The European Parliament,

– having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol thereto,

– having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

– having regard to the 27th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP27), the 17th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP17) and the fourth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA4), and to the Glasgow Climate Pact adopted at the 26th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP26) in Glasgow on 13 November 2021,

– having regard to the agreement made at COP27 to create a specific fund for loss and damage and to decide at the 28th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP28) how the fund would be brought into operation, and to the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage,

– having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on the 2022 UN Climate Change Conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt (COP27)\(^1\),

– having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

– having regard to its resolution of 15 June 2023 on the implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals\(^2\),

– having regard to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report on global warming of 1.5 °C, its special report on climate change and land, its special

\(^1\) OJ C 149, 28.4.2023, p. 28.
\(^2\) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0250.
– having regard to the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change (ESABCC) and its report of 15 June 2023 entitled ‘Scientific advice for the determination of an EU-wide 2040 climate target and a greenhouse gas budget for 2030-2050’,


– having regard to the recently adopted EU legislation translating the Union’s targets of reducing net emissions by at least 55 % by 2030 compared to 1990 levels and towards reaching the binding EU climate neutrality target by 2050 (‘Fit for 55’ package) into concrete policies across different sectors,

– having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/591 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030,

– having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency,

– having regard to the European Court of Auditors Special report 18/2023 of 26 June 2023 entitled ‘EU climate and energy targets – 2020 targets achieved, but little indication that actions to reach the 2030 targets will be sufficient’,

– having regard to the ‘World Energy Transitions Outlook 2023: 1.5 °C Pathway’ of the International Renewable Energy Agency,


2 OJ L 114, 12.4.2022, p. 22.
4 European Court of Auditors Special report 18/2023 entitled ‘EU climate and energy targets – 2020 targets achieved, but little indication that actions to reach the 2030 targets will be sufficient’, 2023.
– having regard to the UNFCCC synthesis report of 26 October 2022 on nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement,

– having regard to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) 2022 emissions gap report of 27 October 2022 entitled ‘The Closing Window – Climate crisis calls for rapid transformation of societies’, its 2022 adaptation gap report of 1 November 2022 entitled ‘Too Little, Too Slow – Climate adaptation failure puts world at risk’ and its 2021 production gap report of 20 October 2021,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘Forging a climate-resilient Europe – the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change’ (COM(2021)0082),

– having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the EU strategy on adaptation to climate change1,


– having regard to the IEA Global Methane Tracker report 2022 of February 2022,


– having regard to the Commission communication of 14 October 2020 on an EU strategy to reduce methane emissions (COM(2020)0663),

– having regard to its resolution of 21 October 2021 on an EU strategy to reduce methane emissions2,

– having regard to the report of the World Meteorological Organization of 21 April 2023 on the state of the global climate in 2022,

– having regard to the Copernicus Climate Change Service and its 2022 Global Climate Highlights report,

– having regard to the Global Registry of Fossil Fuel Emissions and Reserves3,


– having regard to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030,

– having regard to the 2023 report of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

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2 OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 105.
3 Global Registry of Fossil Fuel Emissions and Reserves.
having regard to its resolution of 15 June 2023 on a European Day for the victims of the
global climate crisis,\(^1\),

having regard to the Joint Research Centre report of 7 June 2023 entitled ‘Impacts of
climate change on defence-related critical energy infrastructure’,

having regard to the adoption of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence on
21 March 2022,

having regard to the adoption of the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap on
9 November 2020,

having regard to its resolution of 28 April 2021 on soil protection,\(^2\),

having regard to the report of the European Environment Agency (EEA) entitled ‘The
European environment – state and outlook 2020 – Knowledge for transition to a
sustainable Europe’, which is the EEA’s assessment of the potential of European soils
for stronger climate action,\(^3\),

having regard to the agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas
beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement), adopted on 19 June 2023,

having regard to the UNEP report of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Making Peace with
Nature: A scientific blueprint to tackle the climate, biodiversity and pollution
emergencies’,

having regard to the global assessment report of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) of 25 November 2019 on
biodiversity and ecosystem services,

having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, which was
agreed at the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on
Biological Diversity (COP15),

having regard to the co-sponsored IPBES-IPCC workshop report on biodiversity and
climate change of 10 June 2021,

having regard to its resolution of 6 October 2022 on momentum for the ocean:

\(^1\) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0245.
\(^3\) Report of the European Environment Agency (EEA) entitled ‘The European
environment – state and outlook 2020 – Knowledge for transition to a sustainable
Europe’.
strengthening ocean governance and biodiversity\(^1\),


– having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives\(^2\),

– having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2020 on the EU’s role in protecting and restoring the world’s forests\(^3\),

– having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 entitled ‘Consequences of drought, fire, and other extreme weather phenomena: increasing the EU’s efforts to fight climate change’\(^4\),

– having regard to the UN World Water Development Report on Partnerships and cooperation for water of 9 May 2023 and the UN Water Conference held from 22-24 March 2023, the first major conference of the UN dedicated to water since 1977,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 23 March 2023,

– having regard to the agreed conclusions adopted at the 66th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women on 25 March 2022 entitled ‘Achieving gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls in the context of climate change, environmental and disaster risk reduction policies and programmes’,

– having regard to UN Human Rights Council Resolution 41/21 of 12 July 2019 entitled ‘Human rights and climate change’,

– having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur of 26 July 2022 on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change,

– having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples of 1 November 2017 on the impacts of climate change and climate finance on indigenous peoples’ rights, and to the Stockholm +50 Indigenous Peoples Declaration,

– having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the human rights situation in Egypt\(^5\),

– having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2021 on the case of human rights defender Ahmed Mansoor in the United Arab Emirates\(^6\),

– having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 on the European Year of Greener

\(^1\) OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 106.
\(^2\) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 25.
\(^3\) OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 10.
\(^4\) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 135.
\(^5\) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 94.
having regard to the Council conclusions on the preparations for the 28th Conference of the Parties (COP28) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Dubai, 30 November – 12 December 2023,

– having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 04/2023 of 15 February 2023 entitled ‘The Global Climate Change Alliance(+) – Achievements fell short of ambitions’,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 4 October 2022 on climate finance in view of the UNFCCC 27th Conference of the Parties (COP27) in Sharm El-Sheikh on 6-18 November 2022,

– having regard to the questions to the Commission and to the Council on the 2023 UN Climate Change Conference in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (COP28) (O-000049/2023 and O-000048/2023),

– having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety,

A. whereas the European Parliament has declared a climate and environmental emergency and has committed to urgently take the concrete actions needed to fight and contain this threat before it is too late; whereas biodiversity loss and climate change are interlinked and exacerbate each other, representing equal threats to life on our planet, and as such should be urgently tackled together;

B. whereas the Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016; whereas to date, 193 states plus the EU have joined the agreement, representing over 98 % of global emissions;

C. whereas the Paris Agreement recognises the fundamental priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger;

D. whereas according to the UNEP’s Emissions Gap Report 2022, the implementation of conditional nationally determined contributions (NDCs) would lead to an increase by 2,4 °C in global temperatures by the end of the century; whereas current policies are insufficient to meet even the unconditional NDCs and continuing with current policies would result in a 2,8 °C increase in global temperatures;

E. whereas inadequate collective progress has been made towards achieving the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement since it was adopted in 2015; whereas the 2022 NDC Synthesis Report states that the total global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions level in 2030, taking into account the implementation of all of the latest NDCs, is estimated to be only 0,3 % below the 2019 level; whereas the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6)
concludes that in scenarios limiting warming to 1,5 °C (with over 50 % likelihood by 2100), GHG emissions need to be 43 % below the 2019 level by 2030;

F. whereas the global stocktake (GST) taking place in 2023 for the first time is a central element of the Paris Agreement that provides for an overall picture of progress on the Agreement’s implementation; whereas the outcome of the stocktaking exercise should subsequently spur on the Parties to ratchet up their level of ambition and drive climate action;

G. whereas the IPCC’s 6th Assessment Report confirmed that GHG emissions from human activities have raised global temperature by 1,1 °C compared to pre-industrial levels as an average for 2010-2019; whereas, according to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), there is now a 66 % likelihood of temporarily exceeding 1,5 °C as soon as during the period 2023-2027; whereas the WMO points out that Arctic warming is disproportionately high and new research shows that the Arctic could be ice-free in summers by as soon as the 2030s; whereas climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security and economic growth are projected to increase with global warming of 1,5 °C above pre-industrial levels and increase further with global warming of 2 °C;

H. whereas methane is responsible for around 30 % of the rise in global temperatures since the industrial revolution, and rapid and sustained reductions in methane emissions are key to limiting near-term warming and improving air quality; whereas according to the IPCC’s 6th Assessment Report, keeping global warming under 1,5 °C requires major reductions in anthropogenic methane emissions by 2030; whereas methane is a potent GHG which is 28 times more powerful than CO₂ in terms of its climate impact over a 100-year time frame and 80 times more potent over a 20-year time frame; whereas according to the UNEP emissions gap report, methane and nitrous oxide emissions remained steady from 2019 to 2021, and fluorinated gases continued to surge; whereas stronger action to reduce methane emissions is one of the most cost-effective measures for cutting GHG emissions in the short term; whereas the agriculture and livestock sector emits 145 million tonnes of methane a year, making it the largest and most significant sector for methane emissions; whereas methane emissions in agriculture are primarily driven by increasing livestock numbers; whereas livestock emissions from manure and enteric fermentation account for roughly 32 % of all anthropogenic methane emissions;

I. whereas the IPCC’s AR6 conclusions warn that climate change impacts are already and increasingly affecting the productivity of all agricultural and fishery sectors, exacerbating water scarcity and threatening food security, nutrition and livelihoods; whereas global food systems account for 31 % of global emissions; whereas over

