European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2023 on the torture and criminal prosecution of Ukrainian minors Tihran Ohannisian and Mykyta Khanhanov by the Russian Federation (2023/2735(RSP))

P9_TA(2023)0240 RC-B9-0268/2023

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and Ukraine,

–  having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas on 24 May 2023, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation charged Tihran Ohannisian and Mykyta Khanhanov, born in 2006, with allegedly planning sabotage on the Berdiansk railway; whereas they face up to 20 years’ imprisonment under Article 281 of the Russian Criminal Code and have not received proper legal assistance;

B.  whereas Ohannisian and Khanhanov’s prosecution followed months of brutal interrogation by the Russian authorities, which started on 30 September 2022 and included subjecting these minors to beatings and electroshock torture aimed at eliciting confessions, along with harassment of their families;

C.  whereas numerous reports indicate that the Russian authorities continue to oppress Ukrainian children, the most vulnerable victims of Russia’s war of aggression;

D.  whereas, according to Ukraine’s Children of War platform, at least 488 Ukrainian children have died as a result of Russia’s invasion, as also reported by UNICEF, with at least 1 016 injured, around 19 500 deported to Russia and 3 924 reported missing; whereas the recent Moscow Mechanism report corroborated this phenomenon;

1.  Demands the immediate termination of the proceedings and dismissal of all charges against Ohannisian and Khanhanov and their immediate release; calls on the International Committee of the Red Cross to facilitate their safe return to Ukraine-controlled territory; calls on the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence Against Children to investigate; calls for those behind the prosecution to be added to the EU sanctions list; calls for the release of all Ukrainian citizens unlawfully detained by Russia;

2.  Condemns Russia’s deliberate targeting of Ukrainian children through measures including forcible transfers within Ukrainian territory temporarily occupied by Russia, unlawful deportations to Russia and Belarus, illegal adoptions and attempts to impose ‘re-education’; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to adopt an EU-Ukraine child protection package for children fleeing or affected by the war;

3.  Condemns the targeting, persecution and torture of children in situations of armed conflict and direct attacks on objects protected under international law, including schools and hospitals;

4.  Calls on the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to intensify efforts to prevent and end grave violations against children affected by armed conflict; stresses the importance of advancing the children and armed conflict agenda in the EU’s external action and counterterrorism and security policies, and of integrating it into common security and defence policy operations, security sector reforms and mediation;

5.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Office of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence Against Children, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Belarusian authorities.

European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2023 on the humanitarian situation in Sudan, in particular the death of children trapped by fighting (2023/2736(RSP))

P9_TA(2023)0241 RC-B9-0291/2023

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Sudan,

–  having regard to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocols,

–  having regard to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,

–  having regard to the Geneva Convention,

–  having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the Sudanese military and the Rapid Support Force continue to pursue a violent power struggle, violating international humanitarian law;

B.  whereas the ensuing violence has killed thousands of innocent civilians, displaced more than 1.2 million and forced nearly 500 000 to flee to neighbouring countries, threatening stability in the region;

C.  whereas only limited humanitarian access to parts of Khartoum has been allowed; whereas the conflict has continued in other parts of the country, in particular Darfur;

D.  whereas humanitarian workers are unable to deliver supplies to civilians affected by the conflict; whereas medical facilities have been attacked, with many remaining closed;

E.  whereas more than 13,6 million children in Sudan urgently need humanitarian assistance; whereas before the current crisis, around 3 million children suffered from malnutrition; whereas 70 children have died of malnourishment, dehydration and infections at Mygoma orphanage in Khartoum;

1.  Strongly condemns the continuing violence between the rival armed factions in Sudan; deplores their disregard for agreed humanitarian ceasefires, attacks on humanitarian workers and infrastructure, the deliberate targeting of civilians and the recruitment and involvement of children in the conflict; condemns the use of sexual violence and calls for the necessary support to survivors and for the perpetrators to be brought to justice;

2.  Calls on all sides to immediately cease all military action, allow unrestricted humanitarian access and return to talks on a negotiated peace agreement; fully supports all regional and international efforts for a peaceful solution; welcomes all regional and international mediation efforts in Jeddah and Addis Ababa and by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development;

3.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure that a permanent ceasefire agreement is followed by a process of democratic reform to establish the long-promised civilian government, to which all actors, including the militaries, have committed; calls for them to urgently consider targeted sanctions against those responsible for human rights abuses through the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime;

4.  Reminds all factions of their obligations under international law; calls, in this regard, for the urgent establishment of humanitarian corridors and for basic public services to be fully restored;

5.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to stand ready to provide immediate support and humanitarian assistance to those impacted by the conflict, including internally displaced persons and those seeking refuge in other countries, including by providing emergency travel documentation;

6.  Expresses its deep gratitude to humanitarian personnel for their important work and condemns any attacks on them;

7.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Government of Sudan, the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces, the African Union, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Pan-African Parliament.

European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2023 on the deterioration of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong, notably the case of Jimmy Lai (2023/2737(RSP))

P9_TA(2023)0242 RC-B9-0276/2023

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Hong Kong and on China,

–  having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas since the Chinese regime imposed the National Security Law (NSL) on 30 June 2020, fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and the judiciary’s independence in Hong Kong have deteriorated alarmingly; whereas the PRC has fully breached the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations and the ICCPR;

B.  whereas Jimmy Lai has been detained since February 2021 on trumped-up charges, accused under the NSL of collusion with foreign forces and of fraud; whereas his trial starts in September 2023 and he faces a possible life sentence; whereas his British lawyer has been refused permission to represent him at the trial; whereas several independent media outlets, such as Apple Daily and Stand News, have been forced to cease operations;

C.  whereas political prisoners generally remain imprisoned throughout a lengthy pre-trial detention period in very difficult conditions, while many of them have serious health conditions; whereas this has been the case for prominent representatives of the pro-democracy camp such as Jimmy Lai, Albert Ho, Benny Tai, Chow Hang-Tung, Lee Cheuk-yan, Joshua Wong and Cyd Ho;

1.  Urges the Hong Kong Government to immediately and unconditionally release and drop all charges against Jimmy Lai and all the other pro-democracy representatives and activists who have exercised their freedom of expression and basic and human rights;

2.  Expresses its deep concern for Ms Chow Hang-tung, who was placed in solitary confinement during her 34-hour hunger strike, and for Mr Albert Ho, whose bail was revoked on arbitrary legal grounds and who has cancer;

3.  Reiterates its calls on the Council to introduce targeted sanctions under the EU global human rights sanctions regime against John Lee and all other Hong Kong and PRC officials responsible for the ongoing crackdown on human rights in Hong Kong;

4.  Expresses concern about the extra-territorial application of the NSL; calls on the authorities to stop impeding the work of all journalists; calls on the authorities to repeal the NSL;

5.  Calls on the EEAS to adequately support the EU Office to Hong Kong in intensifying trial observation, in coordination with representations of EU Member States and like-minded countries, monitoring human rights by releasing public statements, and establishing a human rights focal point for human rights defenders and raising their cases with the authorities at all levels; calls on the EEAS and the EU Office to report on the most prominent trials; calls on the EU Office to request a prison visit;

6.  Condemns attempts by the Chinese authorities to target Hong Kong diaspora communities within the EU; reiterates its call on all EU Member States to suspend extradition treaties with the PRC and Hong Kong;

7.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the EU institutions, the Government and Parliament of the PRC, and the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 15 June 2023 on the composition of the European Parliament (2021/2229(INL) – 2023/0900(NLE))

P9_TA(2023)0243 A9-0214/2023

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Article 14(2) of the Treaty on European Union,

–  having regard to Article 106a(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

–  having regard to European Council Decision (EU) 2018/937 of 28 June 2018 establishing the composition of the European Parliament(1),

–  having regard to its resolution of 7 February 2018 on the composition of the European Parliament(2),

–  having regard to its legislative resolution of 3 May 2022 on the proposal for a Council Regulation on the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, repealing Council Decision (76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom) and the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage annexed to that Decision(3) (‘legislative resolution of 3 May 2022 on the reform of European electoral law’),

–  having regard to the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe,

–  having regard to Rules 46, 54 and 90 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A9-0214/2023),

A.  whereas the composition of the European Parliament must respect the criteria laid down in Article 14(2), first subparagraph, of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), namely representatives of the Union's citizens not exceeding seven hundred and fifty in number, plus the President, representation being degressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of six members per Member State and no Member State being allocated more than ninety-six seats;

B.  whereas Parliament has the right of initiative regarding the composition of the European Parliament;

C.  whereas Article 14(2) TEU states that the European Parliament is to be composed of representatives of the Union’s citizens;

D.  whereas Article 10 TEU provides inter alia that the functioning of the Union is to be founded on representative democracy, with citizens being directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament;

E.  whereas Parliament’s legislative resolution of 3 May 2022 on the reform of European electoral law proposes the establishment of a Union-wide constituency;

F.  whereas the establishment of a potential Union-wide constituency requires the Act concerning the elections of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage to be amended;

G.  whereas the determination of the number of seats of a potential Union-wide constituency falls within the remit of a European Council decision on the composition of the European Parliament based on Article 14(2) TEU, while the provisions necessary for its establishment are based on Article 223(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

H.  whereas the allocation of seats among Member States in the current and past legislative terms was not the result of a permanent calculation system, but of political negotiations; whereas, as a result, the current method of allocation of seats to Member States does not automatically comply with the principle of degressive proportionality; whereas a permanent calculation mechanism reflecting the population figures in the Member States of the Union would ensure future compliance with that principle;

I.  whereas the European Council Decision establishing the composition of the European Parliament must be ready sufficiently in advance of polling day in order to enable Member States to enact the necessary legal provisions to organise the elections to the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 parliamentary term;

1.  Notes that the current allocation of seats in the European Parliament as established in Decision (EU) 2018/937 applies to the 2019-2024 parliamentary term; stresses, therefore, that a new decision on the composition of the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 parliamentary term is required without delay;

2.  Recognises that a number of Member States consider that the voting system in the Council needs to be taken into consideration when deciding on the allocation of seats in the European Parliament;

3.  Points out that, in line with its proposal for a Council Regulation annexed to its legislative resolution of 3 May 2022 on the reform of European electoral law, the 28 additional seats for Members elected in a Union-wide constituency are only to be effectively established after the elections following the entry into force of a revised European electoral law, along with the necessary provisions for a Union-wide constituency;

4.  Strongly underlines the need in the future for a permanent system, based on a clear mathematical formula, that would allocate the seats of the European Parliament in an objective, fair, durable and transparent way, respecting the principle of degressive proportionality as defined in Article 1 of Decision (EU) 2018/937; considers that it is not politically viable at this stage for Parliament to propose such a permanent system whilst it needs further deliberation and should be introduced well in advance of elections of the European Parliament; calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs to resume its work on such a permanent system, within this legislature, including exploring the possibility for Eurostat to be involved;

5.  Considers that any further delay in the work of the Council on the modification of European electoral law would run counter to the principle of sincere cooperation as enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU since the Council’s decision is expected to have an impact on the elections of the European Parliament and may have an impact on its composition;

6.  Underlines the urgent need for the European Council to adopt the decision on the composition of the European Parliament so that Member States can enact, in good time, the necessary domestic provisions to enable them to organise the elections to the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 parliamentary term; stresses that Parliament is committed therefore to proceed swiftly with the consent procedure, in the spirit of mutual sincere cooperation;

7.  Adopts, and submits to the European Council, the annexed proposal for a European Council decision establishing the composition of the European Parliament, on the basis of its right of initiative laid down in Article 14(2) TEU; points out that such a decision may only be adopted with Parliament’s consent, and therefore requests the European Council to immediately inform it, if it intends to deviate from the submitted proposal, and in what way;

8.  Instructs its President to forward this legislative resolution and the proposal annexed hereto to the European Council and the Commission, and to the parliaments and governments of the Member States.

ANNEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

Proposal for a

EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECISION

establishing the composition of the European Parliament

THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14(2) thereof,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and in particular Article 106a(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal of the European Parliament(4),

Having regard to the consent of the European Parliament(5),

Whereas:

(1)  Article 14(2), first subparagraph, of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) lays down the criteria for the composition of the European Parliament, namely that representatives of the Union's citizens are not to exceed seven hundred and fifty in number, plus the President, that representation is to be degressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of six members per Member State, and that no Member State is to be allocated more than ninety-six seats.

(2)  Article 10 TEU provides, inter alia, that the functioning of the Union is to be founded on representative democracy, with citizens being directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament and Member States being represented by their governments, themselves being democratically accountable to their national Parliaments or citizens, in the Council.

(3)  Article 14(2) TEU therefore applies within the context of the wider institutional arrangements set out in the Treaties, which also include the provisions on decision making in the Council.

(4)  An appropriate number of representatives in the European Parliament to be elected in a Union-wide constituency should be laid down subject to the adoption of the legal basis for that constituency,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

In the application of Article 14(2) TEU, the following principles shall be respected:

–  the total number of seats in the European Parliament shall not exceed 750 in number, plus the President,

–  the allocation of seats to Member States shall be degressively proportional with a minimum threshold of 6 seats and a maximum threshold of 96 seats per Member State while reflecting as closely as possible the sizes of the respective populations of the Member States,

–  degressive proportionality is defined as follows: the ratio between the population and the number of seats of each Member State before rounding up or down to the nearest whole number shall vary in relation to their respective populations in such a way that each Member of the European Parliament from a more populous Member State represents more citizens than each Member of the European Parliament from a less populous Member State and, conversely, that the larger the population of a Member State, the greater its entitlement to a large number of seats in the European Parliament.

Article 2

The total population of the Member States is calculated by the Commission (Eurostat) on the basis of data provided by the Member States, in accordance with a method established by means of Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6).

Article 3

1.  The number of representatives in the European Parliament elected in each Member State for the 2024-2029 parliamentary term is set as follows:

2.  In addition to the number of Members of the European Parliament elected in each Member State as set out in paragraph 1, and subject to the entry into force of a Council Regulation on the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, repealing Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom and the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage annexed to that Decision, providing for the establishment of a Union-wide constituency, 28 representatives in the European Parliament are elected in a Union-wide constituency in the first elections following that event, as provided for in that Regulation.

Article 4

Sufficiently far in advance of the beginning of the 2029–2034 parliamentary term, the European Parliament shall submit to the European Council, in accordance with Article 14(2) TEU, a proposal for an updated allocation of seats in the European Parliament.

