order of the International Court of Justice of 16 March 2022 on Allegations of Genocide Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

–  having regard to the resolution entitled ‘The Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its people, and its threat to security across the OSCE region’ adopted at the 29th annual session of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly from 2 to 6 July 2022,

–  having regard to the joint statement by the Foreign Affairs Ministers of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania of 16 October 2022 calling for the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine,

–  having regard to the UN General Assembly resolutions of 2 March 2022 entitled ‘Aggression against Ukraine’ and of 12 October 2022 entitled ‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations’,

–  having regard to the UN General Assembly resolutions of 2 November 2022 entitled ‘Report of the International Criminal Court’ and of 14 November 2022 entitled ‘Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine’,

–  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 and 21 October 2022 and of 15 December 2022,

–  having regard to the statement of the President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen of 30 November 2022 on Russian accountability and the use of Russian frozen assets, in which she makes reference to the need to set up a specialised court to investigate and prosecute Russia’s crime of aggression against Ukraine backed by the UN, and to subsequent related high-level statements from Germany, Poland and other countries,

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas in line with the UN Charter and the principles of international law, all states enjoy equal sovereignty and must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state;

B.  whereas since February 2014, Russia has waged an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, which it relaunched on 24 February 2022 with a massive invasion of Ukraine;

C.  whereas the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter, the fundamental principles of international law and various international agreements, such as the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the Budapest Memorandum;

D.  whereas during this time, Russia’s forces have conducted indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, have killed thousands of Ukrainian civilians and have carried out acts of terror throughout the country targeting civilian infrastructure;

E.  whereas thousands of civilians, including children, have already been murdered and many more tortured, harassed, sexually assaulted, kidnapped or forcibly displaced; whereas this inhumane conduct by the Russian forces and their proxies is in total disregard of international humanitarian law;

F.  whereas the reported atrocities committed by the Russian armed forces in Bucha, Irpin and many other Ukrainian towns during the Russian occupation reveal the brutality of the war of aggression waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine and underscore the importance of coordinated international action to establish accountability for the crime of aggression and all violations of international humanitarian law;

G.  whereas on 30 September 2022, Russia unilaterally declared its annexation of the partly Russian-occupied Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia;

H.  whereas the Russian Federation has been recognised by the European Parliament and many national parliaments and assemblies as a state sponsor of terrorism and as a state which uses means of terrorism;

I.  whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is the most outrageous act of aggression conducted by the political leadership of a given country in Europe since 1945 and thus requires an adequate legal response at the international level; whereas in its resolutions(3), the UN General Assembly has recognised ‘the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine’ to be ‘in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter’ and that ‘the Russian Federation must be held to account for any violations of international law in or against Ukraine, including its aggression in violation of the Charter of the United Nations’; whereas those responsible for committing the crime of aggression against Ukraine must not go unpunished;

J.  whereas Russia’s aggression has also been explicitly denounced by representatives of various states and international organisations, such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union, the Economic Community of Western African States, the Pacific Islands Forum, the Organization of American States, the Caribbean Community, the Nordic Council and others;

K.  whereas on 16 March 2022, the International Court of Justice ordered the Russian Federation to immediately suspend its military operations in the territory of Ukraine;

L.  whereas since 2 March 2022, the Prosecutor of the ICC has been conducting an investigation into the situation in Ukraine in relation to past and present allegations of crimes committed by the Russian Federation since 21 November 2013, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity; whereas although Ukraine is not a party to the ICC, it has acknowledged the jurisdiction of the ICC and is cooperating with it;

M.  whereas UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 defines aggression as ‘the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations’ and states that a ‘war of aggression is a crime against international peace’ and that ‘aggression gives rise to international responsibility’; whereas Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute defines the ‘crime of aggression’ as ‘the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations’; whereas an ‘act of aggression’ means the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the UN Charter; whereas according to the Rome Statute of the ICC, the crime of aggression is different from war crimes or crimes against humanity; whereas the crime of aggression is generally a leadership crime in that it can only be committed by those with the power to shape a state’s policy of aggression; whereas the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which focused on the crime of aggression, ruled in 1946 that aggression was ‘the supreme international crime’;

N.  whereas a war of aggression is a grave international crime, especially in the context of the possible use of all types of weapons of mass destruction leading to catastrophic consequences for world peace and human livelihood, as well as severe, long-term damage to the natural environment and climate;

O.  whereas in the Barcelona Traction case, the International Court of Justice indicated that the obligations derived from outlawing acts of aggression are obligations towards the international community as a whole as opposed to towards individual states;

P.  whereas the ICC, following two ad hoc declarations by Ukraine, has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide committed on the territory of Ukraine since November 2013, but does not have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, as defined in Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute and the Kampala Amendments, in this situation, because neither Ukraine nor the Russian Federation have ratified the Rome Statute and the amendments related to the crime of aggression; whereas the Prosecutor of the IСС has been conducting an investigation into the situation in Ukraine since 2 March 2022; whereas the establishment of a special tribunal on the crime of aggression will not affect the jurisdiction of the ICC over other crimes, and will instead complement it;

Q.  whereas the European Parliament and the Parliaments of Czechia, Estonia, France, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Poland have adopted resolutions supporting the establishment of the ad hoc international special tribunal;

R.  whereas on 30 November 2022, the Commission presented alternative options on how to establish an accountability mechanism for the crime of aggression against Ukraine; whereas any decision on such a mechanism should be taken in close cooperation with Ukraine;

S.  whereas in its conclusions of 15 December 2022, the European Council encouraged further efforts to ensure full accountability for war crimes and to secure accountability for the crime of aggression and invited the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Council to take this work forward, in accordance with EU and international law, stressing that the prosecution of the crime of aggression is of concern to the international community as a whole;

T.  whereas the UN Security Council is paralysed over the situation in Ukraine owing to Russia’s ability to veto any substantive action; whereas UN General Assembly Resolution 377 (V) set a precedent by providing the UN with an alternative avenue for action when at least one permanent member of the UN Security Council uses its veto to obstruct the Security Council from carrying out its functions as mandated by the UN Charter;

1.  Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, its unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and its call on Russia to immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine and unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine;

2.  Emphasises that the Russian crime of aggression against Ukraine is a clear and undisputed breach of the UN Charter, which, in the interests of global security and the rules-based international order, cannot remain unanswered by the international community; reiterates its call on the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States to support full accountability for all crimes committed by Russia and its allies and proxies during their war of aggression against Ukraine;

3.  Underscores the urgent need for the EU and its Member States, in close cooperation with Ukraine and the international community, preferably through the UN, to push for the creation of a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression against Ukraine perpetrated by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies and to find a legally sound, common way forward on this matter; believes that establishing such a tribunal would fill the large gap in the current institutional international criminal justice set-up and should be based on the standards and principles that apply to the ICC as set out in the Rome Statute;

4.  Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to work in close cooperation with Ukraine to seek and build political support in the UN General Assembly and other international forums, including the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the G7, for creating the special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine;

5.  Considers that the establishment of the special tribunal would complement the investigative efforts of the ICC and its Prosecutor, as it would focus on alleged genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Ukraine; reiterates its full support for the ongoing investigation by the Prosecutor of the ICC into the situation in Ukraine; underlines the importance of Ukraine ratifying the Rome Statute of the ICC and its amendments and formally becoming a member of the ICC;

6.  Calls for the active use of EU public diplomacy and strategic communication in support of the creation of the special tribunal;

7.  Underlines that, while the exact composition and methods of operation of the special tribunal remain to be determined, they will have to respect the highest criteria on transparency and impartiality; deems, furthermore, that the special international tribunal must have jurisdiction to investigate not only Vladimir Putin and the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation, but also Aliaksandr Lukashenka and the political and military leadership in Belarus, as an enabling state, from the territory of which and with the logistic support of which the Russian Federation is committing its war of aggression against Ukraine, as it falls under the description of a crime of aggression according to Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute;

8.  Emphasises that the EU’s preparatory work on the special tribunal should begin without delay, focus on establishing the arrangements for the special tribunal in cooperation with Ukraine and support Ukrainian and international authorities in securing evidence to be used in the future special tribunal;

9.  Calls for the EU institutions, in particular the Commission and the European External Action Service, to provide support in the meantime for the establishment of an interim prosecutor and notes that setting up this office would be a very important practical step forward in the investigation and prosecution by the future special tribunal of the crime of aggression against Ukraine;

10.  Condemns the Russian practice of blocking any action at UN level aimed at holding it accountable for the war of aggression against Ukraine;

11.  Emphasises the important role of a special tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine in seeking justice for the Ukrainian people, in deterring other international actors from imitating Russia’s illegal aggression and in facilitating the claim for reparations and any future reconciliation;

12.  Invites the EU and the Member States, as well as their partners and allies, to engage in discussion on the legal possibility of using sovereign assets of the Russian state as reparations for the violations of international law by Russia in Ukraine, including potentially by denying such assets the protections of sovereign immunity or limiting such protections owing to the gross nature of these violations;

13.  Strongly believes that the establishment of this special tribunal for the crime of aggression would send a very clear signal to both Russian society and the international community that Putin and the Russian political and military leadership can be convicted for the crime of aggression in Ukraine; underscores that the establishment of this tribunal would also be a clear signal to the political and business elite in Russia and Russian allies that it is no longer feasible for the Russian Federation under Putin’s leadership to return to ‘business as usual’ with the West;

14.  Supports the UN General Assembly recommendation as the first step towards the establishment by UN member states, in cooperation with Ukraine, of an international register of damage to serve as a record for future reparations for damage, loss or injury to all natural and legal persons concerned, and the long-term, widespread and severe damage to the natural environment and the climate, as well as to the state of Ukraine, caused by the internationally wrongful acts of the Russian Federation and its allies in or against Ukraine, as well as to promote and coordinate evidence gathering;

15.  Calls for the EU to adopt a common position on the crime of aggression and on the Kampala Amendments on the crime of aggression to the ICC’s Rome Statute; calls on Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary and Romania to accept and ratify the Kampala Amendments;

16.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Criminal Court, the G7 countries, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Pacific Islands Forum, the Organization of American States, the Caribbean Community, the Belarussian authorities, the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation, and the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine.

(1) OJ C 479, 16.12.2022, p. 68. (2) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0405. (3) UN General Assembly resolutions of 2 March 2022 entitled ‘Aggression against Ukraine’, of 24 March 2022 entitled ‘Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine’ and of 15 November 2022 entitled ‘Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine’.

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the EU response to the protests and executions in Iran (2023/2511(RSP))

P9_TA(2023)0016 RC-B9-0066/2023

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Iran, in particular those of 6 October 2022 on the death of Jina Mahsa Amini and the repression of women’s rights protesters in Iran(1) and of 17 February 2022 on the death penalty in Iran(2), as well as all its other resolutions on the human rights situation in Iran,

–  having regard to the UN General Assembly Third Committee resolution of 16 November 2022 on Human Rights in Iran,

–  having regard to the statement by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 10 January 2023,

–  having regard to the statement by the UN Experts of 11 November 2022 calling on Iran to stop sentencing peaceful protesters to death,

–  having regard to the special session of the UN Human Rights Council on the Islamic Republic of Iran, which took place on 24 November 2022, and the resolution adopted at that session,

–  having regard to the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran of 22 September 2022, 18 June 2022, 13 January 2022, and 11 January 2021,

–  having regard to the G7 foreign ministers’ statement of 4 November 2022,

–  having regard to the EU Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 12 December 2022,

–  having regard to the sanctions against Iranian individuals and entities adopted by the Council of the EU on 12 April 2021, 17 October 2022, 20 October 2022 and 14 November 2022 and to Council implementing decision (CFSP) 2022/2433 of 12 December 2022(3),

–  having regard to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s sanctions against European and British entities and individuals,

–  having regard to the statements of the European External Action Service (EEAS) spokesperson of 7 January 2023 on the recent executions of Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, of 8 December 2022 on the execution of Mohsen Sekari and of 15 January 2023 on the execution of Mr Alireza Akbari,

–  having regard to the declaration by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU on Iran of 25 September 2022 and the statement by the European External Action Service spokesperson of 19 September 2022 on the death of Jina Mahsa Amini,

–  having regard to the press release of the EEAS spokesperson of 9 January 2023 announcing the summoning of the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the European Union,

–  having regard to the statements of the Chair of its Delegation for Relations with Iran of 22 September 2022, 9 November 2022 and 13 December 2022,

–  having regard to the joint statement by Canada and the United States of 9 December 2022 on the human rights situation in Iran,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR), and to Iran’s ratification thereof in June 1975,

–  having regard to the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime,

–  having regard to Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism(4),

–  having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism(5),

–  having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA(6),

–  having regard to the EU guidelines on the death penalty, on human rights defenders and on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas on 13 September 2022, 22-year old Kurdish Iranian woman Jina Mahsa Amini was arrested in Tehran by Iran’s ‘morality’ police for an alleged failure to observe the mandatory veiling law; whereas Jina Mahsa Amini was brutally tortured and died on 16 September 2022 while in police custody; whereas a proper investigation has not been concluded;

B.  whereas, following the killing of Jina Mahsa Amini, nation-wide protests broke out across the country, involving hundreds of thousands of Iranian citizens representing all segments of society; whereas the protests were initiated by women demanding accountability for the death of Jina Mahsa Amini and calling for an end to violence and discrimination against women in Iran; whereas during the protests, many women have taken off their hijabs or cut their hair in protest at Jina Mahsa Amini’s death; whereas the women’s protests inspired solidarity from men, sparking a pan-Iranian revolution and a protest movement against the regime; whereas students are protesting at numerous universities across the country by boycotting their classes and demonstrating against repression; whereas Jina Mahsa Amini was from the Kurdistan region of Iran, in which protests have been widespread and have met with a repressive response from the regime;

C.  whereas the response of the Iranian security and police forces to the protests is violent, indiscriminate, disproportionate and unrestrained; whereas the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei, and President Ebrahim Raisi have repeatedly expressed praise for, and encouraged, the violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations and the killing of protesters by the paramilitary Basij militia of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);

D.  whereas, as of 16 January 2023, Iranian security forces had reportedly killed several hundreds of peaceful protesters, including dozens of children, and detained, arrested and abducted more than 20 000 demonstrators, among them human rights defenders, students, lawyers and civil society activists, including EU citizens and residents from Germany, Poland, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden;

E.  whereas Iran does not recognise dual nationality, thereby limiting the access that foreign embassies have to their dual nationals held in the country; whereas ex-deputy Iranian Defence Minister Alireza Akbari, a holder of British and Iranian dual nationality, was convicted of spying for the United Kingdom in Iran, which he denied, sentenced to death and executed; whereas Swedish-Iranian national Dr Ahmadreza Djalali, who specialises in emergency medicine and is a scholar at Belgium’s Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Italy’s Università del Piemonte Orientale, was arrested on 24 April 2016 by the Iranian security forces; whereas he was sentenced to death on spurious espionage charges in October 2017 following a grossly unfair trial based on a confession extracted under torture; whereas the sentence was upheld by Iran’s Supreme Court on 17 June 2018; whereas Franco-Iranian researcher Fariba Adelkhah was arrested in June 2019 and sentenced to five years in prison for ‘undermining national security’;

F.  whereas other EU nationals are being arbitrarily detained in Iran, including the Belgian national Olivier Vandecasteele, who was sentenced to a total of 40 years in prison and dozens of lashes on the basis of a series of fabricated allegations; whereas the sentence was handed down after Belgium’s highest court suspended a controversial bilateral treaty on prisoner exchanges that would have allowed Iranian diplomat Assadollah Assadi, convicted of attempted terrorism in Belgium, to be sent back to the Islamic Republic of Iran in return for Olivier Vandecasteele’s freedom; whereas seven French citizens are still being detained in Iran, including Cécile Kohler, a teacher and trade unionist, and her partner Jacques Paris, as well as Benjamin Brière, who were arrested in May 2020 and sentenced to eight years and eight months in prison for ‘espionage’;

G.  whereas Iran has the world’s highest number of executions per capita; whereas the Iranian regime has imposed and carried out death sentences against peaceful protesters, including minors, following unfair and summary judicial proceedings violating the most basic and fundamental requirements of a fair trial; whereas Amnesty International has found evidence that the Iranian regime continues to wield the death penalty as a weapon of repression to crush protest; whereas the police and security forces of the Islamic Republic perpetrate widespread torture, rape, and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment against detainees in Iranian prisons;

H.  whereas Amnesty International has compiled a list of approximately 25 individuals who are at serious risk of execution, notably Mohammad Ghobadlou; whereas Amnesty International raises fears that many more people could face the death penalty for their participation in the protests; whereas the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reports that more than 40 Iranian artists have been charged with crimes carrying the death penalty; whereas Iranian actors, musicians, athletes and other celebrities have publicly backed the protests against the clerical establishment;

I.  whereas the human rights situation in Iran is continuing to deteriorate; whereas the killing of Jina Mahsa Amini and others, as well as the current wave of executions, are illustrative of the ongoing human rights crisis in Iran; whereas this deterioration is perpetuated by the systemic impunity of the Iranian regime and its security apparatus, which has permitted widespread torture as well as extrajudicial executions and other unlawful killings; whereas the Iranian criminal justice system relies heavily on forced confessions extracted through torture and other forms of coercion and constraint; whereas the worldwide abolition of the death penalty is one of the main objectives of the EU’s human rights policy;

J.  whereas, in blatant violation of the separation of powers, on 6 November 2022, 227 members of the Iranian parliament called on the judiciary to act decisively against people arrested during the protests and to make use of the death penalty as a punishment;

K.  whereas the Iranian Constitution grants ethnic minorities equal rights; whereas the death penalty is disproportionately applied to LGBTIQ+ people and those belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, notably the Baluch, Kurds, Arabs, Baha’is and Christians; whereas an increasing number of human rights defenders have been arrested since the killings and the crackdown started; whereas women and girls, who have been at the forefront of protests, including members of ethnic and religious minorities, have been arrested and jailed for demanding an end to systemic and systematic discriminatory laws, policies and practices, and are being particularly targeted with charges carrying the death penalty and with death sentences;

L.  whereas a group of human rights experts, including several UN Special Procedures mandate-holders, have issued a statement condemning the killings and the crackdown by security forces in Iran on protesters; whereas the experts conveyed their deep concerns about the ‘excessive and lethal force’ used against demonstrators in the protests that followed Ms Amini’s death, including sexual violence against women and girls, intimidation and harassment against protesters, and systematic impunity for perpetrators of human rights violations; whereas the UN Experts urged the Iranian regime on 11 November 2022 to stop indicting people with charges punishable by death for their participation, or alleged participation, in peaceful demonstrations;

M.  whereas the UN Experts called on the Human Rights Council to urgently take the necessary actions to hold a special session on the situation in Iran and to establish an international investigative mechanism, to ensure accountability in Iran and to end the persistent impunity for grave human rights violations; whereas the Human Rights Council held a special session on 24 November 2022 on the situation in Iran; whereas at this special session it was agreed that an independent international fact-finding mission should investigate human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran, collect and analyse evidence and engage with stakeholders to establish the facts surrounding these allegations with a view to bringing all perpetrators of severe human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the highest authorities, to justice;

N.  whereas the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights indicated on 10 January 2023 that the weaponisation of criminal procedures to punish people for exercising their basic rights amounts to state sanctioned killing;

O.  whereas the EU foreign affairs ministers adopted Council conclusions on Iran on 12 December 2022; whereas these conclusions notably call on the Iranian authorities to immediately abolish the deplorable practice of imposing and carrying out death sentences against protesters as well as to annul without delay the recent death penalty sentences pronounced in the context of the ongoing protests and ensure that due process is provided to all detainees;

P.  whereas on 9 January 2023, the Secretary-General of the EEAS summoned the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the European Union, on behalf of the High Representative, to reiterate the EU’s abhorrence at the recent executions of Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, who were arrested and sentenced to death in connection with the protests in Iran; whereas Mohsen Shekari and Majidreza Rahnavard were executed for their participation in the protests on 8 and 12 December 2022, respectively;

Q.  whereas Canada and the United States issued a joint statement on 9 December 2022 condemning the Islamic Republic of Iran’s brutal acts of violence against peaceful protesters and the ongoing repression of the Iranian people and the oppression and state-sponsored violence against women; whereas both countries further adopted sanctions against Iranian officials connected to human rights abuses, including those committed as part of the ongoing brutal crackdown;