2. WMO update May 2023.
3. IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C.
4. IEA, Global Methane Tracker 2022 – Methane and climate change.
100 million tonnes of synthetic fertiliser are applied to crops worldwide every year\(^1\); whereas most emissions from synthetic nitrogen fertilisers occur after they are applied to the soil and enter the atmosphere as nitrous oxide (N\(_2\)O) – a persistent GHG with 265 times more global warming potential than CO\(_2\) over a 100 year period; whereas the synthetic nitrogen fertiliser supply chain was responsible for an estimated 2.1% of global greenhouse gas emissions\(^2\);

J. whereas the Council stated in its conclusions of 24 October 2022 that it stands ready, as soon as possible following the conclusions of the negotiations on the essential components of the ‘Fit for 55’ package, to update, as appropriate, the NDCs of the EU and its Member States;

K. whereas the UNFCCC’s First report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties states that national reports submitted by developing country Parties demonstrate that the costs to meet their needs related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement cumulatively amount to USD 5.8–5.9 trillion up until 2030, of which USD 502 billion is identified as costs to meet their needs requiring international sources of finance\(^3\); whereas public and private finance flows for fossil fuels remain higher than those for climate adaptation and mitigation\(^4\);

L. whereas, according to Article 4(3) of the Paris Agreement, the Union’s updated NDCs must reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities;

M. whereas the climate and biodiversity crises are interlinked, exacerbate each other and should be tackled together as a matter of urgency;

N. whereas the preamble to the Paris Agreement notes the ‘importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, including oceans’; whereas the IPBES global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services\(^5\) underlines that the sustainable use of nature will be vital for adapting to and mitigating dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system;

O. whereas soils are the largest terrestrial carbon pool on the planet; whereas ensuring healthy soils strengthens resilience and reduces vulnerability to climate change; whereas, globally, 500 000 hectares of peatlands a year are lost, while already drained and degraded peatlands contribute around 4% of annual global human-induced emissions\(^6\); whereas despite only covering 3–4% of the world’s land surface area, peatlands are responsible for storing nearly one third of the world’s soil carbon, which is more than double that of all the world’s forests combined;

\(^3\) UNFCCC, First report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement (NDR), 2019.
\(^4\) IPCC AR6 WG3, Climate Change 2022, summary report for policymakers, 2022.
P. whereas the latest UNEP adaptation gap report highlights the fact that global efforts in adaptation planning, financing and implementation are failing to keep pace with increasing climate risks; whereas the Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation and the global stocktake should be used as opportunities for all Parties to act upon the conclusions of that report, as well as those of the IPCC’s Working Group II in the AR6;

Q. whereas there are scientifically proven interlinkages between health and the environmental and climate crises; whereas the European Climate and Health Observatory identifies serious health effects from heat, wildfires, flooding, vector-borne diseases, water and food-borne diseases, pollution, air pollution, UV radiation, aeroallergens, ground-level ozone, mental health effects and occupational safety and health effects; whereas extreme weather events, biodiversity loss, land degradation and water scarcity are displacing people and having a dramatic impact on their health and their ability to fully enjoy their human rights;

R. whereas the UN World Water Development Report of 2023 warns of a global water crisis with imminent risks; whereas more than 90% of disasters are water-related, with climate change hitting hardest through water\(^1\); whereas the parties to the Paris Agreement recognise the fundamental priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger;

S. whereas water scarcity is becoming endemic as a result of the local impact of physical water stress coupled with the acceleration and spread of freshwater pollution; whereas low- middle- and high-income countries all show signs of risk related to water quality\(^2\); whereas the multiple ecosystem services provided by water should be ensured, inter alia, through water planning and investment in water-related innovation, including energy and water efficiency, in line with the water-smart society principles;

T. whereas in the EU, natural disasters affected nearly 50 million people between 1980 and 2020 and caused an average of EUR 12 billion in economic losses each year during that period\(^3\); whereas these losses are unequally distributed; whereas the Copernicus Climate Change Service revealed that 2022 was another year of extremes, with many temperature records broken, and that the summer of 2022 was the hottest on record for Europe; whereas water scarcity, flooding and droughts are key risks also in Europe; whereas the outermost regions and islands are among the most affected by climate change in particular and in terms of sustainable development, in comparison to the rest of the EU and the rest of the developed world;

U. whereas, although the ocean plays a unique and vital role as a climate regulator in the context of the climate crisis – as it covers 71% of the earth’s surface, produces half of our oxygen and absorbs a third of CO\(_2\) emissions and 90% of the excess heat in the climate system\(^4\) – marine biodiversity is seriously endangered according to IPBES and

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4 UN Climate Action, ‘The ocean – the world’s greatest ally against climate change’.
the IPCC; whereas ocean warming is affecting coastal ecosystems, leading to intensified marine heatwaves, acidification, loss of oxygen, salinity intrusion and sea level rise\(^1\); whereas the European Environment Agency has issued warnings about the current state of degradation of the European marine environment and the need to rapidly restore our marine ecosystems by addressing the impact of human activities on the marine environment; whereas marine hotspots such as coral reefs, mangroves and seagrass beds are severely degraded and threatened by climate change and pollution;

V. whereas, according to the UNEP, plastic pollution alters habitats and natural processes, reducing ecosystems’ ability to adapt to climate change and directly affecting millions of people’s livelihoods; whereas the global plastics sector is responsible for 6% of global oil consumption, which is expected to reach 20% by 2050\(^2\); whereas processes to extract and distil oil and to produce plastic are energy intensive; whereas discarded plastic waste generates GHG emissions when exposed to solar radiation in air and water, and it also interferes with the ocean’s ability to sequester carbon; whereas global plastic emissions are set to double to 44 million tonnes per year and that in the absence of ambitious new policies, global plastic consumption will rise from 460 million tonnes in 2019 to 1,231 million tonnes in 2060\(^3\);

W. whereas the energy crisis has brought into focus the issue of energy security and the need for energy demand reduction and a diversified energy system; whereas the Russian military invasion of Ukraine has added urgency to the need to rapidly transform the global energy system;

X. whereas the Glasgow Climate Pact and the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan recognise the important role of non-Party stakeholders in contributing to progress towards achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement;

Y. whereas the ESABCC recommends EU emission reductions of 90–95% by 2040, relative to 1990, and a remaining greenhouse gas budget of 11-14 billion tonnes of CO\(_2\) for 2030-2050, based on a science-based assessment, in order to mitigate climate risks and ensure a sustainable future;

Z. whereas the recent report by the UN High-Level Expert Group on the Net-Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities (HLEG) recommends better transparency and reporting of non-state climate action;

AA. whereas people in the richest 1% of the global population are set to generate per capita consumption emissions in 2030 that are still 30 times higher than the global per capita level, while the footprints of the poorest half of the world population are set to remain several times below that level\(^4\); whereas the world’s 46 least developed countries (LDCs), home to about 1.1 billion people, have contributed minimally to CO\(_2\) emissions; whereas, however, 69% of worldwide deaths caused by climate-related

\(^{1}\) IPCC, *Special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate*, 2019.
\(^{3}\) OECD, *‘Global plastic waste set to almost triple by 2060’*, June 2022.
\(^{4}\) Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP) and Oxfam, *‘Carbon Inequality in 2030’*, November 2021.
disasters over the last 50 years have occurred in LDCs; whereas by 2050, as many as 216 million people could be internal climate migrants across the regions of Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Pacific and Eastern Europe;

AB. whereas the adverse impacts of the climate crisis and related loss and damage disproportionately affect vulnerable and marginalised people;

**COP28 in Dubai and the first global stocktake (GST)**

1. Recalls the conclusions by the IPCC’s 6th Assessment Report that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C, or even to less than 2 °C, requires rapid, deep and sustained mitigation actions; stresses that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C requires a reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions by 43 % compared to 2019 levels in this critical decade before 2030; urges the international community to make a concerted effort to achieve this goal and calls on the developed countries and major emitters to lead by example; reiterates the commitments made under the Glasgow Climate Pact and expresses concern about the limited progress made in stepping up climate change mitigation, including during COP27 and the inter-sessional meeting in Bonn in June 2023;

2. Acknowledges that the IPCC’s 6th Assessment Report confirmed that GHG emissions resulting from human activities have raised the global temperature by 1.1 °C compared to pre-industrial levels; expresses concern at the findings of the UNEP’s emissions gap report 2022, in particular that, while implementation of conditional NDCs would lead to an increase by 2.4 °C in global temperatures by the end of the century, current policies are insufficient to meet even the unconditional NDCs and continuing with current policies would result in a 2.8 °C increase in global temperatures; is alarmed that emissions are still rising and that the emissions gap is widening, and emphasises that climate risks will be magnified by any delay in implementing effective measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change, therefore resulting in increasing loss and damage;

3. Stresses that 2023 is set to be the hottest year on record, reaching 1.43 °C above pre-industrial levels; is deeply concerned by the fact that the window for staying below 1.5 °C is closing at an alarming rate; underlines the fact that record heatwaves, drought and forest fires have already caused global gross domestic product loss of around 0.6 % in 2023, and that weather- and climate-related extreme events caused losses of around EUR 600 billion in Europe over the period 1980-2022;

4. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to use all diplomatic channels prior to the conference to engage with all Parties to scale up their short-, medium- and long-term

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4 Allianz, special publication, ‘Climate risk – Global boiling: Heatwave may have cost 0.6pp of GDP’, 4 August 2023.
climate targets and accompanying policies, and to raise the level of ambition of their NDCs to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C, in accordance with the Glasgow Climate Pact;

