The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements of 13 September 1993 (the Oslo Accords),

–  having regard to the Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, representing the Palestinian people, of 29 April 1994 (the Paris Protocol), and to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of 28 September 1995 (Oslo II Accord),

–  having regard to the Fourth Geneva Convention,

–  having regard to the EU-Palestinian Authority (PA) action plan approved in May 2013,

–  having regard to the European joint strategy in support of Palestine 2021-2024 – Towards a democratic, accountable and sustainable Palestinian state,

–  having regard to the 1997 Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part(1),

–  having regard to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part(2) (EU-Israel Association Agreement),

–  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 May 2012, 12 May 2014, 22 July 2014, 20 July 2015 and 20 June 2016,

–  having regard to the statement of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 22 August 2022 on the Israeli raids on six Palestinian civil society organisations,

–  having regard to special report No 14/2013 of the European Court of Auditors entitled ‘European Union direct financial support to the Palestinian Authority’,

–  having regard to the joint declaration between the EU and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) of 17 November 2021 on EU support to UNRWA (2021-2024),

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood – A new Agenda for the Mediterranean’ (JOIN(2021)0002),

–  having regard to the Commission’s Interpretative Notice of 12 November 2015 on indication of origin of goods from the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967(3),

–  having regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 12 November 2019(4) on products produced by Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt),

–  having regard to the European External Action Service report of 15 May 2023 entitled ‘2022 Report on Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem’,

–  having regard to the European External Action Service report of 28 March 2023 entitled ‘One Year Report on Demolitions and Seizures in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem’,

–  having regard to the Updated European Union Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law(5) and the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders,

–  having regard to the new Israeli Government’s Coalition Framework Agreement and Government Guidelines,

–  having regard to the statement of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 30 April 2021 on the postponement of the elections in Palestine,

–  having regard to the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002,

–  having regard to the 2017-2022 national health strategy of the State of Palestine of October 2016,

–  having regard to the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly,

–  having regard to the report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 of 21 September 2022,

–  having regard to the UN Women report of 2022 entitled ‘Women’s Role in Local Peacebuilding – Recommendations to better support the work of Palestinian women-led grassroots organizations’,

–  having regard to the report of the UN Independent Task Force on Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions of April 2004 entitled ‘Reforming the Palestinian Authority: An Update’,

–  having regard to the outcomes of the UN Ad Hoc Liaison Committee meeting of 18 September 2011,

–  having regard to the report of the Director-General of the World Health Organization of 17 May 2023 entitled ‘Health conditions in the occupied Palestinian territory, including east Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan’,

–  having regard to the World Bank report of 22 December 2021 entitled ‘Palestinian Digital Economy Assessment’,

–  having regard to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports of 22 December 2021 entitled ‘The Economic Costs of the Israeli Occupation for the Palestinian People: Arrested Development and Poverty in the West Bank’ and of 8 August 2022 entitled ‘Report on UNCTAD assistance to the Palestinian people: Developments in the Economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory’,

–  having regard to the ongoing investigation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) into the situation in Palestine, opened on 3 March 2021,

–  having regard to the report of the Carter Center of 15 April 2022 entitled ‘March 26, 2022 Municipal Elections in West Bank/Gaza’,

–  having regard to the statement of the Swedish Government of 30 October 2014 on its recognition of the State of Palestine,

–  having regard to the Declaration of Algiers, signed by 14 Palestinian factions in Algeria on 13 October 2022, which committed to organising elections by October 2023,

–  having regard to its recommendation of 14 September 2022 to the Commission and the Commission Vice-President / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood – a new agenda for the Mediterranean(6),

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on the Middle East peace process, in particular those of 18 May 2017 on achieving the two-state solution in the Middle East(7) and of 14 December 2022 on the prospects of the two-state solution for Israel and Palestine(8),

–  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2014 on recognition of Palestine statehood(9),

–  having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0226/2023),

A.  whereas the two-state solution, with the state of Israel and the state of Palestine living side by side in peace, security and mutual recognition under the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as the capital of both states, and in full compliance with international law, is the only viable solution to the conflict, in line with the Council conclusions of July 2014;

B.  whereas the Palestinian people have the right to self-determination, as enshrined in the UN Charter and repeatedly upheld by UN bodies, including the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Commission on Human Rights / Human Rights Council;

C.  whereas the Palestinian leadership has recognised the state of Israel while calling for the establishment of a state of Palestine based on the pre-1967 borders, which has not been reciprocated by successive Israeli governments; whereas the Palestinian leadership has repeatedly called for renewed peace talks leading to a two-state solution;

D.  whereas, as a result of the occupation, the PA lacks key competences that are at the core of statehood, including border control and the ability to carry out full tax collection;

E.  whereas meaningful negotiations can only happen when both sides are on equal footing; whereas among others, a lack of political will and international recognition, coupled with decades of occupation of Palestine, are serious obstacles to fair negotiations in this case; whereas there is a continued need to invest in meaningful negotiations between Israel and the PA;