R.  whereas the EU has recently and on several occasions adopted restrictive measures related to these blatant violations of human rights, notably against high-ranking individuals within the IRGC, including asset freezes, bans on travel to the EU and a prohibition on making funds or economic resources available for the listed individuals and entities in response to their role in the violent crackdown in Iran and the Islamic Republic’s provision of armed drones used in terrorist activities perpetrated by the Russian Federation against Ukraine; whereas the list of those subject to EU restrictive measures in the context of the existing Iran human rights sanctions regime now comprises a total of 126 individuals and 11 entities; whereas the EU sanctions list notably includes Iran’s Minister of Interior, Ahmad Vahidi, its Minister of Information and Communications Technology, Issa Zarepour, the Iranian law enforcement forces and the provincial heads of the IRGC;

S.  whereas, as a reciprocal action, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran adopted counter-measures under the sanctions mechanism which notably target Ms Neumann, Member of the European Parliament and Chair of the Delegation for Relations with the Arab Peninsula, as well as other Members and German and French former politicians; whereas in response to Iran’s sanctions on Members of the European Parliament, in November 2022 Parliament decided that its delegations and committees will no longer engage with the Iranian authorities;

T.  whereas the Islamic Republic, in particular through the IRGC, engages in large-scale, sophisticated and violent transnational repression activities targeting exiled and diaspora activists, dissidents, independent journalists, and human rights defenders, including on EU soil, as well as threatening and harassing their family members in Iran; whereas the Islamic Republic, both directly and by acting through local proxies, has assassinated diaspora dissidents, kidnapped exiles for abduction to Iran, and plotted bomb attacks in several countries, including EU Member States;

U.  whereas the regime of the Islamic Republic is deliberately disrupting internet and mobile connections and severely restricting social media platforms to undermine the ability of the Iranian population to organise protests; whereas the EU sanctions regime also includes a ban on exports to the Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment which might be used for internal repression and of equipment for monitoring telecommunications;

V.  whereas Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell, in his statements of 8 December 2022 and 7 January 2023, condemned the execution of Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyyed Mohammad Hossein; whereas his statements call on the Iranian authorities to immediately end the practice of imposing and carrying out death sentences against protesters; whereas, in these statements, the EU further calls on the Iranian authorities to annul without delay the recent death sentences and to strictly abide by their international obligations;

W.  whereas the Islamic Republic has accused Kurdish groups, including those inside Iraq, of inciting protests in Iranian Kurdistan; whereas, under this pretext, the IRGC has launched armed attacks against the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, killing dozens, including civilians; whereas the crackdown on the protests has been especially severe in northwest and southeast Iran, where many members of the country’s Kurdish and Baluch minorities live;

X.  whereas the IRGC, comprised of the paramilitary Basij militia, the Quds Force, the Ground Forces, the Aerospace Force and the Navy, plays a central role in the repression of internal dissent and external military activity; whereas the IRGC, acting as a state within a state, reportedly controls two thirds of the Iranian economy, including holdings in the infrastructure, petrochemicals, financial, telecommunications, automotive, and marine industry sectors, as well as sizeable patronage trusts known as ‘bonyads’ and large-scale illicit smuggling networks;

Y.  whereas women and girls are brutally murdered in Iran in so-called ‘honour killings’; whereas victims often receive no justice in crimes committed against them in the name of ‘honour’;

Z.  whereas the IRGC perpetrates, guides and contributes to terrorist activity both domestically and regionally; whereas the Russian aggression against Ukraine has resulted in the deepening of Tehran’s relations with Moscow;

AA.  whereas the aggressive interior policy of the Mullah regime is emulated in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy; whereas the regime contributes to destabilising the whole Middle East region and beyond;

AB.  whereas Ebrahim Raisi, who was elected President of Iran in June 2021 and is on the US sanctions list, previously served as chief of the Iranian judiciary, despite having a well-documented record of grave human rights violations; whereas Ebrahim Raisi’s victory was engineered by the Islamic Republic’s institutions in elections that were not fully free or fair; whereas only 7 out of 592 candidates received the green light from the Guardian Council to run for the presidency; whereas none of the candidates were women, persons from minority groups or those who held views opposed to the regime’s;

AC.  whereas negotiations on the renewal of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have still not been officially suspended; whereas talks continue on the safeguards probe that was launched by the International Atomic Energy Agency after it found traces of uranium at three undeclared sites in Iran;

1.  Condemns in the strongest terms the death sentences against and executions of peaceful protesters in Iran, notably Mohsen Shekari, Majidreza Rahnavard, Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini; demands that the Iranian authorities immediately and unconditionally halt any plans to carry out executions and refrain from seeking further death sentences; calls on the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran to establish an official moratorium on executions with the objective of abolishing the death penalty completely; urges the Iranian authorities to quash all convictions and death sentences; reiterates its firm and principled opposition to the use of capital punishment at all times and in all circumstances;

2.  Urges the authorities of the Islamic Republic to ensure the immediate and unconditional release of all protesters sentenced to death, including Mohammed Boroughani, Mohammad Ghobadlou, Hamid Ghare Hassanlou, Mahan Sadrat Marani, Hossein Mohammadi, Manouchehr Mehman Navaz, Sahand Nourmohammad-Zadeh, Saman Seydi, Reza Arya, Saleh Mirhashemi Baltaghi, Saeed Yaqoubi Kordafli, Javad Rouhi, Arshia Takdastan, and Mehdi Mohammadifard, Saleh Mirhashemi, Majid Kazemi and Saeid Yaghoubi; strongly condemns the fact that the criminal proceedings and the death penalty have been weaponised by the Iranian regime to stamp out dissent and to punish people for exercising their basic rights; calls on the Islamic Republic to review its legal code and eliminate moharebeh (‘enmity against God’) and mofsed-e-filarz (‘corruption on earth’) as punishable offences;

3.  Expresses its solidarity with the Iranian youth, women and men, including minorities, leading and participating in the protests; supports the peaceful protest movement across the country against the systemic and increasing oppression and against the severe and mass violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms; strongly supports the aspirations of the Iranian people to live in a free, stable, inclusive and democratic country; condemns the Iranian regime’s systematic discrimination against women through laws and regulations that severely restrict their freedoms, lives and livelihoods;

4.  Extends its condolences to the families of all those who have been killed, tortured, abducted or unlawfully imprisoned following the recent and previous protests in Iran;

5.  Reiterates its strong condemnation of the widespread, brutal, intentional and disproportionate use of force by the Iranian security forces against peaceful protesters; calls on the Iranian authorities to put an end to the crackdown on their own citizens; recalls that the right to peaceful assembly must be ensured;

6.  Demands that the international community and the EU and its Member States use all engagements with the authorities of the Islamic Republic to demand an immediate end to the execution of protesters and violent crackdown against protests, and the unconditional release of all those arrested for exercising their right to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly; calls on the EEAS and Member States to continue holding the Iranian regime accountable for the killing of its own people and grave human rights violations;

7.  Calls on the Iranian regime to allow for an international, impartial and effective investigation into the regime’s human rights abuses, including Jina Mahsa Amini’s killing, the killing of hundreds of protesters, and torture and ill-treatment suffered by those arbitrarily detained, to be conducted by an independent competent authority in cooperation with international organisations; demands that the Iranian authorities allow for a swift, evidence-based, impartial and effective investigation into all killings of protesters and that those responsible be brought to justice; underlines that the EU should continue to address the killing of Jina Mahsa Amini and the way the Iranian security forces have responded to the ensuing demonstrations;

8.  Urges the immediate release of all individuals detained for their involvement in peaceful demonstrations, and all political prisoners; calls for targeted restrictive measures to be imposed under Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 on all judges issuing sentences against protesters; further demands that the Iranian authorities immediately and unconditionally drop all charges against anyone who is imprisoned solely for peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly in connection with the protests; calls on the Iranian authorities to live up to their international obligations, including those under the ICCPR;

9.  Welcomes the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 12 December 2022 and the adoption of the recent restrictive measures against those involved in the violence against protesters and against all those associated with the ‘morality’ police, who are found complicit in or responsible for the death of Jina Mahsa Amini; considers, nevertheless, that the Iranian regime’s blatant disregard for the human dignity and democratic aspirations of its own citizens as well as its support to the Russian Federation necessitate further adjustments in the EU’s position towards Iran;

10.  Calls on the VP/HR and the Council to expand the EU sanctions list to all individuals and entities responsible for human rights violations and their family members, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Ebrahim Raisi, and Prosecutor General Mohammad Jafar Montazeri, as well as all foundations (‘bonyads’) linked to the IRGC, notably the Bonyad Mostazafan and the Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan; calls also on the VP/HR, the Council and the Member States to consider sanctions against the 227 Members of the Iranian parliament who encouraged the use of death sentences; welcomes the ongoing preparation in the United Kingdom for the inclusion of the IRGC on the UK list of terrorist organisations; vigorously condemns the sanctions imposed by the Iranian authorities against German and French former politicians as well as against Members of the European Parliament; recalls that as long as European parliamentarians are sanctioned by the authorities, the inter-parliamentary dialogue should remain suspended;

11.  Calls on the Council and the Member States to add the IRGC and its subsidiary forces, including the paramilitary Basij militia and the Quds Force, to the EU terrorist list, and to ban any economic and financial activity involving businesses and commercial activities related to, owned, wholly or in part, by, or fronting for, the IRGC or IRGC-affiliated individuals, regardless of their country of operation, while avoiding any adverse consequences for the people of Iran as well as for EU humanitarian and development aid; calls for the EU and its Member States, in cooperation with like-minded partners, to urge any country in which the IRGC deploys military, economic, or informational operations to sever and outlaw ties with the IRGC; strongly condemns the IRGC’s unprovoked attack in the Erbil Governorate of Iraqi Kurdistan and stresses that such indiscriminate attacks threaten innocent civilians and the region’s stability;

12.  Reiterates its strong condemnation of the rapidly deteriorating human rights situation in Iran, for which the Islamic Republic, its highest leadership and its security forces, including the IRGC, hold sole responsibility; demands that the Iranian authorities respect ethnic and religious minorities and LGBTIQ+ people’s fundamental rights and freedoms; calls on the Iranian authorities to eliminate all forms of discrimination;

13.  Welcomes the establishment of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, mandated by the UN Human Rights Council in resolution S35/1 of 24 November 2022 to investigate human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran and collect and analyse related evidence, and calls for its swift deployment; urges the authorities of the Islamic Republic to provide the fact-finding mission with full and unimpeded access to carry out its mandate and to refrain from harassing and intimidating those, or the family members of those, who cooperate with the fact-finding mission; calls for the EU and its Member States to fully support preparations for, and the implementation of, the fact-finding mission; urges the UN Human Rights Council to immediately refer the Iranian case to the UN Security Council in the absence of cooperation from the Islamic Republic;

14.  Further asks the Iranian authorities to allow visits of all Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council, and particularly to ensure that the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran is allowed to enter the country;

15.  Demands that the Iranian regime release all human rights defenders; asks the Iranian regime to cease targeting all human rights defenders in Iran and to guarantee, in all circumstances, their ability to carry out their legitimate human rights activities without fear of reprisals and free from all restrictions, including judicial harassment;

16.  Condemns the arrest of dozens of journalists and calls on the Iranian authorities to release them immediately; is deeply concerned about the arrest of more than 80 media workers, including Niloofar Hamedi, the journalist who first broke the news about Jina Mahsa Amini’s arrest and hospitalisation, and calls on the Iranian authorities to free them without delay; calls on the Islamic Republic to respect the freedom of expression and belief of everyone living in Iran; expresses its concern about the criminalisation of and violence against medical professionals by the security forces and calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide civilian medical personnel with all available assistance so they can provide impartial medical aid;

17.  Condemns in the strongest terms the systematic use of torture, including sexual violence as a weapon, in Iranian prisons and calls for the immediate cessation of all forms of torture and ill-treatment of all detainees; strongly condemns the Islamic Republic’s policy of forcing confessions using torture, intimidation, threats against family members or other forms of duress, and the use of these forced confessions to convict and sentence protesters; further condemns the practice of denying detainees access to phone calls and family visits; expresses grave concerns about detainees’ inability to access legal representation during interrogations; calls on the Iranian regime to treat prisoners with the respect due to their inherent dignity and value as human beings; reiterates its call on Iran to ratify without delay the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and to act in full accordance with the provisions contained therein;

18.  Urges the Iranian authorities to immediately release all EU nationals arrested and drop all charges against them; strongly condemns the sentencing of Belgian national and non-governmental organisation (NGO) staffer, Olivier Vandecasteele, to 40 years in prison, 74 lashes, and a fine amounting to EUR 1 million on fabricated espionage charges, and the continued imprisonment of, and death sentence issued against, Swedish national Ahmadreza Djalali, as well as the Islamic Republic’s cynical use of hostage diplomacy to force the release of convicted terrorist Asadollah Asadi; calls for the immediate and unconditional release and safe repatriation of Ahmadreza Djalali and Olivier Vandecasteele and the seven French citizens still detained in Iran including Cécile Kohler; condemns in the strongest terms the execution in Iran of Iranian-British national Alireza Akbari; expresses further concern about the public threats by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security against European embassies;

19.  Calls on Member States and NGOs to store, preserve and share any available evidence that may contribute to investigations, and to cooperate with and support the work of the International Criminal Court; urges the Iranian authorities to take steps to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; stresses that the continuous and grave human rights violations being committed by the Iranian regime against its own people jeopardise the negotiations on the JCPOA;

20.  Strongly condemns the Islamic Republic’s continued practice of shutting down internet and mobile networks in the context of protests in the country, which prevents communication and the free flow of information for Iranian citizens; underscores that such actions are a clear violation of international law; welcomes the various EU restrictive measures enacted under the sanctions mechanism in response to the repression, notably those targeting individuals and entities active in the area of information and communications technology and those responsible for disinformation; further welcomes the addition of the Iranian minister of information and communications technology to the EU sanctions list; calls on the Commission to consider, in compliance with the principle of necessity, allowing EU-based communications providers to offer safe tools to the citizens and residents of Iran;

21.  Calls on the Member States to commit to enabling Iranians to access a free internet in spite of the regime’s massive internet censorship; suggests that the necessary technical and financial resources could be provided through an EU fund;

22.  Urges all Member States to exercise universal jurisdiction over all Iranian officials reasonably suspected of criminal responsibility for crimes under international law and other grave violations of human rights; urges those Member States whose domestic legislation does not yet provide for the enactment of the principle of universal jurisdiction to introduce such legislation without delay;

23.  Calls for the expansion of restrictive measures in the light of the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to provide unmanned aerial vehicles and plans to provide surface-to-surface missiles to the Russian Federation for use against Ukraine; stresses that the Islamic Republic is contributing to war crimes in Ukraine, as these weapons are being used to target civilians and civilian infrastructure;

24.  Calls on the Commission and the Council to close all loopholes in the enforcement of existing sanctions, including financial loopholes, to ensure their strict implementation and to closely coordinate and cooperate with international partners for effective implementation of restrictive measures;

25.  Expresses deep concern over the structural transnational repression carried out by the authorities of the Islamic Republic, which includes espionage, assassinations, attempted bomb attacks, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and other control efforts, in particular by its embassies and the IRGC, against the Iranian diaspora living in the EU, which stifles the freedom of speech and of expression of EU citizens and residents, endangers their safety, and amounts to malign interference; calls on the EU and the Member States to expand protections for the Iranian diaspora against the Islamic Republic’s transnational repression; calls on the EEAS and the Member States to find avenues for providing technical and capacity support to those helping Iranian civil society while ensuring Iranian ownership of these activities;

26.  Condemns the recent attacks by Iranian officials against the newspaper Charlie Hebdo and welcomes the launch of the investigation into the cyberattack on the newspaper following the publication of satirical cartoons;

27.  Calls for the EU, including the VP/HR, to continue raising human rights concerns with the Iranian authorities in bilateral and multilateral forums and to use all planned engagements with the Iranian authorities for that purpose, in particular in the context of the EU-Iran High Level Political Dialogue; reaffirms that respect for human rights is a core component in the development of EU-Iran relations;

28.  Reiterates its call on all Member States to jointly make public statements and undertake diplomatic initiatives to monitor unfair trials and visit prisons where EU hostages in Iran, human rights defenders and other prisoners of conscience are being detained; encourages stronger coordination among the EU embassies accredited in Tehran; urges all Member States with a diplomatic presence in Tehran to use the mechanisms provided for in the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders to support and provide assistance to the individuals sentenced to death and to those unlawfully condemned and arrested; urges the Member States to ensure that prisoners are able to receive visitors and to carefully monitor their detention conditions;

29.  Urges the Iranian authorities to grant independent observers from Member States’ embassies in Iran access to all trials connected to the protests; asks the Member States to monitor all trials connected with the protests, with particular attention to capital trials, and to publicly denounce their flaws;

30.  Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States, in cooperation with like-minded partners, to extend and enhance tangible support for the democratic aspirations of the people of Iran, notably by enhancing support for independent human rights and civil society organisations, as well as independent media platforms, and by supporting the efforts of like-minded partners to maintain internet connectivity in Iran; encourages the democratic opposition of Iran to pursue greater unity where possible, on the basis of shared values and with the involvement of exiled and diaspora Iranians, in order to facilitate further support by the international community; urges the EU and its Member States to increase their strategic communications directed towards the Iranian people, notably by enhancing the mandate of the EEAS StratCom Task Force South to include the Islamic Republic and by substantially increasing its funding and visibility;

31.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to facilitate the issuance of visas to any person who has a well-founded fear of persecution for peacefully exercising his or her right to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly in connection with the demonstrations in Iran; calls on the EEAS to reach out to Iran’s immediate neighbours to ensure that border crossings remain open to activists fleeing Iran and to ensure that these individuals can safely apply for asylum in Europe from these countries;

32.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Office of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0352. (2) OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 286. (3) Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/2433 of 12 December 2022 implementing Decision 2011/235/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Iran (OJ L 318 I, 12.12.2022, p. 36). (4) OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93. (5) OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 70. (6) OJ L 88, 31.3.2017, p. 6.