5. Stresses the need to accelerate climate action to meet the targets of the Paris Agreement in a way that ensures a just transition that leaves no one behind; calls for COP28 to address the need for a systemic transformation towards an economic model that ensures well-being for all within planetary boundaries;

6. Underlines that the process of GSTs is a central element of the Paris Agreement and that the first GST is a key moment for enhancing the collective ambition of climate action and support; expects all Parties to fully engage in the GST in order to strengthen commitments in line with the Paris Agreement, matching ambition with accelerated implementation of concrete measures to bring about an effective transition and secure a climate-neutral, climate-resilient and equitable future;

7. Reiterates that GST work should be based on science and guided by the principle of equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities; recalls that the GST should review climate action, while also taking into account human rights, gender and intergenerational justice; urges the Parties to the UNFCCC to integrate the human rights dimension into their NDCs;

8. Supports a global target for tripling renewable energy and doubling energy efficiency by 2030 at COP28, together with a tangible phase-out of fossil fuels as soon as possible, to keep 1.5 °C within reach, including by halting all new investments in fossil fuel extraction; urges the EU and the Member States to play a proactive and constructive role in that regard; reiterates its call on the Commission, the Member States and the other Parties to work on developing a fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty; stresses that the environmental transition should be carried out with the least environmental cost and that synergies between renewable energy and nature restoration should be maximised;

9. Calls on all Parties to establish a comprehensive system for monitoring transport and energy poverty, and to exert every effort to ensure that the proportion of individuals experiencing transport and energy poverty does not increase;

10. Urges all Parties to the UNFCCC to increase their NDCs in order to close, as a matter of urgency, the emissions gaps on the basis of the assessment of the first GST and as identified by the IPCC and the UNEP, and to close the implementation gaps by stepping up and improving mitigation policy implementation in order to achieve all relevant commitments; underlines the particular responsibility of all major emitters and the G20 countries to take the lead; encourages all Parties, including the EU, based on the COP26 decision regarding common time frames, to communicate, in 2025, an NDC for 2035;

11. Stresses that the GST outputs and related COP28 decisions must propose concrete, actionable and specific processes to get on track with the Paris Agreement goals; is of the opinion that such processes should include the continuation of the annual NDC synthesis report to assess progress on closing the ambition gap, as well as yearly UNFCCC reports measuring progress on the sectoral objectives and pledges taken so far; stresses that such processes should lead to concrete science-based policies and plans;
12. Urges all Parties to ensure robust rules for cooperative mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and calls on the EU and the Member States to strictly defend a high level of climate integrity, based on the best available science, in the negotiations on the outstanding issues, including on the role of removals, in order to ensure that the rules provide genuine emission reductions and full transparency;

13. Is of the opinion that the Union and the Member States should not accept an outcome that encourages abatement technologies for fossil fuels in the power sector, or a weak stance on a just energy transition;

Adaptation

14. Underlines the need to step up adaptation action within the EU and globally; reiterates that adaptation action in the short, medium and long term is a necessity for all Parties to minimise the negative effects of climate change and biodiversity loss, while stressing the particular vulnerabilities of developing countries, especially the LDCs and small island developing states (SIDS); calls on the countries that have not yet submitted adaptation communications or national adaptation plans to do so without delay; calls on all Parties to update their NDCs to include a robust adaptation component, with specific adaptation measures and associated quantified targets, prior to COP28;

15. Urges all Parties to deliver a credible, robust and implementable global adaptation framework at COP28 in order to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change, with an enhanced focus on water, water ecosystems and services; stresses the importance of setting the global goal on adaptation (GGA) and for all Parties to enhance adaptation action; urges all Parties to adopt a permanent agenda item on the GGA under the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Paris Agreement (CMA) and its subsidiary bodies; highlights the need to step up efforts to translate the GGA into measurable outcomes that should, inter alia, provide a comprehensive understanding of climate and disaster risks and associated adaptation needs and costs at multiple levels, increase the availability of consistent and comparable data, determine and enhance the provision and accessibility of means of implementation, including finance and technology support, and draw up a common set of quantitative and qualitative metrics, methodologies and approaches to track progress towards achieving the goal over time; stresses the importance of community-based approaches to adaptation; calls for the Green Climate Fund, the Global Environment Facility, the Adaptation Fund and the Sustainable Impact Fund to develop better strategies to reach local-level actors who lead climate adaptation solutions;

16. Notes that financial support for mitigation remains greater than support for adaptation; points out that in 2019, mitigation represented two thirds of total climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries (USD 50.8 billion), while adaptation finance only accounted for USD 20.1 billion and cross-cutting mitigation and adaptation accounted for USD 8.7 billion\(^1\); calls on all Parties to scale up their commitments and present a definitive roadmap for a collective objective of doubling adaptation finance by 2025, based on 2019 levels, with the aim of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation finance, and invites further contributions to the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund; calls on the Commission and the Member

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17. Recalls that in line with the EU Climate Law, the Member States must ensure continuous progress in enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change in accordance with Article 7 of the Paris Agreement; reiterates its call on the Commission to prepare a comprehensive EU-wide climate risk assessment to address resilience and preparedness to climate change in Europe; also reiterates its call on the Commission to propose a comprehensive, ambitious and legally binding European Climate Adaptation framework, including the appropriate legislative tools, with particular emphasis on the most vulnerable regions; stresses the importance of the new EU Adaptation Strategy, its linkages with the EU Biodiversity Strategy and the new regulatory framework on adaptation stemming from the European Climate Law, and reiterates Parliament’s calls for their ambitious implementation, including of their international components;

18. Stresses that early warning systems are critical to effective adaptation but are only available to less than half of WMO members; supports the WMO’s proposal to ensure that early warning systems reach everyone in the next five years; calls for the rapid implementation of this early warning services initiative with the aim of saving many lives as soon as possible;

Loss and damage

19. Urges all Parties to deliver on making the loss and damage fund operational at COP28 in order to ensure new, additional, adequate and predictable funding to avert, minimise and address loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change; strongly believes that loss and damage funding should prioritise grants and be additional to and distinct from humanitarian aid; urges the Commission and the Member States, together with other major emitters, to be ready to contribute their fair share to the loss and damage fund to ensure global climate justice, by making significant multi-year pledges by or at COP28;

20. Takes note of the adoption of the recommendations of the Transitional Committee on the Loss and Damage Fund; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work on addressing and clarifying the remaining gaps and shortcomings at COP28; reiterates, in this regard, the need for significant and fair contributions to support communities harmed by the climate and debt crises;

21. Welcomes the commitment by Commissioner for Climate Action Wopke Hoekstra to work with global partners to create new and innovative sources of funding for loss and damage, in line with the polluter pays principle; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take leadership in this regard both at international level and through leading by example, including by dedicating a share of EU Emissions Trading System revenues to funding for loss and damage;

22. Notes that Article 8 of the Paris Agreement (on loss and damage) states that the Parties should take a cooperative approach to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change; calls for a clear definition for loss and damage and a methodology for estimating it, informed by science and the needs of communities; calls for an outcome at COP28 that gives clear recommendations for the new fund’s
structure, governance and funding arrangements; calls on all Parties to ensure the meaningful participation of civil society and the most affected communities within the governing instrument of the loss and damage fund; emphasises that local and regional authorities have an essential role in diagnosing, assessing and shaping responses based on the needs of and risks to their population and territories and the threats that they face; highlights that the decentralised delivery of loss and damage finance through local governments can guarantee that finance is available at local level when shocks occur, and that investments are geared to respond to local conditions and channelled more effectively towards citizens’ priorities;

23. Underlines that to cope with the global challenges posed by climate change, there is a need to rapidly increase investment and climate finance flows – both public and private – on a global scale; stresses that this finance must be easily accessible to all countries, especially to LDCs and SIDS, where possible through direct access modalities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue to act as bridge-builders between developed, developing and least developed countries, and aim to step up the work of the High Ambition Coalition on both mitigation and adaptation finance and the operationalisation of the loss and damage fund;

24. Calls on the Loss and Damage Transitional Committee to ensure that the Loss and Damage Fund is gender-sensitive and transformative, is guided by the needs of those most impacted and responds to specific losses suffered by women; believes that women should be centrally engaged in the design, management and disbursement of the new fund;

25. Reiterates its call for loss and damage to be a standing agenda item for future COPs, so that there is clear negotiating space to monitor and make progress on this issue, and for the full operationalisation of the Santiago Network in order to effectively catalyse technical assistance for adequately addressing loss and damage; urges the Commission to support further work on the selection of the Santiago Network host according to the principles set out in the COP27 decision with a view to taking a decision at COP28;

Participation of stakeholders at COP28

26. Recalls the importance of the full involvement of all Parties in the UNFCCC decision-making processes; stresses that the current decision-making process under the UNFCCC could be improved to better allow for the full participation of developing countries and LDC delegates; calls, therefore, on the COP28 presidency and future presidencies to explore additional ways to ensure the effective and meaningful participation of those delegates and to allocate additional resources to this;

27. Commends and expresses its solidarity with those seeking to raise awareness about the climate crisis and campaigning for meaningful action; stresses the important role of young people, as noted in the Glasgow Climate Pact, in driving climate ambition in their relevant jurisdictions; calls for adequate resources to raise awareness, build capacity and engage local communities with climate action;

28. Stresses that climate goals cannot be achieved without the support and involvement of the public, including young people; calls on all Parties to raise awareness of climate change and related issues, combat misinformation and work with public representatives, including non-governmental organisations, to gain public support for mitigation and
adaptation measures;