Article 5

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at ...

For the European Council

The President

(1) OJ L 165 I, 2.7.2018, p. 1. (2) OJ C 463, 21.12.2018, p. 83. (3) OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 171. (4) Proposal adopted on ... (not yet published in the Official Journal). (5) Consent of ... (not yet published in the Official Journal). (6) Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on European demographic statistics (OJ L 330, 10.12.2013, p. 39).

European Parliament recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (2023/2500(RSP))

P9_TA(2023)0244 B9-0260/2023

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and in particular Articles 2, 4, 6 and 21 thereof,

–  having regard to Articles 16, 223, 225 and 226 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), and in particular Articles 7, 8, 11, 17, 21, 41, 42 and 47 thereof,

–  having regard to Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications)(1) (‘e-Privacy Directive’),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)(2),

–  having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA(3),

–  having regard to Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 on attacks against information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA(4) (‘Cybercrime Directive’),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items(5) (‘Dual-Use Regulation’),

–  having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States(6) as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/796 of 17 May 2021(7),

–  having regard to the Act concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage(8),

–  having regard to Decision 95/167/EC, Euratom, ECSC of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 6 March 1995 on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the European Parliament’s right of inquiry(9),

–  having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/480 of the European Parliament of 10 March 2022 on setting up a committee of inquiry to investigate the use of the Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware, and defining the subject of the inquiry, as well as the responsibilities, numerical strength and term of office of the committee(10),

–  having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU(11) (‘Anti-Money Laundering Directive’),

–  having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 September 2022 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market (European Media Freedom Act) and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (COM(2022)0457),

–  having regard to Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

–  having regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in case C-37/20(12) on the anti-money-laundering directive on the provision whereby the information on the beneficial ownership of companies incorporated within the territory of the Member States is accessible in all cases to any member of the general public is ruled invalid,

–  having regard to Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

–  having regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights(13),

–  having regard to the statement of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet of 19 July 2022 entitled ‘Use of spyware to surveil journalists and human rights defenders’,

–  having regard to the comment of Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Dunja Mijatovic of 27 January 2023 entitled ‘Highly intrusive spyware threatens the essence of human rights’(14),

–  having regard to the European Data Protection Supervisor’s (EDPS) Preliminary Remarks on Modern Spyware of 15 February 2022(15),

–  having regard to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and in particular Articles 8, 10, 13, 14 and 17 thereof and the protocols to that Convention,

–  having regard to Europol’s 2021 Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) entitled ‘A Corrupting Influence: the Infiltration and Undermining of Europe’s Economy and Society by Organised Crime’,

–  having regard to the 2017 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) report entitled ‘Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU’, and to the updates presented on 28 February 2023 to the Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA),

–  having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs(16) and in particular to the recommendations contained therein on strengthening IT security in the EU’s institutions, bodies and agencies,

–  having regard to EDPS opinion 24/2022 of 11 November 2022 on the European Media Freedom Act,

–  having regard to the glossary on malware and spyware drawn up by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA),

–  having regard to the European Ombudsman’s Decision on how the European Commission assessed the human rights impact before providing support to African countries to develop surveillance capabilities (case 1904/2021/MHZ),

–  having regard to the statement 2 February 2023 by Ms Irene Kahn, UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression and Mr Fernand de Varennes, UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues demanding an investigation into the alleged spying programme targeting Catalan leaders(17),

–  having regard to the report on by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) on the democratic oversight of the security services(18) and to its opinion entitled ‘Poland - Opinion on the Act of 15 January 2016 amending the Police Act and Certain Other Acts’(19),

–  having regard to the report of the Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of the Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (A9‑0189/2023),

–  having regard to Rule 208(12) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas, thanks to the efforts of CitizenLab and Amnesty Tech and numerous investigative journalists, it has been revealed that government bodies in several countries, both EU Member States and non-EU countries, have used Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware against journalists, politicians, law enforcement officials, diplomats, lawyers, business people, civil society actors and other actors, for political and even criminal purposes; whereas such practices are extremely alarming and demonstrate the risk of abuse of surveillance technologies to undermine fundamental human rights, democracy and electoral processes;

B.  whereas whenever the term ‘spyware’ is mentioned in the report, it means ‘Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware’ as defined in Parliament’s Decision to set up the PEGA Committee;

C.  whereas it has been observed that state actors have deliberately used spyware in a misleading manner by using spyware that can disguise itself as legitimate program, file or content (‘Trojan horse’), such as fake messages from public institutions; whereas in some cases public authorities have used phone operators to transmit malicious content to the targeted person’s device; whereas spyware can be deployed by exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities without the interaction of the target with infected content, can remove all traces of its presence after uninstallation and can anonymise the link between remote operators and server;

D.  whereas in the early days of mobile communication, eavesdropping was conducted through the interception of calls and, later, of text messages in plain format;

E.  whereas the emergence of encrypted mobile communication applications led to the emergence of the spyware industry exploiting existing vulnerabilities in smartphone operating systems to install software that imports spyware into the phone, including through ‘zero-click’ infections without the user’s knowledge or any action by the user, enabling the extraction of data before encryption; whereas such zero-click spyware, by its very design, makes effective and meaningful scrutiny of its use very difficult;

F.  whereas knowledge about vulnerabilities in software systems is traded directly between parties, or is facilitated by brokers; whereas this trade includes non-state actors and criminal organisations;

G.  whereas the acquisition, trading and hoarding of zero-day vulnerabilities fundamentally undermines the integrity and security of communications and cyber security of EU citizens;

H.  whereas spyware surveillance should remain the exception and always require effective, binding and meaningful prior judicial authorisation by an impartial and independent judicial authority, which must ensure that the measure is necessary, proportionate and strictly limited to cases affecting national security or involving terrorism and serious crime; whereas surveillance techniques are liable to be abused in environments without effective checks and balances;

I.  whereas any spyware surveillance must be scrutinised by an independent ex post oversight authority, which must ensure that any authorised surveillance is carried out in compliance with fundamental rights and in accordance with the conditions set out by the CJEU, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Venice Commission; whereas this ex post oversight authority should order the termination of surveillance immediately if it is found to be incompatible with the above-mentioned rights and conditions;

J.  whereas spyware surveillance failing to meet the requirements set out in Union law and the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR runs counter to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU and the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter, in particular those in Articles 7, 8, 11, 17, 21 and 47 thereof, which recognise specific rights, freedoms and principles such as respect for private and family life, the protection of personal data, freedom of expression and information, the right to property, the right to non-discrimination, as well as the right to effective remedy, a fair trial and the presumption of innocence;

K.  whereas the rights of targeted persons are laid down in the Charter and international conventions, in particular the right to privacy and the right to a fair trial, as well as in Union rules on the rights of suspects and accused; whereas these rights have been confirmed by CJEU and ECtHR case-law;

L.  whereas the impact of targeted surveillance on women can be particularly grievous, as authorities may use the increased social scrutiny women are under to weaponise private and intimate data extracted through spyware for defamation campaigns;

M.  whereas it is clear from the testimonies of persons targeted that even if legal remedy and civil rights exist on paper, they mostly become void in the face of obstruction by government bodies, the absence or non-implementation of the right of persons targeted to be informed and the administrative obstacle of individuals having to prove they have been targeted; whereas even in systems with quick and open procedures, the nature of spyware makes it very hard to prove authorship and the nature and extent to which an individual has been targeted;

N.  whereas courts have not accepted the forensic evidence of independent experts but only evidence based on examination of the authorities, security or law enforcement that are allegedly behind an attack; whereas this leaves targets in a paradoxical situation with no viable option for proving a spyware infection;

O.  whereas the Polish government has weakened and eliminated institutional and legal safeguards, including proper oversight and scrutiny procedures, effectively leaving persons targeted without any meaningful remedy; whereas Pegasus surveillance spyware has been illegally deployed for political purposes to spy on journalists, opposition politicians, lawyers, prosecutors and civil society actors;

P.  whereas the Hungarian government has weakened and eliminated institutional and legal safeguards including proper oversight and scrutiny procedures, effectively leaving persons targeted without any meaningful remedy; whereas the Pegasus surveillance spyware has been illegally deployed for political purposes to spy on journalists, opposition politicians, lawyers, prosecutors and civil society actors;

Q.  whereas it has been officially confirmed that a Member of the European Parliament(MEP) for Greece and a Greek journalist have been both wiretapped by the Greek National Intelligence Service (EYP) and targeted with Predator spyware; whereas a former US-Greek employee at Meta was simultaneously wiretapped by the EYP and targeted with Predator spyware, the use of which is illegal under Greek law; whereas according to media reports, opposition and government party MPs in Greece, party activists and journalists have allegedly also been targeted with Predator spyware or conventional wiretapping by the EYP or both; whereas the Greek government denies having purchased or used Predator, but it is highly probable that Predator has been used by or on behalf of persons very close to the Prime Minister’s office; whereas the Greek government admitted it has granted export licences to Intellexa for the sale of the Predator spyware to repressive governments, such as Madagascar and Sudan; whereas the government has responded to the scandal with legislative amendments that further reduce the rights of targets to be informed after surveillance has taken place and is further hampering the work of independent authorities;

R.  whereas revelations identified two categories of spyware target in Spain; whereas the first includes the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence , the Minister of the Interior and other high officials; whereas the second category are part of what is referred to as ‘CatalanGate’ by the Citizen Lab organisation, and includes 65 targeted persons, including political figures from the regional Government of Catalonia, Members of the pro-Catalan independence movement, MEPs, lawyers, academics and civil society actors; whereas in May 2022 the Spanish authorities admitted to targeting 18 persons with court authorisation, though they have so far not disclosed the warrants or any other information, invoking national security when accounting for the use of spyware surveillance in Spain; whereas 47 other persons have also been allegedly targeted, but not received any information other than from Citizen Lab;

S.  whereas no allegations of spyware infections have been confirmed in Cyprus; whereas Cyprus is an important European export hub for the surveillance industry and an attractive location for companies selling surveillance technologies;

T.  whereas there are strong indications that the governments of Morocco and Rwanda, among others, have targeted high profile Union citizens with spyware, including the President of France, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Minister of the Interior of Spain, the then Prime Minister of Belgium, the former President of the Commission and former Prime Minister of Italy, and Carine Kanimba, the daughter of Paul Rusesabagina;

U.  whereas it can be safely assumed that all Member States have purchased or used one or more spyware systems; whereas most governments in the European Union will refrain from illegitimate use of spyware, but the risk of abuse is very plausible in the absence of a solid legal framework including safeguards and oversight, and in light of technical challenges in detecting and tracing infections;

V.  whereas most Member State governments and Member State parliaments have not provided the European Parliament with meaningful information about their legal frameworks governing the use of spyware beyond what was already publicly known, despite an obligation to do so pursuant to Article 3(4) of the Decision of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 6 March 1995 on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the European Parliament’s right of inquiry; whereas it is difficult to assess the enforcement of Union legislation and the safeguards, oversight and means of redress, which prevents the adequate protection of citizen’s fundamental rights;

W.  whereas Article 4(3) TEU reads ‘pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties’;

X.  whereas several key figures from the spyware industry have acquired Maltese citizenship, which facilitates their operations within and from the Union;

Y.  whereas many spyware developers and vendors are or have been registered in one or more Member States; whereas examples include NSO Group with corporate presence in Luxembourg, Cyprus, the Netherlands and Bulgaria; the parent company of Intellexa, Thalestris Limited, in Ireland, Greece, Switzerland and Cyprus; DSIRF in Austria; QuaDream in Cyprus; Amesys and Nexa Technologies in France; Tykelab and RCS Lab in Italy; and FinFisher (now defunct) in Germany;

Z.  whereas the European Union does not participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies; whereas all Member States except Cyprus participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement, although Cyprus submitted a request to join the Wassenaar Arrangement a long time ago; whereas Cyprus is bound by the Dual-Use Regulation;

AA.  whereas Israel’s export regime(20) applies in principle to all Israeli citizens, even when operating from the EU; whereas Israel is does not participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement but claims to apply its standards nevertheless;

AB.  whereas the export of spyware from the Union to non-EU countries is regulated in the Dual-use Regulation, which was revised in 2021; whereas the Commission published its first implementation report in September 2022(21);

AC.  whereas some spyware producers exporting to third countries establish themselves within the Union to gain respectability while trading in spyware with repressive regimes; whereas exports from the Union to repressive regimes or non-state actors are taking place, in violation of the EU export rules;

AD.  whereas Amesys and Nexa Technologies are currently being prosecuted in France for exporting surveillance technology to Libya, Egypt and Saudi Arabia; whereas Intellexa companies based in Greece reportedly exported their products to Bangladesh, Sudan, Madagascar and at least one Arab country; whereas FinFisher’s software is being used by dozens of countries all over the world, including Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Morocco’s intelligence services, which have been accused of using Pegasus spyware against journalists, human rights defenders, civil society and politicians by Amnesty International and Forbidden Stories; whereas it is unknown if export licences were granted for the export of spyware to all these countries; whereas former FinFisher executives have been charged by the public prosecutor’s office in Munich for exporting surveillance technology to Turkey without an export licence;

AE.  whereas the number of attendees at arms fairs and ISSWorld who were marketing spyware capabilities demonstrates the predominance of third country providers of spyware and related products and services, a significant number of which are headquartered in Israel (e.g. NSO Group, Wintego, Quadream and Cellebrite) and reveals prominent producers in India (ClearTrail), the United Kingdom (BAe Systems and Black Cube) and the United Arab Emirates (DarkMatter), while the United States Entity List blacklisting spyware producers located in Israel (NSO Group and Candiru), Russia (Positive Technologies) and Singapore (Computer Security Initiative Consultancy PTE LTD.) further highlights the diverse origins of spyware producers; whereas the fair is also attended by a wide range of European public authorities, including local police forces;

AF.  whereas Article 4 (2) TEU provides that national security remains the sole responsibility of each the Member State;

AG.  whereas, however, the CJEU has ruled (case C-623/17) that ‘although it is for the Member States to define their essential security interests and to adopt appropriate measures to ensure their internal and external security, the mere fact that a national measure has been taken for the purpose of protecting national security cannot render EU law inapplicable and exempt the Member States from their obligation to comply with that law’;