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – Annual Report 2021 (2022/2153(INI))

P9_TA(2023)0017 A9-0294/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the European Investment Bank (EIB) activity report 2021 entitled ‘The Innovation Response’, published on 27 January 2022,

–  having regard to the EIB Financial Report 2021 and the EIB report on financing and borrowing activities 2021, both published on 5 May 2022,

–  having regard to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2021, published on 20 January 2021,

–  having regard to the EIB Investment Report 2020/2021: Building a smart and green Europe in the COVID-19 era, published on 21 January 2021,

–  having regard to the implementation plan for the EIB Group Climate Bank Roadmap 2021-2025, adopted by the EIB’s Board of Directors on 14 November 2020 and published on 14 December 2020,

–  having regard to the EIB Climate Strategy, adopted in November 2020 and published on 15 November 2020,

–  having regard to the EIB Group Sustainability Report 2021, published on 6 July 2022,

–  having regard to the EIB Group Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework, adopted on 2 February 2022,

–  having regard to the EIB Audit Committee Annual Reports for the year 2021, published on 21 July 2022,

–  having regard to the EIB Fraud Investigations Activity Report 2021, published on 7 July 2022,

–  having regard to the Annual Report of the Procurement Complaints Activity and the Procurement Complaints Committee of the European Investment Bank 2021, published on 7 April 2022,

–  having regard to the working arrangement signed by the EIB, the European Investment Fund (EIF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office on 7 December 2021,

–  having regard to the EIB Compliance Activity Report 2021, published on 25 August 2022,

–  having regard to the EIB Group PATH Framework – Supporting counterparties on their pathways to align with the Paris Agreement (Paris Alignment for Counterparties framework), published on 26 October 2021,

–  having regard to the EIB Group Anti-Fraud Policy, published on 5 August 2021,

–  having regard to the 2020 Annual Report of the EIB Ethics and Compliance Committee, published on 8 April 2022, and to the Committee’s operating rules,

–  having regard to the codes of conduct for EIB Group staff, for members of its Audit Committee and for its Management Committee,

–  having regard to the EIB Group’s Risk Management Disclosure Report 2021, published on 9 August 2022,

–  having regard to the EIB’s Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the Tripartite Agreement between the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and the European Investment Bank (the Tripartite Agreement), which came into force in November 2021,

–  having regard to the EIB Group Transparency Policy, published on 18 November 2021, and to its whistleblowing policy, published on 24 November 2021,

–   having regard to the new EIB Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027, published on 13 October 2021,

–  having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2022 on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2020(1),

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0294/2022),

A.  whereas the EIB Group consists of the EIB and the EIF, is the biggest multilateral financial institution in the world and one of the largest providers of climate finance; whereas the EIB focuses on the priority areas of climate and environment, development, innovation and skills, small and medium-sized enterprises, infrastructure and cohesion; whereas the EIF supports small and medium-sized enterprises with financing for entrepreneurship, growth, innovation and research, employment and regional development;

B.  whereas the EIB is required by the treaties to contribute to EU integration, as well as to the balanced and steady development of the internal market, taking into account public policy goals such as social cohesion and sustainable development, in order to address inequalities by providing better conditions for accessing jobs and education opportunities, public infrastructures and services, and promoting a healthy and sustainable environment;

C.  whereas the EIB is bound by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; whereas human rights principles are integrated into its due diligence procedures and standards, including publicly available ex-ante assessments;

D.  whereas EIB investments have the capacity to support the social sector, including health, housing and education;

E.  whereas territorial and social cohesion, sustainable development and tackling unemployment, poverty and social exclusion should be at the heart of the EIB’s activity; whereas sustainability is required to be integrated into any lending, borrowing and advisory activities because the EIB’s remit is to foster sustainable growth within the European Union and abroad; whereas support for cohesion is enshrined in its Statute and the EIB’s investments aim at contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market;

F.  whereas the EIB plays a key role as the EU climate bank in the fight against the global emergencies of climate change, environmental degradation and biodiversity loss; whereas the EIB is committed to aligning all of its activities to the Paris Agreement in order to increase the annual financing for climate action and environmental sustainability to more than 50 % of total lending by 2025; whereas it is committed to investing at least EUR 1 trillion in climate financing over the next decade;

G.  whereas the Guarantee Agreement with the EIB Group (EIB and EIF) under InvestEU was negotiated in 2021 and at the beginning of 2022 and was signed on 7 March 2022;

H.  whereas the Member States may entrust to the EIB the implementation of financial instruments which they use to invest Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds into eligible projects; whereas the EIB may offer further financing and dedicated advisory support to the Member States for investing their RRF funds;

I.  whereas the EIB contributes to implementing the political and economic goals of the European Union and supports the Union’s external action priorities in all regions around the world, including in politically sensitive countries in the Eastern and Mediterranean Neighbourhood regions;

J.  whereas the EIB is the largest multilateral lender in the EU Neighbourhood regions, covering the Eastern Neighbourhood countries, the Western Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa; whereas the EIB runs operations outside the European Union through a network of nearly 30 external offices located in Africa, Latin America and Asia;

K.  whereas the EIB Group works closely with the EU institutions and other partners to support the Union’s objectives and policy priorities; whereas, in particular in the framework of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2021-2027, the EIB Group works in conjunction with the Commission and with national promotional banks and institutions and development finance institutions; whereas in order to achieve the principles and goals of the Paris Agreement by the end of 2020, the EIB Group worked in coordination with the European External Action Service and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development;

L.  whereas the EIB is at the forefront of tackling the COVID-19 crisis in the European Union and has made a considerable effort to offer additional support in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by establishing the new Pan-European Guarantee Fund (EGF) to provide capital for SMEs, which have been hit particularly hard by the effects of the crisis;

M.  whereas the EIB’s AAA rating is necessary to ensure appropriate market sources of financing at the most preferential rates and must therefore be preserved;

N.  whereas the EIB’s business model requires the highest levels of integrity, transparency, accountability and good governance, as well as adequate measures to effectively and efficiently combat all forms of money laundering, the financing of terrorism, organised crime and harmful tax practices, as well as the types of prohibited conduct identified in its recently reviewed Anti-Fraud Policy;

Performance of the EIB’s financial transactions

1.  Underlines that the EIB is a leading issuer and continuously contributes to innovations and developments in the capital markets while promoting the most rigorous standards;

2.  Remarks that on 31 December 2021 the total EIB Group balance sheet stood at EUR 568 billion, which was an increase of EUR 11,9 billion compared to 31 December 2020;

3.  Notes that in 2021 the bank’s new lending signatures amounted to EUR 65,4 billion, in line with the target set in the Operational Plan 2021 and close to the results of the previous years (EUR 66,1 billion in 2020 and EUR 63,3 billion in 2019); acknowledges that EUR 54,3 billion of this amount was under the bank’s own resources (compared to EUR 64,6 billion in 2020, also under the bank’s own resources);

4.  Points out that, as in previous years, the biggest share was allocated in Italy, France and Spain (16 %, 14 % and 12 % of the total signatures respectively) and that, as in previous years, the transport, global loans and energy sectors received the largest shares (30,2 %, 18,5 % and 14,8 % respectively);

5.  Remarks that the total disbursements amounted to EUR 41,4 billion in 2021, of which EUR 40,4 billion was under the bank’s own resources (in 2020, disbursements amounted to EUR 58,3 billion, of which EUR 56,8 billion was under the bank’s own resources);

6.  Observes that since 31 December 2021 the outstanding volume of signed loans has slightly decreased to EUR 556,4 billion (from EUR 558,7 and EUR 560,3 billion respectively in 2020 and 2019), 82 % of which was for projects within the EU (82,2 % in 2020 and 81,4 % in 2019); notes that the EIB’s disbursed loan portfolio amounted to EUR 433,4 billion, compared to EUR 444,6 and EUR 447,5 billion at the end of 2020 and 2019 respectively;

7.  Underlines that the above financing trend in 2021 reflects the EIB’s increasing focus on using third-party funds in the European Union, such as transactions deployed under the EGF and decentralised financial instruments, which complement the EIB’s own resources and enable it to increase the overall volume of higher-risk transactions; remarks that the EIB only accepts taking credit, market and liquidity risk in line with its risk appetite and public mission;

8.  Notes that in 2021 the EIB was the largest multilateral development bank issuer of green and sustainability use-of-proceeds bonds, reaffirming its role as leader in the global green and sustainability bond markets, with a new record of EUR 11,5 billion in climate and sustainability awareness bonds (against EUR 10,5 billion equivalent issuance in sustainability debt products in 2020); notes also that this increased the sustainability funding share in its total funding to 21 % from 15 % in 2020 (considering both climate awareness bonds and sustainability awareness bonds – CABs and SABs);

9.  Appreciates the report entitled ‘Evaluation of the EIB’s Climate Awareness Bonds’, adopted in March 2021 by the EIB’s Board of Directors; understands that the CABs and SABs will be gradually aligned with the forthcoming EU Green Bond Standard (EU GBS);

10.  Is aware that the EIB raises long-term funds through bond issuance on the international capital markets to meet its lending needs; notes that during 2021 the EIB raised the equivalent of EUR 55,3 billion in 21 currencies;

11.  Takes note that the EIB generates income by financing large volumes of loans at a low margin and that on 31 December 2021 it reported a net profit of EUR 2,5 billion, which was an increase in comparison to EUR 1,7 billion and EUR 2,4 billion in 2020 and 2019 respectively;

12.  Remarks that, because profits are retained to support the EIB’s operations, the bank’s consistent profitability has led to the build-up of considerable reserves over the years; welcomes the fact that the reserves have increased from EUR 73,5 billion at the end of 2020 to EUR 76,1 billion at the end of 2021;

13.  Notes that the overall loan portfolio continued to perform well, with only 0,3 % impaired loans at the end of 2021 (compared with 0,4 % at the end of both 2020 and 2019); observes that the portion of payments overdue by more than 90 days remains very low, totalling EUR 116,3 million at the end of 2021 (compared with EUR 117,1 million and EUR 146,0 million at the end of 2020 and 2019 respectively) and, as in previous years, representing only 0,03 % of the risk portfolio;

14.  Welcomes the Board of Directors’ approval on 15 December 2021 of the EIB Group Operational Plan 2022-2024; appreciates that the new Operational Plan confirms the EIB’s alignment with the EU’s political priorities and its commitment to step up its ambition for the digital and green transitions;

15.  Remarks that the Operational Plan reflects the anticipated borrowing needed to achieve its operational targets and that the Board of Directors has authorised global borrowing of up to EUR 50 billion for 2022; notes, furthermore, that the EIB has announced a funding programme expected to amount to EUR 45 billion;

16.  Calls on the EIB to play an active role in supporting projects that contribute to the just transition, such as research, innovation, digitalisation, SMEs’ access to finance, social investment and skills;

Actions related to the COVID-19 pandemic

17.  Stresses that the European Union’s 2021-2027 long-term budget (EUR 1,2 trillion in current prices), together with the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) temporary recovery instrument (EUR 806,9 billion in current prices), are an unprecedented and unique response aimed at helping to repair the economic and social damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and facilitating the digital and green transitions;

18.  Notes that, in 2021, the various pandemic waves disrupted the activities of many of the bank’s clients, including SMEs and large companies as well as financial institutions, which resulted in reductions in volumes and disbursements;

19.  Remarks that the COVID-19 pandemic has not materially affected the quality of the EIB’s loan portfolio thanks to its credit risk management strategy;

20.  Notes with appreciation that despite the general context of uncertainty in the global financial markets caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the EIB continues to maintain a robust liquidity position and the highest credit rating;

21.  Notes that, in 2021, the EIB approved 109 stand-alone transactions aiming to respond directly to the COVID-19 crisis totalling EUR 12,9 billion (out of a total approved volume of EUR 55,8 billion); points out that since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic the EIB Group has approved almost EUR 72 billion in targeted support for the public health sector, the delivery of vaccines and for businesses which have been severely hit by the crisis;

22.  Underlines the significant support provided by the EIB via the EGF, which complements other actions taken at EU level to tackle the pandemic and post-pandemic crises; appreciates that this support acts as an incentive for financial intermediaries to lend more to companies and under better conditions, thereby helping businesses to access advantageous financing rapidly in order to overcome pandemic-related issues; expresses concerns about the lack of transparency around the EGF, which may result in the near impossibility of assessing whether the fund has actually benefited the European economy;

23.  Notes that the EGF enabled the EIB Group to scale up its support for mostly European SMEs, providing up to EUR 200 billion in additional financing; congratulates the EIB Group for having reached many businesses across the European Union; underlines that projects totalling EUR 23,2 billion have been approved since 31 December 2021 (of which EUR 18,1 billion has already been signed) and that this is expected to mobilise total investments of EUR 174,4 billion;

24.  Appreciates that the EUR 6,0 billion increase in the EIB healthcare pipeline enabled investments in the healthcare sector and medical infrastructures, as well as research, vaccine and treatment-related financing; notes that on 31 December 2021, loans signed under this pipeline amounted to EUR 5,4 billion, part of which related to COVID-19 vaccine research;

EIB support in key policy areas

25.  Notes that the InvestEU programme, the successor to the European Fund for Strategic Investments, is to be deployed under the 2021-2027 MFF and that the EIB will also be the key implementing partner, responsible for managing 75 % of the overall budget of the mandate; understands that over the 2021-2027 period, InvestEU’s EUR 26,2 billion guarantee, with provisioning from the MFF and NGEU, is expected to mobilise more than EUR 372 billion in additional private and public investment in Europe, mainly for sustainable infrastructure, research innovation, digitalisation, SMEs’ access to finance, social investment and skills;

26.  Calls on the EIB to respect the EU priorities supported by InvestEU and to ensure strong protection of the EU’s financial interests; expects the EIB to report to Parliament about its activities and investments related to the InvestEU programme in 2022;

27.  Stresses that Europe’s 23 million smaller firms represent 99,8 % of non-financial businesses and provide around two-thirds of all jobs; underlines that SMEs are a driving force for economic development across the globe and are also key drivers of innovation; understands that the costs of digitalisation and climate actions were at their highest during the COVID-19 pandemic and have put additional pressure on SMEs, which have received EIB support mainly through the COVID-19 financing package and the EGF;

28.  Praises the EIB Group, whose financial support in 2021 to over 431 000 SMEs and mid-caps sustained 4,5 million jobs; recalls that the EIB’s support to SMEs accounts for 47 % of the overall volume of financing signed by the EIB and almost all of the EIF’s activities; recalls that, in absolute terms, in 2021 SME financing represented EUR 45 billion of the EIB Group’s total lending of EUR 94,9 billion, offered at favourable financing terms in the form of lower interest rates and/or longer maturities and advisory services; calls on the EIB to continue its actions and enhance support with additional growth capital to enable SMEs to scale up their operations;

29.  Is concerned that the current high energy prices are seriously affecting European SMEs’ competitiveness; calls on the EIB to assess whether the current level of support for SMEs is sufficient in the context of high energy prices and rising costs of raw materials and to inform Parliament about how it intends to adapt its actions to tackle these new challenges;

30.  Reiterates its call for a fair and transparent geographical distribution of projects and investment, with a focus on less developed regions, especially in innovation, digitalisation and infrastructure, with a view to promoting inclusive growth and economic, social and territorial convergence and cohesion; calls for the EIB to be more active in addressing recurring shortcomings that prevent certain regions or countries from taking full advantage of the EIB’s financial activities;

31.  Notes that in the present difficult context (the post-pandemic crisis and the Russian aggression against Ukraine), the gap between the economic situations and capacities of the Member States has deepened and underlines the importance of ensuring that the most affected regions and countries adjust to the new circumstances so that no one is left behind;

32.  Reiterates its call on the EIB to increase investments in breakthrough innovations to facilitate the digital and green transition;

33.  Maintains that all of the EIB’s financial flows should be fully consistent with net-zero emissions by 2050 at the latest and with the EU’s increased climate objective for 2030; insists that the climate transition must be inclusive and fair and that green investments must be viable; recalls that the EIB is expected to leverage its lending, financial instruments, technical assistance and advisory services in order to support citizens and businesses facing socio-economic challenges arising from the transition towards a carbon-neutral economy;

34.  Reiterates its call for the strengthening of technical assistance for and the financial expertise of local and regional authorities, especially in regions with low investment capacity, and for projects of common interest to several Member States which are of such a size or nature that they cannot be entirely financed by the various means available in the individual Member States before project approval, in order to improve accessibility to EIB funding;

35.  Reiterates its calls for the EIB to carry out due diligence in the preparation phase of all the projects in order to include careful consideration and respect for human rights and indigenous communities, and to develop a clear human rights strategy that includes human rights risk and impact assessments;

36.  Stresses that the requirement for financial intermediaries and corporate clients to draw up decarbonisation plans as soon as possible and at the latest by the end of 2025 must facilitate access to finance for SMEs; notes, however, that this is a crucial requirement in light of the EIB’s ambitions of becoming the EU’s climate bank and achieving a rate of at least 50 % of financing going into green and sustainable projects;

37.  Calls for a focus on the credibility of short-term decarbonisation plans, for their stringent implementation and greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets and for an evaluation to ascertain whether these can be included in contractual clauses between the EIB and its clients;

38.  Is aware that the EIB’s actions connect climate, innovation and development and recognises that innovation and technology are key enablers for the transition to a net-zero emission economy; welcomes the partnership between the Commission and the Breakthrough Energy Catalyst aiming at mobilising up to USD 1 billion over the 2022-2026 period in order to accelerate the deployment and commercialisation of innovative technologies that will help deliver European Green Deal ambitions and the European Union’s 2030 climate targets;

39.  Emphasises the need to achieve an adequate level of energy security in order to achieve the fast and stable independence of European countries;

40.  Calls on the EIB to increase financing in order to boost the technological transition, provide funds to SMEs for long-term research and innovation, support the development of skills adapted to real labour market needs, and promote investment in employees’ and entrepreneurs’ digital skills, digital infrastructure and capacity-building for digitalisation; stresses that European SMEs are lagging behind in embracing digital technologies, with only 55 % of EU SMEs with at least a basic level of digitalisation;

41.  Notes the reported increase in the percentage of EIB signatures related to the horizontal public policy goal on EU Economic and Social Cohesion and Convergence from 34,5 % in 2020 to 41,5 % in 2021; welcomes the EIB’s ambition set in its new Cohesion Orientation paper for 2021-2027 regarding increased EIB Group financing dedicated to cohesion with an orientation of 40 % of financing in the EU for 2022 (reaching 45 % by 2025), of which 20 % is in less developed regions (reaching 23 % by 2025); calls on the EIB to continue providing advisory services to cohesion regions, which helps them to make better use of the available investments;

42.  Calls on the EIB to continue to prioritise investments in health infrastructure, staff training and in the quality of health services in order to reduce inequalities between countries;

43.  Welcomes the decision of the EIB Board of Directors in September 2021 approving the creation of EIB Global, the new branch responsible from 1 January 2022 for all of the EIB’s activities in the enlargement region and the countries of the European Union’s Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific; calls for EIB Global to be centred around an equitable and sustainable development agenda in recipient countries, while demonstrating clear development additionality; points with concern to the challenges faced by projects in non-EU countries, particularly corruption, misuse of funds and ensuring that they reach the intended recipients and deliver on the principles of key policy areas;

44.  Believes that EIB Global should enjoy the operational autonomy needed to successfully implement the EU policies embracing the appropriate corporate culture of a development bank, while benefiting from the bank’s legal framework and sharing the same policies and high standards; calls on EIB Global to ensure the highest standards of due diligence in project appraisal processes;

45.  Underlines the crucial role of the EIB in meeting the goals of the Just Transition Mechanism and calls for more involvement and concrete actions in this respect;

46.  Underlines that the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors are key players for growth and development in rural areas; calls on the EIB to provide better assistance and support innovation in these relevant sectors, which can significantly contribute to food security; underlines that the financial needs of farmers, especially young and new entrants, are significant and that farmers and enterprises in this sector have a lower rate of success when applying for financing; calls for the EIB to continue to work on new financial tools that will boost accessibility for the agricultural sector;

47.  Condemns the Russian Federation’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression and invasion of Ukraine; underlines the fact that the war has created a severe humanitarian crisis and has had a fundamental impact on the economic and security situation in the EU and its neighbourhood, which needs to be broadly reflected in the EIB’s activities and investment plans;

48.  Is concerned about the energy dependency and vulnerability of the Republic of Moldova which the current energy crisis has exacerbated; urges the EIB to support investments in the Republic of Moldova’s long-term energy autonomy and diversification;

EIB compliance, transparency and accountability

49.  Reiterates that the EIB’s AAA rating is necessary to ensure appropriate market sources of financing and must be preserved; believes that financial strength, good governance, conservative risk appetite, long-term sustainability and the EU’s support are essential components as well as intrinsic qualities of its successful business model;

50.  Takes note of the EIB Audit Committee’s observations and recommendations to the bank for 2021; calls on the EIB to implement these recommendations and to complete the implementation of those pending from the previous years;

51.  Agrees with the EIB Audit Committee’s view that there is a need for enhanced monitoring, management and oversight of operational and technology risks, including cyber risks and other non-financial risks;

52.  Welcomes the EIB’s focus on digitisation strategy and information security risk management and cyber-security and the adoption in May 2021 of the EIB Group – Digital Ambition (ICT) Strategy; recalls that cyber-attacks are liable to result in operational, reputational and legal risks; expects the EIB to adopt an action plan encompassing both defence against and recovery from cyber-attacks, with specific deliverables and clear indicators, and to promote a strong cyber-security culture among employees;

53.  Notes that the EIB, the Commission and the ECA renewed the Tripartite Agreement on 11 November 2021; regrets the fact that the revised agreement does not offer the extensive solution which Parliament has called for; welcomes, however, that the new agreement allows for greater access to and improved streamlining of audited EIB documents; reiterates that the ECA is expected to have full access to all information related to EIB operations intended solely for the implementation of EU policies;

54.  Notes that in 2021 the EIB’s complaints mechanism registered 64 new cases (compared with 77 in 2020), processed 107 cases (compared with 137 in 2020) and closed 64 cases (compared with 94 in 2020); encourages the EIB to monitor the complaints mechanism recommendations and to make intensive efforts to reach out to stakeholders to offer tailored events;

55.  Calls on the EIB to ensure that the complaints mechanism is accessible, effective and independent in order to detect and redress any possible human rights violations in EIB-related projects;

56.  Is aware that the Inspectorate General’s Investigations Division (IG/IN) is an internal department which launches enquiries into the types of misconduct defined in the Anti-Fraud Policy in order to provide the EIB Group with relevant facts and recommendations to form the basis of the EIB decision-making process;

57.  Notes that the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic have had an impact, for the second year in a row, on the competent division of the Inspectorate General in carrying out its activities, resulting in fewer allegations received (174 in 2021 and 183 in 2020), fewer investigative missions carried out (5 in 2021 and 10 in 2020) and fewer recommendations and opinions issued (45 in 2021 and 52 in 2020, compared with a bigger number of cases completed, i.e. 204 in 2021 and 195 in 2020);

