



TEXTS ADOPTED

P9_TA(2023)0113

EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, EU Battlegroups and Article 44 TEU: the way forward

European Parliament resolution of 19 April 2023 on the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, EU Battlegroups and Article 44 TEU: the way forward (2022/2145(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Article 44 thereof,
- having regard to the action plan entitled ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, which was approved by Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,
- having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility (EPF)¹,
- having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 November 2018 on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact,
- having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2018 on the integrated approach to external conflicts and crises,
- having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of Heads of State and Government of 11 March 2022,
- having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 and 25 March and of 30 and 31 May 2022,
- having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2022²,
- having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty,

¹ OJ L 102, 24.3.2021, p. 14.

² Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0010.

- having regard to the Wales Summit Declaration adopted by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the North Atlantic Council meeting of 5 September 2014, and in particular to the measures making the NATO Response Force (NRF) more responsive and capable,
 - having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022, and in particular to the new NATO Strategic Concept adopted at this Summit,
 - having regard to the joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016 and 10 July 2018, and to the 74 proposals for common action endorsed by EU Member States and NATO Allies,
 - having regard to the report on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe of 9 May 2022,
 - having regard to the results of the Foreign Affairs Council (Defence) of 15 November 2022,
 - having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,
 - having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0077/2023),
- A. whereas since 2003 the EU has acquired extensive experience in deploying military operations and civilian missions to promote peace, security, stability and progress in Europe and in the world, gained in 19 completed and 18 ongoing missions; whereas these common security and defence policy (CSDP) operations and missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the Member States, United Nations, NATO, other international organisations and third countries; whereas many EU Member States are also key contributors to UN-led missions and operations; whereas the simultaneous presence of several actors, missions and operations in a single conflict area underlines the importance of coordination and the division of labour for improving coherence and effectiveness;
- B. whereas the geopolitical landscape in Europe has changed dramatically after the outbreak of war on European soil; whereas the global security situation has worsened and whereas the Union needs to be more responsive and credible in addressing crises; whereas the EU has been striving for over 20 years to become an effective security actor and encourages cooperation of EU Member States through a variety of structures and instruments, such as the European Defence Agency, the Capability Development Plan, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) in order to improve capabilities, interoperability and cost-effective solutions for European defence; whereas the results and effectiveness of these instruments are still rather limited; whereas 61 PESCO projects have been launched since 2017 without achieving any tangible results;
- C. whereas Sweden and Finland jointly submitted their applications to join NATO on 18 May 2022; whereas NATO Allies signed the Accession Protocols for Finland and Sweden on 5 July 2022;

- D. whereas Europe is a pillar of peace and stability in the world, a role which requires the strong support of the European citizens; whereas, in this context, the need has arisen to counter hostile disinformation campaigns and to proactively communicate the purpose and objectives of EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (EU RDC) deployments to European citizens, the local populations of host countries and the international community;
- E. whereas the EU RDC is a key component for the European Union's strategic autonomy and should significantly improve our security and defence capacities for acting outside EU territory; whereas the creation of the EU RDC should generate new security synergies and strengthen operational capabilities, including also in relations with our partners;
- F. whereas CSDP missions and operations regularly depend on good operationalisation of the EU's integrated approach, on the effective performance of international partners' missions, reliable cooperation, timely information-sharing, as well as on sincere host nation institutional and societal support, ownership, respect for international human rights law, international humanitarian law and democratic and transparency standard, as well as on the political will of the Member States to guarantee sufficient personnel and financial resources; whereas the lack of any of these can jeopardise the successful implementation of a CSDP mission's mandate and ultimately lead to the withdrawal of EU-led forces; whereas mandates should set clearly defined objectives for EU missions and operations, including a timetable for their achievement, as well as a comprehensive exit strategy;
- G. whereas in light of recent experiences in the Sahel region, there is a need to learn lessons and put the security interests of the local population at the heart of a genuine human security approach;
- H. whereas the premature termination of CSDP missions can leave host nations and their authorities in a weak position to protect their populations, thereby creating power vacuums that can be exploited by other state and non-state actors, including terrorists and extremists, including those sponsored by our global competitors;
- I. whereas the European Union and its Member States should strive for coordination with like-minded partners when preparing, conducting and sustaining CSDP missions and operations; whereas the Union should be capable of rapidly deploying multinational, multidimensional and modular forces, swiftly reinforcing them where needed and sustaining them as long as required in coordination with like-minded partners but without depending on third-party support;
- J. whereas CSDP missions are undertaken using human resources and capabilities provided by the Member States and depend on the sufficient provision of forces and equipment; whereas Member States frequently fail to provide sufficient forces and equipment to CSDP missions, thus compromising the effectiveness of the mission; whereas Member States' capabilities are used for national purposes and for their contributions to collective defence and to missions abroad; whereas candidate and association countries have also contributed to CSDP missions;
- K. whereas for collective defence, many Member States coordinate their efforts and employ their forces within the NATO framework; whereas many Member States also contribute to missions outside the EU within the CSDP framework;