AH.  whereas the CJEU has ruled (case C‑203/15) that ‘Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, for the purpose of fighting crime, provides for general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data of all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic communication’;

AI.  whereas the CJEU has ruled (case C-203/15) that ‘Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation governing the protection and security of traffic and location data and, in particular, access of the competent national authorities to the retained data, where the objective pursued by that access, in the context of fighting crime, is not restricted solely to fighting serious crime, where access is not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative authority, and where there is no requirement that the data concerned should be retained within the European Union’;

AJ.  whereas the case-law of the ECtHR makes clear that all surveillance must occur in accordance with the law, serve a legitimate aim and be necessary and proportionate: whereas, moreover, the legal framework must provide precise, effective and comprehensive safeguards on the ordering, execution and potential redress opportunities against surveillance measures, which must be subject to adequate judicial review and effective oversight(22);

AK.  whereas the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108), recently modernised as Convention 108+, applies to processing of personal data for state (national) security purposes, including defence; whereas all Member States are parties to this Convention;

AL.  whereas important aspects of the use of surveillance spyware for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences and the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security, fall within the scope of EU law;

AM.  whereas the Charter lays down the conditions for the limitation of the exercise of fundamental rights, requiring that it must be provided for by law, respect the essence of the rights and freedoms concerned, be subject to the principle of proportionality and only be imposed if it is necessary and genuinely meets objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others; whereas when spyware is used, the level of interference with the right to privacy can be so severe that the individual is in fact deprived of it and the use cannot always be considered proportionate, irrespective of whether the measure can be deemed necessary to achieve the legitimate objectives of a democratic state;

AN.  whereas the e-Privacy Directive provides that Member States must ensure the confidentiality of communications; whereas the deployment of surveillance tools constitutes a restriction of the right to protection of terminal equipment afforded by the e-Privacy Directive; whereas such restrictions place national laws on spyware within the scope of the e-Privacy Directive in a similar way to national data retention laws; whereas frequent deployment of intrusive spyware technology would not be compatible with the Union legal order;

AO.  whereas under international law a state has the right to investigate potential crimes only within its jurisdiction and has to resort to the assistance of other states where the investigation has to be carried out in other states unless there is a basis for conducting investigations in other jurisdictions under an international agreement or in in Union law, in the case of Member States;

AP.  whereas the infection of a device with spyware and the subsequent collection of data takes place through the servers of mobile service providers; whereas as free roaming within the Union has resulted in persons sometimes having mobile contracts from other Member States than the one where they reside, there is currently no legal basis in Union law for the collection of data in the other Member State through the use of spyware;

AQ.  whereas David Kaye, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of expression(23) and Irene Khan, current UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of expression(24), have called for an immediate moratorium on the use, transfer and sale of surveillance tools until rigorous human rights safeguards are put in place to regulate practices and guarantee that Governments and non-state actors use these tools in legitimate ways;

AR.  Whereas there are cases where spyware companies, in particular Intellexa, have not only sold the interception and extraction technology itself, but also the entire service, also referred to as ‘hacking as a service’ or ‘active cyberintelligence’, offering a package of surveillance and interception technology methods, as well as training for staff and technical, operational and methodological support; whereas this service could allow the company to be in control of the entire surveillance operation and aggregate the surveillance data; whereas this practice is almost impossible for the relevant authorities to oversee and control; whereas this makes it difficult to adhere to principles of proportionality, necessity, legitimacy, legality and adequacy; whereas this service is not permitted by Israel’s defence export agency (DECA); whereas Cyprus has been used to bypass existing limitations under Israeli law in order to provide hacking as a service;

AS.  whereas Member States must comply with Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 2009/81/EC on public and defence procurement, respectively; whereas they must adequately justify derogations under Article 346(1)(b) TFEU, as Directive 2009/81/EC explicitly takes into account the sensitive characteristics of defence procurement and comply with the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, as amended 30 March 2012(25) if party to it;

AT.  whereas the EDPS has underlined that Member States have to respect the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, which sets limits to surveillance activities for national security; whereas, furthermore, when used for law enforcement purposes, surveillance has to comply with EU law and in particular Charter and EU directives such as the ePrivacy Directive and the Law Enforcement Directive;

AU.  whereas it has been reported that large financial institutions have tried to encourage spyware producers to refrain from applying appropriate human rights standards and due diligence and continue selling spyware to repressive regimes;

AV.  whereas in the Horizon 2020 programme, Israel is ranked third among Associated Countries for overall participation in the programme; whereas the Horizon Europe Agreement with Israel has an overall budget for 2021-27 of EUR 95,5 billion(26); whereas some funds have been made available to Israeli military and security companies through these European programmes(27);

AW.  whereas the main legislative instrument for Union development policies is Regulation (EU) 2021/947(28) (‘Global Europe Regulation’) and Union funding may be provided through the types of financing provided for by the Financial Regulation; whereas assistance can be suspended in the event of degradation in democracy, human rights or the rule of law in third countries;

1.  Highlights the undeniable importance of the protection of privacy, the right to dignity, private and family life, freedom of expression and information, freedom of assembly and association, and the right to a fair trial, in particular in an increasingly digital world where more and more of our activities take place online;

2.  Takes the firm position that breaches of these fundamental rights and freedoms are key in terms of respect for the common legal principles set out in the Treaties and in other sources, and notes that democracy itself is at stake, as the use of spyware on politicians, civil society and journalists has a chilling effect and severely affects the right to peaceful assembly, freedom of expression and public participation;

3.  Strongly condemns the use of spyware by Member State governments and members of government authorities or state institutions for the purpose of monitoring, blackmailing, intimidating, manipulating and discrediting opposition members, critics and civil society, eliminating democratic scrutiny and the free press, manipulating elections and undermining the rule of law by targeting judges, prosecutors and lawyers for political purposes;

4.  Points out that this illegitimate use of spyware by national and non-EU governments directly and indirectly affects the Union’s institutions and the decision making process, thereby undermining the integrity of European Union democracy;

5.  Notes with grave concern the fundamental inadequacy of the current Union governance structure to respond to attacks on democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law from within the Union, and the lack of action taken by many Member States; notes that when they are threatened in one Member State, the entire Union is put at risk;

6.  Stresses that digital standards governing technological developments in the Union must respect fundamental rights;

7.  Takes the firm position that the export of spyware from the Union to dictatorships and repressive regimes with poor human rights records, where such tools are used against human rights activists, journalists and government critics, is a severe violation of fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and a gross violation of Union export rules;

8.  Expresses concern, furthermore, about the illegitimate use of, and illicit trade in spyware by Member States, which, taken together, transform the Union into a destination for the spyware industry;

9.  Expresses concern about the targeting of high-profile personalities, human rights defenders and journalists in the Union with spyware, by non-EU countries;

10.  Is equally concerned at the apparent reticence to investigate spyware abuse, both in cases where the suspect is a Member State or a non-EU country government body; notes the very slow progress and lack of transparency in the judicial investigations into spyware abuse against government leaders and ministers of EU Member States and the Commission, as well as against civil society members, journalists or political opponents;

11.  Notes that the legal framework of some Member States does not provide precise, effective and comprehensive safeguards on the ordering and execution of and the potential redress mechanisms against surveillance measures; notes that such measures must serve a legitimate aim, and be necessary and proportionate;

12.  Regrets the failure of Member State governments, the Council and the Commission to fully cooperate with the inquiry and to share all relevant and meaningful information, in order to help the committee of inquiry to fulfil its tasks, as stated in its mandate; acknowledges that some of this information may be subject to strict legal requirements of secrecy and confidentiality; considers the collective reply by the Council wholly inadequate and contrary to the principle of sincere cooperation as enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU;

13.  Concludes that neither the Member States, nor the Council, nor the Commission seemed to be at all interested in maximising their efforts to fully investigate the spyware abuse, thus knowingly protecting Union governments which violate human rights within and outside of the Union;

14.  Concludes that major contraventions and maladministration in the implementation of Union law have taken place in Poland;

15.  Calls on Poland to:

16.  Urges the Commission to assess the compatibility of the Polish 2018 Act on the protection of personal data processed in connection with the prevention and combating of crime with the EU Law Enforcement Directive and, if necessary, to start an infringement procedure;

17.  Concludes that major contraventions and maladministration in the implementation of Union law have taken place in Hungary;

18.  Calls on Hungary to:

19.  Concludes that contraventions and maladministration in the implementation of Union law have taken place in Greece;

20.  Calls on Greece to:

21.  Concludes that overall, the regulatory framework in Spain is in line with the requirements set by the Treaties; points out, however, that some reforms are needed, and the implementation in practice must be fully in line with fundamental rights and ensure the protection of public participation;

22.  Calls, therefore, on Spain to:

23.  Concludes that there is evidence of maladministration in the implementation of the EU Dual-Use Regulation in Cyprus which requires close scrutiny;

24.  Calls on Cyprus to:

25.  Is of the view that the situation in some other Member States also gives reason for concern, in particular given the presence of a lucrative and expanding spyware industry benefiting from the good reputation, the single market and free movement of the Union, enabling some Member States such as Cyprus and Bulgaria to become an export hub for spyware to repressive regimes around the world;

26.  Is of the opinion that the failure or refusal of some national authorities to ensure proper protection for the citizens of the Union, including regulatory gaps and proper legal instruments, demonstrates with all necessary clarity that action at Union level is indispensable to ensure that the letter of the Treaties is upheld and that Union legislation is respected, so that the right of citizens to live in a safe environment where human dignity, private life, personal data and property are respected, as required by Directive 2012/29/EU, according to which every victim of crime has a right to receive support and protection in accordance with their individual needs;

27.  Concludes that serious shortcomings in the implementation of Union law have taken place when the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) provided support to non-EU countries, including but not limited to, 10 such countries in the Sahel, to enable them to develop surveillance capabilities(29);

28.  Takes the position that the trade in and use of spyware needs to be regulated strictly; recognises, however, that the legislative process may take time, while abuse must be stopped immediately; calls for the adoption of conditions for the legal use, sale, acquisition and transfer of spyware; insists that, for the continued use of spyware, Member States shall fulfil all of the following conditions by 31 December 2023:

29.  Considers that the fulfilment of these conditions must be assessed by the Commission by 30 November 2023; considers, further, that the findings of the assessment shall be published in a public report;

30.  Stresses that while fighting serious crime and terrorism, and acknowledging that the ability to do so is critically important for Member States, the protection of fundamental rights and democracy is essential; stresses, further, that the use of spyware by Member States must be proportionate, must not be arbitrary, and surveillance must only be authorised in narrowly, pre-determined circumstances; considers that effective ex ante mechanisms to ensure judicial oversight are critical to protecting individual freedoms; reaffirms that individual rights cannot be put at risk by permitting unfettered access to surveillance; underlines that the ability of the judiciary to perform meaningful and effective ex post oversight in the area of requests for surveillance for national security is also important, to ensure that the disproportionate use of spyware by governments can be challenged;

31.  Underlines that the use of spyware for law enforcement should be directly regulated through measures based on Chapter 4 of Title 5 TFEU on Judicial cooperation in criminal matters; emphasises that the configuration of spyware that is imported into the EU and otherwise placed on the market should be regulated by way of a measure based on Article 114 TFEU; notes that the use of spyware for national security purposes may only be indirectly regulated through, for example, fundamental rights and rules relating to data protection;

32.  Considers that owing to the transnational and EU dimension of the use of spyware, coordinated and transparent scrutiny at EU level is necessary to ensure not only the protection of EU citizens but also the validity of evidence gathered by way of spyware in cross-border cases, and that there is a clear need for common EU standards on the basis of Chapter 4 of Title 5 TFEU regulating the use of spyware by Member State bodies, drawing from standards laid down by the CJEU, ECtHR, the Venice Commission and the Fundamental Rights Agency(30); considers that such EU standards should cover at least the following elements:

33.  Calls on the Member States to undertake public consultations with stakeholders, secure transparency of the legislative process and include EU standards and safeguards when drafting new legislation on the use and sale of spyware;

34.  Emphasises that only spyware that is designed so that it enables and facilitates the functionality of spyware according to the legislative framework as set out in paragraph 32 may be placed on the internal market, developed or used in the Union; affirms that such a regulation on the placing on the market of spyware that provides for ‘rule-of-law-by-design’ based on Article 114 TFEU should grant Union citizens a high level of protection; considers it unjustifiable that, while the Dual-Use Regulation has provided citizens of non-EU countries protection against spyware exports from the EU since 2021, no equivalent protection is offered to EU citizens;

35.  Considers that only interception and extraction technology may be sold by companies in the EU and acquired by Member States, and not ‘hacking as a service’, which includes the supply of technical, operational and methodological support of surveillance technology, and allows the provider access to a disproportionate amount of data that is incompatible with principles of proportionality, necessity, legitimacy, legality and adequacy; calls on the Commission to propose a legislative proposal in this regard;

36.  Stresses that spyware may only be placed on the market for sale to and use by public authorities, based on a closed list, whose instructions include investigations of crimes or the protection of national security for which the use of spyware may be authorised; considers that security agencies should only use spyware when all recommendations laid out by the Fundamental Rights Agency have been implemented(31);

37.  Highlights the obligation to use a version of spyware that is designed in such a way that it minimises the access to all data stored on a device, but should be designed in such a way that it limits access to data to the minimum of what is strictly necessary for the purpose of the authorised investigation;

38.  Concludes that when a Member State has purchased spyware, the acquisition must be auditable by an independent, impartial audit body with appropriate clearance;

39.  Stresses that all entities placing spyware on the internal market should comply with strict due diligence requirements, and companies applying in a public procurement process to be suppliers should undergo a vetting process which includes the company’s response to human rights violations committed with their software and whether the technology relies on data gathered in undemocratic and abusive surveillance practices; underlines that the competent national supervisory authorities should report to the Commission on an annual basis on compliance;

40.  Stresses that companies offering surveillance technologies or services to state actors should disclose to the competent national supervisory authorities the nature of the export licences;

41.  Underlines that Member States should establish a cooling-off period, temporarily preventing former employees of governmental bodies or agencies from working for spyware companies;

Need for boundaries to national security

42.  Is concerned about cases of the unjustified invocation of ‘national security’ to justify the deployment and use of spyware and to ensure absolute secrecy and lack of accountability; welcomes the Commission statement, in line with the CJEU’s jurisprudence(32) that a mere reference to national security cannot be interpreted as being an unlimited carve out from the application of EU law and should require a clear justification, and calls on the Commission to follow up on that statement in the cases where there are indications of abuse; considers that in a democratic transparent society that abides by the rule of law, such limitations in the name of national security will be the exception rather than the rule;