58.  Observes that the number of cases where allegations were substantiated following investigation decreased sharply in 2021 (17 cases substantiated out of 67 investigations opened in 2021 and 37 cases substantiated against 91 investigations opened in 2020, which is a decrease from 41 % to 25 %);

59.  Welcomes the signature on 29 October 2021 of the working arrangement between the EIB and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL), which should pave the way towards more effective prevention and detection of risks linked to EIB Group funding;

60.  Welcomes the establishment of a new system for following up and reporting on recommendations and opinions; asks the EIB IG/IN to report to Parliament in more detail about the outcome of its investigations; calls for the EIB IG/IN annual report to cover the financial impacts of the cases it investigates, going beyond the mere narrative of the case studies, in order to provide valuable insight for assessing the protection of financial interests, including the EIB’s evaluation of the financial, operational and reputational risks when deciding whether an investigation to that end is appropriate;

61.  Appreciates the continuous work of the Proactive Integrity Reviews Unit and encourages enhanced cooperation between EIB exclusion and debarment capabilities, the Commission’s Early Detection and Exclusion System and other relevant actors (such as the Irregularities Management System database of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the ARACHNE risk-scoring tool) in order to enhance the fraud prevention and detection activities that are essential to safeguard the Union’s financial interests;

62.  Reminds the EIB that its dual nature (EU body and financial institution) makes its alignment with EU law even more relevant, and that appropriate governance, processes and mechanisms should consistently be designed, implemented and adhered to in line with the Union’s standards and criteria and well integrated with those followed by other Union services with which the EIB interacts frequently;

63.  Takes note of the updated codes of conduct of the Management Committee and the EIB Board of Directors of August 2021; welcomes the introduction of a longer cooling-off period for members of the Management Committee (24 months instead of 12) and for members of the Board of Directors (12 months instead of 6); regrets, however, that there is no provision excluding vice-presidents from overseeing and taking decisions on operations in their countries of origin, and insists that this be addressed in the next revision;

64.  Trusts that project assessments relevant to grant financing decisions are drawn up in compliance with objective technical, financial and economic indicators, and that project quality is the decisive factor in them; believes that the ‘governance package’ adopted by the Board of Governors in August 2021 and which includes new codes of conduct for the Board of Directors, the Management Committee and the Audit Committee, together with the revised Operating Rules of the Ethics and Compliance Committee, strengthens the EIB’s ethical framework, as it includes more stringent rules on post-employment activities; reiterates its call for addressing the remaining shortcomings regarding avoidance of conflict of interests in the next revision of the Management Committee’s code of conduct;

65.  Is concerned by the failings of the EIF’s first and second lines of defence reported to the EIB Audit Committee in internal audit reports in December 2021 and January 2022; calls on the EIB to take appropriate remedial action and to inform Parliament about such interventions;

66.  Welcomes the revised EIB Group whistleblowing policy of November 2021, which also grants protection to whistleblowers who are not EIB staff members;

67.  Recognises that human rights, inclusiveness and sustainability are fundamental pillars of the EIB Group’s activities and operations; welcomes the progress made in 2021 in the revision and adoption (finalised in February 2022) of the Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework; is aware that the new framework consists of the revised EIB Group Environmental and Social Policy and the EIB’s Environmental and Social Standards and that lessons learned through complaints lodged with the Complaints Mechanism and the European Ombudsman are duly fed into this review;

68.  Takes the view that a strengthened anti-fraud policy should indicate effective ways to correct misconduct and mitigate risks and should provide a set of tools that are compatible with the regulatory framework in order to successfully freeze projects affected by credible suspicions and to terminate contracts with non-compliant clients;

69.  Reiterates its concern about several cases which OLAF closed in 2020 focusing on educational allowances unduly granted to EIB staff members; welcomes the EIB’s revision and reform of the allowances system and its correction of many of the errors which OLAF detected, including steps to recover undue payments; reiterates its request to the EIB to report to Parliament on the outcome of the follow-up to OLAF’s recommendations;

70.  Welcomes the adoption of the EIB Group’s revised transparency policy on 17 November 2021 following an extensive public consultation; notes that this policy lays down provisions for the proactive publication of information and documents and their disclosure upon request; recalls the importance of transparency for intermediaries, for internal decision-making procedures and for the environmental and human rights impact of projects through to their full implementation;

71.  Invites the EIB to better implement its transparency policy, to implement the Ombudsman recommendations from the three decisions published on 21 April 2022 calling on the EIB to adopt a more ambitious approach to its disclosure practice, in line with EU transparency legislation, and to take several transparency steps;

72.  Urges the EIB to quickly respond to the Ombudsman’s requests to enable the public to see more easily the potential environmental impact of the projects it finances;

73.  Reiterates its call for more transparency and accountability to Parliament; reiterates, in particular, the importance of greater Parliament scrutiny over decisions of the EIB Board of Directors, with enhanced transparency from the Commission on the positions it takes in the EIB Board of Directors meetings; in this regard calls for the consideration of the possibility for Parliament to have observer status in the Board’s meetings;

74.  Considers that the Commission should provide more transparency on its opinions on the projects financed by the EIB, as this would help clarify its role in respect of the Union’s policy objectives;

75.  Is aware that the calls for enhanced transparency cannot lead to reduced protection of the legitimate financial interests of clients and need to fall within the existing legal frameworks and the data protection regime;

76.  Invites the representatives of the bank to increase the level of engagement and interaction with Parliament, especially regarding the control of financial activities;

77.  Is concerned that the targets set in the diversity and inclusion strategy 2018-2021 have not been fully achieved; calls on the EIB to make concrete efforts to improve the gender balance of its staff, in particular at management and senior official levels;

78.  Understands that the reduced recruitment during the COVID-19 pandemic, the specific nature of the profiles sought by the bank (in risk management, compliance and IT roles, recruited in many cases from the banking industry and specialised sectors that are not necessarily diverse themselves) and the competitiveness of the labour market in Luxembourg are examples of the limitations to be taken into consideration in assessing the overall situation;

79.  Acknowledges the long-standing concerns and complaints regarding the vast pay gaps between administrative and professional categories of staff; draws attention to the high costs of living in Luxembourg and notes that the correction coefficient for Luxembourg is fixed at 100 %, although it should be higher; points to the challenges faced by the staff members employed under the administrative category and how these can negatively impact the attractiveness of working at the EIB and the standard of living of its staff;

80.  Encourages the bank to persist in taking action to achieve more discernible gender balance within its organisation;

81.  Welcomes the fact that the EIB is constantly monitoring geographical balance and that the data on this are taken into consideration for ongoing and future recruitment processes;

82.  Reiterates its call on the EIB to ensure proper geographical representation from all Member States in its administration, taking into consideration the competences and merits of the candidates; calls on the bank to publish, annually, a gender and nationality breakdown of middle and senior management positions;

83.  Notes the two proposals for a Framework on the Right to Strike and a Framework on the Recognition of Trade Unions and understands that the Management Committee will adopt these frameworks in a timely manner;

84.  Invites the bank to further report on the implementing measures that have been rolled out on the basis of the 2021 health and wellbeing survey; in particular, invites the bank to report on transparency in internal management and internal recruitment processes and on measures taken to address the outcomes of the ‘staff satisfaction surveys’;

Follow-up to Parliament’s recommendations

85.  Calls on the EIB to continue reporting on the state of play and status of the previous recommendations issued by Parliament in its annual resolutions especially as regards:

o
o   o

86.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and calls on the Council and EIB Board of Directors to hold a debate on this resolution.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0299.

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2021 (2022/2152(INI))

P9_TA(2023)0018 A9-0299/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Articles 310(6) and 325(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to the Commission report of 23 September 2022 entitled ‘33rd Annual Report on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests and the fight against fraud – 2021’ (COM(2022)0482) (PIF Report 2021),

–  having regard to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) Report 2021 and the 2021 Annual Report of the OLAF Supervisory Committee,

–  having regard to the OLAF Supervisory Committee Opinions No 1/2021 of 4 February 2021 entitled ‘OLAF’s recommendations not followed by the relevant authorities’, No 2/2021 of 31 May 2021 on the ‘Working arrangements between OLAF and EPPO’, No 4/2021 of 18 October 2021 entitled ‘OLAF’s Preliminary Draft Budget for 2022’ and No 5/2021 of 17 December 2021 entitled ‘Analysis of OLAF’s investigations lasting more than 36 months in 2019’,

–  having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2021 Annual Report published in March 2022,

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on suspicions of corruption from Qatar and the broader need for transparency and accountability in the EU institutions(1),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2223 of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013, as regards cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of the European Anti-Fraud Office investigations(2) (OLAF Regulation),

–  having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law(3),

–  having regard to the Commission report of September 2021 entitled ‘VAT Gap Report 2021’,

–  having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law(4) (PIF Directive),

–  having regard to the Commission report of 6 September 2021 on the implementation of Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (COM(2021)0536),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office(5) (EPPO Regulation),

–  having regard to Decision (EU) 2019/1798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 appointing the European Chief Prosecutor of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office(6),

–  having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21 and C-157/21 and the CJEU’s conclusions that the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism is in line with EU law, which confirmed the appropriateness of the legal basis and the compatibility of the general regime of conditionality with Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the principle of legal certainty,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal of 18 September 2022 for a Council implementing decision on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary (COM(2022)0485),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(7) (the Conditionality Regulation),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 2 March 2022 entitled ‘Guidelines on the application of the Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’(8),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 29 April 2019 entitled ‘Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy: enhanced action to protect the EU budget’ (COM(2019)0196),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 14 December 2020 on the review of the European Union under the Implementation Review Mechanism of the United Nation Conventions against Corruption (UNCAC) (COM(2020)0793),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 250/2014(9),

–  having regard to its recommendation of 17 February 2022 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning corruption and human rights(10),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 14 April 2021 on the EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-2025 (COM(2021)0170),

–  having regard to the judgment of the CJEU of 1 September 2021 in Case T-517/19, Homoki v Commission(11),

–  having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(12),

–  having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2022 on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2020(13),

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0299/2022),

A.  whereas Member State authorities manage more than 85 % of EU expenditure, including the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), and collect the EU’s traditional own resources (TOR) while the Commission oversees both of these areas, sets standards, verifies compliance and reports to both Parliament and the Council on the measures taken to counter fraud and other illegal activities affecting the EU’s financial interests, pursuant to Article 325(5) TFEU;

B.  whereas sound public spending and the protection of the EU’s financial interests should be key elements of EU policy in order to increase citizens’ confidence by ensuring that taxpayers’ money is used properly and effectively;

C.  whereas trust in Parliament’s integrity and the rule of law is paramount for the functioning of European democracy; whereas it is key to ensure that democratic processes are not captured by private and external interests and that citizens’ rights are fully respected;

D.  whereas the annual PIF Report is based on information provided by the Member States, including data on irregularities and fraud detected, which is analysed to identify the areas most at risk, and whereas it describes the countermeasures adopted and makes it possible to implement more targeted action at both EU and national levels;

E.  whereas the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget has been applicable and enforceable since 1 January 2021; whereas all breaches in a Member State of the principles of the rule of law, such as fraud, that affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the EU budget and the financial interests of the EU in a sufficiently direct way since that date are therefore subject to that regime;

F.  whereas the Conditionality Regulation allows the EU to take measures – for example, the suspension of payments or the application of financial corrections – to protect the budget from fraud and shield the rule of law;

G.  whereas the CJEU has dismissed claims by two Member States, ruling that the Conditionality Regulation falls within the powers conferred by the financial rules for the implementation of the EU budget;

H.  whereas the Commission should apply the same criteria, based on respect for the rule of law, with regard to funds provided to non-EU countries under the EU budget, and adopt an uncompromising stance to stop any ongoing financial transactions to such countries in cases where the latter exert undue influence on EU institutions or lawmakers;

I.  whereas in 2021 the EU completed the adoption of the 2021-2027 spending programmes, including the Union Anti-Fraud Programme, which supports the fight against fraud by providing grants for specific initiatives and enabling the financing of dedicated IT platforms and tools to facilitate the exchange of information between the Member States and the EU;

J.  whereas the Union and the Member States share responsibility for protecting the EU’s financial interests; whereas, regarding the unprecedented deployment of funds under the RRF, they also share responsibility for regulating and implementing the national recovery and resilience plans (RRPs); whereas the role of national authorities in ensuring an adequate level of protection of the EU’s financial interests has increased significantly as a result;

K.  whereas the implementation of the RRF will increase the pressure on European and national administrations in the coming years, and it coincides with the 2021-2027 spending programmes; whereas the Member States will need to master different management modes linked to the implementation of the various funds and the Commission will need to strengthen its monitoring capacity, given that it is currently only capable of monitoring a fraction of all expenditure;

L.  whereas the Commission has made efforts to support national authorities on the design and assessment of RRPs, paying particular attention to the provisions concerning measures to protect RRF resources from fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and double funding;

M.  whereas Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(14) (the RRF Regulation) contains provisions concerning the protection of the EU’s financial interests, and the RRF Regulation ensures that the Commission, OLAF, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and the EPPO are able to exercise their mandates and that national authorities put in place effective anti-fraud measures taking into account any risk identified;

N.  whereas the diversity of legal and administrative systems in the Member States is a disadvantage and needs to be adequately addressed in order to create more unified, interoperable and comparable administrative and reporting systems in the EU, with a view to effectively preventing and overcoming irregularities and combating fraud and corruption;

O.  whereas deficiencies in the validity and comparability of data and reporting technologies, including as a result of the varying levels of digitalisation in the Member States, continue to severely undermine the quality and reliability of the information available;

P.  whereas the Arachne tool is voluntary and, although it is already widely used in cohesion policy and is being introduced for agricultural spending, making it mandatory – as repeatedly requested by Parliament – would be a major step forward, according to the Commission;

Q.  whereas value added tax (VAT) is an important revenue source for national budgets and whereas VAT-based own resources account for around 10 % of own-resource revenue (12,3 % of total EU budget revenue in 2020 and 11 % in 2019);

R.  whereas the Commission’s action plan for fair and simple taxation supporting the recovery strategy (COM(2020)0312) contributes to the EU’s strategy for simplifying and adapting taxation to the digitalisation of the economy and the green transition and identifies the fight against VAT fraud as a priority;

S.  whereas on 1 June 2021 the EPPO finally started its operational activities as the final pillar of the anti-fraud architecture designed by the Union to enhance the protection of its financial interests; whereas the workload of the EPPO is expected to increase;

T.  whereas the EPPO, despite minimal resources and extreme time pressure, has already demonstrated its capabilities and cost-effectiveness; whereas the EPPO’s budget for 2021 was less than EUR 45 million, while EPPO judges ordered the seizure of more than EUR 250 million in the organisation’s first year of operations, illustrating that the EPPO can deliver a massive and immediate return on investment;

U.  whereas the Commission’s knowledge of the extent, nature and causes of fraud is somewhat limited and many potential frauds are not reported through the irregularity management system; whereas corruption undermines citizens’ trust in the EU and jeopardises the Union’s financial interests and the EU economy as a whole, as well as posing a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law in the EU;

V.  whereas, according to Article 83 TFEU, corruption is among the particularly serious crimes that have a cross-border dimension and affect all Member States to varying degrees; whereas criminal organisations are particularly active in the interception of European funds and are able to exploit the heterogeneity of legal and administrative systems in Member States to penetrate their economic, financial, business, social and political fabric, thereby harming economic freedom and free competition;

W.  whereas the unprecedented increase in EU spending under the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2021-2027 and the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) recovery plan poses significant risks, including the potential for misuse of funds by organised criminals;

X.  whereas cooperation with international partners is crucial to protect EU funds spent outside Europe and the revenue side of the EU budget; whereas OLAF signed administrative cooperation arrangements with two international partner authorities in 2021, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine and the World Customs Organization (WCO); whereas OLAF organised online events in 2021 to establish new operational contacts with investigative authorities in non-EU countries and encourage the reporting of fraud and irregularities through EU delegations around the world;

1.  Welcomes the 33rd Annual Report on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests and the fight against fraud – 2021;

2.  Is aware that 2021 was a challenging year in which the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic required the adaptation of control strategies and a focus on prevention through specific mitigating measures and targeted actions to detect irregularities and fraud;

3.  Recalls that, on 19 February 2021, the RRF, which is the main pillar of the NGEU, entered into force, financed by the Commission’s borrowing on the capital markets and aiming at financing reforms and investments in Member States retroactively from the start of the pandemic in February 2020;

4.  Underlines the fact that in 2021 operations were eligible for EU financing under the MFF 2014-2020 (which will end in 2024), under the MFF 2021-2027 and within the NGEU recovery package;

5.  Highlights the fact that the new MFF 2021-2027, the last programmes for which were adopted in 2021, coupled with the NGEU recovery plan, provides the EU with EUR 1,8 trillion, representing an unprecedented volume of resources; highlights the fact that Parliament (for the purpose of ensuring discharge), OLAF, the ECA, the Commission itself and, where applicable, the EPPO may access relevant data and verify the use of funds to complement and strengthen the auditing measures laid down by the regulations in force;

6.  Notes that Parliament and its Budgetary Control Committee should have a strong role in the RRF’s governance, including through regular, structured dialogues where the Commission is invited to discuss the implementation of the RRF, with the Commission being required to take into account the views arising therefrom;

7.  Stresses that a correspondingly high level of attention and control is also needed and expected in order to guarantee that these funds can make the best possible contribution to the common goals of the Union; recalls the increased pressure on the authorities managing EU funds, the increased volume of resources deployed and the increased risks related to their management (following the introduction, in the context of the pandemic, of simplified and urgent procedures, which are prone to abuse);

8.  Takes the view that the enhancement of transparency, the digitalisation of the fight against fraud and the continuous strengthening and development of fraud risk assessment and fraud risk management should be pursued in parallel with a sound implementation of the EU anti-fraud architecture;

9.  Calls for enhanced levels of digitalisation, interoperability of data systems and harmonisation of reporting, monitoring and auditing in the EU and, to this end, reiterates its call on the Commission to harmonise definitions so that comparable data can be obtained across the EU;

10.  Calls on the Commission to submit a legislative proposal on mutual administrative assistance in those areas of EU fund spending that do not so far provide for this practice; encourages the Commission to develop a system for the exchange of information between competent authorities to enable cross-checking of accounting records concerning transactions between two or more Member States in order to avoid transnational fraud within the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), so as to ensure a cross-cutting approach to the protection of the financial interests of the EU;

11.  Expresses concern about the quite late publication of the annual PIF Report, since the report for year n is only published in September of year n+1; understands that the main reason for this is the fact that the Member States submit their information quite late; invites the Commission to be more proactive in requesting that the Member States submit their data earlier so that its annual report can be finalised sooner, which would allow the Parliament resolution on the report to be adopted earlier, ideally within year n+1;

12.  Takes the view that, especially in light of the entry into force of the new OLAF Regulation, the RRF Regulation and the Conditionality Regulation, as well as the beginning of the operational activities of the EPPO, which completes the EU anti-fraud architecture, it is necessary to make the annual PIF Report more holistic in order to provide a comprehensive overview of the synergies between all relevant actors, identify best practice and address shortcomings; reiterates, therefore, its call on the Commission to explore new avenues to that end;

Fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities detected

13.  Notes that the number of cases of fraud and irregularities reported by the competent EU and national authorities – 11 218 in total – remained stable in 2021 relative to 2020 (when there were 11 755 cases overall); points out that the value involved in these irregularities rose significantly, more than doubling (+121 %) from EUR 1,46 billion in 2020 to EUR 3,24 billion in 2021, due to a small number of large cases in certain Member States; expresses its grave concern about the increased magnitude of fraud and irregularities;

14.  Acknowledges that the number of irregularities detected that are reported as fraudulent is an indication of the level of detection and of the capacity to intercept potential fraud by the Member States and Union bodies, and is not a direct indicator of the level of fraud affecting the Union budget or a specific Member State; understands that the detection and reporting of an irregularity implies that corrective measures have been taken in order to protect the Union’s financial interests and that, whenever relevant, criminal proceedings have been launched;

15.  Observes with concern that the great majority of reported irregularities (fraudulent and non-fraudulent) are detected during ex post controls and that this results in a significant time lag between the moment in which irregularities are committed and when they are reported to the Commission, with this lag averaging from two and a half to three years; is also concerned that some Member States do not report any irregularities, which might indicate insufficient detection efforts;