F.  whereas Arab states such as Egypt and Jordan, which have maintained diplomatic relations with Israel for years, have played a meaningful role in promoting dialogue on the Middle East peace process, including on security and stability;

G.  whereas the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory has been ongoing for 56 years; whereas it remains the EU’s firm position that permanent occupation, settlements, demolitions and evictions are illegal under international law; whereas the number of settlers and the construction of related infrastructure in the West Bank and East Jerusalem have dramatically increased since the signing of the Oslo and Oslo II Accords and constitute a flagrant violation of international law and a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-state solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace; whereas this has profoundly changed the social and demographic landscape of the West Bank and led to the fragmentation of Palestinian areas;

H.  whereas the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967(10), as well as various Israeli, Palestinian and international human rights organisations, have recently issued reports concluding that the Israeli Government systemically oppresses and institutionally discriminates against Palestinians in a number of areas, including law enforcement, building permits, freedom of movement and economic activity; whereas Palestinians and Israeli settlers are tried in different courts and under different laws for the same offences; whereas the separation wall constructed by Israel in the West Bank is illegal;

I.  whereas Israel does not allow PA activities in annexed East Jerusalem; whereas the PA only has a degree of control over the non-contiguous Areas A and B of the West Bank, which are surrounded by Area C, which is under full Israeli control and represents 60 % of the West Bank; whereas EU relations with the PA therefore cannot be addressed without addressing Israeli policies;

J.  whereas the new Israeli Government has announced plans to advance and develop settlements in the West Bank in its Coalition Framework Agreement and Government Guidelines; whereas the first sentence of the Coalition Framework Agreement states that ‘the Jewish people have an exclusive and inalienable right to all parts of the Land of Israel ... the Galilee, the Negev, the Golan, and Judea and Samaria’;

K.  whereas the rivalry between Palestinian political factions and the lack of a unified national vision or strategy, which is essential for a negotiated political solution, remain some of the main challenges in Palestinian politics; whereas the fractured Fatah movement, the consolidation of power in the office of the PA President, the shrinking space for Palestinian civil society and the suppression of political dissent and demonstrations in support of democratic reforms show some of the challenges that the PA needs to address; whereas the EU has designated Palestinian Hamas as a terrorist organisation;

L.  whereas, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2022 was the deadliest year since 2006 for Palestinians residing in the occupied West Bank; whereas, since the beginning of 2023, the cycle of violence has intensified, which strongly affects civilians in the oPt and also in Israel and leads to growing tensions and the instrumentalisation of the conflict by extremist and terrorist groups;

M.  whereas European development partners (the EU, its Member States, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) are by far the largest donors and disburse EUR 1,2 billion annually in official development assistance to the Palestinian people; whereas international assistance is key to the stability of the West Bank and Gaza and thus also benefits Israel; whereas Israel is obliged under international humanitarian law to ensure the basic needs and well-being of the civilian population under its occupation;

N.  whereas the Israeli authorities seize and/or demolish EU-funded facilities, assets and structures in Palestine; whereas in 2022, a total of 101 structures funded by the EU or EU Member States (valued at EUR 337 019) were demolished or seized; whereas the EU has repeatedly requested that Israel compensate the loss of EU taxpayers’ money;

O.  whereas EU assistance provides vital budget support to the PA through the PEGASE programme; whereas, since the beginning of the current multiannual financial framework, EU assistance to Palestine has only been provided through annual action plans; whereas the 2021-2024 joint strategy provides a basis on which multiannual action programmes can be adopted, but a multiannual prospect for concrete funding is still lacking; whereas it is necessary to continue to implement an effective allocation, review and scrutiny process for EU funds;

P.  whereas the PA and the PLO continue to provide ‘martyr payments’ to the families of Palestinians killed while engaged in violence against Israelis or killed by Israeli military actions; whereas they also continue to provide separate stipends to Palestinians in Israeli prisons, including those convicted of acts of terrorism involving Jewish targets;

Q.  whereas out of the 21 organisations listed on the EU terror list, seven are Palestinian; whereas Hamas and other EU-listed Palestinian terror organisations use hybrid terror tactics, including knife and bomb attacks against Israeli civilians, as well as the firing of rockets from Gaza at Israel, seeking to deliberately hit civilian areas;

R.  whereas UNRWA, which remains a critical lifeline for millions of Palestine refugees, continues to face serious challenges and chronic funding shortfalls that undermine its efforts to fulfil its essential mandate; whereas the European Parliament, in view of the crucial role that the agency plays in promoting stability and development in the region and keeping alive the prospects of sustainable peace, continually supports its essential humanitarian and development work and advocates for it to be continued, with a strong focus on promoting education based on peacebuilding, reconciliation, tolerance, coexistence and non-violence; whereas the UN General Assembly voted in December 2022 to extend UNRWA’s mandate until 30 June 2026; whereas the EU and its Member States are the largest donors to the agency and EU funding includes a multiannual contribution, ensuring predictable support in line with the EU-UNRWA joint declaration of 17 November 2021;