43.  Considers that the notion of national security must be contrasted with the more restricted scope vis-à-vis internal security, whereby the latter has a broader scope, including the prevention of risks to citizens, and, in particular, the enforcement of criminal law;

44.  Regrets the difficulties stemming from the lack of a common legal definition of national security laying down criteria to determine what legal regime may apply in matters of national security, as well as of a clear demarcation of the area where such a special regime may apply;

45.  Considers that the use of spyware constitutes a limitation of fundamental rights; further considers that where a concept is used in a legal context, entailing the transfer of rights and the imposition of obligations (and, in particular, limitations of the fundamental rights of individuals), the concept needs to be clear and foreseeable to all persons affected by it; recalls that the Charter provides that any limitation to fundamental rights according to Article 52(1) must be set out in law; considers, therefore, that it is necessary for ‘national security’ to be clearly defined; underlines that regardless of the precise demarcation, the domain of national security must be subject to independent, binding and effective oversight in its entirety;

46.  Stresses that if the authorities invoke national security grounds as a justification for using spyware, they should, in addition to the framework laid down in paragraph 29, demonstrate compliance with EU law, including adherence to the principles of proportionality, necessity, legitimacy, legality and adequacy; highlights that the justification should be easily accessible and made available to a national scrutiny body for assessment;

47.  Reiterates, in this context, that all Member States signed Convention 108+, which lays down standards and obligations for the protection of individuals concerning the processing of personal data, including for national security purposes; points out that Convention 108+ is a binding European framework dealing with the processing of data by intelligence and security services; urges all Member States to ratify this convention without delay, to already implement its standards in national law and to act accordingly over national security;

48.  Emphasises that exceptions and restrictions to a limited number of provisions of the convention are only permitted when they are in accordance with the requirements referred to in Article 11 of the convention, meaning that when implementing Convention 108+, each specific exception and restriction must be provided for by law, must respect the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms, and must justify that it ‘constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society’ for one of the legitimate grounds listed in Article 11(33) and that such exceptions and restrictions must not interfere with the ‘independent and effective review and supervision under the domestic legislation of the respective Party’;

49.  Further notes that Convention 108+ stresses that the oversight ‘shall have powers of investigation and intervention’; considers that effective review and supervision implies binding powers where the impact on fundamental rights is the greatest, particularly in the accessing, analysis and storage phases of processing personal data;

50.  Considers that the lack of binding powers of oversight bodies within the domain of national security is incompatible with the criterion laid down in Convention 108+ that this ‘constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society’;

51.  Points out that Convention 108+ allows for a very limited number of exceptions with regard to its Article 15 but it does not allow such exceptions, notably regarding paragraph 2 [awareness-raising duties], paragraph 3 [consultation on legislative and administrative measures], paragraph 4 [requests and complaints by individuals], paragraph 5 [independence and impartiality], paragraph 6 [necessary resources for the effective performance of tasks], paragraph 7 [periodic reporting], paragraph 8 [confidentiality], paragraph 9 [possibility of appeal] and paragraph 10 [no power regarding bodies when acting in their judicial capacity];

Better implementation and enforcement of existing legislation

52.  Underlines the shortcomings in national legal frameworks and the necessity for better enforcement of existing Union legislation to counterpose these deficiencies; identifies the following Union laws as relevant but too often improperly implemented and/or enforced: the Anti-Money Laundering Directive, the Law Enforcement Directive, procurement rules, the Dual-Use Regulation, case-law (rulings on surveillance and national security), and the Whistleblower Directive; calls on the Commission to investigate and report on the shortcomings in implementation and enforcement, and put forward a roadmap to correct them by 1 August 2023 at the latest;

53.  Considers the proper implementation and strict enforcement of the Union legal framework on data protection, particularly the Law Enforcement Directive, the General Data Protection Regulation and the e-Privacy Directive, to be crucial; considers equally important the full implementation of the relevant CJEU judgments, which is still lacking in several Member States; recalls that the Commission has a central role in enforcing EU law and ensuring its uniform application throughout the Union, and should make use of all tools available, including infringement procedures in cases of persistent non-compliance;

54.  Calls for the Wassenaar Arrangement to become a binding agreement on all its participants, with the aim of making it an international treaty;

55.  Calls for Cyprus and Israel to become participating states of the Wassenaar Arrangement; reminds the Member States that all efforts must be made to enable Cyprus and Israel to join the Wassenaar Arrangement;

56.  Stresses that the Wassenaar Arrangement should include a human rights framework that embeds the licensing of spyware technologies, assesses and reviews the compliance of companies producing spyware technologies and that participants should prohibit the purchase of surveillance technologies from states that are not part of the arrangement;

57.  Stresses that in the light of the spyware revelations, the Commission and the Member States should conduct an in-depth investigation into the export licences granted for the use of spyware under the Dual-Use Regulation and the Commission should share the results of this assessment with Parliament;

58.  Underlines the need for the traceability of and accountability for spyware exports and recalls that EU companies should only be able to export spyware that demonstrates sufficient traceability properties to ensure that responsibility can always be attributed;

59.  Emphasises that the Commission needs to regularly check and properly enforce the recast Dual-Use Regulation to avoid ‘export regime shopping’ throughout the Union, as is currently the case in Bulgaria and Cyprus, and that the Commission should have adequate resources for this task;

60.  Calls on the Commission to ensure sufficient staff capacity for the units responsible for the oversight and enforcement of the Dual-Use Regulation;

61.  Calls for amendments to the Dual-Use Regulation to clarify in Article 15 that export permits of dual-use goods must not be given where goods are or may be intended for use in connection with internal repression and/or the commission of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law; calls for the full implementation of human rights and due diligence checks in the licensing process and further improvements such as remedy for targets of human rights abuses and the transparent reporting of performed due diligence;

62.  Calls for changes to the Dual-Use Regulation to ensure that transit is prohibited in cases where goods are or may be intended for internal repression and/or the commission of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law;

63.  Stresses that, in a future amendment of the Dual-Use Regulation, the designated national authorities responsible for the approval and denial of export licences for dual-use items should provide detailed reports, including information on the dual-use item in question; the number of licences applied for; the name of the exporting country; a description of the export company and whether this company is a subsidiary; a description of the end user and destination; the value of the export licence; and why the export licence was approved or denied; emphasises that these reports should be made public on a quarterly basis; calls for the setting up of a dedicated standing parliamentary committee with access to classified information from the Commission, for the purpose of parliamentary oversight;

64.  Stresses that, in a future amendment of the Dual-Use Regulation, the exception to the requirement to provide information to the Commission on grounds of commercial sensitivity, defence and foreign policy or national security reasons must be abolished; considers instead that in order to prevent sensitive information becoming available to non-EU countries, the Commission can decide to classify certain information in its annual report;

65.  Stresses that the definition of cyber-surveillance items in the recast Dual-Use Regulation cannot be given a restrictive interpretation but should include all technologies in this area, such as mobile telecommunications interception or jamming equipment; intrusion software; IP network communications surveillance systems or equipment; software specially designed or modified for monitoring or analysis by law enforcement; laser acoustic detection equipment; forensic tools which extract raw data from a computing or communications device and circumvent the ‘authentication’ or authorisation controls of the device; electronic systems or equipment, designed either for the surveillance and monitoring of the electro-magnetic spectrum for military intelligence or security purpose; and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles capable of conducting surveillance;

66.  Calls for additional European legislation that requires corporate actors producing and/or exporting surveillance technologies to include human rights and due diligence frameworks, in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs);

International cooperation to protect citizens

67.  Calls for a joint EU-US spyware strategy, including a joint whitelist and/or blacklist of spyware vendors whose tools have been abused or are at risk of being abused to maliciously target government officials, journalists and civil society, and who operate against the security and foreign policy of the Union, by foreign governments with poor human rights records, (not) authorised to sell to public authorities, common criteria for vendors to be included on either list, arrangements for common EU-US reporting on the industry, common scrutiny, common due diligence obligations for vendors and the criminalisation of the sale of spyware to non-state actors;

68.  Calls for the EU-US Trade and Technology Council to hold wide and open consultations with civil society for the development of the joint EU-US strategy and standards, including the joint whitelist and/or blacklist;

69.  Calls for talks to be launched with other countries, in particular Israel, to establish a framework for spyware marketing and export licences, including rules on transparency, a list of eligible countries regarding human rights standards and due diligence arrangements;

70.  Notes that compared to the US, where NSO was quickly blacklisted and the US President signed an Executive Order, stating that it must not make operational use of commercial spyware that poses significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States Government or significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person, no sufficient action has been taken at EU level as regards the imports of spyware and the enforcement of the export rules;

71.  Concludes that the Union export rules and their enforcement must be strengthened for the protection of human rights in non-EU countries and must be given the necessary tools to implement its provisions effectively; recalls that the EU should seek to join forces with the US and other allies in regulating the trade in spyware and using their combined market power to force change and set robust standards of transparency, traceability and accountability for the use of surveillance technology, which should culminate in an initiative at United Nations level;

Zero-day vulnerabilities

72.  Calls for the regulation of the discovery, sharing, patching and exploitation of vulnerabilities, as well as disclosure procedures, thereby completing the basis set out by Directive (EU) 2022/2555(34) (NIS 2 Directive) and the proposal for the Cyber Resilience Act(35);

73.  Considers that researchers must be able to research vulnerabilities, and share their results without civil and criminal liability under, inter alia, the Cybercrime Directive and the Copyright Directive;

74.  Calls on the major industry players to create incentives for researchers to participate in vulnerability research, by investing in vulnerability treatment plans, disclosure practices within the industry and with civil society, and to run bug bounty programmes;

75.  Calls on the Commission to increase its support and funding for bug bounties and other projects aimed at searching for and patching security vulnerabilities, and to set up a coordinated approach to mandatory vulnerability disclosure among Member States;

76.  Calls for a ban on the sale of vulnerabilities in a system for any purpose other than strengthening the security of that system , and an obligation to disclose the findings of all vulnerability research in a coordinated and responsible manner that promotes public safety and minimises the risk of exploitation of the vulnerability;

77.  Calls on public and private entities to create a publicly available contact point where vulnerabilities can be reported in a coordinated and responsible manner, and for organisations that receive information about vulnerabilities in their system to act immediately to fix them; considers that, when a patch is available, organisations should be mandated to have the appropriate measures in place to ensure rapid and guaranteed deployment, as part of a coordinated and responsible disclosure process;

78.  Considers that the Member States should allocate sufficient financial, technical and human resources to security research and patching vulnerabilities;

79.  Calls on the Member States to develop a vulnerability equity processes, prescribed by law, which determine that, by default, vulnerabilities must be disclosed and not exploited, and that any decision to deviate from this must be an exception and assessed under the requirements for necessity and proportionality, including the consideration as to whether the infrastructure affected by the vulnerability is used by a large share of the population, and be subject to strict oversight by an independent supervising body, as well as to transparent procedures and decisions;

Telecom networks

80.  Stresses that the licence of any service provider found to be facilitating unlawful access to national and/or international mobile signalling infrastructure across all generations (currently 2G to 5G) should be revoked;

81.  Stresses that the processes through which new phone numbers from all over the world can be created by malicious actors should be better regulated to make illicit activity more difficult to hide;

82.  Stresses the need for telecom providers to ensure that they have the capacity to detect potential misuse of access, control, or effective end use of signalling infrastructure gained by third parties through commercial or other agreements in the Member State that they operate in;

83.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that competent national authorities, in accordance with the NIS 2 Directive’s provisions, evaluate telecom providers’ level of resilience to unauthorised intrusions;

84.  Calls on telecom providers to take firm and demonstrable action to mitigate against the various forms of emulating without authorisation the origination of telecoms traffic by a network element in order to access the data or service that was meant for the legitimate user, and other activity involving the manipulation of the normal operations of mobile network elements and infrastructure for surveillance purposes by malicious actors, including state-level actors, as well as criminal groups;

85.  Calls on the Member States to take action to ensure that non-EU state actors that do not respect fundamental rights do not have control or effective end use of strategic infrastructure, or influence over decisions related to strategic infrastructure within the Union, including telecommunications infrastructure;

86.  Calls on all Member States to prioritise greater investment in the protection of critical infrastructure, such as national telecommunications systems, to address gaps in protection against privacy breaches, data leaks and unauthorised intrusions, in order to defend the fundamental rights of citizens;

87.  Calls on the competent national authorities to actively promote strengthening the capabilities of providers, as well as response capabilities, to better support the identification of persons illegally targeted, notification and incident reporting, in order to provide ongoing, measurable assurance and mitigation of the exploitation of security gaps by non-EU and domestic malicious actors;

e-Privacy

88.  Calls for the rapid adoption of the e-Privacy Regulation in a way that fully reflects the case-law on the restrictions for national security and the need to prevent the abuse of surveillance technologies, that strengthens the fundamental right to privacy and provides for strong safeguards and effective enforcement; points out that the scope for lawful interception should not go beyond the e-Privacy Directive (2002/58/EC);

89.  Calls for the protection of all electronic communications, content and metadata against the abuse of personal data and private communications by private companies and government authorities; points out that digital safety-by-design tools such as end-to-end encryption should not be weakened;

90.  Calls on the Commission to assess the Member States’ implementation of the e-Privacy Directive across the EU, and to start infringement procedures where violations occur;

The role of Europol

91.  Notes that a letter from Europol to the Chair of the PEGA Committee of April 2023 informs the Committee that Europol has contacted Greece, Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain and Poland to ascertain whether there are any ongoing or envisaged criminal investigations or other inquiries under the applicable provisions of national law, which could be supported by Europol; stresses that offering assistance to Member States does not constitute the initiation, conduct or coordination of a criminal investigation as laid down in Article 6;

92.  Calls on Europol to make full use of its newly acquired powers under Article 6 (1a) of Regulation (EU) 2022/991, enabling it to propose to the competent authorities of the Member States concerned to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation, where relevant; points out that under Article 6 it is up to the Member States to reject such a proposal;

93.  Calls on all Member States to commit to the European Parliament and the Council to involve Europol in investigations into allegations of illegitimate use of spyware at national level, particularly when a proposal under Article 6 (1a) of Regulation (EU) 2022/991 has been made;