29. Remains seriously concerned about the human rights situation in the United Arab Emirates, in particular the curtailing and violation of freedom of speech, association, peaceful assembly and expression both online and offline, which are enshrined not only in universal human rights instruments, but also in the Arab Charter on Human Rights; expresses once again its concern about the arbitrary and prolonged imprisonment of Emirati human rights defenders Ahmad Mansoor, Mohammed Al-Roken, Mohammed Al-Mansoori and Nasser Bin Ghaith following unfair trials, and calls for their immediate and unconditional release;

30. Calls on the UNFCCC, all Parties and the authorities of the United Arab Emirates to ensure equitable access to COP28 and full and unrestricted participation, including with access to relevant documents, at COP28 for all citizens and civil society organisations, in particular those representing the most vulnerable communities; condemns the barriers to participation present at previous COPs; strongly deplores the numerous cases of censorship, intimidation, harassment and surveillance of members of civil society organisations, as well as the wave of arrests and detentions, that took place around COP27 in Egypt; reiterates its call on the UNFCCC Secretariat to develop human rights criteria that countries hosting future COPs must commit to meeting as part of the host agreement, and urges the Commission and the Member States to take the lead in this process; calls, moreover, for host country agreements to be made publicly available for transparency reasons and for assurances that there are measures in place to protect delegates from all forms of harassment; calls, therefore, for strong measures by the UNFCCC and host countries to protect delegates and participants from harassment and intimidation at COP28 and future COPs;

Conflict of interest, transparency and integrity

31. Expresses concern that more than 630 fossil fuel lobbyists were accredited attendees at COP27, constituting an increase of more than 25% compared to COP26; calls for the UNFCCC and the Parties to ensure that the decision-making process is protected from interests that run counter to the goal of the Paris Agreement and to ensure that fossil fuel companies do not exert any undue and improper influence over public officials and the UNFCCC public decision-making process that may compromise the goals of the Paris Agreement; urges the UNFCCC to take the lead in proposing an ambitious Accountability Framework that would protect the UNFCCC's work from undue influence from corporate actors with proven vested interests, based on the model contained in the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control with regard to the tobacco industry;

32. Expresses strong concern that the United Arab Emirates has named the head of the state oil company Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) Group, Sultan Al Jaber, as the Chair of COP28, and a dozen employees of the COP28 team have direct links with the fossil fuel industry; is alarmed by reports showing that ADNOC employees have been able to read emails to and from the COP28 climate summit office and were consulted on how to respond to media inquiries; considers that this constitutes a serious risk of conflict of interest; urges the Commission and the Member States to take all necessary actions to ensure that this and upcoming COP presidencies are free of conflicts of interest;
33. Underlines that effective access to justice in environmental matters, in line with the Aarhus Convention, is critical to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement; believes that the EU and the Member States should lead by example and abide by the findings and recommendations of the Aarhus Convention’s Compliance Committee;

An ambitious EU climate policy

34. Takes note of the EU’s updated NDC; highlights the fact that the EU’s recently adopted ‘Fit for 55’ package and its cumulative impact will reduce the Union’s net GHG emissions by around 57% compared to 1990; stresses that, according to the ESABCC, additional efforts to increase the Union’s ambition beyond reaching a 55% reduction in net GHG emissions by 2030 would considerably decrease the Union’s cumulative emissions until 2050 and thereby increase the fairness of the Union’s contribution to global mitigation; urges other Parties to the UNFCCC to increase their NDCs in light of the decision contained in the Glasgow Climate Pact to revisit the 2030 target and to turn the commitments into concrete measures;

35. Welcomes the work of the ESABCC and its advice on determining an EU-wide 2040 climate target and a greenhouse gas budget for 2030-2050; stresses that, according to the ESABCC, the Union should take additional measures to account for the fact that it has already exhausted its fair share of the global GHG budget in line with limiting global warming to 1.5°C;

36. Calls on the Commission to publish its impact assessed recommendation concerning the Union’s post-2030 targets at the beginning of 2024 and to adopt its proposal in accordance with Article 4(3) of the European Climate Law, taking into account the COP26 decision regarding common time frames; stresses that when making this proposal, the Commission must take into account the ESABCC’s advice, as well as all social, economic and environmental considerations listed in Article 4(5) of the EU Climate Law; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to keep EU legislation up to date and to prepare corresponding legislative proposals to contribute to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement;

37. Welcomes the commitments made by Commission Executive Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič and Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra to prepare an EU climate target for 2040 that is in line with the Paris Agreement and based on a thorough impact assessment looking at the projected impacts of scenarios covering a full range of pathways from 2030 to 2050 and 2040 targets, including those contained in the ESABCC recommendations on the 2040 pathways and the carbon budget;

38. Reiterates the need to mainstream climate ambition into all EU policies and the measures transposing them and underlines that Article 6(4) of the European Climate Law obliges the Commission to assess the consistency of any draft measure or legislative proposal, including budgetary proposals, with the EU’s climate targets; urges the Commission to fully implement this provision in the way it conducts impact assessments on all EU policy areas; reiterates the principle of policy coherence for development, to which the EU and its Member States have committed and which aims to minimise contradictions and build synergies between different EU policies; insists on a coherent approach to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in both internal and external policies;
39. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to ensure that the national energy and climate plans and long-term strategies of the Member States include sufficient actions and financial means to achieve the 2030 EU targets and provide transparency on the performance of the Member States and the EU as a whole in terms of climate and energy action, in line with the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors;

40. Highlights that in order to ensure the consistency of NDCs with the economy-wide commitments required by the Paris Agreement, the Parties should be encouraged to include emissions from international shipping and aviation in their NDCs and to agree on implementing measures at regional and national level to reduce emissions from these sectors, including non-CO₂ impacts from aviation and the climate emissions of maritime fuels; highlights the fact that the Union should lead by example in that respect;

41. Supports the European Court of Auditors recommendation for the EU to account for all GHG emissions caused by the EU, which is a net importer of goods from the rest of the world; reiterates its call for science-based binding EU-wide targets for reducing the Union’s material and environmental footprints, including from imported goods;

42. Stresses the importance of upholding the commitment to the European Green Deal; believes that the European Green Deal as a whole must be implemented in order to reach the Union’s objectives and therefore calls on the Commission to deliver on all elements of the European Green Deal without delay; underlines the data gaps which need to be filled in order to track progress in achieving the EU’s climate goals and enable a regular revision of current policies;

43. Stresses that the current geopolitical situation highlights the urgency of cutting dependence on fossil fuels and the need to boost the deployment of renewables;

44. Notes the Commission proposal to withdraw the EU, its Member States and Euratom from the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT); highlights the announced intention of several Member States to withdraw from the ECT and reiterates Parliament’s position of 24 November 2022 on this matter; underlines the need to act in a coordinated manner in order to be stronger in the withdrawal negotiations and to limit the negative effects of the sunset clause and to effectively prevent intra-EU disputes; recognises that the ECT has come under criticism as an obstacle to the transition to renewable energy and to the protection of energy security in the EU and its Member States; underlines that increased renewable energy sources will help the EU transition towards a prosperous, sustainable, climate-compatible and independent economy; urges all actors to accelerate the energy transition; regrets that according to the International Renewable Energy Agency, renewable energy investment remains concentrated in a limited number of countries and focused on only a few technologies; calls for the EU and the Member States to instigate the systemic and structural overhaul required to promote a more resilient, inclusive and climate-safe global energy system based on renewable energy;

**International climate finance and sustainable finance**

45. Notes the fact that the EU and its Member States are the largest providers of public climate finance, while expressing its deep concern that the public climate finance provided by the EU and its Member States decreased in 2022 compared to 2021; stresses that in its conclusions on the preparations for the 28th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 28), the Council renewed the commitment made by the Union
and its Member States to continue scaling up their international climate finance towards the developed countries’ goal of mobilising at least USD 100 billion per year as soon as possible and through to 2025 from a wide variety of sources; underlines the need for continued and increased contributions; reiterates its call, in this respect, for a dedicated EU public finance mechanism that provides additional and adequate support towards delivering the EU’s fair share of international climate finance goals; stresses that when determining the use of revenues generated from the auctioning of the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) allowances, Member States must take into account the need to continue scaling up international climate finance in vulnerable non-EU countries in accordance with the recently adopted agreement on the EU ETS revision;

46. Highlights that significant financial resources from a variety of sources are needed to implement the goals of the Paris Agreement in developing countries, also considering that many developing countries have conditional NDCs, the achievement of which depends on sufficient financial support; recalls that the Glasgow Climate Pact urges developed country Parties to significantly scale up their provision of climate finance as a matter of urgency; notes that not all developed country Parties have fulfilled their part of the USD 100 billion climate finance goal; stresses that the failure to deliver the climate finance commitment by 2020 made by developed countries at successive COPs has eroded trust and is hindering progress on other agenda items, as witnessed during the UNFCCC Bonn climate talks of June 2023;

47. Is concerned about the growing gap between the needs of developing country Parties and the current scale, sufficiency and accessibility of climate finance; underlines that it will be impossible to close this gap without significant mobilisation of private finance, in addition to public finance; points to the finance gap, particularly for adaptation; stresses that the Parties should aim to achieve a balance between mitigation and adaptation finance, and highlights that a commitment was made at COP26 to double collective adaptation finance by 2025 based on 2019 levels; stresses that financing from the developed countries responsible for a large share of historical emissions will also be crucial to build trust for a more ambitious dialogue on climate mitigation targets; calls on historical emitters to help developing countries adapt to climate change, inter alia, through grants-based financing and technical support;