16.  Is aware that much EU expenditure follows multiannual cycles, with implementation increasing progressively towards programme closure, such that peaks in the reporting of irregularities usually appear in year n+2 or n+3 after the final year of the cycle; points out, therefore, that a year-to-year comparison of the reporting of irregularities does not offer a reliable analysis of the real-time situation, while a multiannual perspective can mitigate distortions; welcomes the approach adopted to mitigate this effect whereby the results from the reported year are compared with the five-year average for TOR and with the average for the relevant programming period for expenditure, with the exception of annual spending for direct aid to farmers and market support; stresses, however, that the differences in the regulatory frameworks governing different programming periods can make comparison sterile and nullify the analysis efforts;

17.  Calls on the Commission to increasingly focus on more severe issues, such as intentional manipulations of tender criteria to favour the applications of certain bidders, corruption in relation to bidder selection, and conflicts of interest in general, instead of minor formal errors;

Major threats

18.  Is concerned by the increasing threat to the EU budget posed by organised crime, including mafia-type organisations and oligarchic structures; is aware that organised crime groups try to infiltrate the legal economy and perpetrate administrative irregularities with criminal methods that are more harmful and more difficult to investigate and remedy; points out that their modi operandi increasingly include making use of highly skilled intermediaries who are able to carry out extremely sophisticated, hard-to-detect EU fund fraud by making money disappear through complex financial architectures, sometimes with the help of tax havens, making it particularly difficult to trace and recover funds;

19.  Reiterates its concern that the prevalence of oligarchic groups has reached an unprecedented magnitude in recent years and that oligarchic systems often go hand in hand with widespread corruption, tight control over the media and an ability to influence the judiciary and prosecution services in such a way as to conceal possible criminal activities and avoid prosecution;

20.  Recalls that fraud affecting European funds increasingly has transnational dimensions, that criminal organisations take advantage of the heterogeneity of legal systems to perpetrate fraudulent activities against the financial interests of Member States, and that the EU, within the limits set by the TFEU, has an obligation to intervene in anti-corruption policies and is obliged to counter corruption with measures to combat and prevent it; calls, therefore, on the Commission to do everything possible to align the Member States’ criminal laws;

21.  Recalls that the lack of efficient legislation and action to combat organised crime in many Member States provides fertile ground for the growing number of cross-border activities in areas affecting the Union’s financial interests; reiterates, therefore, its previous calls for the revision of Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime(15) and its position on the need to establish a new common definition of organised crime, which is in keeping with the latest developments and takes into consideration the use of violence, corruption or intimidation by criminal groups to gain control over economic activities or public procurement or affect the democratic process; calls on the Commission to promote the good practices of those countries in the EU that have an advanced regulatory framework for fighting organised crime;

22.  Stresses that timely cooperation between national law enforcement authorities, as well as between such authorities and the relevant EU agencies and bodies, is a key component of an effective response to transnational crime to protect the EU’s financial interests; advocates, as part of this cooperation and response, efforts to advance common policies combating mafia-related criminality and to follow the example of the most diligent and experienced countries in this area;

23.  Stresses that corruption, especially high-level corruption, including in EU institutions, is a particularly serious crime with the potential to extend across borders, whose impact affects the Union’s financial interests and the EU economy as a whole, representing a serious threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law across Europe, and undermining citizens’ trust in democratic institutions in the EU and in the Member States;

24.  Is appalled that at least two non-EU countries were able to perpetrate high-level acts of corruption and exert undue influence on MEPs, which led to criminal investigations by the Belgian authorities in December 2022; stresses that such dealings threaten the principle of citizens’ democratic representation in EU decision-making and undermine citizens’ trust in EU institutions; demands in this regard that the Commission present a draft interinstitutional agreement as soon as possible for the establishment of an EU ethics body with the necessary independence and the right to conduct its own investigations, as demanded by Parliament since September 2021, in order to overcome the weaknesses of the current system;

25.  Considers that a revision of the Staff Regulations, and especially Article 22c thereof, is necessary in order to align it with Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law(16) (the ‘Whistleblower Directive’); calls on the Bureau, in the interim, to immediately revise Parliament’s Internal Rules Implementing Article 22c of the Staff Regulations to bring them into line with the protections provided for in the Whistleblower Directive;

26.  Calls on the Commission to produce an annual report on corruption, in a similar vein to the existing report on fraud, in order to provide an in-depth analysis of the approaches, procedures and tools used by the Member States in their fight against corruption and to help to assess which areas are most at risk, thereby making it possible to implement more targeted action at both EU and national levels;

27.  Emphasises the role of the EPPO, the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), Europol and OLAF in the fight against corruption; calls for the capacities of and cooperation between the EPPO and OLAF to be strengthened further; calls for common anti-corruption rules applicable to MEPs and staff of EU bodies;

28.  Highlights the fact that in order to effectively fight corruption and protect the financial interests of the Union, the Commission and other EU institutions and bodies should adopt a consistent approach to transparency, incompatibilities, illegal lobbying, revolving-door situations and conflicts of interest, while also strengthening internal control mechanisms; calls for the EU institutions to urgently adopt measures to introduce the practice of minimum ‘cooling-off periods’ for senior EU officials and former MEPs, in order to avoid the phenomenon of revolving doors;

29.  Recalls that the weakening independence of the institutions responsible for monitoring and controlling finances in certain Member States seriously harms the Union’s financial interests and represents a threat to the rule of law;

30.  Believes that the enhanced and consistent level of protection for journalists and whistleblowers across the Union helps to detect corruption and counter the spread of a subculture of impunity, silence and conspiracy, and that more efforts should be made in this vein; stresses the important role played by the media and investigative journalists in the fight against corruption;

31.  Is of the opinion that offshore companies and organisations that involve offshore companies and organisations in their ownership structures should be excluded from the use of EU funds;

Revenue

32.  Observes that, for TOR and compared to the five-year average, in 2021 the number of irregularities remained stable while the amounts affected increased by 32 % for fraudulent irregularities and 13 % for non-fraudulent irregularities;

33.  Notes that inspections by anti-fraud services and post-release controls were the most successful detection tools for fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities, respectively, and that the most frequent modi operandi involved undervaluation, incorrect origin, misdescription of goods and smuggling;

34.  Remarks that China remained the country of origin for most goods affected by irregularities; stresses that a number of the cases investigated, which involved products sent from China, are emblematic of the challenges posed by China’s Belt and Road Initiative; is concerned by the recurrence of cases of absorption and circumvention of trade defence measures and by the difficulty in detecting them; calls on the Commission to adopt countermeasures and deploy them intensively to address unfair trade;

35.  Calls for the EU and the Member States to join forces in tackling missing trader intra-community VAT fraud, which, according to Europol, costs EUR 50 billion annually in tax losses or up to 27 % of the annual EU budget; believes that this measure would significantly increase the resources available for EU policies and reduce the annual contributions of the Member States to the EU budget;

36.  Stresses that the VAT gap is due to several factors, which may differ in each Member State, such as a lack of resources, limited digital efficiency in tax administrations, or legislative loopholes affecting the effectiveness of control measures deployed to counter tax evasion and tax avoidance; reiterates its call on the Member States to strengthen administrative cooperation, based on the model of the cooperation between members of Eurofisc, and the multilateral warning system for combating VAT fraud, with a view to rapidly detecting carousel-type fraud;

37.  Highlights the fact that the EPPO has the authority to investigate serious offences against the common VAT system provided that they are associated with the territory of two or more Member States and involve a total loss of at least EUR 10 million, and that, acting as a single, transnational prosecution office, it brings unprecedented efficiency to the fight against VAT fraud; notes in particular that in 2021, the EPPO investigated 91 such cases involving estimated losses of EUR 2,5 billion; welcomes the Commission’s second report, published on 16 September 2022, on the implementation of the PIF Directive (COM(2022)0466), which also focuses on the appropriateness of the EUR 10 million VAT threshold;

Expenditure

38.  Remarks that, according to the PIF Report 2021, the level of controls and audits on expenditure remained high, despite the flexibility introduced to address the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, and that the measures put in place to mitigate the risks arising from the pandemic-related constraints on audits and controls were robust and effective;

39.  Asks the Commission to publish audit reports and findings before the end of the implementation period, which can take several years; believes that the public has the right to be aware of the actions that Member States are required to take to protect the EU budget;

40.  Observes that for agriculture, the analysis in the PIF Report 2021 confirms a very low incidence of reported fraud in proportion to disbursements for direct payments, with the highest level observed for market measures in the fruit and vegetable sector and related to the promotion of agricultural products; notes, however, the progressive increase in fraudulent irregularities in rural development related to the 2014-2020 programming period;

41.  Underlines the need for a strict application of the new social conditionality mechanism introduced under the latest common agricultural policy reform, linking subsidies to work and employment standards; recalls the vital importance of this new mechanism for the protection of the EU’s financial interests, and requests that adequate measures in this respect be put in place by both the Member States and the Commission;

42.  Notes that for the ESIF implementing cohesion policy, the number of fraudulent irregularities reported for the 2014-2020 programming period remained in line with the number reported for the 2007-2013 programming period, while there was a fall in the number of non-fraudulent irregularities; remarks with concern that the financial amounts involved in the fraudulent irregularities linked to the cohesion policy in 2021, compared to the five-year average for 2017 to 2021, increased by 186 %;

43.  Remarks with concern that in the case of the ESIF, most fraudulent irregularities concerning ethics and integrity were related to conflicts of interest and stresses the importance of the Commission’s urging all Member States to ensure that they have stringent rules against conflicts of interest;

44.  Calls on the Commission to urgently ensure the implementation of Article 61 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046(17) (Financial Regulation) on conflicts of interest, which prohibits any persons or national authorities involved in budget implementation from taking any action that may bring their own interests into conflict with those of the Union; considers it necessary for the Commission to evaluate the practical implications of the provisions under Article 61 and to consider a possible way forward;

45.  Observes that, in ESIF matters, infringements of public procurement rules were the most frequently reported non-fraudulent irregularities, but only in 4 % of these cases was fraud detected; believes that enhanced transparency in public procurement would ensure sounder management of resources; takes the view that reducing single bids by shining a spotlight on them through ex post controls, encouraging the adoption of electronic public procurement systems, and providing training on public procurement for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises would help boost participation and facilitate public scrutiny and controls, increase competition in public contracts and allow a more efficient use of EU funds in public procurement, while reducing the risk of fraud and irregularities;

46.  Observes that the analysis of irregularities highlights risks in relation to the green transition for investments in energy efficiency, the provision of drinking water, waste management, renewable energy (particularly solar power) and risk prevention; notes that the risks linked to the digital transition relate to services and applications for small and medium-sized enterprises, in terms of the number of irregularities, and services and applications for e-government, in terms of the financial amounts involved;

47.  Calls on all Member States to maintain a high level of checks and monitoring on emergency spending and, in the case of ex post controls conducted for urgent procedures, to assess emergency procurement on a case-by-case basis; calls on the Member States to finally complete the transition to e-procurement processes;

48.  Observes that, in the case of direct management, the number of fraudulent irregularities detected has fallen since 2016 and that, despite the marginal increase in 2021, they remained stable over the preceding four years, while non-fraudulent irregularities continued to decrease, with 2021 being the year with the lowest figures in terms of both the number of cases and the amounts concerned; notes with appreciation that recovery remains at positive levels;

49.  Recalls that transparency has a key role in the management of public funds, both as a deterrent and to build trust among citizens; invites the Commission and the Member States to step up their efforts to strengthen transparency in the use of funds, including concerning information on final beneficiaries;

50.  Points out that risk analysis is still making a marginal contribution to detecting fraud; takes note of the significant and growing role of information from civil society (including information published in the media) in this area; stresses the importance of protecting these valuable sources of information, who often face threats and even risk their lives; calls for the Commission to propose legislation as soon as possible against strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPS), which are often used to silence people who report fraud and irregularities, as previously requested by Parliament in its resolution of 11 November 2021 on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society(18);

51.  Believes that integrity pacts allow increased transparency, accountability and good governance by fostering civil society-supported monitoring in public contracting; calls on the Commission to encourage the use of and promote this tool in the 2021-2027 programmes currently under design and assessment by providing support and guidance to Member States so that they can gradually mainstream them in these programmes;

52.  Notes that despite the reported figure, the proportion of cases of suspected fraud that have not led to a conviction remains high, while the share of cases in which fraud is established is low, suggesting the need to invest more in investigating and prosecuting such cases; notes that the average indictment rate based on OLAF recommendations to Member States decreased to only 35 % for the period between 2017 and 2021; asks OLAF and the Commission to systematically follow up with Member States to ascertain why the recommendations provided have not resulted in the launch of judicial proceedings;

53.  Stresses the need to address the lack of information on the owners and ownership structure of companies or groups of companies with the aim of making the current distribution of funds more transparent and helping to make significant improvements in the efficient detection of irregularities;

54.  Demands that the Member States collect data on the final recipients of funds and make this data available on request;

IT support

55.  Welcomes the Commission’s proposals on the compulsory use of a single integrated IT system for data mining and risk scoring, on the increased scope and effectiveness of the early-detection and exclusion system (EDES) and on the enhanced use of digitalisation and technology to increase the efficiency and quality of controls and audits; believes that these measures would strengthen the response to the increased risks of serious irregularities that follow the urgent delivery of funding under pressure in emergency situations;

56.  Emphasises that the EDES, as the EU’s blacklist, has huge potential to flag people and companies that misuse EU funds; welcomes the Commission’s proposal(19) to change the Financial Regulation in order to strengthen the use of the EDES not only in direct management but also in indirect and shared management;

57.  Underlines the need to make the use of the single integrated IT system compulsory as soon as possible, without waiting for the next MFF, as also stated in the ECA’s Opinion 06/2022 of 27 October 2022(20);

58.  Welcomes the Commission’s continued support for Member States through the structural reform support programme and the Technical Support Instrument; expresses its support for the financing of the CORE project, which aims to develop a procedure to compute corruption risk in public procurement during the pandemic and improve the early detection of corruption risk;

59.  Welcomes the decision adopted by the Advisory Committee for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention (COCOLAF) to set up an expert group dedicated to the use of IT tools to protect RRF resources;

60.  Calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of using artificial intelligence for the protection of the EU’s financial interests;

The EU anti-fraud architecture: the internal components (OLAF, EPPO, Europol, Eurojust, Commission, ECA and EIB)

61.  Underlines the fact that the EU anti-fraud architecture is a composite institutional architecture designed to detect, prevent and combat fraud and other forms of misconduct affecting the EU’s financial interests, built on a multilayered network of cooperation: the first layer is grounded on horizontal cooperation among EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, while the other layers are based on vertical relationships between EU and national authorities, and between EU authorities and international organisations;

62.  Highlights the added value that EU bodies bring to the protection of the financial interests of the Union and the fight against fraud by overcoming national systems’ limitations, especially for cross-border crime, as shown by the operational results achieved by the EPPO and OLAF; emphasises the role of the EPPO, Eurojust, Europol and OLAF in the fight against corruption;

63.  Welcomes the start of operations of the EPPO on 1 June 2021, as the final component of the EU anti-fraud architecture to be put in place; observes that in its first half year of operational activity, the EPPO received 2 832 reports and opened 576 investigations; notes, with regard to the proceeds of criminal activities, that 81 recovery actions took place in 12 of the participating Member States and that the EPPO requested that a total of EUR 154,3 million be seized, of which the seizure of EUR 147 million was granted;

64.  Praises the EPPO for having created a new climate of trust for citizens and invites the Commission and the Member States to increase their cooperation in order to enable the full implementation of the EPPO’s mandate; recalls in this regard that, on the one hand, the Member States’ detection rates need to be enhanced, and that the cooperation of OLAF has a key role to play in the EU anti-fraud structures; recalls also the various critical shortcomings identified in the EPPO Regulation that need to be addressed as soon as possible; invites the Commission to urgently take action on the requests made by the EPPO on its budgetary implementation, so that the EPPO can become a fully effective and independent prosecution office;

65.  Notes the observations and considerations expressed by the European Chief Prosecutor on the need to amend the EPPO Regulation; calls on the Commission to engage in a discussion with the EPPO to identify the improvements required to enhance its operational effectiveness; recalls that the EPPO is an independent body of the Union and should not be assimilated to an agency, as this would have an impact on its independence and efficiency; notes that there are several other provisions of the EPPO Regulation that have an impact on the operations of the EPPO and, therefore, on the protection of the EU’s financial interests, and asks the Commission to propose solutions to improve the situation and to report to Parliament in line with Article 119(1) of the EPPO Regulation;

66.  Deeply regrets the fact that five Member States still refuse to participate in the EPPO, namely Poland, Hungary, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland;

67.  Regrets the fact that the participation of Member States in the EPPO is not obligatory; reiterates its call on the remaining Member States to join the EPPO as soon as possible; calls on the Commission to incentivise participation in the EPPO through positive measures;

68.  Highlights the fact that the legal frameworks of OLAF and the EPPO clearly provide for the two offices to work in close cooperation while respecting their individual mandates, powers and competences; notes in this regard that, in 2021, OLAF opened 26 complementary investigations and carried out eight supporting operations; remarks that OLAF forwarded 167 files to EPPO, mainly related to shared management (63) and direct expenditure (34) and in equal number concerning internal and international investigations (25 cases each); appreciates that this transmission resulted in the opening by the EPPO of 85 criminal investigations and that such cases relate to an estimated total loss to the EU budget of EUR 2,2 billion; encourages both OLAF and the EPPO to continue to enhance their cooperation;

69.  Remarks that OLAF actively cooperates with the ECA, Eurojust and Europol; welcomes the joint efforts of OLAF and Europol to assess the threats and vulnerabilities of the RRF instrument and their cooperation with other Commission services entrusted with supervising the RRF (the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs and the Commission Secretariat-General); appreciates the joint OLAF/Europol report entitled ‘Assessing the threats to the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) Fund’;

70.  Appreciates the working arrangement between Europol and the EPPO, which entered into force on 19 January 2021; notes that working arrangements were also signed on 3 September 2021 for a framework for cooperation between the EPPO and the ECA;

71.  Is aware that the EPPO and the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group have also signed working arrangements to guarantee that the EIB can smoothly transmit information falling within the EPPO remit before any action is undertaken by the EIB Inspectorate General;

72.  Calls for closer cooperation with Eurojust; welcomes the sharing of expertise and the exchanges between attendees at seminars and other presentations, but believes that Eurojust’s contribution should be assessed and defined in the framework of the anti-fraud architecture, building on its complementarity with the EPPO and confirming the synergies from its cooperation with OLAF;

73.  Welcomes the launch of Operation Sentinel and the NextGenerationEU – Law Enforcement Forum, the latter of which is a joint initiative, co-led by Europol and Italy, that brings together Europol, the EPPO, OLAF, Eurojust, the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training and the Member States, providing a forum for intelligence sharing and coordination of operations to tackle the infiltration of organised crime in the legal economy, and to protect the NGEU stimulus package, with a specific focus on corruption, tax evasion, embezzlement and money laundering; takes the view that, in order to effectively address the threat posed by organised crime, the exchange of best practice and development of common and coordinated strategies are pivotal;

74.  Recalls that OLAF was created not only for internal investigations but also to support Member States in external investigations; recalls that the subsidiarity principle prevents OLAF from launching investigations where Member States are in a better position to act, but this does not preclude OLAF from conducting analyses of recurring cases, trends and patterns, or from building on the enhanced cooperation and successful actions brought about by its ability to detect these phenomena;

75.  Acknowledges, on customs-related matters, the extremely close operational coordination between OLAF, the European Union Intellectual Property Office, Interpol and the WCO; regrets the weakness of the Member States’ alert systems;

76.  Is aware that on 18 June 2021 the Commission and the EPPO signed the administrative arrangements for implementing the mutual information and consultation obligations set out in Article 103(2) of the EPPO Regulation, under which the EPPO can more effectively investigate and prosecute crimes affecting the EU budget, and Commission departments can ensure appropriate administrative, financial and disciplinary follow-up of the EPPO’s investigations, including precautionary measures to protect the EU budget;

77.  Deplores the fact that in 2021, out of an overall budget of EUR 44,9 million, the EPPO was forced to return EUR 9,5 million (about 20 %) to the EU budget, after having requested and obtained additional resources from the budgetary authority to hire statutory staff because the clearance to hire them was not granted by the Commission;

78.  Is of the opinion that OLAF should also follow up on its financial recommendations in order to compare them with the amounts recovered at the end of the procedures by the Commission and thereby contribute to the overall monitoring of the recovery of funds;