S.  whereas, in 2011, the UN Ad Hoc Liaison Committee concluded that Palestinian institutions are ready for statehood; whereas, since then, the democratic status of the PA has deteriorated owing to the external occupation and internal problems, such as a decline in the rule of law and worsening corruption; whereas, under international humanitarian law, the occupation of territory in wartime is a temporary situation and does not deprive the occupied power of its statehood or its sovereignty;

T.  whereas the PA faces a loss of legitimacy; whereas the last Palestinian parliamentary elections were held in 2006; whereas the last Palestinian presidential elections were held in 2005; whereas parliamentary and presidential elections were set to take place in May 2021, but were cancelled by President Abbas by a presidential decree; whereas, upon request from the PA, the EU requested permission from the Israeli authorities in February 2021 for an exploratory mission to observe the votes, but was not granted access;

U.  whereas the PA has adopted increasingly repressive practices, including cracking down on peaceful protests with unlawful force, targeting journalists, civil society activists, and lawyers with arbitrary arrests and torturing detainees; whereas, according to Human Rights Watch, the Palestinian authorities systematically mistreat and torture Palestinians in detention, including critics and opponents; whereas the UN Committee against Torture has called for justice and expressed regret that the Palestinian authorities have failed to ensure accountability for the killing of Palestinian activist Nizar Banat;

V.  whereas, in October 2022, President Abbas issued a decree to form the Supreme Council of Judicial Bodies and Authorities, placing all Palestinian authorities under his control and dismantling the last pillar of judicial independence in Palestine;

W.  whereas women in the Palestinian territories face discrimination and still have fewer rights than men, for instance in relation to divorce, the custody of children and inheritance; whereas, even though same-sex acts have been decriminalised in the West Bank, persons belonging to the LGBTQI+ community still face harassment and discrimination;

X.  whereas 84 % of the participants in a March 2022 poll run by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research believed that there was corruption in PA institutions;

Y.  whereas the EU Mission for the Support of Palestinian Police and Rule of Law was established in January 2006 to assist the PA in Palestinian state-building;

Z.  whereas the PA has consistently maintained security coordination with Israel, contributing to the security of both Israel and Palestine; whereas the PA stopped cooperating with Israel in a number of areas, including security, in January 2023, in response to the latest developments;

AA.  whereas socio-economic and employment conditions in Palestine have severely deteriorated with the continued conflict; whereas the Israeli occupation imposes significant restrictions on the Palestinian economy, including a lack of control over land, water, physical boundaries, revenues and mobility; whereas these restrictions hinder Palestinian trade, weaken the PA’s budget revenue and contribute to its dependence on international donors; whereas economic reforms by the Palestinian authorities are necessary, but are not in themselves enough to ensure sustainable economic growth and private sector development in the Palestinian territories; whereas this inhibits Palestinian exports to the EU under the EU-PLO Interim Association Agreement and undermines the effectiveness of EU aid;

AB.  whereas the blockade and intermittent conflict have crippled the economy in Gaza and 63 % of the area’s residents require some form of humanitarian assistance;

AC.  whereas the UN General Assembly passed a resolution in December 2022 calling on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to issue an opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s ongoing occupation of Palestinian territories; whereas Israel responded to the UN resolution by seizing USD 39 million of tax revenues collected on behalf of the PA; whereas more than 90 countries expressed their ‘deep concern’ about Israel’s punitive measures;

AD.  whereas Palestinians are affected by the use of Israeli spyware, including Pegasus, in the oPt, depriving them of their right to privacy, freedom of expression and an open, secure and free internet;

AE.  whereas the new Procedure for Entry and Residence of Foreigners in the Judea and Samaria Area, introduced by the Israeli Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), has required third-country nationals, including EU citizens, to request a permit to enter the West Bank since 20 October 2022; whereas the new COGAT rules restrict the ability of foreign spouses of Palestinians to travel to the West Bank and impose similar restrictions on volunteers, academics and business people working in the West Bank, thus undermining relations between the EU and Palestine;

AF.  Whereas Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement states that ‘relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement’;

1.  Recommends that, in implementing the EU’s relations with the PA, the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:

2.  Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Legislative Council.

(1) OJ L 187, 16.7.1997, p. 3. (2) OJ L 147, 21.6.2000, p. 3. (3) OJ C 375, 12.11.2015, p. 4. (4) Judgment of the Court of Justice, 12 November 2019, Organisation juive européenne and Vignoble Psagot Ltd v Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances, C-363/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:954. (5) OJ C 303, 15.12.2009, p. 12. (6) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 154. (7) OJ C 307, 30.8.2018, p. 113. (8) OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p. 73. (9) OJ C 294, 12.8.2016, p. 9. (10) https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/a77356-situation-human-rights-palestinian-territories-occupied-1967