48. Calls for developed country Parties, including the EU and its Member States, to ensure that the USD 100 billion climate finance goal can be met in 2023 and disbursed on average between 2020 and 2025, and to further detail the way forward for the new post-2025 climate finance goal which should go beyond the 2020 USD 100 billion annual goal; believes that the post-2025 goal should take into account the needs and priorities of developing countries for additional and adequate climate finance, clearly prioritise grants-based finance and encompass both mitigation and adaptation actions; believes that the responsibility to deliver the new goal will need to encompass a broad donor base that includes both developed countries and other countries that are in a position to contribute, as well as innovative sources of finance and private finance; recalls its view that stand-alone targets for mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage should be explored as part of this new collective quantified goal on climate finance; highlights the importance of capacity-building and training in order to facilitate access to climate finance by local and regional actors in order to provide tailored solutions to the unique challenges on the ground;

49. Recalls the conclusions of COP27 that delivering the necessary funding for the climate
transition will require a transformation of the financial system and its structures and processes and the engagement of governments, central banks, commercial banks, institutional investors and other financial actors; considers it essential to advance the Bridgetown Agenda without delay and to make the international financial system fit for the challenges of the 21st century; calls on all the major international financial institutions and multilateral development banks to align their portfolios and lending policies with the Paris Agreement, integrate tackling climate change and preserving nature and biodiversity into their practices and priorities, phase out all direct and indirect support to fossil fuels and gather and use high-quality climate risk, vulnerability and impact data to guide the direction of investments towards 1.5 °C aligned investments; takes note of the road map drawn up at the Paris Summit for a New Global Financial Pact of June 2023 and calls for its timely implementation;

50. Highlights the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) as the EU’s climate bank and its Climate Bank Roadmap and updated Energy Lending Policy and the additional efforts of the European Investment Fund to spearhead climate investments; welcomes the fact that the European Central Bank has committed to integrating climate change considerations into its monetary policy framework;

51. Reiterates its support for the work of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action and encourages all governments to adopt the coalition’s commitments to align all policies and practices in the remit of finance ministries with the goals of the Paris Agreement and to adopt effective carbon pricing, as laid down in the Helsinki Principles;

52. Recalls that, according to the Paris Agreement, all Parties must make financial flows – public and private, domestic and international – compatible with the path towards the 1.5 °C target set out in the Paris Agreement; underlines the importance of addressing this element of the Paris Agreement in a comprehensive way at COP28;

53. Notes that many climate-vulnerable countries are in debt distress or at significant risk of debt distress; welcomes the commitment taken by the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the UK, France, Canada and the United States to include climate resilience debt clauses in future lending, so that debt repayments are suspended in the event of climate disasters; calls on other countries and multilateral development banks, including the EIB, to adopt similar measures; supports the establishment at COP28 of a global expert review on debt, nature and climate as proposed by France, Colombia and Kenya during the Paris Summit for a New Global Financing Pact; considers it necessary to have solutions that jointly tackle the climate and debt crises; reiterates the need to clearly prioritise grants-based climate finance to ensure that climate finance does not contribute to unsustainable debt levels in developing countries and calls on the Parties to engage in discussions and undertake the necessary measures to alleviate the debt burden of developing countries; stresses that many developing countries are in great fiscal need and require investments in order to transition their energy systems and undertake effective climate mitigation and adaptation efforts; highlights the importance of increasing grants-based finance, especially for adaptation, and that climate finance provided in the form of loans can exacerbate developing countries’ debt distress; notes that 50 % of the EU’s total climate finance in 2020 was provided in the form of grants and urges the EU and all Member States to increase grants-based finance, particularly for adaptation and especially for least developed countries and SIDs;
54. Recalls that fossil fuels are the largest contributor to climate change, responsible for over 75% of all GHGs, and that current plans would lead to the production of around 240% more coal, 57% more oil, and 71% more gas than would be consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5 °C; is alarmed by the fact that CO₂ emissions from current global fossil fuel infrastructures would in themselves exceed the remaining carbon budget for remaining below 1.5 °C, which confirms the IEA’s assessment that there should be no new oil, gas or coal development if global warming is to stay below 1.5 °C;

55. Regrets that fossil energy subsidies in the Union have remained stable since 2008, totalling around EUR 55-58 billion per year and corresponding to around one third of all energy subsidies in the Union; reiterates its call to end, as a matter of urgency, all direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies in the EU as soon as possible and by 2025 at the latest, and other environmentally harmful subsidies as soon as possible and by 2027 at the latest, at both EU and Member State levels through the implementation of concrete policies, timelines and measures; calls on all Member States to improve their national reporting of fossil fuel subsidies and plan for their phase-out in the upcoming revisions of their national energy and climate plans;

56. Is concerned by the fact that governments worldwide spent more than EUR 900 billion on fossil fuel subsidies in 2022, the highest figure ever recorded; encourages the other Parties to end all direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies as soon as possible and by 2025 at the latest;

57. Draws attention to the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue under Article 2(1)(c) of the Paris Agreement as an opportunity to make progress in discussions on an equitable approach to the phase-out of public and private fossil fuel and environmentally harmful finance, to realign finance to support a just transition and to make finance more available and affordable for developing countries to undertake climate action, with a view to advancing action on Article 2(1)(c) at COP28 and beyond; calls for a permanent agenda item on the implementation of Article 2(1)(c) of the Paris Agreement; calls for the EU and its Member States to promote the international discussion on green bond standards, taking into account the already established EU green bond standard;

58. Reiterates its support for the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA), which was launched at COP26, and stresses the imperative of its objective to limit the supply of fossil fuels and set an end for oil and gas production; supports a socially just and equitable global transition to align oil and gas production with the objectives of the Paris Agreement; calls on all Member States and other Parties to the Paris Agreement to join this initiative; welcomes the G7’s commitment to stop funding fossil fuel development overseas by the end of 2022, while stressing that this commitment should also apply domestically;

59. Welcomes the Global Registry of Fossil Fuel Emissions as an open and transparent repository of data on fossil fuel production worldwide, expressed in terms of its embedded CO₂ emissions; believes that the tool can lead to better understanding of extraction impacts on the remaining carbon budget, reporting by the Parties and decision-making;

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The climate and environmental crisis

60. Underscores that the climate and biodiversity crises are interlinked and that the responses to both crises need to be aligned; recalls that, currently, 80 % of habitats in the EU are in a bad state\(^1\); emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring biodiversity and ecosystems, in particular soils, forests, agricultural ecosystems, freshwater bodies, oceans and other carbon-rich ecosystems, and to manage natural resources sustainably in order to enhance nature-based climate change mitigation and build resilience, which are necessary for achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement; firmly believes that the Paris Agreement goals cannot be met without restoring nature, including in the Union; calls for the swift conclusion of an EU agreement on the Nature Restoration Law;

61. Highlights the conclusions contained in the IPCC 6th assessment that conservation, improved management and restoration of ecosystems offer the largest share of economic mitigation potential in the land use sector; stresses that the IPCC 6th Assessment Report also demonstrates the need for the urgent implementation of actions for the restoration of degraded ecosystems in order to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change, in particular by restoring degraded wetlands and rivers, forests and agricultural ecosystems; notes the importance expressed in the report of inclusive decision-making with indigenous peoples and local communities for successful adaptation and mitigation across ecosystems; calls on all Parties, including the EU Member States, to implement ambitious nature restoration measures in their territories and to invest more in nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based approaches;

62. Stresses that agriculture should contribute to protecting and restoring biodiversity;

63. Recognises that healthy ecosystems and rich biodiversity underpin human survival and provide life-critical services such as food and clean water, and highlights that climate change is one of the direct drivers of biodiversity loss; points to how climate change has already altered terrestrial, freshwater and marine ecosystems all around the world, causing species losses and declines in key ecosystem services; recognises that these climate-driven impacts on ecosystems have caused measurable economic and livelihood losses around the world; notes that the IPPC’s 6th Assessment Report concludes that climate change has reduced food security and affected water security due to warming, changing precipitation patterns, the reduction in and loss of cryospheric elements, and the greater frequency and intensity of climatic extremes; stresses that the world’s land and ocean sinks have absorbed 56 % of the human-induced GHG emissions of the past 60 years, and that according to the IPCC, maintaining the resilience of biodiversity and ecosystem services on a global scale depends on effective and equitable conservation of approximately 30 % to 50 % of the Earth’s land, freshwater and ocean areas\(^2\);

64. Underlines that the conservation and restoration of high-carbon ecosystems such as peatlands, wetlands, rangelands, and blue carbon ecosystems such as salt marshes, seagrasses and mangroves, offers a wide range of mitigation and adaptation benefits; calls on the Commission to develop the mapping of these ecosystems in order to work further on the identification of robust, transparent and science-based methodologies for

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the proper accounting of carbon removals and emissions from those ecosystems in a manner that does not undermine other biodiversity objectives;

65. Stresses the need to protect the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and local communities by ensuring effective and robust regulatory protection of the environment, land rights and indigenous peoples’ rights, livelihoods and cultures, including the right to free, prior and informed consent; stresses the central role of indigenous communities in climate action, implementation, data collection, decision-making and knowledge-sharing; calls on the Parties to ensure that all commitments made at COP28 to implement the Paris Agreement align with existing international human rights obligations and standards applicable to business operations, and respect indigenous people’s rights; stresses the need to support and protect environmental defenders and calls for those responsible for murders, defamatory attacks, acts of persecution, criminalisation, imprisonment, harassment and intimidation against them to be held accountable;

66. Strongly welcomes the agreement on the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, which was adopted during the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity; stresses the importance of effectively, swiftly and fully implementing the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework in order for it to be a success; recalls the failure in achieving the Aichi targets, owing largely to the lack of implementation;

67. Recalls target 8 of the Kunming-Montreal Biodiversity Framework to minimise the impact of climate change and ocean acidification on biodiversity and increase its resilience through mitigation, adaptation and disaster risk reduction actions, including through nature-based solutions and/or ecosystem-based approaches, while minimising negative and fostering positive impacts of climate action on biodiversity; recalls the landmark report entitled ‘The European environment – state and outlook 2020’, which finds that the impacts of climate change on biodiversity and ecosystems are expected to intensify, while activities such as agriculture, fisheries, transport, industry and energy production continue to cause biodiversity loss and harmful emissions;