79.  Reiterates its concerns related to the permanent understaffing at OLAF, the EPPO, Europol and Eurojust and their lack of financial and human resources, as they need an adequate and predictable budget to be able to organise and carry out their work to the best of their ability; underscores that their workload has now further increased due to the adoption of the NGEU and the provision of extraordinary funds to support Ukraine; reiterates its call to ensure that those EU bodies and agencies are adequately resourced and, in this regard, reminds the Commission and the Council that every euro spent on investigation and anti-fraud actions returns to the EU budget;

80.  Asks the Commission to increase the EPPO’s and OLAF’s financial and human resources to enable them to tackle the challenges that will arise from the spending of the exceptionally large recovery fund; asks the EPPO and OLAF to avoid any overlapping of work and any delays in proceedings; is of the opinion that OLAF and the EPPO should complement each other’s work and focus their respective investigations on those fields where the other institution has no competence;

81.  Calls on the Commission to establish a mechanism for small and medium-sized enterprises to lodge a complaint directly with the Commission whenever they are faced with a high level of corruption, severe misconduct by national authorities, irregular or biased treatment in tenders or regarding the distribution of subsidies, pressure or intimidation from criminal structures, organised crime or oligarchic structures, or any other severe infringement of their rights;

82.  Recognises the principle of confidentiality of OLAF investigations; is of the opinion, however, that there is an overarching public interest and that EU citizens also have the right to access the reports and recommendations relating to closed OLAF investigations and national follow-up procedures, as ruled by the CJEU in Case T-517/19; asks OLAF, therefore, to set up a mechanism to publish the reports and recommendations for which there is no longer any legitimate reason to maintain the principle of confidentiality;

83.  Reiterates its request for a mechanism to be put in place by OLAF to grant access on request to its investigation reports and recommendations, which are often of great public interest, in order to increase transparency while respecting the confidentiality of its investigations;

84.  Welcomes the targeted revision, initiated by the Commission, of the action plan accompanying the Commission’s anti-fraud strategy, and calls on the Commission to take into account the proposals put forward herein and in Parliament’s previous resolutions on PIF matters;

The EU anti-fraud architecture: the external components (Member States, AFCOS, NAFS, UAFP, the rule of law)

85.  Underlines the important role that the Member States play in protecting the Union’s financial interests; is aware that, under the new delivery model adopted with the RRF, the Member States have greater responsibility for preventing and countering fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and double funding; believes, however, that the European level of protection is also crucial for the protection of the EU’s financial interests and that efficient cooperation between the EU and the national authorities is essential for proper delivery;

86.  Calls on the Member States that participate in the EPPO to provide the necessary support to the office (through support staff and appropriate working conditions for European delegated prosecutors, access to databases, police officers, prompt cooperation from taxation and customs authorities, etc.), so that it can optimise its efficiency in protecting the EU’s and Member States’ budgets;

87.  Encourages the Member States to take a proactive approach to protecting the Union's financial interests by using data from all available sources, analysing data and exchanging information, including with law enforcement authorities and the Commission, in order to identify and address emerging risks and fraud trends in a timely manner;

88.  Welcomes the analysis in the PIF Report 2021 and calls on national authorities to take it into account in their control activities;

89.  Reiterates its worries about the bureaucratic overburdening of the national authorities; calls on the Commission to always strive to decrease the number of indicators needed for audit and control purposes when determining which indicators and data are truly relevant, necessary and proportionate;

90.  Asks the Commission to strengthen the conflict-of-interest provisions in the review of the Financial Regulation to include the preparation of the budget by public officials;

91.  Calls on Ireland and Poland to immediately start cooperating with the EPPO on the basis of existing mutual legal assistance treaties and legislation and emphasises that their current lack of cooperation goes against the duties of sincere cooperation (Article 13 TEU) and the specific objective, and related obligations on the Member States, of the effective protection of the Union’s financial interests (Article 325 TFEU);

92.  Believes that uneven and fragmentary legislation, controlling mechanisms, digitalisation of data and reporting systems across the Member States represent obstacles to the effective protection of the Union’s financial interests, hindering comparability and preventing the evaluation and mapping of the scale, nature and causes of fraud in the EU; stresses that, in particular, the diverse implementation of the PIF Directive, combined with the rules set out in Article 25 of the EPPO Regulation, make it impossible for the EPPO to exercise its competence in some Member States (for example, with regard to smuggling and situations where national and EU funding overlap), creating loopholes in the anti-fraud architecture;

93.  Stresses the need for complete transparency in accounting for the transfers and loans provided for under the RRF, so that any potential fraud to the EU’s financial interests can be pursued by the EPPO and/or OLAF; calls on the Commission to ensure that Parliament has full access to all relevant information;

94.  Observes that the transposition of the PIF Directive is a precondition to enabling the EPPO and its partners to effectively carry out investigations and prosecutions; welcomes the first report of the Commission on the transposition of the Directive, published on 6 September 2021; notes that, since then, and despite the transposition of the Directive by all the Member States, the Commission has opened infringement procedures against 17 Member States for not correctly transposing the PIF Directive(21);

95.  Recalls that 18 infringement procedures have been opened for the incorrect transposition of Directive (EU) 2018/843 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing(22); points out that the deadline for the transposition of the Whistleblower Directive was 17 December 2021 and that by that date only five Member States had transposed it, while four more have adopted specific legislation in 2022; encourages the Commission to take all further steps needed to ensure effective compliance by the Member States;

96.  Notes with concern that the Commission has opened infringement procedures against 15 Member States for not having transposed the Whistleblower Directive;

97.  Recalls that an effective fight against money laundering is essential to protect the financial interests of the Union and ensure the full recovery of funds;

98.  Is concerned by the overall lack of action by many Member States, which is preventing the creation of a more uniform playing field in the anti-fraud landscape;

99.  Is aware that on 1 January 2021 the Union Anti-Fraud Programme (UAFP), the successor to Hercule III(23), entered into force; observes that the new UAFP redesigns and merges the resources financing the Hercule III programme, the Anti-Fraud Information System and the Irregularity Management System so as to enhance coordination and synergies; remarks that OLAF plays a leading role in its implementation;

100.  Recalls that anti-fraud coordination services (AFCOS) are a requirement in every Member State and that they should facilitate effective cooperation and information sharing with OLAF; regrets, however, the fact that not all Member States effectively entrust their AFCOS with coordinating the fight against fraud and corruption affecting the EU’s financial interests; maintains that effective coordination at national and EU levels can be achieved with the adoption of a national anti-fraud strategy (NAFS) that allocates tasks and defines processes and responsibilities clearly;

101.  Appreciates that the Commission’s encouragement to Member States to adopt a NAFS has resulted in a steady increase in the number of strategies adopted; notes that by the end of 2021, 17 Member States had adopted or updated a NAFS (up from 10 in 2019 and 14 in 2020); observes that of the 10 Member States yet to adopt a NAFS, four reported that they were in the process of drafting, or close to adopting, a strategy; regrets the fact that, despite the improvements compared to 2020, six Member States are still far from adopting a NAFS;

102.  Insists that even in the Member States where such strategies have already been adopted, a revision is required to reflect the new anti-fraud landscape, including new challenges, as well as developments in systems; stresses that the EPPO has been operational since June 2021 and the RRF Regulation was adopted in February 2021, and there is an opportunity to reflect significant new risks, such as those associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the implementation of the RRPs;

103.  Remarks that in the PIF Report 2021, the Commission recommended that Member States adopt or revise a NAFS in order to take into account RRF-related risks; is aware that the adoption of NAFSs by the Member States is also to be encouraged by the Commission’s services under point 37 of the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy Action Plan(24); calls on the Commission and OLAF to consider providing support and advice to the Member States in a more structured way, taking a cross-cutting approach, and to that end, to update the AFCOS guidelines initially formulated in 2015, which are no longer adequate to effectively assist the national authorities in developing a well-structured coordination service; asks the Commission, furthermore, to submit a detailed explanation of the work in progress in this regard to the discharge authority;

104.  Is aware that in its PIF Report 2020, the Commission made targeted recommendations to Member States aiming at enhancing cooperation and strengthening internal control frameworks; notes that attention was drawn to risk assessment and risk management, the collection and analysis of data on irregularities and fraud, and the use of integrated and interoperable information and monitoring systems for the implementation of RRF- and EU budget-financed activities; regrets that not all the Member States have implemented such recommendations, and notes that some of them have systematically refused to do so; asks the Commission to enhance its monitoring actions for those Member States that have not implemented the PIF recommendations;

105.  Welcomes the adoption of the Conditionality Regulation; reiterates that it entered into force on 1 January 2021; welcomes the judgments of the CJEU of 16 February 2022 concerning the actions brought by two Member States against the conditionality mechanism and its conclusions confirming that the EU does indeed have competences regarding the rule of law in the Member States and that the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism is in line with EU law;

106.  Recalls that Member States’ ineffective or untimely cooperation or non-cooperation with the EPPO and OLAF constitutes grounds for action under the Conditionality Regulation; calls on the EPPO and OLAF to therefore report each case where Member States have failed to comply with their obligations to inform, to assist, to take appropriate action and precautionary measures and to ensure an appropriate and timely follow-up of reports and recommendations;

107.  Points out that the Conditionality Regulation is a permanent instrument applying beyond the limits of a given MFF and applicable across the board as a prerequisite for accessing all EU funds;

108.  Recalls that compliance with the rule of law and with Article 2 TEU are prerequisites for gaining access to funds, that the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism is fully applicable to the resources of the RRF as explicitly stipulated by Article 8 of the RRF Regulation, and that no measures may be financed under the RRF that are contrary to the EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

109.  Considers that the Conditionality Regulation is sufficient and able to prevent or remedy democratic backsliding, but only if it is used in a timely manner, with strict and clear conditions and followed up by close monitoring of the implementation of the national remedial measures;

110.  Deeply regrets the fact that under the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism, the Commission presented Hungary, as remedial measures, with a set of 17 conditions that are not sufficient to rectify the serious breaches of the rule of law; regrets that the Commission did not request more substantial changes and safeguards to restore the independence of the judiciary, reduce the level of corruption and guarantee the adequate protection of the EU’s financial interests;

111.  Maintains that compliance by the Member States with the principles of the rule of law is a prerequisite for sound financial management, in general, and for the efficient and effective management of EU resources, in particular; believes that violations of such principles therefore pose a serious danger to the Union’s financial interests; welcomes the judgments of the CJEU(25) that have recently highlighted the clear relationship between respect for the principles of the rule of law and the efficient implementation of the Union budget; reiterates that only by strengthening the EU anti-fraud architecture can the protection of the EU’s financial interests be effectively and efficiently pursued and enhanced by overcoming the national systems’ inherent limits, which are an obstacle when dealing with financial crime, which has become an increasingly transnational form of misconduct; takes the view that only effective judicial review can ensure compliance with EU law as noted by the CJEU, namely that expenditure ‘cannot be fully guaranteed in the absence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with EU law; the existence of such review, both in the Member States and at EU level, by independent courts and tribunals, is of the essence of the rule of law’(26);

112.  Highlights the detrimental effects of corruption on the rights of citizens; reiterates once again its recommendation that the EU should become a member of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), since there are no legal obstacles to its full membership; invites the Commission, therefore, to recommend that the Council conclude an international agreement with GRECO to set down its membership; requests the Council to take a clear position on the EU joining GRECO, clarifying whether there is any specific opposition and, if so, from which Member State or States;

113.  Recalls that in order to effectively protect the EU’s financial interests, more coherent and systematic rules on transparency, incompatibilities, conflicts of interest, illegal lobbying and revolving doors should be put in place; highlights the need to enhance the EU transparency register; calls on the Commission to strengthen its internal control mechanisms, including through the setting up of an internal corruption mechanism for the EU institutions;

External dimension of the protection of the EU’s financial interests

114.  Notes that more attention should be given to the control of funds for assistance in non-EU countries under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI-Global Europe); observes that this is especially important in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine; recalls that overall, the EU dedicates around 10 % of its budget to external action;

115.  Calls on the Commission to update the fraud report system for funds spent in non-EU countries; notes that the new system should take into account specific issues that the EU faces when spending money outside EU territory;

116.  Notes from the ECA’s report on the implementation of the Union’s budget for 2021 that in the case of the NDICI-Global Europe (under the Union’s general budget), out of the 67 transactions examined, 32 (48 %) were affected by errors, and despite the limited sample size, the audit results confirm that the risk of error in this MFF heading is high, and 24 of those errors were identified as having an impact on the EU budget; notes, furthermore, that the most common categories of error for ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ (heading 6) were expenditure not incurred, ineligible costs, absence of supporting documents and public procurement errors;

117.  Recommends the suspension of budgetary support in non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where authorities manifestly fail to take genuine action against widespread corruption, while ensuring that the assistance reaches the civil population through alternative channels; calls for greater priority to be given to the fight against corruption in pre-accession negotiations with a focus on capacity building, such as via specialised anti-corruption bodies; calls on the Commission to send clear signals to candidate countries that a backlash against rule-of-law standards is jeopardising or delaying the accession to the EU; regrets the fact that, according to ECA Special Report No 01/2022, EUR 700 million in financial support for the improvement of the rule of law in the Western Balkans provided by the EU between 2014 and 2020 had little impact on fundamental reforms;

118.  Highlights the fact that cooperation with international partners is crucial to protect EU funds spent outside Europe and the revenue side of the EU budget; welcomes the administrative cooperation arrangements that OLAF signed in 2021 with two international partner authorities, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine and the WCO; welcomes the fact that OLAF organised online events in 2021 to establish new operational contacts with investigative authorities in non-EU countries and encourage the reporting of fraud and irregularities through EU delegations around the world;

o
o   o

119.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0448. (2) OJ L 437, 28.12.2020, p. 49. (3) OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17. (4) OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29. (5) OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1. (6) OJ L 274, 28.10.2019, p. 1. (7) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 1. (8) OJ C 123, 18.3.2022, p. 12. (9) OJ L 172, 17.5.2021, p. 110. (10) OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 295. (11) Judgment of 1 September 2021, Andrea Homoki v European Commission, T-517/19, ECLI: EU:T:2021:529. (12) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 86. (13) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0300. (14) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17. (15) OJ L 300, 11.11.2008, p. 42. (16) Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17). (17) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1). (18) OJ C 205, 20.5.2022, p. 2. (19) Commission proposal of 16 May 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (COM(2022)0223). (20) Opinion 06/2022 (pursuant to Article 322(1), TFEU) concerning the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ C 446, 24.11.2022, p. 26). The full opinion is available at https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/OP22_06/OP_Recast_EN.pdf. (21) By the end of 2021, 13 out of the 14 procedures launched in 2019 had been closed. In the subsequent conformity check, the Commission services assessed the compatibility of these notified national transposition measures with the Directive’s provisions and obligations. In December 2021, the Commission launched infringement proceedings for incorrect transposition against another eight Member States. (22) Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 43). (23) Regulation (EU) 2021/785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 250/2014 (OJ L 172, 17.5.2021, p. 110). (24) Commission staff working document of 20 September 2021 entitled ‘Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy (CAFS) Action Plan – State of Play June 2021’ (SWD(2021)0262). (25) Judgment of 16 February 2022, Hungary v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-156/21, ECLI: EU:C:2022:97 and the judgment of 16 February 2022, Republic of Poland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-157/21, ECLI: EU:C:2022:98. (26) Judgment of 16 February 2022, Hungary v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C‑156/21, ECLI: EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 132.

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the small-scale fisheries situation in the EU and future perspectives (2021/2056(INI))

P9_TA(2023)0019 A9-0291/2022

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Commission maritime economic paper No 08/2020 of 9 March 2021 entitled ‘The EU fishing fleet 2020: Trends and economic results’(1),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 16 June 2020 entitled ‘Towards more sustainable fishing in the EU: state of play and orientations for 2021’ (COM(2020)0248),

–  having regard to Articles 38 to 44 and Article 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to recital (4) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC(2) (the ‘CFP Regulation’), which states that the CFP should contribute to ‘long-term environmental, economic, and social sustainability’ and to ‘a fair standard of living for the fisheries sector including small-scale fisheries’, and to recital (33) thereof, which states that ‘access to a fishery should be based on transparent and objective criteria including those of an environmental, social and economic nature’ and that ‘Member States should promote responsible fishing by providing incentives to those operators who fish in the least environmentally damaging way and who provide the greatest benefits for society’,

–  having regard to Article 17 of the CFP Regulation, which states that, when allocating fishing opportunities, the Member States are to use ‘transparent and objective criteria including those of an environmental, social and economic nature’,

–   having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1379/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the common organisation of the markets in fishery and aquaculture products, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1184/2006 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000(3) (the ‘CMO Regulation’),

–   having regard to Directive 2014/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning(4),

–   having regard to the amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 11 March 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, and amending Council Regulations (EC) No 768/2005, (EC) No 1967/2006, (EC) No 1005/2008, and Regulation (EU) 2016/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards fisheries control(5),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1004(6) (the ‘EMFAF Regulation’),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2328/2003, (EC) No 861/2006, (EC) No 1198/2006 and (EC) No 791/2007 and Regulation (EU) No 1255/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7) (the ‘EMFF Regulation’),

–   having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2021 on a farm to fork strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system(8),

–  having regard to the report of the Commission’s Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) of 20 August 2019 entitled ‘The 2019 Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing Fleet (STECF 19-06)’(9),

–  having regard to the STECF report of 26 September 2019 entitled ‘Social data in the EU fisheries sector (STECF 19-03)’(10),

–  having regard to the STECF report of 8 December 2021 entitled ‘The 2021 Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing Fleet (STECF 21-08)’(11),

–  having regard to the STECF report of 10 December 2020 entitled ‘Social dimension of the CFP (STECF 20-14)’(12),

–   having regard to the conclusions of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Regional Conference ‘Building a future for sustainable small-scale fisheries in the Mediterranean and Black Sea’, held in Algiers from 7 to 9 March 2016,

–  having regard to target 14.b of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which calls for access to marine resources and markets for small-scale artisanal fishers,

–  having regard to the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication,

–   having regard to the FAO report entitled ‘The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2020: Sustainability in action’,

–  having regard to the International Year of Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture for 2022, as proclaimed by the UN,

–   having regard to the 7th Environment Action Programme (EAP) and the concepts enshrined therein, such as planetary boundaries and ecological limits,

–   having regard to the publication entitled ‘Small-Scale Fisheries in Europe: Status, Resilience and Governance’(13),

–   having regard to the MedFish4Ever ministerial declaration and road map(14),

–   having regard to the EMFF implementation report 2020(15),

–   having regard to the ministerial declaration of 2018 on the Regional Plan of Action for Small-Scale Fisheries in the Mediterranean and Black Sea,

–   having regard to the 2018 study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) entitled ‘Relative Effects of Fisheries Support Policies’(16),

–   having regard to the scientific article entitled ‘Small-scale fisheries access to fishing opportunities in the European Union: Is the Common Fisheries Policy the right step to SDG14b?’(17),

–   having regard to the scientific article entitled ‘Defining Small-Scale Fisheries and Examining the Role of Science in Shaping Perceptions of Who and What Counts: A Systematic Review’(18),

–   having regard to the 2017 study conducted for the Committee on Fisheries entitled ‘Small-scale Fisheries and “Blue Growth” in the EU’(19),

–   having regard to the 2021 study conducted for the Committee on Fisheries entitled ‘Workshop on electronic technologies for fisheries – Part III: Systems adapted for small-scale vessels’(20),

–   having regard to the study conducted for the Committee on Fisheries of July 2021 entitled ‘Impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on EU fisheries and aquaculture’(21),

–   having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2012 on small-scale coastal fishing, artisanal fishing and the reform of the common fisheries policy(22),

–  having regard to its resolution of 12 April 2016 on innovation and diversification of small-scale coastal fishing in fisheries-dependent regions(23),

–   having regard to its resolution of 4 July 2017 on the role of fisheries-related tourism in the diversification of fisheries(24),

–   having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2021 entitled ‘Towards a stronger partnership with the EU outermost regions’(25),

–   having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘Fishers for the future: Attracting a new generation of workers to the fishing industry and generating employment in coastal communities’(26),

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries (A9-0291/2022),

A.  whereas the EMFAF Regulation defines ‘small-scale coastal fishing’ as fishing activities carried out by marine and inland fishing vessels of an overall length of less than 12 metres and not using towed gear and also by fishers on foot, including shellfish gatherers, and whereas this is the only definition of coastal fishing existing in EU legislation;