- L. whereas building capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture, threat perception and solutions to be developed and combined in doctrine and concepts, the organisation and structure of forces, regular individual, collective and multinational training, adequate logistics, defence materiel development, procurement and life-cycle management, military leadership development, staff recruitment and development, defence infrastructures, installations and facilities, interoperability and standardisation;
- M. whereas common procurement initiatives are critical for ensuring the EU's strategic autonomy in a currently volatile regional and international environment;
- N. whereas Member States should address capability shortfalls in strategic enablers and commit to substantially narrowing critical gaps by 2025, in particular those linked to the EU RDC;
- O. whereas exercises should be adapted to the current threat landscape and possible EU RDC deployment scenarios; whereas based on the single set of forces principle, converging training and certification standards can improve the interoperability of available EU Member State forces; whereas joint training for civil and military officials in the EU RDC requires the progressive adaptation of the teaching and training provided by the European Security and Defence College, established by Joint Action 2008/550/CFDP;
- P. whereas the Strategic Compass was adopted on 21 March 2022, very shortly after Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine began, and sets out EU-level action in many of these areas;
- Q. whereas when adopting the Strategic Compass, Member States agreed that they must collectively be able to respond to imminent threats or to react rapidly to a crisis outside the Union at any stage of the conflict cycle and to develop a rapid deployment capability which would allow the EU to rapidly deploy a modular force, including land, air and maritime components, as well as the necessary strategic assets;
- R. whereas the Strategic Compass proposes 'significantly enhancing and harnessing the full potential of EU funding instruments, in particular the European Defence Fund, as key to strengthen our defence capabilities and also equip Member States' forces to face the future battlefields';
- S. whereas the European Defence Fund (EDF) is an EU instrument which has already been deployed, is designed to improve military capabilities and includes strengthening the competitiveness of the industrial base;
- T. whereas the EDF and the EPF have already been used; whereas the EDF is an instrument designed to improve military capabilities while the EPF is designed foster operational support, cooperation and burden-sharing abroad;
- U. whereas the proposed European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) and European defence investment programme (EDIP) regulations should facilitate common procurement involving EU Member States in a truly cooperative spirit, thus enhancing interoperability between national armed forces;

- V. whereas a re-evaluation and appropriate increase of the EPF budget to ensure the proper and timely financing of the EU RDC under any conceivable scenario is absolutely vital; whereas these funding increases should take into account the need to co-finance military support for Ukraine, and therefore be increased so that the EPF's budget can cover the costs for its scheduled activities and EU RDC operating expenditure; whereas more than 50 % of the original budget for the EPF for 2021-2027 has already been spent;
- W. whereas consideration should be given to what types of expenditure related to the Rapid Deployment Capacity can be financed from the EU budget under Article 44 TEU;
- X. whereas the EU RDC is essential for CSDP as it is the only military capability on stand-by for possible operations and contributes to enhancing the effectiveness of Member States' armed forces;
- Y. whereas the Battlegroup Concept has helped develop multinational defence cooperation and interoperability, as well as the transformation of armed forces for rapid deployment and their modernisation;
- Z. whereas problems related to decision-making and political will have structurally hampered the deployment of EU battlegroups since their creation in 2007 and as a result they have never been used;
- AA. whereas in general, Member States have not mobilised sufficient political will over the years to make important instruments such as battlegroups a reliable and well-functioning capability;
- AB. whereas in cases when EU battlegroups have not been deployed, individual EU Member States have instead occasionally acted outside the EU framework, either on their own or with other EU or non-EU states, inevitably constraining, if not undermining, the EU's stated aspiration for 'integration' of policy tools, institutions and actors in pursuit of common interests and values, including also in foreign policy; whereas in these cases Parliament has not therefore been able to exercise either formal or informal democratic oversight;
- AC. whereas the 'costs lie where they fall' principle for battlegroup funding provides no incentive for Member States contributing troops to actually deploy them when on stand-by; whereas this has been an underlying reason for Member States' unwillingness to contribute troops;
- AD. whereas the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Council have formally recognised lack of common funding for battlegroups as 'the most significant obstacle'; whereas evidence and previous examples suggest that it appeared to be much easier to come to a decision if there are no additional costs for nations involved;
- AE. whereas each time the use of battlegroups has been discussed but not agreed, a negative precedent that undermines the spirit of solidarity and cooperation has been reinforced;
- AF. whereas the early years of the battlegroups were marked by declining momentum for the CSDP, particularly due to defence cuts after the 2008 financial crisis;
- AG. whereas there has been relatively limited actual convergence among Member States on threat priorities faced by the European Union and the need to be able to rapidly respond