94.  Calls on the Member States to set up a register within Europol of national law enforcement operations involving the use of spyware, wherein each operation should be identified with a code and for the use of spyware by governments to be included in the annual Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment report by Europol;

95.  Takes the view that a reflection must be launched about the role of Europol in case where national authorities fail or refuse to investigate and there are clear threats to the interests and security of the EU;

Union development policies

96.  Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to implement more rigorous control mechanisms to ensure that Union development aid, including the donation of surveillance technology and training in the deployment of surveillance software, does not fund or facilitate tools and activities that could impinge on the principles of democracy, good governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights, or that pose a threat to international security or the essential security of the Union and its Members; notes that the Commission’s assessments of compliance with Union law, in particular the Financial Regulation, should contain specific control criteria and enforcement mechanisms to prevent such abuses, including the possible temporary suspension of specific projects if an infringement of these principles is detected;

97.  Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to include in every human and fundamental rights impact assessment a monitoring procedure on the potential abuse of surveillance, which fully takes into account Article 51 of the Charter in the time frame of within one year [after the publication of the PEGA recommendations]; stresses that this procedure must be presented to Parliament and the Council and that this impact assessment must be carried out prior to any support to non-EU countries;

98.  Calls on the EEAS to report on the abuse of spyware against human rights defenders in the EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy;

Union financial regulations

99.  Highlights that respect for human rights by the financial sector must be enhanced; stresses that the UNGPs 10+ recommendations must be transposed into Union law and that the Due Diligence Directive should fully apply to the financial sector, to ensure respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the financial sector;

100.  Is concerned about the implications of the CJEU decision on Directive (EU) 2018/843 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing(36), whereby the information on the beneficial ownership of corporate and legal entities established in a national and publicly accessible Register of Beneficial Ownership (UBO) has been ruled invalid(37); stresses that, taking the CJEU decision into account, the future directive should allow for as much public accessibility as possible, so that it becomes more difficult to hide purchases or sales of spyware through proxies and broker companies;

Follow-up to Parliament resolutions

101.  Calls for the urgent follow-up to Parliament’s resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs; stresses that the recommendations therein need to be carried out as a matter of urgency;

102.  Stresses that, despite the fact that oversight of intelligence services’ activities should be based on both democratic legitimacy (strong legal framework, ex ante authorisation and ex post verification) and adequate technical capability and expertise, the majority of current EU and US oversight bodies dramatically lack both, in particular the technical capabilities;

103.  Calls, as it did in the case of Echelon, on all national parliaments which have not yet done so to install meaningful oversight of intelligence activities by parliamentarians or expert bodies with legal powers to investigate; calls on the national parliaments to ensure that such oversight committees/bodies have sufficient resources, technical expertise and legal means, including the right to conduct on-site visits, to be able to effectively control intelligence services;

104.  Calls for the setting up of a High-Level Group to propose, in a transparent manner and in collaboration with parliaments, recommendations and further steps to be taken for enhanced democratic oversight, including parliamentary oversight, of intelligence services and increased oversight collaboration in the EU, in particular as regards its cross-border dimension;

105.  Considers this High-Level group should:

106.  Intends to organise a conference with national oversight bodies, whether parliamentary or independent;

107.  Calls on the Member States to draw on best practices so as to improve access by their oversight bodies to information on intelligence activities, including classified information and information from other services, and establish the power to conduct on-site visits, a robust set of powers of interrogation, adequate resources and technical expertise, strict independence vis-à-vis their respective governments, and a reporting obligation to their respective parliaments;

108.  Calls on the Member States to develop cooperation among oversight bodies;

109.  Calls on the Commission to present a proposal for a Union security clearance procedure for all office holders in the Union, as the current system, which relies on the security clearance undertaken by the Member State of citizenship, provides for different requirements and lengths of procedures within national systems, thus leading to differing treatment of Members of Parliament and their staff depending on their nationality;

110.  Recalls the provisions of the interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament and the Council concerning the forwarding to and handling by Parliament of classified information held by the Council on matters other than those in the area of the common foreign and security policy, which should be used to improve oversight at EU level;

Union research programmes

111.  Calls for the implementation of more rigorous and effective control mechanisms to ensure that Union research funds do not fund or facilitate tools, including spyware and surveillance tools, that infringe EU values; notes that assessments of compliance with Union law should contain specific control criteria to prevent such abuses; calls for the termination of Union research funds to entities that are or have been involved in the direct or indirect facilitation of human rights violations with surveillance tools;

112.  Stresses that EU funding for research, such as the Horizon Europe agreements with non-EU countries, must not be used to contribute to the development of spyware and equivalent technologies;

EU Tech Lab

113.  Calls on the Commission to initiate, without delay, the creation of an independently run European interdisciplinary research institute, with a focus on research and development at the nexus of information and communication technology, fundamental rights and security; stresses that this institute should work with experts, academia and civil society representatives, as well as be open to participation by Member States’ experts and institutions;

114.  Stresses that the institute would contribute to better awareness, attribution and accountability in and beyond Europe, as well as expand the European talent base and our understanding of how spyware vendors develop, maintain, sell and deliver their services to third parties;

115.  Considers that the institute should be tasked with discovering and exposing the unlawful use of software for illicit surveillance purposes, providing accessible and free legal and technological support, including smartphone screenings for individuals who suspect that they have been targeted by spyware and the tools necessary for detecting spyware, performing forensic analytical research for judicial investigations and reporting regularly on the use and misuse of spyware in the EU, taking into account technological updates; considers that this report should be made available annually and transmitted to the Commission, Parliament, and the Council;

116.  Recommends that the Commission set up the EU Tech Lab in close cooperation with the Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU institutions, bodies and agencies (CERT-EU) and ENISA and that it consult the relevant experts when establishing the EU Tech Lab in order to learn from the best practices in the academic field;

117.  Underlines the importance of ensuring adequate funding for the EU Tech Lab;

118.  Recommends that the Commission put forward a certification scheme for the analysis and authentication of forensic material;

119.  Calls on the Commission to support civil society capacity globally in order to strengthen resilience against spyware attacks and the provision of assistance and services to citizens;

The rule of law

120.  Stresses that the impact of the illegitimate use of spyware is much more pronounced in Member States, where the authorities that would usually be tasked with investigating, providing redress to persons targeted and ensuring accountability, are captured by the state and that where a rule of law crisis exists and the independence of the judiciary is endangered, the national authorities cannot be relied upon;

121.  Calls, therefore, on the Commission to ensure an effective implementation of its Rule of Law toolbox, particularly by:

Union litigation fund

122.  Calls for the establishment, without undue delay, of a Union Litigation Fund to cover the actual litigation costs and enable the persons targeted by spyware to seek adequate redress, including damages for the illegal use of spyware against them, in line with the Preparatory Action adopted by Parliament in 2017, to create an ‘EU fund for financial support for litigating cases relating to violations of democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights’;

EU institutions

123.  Expresses concern over the lack of action by the Commission so far, and urges it to make full use of all its powers as guardian of the Treaties, and to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth investigation into the abuse of and trade in spyware in the Union;

124.  Urges the Commission to conduct a full-blown inquiry into all allegations and suspicions of the use of spyware against its officials, and report to Parliament and to the responsible law enforcement authorities where necessary;

125.  Calls on the Commission to set up a special taskforce, involving the national electoral commissions, dedicated to protection of the 2024 European elections across the Union; recalls that not only foreign but also internal interference poses a threat to the European electoral processes; stresses that in the event of the misuse of pervasive surveillance tools, such as Pegasus, the elections may be affected;

126.  Notes that the PEGA Committee received a collective reply from the Council to the queries of the European Parliament to all individual Member States only on the eve of the publication of the draft report, approximately four months after the letters from Parliament; expresses dismay at the lack of action of the European Council and the Council of Ministers, and calls for a dedicated European Council Summit, given the magnitude of the threat to democracy in Europe;

127.  Calls on the Council of the EU to address developments related to the use of spyware and its impact on the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU during hearings organised under Article 7(1) TEU;

128.  Calls on the Council to permanently invite the European Parliament to Council Security Committee meetings, as provided for in Article 17(2) of the Council Security Rules 2013;

129.  Takes the position that Parliament should have full powers of inquiry, including better access to classified and non-classified information, the power to summon witnesses, to formally require witnesses to testify under oath and to provide requested information within specific deadlines; reiterates the Parliament’s position in its proposal of 23 May 2012 for a regulation of the European Parliament on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the European Parliament’s right of inquiry and repealing Decision 95/167/EC, Euratom, ECSC of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission(39); calls on the Council to immediately take action on this proposal for a regulation to allow for a proper right of inquiry for the European Parliament;

130.  Acknowledges Parliament’s efforts in detecting spyware infections; considers, however, that the protection of staff should be strengthened, having regard to the privileges and immunities of those who have been spied on; recalls that any attack on a Member’s political rights is an attack on the independence and sovereignty of the institution, as well as an attack on voters’ rights;

131.  Calls for Parliament’s Bureau to adopt a protocol for cases where members or staff of the House have become the direct or indirect target of spyware and underlines that all cases must be reported by Parliament to the responsible law enforcement authorities; stresses that Parliament should provide legal and technical assistance in such cases;

132.  Resolves to take the initiative to launch an interinstitutional conference, wherein Parliament, the Council and the Commission must aim for governance reforms that strengthen the Union’s institutional capacity to respond adequately to attacks on democracy and the rule of law from the inside and to ensure that the Union has effective supranational methods for enforcing the Treaties and secondary law in the case of non-compliance by Member States;

133.  Calls for the swift adoption of the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (COM(2022)0122) and prompt implementation and strict enforcement thereafter, in order to reduce the risk of spyware infections of the devices and systems used by the EU institutions’ staff and politicians;

134.  Calls for the EU to sign up to Convention 108+;

135.  Calls on the European Ombudsman to initiate discussions within the European Network of Ombudsmen on the impact of the misuse of pervasive surveillance on democratic processes and citizens’ rights; calls on the network to develop recommendations on effective and meaningful redress across the EU;

Legislative action

136.  Calls on the Commission to promptly come forward with legislative proposals on the basis of this recommendation;

o
o   o

137.  Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Member States, the Council, the Commission and to Europol.

(1) OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37. (2) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1. (3) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89. (4) OJ L 218, 14.8.2013, p. 8. (5) OJ L 206, 11.6.2021, p. 1. (6) OJ L 129 I, 17.5.2019, p. 13. (7) OJ L 174 I, 18.5.2021, p. 1. (8) OJ L 278, 8.10.1976, p. 5. (9) OJ L 113, 19.5.1995, p. 1. (10) OJ L 98, 25.3.2022, p. 72. (11) OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 43. (12) Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 November 2022, C-37/20, WM and Sovim SA v Luxembourg Business Registers, ECLI:EU:C:2022:912. (13) https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf (14) https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/highly-intrusive-spyware-threatens-the-essence-of-human-rights (15) https://edps.europa.eu/system/files/2022-02/22-02-15_edps_preliminary_remarks_on_modern_spyware_en_0.pdf (16) OJ C 378, 9.11.2017, p. 104. (17) https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/02/spain-un-experts-demand-investigation-alleged-spying-programme-targeting (18) https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2015)010-e (19) https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)012-e (20) Defense Export Control Law 5766-2007, Israeli Ministry of Defence. (21) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2022%3A434%3AFIN&qid=1662029750223. (22) https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/fs_mass_surveillance_eng.pdf (23) ‘Surveillance and human rights’, report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, A/HRC/41/35, 2019. (24) Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Spyware scandal: UN experts call for moratorium on sale of ‘life threatening’ surveillance tech’. (25) https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpa_1994_e.htm. (26) https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/news/all-research-and-innovation-news/israel-joins-horizon-europe-research-and-innovation-programme-2021-12-06_en. (27) https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/dashboard/extensions/CountryProfile/CountryProfile.html?Country=Israelhttps://elbitsystems.com/products/comercial-aviation/innovation-rd/. (28) Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1). (29) Decision in case 1904/2021/MHZ, available at https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/163491. (30) Fundamental Rights Agency, Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU – Volume II ­Summary, 2017, https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/surveillance-intelligence-services-fundamental-rights-safeguards-and-remedies-eu. (31) https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2017-surveillance-intelligence-services-vol-2-summary_en.pdf. (32) Judgment of 6 October 2020, Case C-623/17, Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2020:790, paragraph 44 and Judgments of 6 October 2020, Joined Cases C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18, La Quadrature du Net and Others v Premier ministre and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2020:791, paragraph 99: ‘The mere fact that a national measure has been taken for the purpose of protecting national security cannot render EU law inapplicable and exempt the Member States from their obligation to comply with that law’. (33) This assessment is provided for in the case law of the ECtHR that lays the burden of proof with the State/Legislator. Relevant ECtHR case law includes: Roman Zakharov v. Russia (Application No. 47143/06), 4 December 2015; Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary (Application No. 37138/14), 12 January 2016; Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom (application No. 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24969/15), 25 May 2021 and Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden (application No. 35252/08), 25 May 2021. (34) Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80). (35) Proposal of 15 September 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 (COM(2022)0454). (36) Judgment of 22 November 2022, Joined Cases C-37/20 and C-601/20, ECLI:EU:C:2022:912. (37) CJEU. Press Release No 188/22, Judgment of the Court in Joined Cases C-37/20 and C-601/20. (38) The Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information, June 2013. (39) OJ C 264 E, 13.9.2013, p. 41.