B.  whereas the current definition of small-scale fishing included in the EMFF Regulation and the EMFAF Regulation excludes certain types of vessels, such as those using some traditional gears, which in turn struggle to obtain EU funding as a result of this exclusion; whereas this exclusion also reduces the visibility of small-scale fishing and its presence within EU statistics, as these units are not counted as belonging to the sector;

C.  whereas there are other, less strict approaches to the definition of small-scale, artisanal and coastal fishing, such as in the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication or in the ongoing discussions of the working group on small-scale fishing within the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean;

D.  whereas, in most Member States, the defining characteristics of small-scale fishing go beyond the EMFAF definition, as governments apply a range of additional criteria, including with regard to the gears allowed, the maximum vessel length, the engine power, the maximum duration of fishing trips, the distance from port at which vessels can operate, the area of operation, the maximum allowed travel time and vessel ownership;

E.  whereas the current CFP does not properly define the concept of artisanal fishing, small-scale fishing or coastal fishing, basing it solely on the vessel’s length, while other more appropriate and up-to-date definitions of this type of fishing are set out in international conventions; whereas the European definitions of artisanal fishing, small-scale fishing and coastal fishing should be revised;

F.  whereas, in 2019, the small-scale fisheries (SSF) sector in the EU-28 consisted of a fleet of 42 838 vessels – which represented only 7,5 % of the gross tonnage and 5,4 % of the landed weight across the Member States overall – and employed 62 650 fishers, accounting for 75 % of the active fishing ships and 48 % of crew; whereas the large-scale fleet represented 19 % of the total vessels and 67 % of the gross tonnage, employing 46 % of all fishers and accounting for 81 % of the landed weight recorded in the Member States; whereas the distant-water fleet numbered only 259 registered vessels, representing less than 1 % of the overall number of vessels but 19 % of the gross tonnage and 14 % of the total landed weight recorded in the Member States;

G.  whereas, in addition to very limited resources being made available for vessel support under the EMFF (EUR 500 million) and to a generally low implementation rate, small-scale fishing, despite its size and importance, is the least supported segment, receiving the smallest share of funds: it accounts for 38 % of the total number of vessel-linked operations, which in turn represent just 25 % of the total EMFF spending on vessels;

H.  whereas the European fleet has continued to shrink in recent years and, in 2020, recorded decreases of 17 % in the value of the fish landed, of 19 % in employment and of 29 % in profits compared with 2019(27);

I.  whereas the small-scale fishing fleet is the fleet with the most limited financial resources;

J.  whereas the typical features of small-scale fishing include its low environmental impact; its seasonally diverse nature in terms of species, fishing grounds and gears; the small scale of its production operations; its respect for the biological and migratory cycles of different species thanks to its versatile nature and a highly selective use of gears; its low levels of species bycatch and discards; and its capacity to generate more revenue per euro invested, greater catches per litre of fuel consumed and more socio-economic value per kilo of fish landed;

K.  whereas due account needs to be taken of the marked differences between fleets, fleet segments, the environmental impact of different fleet segments, target species, fishing gear, productivity and the consumption preferences of the various Member States, in addition to the special characteristics of fishing activity resulting from its social structure, forms of marketing and structural and natural inequalities between the various fishing regions;

L.  whereas the general characteristics of the small-scale fleet include very old segments and inadequate technology, highlighting the need for a specific support programme for small-scale fishing and strong public financial support for its modernisation and development, without which its continuity will be jeopardised;

M.  whereas the EMFAF Regulation imposes an obligation on the Member States to take into account the specific needs of small-scale coastal fishing when carrying out the analysis of the situation in terms of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats referred to in the Regulation;

N.  whereas, in 2019, 64,9 % of the vessels in the EU-28’s fishing fleet were at least 25 years old(28) and the average fleet age stood at 29,9 years overall(29) and 32,5 years for the small-scale fishing fleet, which necessarily implies that a very significant portion of the fleet is very old, thus not guaranteeing the best safety and operational conditions, increasing the associated risks and making operations costlier;

O.  whereas the age profile of small-scale fishers is higher than for other types of fishing, with 72 % of small-scale fishing professionals being over 40 years of age and 11 % over 65 years of age;

P.  whereas the limited nature of the existing statistics makes it difficult to conduct an accurate analysis of the role of women in fisheries; whereas, however, empirical evidence demonstrates that women play a significant part in small-scale fishing, taking a more prominent role in its operations in some communities, having an important presence in shellfishing and taking a leading role on land in the preparation of operations and gear, as well as in the sale and processing of fish, particularly in the canning industry;

Q.  whereas, according to the report on the social dimension of fishing in the EU, women account for 5,4 % of the total number of people employed in small-scale fishing (more than double the respective figures for large-scale and distant-water fishing);

R.  whereas the EU fishing sector plays a key role in supplying fish to the public and keeping food stocks in balance in the Member States and the EU as a whole;

S.  whereas it must be ensured that the centralisation of fisheries management advocated by the CFP is compatible with the local management that is essential for ensuring the sector’s socio-economic viability;

T.  whereas regionalisation is one of the pillars of the CFP and the decentralised approach is of particular importance for the small-scale coastal fishing sector, taking into account the differences in the fisheries sector among individual Member States;

U.  whereas local co-management is key to ensuring the participation of the small-scale fisheries segment in the decision-making process;

V.  whereas the CFP therefore does not offer the clear and differentiated legislative support for small-scale fishing that could help to ensure its socio-economic viability; whereas the Member States are also failing to establish effective measures for this type of fishing;

W.  whereas, in many European coastal regions, and in particular in the Mediterranean, small-scale fishing and shellfish gathering operate at the intersection of the economic, social and environmental dimensions, making an important contribution to socio-economic well-being, employment and the promotion of economic and social cohesion in various coastal regions and outermost regions (ORs) that often face structural constraints and need support to harness opportunities for economic diversification;

X.  whereas income from fisheries should therefore not be deemed only as profit, as it also contributes to perpetuating a way of life that has immense cultural and historical value for many coastal communities, while at the same time providing an important social and economic safety net; whereas, in this sense, SSF represent a solution to increasing depopulation, ageing populations and mounting unemployment, which are all major challenges for most of the coastal regions of European countries and islands; whereas SSF’s influence on the social and cultural heritage of coastal areas is exceptional and diverse;

Y.  whereas SSF can play a fundamental role in the achievement of the SDGs, as explicitly recognised by target 14.b; whereas SSF can also provide contributions to the other policy imperatives underlying the SDGs, such as SDG 2 – ‘Zero Hunger’ and target 2.3 thereof, SDG 5 – ‘Gender Equality’ and targets 5.a and 5.b thereof, SDG 8 – ‘Decent Work and Economic Growth’ and target 8.5 thereof, and SDG 13 – ‘Climate Action’ as a whole;

Z.  whereas fishers have a role as ‘guardians of the sea’ and fishing makes a contribution to the supply of protein-rich foods for a healthy, balanced diet;

AA.  whereas the vast majority of accidents and incidents on fishing vessels are the result of human factors (62,4 %), with system/equipment failures being the second most common cause (23,2 % of cases);

AB.  whereas in many circumstances small-scale fishing is carried out with only one professional on board;

AC.  whereas the safety- and comfort-related issues of the SSF fleet cannot be viewed in isolation from fishing effort and fish yield; whereas, in this regard, the gross tonnage limitation, as a criterion to measure fishing capacity, has a negative impact on the safety and comfort of the SSF fleet, as it limits the incentive to replace and modernise vessels or increase available space in order to improve crew comfort, safety and ultimately the attractiveness of the sector, especially for young people and women;

AD.  whereas such safety-related issues cannot be viewed in isolation from the particularities of the SSF fleet in the Member States, such as the fact that the fleet may be exposed to high levels of risk as a result of the lack of specialised safety advice for the sector, the single-handed nature of operations, the long working hours or the danger of entrapment in the equipment; whereas operating conditions vary for the fleet; whereas part of the fleet operates from beaches or ports and harbours where operating conditions are very often precarious; whereas, in light of this situation, consideration should be given to tailoring the propulsion power to the fleet’s characteristics and the operating conditions, without increasing fishing effort or catch rates, with a view to making conditions for the fleet safer when entering and exiting port;

AE.  whereas these aspects relating to an increase in engine power for specific safety reasons should be financed through subsidies and, under certain conditions, should be supported by the EMFAF, provided that they do not increase the fishing effort or the ability to catch fish; whereas, for these reasons, EMFAF support should also be available for port and harbour dredging operations;

AF.  whereas small-scale fishing is much more dependent on sea conditions than large-scale fishing, which leads, depending on the type of vessel and gear, to greater irregularity in fishing periods, thus affecting the number of working days per year on which sailings are possible;

AG.  whereas artisanal fisheries are sustainable in terms of the biological management of fish stocks and with regard to resources and selectivity, as well as socially and economically, all of which contributes to the deep-rootedness of this activity;

AH.  whereas factors exerting pressure on fish stocks, and which also cause direct and indirect damage to fisheries, include pollution, habitat loss, maritime traffic and competition for space, as well as climate change, notable effects of which are rising water temperatures, acidification, changes to ocean currents, species asynchrony and the arrival of non-indigenous species;

AI.  whereas it is necessary to increase capacities to adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change and crises by adopting measures to strengthen the resilience of coastal communities;

AJ.  whereas small-scale fishing also has the potential to contribute to decarbonisation and increased energy efficiency and therefore ultimately to climate mitigation efforts;

AK.  whereas small-scale fishing is very important in the EU, especially for a number of fishing communities, in combination with large-scale and distant-water fishing;

AL.  whereas many of the causes of the worsening socio-economic situation in the sector have still to be addressed, including the need to strengthen the position of fishers in the supply chain;

AM.  whereas the recognition of producer organisations, associations and fishing guilds would enable them to access financial aid, and the promotion of their active participation through co-management could clearly improve earnings in the sector;

AN.  whereas earnings for small-scale, artisanal and coastal fisheries are impacted by volatile prices and sharp market fluctuations, which are sensitive to many external factors, such as the COVID-19 pandemic;

AO.  whereas the different systems of income and wages in the fishing sector are highly variable and largely contingent on the fishing opportunities offered by the sea, and this is one of the factors that makes it less attractive to new generations;

AP.  whereas fishing professionals are often paid low wages and have to contend with difficult – often precarious – working conditions in a profession that remains the most dangerous in the world, while the rising costs associated with starting up a fishing business, combined with the increasing concentration in the industry, make it a less attractive prospect, particularly to young people;

AQ.  whereas markets are often dominated by a small number of established products and SSF products that offer a sustainable alternative to heavily exploited species do not receive sufficient marketing attention; whereas consumers are often prevented from obtaining full information about the product that they are buying or the production system and fishing gear involved;

AR.  whereas the sustainable profitability of SSF is important to increase the attractiveness of the sector;

AS.  whereas small-scale vessels are the most severely impacted by the challenges surrounding the allocation of fishing licences in UK waters, due to the difficulties that they face in proving their fishing history;

AT.  whereas SSF enterprises are often undercapitalised or underfunded and have very limited access to basic accounting tools, credit, microfinance and insurance;

AU.  whereas the SSF sector continues to experience economic difficulties and a substantial decrease in revenues as a result of the significant increase in operating costs and other aggravating factors such as the reduction in the value of first-sale fish and rising fuel prices; whereas these and other factors have rendered SSF ever more reliant on fuel subsidies and often require fishers to increase fishing effort in order to make their activity economically viable;

AV.  whereas the TFEU and the EMFAF Regulation envisage and provide for specific support for the EU’s ORs;

AW.  whereas the SSF sector has traditionally suffered from a lack of organisational capacity; whereas the main factors that limit collective action by SSF include the large number of actors in the SSF sector, combined with their geographical dispersion; the nature of the business, which is mainly based on small family enterprises; the lack of trained staff devoted to management; and the lack of financial support for SSF organisations to take part in the decision-making process;

AX.  whereas SSF in the EU have generally been neglected in terms of monitoring and control by fisheries scientists and fisheries managers at national and EU levels; whereas the monitoring and control of small-scale fisheries should be improved to substantiate the sustainable management of EU fisheries and provide proof of fishing activities when necessary;

AY.  whereas greater investment is needed to conduct up-to-date research on and enhance understanding of the state of natural resources, marine ecosystems and specifically fish stocks, in order to ensure their sustainable management;

AZ.  whereas management strategies based solely on the reduction of fishing days, such as that applied to the Western Mediterranean, are bringing the SSF sector to its knees; whereas such continuous reductions, combined with the already precarious situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, risk leading to the collapse of a large share of the sector, which would no longer be able to reach the minimum profitability threshold that guarantees its survival; whereas these reductions also raise numerous issues, such as concerns around safety on board, a heightened risk of injuries, an increase in illegal fishing and the social repercussions of unemployment;

BA.  whereas fishers’ associations such as guilds are key players in the food systems of some Member States, where they operate as not-for-profit social economy entities representing the fisheries sector, and especially the small-scale coastal fleet and shellfish gatherers, performing functions of general interest for the benefit of maritime fishing and workers in the fisheries sector, as well as carrying out business-related tasks, such as marketing products and providing advisory and management services;

BB.  whereas there is a need to determine a fisheries resource management policy that respects collective access to fisheries resources, is based primarily on their biological aspects and takes the form of a fisheries co-management system that considers the specific conditions of fisheries resources and the respective sea areas, with the effective participation of those working in the sector;

BC.  whereas the farm to fork strategy urges that associations such as guilds be recognised under EU law and be eligible to receive financial aid on an equal footing with producer organisations; whereas the Commission has been asked to adopt an initiative in this regard;

BD.  whereas artisanal fishers have a need for training, including to develop new skills;

BE.  whereas work by women provides added value in the artisanal fisheries sector;

BF.  whereas the SSF sector finds itself increasingly in competition with other blue economy activities, as well as with renewable energy interests that affect many activities along the coast, in beaches or harbour areas, thus potentially taking over areas previously used almost exclusively by SSF, resulting in displacement and ‘sea and coastal grabbing’;

BG.  whereas gentrification processes occurring in many developing coastal areas risk making it increasingly unaffordable for small-scale fishers to live in coastal areas, pushing them far away from their place of work and thus rendering their activity even more difficult and inconvenient;

BH.  whereas the increased focus on conservation promoted by the EU has a particular impact on small-scale fishing, an example of which is the implementation of marine protected areas (MPAs) and MPA networks, which affect small-scale fishing by restricting the associated activities and limiting mobility; whereas the impact on this segment is rarely considered in the design of these policies, an aspect that is aggravated by the fact that actors from the segment are not adequately involved in these processes(30);

BI.  whereas the fishing sector in general and small-scale fishing in particular are under-represented when defining fisheries management policies and policies on the use of maritime space;

BJ.  whereas there are various types of fishery organisations, with different levels of membership representing small-scale fishing: from producer organisations to fishers’ associations, shipowners’ associations and cooperatives, among others; whereas many small shipowners are not affiliated to any organisations; whereas professionals in the fishing industry are represented in fisheries trade unions; whereas it should be up to the sector to determine how it organises itself;

BK.  whereas the disaggregation of the relevant data is inadequate, which makes access to detailed information difficult, particularly where small-scale fishing is concerned, and hampers analysis, in particular in terms of breaking down undertakings, shipowners, fishing professionals, vessels and gear, working conditions, age and gender, among other things;

Strengthening small-scale fisheries along the value chain, promoting higher fisheries incomes and providing income diversification opportunities

1.  Takes the view that the future of small-scale, coastal and artisanal fishing depends not only on long-term and sustainable measures, but also on immediate, meaningful and effective measures to increase fishers’ profit margins also through higher quota allocations in line with scientific advice; considers it necessary to enhance the organisational and commercial capacities of the sector and the profession’s attractiveness, to provide training and targeted support for young people and to improve operating conditions, in particular for the inclusion of women on board vessels and in the sector more generally, and to strengthen its position in the supply chain; calls on the Commission, therefore, working in close cooperation with the Member States, to establish and implement support mechanisms, within the EMFAF framework, for small-scale, artisanal and coastal fisheries that make it possible to tackle the specific problems in this part of the sector;

2.  Believes that the future of small-scale fishing requires that its specific nature be recognised in the CFP and that the present instruments be adapted in order to meet the needs of this sector;

3.  Stresses the need for a common, broader and more appropriate definition of small-scale, artisanal and coastal fisheries; stresses that such a definition should be pragmatic, measureable and clear; also emphasises that the definition should result from an appropriate assessment, taking into account the characteristics and criteria of the SSF segment other than vessel length, in order to bring the EU definition of SSF into line with the reality of the segment, as is already the case with the existing definitions included within certain international conventions such as the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) or the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM);

4.  Stresses the fact that this definition should be included in a more horizontal regulation, such as the CFP Regulation, so as to encompass EU fisheries legislation in its entirety; considers that any change to the definition should not impact the implementation of the EMFAF for the current period; calls on the Commission to address this issue within the future review of the CFP Regulation;

5.  Affirms the need to strengthen and shorten the sector’s value chain between the producer and the consumer, thereby increasing the opportunities for direct sales from fisher to consumer and reducing the number of intermediaries in order, ideally, to reach the point where the producer is able to supply the final customer directly; stresses the need to promote marketing strategies, including through the promotion of new distribution channels, and to foster mechanisms to improve product differentiation, so as to obtain the maximum benefit for fishers, increase profitability, support higher remunerations and promote the fair and appropriate distribution of added value to fishers;

6.  Calls for a fairer and more proper distribution of added value along the sector’s value chain and for consideration to be given to forms of intervention along the lines of guarantee and guide prices, for which the production costs should be taken as a variable, in order to achieve the above aim and improve fishers’ incomes; reiterates that when there are serious imbalances within the chain, Member States should have the power to intervene;

7.  Stresses the fact that SSF are the weakest segment along the value chain and marketing arrangements often tend to favour the interests of the buyer rather than the fishers, who have little to no control over pricing, which in turn leads to marginal earnings for the products sold;

8.  Calls for measures at EU or Member State level aimed at defending or creating markets of origin, thereby advocating preferential short sales channels for traditional products; stresses the importance of promoting and defending the qualities of fish caught by small-scale fishing such as, among others, freshness, seasonality, cultural heritage and sustainability; calls for stronger support for such products at trade fairs, small shops and restaurants, taking into account the population’s eating habits, as a way of maximising the value of local fisheries products and promoting local development; insists on the creation of promotional campaigns for local fishing products taking full advantage of the common organisation of the markets (CMO) and CFP;

9.  Stresses the need to promote product diversification through initiatives aimed at creating new markets, valuing lesser known edible and consumed species in order to improve SSF’s market position, alleviate the demand for products whose constant supply throughout the year can only be guaranteed by imports and help reduce fishing pressure on overexploited species; reiterates the need to also support the promotion of product diversification in the canning industry, namely through the use of undervalued or less-consumed species;

10.  Calls for the implementation of a training programme for the hotel, restaurant and catering (Horeca) sector, providing knowledge of seafood products and good practices to protect resources, in particular raising awareness of the ‘non-sale’ and ‘non-consumption’ of species during the closed season;

11.  Emphasises the importance of implementing innovative projects in the retail sector, highlighting the cooperation work with fisher’s guilds and associations of SSF, through which a close relationship with the final consumer is maintained;

12.  Calls on the Member States and producer organisations to consider better ways to promote the marketing of processed fisheries products with higher added value, including canned products, following the example of certain agricultural products, and programmes for the external promotion of EU fisheries products, including their presentation at international competitions and fairs;

13.  Stresses the fact that the seafood sector has very limited tools, such as labels, available to consumers in order to assess the sustainability criteria for the SSF segment and promote low-impact products; underlines that where labels exist, they could become a disadvantage to SSF, as it might be burdensome to access some of the data needed or they may lack the financial capacity to initiate a certification process;

14.  Points out the need for an ambitious revision of the CMO Regulation with the aim of increasing its contribution to the sector’s income and to market stability, as well as to improve the marketing of fishery products and increase their added value; in this context, stresses the importance of creating certified seafood labels and fisheries product brand mechanisms, as well as of increasing traceability in the supply chain, which would in turn improve information to consumers, encouraging them to buy locally and sustainably sourced seafood and raise their awareness of SSF products;

15.  Calls for small-scale fishing support programmes to be facilitated through the EMFAF with a view to improving business management and organisational capacities, driving down production costs, improving first-sale prices and ensuring economic and environmental sustainability, in particular through a more sustainable and modern fleet;