to them; whereas the Strategic Compass makes considerable progress on this through the common threat analysis;

- AH. whereas a comprehensive approach is a prerequisite for achieving sustainable results in enhancing security and stability in conflict areas; whereas the EU's integrated approach provides for the coherent use of different instruments at different stages of conflicts; whereas the integrated approach is also meant to prioritise prevention and promote the human security of local populations;
- AI. whereas NATO remains the key institutional framework for Euro-Atlantic security;
- AJ. whereas the European Union urgently needs to assume more responsibility for its own security by acting in its neighbourhood and beyond; whereas to achieve this end, the EU must improve its own security and defence capabilities in order to ensure its strategic autonomy as well as its ability to safeguard its own values and interests;
- AK. whereas on 14 November 2022 the Council adopted conclusions on women, peace and security (WPS), where paragraphs 7 and 14 explicitly highlight the importance of meaningful leadership by women throughout full conflict cycles and the implementation of the WPS agenda in CSDP missions and operations;
- AL. whereas joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation should define areas of cooperation and coordination, determine the tasks to be fulfilled within each framework and be accompanied by roadmaps for their implementation;
- AM. whereas the Strategic Compass sets out a clear roadmap for implementing EU-level actions, in particular for transforming the EU battlegroup system, establishing a more agile and flexible EU RDC, building on substantially modified EU battlegroups and paving the way towards entrusting the implementation of specific CSDP tasks to a group of Member States within the Union framework in accordance with Article 42(5) and Article 44 TEU;
- AN. whereas as the EU RDC is a key deliverable of the Strategic Compass, it should therefore be implemented as a matter of urgency and given the necessary level of urgency by EU Member States; whereas in order to be fully operational, the EU RDC should overcome the obstacles encountered by battlegroups in the past and not repeat the same mistakes;
- AO. whereas, as stated in the Strategic Compass, the EU RDC should be based on pre-defined operational scenarios as well as practical field experience in employing the EU RDC and should take account, inter alia, of the guidelines in the Strategic Compass;
- AP. whereas Article 44 TEU has never been used, and is imprecise in terms of how it would work in practice;
- AQ. whereas Article 44 TEU provides for possibilities to react within an EU framework to different crises in a more rapid and flexible manner with the aim of safeguarding the Union's values and interests: whereas after the Council (representing 27 Member States) has decided to create a group of Member States under Article 44 TEU, Member States in this group can exercise their decision-making autonomy and veto any further Council decisions;

- AR. whereas the possible implementation of Article 44 TEU, as well as the creation and operation of the EU RDC, should be considered key aspects of the CSDP on which the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) needs to regularly consult Parliament;
- AS. whereas, in line with Article 41 TEU and building on the experience of the European security and defence college, the administrative expenditure for the EU RDC should be charged to the Union budget except for expenditure that is covered by EPF, while still allowing for the possibility for participating Member States to make free-of-charge contributions to the EU RDC;
- AT. whereas the Petersberg tasks comprise humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks and post-conflict stabilisation tasks;
- AU. whereas the scope of common costs for EU RDC for missions outside the Union should therefore be extended; whereas, in those regards, it could be necessary to update EU secondary law or to propose new Union acts, to reflect all of the foregoing;
- AV. whereas in line with the Strategic Compass, the MPCC is the preferred command and control structure for the EU RDC at the military-strategic level and should reach its full operational capability as soon as possible, in line with the Council conclusions of 19 November 2018, which set 2020 deadline as the deadline for this;
- AW. whereas the relevant Union acts should be updated to reflect all of the foregoing;