European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2023 on a European Day for the victims of the global climate crisis (2023/2740(RSP))

P9_TA(2023)0245 B9-0296/2023

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

–  having regard to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s sixth assessment report, its synthesis report thereon and in particular to the latest and most comprehensive scientific evidence on the damaging effects of climate change provided in the report,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640),

–  having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/591 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030(1),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality (‘European Climate Law’)(2) and to the European Union’s objective of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘Forging a climate-resilient Europe - the new EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change’ (COM(2021)0082),

–  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the EU strategy on adaptation to climate change(3),

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas climate change is having widespread and pervasive impacts on ecosystems, people, settlements, infrastructure, agriculture and food supply chains, and puts pressure on natural and human systems across the world, including in Europe, to adapt to new weather and climate extremes;

B.  whereas climate change is leading to more unpredictable weather phenomena, including more frequent and intense heatwaves, wildfires and floods, to threats to food, water safety and security, and to the emergence and spread of infectious diseases, which are intensifying and taking an ever-higher human toll both globally and in Europe;

C.  whereas it is appropriate to commemorate the victims of the climate crisis and at the same time raise awareness of the increasing loss of human life, the impacts on physical and mental health, the growing threats to livelihoods and the humanitarian crises caused by climate change which are driving the displacement of people from their homes;

D.  whereas the European Green Deal and the General Union Action Programme aim to protect, conserve and enhance the Union’s natural capital and to protect the health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts;

E.  whereas there is also a need to raise awareness of the concrete actions that can be taken to prevent, prepare for and respond to such disasters; whereas tribute should be paid to those engaged in this work;

F.  whereas the creation of an annual ‘EU day for the victims of the global climate crisis’ would help raise the awareness of these issues;

1.  Calls for the creation of an ‘EU day for the victims of the global climate crisis’ and for the EU to observe this day every year on 15 July, beginning in 2023;

2.  Invites the Council and the Commission to back this initiative with a view to its joint adoption by all the three institutions;

3.  Proposes to the Council and the Commission that they cooperate with Parliament on this annual ‘EU day for the victims of the global climate crisis’, on joint initiatives commemorating victims of the global climate crisis in Europe and, through the European External Action Service, in the world, on awareness-raising among stakeholders and the general public about the concrete steps they can take to contribute to prevent these disasters from happening and be better prepared for and respond to climate disasters;

4.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European External Action Service and the parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 114, 12.4.2022, p. 22. (2) OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1. (3) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 156.

European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2023 on supporting the accession of Ukraine to the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (2023/2689(RSP))

P9_TA(2023)0246 B9-0267/2023

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

–  having regard to Articles 24 and 29 of the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (‘Judgments Convention’),

–  having regard to the question to the Commission and the Council concerning Ukraine’s accession to the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters,

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 February 2023 on one year of Russia’s invasion and war of aggression against Ukraine(1) and to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine(2),

–  having regard to the question to the Commission on supporting the accession of Ukraine to the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (O-00000024/2023 – B9‑0025/2023),

–  having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

A.  whereas the statutory purpose of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (‘Hague Conference’) is to work for the progressive unification of the rules of private international law;

B.  whereas the European Union became a party to the Hague Conference on 3 April 2007;

C.  whereas the Judgments Convention facilitates the effective international circulation of judgments in civil or commercial matters by providing legal certainty and predictability to parties involved in cross-border transactions and clarity as to whether and to what extent a judgment will be recognised and enforced in another jurisdiction; whereas by ensuring the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the Judgments Convention should enhance access to justice by reducing legal time frames, costs and risks in cross-border circumstances;

D.  whereas pursuant to Article 24 of the Judgments Convention, any third state can accede to the Convention; whereas such accession creates treaty relations between two contracting parties only if neither of them has notified the depositary that the accession must not have the effect of establishing treaty relations with the other; whereas such a notification must be submitted within a period of 12 months after the date on which the accession was notified;

E.  whereas under the current practice, the Commission does not initiate a formal procedure in accordance with Article 218(6) TFEU for the conventions that contain a non-objection mechanism, but only informs the Council and Parliament of any third country’s request to accede to a given Hague instrument;

F.  whereas, according to well-established case-law, an international agreement cannot affect the allocation of powers fixed by the Treaties, thus the fact that at international level a silence procedure has been adopted to facilitate accession by third states should be of no consequence for the EU’s internal decision-making process;

G.  whereas the European Union acceded to the Judgments Convention on 29 August 2022;

H.  whereas Ukraine has signed and ratified the Judgments Convention;

I.  whereas on 24 April 2023, the Council agreed to establish treaty relations with Ukraine in the framework of the Judgments Convention;

J.  whereas if the Union accepts Ukraine’s accession to the Judgments Convention, it will enter into force on 1 September 2023 and be applicable between the two parties;

1.  Reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the people and leadership of Ukraine and its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders;

2.  Welcomes the positive assessments made by the Commission and the Council with the aim of establishing treaty relations with Ukraine in the framework of the Judgments Convention;

3.  Supports the accession of Ukraine to the Judgments Convention;

4.  Notes that this resolution is without prejudice to the procedure set out in Article 218(6) TFEU, which should be followed in matters concerning the establishment of the EU position regarding accession by third states to the Hague Conference Conventions;

5.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and the Council.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0056. (2) OJ C 125, 18.3.2022, p. 2.

European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2023 on the sustainable reconstruction and integration of Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic community (2023/2739(RSP))

P9_TA(2023)0247 RC-B9-0270/2023

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine, in particular since the escalation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022,

–  having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part(1) and to the accompanying Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the European Union and Ukraine, signed in 2014,

–  having regard to the application for EU membership by Ukraine on 28 February 2022, and to the consequent granting of candidate status by the European Council on 23 June 2022,

–  having regard to the joint statement following the 24th EU-Ukraine Summit of 3 February 2023 in Kyiv,

–  having regard to the NATO Bucharest summit declaration of 3 April 2008,

–  having regard to the G7 Leaders’ Statement of 27 June 2022 on support for Ukraine and to the latest G7 Leaders’ Statement of 19 May 2023,

–  having regard to the statement by Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell and the Commissioner for Crisis Management Janez Lenarčič of 6 June 2023 on the destruction of the Kakhovka dam,

–  having regard to the outcome document of the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC2022) held in Lugano from 4 to 5 July 2022 and to the upcoming URC2023 in London from 21 to 22 June 2023,

–  having regard to the outcome of the International Expert Conference on the Recovery, Reconstruction and Modernisation of Ukraine, held in Berlin on 25 October 2022,

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas since 24 February 2022, when Russia re-launched its unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the geopolitical situation in Europe has fundamentally changed; whereas this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of the fundamental principles of international law; whereas the crimes committed by Russia against Ukraine, which include the crime of aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity that may amount to genocide, require the full accountability of government officials, military leaders, media propagandists and other perpetrators, in line with international law; whereas Ukraine and its citizens have been determined in their resistance against Russia’s war of aggression and have successfully defended their country, albeit with a high cost in terms of civilian and military casualties, destroyed civilian and critical infrastructure and the destruction of the natural environment and cultural heritage sites; whereas a third of the Ukrainian population have fled their homes and the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have decreased by at least one third in 2022; whereas Russia’s actions in Ukraine over the past 16 months continue to threaten peace and security in Europe and worldwide;

B.  whereas Ukraine, as an independent and sovereign country, possesses the fundamental right to determine its own future; whereas this includes the freedom to choose its alliances, to establish its own policies and to pursue its national interests in line with the will of its people; whereas a strong, stable and independent Ukraine is vital for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and crucial for fostering European and global peace and stability, and upholding the principles of democracy and international law;

C.  whereas Ukraine is a candidate country for EU membership and has received massive support from the EU in all areas; whereas Ukraine has made tangible progress in advancing crucial reforms and demonstrates a clear commitment to EU and NATO integration; whereas in October 2023, the Commission will submit a report on Ukraine’s progress in implementing the seven recommendations indicated in the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 on the country’s application for EU membership; whereas the European Council is expected to decide on Ukraine’s preparedness for EU membership and further steps on its European path at its meeting in December 2023;

D.  whereas the EU and its Member States, together with international partners and NATO allies, have been providing substantial military support to assist Ukraine in exercising its legitimate right to self-defence against Russia’s war of aggression;

E.  whereas, in the NATO Bucharest summit declaration, the allies welcomed Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations and agreed that it would become a NATO member; whereas every round of NATO enlargement has followed the principle that it should bring additional security to the existing members; whereas the upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius in July 2023 will have to address the question of how to follow up on the statement of support for Ukraine’s membership issued in Bucharest in 2008;

F.  whereas threats to international peace will greatly increase if Ukraine is not victorious, as this would irreparably damage the very foundation of international order while emboldening hostile autocracies throughout the world to replicate Russia’s imperialistic behaviour and conduct similar acts of aggression;

G.  whereas the Kakhovka dam, located on the Dnipro river in the Russian-occupied part of southern Ukraine, was deliberately destroyed in an act of terrorism on 6 June 2023; whereas the blast resulted in a massive breach in the dam, with water flooding downstream in the direction of Kherson; whereas the breach in the dam caused several deaths, forced the evacuation of the local civilian population, destroyed infrastructure, homes and wildlife, and led to water being contaminated with industrial chemicals and oil; whereas Ukraine has estimated that tens of thousands of people remain stranded in the affected area and hundreds of thousands have been left without access to safe drinking water; whereas landmines have been dislodged by the flooding, prompting serious safety concerns; whereas tens of thousands of hectares of agricultural land have been damaged and the draining of the Kakhovka Reservoir will leave 584 000 hectares of agricultural land unirrigated; whereas the vast reservoir provided cooling water for the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (NPP) and the decrease in water levels poses an additional threat to it;

H.  whereas the second Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment by the Government of Ukraine, the World Bank Group, the Commission and the United Nations, published on 23 March 2023, estimates that the cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine has grown to at least EUR 383 billion; whereas this figure is to increase further as more infrastructure is damaged or destroyed, as exemplified by the recent destruction of the Kakhovka dam; whereas the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine was launched on 26 January 2023, bringing together high-level officials from Ukraine, the EU, G7 countries and international financial institutions such as the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; whereas the platform is intended to act as a catalyst, for mobilising the international commitments required to respond to Ukraine’s needs;

1.  Reiterates its unwavering solidarity with and pays tribute to the brave people and leaders of Ukraine, who are courageously defending their country’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity;

2.  Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest terms, of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine and of the involvement of the regime in Belarus; calls on Russia to immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine and to completely and unconditionally withdraw all forces, proxies and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, to end its forced deportations of Ukrainian civilians and to release all detained and deported Ukrainians, particularly children;

3.  Reaffirms its determination to continue supporting Ukraine until the full restoration and control of its internationally recognised borders and throughout the process of Ukraine’s sustainable recovery and reconstruction; acknowledges the resilience and determination demonstrated by the Ukrainian people in their pursuit of democratic values, reform efforts and aspirations for integration into the Euro-Atlantic community of nations;

4.  Condemns in the strongest possible terms the destruction by Russia of the Kakhovka dam on 6 June 2023, which brought about extensive flooding, caused an environmental disaster and ecocide in Ukraine and constitutes a war crime; reiterates that all those responsible for such war crimes, including the destruction of the dam, will be held accountable in line with international law; welcomes the rapid activation of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism; calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide all the essential assistance required in the flooded area, in particular equipment and machinery for relief efforts, drinking water and food; expresses alarm that the destruction of the Kakhovka dam could also jeopardise the safety of the Zaporizhzhia NPP; supports the International Criminal Court investigation into the destruction of the Kakhovka dam;

5.  Expresses its continued concern about the situation at the Zaporizhzhia NPP, which is illegally occupied and controlled by the Russian Federation; demands that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) personnel be granted immediate access to all facilities at the Zaporizhzhia NPP; supports efforts to maintain a continued IAEA presence at the Zaporizhzhia NPP; underlines the importance of reinforcing the international framework for the protection of nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, including in armed conflicts; reiterates its deep concern about the broader long-term environmental impact of the conflict; recalls and condemns Russia’s previous acts of ecocide against Ukraine’s flora and fauna, including the logging of Ukrainian forests, the mining of large areas and the poisoning of air and water resources;

6.  Underlines that the peace brought by Ukraine’s victory must be secured by integrating Ukraine into the EU and NATO; reiterates, in this context, its support for the European Council’s decision to grant EU candidate status to Ukraine; hopes for a positive recommendation from the Commission following the fulfilment of the seven steps set out in the Commission opinion on Ukraine’s EU membership application; calls on the Council and the Commission to set out a clear pathway for the start of the accession negotiations, based on a step-by-step approach, focusing on providing tangible benefits for Ukrainian society and citizens from the start of the process; urges the Commission and the Member States to continue to support Ukraine so that its EU accession negotiations can be opened this year and notes that this could be followed by an intergovernmental conference within the same time frame; reaffirms its commitment to Ukraine’s membership of the EU, which represents a geostrategic shift and investment in a united and strong Europe;

7.  Reiterates its call for an innovative, complementary and flexible interaction between the ongoing work on the implementation of the Association Agreement in force and the accession negotiation process, thus allowing for Ukraine’s gradual integration into the EU single market and sectoral programmes, including access to EU funds in the respective areas; urges the Member States to abstain from any unilateral actions that would limit Ukraine’s access to the EU single market;

8.  Underlines that the process of accession to the EU must take place in accordance with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, based on respect for the relevant procedures and conditional upon the fulfilment of the established criteria, in particular the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, and remains a merit-based process that requires the adoption and implementation of relevant reforms, in particular in the areas of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, a market economy and the implementation of the EU acquis; urges Ukraine to prioritise strengthening the rule of law, continuing the reform of its judiciary and fighting corruption, as progress in these areas will determine not only its progress on the European path but also the success of its reconstruction and recovery; strongly believes that a firm, merit-based prospect of EU membership for Ukraine is in the Union’s own political, economic and security interests;

9.  Encourages the EU and its Member States to provide increased support and assistance to Ukraine on its path to EU accession, including in terms of technical expertise, capacity-building and the institutional reforms necessary to meet the membership criteria; underlines that the Union itself must undertake the reforms needed in view of future enlargements;

10.  Welcomes the decision of the Council of Europe summit of 17 May 2023 in Reykjavík to set up a register for damage caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which serves as one of the first steps towards an international compensation mechanism for victims of Russia’s war of aggression; calls on the remaining Council of Europe members to join the agreement as soon as possible; reiterates, in this context, its call on the EU institutions and Member States to ambitiously advance their work towards establishing a legal basis for the confiscation of Russian public assets for the purpose of financing Ukraine’s reconstruction and compensating the victims of Russia’s aggression; underlines its conviction that once the war ends, Russia must be obliged to pay the reparations imposed on it to ensure that it makes a substantial contribution to the reconstruction of Ukraine;

11.  Highlights the importance of linking Ukraine’s reconstruction with the country’s EU accession preparations and ongoing domestic reforms; reiterates that damaged infrastructure and industrial capacity should be rebuilt in accordance with the ‘build back better’ principle and the goals of the European Green Deal, with the aim of promoting a carbon-free and digital economy and transforming Ukraine into a modern European welfare state and market economy;