16.  Stresses the difficulties that the SSF sector is still experiencing, which can also be aggravated by fluctuating and rising prices for fuel and other inputs, a situation that particularly affects the less competitive fleet segments, namely small-scale, artisanal and coastal fishing;

Improving operating conditions and guaranteeing the future of small-scale, artisanal and coastal fisheries

17.  Welcomes the fact that the EMFAF provides the possibility to support the modernisation, replacement or acquisition of newer engines that emit less CO2, including engines using new energy-efficient technologies, and the conversion of petrol engines; considers that the highest existing co-financing rates should be used; warns that many of these alternative motorisation solutions have not yet been sufficiently developed or involve a significant increase in gross tonnage, such as in the case of some electric motors;

18.  Underlines that in certain regions, the majority of the SSF sector is dependent on fuel subsidies; warns that the Commission’s proposal for a Council directive restructuring the Union framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (COM(2021)0563), by ending the current mandatory exemption for the fishing sector and introducing a minimum rate of taxation, puts at risk the viability of the majority of the SSF segment, which cannot make long voyages in order to refuel in ports with lower prices; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure equal conditions at international level and therefore continue to exempt the fishing industry from fuel taxation; stresses that any new approach should not result in a burden for SSF and should focus on alternative solutions that allow the sector to combine a just transition towards the goals set in the Green Deal with the ability to thrive economically and guarantee decent conditions for its workers; considers, in that regard, and given the current extraordinary inflation of fuel prices, that extraordinary measures could be envisaged by the Member States to provide aid to the small-scale, coastal and artisanal fisheries segment for the expected rising production costs, in particular within the scope of the EMFAF and the national operational programmes;

19.  Highlights the difficulties and the serious adverse economic and social effects that the COVID-19 crisis has had on the fisheries sector and the importance for Member States to channel the available national and EU funds, if needed, as well as the consideration of exceptional measures to help fishers, including workers, in overcoming crises or market disturbances; calls on the Member States to use the resources made available through the crisis mechanisms to support SSF; underlines that, in spite of the crisis, the small-scale coastal fisheries sector still continued to function, giving EU citizens access to seafood, especially in isolated coastal regions, islands and the ORs;

20.  Urges Member States to allocate funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility to investment in the small-scale coastal fleet with the aim of helping fishers and operators who do associated work, mainly women, such as net menders, shore-based assistants and packagers, and workers;

21.  Urges the Commission to facilitate, under the aegis of the EMFAF, SSF sector-specific support for the installation of storage, freezing and refrigeration infrastructure and for maintaining the cold chain from boat to final consumer; considers this support a decisive element to enable the SSF segment to take full advantage of fisheries resources – without destroying or depleting stocks – as well as to ensure a regular supply and delivery of fresh and high-quality products to the public, the Horeca sector and the food processing industry;

22.  Considers that proper storage conditions in ports could facilitate and guarantee the preservation of fish and assist commercial placement, with a view to improving the profitability of fish by acting indirectly in price formation; recalls, in this context, the possibilities provided for in the CMO and by producer organisations;

23.  Takes the view that the EMFAF and the new national operational programmes should strengthen and provide clear support to small-scale fishing, in order to contribute to ensuring the sustainability and future viability of the countless coastal communities that are traditionally dependent on fishing, so as to address the specific problems of this segment and support the local sustainable management of the fisheries involved;

24.  Considers that the support channelled by Member States when implementing the EMFAF should be marshalled to address structural failures, thereby contributing to increased incomes from fishing, promoting jobs with rights in the sector and ensuring fair prices for producers, supporting the development of related activities, upstream and downstream of fishing, contributing to the development and cohesion of coastal regions within a framework of sustainable fishing and a future for the SSF sector;

25.  Stresses that, with a view to improving the execution rate of EMFAF financing and ensuring that SSF have access to support, it is necessary to look into and implement measures to streamline procedures, thereby reducing the red tape, complexity and approval time surrounding applications; amend the funding process for receiving aid and replace it with a system of pre-financing; and fully utilise the fund’s financing limits;

26.  Stresses that the EU is missing a tool to understand the extent of EMFF and EMFAF investments in the SSF sector, the number of good practices funded, the delivery of concrete results and how Fisheries Local Action Groups are working and effectively implementing the CFP; calls on the Commission to establish such a tool as a fundamental step in order to understand how to scale up good practices and replicate virtuous fishing methods on an EU-wide scale;

27.  Calls on Member States to provide technical assistance at local level to facilitate small-scale fishers’ access to EU and national funding;

28.  Warns of the high average age of the small-scale fishing fleet and stresses, in this regard, the need to make the fishing activity of this segment attractive for young people and women; emphasises the need to renew and update the small-scale fleet with a view to improving safety and living conditions on board, improving energy efficiency and making the segment more environmentally friendly, while ensuring that there is no increase in fishing capacity in the overall fishing fleet and improving the social and economic sustainability of the fishing communities that depend on the fleet; in this context, highlights the need to address situations where vessels have become obsolete bringing increased operating, maintenance and reclassification costs (economically and environmentally), which in turn compromise the guaranteed safety conditions during operations; stresses that the gross tonnage criteria to measure fishing capacity, by also including the space reserved for crew facilities and comfort, might hinder the modernisation of fishing vessels and the much-needed improvement of the working conditions of the small-scale fishing fleet; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to review these criteria and other interlinked provisions in order to find a solution capable of balancing the needs of small-scale fishing workers with the need to ensure that the EU fleet’s fishing capacity is not increased;

29.  Reiterates that support for the required renewal and/or modernisation of the fleet is necessary for improving the safety, working conditions and economic and environmental sustainability of activities; stresses, however, that this should only be achieved without increasing fishing capacity;

30.  Takes the view that ignoring the need for fleet renewal and the maintenance and improvement of vessels, particularly but not exclusively, of obsolete and inefficient vessels, would endanger the future of small-scale fishing, especially in the ORs;

31.  Points out that the EMFAF provides opportunities for investments in safety, better living conditions and energy performance for vessels, which may also benefit the small-scale coastal and artisanal fleet, and that it should also offer funding opportunities for the renewal, restructuring and resizing of vessels, and the purchase of new vessels in the small-scale fishing fleet – especially in the identified cases where this fleet is of an advanced average age and does not guarantee essential conditions of safety and operability – as well as for increases in engine power where duly justified in order to ensure better safety conditions on board during operations and at entry and exit from the sea, and to increase the time spent at sea, provided that there is no increase in fishing effort capacity, particularly in the ORs;

32.  Urges the Member States to ensure the full implementation of EU standards and regulations in relation to safety, labour and living conditions on board fishing vessels;

33.  Emphasises that Member States should continuously work on maintaining and upgrading their ports and harbours to ensure that catches can be landed and unloaded in conditions of safety;

34.  Stresses the socio-economic importance, in terms of employment and social cohesion, of the fisheries sector, including small-scale, artisanal and coastal fisheries for the ORs, areas that are characterised by structural constraints and fewer opportunities for economic diversification; calls, therefore, for an increase in EU support for the SSF sector in those regions;

35.  Notes the support, provided under the EMFAF, for the fisheries sector in the ORs, with a view, in particular, to providing support for the additional costs arising from remoteness when it comes to selling certain fisheries products from some ORs;

36.  Points to the specific features of the fisheries sector value chains in the ORs and maintains that special attention is needed in order to strengthen them and facilitate their access to markets, an aim that could be achieved by not only re-establishing a POSEI scheme for fisheries, but also by establishing a similar scheme for transport;

37.  Highlights the potential of tourist fishing in these regions as a way of attracting young people into the profession and diversifying fishers’ incomes without increasing their fishing effort, respecting the fishing effort limits and raising public awareness about the traditions of the sector and sea literacy; stresses the need to guarantee a reduction in bureaucracy related to this activity and to provide EU support for these activities;

38.  Considers that the future of small-scale fishing requires that EU regulations ensure a regulatory environment that strengthens the position of fishers in the supply chain and provides investments for the long-term sustainability, stability and economic competitiveness of the sector;

39.  Takes the view that the objectives of a fisheries policy should include guaranteeing the supply of fish to the public – as part of ensuring food security and sovereignty – developing coastal communities, while ensuring that fisheries activities develop within ecological limits, and promoting the fisheries-related professions by increasing their attractiveness; highlights that the implementation of the CFP should also recognise the socio-economic role of SSF in fishing communities, providing jobs and improving the living conditions of fishers and of the workers carrying out auxiliary tasks, usually women, with the improvement of working, habitability conditions and safety conditions for crews, in order to attract young people and achieve a generational renewal of this activity, within a framework of guaranteed sustainability and good resource conservation;

40.  Reiterates that the reality of fisheries in the EU is complex and varies widely from Member State to Member State in terms of the respective fishing fleets, the environmental impact of different fleet segments, fishing gear, fish stocks and their state of conservation, and the consumption habits of the population; highlights the possibility of the regionalisation, where appropriate, of fisheries management within the framework of the CFP, while at the same time ensuring a level playing field for all fishers, including in regional fisheries management organisations; reaffirms that this great diversity requires the management of fisheries to be accompanied by exceptions that permit Member States and regions to implement more specialised management practices, that take into account specific characteristics, promote dialogue, involve the sector and coastal communities in the decision-making process, in defining and implementing policies, and that are based on sound scientific knowledge;

41.  Believes, therefore, that management initiatives at local level through co-management need to be considered in the Member States’ EMFAF programmes;

42.  Emphasises that the revision currently under way of Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 on the control of fisheries should respect the special features of small-scale fishing activity and not overload it with bureaucracy, particularly in relation to geolocation or electronic sending of catch data; calls for a control system that is specifically designed and suited to the reality and the diversity of the small-scale coastal fleet, including shellfish gathering and fishing without vessels, in which proportionality and a phased approach are key;

43.  Considers that the diversification of activities within the broader sustainable blue economy is important, entailing shoring up the culture of communities, promoting fishing by-products and products that, while they have potential, have no commercial value; considers, however, that such activities should not compromise fishing activity or fishers’ historic rights to the sea;

44.  Believes that the use of maritime space for other areas of economic exploitation should not compromise historic fishing rights; considers that small-scale fishing should be fully integrated into the strategic planning of these policies; believes that a similar situation exists in inland waters, where SSF face increasing conflicts over resources and freshwater use, competing with industries that have a negative impact on riparian habitats and fish resources;

45.  Stresses that the socio-economic and environmental challenges arising from the management of MPAs offer a potential solution to reconcile conservation and sustainability objectives on the one hand with the integration of the SSF sector into management decisions in and around MPAs on the other; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to develop participatory approaches to the management of MPAs, based on biological and socio-economic data jointly formulated, implemented and revised together with MPA practitioners, concerned stakeholders and the SSF sector; calls on the Commission and the Member States to consider developing participative management practices, also with a view to striking a balance between the sustainable development of SSF and, where applicable, the sustainable development of responsible tourism;

46.  Points out the need for economic and social protection during non-fishing periods and in the event of disasters that hamper activities; highlights the need for mechanisms providing for wage compensation for lost earnings during such periods; stresses that such compensation should be treated as actual working time for the purposes of the retirement pension and other social security entitlements;

47.  Believes that, if we wish to see generational renewal, attractive conditions for young people and women must be put in place, which means valuing the income of fishing while ensuring its stability, and the application of the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, increasing quota allocation to SSF in line with scientific advice, ensuring training under conditions that take due account of the diversity of fishing practices, fishing gears and needs of each Member State, as well as guaranteeing adequate working conditions and safety on board; recalls that the EMFAF provides support for training and professional development; considers that training should guarantee a strong practical component, taking into account the specific reality of the national, regional or local context in which it takes place; holds the view, in addition, that it should be possible to combine this with theoretical training, while also profiting from the accumulated knowledge of those who have been or are at sea;

48.  Calls for the financial and technical resources for fisheries research in each Member State to be increased with a view to developing activities targeted at fisheries and fishery resources, stepping up and improving data collection and the assessment of the state of resources;

49.  Calls for an increase in the financial and technical resources for fisheries-related scientific research and development in the EU and in each Member State; in particular, stresses the need to support research institutes and laboratories in this area with material and human resources with a view to developing activities targeted at promoting small-scale, coastal and artisanal fisheries, and guaranteeing better understanding of the various causes of fish stock depletion, and the conservation of fish resources; stresses the need to involve fishers and fishers’ associations in scientific monitoring, mapping, data collection, management and control activities, in order to take full advantage of their knowledge;

50.  Calls on the Commission to launch a comprehensive and region-wide mapping action to develop an accurate and complete body of baseline data on SSF with a view to measuring the economic and social impact of SSF both in quantitative and qualitative terms and to estimate the value of the output produced by SSF; their economic impact on coastal communities; and their impact on related sectors;

51.  Calls on Member States and the Commission to support research into practices increasing and diversifying the income of fishing communities and the fishing sector, including SSF; believes that the result of such research should be disseminated in the EU with a view to replicating, implementing and promoting projects both at national and EU level;

52.  Highlights that in spite of improvements in data coverage, there is still a lack of exhaustive economic, social and territorial statistical data and indicators at European level on SSF; stresses that this lack of statistics does not allow for a proper analysis of the segment and therefore make it more difficult to put in place proper legislative action to tackle the most critical issues SSF are facing;

53.  Calls on Member States to step up and improve the proper collection and disaggregation of data on fisheries, obtaining adequate statistical data on catches and landings with a view to better resource assessment and management, including associated activities, social and economic aspects, and analyses of other commercial uses, particularly for SSF and the communities associated with them;

54.  Calls on the Commission to launch a comprehensive and region-wide mapping of social protection systems and the national legislation in place and available to SSF in the Member States with a view to identifying and promoting the most successful options, including legislative and institutional mechanisms which ensure the full participation of SSF in all activities related to the sustainable development of the sector, such as the development of alternative activities, co-management, financial support, labelling, traceability and the right to decent work and social protection;

55.  Takes the view that when implementing the CFP, Member States must ensure that the implementation of the necessary environmental objectives must go hand in hand with defining social and economic objectives, and that their interdependence should be taken into account by the Commission and the Member States, both when implementing legislation and when designing future legislative initiatives;

56.  Stresses that producer organisations can play a key role in the management of the commercialisation structures of SSF products, in improving market access for SSF products and in increasing the availability of local food products within coastal communities; stresses in particular the fact that these strengthening and promotion activities would help to put SSF in a better position to negotiate prices, and would promote healthy intra-sectoral competition and a more efficient use of their own structures and resources through collective action;

57.  Stresses, in this regard, the crucial importance for the SSF sector to have a stronger dedicated organisational capacity in order to strengthen its position in the value chain; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take measures to increase the bargaining power of small-scale fishers and to support, encourage and facilitate the creation of producer organisations, associations and cooperatives for this segment as an important tool in improving their strength in the supply chain and increase their negotiating power vis-à-vis other market actors, in order to ensure good profit margins and to better manage their fishing activities;

58.  Insists that associations and guilds must be recognised and eligible to receive financial aid on an equal footing with producer organisations; calls on Member States and the Commission, in particular within the framework of the reform of the CMO, to adopt initiatives on this matter with the aim of removing any discrimination between guilds and producer organisations;

59.  Calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to follow up on the CMO Regulation by establishing regional plans for SSF producers’ organisations in order to increase the SSF sector’s profitability and improve the quality and traceability of its products;

60.  Stresses the importance of involving small-scale fishers in decision-making processes at the EU, national and local levels, and calls on the Council and Member States to improve transparency in the decision-making process concerning SSF to ensure accountability; encourages the empowerment of associations of small-scale fishers to share responsibility and decision-making power in the drafting and implementation of co-management plans with national authorities in co-management committees;

61.  Stresses that the viability of SSF critically depends on secure access to resources and fishing areas on the one hand, and to value-added markets on the other; calls, in this respect, for a differentiated approach to the management of SSF that includes priority access to inshore fishing areas;

62.  Considers that co-management is a vital tool for SSF, making it possible to optimise the management of fishing resources using an integrated approach, taking into account all aspects of sustainability, including environmental, social and economic aspects, and incorporating the active participation and involvement of the administration, the fishing sector, the scientific community and civil society organisations;

63.  Underlines the low environmental impact of fisheries and its healthy food production, as it does not involve artificial feeding, antibiotics, fertilizers or any use of chemical pesticides;

64.  Stresses that an artificial conflict between industrial versus small-scale fishers should not be created; takes the view that the industrial and small-scale fishers are not in competition with each other, as they mostly fish for different species in mostly different fishing grounds; takes note of the fact that the so-called industrial fishing companies are also family businesses that have existed for generations and are deeply rooted in and connected to local fishing communities;

65.  Points out that the declaration of 2022 as the International Year of Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture constitutes an exceptional opportunity for directing global attention to the work done by this segment of the fleet for food security and the sustainable use of natural resources, as well to ensure that artisanal fishing gains visibility and is included more actively in decision-making processes;

66.  Considers that improving selectivity and making the transition towards low-impact fishing techniques is key for the survival and prosperity of SSF;

67.  Stresses that public institutions should facilitate access to finance to the weakest segments of the fleet in order to foster value chains and prevent market failures; in this regard, calls on the Commission and the Member States to set up legislative initiatives to facilitate access to formal finance for the SSF sector; stresses that this should include access to both formal credit for capital expenses and financing for fishing operations; the development, in partnership with financial institutions, of facilities and financial products for medium to long-term investment; and the application of formal financing schemes such as production contracts or storage receipts, with the participation of fishers, traders and public authorities;

68.  Highlights that marine spatial planning (MSP) is key in ensuring the participation of all stakeholders in decisions concerning the use and protection of the marine environment; highlights that MSP is a key tool to ensure the participation of small-scale fishers in the decision-making process;

69.  Maintains that the continuous fall in EU support for the sector under successive multiannual financial frameworks and, in particular, the cut in funding for the EFF/EMFAF and the CMO, is one of the factors which has been serving to worsen the situation in the sector; reiterates, therefore, that the EU’s financial support for the fisheries sector needs to be stepped up considerably;

70.  Considers the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication to be a valuable contribution in defining a framework to safeguard, maximise and promote small-scale fishing within the context of a fisheries management policy;

71.  Calls on all Member States to enhance the role of work by women in fishing through specific projects and by giving full legal recognition to the role of women as ‘assistants’ and co-workers in family fishing firms, with the aim of ensuring greater labour guarantees, income for the future and social security benefits;

72.  Considers it appropriate to strengthen cooperation with a view to recognising basic training provided by schools or educational institutions that are recognised by the national education systems of each Member State or third country and which are internationally recognised;

73.  Considers that building points of unity between the diverse range of organisations representing the sector would be an important element in defending its claims and ensuring that it is duly taken into account in defining fisheries management policies and policies for the use of maritime space;

74.  Calls on the Commission to promote projects, in the context of cohesion policy, that will make a contribution to protecting coastal and island areas as integral parts of fishing and maritime heritage;

75.  Stresses that the SSF sector, more than the rest of the fleet segments, may bear the brunt of the impact of the growing need for renewable energy sources to meet the goals set by the EU Green Deal; stresses that SSF will be particularly affected if displacement deriving from the installation of a growing number of offshore windfarm units within inshore fishing grounds takes place, as they may not have the capacity to move to fishing grounds further afield or to change fishing methods; calls, in this regard, for appropriate marine spatial planning in order to guarantee the interests of all sectors and for fair compensation to small-scale fishers as a last resort;

76.  Stresses the opportunities deriving from possible synergies between SSF and other sectors and, in particular, with coastal tourism that shares the same assets and infrastructures as the SSF sector; stresses that such synergies would enable diversification in the local economy, provide additional jobs and income to families, and help stabilise the declining profitability and employment in the fisheries sector; calls, in this regard, for a clear definition of ‘pesca-tourism’ that allows for a regulated activity and at the same time for professional small-scale fishers to take full advantage of the opportunities provided by synergies with the blue economy sector;

77.  Highlights that within the SSF sector women continue to be under-represented; stresses that in spite of this, women have always played an active, although frequently invisible, role within the SSF sector; stresses that this ‘invisibility’ is attributable not only to cultural reasons, but also to the lack of official statistical data on women’s employment within the SSF sector; calls on the Commission and Member States to support projects dedicated to collecting information on women’s employment, as well as to enable women to enter the SSF sector and occupy a central role within it;

78.  Considers that guaranteeing an accessible working environment, including within the fisheries sector, with a view to reintegrating into the labour market both active and former fishers and other workers in the fishing industry who suffer from physical or mental disabilities, would lead to more social inclusion and help to create more incentives for income generation in the fisheries sector and fishing communities;

o
o   o

79.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

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