Establishing a European Union Rapid Deployment Capacity

1. Welcomes the VP/HR's proposal, enshrined in the Strategic Compass approved by the EU Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers and endorsed by the European Council, to establish the EU RDC; stresses the importance of the EU having the necessary flexible, robust and credible instruments, capabilities, and command and control structure to act effectively and respond rapidly and decisively to prevent and manage crises in order to assert itself as a more credible security and defence actor and serve and protect the Union's citizens, interests, principles and the values enshrined in Article 21 TEU across the world; considers the EU RDC to be crucial for closing the gap between the EU's level of ambition and its actual capabilities; underlines, in this context:
 - (a) that the needs identified in the Strategic Compass and the developments in the operating environment should be taken into account in the EU RDC;
 - (b) the necessity of designing the EU RDC to reflect the new geopolitical context;
 - (c) that the EU RDC should reach full operational capability by 2025 at the latest;
2. Strongly encourages the VP/HR to propose a Council decision for an EU RDC to protect the Union's values and serve the interests of the Union as a whole, to respond to imminent threats or to react rapidly to a crisis situation outside the Union including in non-permissive environments and during all stages of a conflict cycle along the following lines, while also taking into account changes in the geopolitical context:

- (a) the EU RDC should be established as one of the types of European Union military capability for crisis response with its own legal and institutional identity, to allow for setting up the EU RDC as a force that is permanently available and trains together with the goal of reaching a standing force;
- (b) The EU RDC should reflect the challenges, risks and threats identified in the EU Threat Analysis, encompass all of the Petersberg Tasks identified in 1992 and focus its conceptual planning on, but not only on, the crisis management tasks laid down in Article 43 TEU; its tasks should also include rescue and evacuation operations, the initial entry and initial phase of stabilisation operations, temporary reinforcement of other missions and acting as a reserve force to secure exit; the Council could assign further tasks under Article 43 TEU and the duration and scope of assignments should be consistent with resources allocated to the EU RDC; notes that flexibility should be introduced in task and scenario planning so that the EU RDC is prepared to address all possible crisis situations;
- (c) The EU RDC should number a minimum of at least 5 000 troops, excluding strategic enablers, such as air- and sealift personnel, intelligence assets, strategic transportation and satellite communications and strategic reconnaissance assets, special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units, with different 'notice to move' deadlines for different parts of the EU RDC, with some having a 'notice to move' of 5 to 10 days; notes that an exact number for minimum troops can only be assessed after conceptual planners have analysed potential scenarios;
- (d) The EU RDC should conduct regular joint exercises at the strategic, joint forces, and tactical level in line with NATO standards within an EU framework based on operational scenarios and following uniform training and certification standards, such as NATO's, in order to improve readiness and interoperability; the exercises should be scheduled by the VP/HR and planned and conducted by the MPCC in order to increase readiness and interoperability; stresses that the operational scenarios should be flexible and adapted to geopolitical realities, the current threat landscape and possible EU RDC deployment scenarios; underlines the vital need to conduct regular live exercises from 2023 onwards;
- (e) All EU RDC force elements should be assigned exclusively to it, while still allowing for the possibility of Member States calling them up for national duty in the event of an emergency; highlights that the VP/HR should play a major role in synchronising actions with NATO so that EU ambitions are not influenced by NATO and vice versa, including through aligning the readiness categories of the EU RDC and the NATO Force Model; stresses that only 'single-hatting' will ensure the operationalisation of the EU RDC and the availability of its forces and capabilities in the event of a crisis; calls on Member States to therefore fulfil their respective commitments to ensure the EU RDC's operational readiness; welcomes in this regard the third Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation and underlines the importance of further steps aiming to deepen this partnership, building on the EU's Strategic Compass, NATO's new Strategic Concept and concrete steps to further enhance this cooperation;
- (f) The bulk of EU RDC modules would need to remain at a standard readiness level, except those for high urgency tasks; notes that, depending on the security situation, the MPCC could decide to increase the readiness of modules needed for

a specific mission;