12.  Underscores the need to prioritise a comprehensive EU recovery package for Ukraine, which should be focused on the country’s immediate, medium- and long-term relief, reconstruction and recovery; calls for the recovery package to be supported by credible and adequate EU funding in line with the needs, and looks forward to the Commission’s proposals on the midterm revision of the current multiannual financial framework and on the financing of Ukrainian reconstruction efforts in the coming years through the Rebuild Ukraine facility, once it has been established;

13.  Acknowledges the work done by Ukraine, the EU, the G7, international financial institutions and other like-minded partners to develop a recovery and reconstruction plan for Ukraine; welcomes and supports the seven guiding principles of the Lugano Declaration in particular; calls on the Commission, together with the EU’s and Ukraine’s international partners, to convene another high-level conference dedicated to Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery process, which would build on the results of the 2022 Lugano and Berlin international conferences and the upcoming London international conference, and would also contribute to more closely intertwining the reconstruction process with Ukraine’s European integration process; welcomes the EU’s intention to play a leading role, in particular through the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform agreed with Ukraine, the G7, international financial institutions and other key partners; underscores the need for the European Parliament to be involved as an observer; highlights the importance of good coordination and a proper division of labour between donors and Ukraine; underscores the need to ensure full Ukrainian ownership of the reconstruction process, with the close involvement of civil society organisations and local authorities; urges the EU, the Member States and international financial institutions to provide conditional grants rather than loans;

14.  Highlights that demining and the clearance of unexploded ordnance (UXO) are prerequisites for Ukraine’s reconstruction, including its agricultural production, which is vital for the country’s economy and for global food security; recalls that a large part of Ukraine’s territory is contaminated by mines and UXO; highlights the fact that the current demining and clearance efforts do not cover the demand for these activities; stresses that demining and the clearance of UXO need to be sped up in order to be able to provide assistance of the requisite magnitude to the parts of the country that have been most affected by the Russian aggression; highlights that these efforts will require comprehensive, long-term funding;

15.  Calls on the Ukrainian Government to continue to strengthen local self-government and to embed the success of the decentralisation reform in the overall architecture of Ukraine’s repair, recovery and reconstruction processes by, inter alia, giving local authorities a prominent role in decision-making about reconstruction projects; draws attention to the Association of Ukrainian Cities and the European Alliance of Cities and Regions for the Reconstruction of Ukraine, the latter of which was launched on 30 June 2022 as a vehicle to map local and regional needs in Ukraine;

16.  Expresses its conviction that Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery process must be firmly based on the principles of social fairness and inclusion, gender equality, sustainability and green transformation, local ownership, transparency and accountability, and should be accompanied by effective mechanisms to monitor its implementation; underscores the importance of a transparent governance architecture, accountability and sound financial management; stresses the need to utilise environmental impact assessments for future reconstruction projects, particularly in protected sites, such as those in the Carpathian mountain range;

17.  Warns against using the future reconstruction efforts to amend legislation in such a way as to benefit certain vested interests at the expense of a level playing field and of transparency; calls on President Zelenskyy not to sign draft law 5655 on urban development activity;

18.  Underlines, in addition, the need to take into account the concerns, needs and expertise of internally displaced persons and refugees, as their reintegration into local communities will be crucial for strengthening Ukraine’s societal and institutional resilience and increasing its unity; recalls the looming challenge of addressing the suffering of victims and veterans, many of whom will have difficulty in fully integrating back into social life after the war is over, particularly those who were detained, tortured, raped or otherwise abused by the Russian occupying forces; reiterates that many of them will require long-term psychological and medical rehabilitation and reintegration assistance;

19.  Reiterates its position that representatives of local self-government and civil society in Ukraine must be actively involved in the recovery and reconstruction process and that this process must meet the highest standards of transparency and accountability; calls for particular attention to be given to the to the needs and expectations of young and vulnerable groups;

20.  Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to maintain EU unity and to put increased pressure on Russia and its allies, including through further sanctions packages aimed at strategically weakening Russia’s war capacity; condemns the behaviour of the states, entities and individuals that help Russia to avoid the effects of EU sanctions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a sanction circumvention prevention mechanism; calls on the Commission and the Member States to expand the sanctions to include a full ban, in all Member States, on the marketing and cutting of diamonds of Russian origin or re-exported by Russia, and to lower the price cap on Russian oil; reiterates its call for European companies to withdraw their operations from Russia; calls on the Member States to take particular measures to prevent advanced technology products that are being exported to non-EU countries from ending up in Russia; calls on the Member States to very strictly prosecute individuals or entities participating in the circumvention of EU sanctions; calls for the strengthening of restrictive measures against the regime in Belarus, which do not mirror the sanctions imposed on Russia despite numerous calls for them to do so, even though the regime in Belarus has given constant political, financial, operational and logistical support to Moscow in its aggression against Ukraine and has engaged in joint hybrid actions against the EU, such as the weaponisation of migration, in order to destabilise the EU and weaken support for Ukraine;

21.  Underlines that EU support goes far beyond the civilian sector and also encompasses far-reaching support in the military field; calls for the EU, the Member States and like-minded partners to enhance military cooperation with Ukraine, including through the provision of increased capabilities, training and capacity-building, in order to strengthen Ukraine’s defence capabilities to the level needed to liberate the internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and to deter further aggression; reiterates its support for these measures and for their substantial expansion and the need to make full use of the European Peace Facility in this respect;

22.  Underlines that by successfully halting the Russian aggression, the Ukrainian army has proven to be one of the most battle-hardened and experienced armies in the world; acknowledges and commends Ukraine’s significant contribution to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and the defence of its values by resisting Russia’s war of aggression; recalls the risks involved in leaving Ukraine languishing in a security grey area that would invite Russia to sustain hostilities in the long run;

23.  Calls on the NATO allies to honour their commitment regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership and expects that the upcoming summits in Vilnius and Washington will pave the way for extending an invitation to Ukraine to join NATO and that the accession process will start after the war is over and be finalised as soon as possible; calls for the EU, the Member States, NATO allies and like-minded partners to work closely with Ukraine to develop a temporary framework for security guarantees, to be implemented immediately after the war, until full NATO membership is achieved; emphasises the fact that Ukraine’s integration into NATO and the EU would enhance regional and global security, promote stability and strengthen the bonds of cooperation and shared values between Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic community;

24.  Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to strengthen strategic communication and provide relevant information on the mutual benefits of and opportunities presented by enlargement both in Ukraine and in the Member States, in order to further increase support and improve understanding of the accession process; calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to improve the visibility of EU funding and its tangible results in Ukraine; insists that EU and Ukrainian civil society should play an active role in implementing these objectives;

25.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the NATO Secretary General and the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

(1) OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3.

European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2023 on the situation in Nicaragua (2023/2743(RSP))

P9_TA(2023)0248 RC-B9-0272/2023

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Nicaragua, in particular those of 16 December 2021 on the situation in Nicaragua(1), of 9 June 2022 on the instrumentalisation of justice as a repressive tool in Nicaragua(2) and of 22 September 2022 on Nicaragua, in particular the arrest of the bishop Rolando Álvarez(3),

–  having regard to the statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and his spokesperson about Nicaragua, in particular the statements of 4 August 2022 on the closure of radio stations and shutdown of civil society organisations, of 10 February 2023 on the release of political prisoners, of 16 February 2023 on the revocation of the citizenship of political opponents and of 18 April 2023 on the fifth anniversary of the nationwide protests,

–  having regard to the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and Central America on the other(4),

–  having regard to the Council regulations and decisions concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses in Nicaragua and to the Council decision of 13 October 2022 renewing these sanctions until 15 October 2023(5),

–  having regard to the report of the UN Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua (GHREN) of 2 March 2023,

–  having regard to the statements by the spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 9 May 2022 and 2 June 2023,

–  having regard to the decision of 8 February 2023 by the First Criminal Chamber of the Managua Court of Appeals on the deportation of 222 traitors to the homeland and the statement of 15 February 2023 by the presiding magistrate of the Managua Court of Appeals on the accusation of 94 traitors to the homeland,

–  having regard to the statements of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in particular those of 13 February 2023 welcoming the release of political prisoners in Nicaragua but rejecting the arbitrary deprivation of nationality, of 17 February 2023 condemning the escalation of human rights violations in Nicaragua and of 18 April 2023 marking five years since the start of the human rights crisis in Nicaragua,

–  having regard to the reports by the Special Monitoring Mechanism for Nicaragua,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners of 2015 (the Nelson Mandela Rules), the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders of 2010 (the Bangkok Rules) and the Vienna Convention of 1969,

–  having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969 (the Pact of San Jose),

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas since 2018, the Nicaraguan regime has systematically, repeatedly and arbitrarily incarcerated, harassed and intimidated presidential pre-candidates, opposition leaders and religious leaders, as well as student and rural leaders, indigenous people, LGBTI persons, journalists, human rights defenders, civil society organisations, business representatives and all other critical voices in the country; whereas the situation in Nicaragua continues to deteriorate;

B.  whereas the human rights violations and abuses perpetrated since April 2018 are not an isolated phenomenon, but rather the product of a dynamic process of dismantling the separation of powers and democratic guarantees and of thoroughly concentrating power in the figures of the President and Vice-President of the Republic of Nicaragua;

C.  whereas on 9 February 2023, the Ortega-Murillo regime deported 222 arbitrarily detained political prisoners to the United States, including political figures, pre-candidates in the 2021 presidential elections, journalists, human rights defenders and demonstrators in the 2018 protests; whereas all of them were declared ‘traitors to the homeland’ and stripped of their nationality;

D.  whereas Bishop Rolando Álvarez refused to be exiled from Nicaragua and, as a punishment, was sentenced on 10 February 2023 to 26 years’ imprisonment and the deprivation of his nationality and political rights following his conviction on charges of ‘treason’, ‘undermining national integrity’ and ‘spreading fake news’; whereas Rolando Álvarez is currently in La Modelo prison and has not been permitted any visits since 25 March 2023; whereas the crackdown on the church continues, despite its mediator role in the 2018 national dialogue, with the expulsion of nuns and the arrest of several priests and church employees; whereas in April, the Vatican closed its embassy in Nicaragua after the country’s regime proposed suspending diplomatic relations;

E.  whereas in addition to Rolando Álvarez, as of 30 April 2023, at least 46 political prisoners, including some who have been detained since 2018, remain imprisoned in unacceptable conditions, following closed-door trials that failed to uphold basic fair trial guarantees; whereas this framework of state repression has been installed with the clear connivance of the judiciary;

F.  whereas on 15 February 2023, 94 additional political opponents were stripped of their nationality and had their property seized after being accused of conspiring to undermine national integrity and of spreading misinformation; whereas about a third of them remain in Nicaragua;

G.  whereas several countries have offered nationality, citizenship or temporary protection to the Nicaraguan citizens made stateless by the regime of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo; whereas Spain has offered citizenship to the 222 exiles;

H.  whereas in May 2023, 63 people throughout the country were reported to have been arbitrarily detained and charged with ‘conspiring to undermine national integrity’ and ‘spreading fake news’, charges that the regime is using to silence its critics;

I.  whereas on 9 and 11 May 2023, the Nicaraguan Supreme Court ruled that 26 lawyers and notaries critical of the regime, including some of the country’s most prominent human rights defenders, could no longer practise law in Nicaragua;

J.  whereas since April 2018, the Nicaraguan government has shuttered more than 3 300 non-profit organisations and foundations, including women’s organisations and organisations related to the Catholic Church, leaving countless people without access to their services or assistance; whereas the legal status of several universities has been revoked in order to quash student dissent; whereas media outlets have also been forced to close;

K.  whereas on 9 June 2023, the Government of Nicaragua confiscated properties belonging to the 222 political prisoners who had been forced into exile that February after being convicted of ‘committing acts against the nation’s sovereignty, independence and self-determination’;

L.  whereas, as stated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the revocation of the citizenship of human rights defenders and dissidents on arbitrary grounds breaches international law, specifically Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness; whereas Nicaragua is a party to all of the above-mentioned instruments;

M.  whereas the GHREN has published its first report on the situation in Nicaragua, describing how agents of the police and the National Penitentiary System and members of pro-regime armed groups committed extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detention and acts of physical and psychological torture, including sexual and gender-based violence among others, in the context of the apprehension, interrogation, and detention of political opponents;

N.  whereas on 28 September 2022, the Nicaraguan regime took the unjustified decision to expel the Head of the EU Delegation to Nicaragua and cut diplomatic ties with the Kingdom of the Netherlands; whereas the EU responded reciprocally by declaring the Head of the Mission of the Republic of Nicaragua to the EU persona non grata;

O.  whereas in 2022, the flow of Nicaraguans migrating to other countries as a consequence of the political, social, human rights and economic crises increased; whereas more than 192 000 Nicaraguans have fled to Costa Rica since 2018, either as asylum seekers or as refugees; whereas this trend could undermine the Costa Rican asylum system and overburden support networks in the country;

P.  whereas since the illegal, unprovoked and unjustified Russian war of aggression against Ukraine began, the Ortega-Murillo regime has systematically supported the Russian regime in UN resolutions; whereas Russia has supported Nicaragua with military equipment and continues to host a Russian military presence in the country; whereas the several memoranda signed between Russia and Nicaragua reinforce the clear evidence of the strong relationship and common support between the Ortega-Murillo regime and Putin’s regime;

1.  Strongly condemns the Nicaraguan regime’s widespread perpetration of systematic and deliberate human rights violations against its population for purely political reasons; stresses that these violations amount to crimes against humanity, as stated by the GHREN; condemns the practices used by the regime to silence the population; reaffirms its solidarity with and continuous and unwavering support for the Nicaraguan population;

2.  Takes note of the release of 222 political prisoners, but condemns the Nicaraguan regime’s decision to deport them, strip them of their nationality and their civil and political rights, freeze their assets and confiscate their property; reminds the Nicaraguan authorities that the arbitrary deprivation of nationality is prohibited by international law and calls on the Nicaraguan authorities to immediately reverse these steps and to cease their politically motivated persecution of and reprisals against dissidents and human rights defenders;

3.  Expresses its concern about the state of civil death endured by those who have been deprived of their nationality but have remained in Nicaragua; calls on the Nicaraguan government to guarantee the life and integrity of human rights defenders who remain in Nicaragua, including, among others, Vilma Nuñez de Escorcia;