68. Urges the Parties to raise their level of ambition in the land, freshwater and ocean sectors through a rights-based approach in their next round of NDCs, national adaptation plans and long-term low-emissions development strategies in conjunction with their national biodiversity strategies and plans;

69. Welcomes all efforts by governments and non-governmental actors to maximise the potential of soils to mitigate climate change and to improve water availability; underlines the transboundary impacts of soil degradation that warrant joint international efforts to tackle all soil degradation threats; draws attention to the huge importance of peatlands for climate change mitigation; calls for efforts globally and within the EU to swiftly restore peatlands, so that they can be a sink rather than a source;

70. Emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring water and water-related ecosystems, including river basins, aquifers and lakes; highlights the devastating environmental, social and economic impacts of desertification, droughts, floods and water pollution, and the need for common approaches to properly prevent and adapt to this phenomenon and overcome it; underlines, therefore, the importance of water availability and sustainable water management for climate change mitigation and
adaptation; highlights that water stress is becoming a major and growing concern in Europe and that droughts and water scarcity are no longer rare or extreme events, with about 20% of the European territory and 30% of Europeans affected by water stress during an average year according to the EEA; highlights the need to prevent excessive pressures from economic activities on river bodies in some regions of Europe affecting their ecological flow; calls for the efficient use, reuse and recycling of water and for the protection and restoration of ecosystems supporting groundwater resources; stresses the need for the speedy and full implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive in order to achieve its objectives and better manage Europe’s water resources;

71. Welcomes the adoption of the historic UN High Seas Treaty, or Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction treaty; calls on the Parties to continue work on the UN Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue and expresses its support for the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development and the Commission’s ‘Mission Starfish 2030: Restore our Ocean and Waters’; stresses that climate mechanisms depend on the health of the ocean and marine ecosystems currently affected by global warming, pollution, overexploitation of marine biodiversity, acidification, deoxygenation and coastal erosion; stresses that the IPCC recalls that the ocean is part of the solution to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change; recalls the importance of ocean-based solutions also in restoring ecosystems, ensuring food security and providing resources;

72. Stresses the need to combat plastic pollution also because of the climate impact of plastic throughout its life cycles; welcomes the ongoing work on the Global Plastics Treaty and calls on the UN member states to reach an ambitious and effective agreement, consistent with the Paris Agreement, by no later than 2024; underlines the necessity to address plastic pollution by reducing waste at its source, cutting down on plastic use and consumption, and increasing circularity; calls for a systemic approach in order to appropriately address plastic pollution in the environment, including microplastics, and its impact on climate change;

Methane and other non-CO\textsubscript{2} greenhouse gases

73. Welcomes the fact that 122 Parties have become signatories to the Global Methane Pledge; strongly urges, in particular, the large methane-emitting Parties that have not joined the pledge to do so as soon as possible; calls for a quantified, science-based assessment of the progress made since the adoption of the Global Methane Pledge at COP26, the pledge’s participants having agreed to voluntarily contribute to a collective effort to reduce global methane emissions by at least 30% from 2020 levels by 2030; urges all signatories to ensure that they reduce methane emissions within their territories by at least 30% from 2020 levels by 2030 and to adopt national measures to achieve this aim; calls for the signatories of the pledge to enhance governance on methane by drawing up an overarching framework to make progress towards the collective commitment; calls for more attention at the upcoming and future COPs to be given to mitigating non-CO\textsubscript{2} GHGs;

74. Calls on all Parties also to include specific methane reduction targets in their NDCs; notes that no Parties have set any quantified targets to address methane emissions from livestock; reiterates its call to ensure ambitious reductions of GHG emissions in the

\footnote{EEA report entitled ‘Water resources across Europe – confronting water stress: an updated assessment’, October 2021.}
Recalls the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector; underlines that capturing methane in the oil and gas value chain is warranted from an economic and energy-dependency point of view; reiterates that importers of fossil energy to the Union should be subject to rules that are similar to those for producers within the Union; reiterates its call on the Commission to propose, based on an impact assessment, a 2030 EU binding methane emissions reduction target covering all relevant emitting sectors and including methane among the regulated pollutants in the National Emission Reduction Commitments Directive\(^1\);

**Efforts across all sectors**

Highlights the fact that the transport sector is the only sector in which emissions have risen at EU level since 1990 and that this is not compatible with the EU’s climate goals, which require greater and faster reductions in emissions from all sectors of society, including the aviation and maritime sectors; welcomes, in this regard, the inclusion of maritime and aviation emissions in the EU ETS, which will foster greater ambition at international level, including in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); is concerned by the slow progress achieved in the IMO and the ICAO in addressing emissions from international shipping and aviation;

Calls on the IMO to adopt measures to reduce maritime emissions in line with the Science Based Targets and the 1.5 °C limit set by the Paris Agreement, requiring a 37 % emission reduction by 2030, 96 % by 2040 and 100 % by 2050; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support this ambition; notes that the Science Based Targets have already been endorsed by developed nations such as the US, the UK, Canada and New Zealand and climate-vulnerable countries such as Fiji, the Solomon Islands, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and Palau; recognises that if the IMO negotiations fail to achieve action in line with the Paris Agreement, the EU should revise its shipping legislation to enlarge its scope and to align it with the Science Based Targets; notes that recently approved EU shipping legislation is a step in the right direction, but acknowledges that further efforts are needed to achieve zero emissions from shipping; calls on the Commission and the Member States to restart UNFCCC negotiations on attributing international shipping emissions to national inventories on a 50-50 % basis, mirroring the scope of the ETS and FuelEU Maritime; calls for the EU to engage in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to support other countries in setting up their own national and regional legislation to decarbonise the shipping sector;

Notes that black carbon emissions from shipping rose globally by 12 % between 2012 and 2018, and by 85 % in the Arctic between 2015 and 2019\(^2\); stresses that black carbon


is estimated to account for about 21% of shipping emissions over a 20-year timescale\(^1\); calls for immediate action to reverse the current increase in black carbon emissions from Arctic shipping, in particular in the light of the alarming rate at which the Arctic is melting; considers that the IMO ban on the use of heavy fuel oil in the Arctic still contains loopholes and therefore risks being rendered ineffective in protecting the Arctic; urges the Commission to ensure that all ships calling at EU ports and travelling in or near the Arctic switch to cleaner distillates and install particulate filters, which would reduce black carbon emissions by over 90%;

79. Points to the disproportionate climate impact of the use of private jets; stresses that private jets are up to 14 times more polluting than commercial planes per passenger; notes with concern that private jet use in Europe is estimated to have increased by 30% compared to the pre-pandemic level\(^2\); calls on all Parties, including the EU Member States, to take measures to discourage the use of private jets; underlines the importance of leaders leading by example and urges all participants at COP28, including from the EU institutions, to refrain from using private jets and to choose the least polluting transport option possible to reach their destination;

80. Stresses that the IPCC 6th Assessment Report recognises the importance and mitigation potential of ‘sufficiency’ and demand-side policies for the achievement of our climate targets, alongside energy efficiency and the replacement of fossil fuels by renewable energies; stresses also that the report shows that demand reduction and shifts in consumption patterns can reduce global GHG emissions in end-use sectors by 40-70% by 2050 compared to baseline scenarios; recognises that the reduction potential is higher for countries and population segments with relatively high levels of consumption and encourages all Parties to the UNFCCC to integrate these aspects into their NDCs;

81. Welcomes the new law introduced in France to ban short-haul flights for journeys which can be taken in under 2.5 hours by train; encourages all Parties to introduce such a ban on short-haul flights;

82. Recalls that agriculture accounted for 11% of the EU’s total domestic GHG emissions in 2020\(^3\) and acknowledges the significant potential for GHG emissions reduction in the agricultural sector; stresses that a transition towards more sustainable agricultural practices, shorter supply chains and a shift towards more healthy foods, diets and lifestyles, including increased consumption of sustainably and regionally produced plants and plant-based foods, would contribute significantly to reducing agricultural emissions and therefore increase mitigation and adaptation while releasing pressure on land and helping restore soil quality and ecosystems; reiterates that the overconsumption of meat and ultra-processed products needs to be addressed;

83. Emphasises the importance of developing a more sustainable agriculture, including by giving farmers alternatives in order to reduce the use of synthetic fertilisers and pesticides; emphasises that reducing the overall production and use of synthetic fertilisers and increasing the use of natural carbon sequestration in soils and soil organic

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matter can offer multiple benefits by increasing soil fertility and biodiversity restoration while providing substantial mitigation potential;

84. Stresses that all sectors must contribute to the reduction of emissions, including the defence sector, while maintaining operational effectiveness, and that the development of decarbonisation technologies and strategies in the defence sector should be accelerated; notes that the inclusion of disaggregated military emissions in UNFCCC submissions is voluntary and it is not currently possible to identify reported military GHG emissions from the submitted UNFCCC data; calls on the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission and the Council to formulate a proposal for the transparent accounting of military emissions to the UNFCCC which acknowledges the adoption of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, and in order to fully implement the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap;

85. Calls on the Member States to ensure that military GHG emissions are included in domestic net-zero targets in order to accelerate the development of decarbonisation technologies and strategies;

86. Reiterates its support for the creation of a global platform for assessing the environmental damage caused during armed conflicts – an initiative of the Ukrainian Government; calls on the Commission to explore this idea and to draw up a proposal ahead of COP28 for creating such an international platform; stresses the need for more attention to be given to the environmental and climate impacts of armed conflicts;