- (g) The EU RDC will rely on rotating units with a rotation period of 12 months in order to remove incentives for Member States to delay decision-making when they have taken on the leadership of the EU RDC;
 - (h) The EU RDC must be able to be deployed on the ground, so at the time of their engagement all participating Member States must notify EU RDC Headquarters of what units and equipment, including air, sea and land transport, will be permanently at the disposal of the EU RDC so that the country responsible can deploy them without delay; countries that do not have sufficient personnel, materiel or logistics capacities should pre-establish agreements with other countries in order to be able to fulfil their commitments to the EU RDC when they take on the leadership of the EU RDC;
 - (i) The EU RDC will be funded as follows:
 - (i) In line with Article 41 TEU, the EU RDC's administrative expenditure should be funded from the Union budget; provided that the CFSP budget is considerably increased and that ongoing civilian CSDP missions do not see their budget reduced as a consequence;
 - (ii) Operating expenditure, including for joint exercises for fully operational capability (FOC) certification and the costs of ammunition, leasing military equipment by the EU and costs related to organising and carrying out live exercises, should come from a revised EPF with an increased budget; notes that EPF budget rules permit this 'if the Council so decides' and encourages the Council to take positive decisions in such cases; calls, further, in this regard for an extension of the scope of common costs for the EU RDC; welcomes the December 2022 Council conclusions and European Council endorsement to increase the EPF budget by EUR 2 billion for 2024-2027;
 - (iii) The EU battlegroups should be funded at EU level during their stand-up, stand-by and stand-down phases; funding for them should also cover the costs for the replacement of equipment lost or used in action;
3. Calls on the Member States to show political will and to provide the adequate amount of funds and personnel needed to take action as soon as possible to deliver the transformation of the EU battlegroup system into a more robust and flexible instrument to match the needs of the EU RDC;
 4. Calls on Member States to adapt national procedures to allow for rapid deployments, while acknowledging Member States' own strategic culture, capabilities and competences in security and defence;
 5. Stresses that the development of the EU RDC should build on the lessons learnt from EU battlegroups and that the EU RDC should not be viewed as a revised EU battlegroups concept; considers that the EU battlegroup concept suffers from structural design flaws that allowed Member States to perform national cost-benefit calculations every time a request for deployment was made and to use their veto while providing alternative explanations for this; notes that the EU RDC's higher level of ambition the

compared to battlegroups is thus primarily qualitative because it solves the shortcomings of the battlegroups; considers that the EU RDC has great potential to substantially improve and build on the lessons learnt from battlegroups, strengthen the EU's strategic autonomy and positively contribute to the EU's integrated approach to security and peace;

6. Highlights that rapid deployment requires flexibility in political decision-making and the adequate readiness of military modules, which, in addition to ground forces, include the necessary air, sea and special operation components and strategic enablers;
7. Stresses the EU's insufficient progress on strategic enablers over the past 20 years and calls for the Member States and relevant EU institutions to urgently address capability shortfalls and commit to substantially narrowing critical gaps by 2025, in particular those linked to the EU RDC and structural gaps; highlights that these strategic enablers need to be tailor-made for the EU RDC's needs and be prioritised for its use; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR, further, to also identify the financial needs for addressing these gaps; underlines in this regard the EDF's role in addressing capability shortfalls; urges the Member States to give special consideration to the EU RDC's potential needs in existing frameworks such as PESCO; welcomes the Commission's initiatives to facilitate joint procurement as a complementary instrument for improving the EU's capabilities and interoperability;
8. Highlights that the availability of European strategic enablers needs to be improved given that this is a precondition for a fully operational and adequately equipped EU RDC which includes robust, if possible autonomous, and proactive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, strategic transportation and airlift capability, air-to-air refuelling, satellite communications, space communication assets, medical care and evacuation units and cyber defence capabilities which can properly assess evaluations of a crisis situation;
9. Emphasises that the EU RDC should be made gradually operational for different scenarios depending on the maturity of its strategic enablers, from the least demanding up to the most demanding operations;
10. Points to the fact that more effort and investments in strategic enablers would also contribute to broader European support for NATO; underlines that the EU largely relies on the US for the provision of strategic enablers; points out, further, that the EU's legislative powers in key areas such as hybrid warfare, cybersecurity or space policy have a substantial impact on the development and availability of the strategic enablers required for the operationalisation of the EU RDC; underlines, therefore, the need for horizontal coordination across policy fields in the EU;
11. Stresses that rapid deployment requires increasing the EU's readiness and cooperation by enhancing military mobility; welcomes the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0, especially its stated goal of supporting large-scale movements of military forces across the EU, which are crucial for allowing the EU to deploy the EU RDC at short notice;
12. Highlights that the aspirations of the Strategic Compass will only be met if Member States are able to adequately increase and coordinate their defence procurement programmes and national defence capabilities; recalls, in this respect, that sustained investment in addressing Europe's military shortfalls should be sought by European

collaboration as it is a basic requirement for effectively rolling out the EU RDC and successfully contributing to developing the EU as a serious and credible geopolitical actor; welcomes, furthermore, the Commission's initiatives to facilitate joint procurement as a complementary instrument for improving EU's capabilities and interoperability;