87. Welcomes the fact that several EU trading partners have introduced carbon trading or other carbon pricing mechanisms and invites the Commission to further promote this and similar policies on a global scale and to explore links and other forms of cooperation with existing carbon pricing mechanisms in non-EU countries in order to accelerate cost-efficient and socially fair emissions reductions worldwide; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to put in place safeguards to ensure that any links with the EU ETS will continue to deliver additional and permanent mitigation contributions and will not undermine the EU’s domestic GHG emissions commitments;

88. Highlights the fact that the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism will provide an effective mechanism to price emissions from products imported to the EU and to address carbon leakage while supporting the adoption of carbon pricing worldwide, which will contribute to reducing global carbon emissions and to achieving the Paris Agreement goals and ensure that the EU’s climate objectives are not undermined owing to carbon leakage;

89. Stresses the need to address the climate and environmental impact of the textile sector; recognises that the textile industry needs to play an important role in the transformation to a circular economy and tackle challenges related to, for example, waste prevention, waste management, microplastic shedding, water usage, overproduction and the overall durability and non-toxicity of the production process and recyclability of textile products, including by ensuring that textiles are designed to be long-lasting and recyclable; stresses that working towards establishing global standards for when brands can make green claims about a product is imperative; highlights, in this regard, that consistent and transparent mandatory criteria will help consumers make informed choices and prevent greenwashing and ensure that sustainability claims are backed by verifiable evidence;
90. Stresses that climate change and environmental degradation lead to scarcity of natural resources, can increase conflicts and tensions, as well as food shortages and natural catastrophes, and are major drivers of human displacement and threat multipliers; highlights the fact that women are disproportionately affected by this and that 80% of people displaced by climate change are women; expects COP28 to pay more attention to climate-induced displacement; calls on the Commission and the Member States to recognise the needs and vulnerability of people affected by climate displacement and step up efforts to find solutions;

91. Highlights the fact that the Mediterranean is one of the regions in the world most affected by climate change; notes that the Mediterranean basin is warming 20% more quickly than the global average and that the region is one of the main climate change hotspots in the world, where 250 million people are projected to be considered ‘water poor’ within 20 years; underlines that the Mediterranean is turning into the fastest warming sea in the world with consequences for important economic sectors and the whole sea ecosystem, which will lead to irreversible changes to the ecosystem and species; calls on the Commission and the Member States to act with urgency and cooperate with its Mediterranean partners in working on ambitious adaptation measures and to lead mitigation action;

92. Notes that there is growing scientific and political interest in solar radiation modification (SRM) as a set of climate engineering approaches proposed to artificially reflect sunlight and cool the planet, such as stratospheric aerosol injection; stresses that SRM does not address the root cause of climate change and is not an alternative to mitigation efforts; notes the lack of scientific certainty on the effects and expresses concern about the global risks and adverse impacts of SRM on the environment and climactic and geopolitical stability; underlines, therefore, that a global approach is essential and that no countries should unilaterally experiment with this technology; takes note that a UN resolution on global governance has been blocked; calls on the Commission and the Member States to initiate a non-use agreement at international level, in accordance with the precautionary principle and in the absence of evidence of its safety and a full global consensus on its acceptability;

Climate change and gender

93. Points to the fact that people are impacted by climate change in different ways, depending on factors such as gender, age, disability, ethnicity and poverty; notes that vulnerable populations, such as the poor, indigenous peoples, women and elderly people are the hardest hit by its consequences; believes that gender balance and the empowerment of women and girls are key to an inclusive and just transition; emphasises the need for more effective gender mainstreaming throughout all relevant targets and goals;

94. Calls on all Parties, including the EU and its Member States, to increase efforts to

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2 Mediterranean experts on climate and environmental change, ‘Risks associated to climate and environmental changes in the Mediterranean region’, 2019.
integrate gender equality in their revised NDCs, as well as in climate and environmental policies, in particular those related to mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage, and to increase the meaningful involvement of women’s groups in their design and implementation; stresses the need for more concrete actions by all Parties, including the EU, to deliver on the commitments contained in the renewed Gender Action Plan agreed at the 25th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP25); urges the Member States and the Commission to increase efforts to achieve the goals set out in the EU Gender Action Plan III;

95. Stresses the need to accelerate action for gender-responsive disaster risk reduction and therefore for a gender-responsive implementation of the Sendai Framework; calls for further efforts to be made to prioritise and account for gender in disaster preparedness, particularly using disaggregated disaster risk reduction data sets;

96. Considers that women’s access to inclusive climate finance must be increased and enabled; highlights the fact that gender-responsive climate financing is critical for a just transition; emphasises the importance of a gender-transformative approach in climate finance; urges the EU and its Member States to report on the gender responsiveness of its climate finance contributions and to increase the coherence between support for gender and climate through external action instruments and through the EIB, including through enhancing the participation of women and women’s organisations in governance, decision-making and programmes which support the role of women in climate governance;

97. Highlights the importance of increasing women’s participation in decision-making in the climate diplomacy context, including in COP delegations and leadership at all levels of climate action; regrets the fact that women made up less than 34 % of country negotiating teams at COP27 and that as much of 90 % of some Party delegations were made up of men; calls on all Parties to aim for gender parity in their delegations and at all levels of climate change decision-making and negotiations; urges all Parties to nominate a national gender and climate change focal point and increase their resources, training and support, including in the EU;

Energy policy

98. Welcomes all initiatives to reduce the EU’s dependency on fossil fuels; notes the ongoing work of the EU with international partners to diversify energy supplies;

99. Highlights the fact that climate change and extreme events are having an impact on our energy systems, including the production of hydropower, bioenergy yields, the efficiency of thermal power plants and heating and cooling demands; recalls the need to develop more feasible power system retrofit options that support infrastructure resiliency, reliable power systems and efficient water use for current and new power generation systems;

100. Welcomes the higher EU-binding targets agreed by the co-legislators in 2023 for renewables under the revised Renewable Energy Directive of 42,5 %, and the aim to achieve 45 %, and the target of 11,7 % energy efficiency under the revised Energy Efficiency Directive (EED);

101. Highlights the central role of energy efficiency and a diversified energy system in the
transition towards a climate-neutral economy\(^1\); recognises the progress achieved in the build-out of renewable energy sources and calls, at the same time, for further build-out of energy efficient actions such as sector integration and reuse of excess heat; acknowledges, however, the importance of aligning renewable energy and energy efficiency targets to achieve climate neutrality at the latest by 2050 and to comply with the Paris Agreement; recognises that increased ambition in the Union’s 2030 energy efficiency target should be compatible with the increase and uptake of electrification, hydrogen, e-fuels and other clean technologies needed for the green transition;

102. Recalls the need for a massive scaling-up and speeding-up of permit-granting procedures for renewable energy projects in order to make them as predictable as possible;

103. Recalls the Union’s commitment to the energy efficiency first principle, which takes into account cost efficiency, system efficiency, storage capacity, demand-side flexibility and security of supply; underlines the importance of mainstreaming and implementing the principle in all relevant legislation, initiatives and policy decisions and across all sectors where appropriate; points out the untapped potential of energy efficiency in sectors such as industry\(^2\), information technology, transport and buildings, including heating and cooling; calls on the Commission and the Member States to rapidly implement ambitious targets as set in the recently agreed revision of the EED;

104. Believes that, for the Union to achieve climate neutrality, its energy system should be integrated and based on a cascading priority starting from implementing the energy efficiency first principle; recalls that, in order to have an impact, the energy efficiency first principle needs to be consistently applied by national, regional, local and sectoral decision-makers in all relevant scenarios when making policy, planning and major investment decisions; recalls, further, that this principle implies adopting a holistic approach, which takes into account the overall efficiency of the integrated energy system, security of supply and cost effectiveness, and promotes the most efficient solutions for climate neutrality across the whole value chain, from energy production and network transport to final energy consumption, so that efficiencies are achieved in both primary and final energy consumption; considers that this approach should look at the system performance and dynamic use of energy, where demand-side resources and system flexibility are considered to be energy-efficiency solutions;

105. Highlights the need to accelerate the electrification of energy demand, building on a renewables-based power system; stresses the need for the electricity markets to integrate renewable energy sources while providing flexibility with regard to demand and energy storage; calls for a future-proof climate-responsive electricity market prepared to tackle energy price shocks; welcomes the reform of the EU’s electricity market design in order to accelerate a surge in renewables and the phase-out of gas, ensure affordable consumer bills that are less dependent on volatile fossil fuel prices, better protect consumers from future price spikes and potential market manipulation, and make the EU’s industry clean and more competitive;

106. Highlights that energy policies should be pursued in line with the principle of a fair and

\(^1\) IPCC 2023 – Synthesis report AR6.

\(^2\) It is estimated that the economic potential of reducing final energy consumption for industry by 2030, compared to business as usual, is 23.5\%.
just transition, as well as in close cooperation with civil society and the social partners; considers, therefore, that public policies, stronger social partnerships and civil society engagement at local, national and EU level are fundamental to achieving climate neutrality across all sectors of society in a fair, inclusive and socially sustainable way;

107. Calls for European leadership in the renewable industry and for its supply chains to form part of the EU’s industrial policy;

108. Encourages the continuation of the work to revise the Directive on Energy Taxation with the aim of aligning taxation policies to the energy and climate targets for 2030 and 2050, while assessing its impacts, including on consumers, energy and transport poverty;

109. Stresses that although Europe is working towards meeting its ambitious goals, achieving global net-zero emissions at the latest by 2050 will require coordinated global actions; highlights that developing countries will require international assistance in order to achieve their green transition; stresses the importance of enhancing close cross-border cooperation and the sharing of best practices with international partners in the fields of policy-making and science, including technology transfer, in order to promote energy efficiency and investments in sustainable energy technologies and infrastructure; welcomes the fact that COP27 saw the launch of a new five-year programme to promote climate technology solutions in developing countries;

Industry, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and competitiveness

110. Believes that economic prosperity, social cohesion, job creation, sustainable industrial development and climate policy should be mutually reinforcing; highlights that combating climate change should aim to reduce energy poverty and increase resilience and competitiveness, and to provide opportunities for EU industry and SMEs that can be taken up if legislators commit to timely, tailor-made, solidarity-based and adequate policy responses; deems it of the utmost importance for the Union to ensure a just transition and that it obtains a first-mover advantage, and to lead by example while ensuring a level playing field for European industries globally;

111. Stresses that the Union should do its utmost to keep its industries’ and SMEs’ leading position and global competitiveness in the transition towards a net-zero GHG emissions economy; underlines the need to rapidly decarbonise European industry further and to continue the Union’s support for this endeavour, in particular for proportionate solutions for take-up by SMEs; notes that the proposed Net-Zero Industry Act aims at increasing the European manufacturing capacity of the net-zero technologies that are key to meeting the EU’s climate-neutrality goals; welcomes the initiatives undertaken for strategic value chains; recognises the positive effects on European industries, including SMEs, stemming from adopting early strategies to fight climate change; stresses the need to establish enforceable multi- and bilateral agreements between the EU and its partners; stresses the need to prevent the relocation of production and investments of European industries and SMEs owing to less ambitious climate measures outside the Union; considers that production and investments in Europe would strengthen the industrial value chain and strategic autonomy of the EU in an unstable global context; recognises that climate change is also affecting industrial and service sectors, causing occasional supply and operational disruptions, particularly as a result of extreme weather events; stresses the need for industries to take measures to adapt to the
changing climate;

112. Recognises the essential role of SMEs, in particular micro enterprises and start-ups, in driving and delivering on employment and growth, as well as in leading the way on the digital and green transitions; recalls that SMEs are an essential part of the European economic and social fabric and must be supported and incentivised in this transition by legislators, in particular by ensuring access to finance for sustainable technologies, services and processes, by simplifying administrative procedures and by providing equal opportunities in public procurement; is concerned that SMEs’ opportunities and vulnerabilities are not sufficiently taken into account in all EU policies relative to the single market, including in the drive to promote digitalisation and the green transition;

113. Considers that the transition towards a sustainable economy needs to be combined with upholding Europe’s competitiveness and creating jobs, as well as with upholding the promise that no one is left behind; stresses that this combination is crucial to the success of the European Green Deal and that the single market should remain cost efficient when adjusting to a new and favourable regulatory environment, in particular for the net-zero industries and the sustainability of European industries; stresses, further, that this combination aims at achieving the 2030 and 2050 climate objectives and drives the transformation to climate neutrality and a sustainable circular economy;

114. Emphasises the need to promote competitive markets for the commodities and rare metals that are essential for the green transition; highlights the fact that a continued dependency on a few suppliers will undermine some of the current policy measures such as the RePowerEU plan and efforts made by the Union’s citizens; points to the need to improve the limited capacity for domestic sourcing and processing; believes that the EU Innovation Fund should support the scaling-up of state-of-the-art and innovative recycling EU net-zero industry technologies and their supply chains; notes that the proposed Critical Raw Materials Act aims to reduce dependency on current suppliers and ensure instead that the EU can continuously access a secure, diversified, affordable and sustainable supply of critical raw materials while protecting the environment;

115. Highlights the need for qualification programmes to reinforce the workforce to meet the increasing demand for labour in the energy efficiency, renewables, building renovations and green tech solutions sectors; calls on all Member States to take steps to ensure that the current and future European workforce acquires all the necessary skills to manage, implement and innovate the green transition, especially in regions more negatively impacted by the transition;

116. Believes that the Union should aim to enhance cooperation on the trade, research and production of net-zero technologies with like-minded and reliable partners through bilateral cooperation and joint efforts to enhance the multilateral trading system, and that the Union should foster international collaboration and partnerships to promote secure, sustainable and resilient global supply chains through the promotion of open and rules-based trade;

117. Underlines that solutions based on carbon capture and storage and carbon capture and use technologies can play a role in decarbonisation, especially for the mitigation of process emissions in industry, for those Member States that choose this technology; underlines the importance of European leadership in this regard;
Research, innovation, digital technologies and space policy

118. Welcomes the role of the Horizon Europe programme and its contribution to climate neutrality; is of the opinion that the partnerships under Horizon Europe, including the Joint Undertakings, will foster collaboration between the public and the private sectors with the goal of contributing to the achievement of the green transition, while ensuring that innovations are sustainable, available, accessible and affordable; underlines the importance of improving SMEs’ access to and participation in Horizon Europe calls and of better communication with and involvement of citizens concerning the results of European research and development projects and concerning new technologies, including lighthouse projects, in order to increase public uptake and make the role of the Union more visible to its citizens;

119. Welcomes the role of the Copernicus programme and the new EU Knowledge Centre on Earth Observation in monitoring the land, atmospheric and marine environment; underlines the importance of satellite observation capacities to monitor, model, predict and support policy-making on climate change;

120. Highlights the need to attract more investment, both public and private, in research, innovation and the deployment of new sustainable technologies, including in labour-intensive industries and in necessary new infrastructure networks and projects, contributing to the goals of the European Green Deal and the Paris Agreement; stresses that future research and technology should consider sustainability and circularity; emphasises, at the same time, the importance of basic research, as well as of collaborative and transdisciplinary approaches in research and innovation (R&I), in addressing climate challenges; points, further, to the need for supporting social innovation that is essential to addressing unmet societal needs and challenges while empowering people during the green transition;

121. Underlines the importance of ensuring coherence and consistency in incentives to foster innovative technologies to achieve the 2030 and 2050 targets, addressing the deployment of already mature technologies, as well as investments in new technologies that need to be developed to reach the Union’s goal of climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest;

122. Stresses the need for a twin transition, where the digital and green transitions go hand in hand; notes that the digital divide in Europe is still very significant, with considerable differences between Member States and regions; underlines the need to create a competitive and robust data economy that enables high-level digitalisation in all areas of society and the economy in a sustainable, energy efficient, cyber-secure and affordable manner; underlines the fundamental role that digital technologies can play in the Union’s green transition; recalls that the Union’s recovery requires the creation of a stable regulatory framework conducive to progress, including market-driven progress, in research, innovation and the development of sustainable technologies and the appropriate conditions for their financing;

123. Underlines that digitalisation is one of the key factors driving energy system integration as it can enable dynamic and interlinked flows of energy carriers, allow for more diverse markets to be interconnected, and provide the necessary data to match supply and demand; highlights the potential of digital technologies to increase energy efficiency and thus reduce overall GHG emissions; highlights the need to ensure a
secure regulatory framework with non-discriminatory and transparent procedures for access to and the transmission of energy data; recalls that the Commission estimates that the environmental footprint of information and communications technology (ICT) accounts for between 5% and 9% of global electricity use and more than 2% of global GHG emissions; underlines that 47% of digital carbon emissions emanate from consumer equipment such as computers, smartphones, tablets and other connected objects; welcomes the revision of the EED, which will require all data centres in the EU apart from small ones to publicly report, inter alia, their energy performance yearly; calls for further measures to reduce the carbon footprint of the ICT sector at data centre and consumer device level; reiterates the goal to make data centres climate-neutral and highly energy efficient by no later than 2030, as stated in the Digital Strategy;

124. Recalls the importance of R&I’s contribution to achieving the goals set out in the Paris Agreement and the objectives of the European Green Deal; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support R&I, and an overall increase in EU and national budgets devoted to R&I, in sustainable and safe energy technologies and innovation; calls on the Commission to consider further supporting technologies and innovative solutions that will contribute to a climate-proof and integrated energy system, including those where Europe has global leadership and domestic-based value chains; considers it is essential to have key segments of renewable energy value chains within the Union and calls for adequate measures to support the role of Europe-based content in the renewable-energy sources supply chain and legislation;

**Climate change and development**

125. Welcomes the UN’s SDG Stimulus plan, which aims to tackle the high cost of debt and rising risks of debt distress; calls for EU support for its implementation, in particular regarding the creation of a multilateral debt workout mechanism, under the auspices of the UN, to address both the impact of the climate crisis and the financing requirements of the 2030 Agenda;

126. Calls for the EU and its Member States to deliver on the existing commitments towards developing countries on the provision of climate finance and to maintain a high level of ambition in relation to climate action support for developing countries in the lead up to, during and after COP28; calls for the European institutions to implement an integrated approach to the SDGs, which provide a universal compass for people’s prosperity, and to protect the planet; stresses that developing countries’ general confidence in the EU as a reliable and trustworthy partner depends on the extent to which the Union delivers on its promises; notes that fruitful cooperation between the EU and developing countries in the fight against climate change can strengthen the attractiveness of the Union as a partner, which is of crucial importance in an increasingly competitive geopolitical context;

127. Emphasises that climate diplomacy must go hand in hand with the full implementation of the principle of policy coherence for development, as enshrined in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, meaning that the EU has to ensure consistency between its development, trade, agriculture, fishery, energy and climate policies;

**Role of the European Parliament at COP28**
128. Believes that the European Parliament should be an integral part of the EU delegation at COP28, given that it must give its consent to international agreements and plays a central role in the domestic implementation of the Paris Agreement as one of the EU’s co-legislators; expects, therefore, to be allowed to attend EU coordination meetings at COP28 in Dubai and to be guaranteed access to all preparatory documents; commits to acting independently and free from conflicts of interest;

129. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and requests that it be circulated to all non-EU Parties to the Convention.