13. Considers that the EU Satellite Centre should provide their services and expertise to the EU RDC and calls for the future necessary arrangements to be made, including ensuring that adequate funding is made available to EUSatCen;

Military Planning and Conduct Capability

14. Points out that the EU RDC should have permanent, fully-fledged operational headquarters under the MPCC and should ensure its effectiveness by taking account of the following:
 - (a) Its full operational capability should be reached immediately given that the Council conclusions of 19 November 2018 set 2020 as deadline; highlights the need to make progress on civil-military cooperation;
 - (b) A permanently active headquarters requires up to 350 staff members capable of planning and running EU RDC deployments when it reaches FOC;
 - (c) It should organise training and joint live exercises, follow the EU's integrated approach to external conflicts and crises while avoiding unnecessary duplication with NATO initiatives, and work jointly with other CSDP-related structures such as the EEAS, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre, the EU Military Staff and the Commission;
 - (d) The headquarters should have adequate infrastructure, an integrated secure communication and information structure drawing on the EU's secure connectivity programme, and facilities for secure meetings and for the use of intelligence services; requests the MPCC to address the lack of interoperable communications systems between EU defence forces;
 - (e) Underlines the need for appropriate funding to allow its headquarters to carry out its functions and mandated tasks;
15. Suggests keeping national 'high readiness' operational headquarters as fall-back EU command options in order to anticipate scenarios in which multiple crises happen at the same time;
16. Underlines that Article 36 TEU requires the VP/HR to regularly inform Parliament and should therefore do so on the progress made towards developing the MPCC into a full command and control structure, capable of planning, controlling and commanding non-executive and executive tasks and operations, thereby enabling Parliament to exercise scrutiny, in particular over whether all EU actions are sufficiently coordinated to maximise coherence and effectiveness;

Article 44 TEU – acting in the name of the European Union

17. Highlights that the use of Article 44 TEU can offer significant benefits, such as speed, flexibility and freedom of action while preserving joint EU action in situations where troop deployment needs to be rapid in order to prevent further escalation and where the risks to combat troops are at the higher end; highlights, that decision-making on the deployment of the EU RDC based on Article 44 TEU also allows for the involvement of third countries in EU RDC missions where necessary and desired;
18. Calls on the Member States to act on behalf the European Union as mandated by the Council under Article 44 TEU and to therefore use all the tools in the Treaty to increase the credibility, flexibility and efficiency of the EU's crisis management;
19. Calls on the Member States, further, to act under Article 44 TEU on the basis of a proposal by the VP/HR, including if this is suggested in advance by a Member State, after receiving unanimous endorsement by the Council, which may be achieved through the use of constructive abstention; urges the Member States entrusted with the implementation of the task to utilise qualified majority voting for their subsequent decisions;
20. Considers that the political and economic incentives need to change in order to improve the prospects of Article 44 TEU being used; calls for Member States using Article 44 TEU to be allowed greater access to common funding to cover additional costs and for them to be allowed greater flexibility for operational decisions and the drafting of crisis management concepts and operational plans; suggests using scenarios to simulate possible uses of Article 44 TEU in advance and to clarify associated modalities;
21. Urges the VP/HR to regularly inform Parliament as required in Article 36 TEU and to ensure that the views of Parliament are duly taken into account in the VP/HR's proposals;
22. Stresses that the Member States and the EU RDC must follow the EU's integrated approach in order to ensure effective coordination of an EU response throughout the different phases of a crisis or conflict, combining defence and security activities with development and diplomatic actions;
23. Highlights that the use of Article 44 TEU provides significant benefits compared to Member States acting outside the EU framework;

Updating relevant legal acts

24. Calls on the Commission to propose the appropriate changes to the EU's Financial and Staff Regulations, to the relevant interinstitutional agreement on budgetary matters, and to other Union acts as necessary;
25. Calls on the VP/HR to propose the necessary Council decisions, jointly with the Commission where appropriate;

Gender, social and workers' rights

26. Highlights that women's participation in CSDP contributes to the effectiveness of missions and is a driver of the EU's credibility as an advocate of gender equality worldwide; calls for meaningful gender mainstreaming in the formulation of the CSDP, in particular by means of better gender balance in the personnel and leadership of CSDP

missions and operations and specific training for personnel deployed; calls for all deployed EU military personnel to be sufficiently trained in gender equality and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and specifically on how to integrate a gender perspective into their tasks;

27. Notes that the EU RDC will be made up of forces that will train and work together and that as long as they are under EU command, the troops assigned to the EU RDC should enjoy equal working and social rights;

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28. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council and the Commission.