4.  Expresses its concern about the situation of the relatives in Nicaragua of those who have been deported and the situation of those who remain in the country and are being persecuted, as well as their families; underlines the need to facilitate family reunification processes; stresses, furthermore, the importance of monitoring the wellbeing of the 222 Nicaraguans who were initially deported to the US and of those who were stripped of their nationality;

5.  Calls for proof that Bishop Rolando Álvarez is alive; reiterates its call for his immediate and unconditional release and that of all arbitrarily detained political prisoners, opposition activists, human rights and environmental defenders, members of the Catholic Church and journalists, and for the annulment of the proceedings conducted and sentences pronounced against them, as well as the safe return of all refugees and exiled persons;

6.  Condemns the continued psychological and physical abuse that all detainees face at the hands of police and prison authorities, of which women and members of the LGBTI community are particular targets, and the situation of incommunicado detention in which some of them are being held, without access to their lawyers, families or medical care; requires that families be kept informed of the state of health of their loved ones who are in detention; reminds the Nicaraguan regime of its responsibility to ensure that detention conditions comply with its international human rights obligations and with standards such as the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules);

7.  Expresses concern about the manipulation of criminal law and the use of the justice system as a tool to criminalise the exercise of civil and political rights, as well as the freedom of religion and belief; calls for the repeal of the restrictive laws passed since 2018 that unduly encroach on civic and democratic space; calls on the Nicaraguan authorities to uphold and respect human rights and to allow the Nicaraguan people to exercise their civil and political rights; urges the Nicaraguan authorities to allow international organisations and civil society organisations unrestricted access to the country;

8.  Calls on the Nicaraguan regime to stop arbitrarily closing down non-governmental and civil society organisations and to reinstate the legal charter of all organisations, political parties, religious organisations, media associations and outlets, universities and human rights organisations that have been shut down arbitrarily, as well as to return all their property, assets, documents and equipment that have been unduly seized and to re-establish their legitimate legal status;

9.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to include specific guarantees of compliance with human rights regarding European funds allocated, including where these funds are allocated through multilateral and financial institutions such as the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, and to carry out strict monitoring to ensure that these funds do not contribute to strengthening the Nicaraguan regime;

10.  Highlights and commends the key role played by civil society, human rights and environmental defenders, the Catholic Church and journalists in Nicaragua; asks the European External Action Service and the Commission to reinforce their regular dialogue with them, to strengthen mechanisms to support their vital work and to closely monitor the situation on the ground, including by monitoring trials and visiting opposition leaders and government critics in prison or under house arrest; calls for the EU and its Member States to use all the tools at its disposal, including visas, to facilitate the mobility of human rights defenders and other persons at risk and ensure the continuity of their work;

11.  Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to increase support for members of the Nicaraguan opposition currently in exile, as well as to maintain their close collaboration with and support for countries receiving substantial numbers of migrants fleeing the Nicaraguan regime, in particular Costa Rica; requests that the Commission and the Member States establish and facilitate, through their development cooperation agencies, specific programmes to support the educational development of Nicaraguan young people and students who have been deprived of their right to education;

12.  Calls for the EU to support and actively engage in any prospect of meaningful national dialogue and to further insist on sine qua non conditions for dialogue, including the release of arbitrarily detained political prisoners, the restoration of the rule of law and freedoms, the cessation of repression and fear, the re-establishment of the legal status of the political parties and organisations that were arbitrarily outlawed, the return of exiles without exception and with full guarantees, the return of international human rights bodies to the country and the holding of free, fair and transparent elections;

13.  Calls on the Nicaraguan regime to implement the recommendations issued by the GHREN in its report, as well as those issued by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; urges the Nicaraguan institutions to stamp out impunity for the serious violations and abuses of human rights and to provide the victims with access to justice and full reparations; welcomes the renewal of the GHREN’s mandate and requests that the EU and its Member States continue to support its vital work;

14.  Draws attention to the continued instrumentalisation of the judicial system and the complicity of the judges in this; reiterates its call for judges and prosecutors to be swiftly included on the list of individuals sanctioned by the EU and for the list of sanctioned individuals and entities to be expanded to include Daniel Ortega and his inner circle;

15.  Stresses that the upcoming summit between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELA) is an opportunity to uphold the principles of the rule of law, democracy and human rights, and calls that all participants abide by these principles; points out that this will not be possible without the truly transparent, comprehensive and meaningful inclusion of civil society; calls on the EU-CELAC summit to issue a statement demanding due respect for human rights in both regions, in particular in Nicaragua; recalls that, in the light of the Association Agreement between the EU and Central America, Nicaragua must respect and consolidate these principles; reiterates its demand that, in the light of the current circumstances, the democratic clause of the Association Agreement be triggered;

16.  Calls on the Member States to build on the evidence collected by the GHREN regarding the crimes against humanity committed by the Nicaraguan authorities and to support the end of impunity in Nicaragua, including by opening formal investigations and taking legal action against those responsible through the exercise of universal jurisdiction; encourages the Member States to bring Nicaragua before the International Court of Justice for violating the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which Nicaragua is a party;

17.  Condemns the Nicaraguan regime’s unconditional support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and express its concern over the Russian military assistance to further repress the Nicaraguan population; deplores the increasing isolation of Nicaragua from the international community; condemns the aggressive rhetoric of the Nicaraguan authorities; reiterates that the principle of universality of human rights is the cornerstone of international law;

18.  Reiterates its call for the immediate extradition of Alessio Casimirri to Italy;

19.  Asks its Conference of Presidents to authorise a fact-finding mission to monitor the situation in Nicaragua;

20.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, the Central American Parliament, the Presidency Pro Tempore of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, the Vatican and the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Nicaragua.

(1) OJ C 251, 30.6.2022, p. 134. (2) OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 100. (3) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 76. (4) OJ L 346, 15.12.2012, p. 3. (5) OJ L 268, 14.10.2022, p. 22.

European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2023 on lessons learnt from the Pandora Papers and other revelations (2022/2080(INI))

P9_TA(2023)0249 A9-0095/2023

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report of 26 January 2021 entitled ‘Exchanging tax information in the EU: solid foundation, cracks in the implementation’,

–  having regard to the European Court of Auditors’ annual report of 27 October 2022 entitled ‘Annual report on EU agencies for the financial year 2021’,

–  having regard to the decision of the European Ombudsman of 16 May 2022 on how the European Commission manages ‘revolving doors’ moves of its staff members (case OI/1/2021/KR),

–  having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 with proposals to the Commission on citizenship and residence by investment schemes(1),

–  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report of 28 June 2021 entitled ‘EU efforts to fight money laundering in the banking sector are fragmented and implementation is insufficient’,

–  having regard to its resolution of 10 July 2020 entitled ‘A comprehensive Union policy on preventing money laundering and terrorist financing – the Commission’s Action Plan and other recent developments’(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on reforming the EU list of tax havens(3),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on the implementation of the EU requirements for exchange of tax information: progress, lessons learnt and obstacles to overcome(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on reforming the EU policy on harmful tax practices (including the reform of the Code of Conduct Group)(5),

–  having regard to its resolution of 21 October 2021 on the Pandora Papers: implications for the efforts to combat money laundering, tax evasion and tax avoidance(6),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2020 on institutions and bodies of the Economic and Monetary Union: preventing post-public employment conflicts of interest(7),

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Development and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A9-0095/2023),

A.  whereas the Pandora Papers were a massive data leak, which the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists began publishing on 3 October 2021, documenting the beneficial owners of corporate entities established in secrecy jurisdictions;

B.  whereas 2,94 terabytes of data were leaked to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and shared with media partners around the world; whereas some of the files date back to the 1970s, but most of those reviewed by the ICIJ were created between 1996 and 2020; whereas the new data leak reportedly concerns more than 330 political figures and public officials from almost 100 countries, including 35 current or former heads of state or government;

C.  whereas the Pandora Papers revealed how high-net-worth individuals, including politically exposed persons, criminals, public officials and celebrities, are assisted by intermediaries, such as banks, accountants and law firms, in designing complex corporate structures registered in secrecy jurisdictions or tax havens in close cooperation with offshore professional service providers in order to shield income and assets from taxation, sanctions and other legal obligations and to enable money laundering and terrorist financing;

D.  whereas, regrettably, a number of high-level EU decision-makers also featured in the Pandora Papers;

E.  whereas the activities revealed in the Pandora Papers include the misuse of shell companies, foundations and trusts for the following purposes: anonymously buying property and luxury goods, and making investments and transferring money between bank accounts for illegal purposes, tax avoidance and committing financial crimes, including money laundering and terrorism financing;

F.  whereas the Pandora Papers are the latest major data leak to expose the inner workings of the offshore financial world, following on from the Lux Leaks in 2014, the Swiss Leaks in 2015, the Panama Papers in 2016, the Paradise Papers in 2017, the Mauritius Leaks in 2019, the Luanda Leaks and the FinCEN Files in 2020, and the Lux Letters in 2021;

G.  whereas, according to research(8), the amount of financial wealth held in tax heavens in 2017 was EUR 7 900 billion; whereas this amount is equivalent to 8 % of the world’s gross domestic product; whereas, as a result, there is a loss of tax revenue of around EUR 155 billion per year worldwide;

H.  whereas the Panama Papers and Swiss Leaks revelations suggest that the wealthiest 0,01 % of people own about 50 % of their wealth in tax havens, while they are evading about 25 % of their tax liability by concealing assets and investment income abroad, making tax evasion also an issue of inequality(9);

I.  whereas the practices described in the Pandora Papers further entrench social and economic inequalities in our societies and strongly erode citizens’ trust in the rule of law and in our economic and democratic system; whereas fostering social and economic justice is ever more important in the crisis currently faced by the EU due to the war of aggression against Ukraine and the cost of living crisis that has ensued;

J.  whereas tax crimes are a predicate offence for money laundering under EU law and international standards; whereas the activities reported in the Pandora Papers are not all illicit or criminal, but may amount to tax avoidance and abuse of corporate secrecy;

K.  whereas the parties to the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the outcome document of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, committed to enhance revenue administration through modernised, progressive tax systems and more efficient tax collection, as well as to scale up international tax cooperation;

L.  whereas corporate income tax represents a higher share of tax revenues and gross domestic product in developing countries than in rich countries(10); whereas losses due to global corporate taxation in developing countries are estimated to range from 6 to 13 % of total tax revenue, compared with 2 to 3 % in member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)(11);

M.  whereas in October 2021, the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting agreed on a two-pillar solution to address the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy; whereas, however, some developing countries expressed concerns about this global corporate tax deal, or even refused to endorse it (for example, Kenya and Nigeria);

N.  whereas according to the ‘Tax Transparency in Africa 2022: Africa Initiative Progress Report’, illicit financial flows (IFFs) are estimated to amount to USD 50-80 billion (EUR 48-77 billion) annually for the continent;

O.  whereas in 2019, the Africa Group at the United Nations called for a UN convention on tax as an important tool for tackling IFFs; whereas in February 2021, the High Level Panel on International Financial Accountability, Transparency and Integrity for Achieving the 2030 Agenda (the FACTI Panel) also included a proposal for a UN tax convention as a key recommendation in its final report;

P.  whereas the Commission and the Council have not fully followed up on Parliament’s recommendations following the Pandora Papers in its resolution of 21 October 2021 on the Pandora Papers: implications for the efforts to combat money laundering, tax evasion and tax avoidance;

Q.  whereas few European legislative initiatives have been launched for tackling harmful tax practices that attract high net-worth individuals or individuals with luxury assets;

R.  whereas, despite a decade of tax scandals and legislative reforms in the EU, progress at global level to rein in corporate secrecy and offshore tax evasion and avoidance has been insufficient, as shown by the Pandora Papers; whereas the lack of transparency, including through international information-sharing, is a key underlying cause of tax-related illicit financial flows;

S.  whereas the two-pillar solution agreed on in October 2021 by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting addresses the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy; whereas developing countries, including the African Tax Administration Forum, have criticised the solution for side-lining their interests and for not sufficiently addressing the specific loopholes that limit the taxation rights of African countries;

General considerations

1.  Recognises that journalists and whistleblowers have an important role in investigating and exposing potential violations of tax law, as well as corruption, organised crime and money laundering; deems it necessary to further protect the confidentiality of the sources of investigative journalism, including whistleblowers; welcomes the fact that investigative journalists have uncovered a complex system of tax havens, shell corporations and offshore accounts whose beneficial owners are persons of high public interest;

2.  Stresses the importance of defending the freedom of journalists to report on issues of public interest without facing the threat of costly legal action, including when they receive confidential, secret or restricted documents, datasets or other materials, regardless of their origin;

3.  Welcomes the Commission proposal for a directive on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings(12), also known as the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) directive; recalls the enormous financial and psychological burdens that SLAPPs place on the work of journalists and media workers, which also have a chilling effect and lead to self-censorship; underlines that a strong EU anti-SLAPP directive must include clear provisions on early dismissal mechanisms and effective sanctions, including financial penalties, against initiators of SLAPPs; stresses that an effective anti-SLAPP framework cannot exist in the absence of coordinated complementary measures at national level; calls on the Member States to adopt anti-SLAPP legislation tackling domestic lawsuits against public participation;

4.  Stresses that investigative journalists and media workers are often subject to intense financial pressure and encounter considerable difficulties in obtaining financial resources for projects investigating tax crime, corruption or organised crime; calls on the Commission to explore further ways to increase the funding available to the media sector, including by establishing a dedicated permanent fund for investigative journalism;

5.  Highlights the many cases that have recently come to light in which spyware has been used to conduct surveillance on journalists in the EU and notes that these are extremely worrying;

6.  Deplores the fact that journalists like Peter Rudolf de Vries, Daphne Caruana Galizia and Ján Kuciak were murdered in relation to their journalistic revelations; highlights the vulnerability to threats and attacks of independent journalists and media workers in the absence of a strong European legislative framework to protect them; welcomes Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union(13); stresses, nevertheless, that this can only be considered a starting point and calls for urgent action on establishing binding measures to ensure the protection of journalists and media workers across the EU;

7.  Notes that Switzerland revised its Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks on banking secrecy in the framework of adopting the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for exchanging information on financial accounts; regrets, however, that banking secrecy remain in place for information that does not fall under the CRS; is worried that banking secrecy rules in Switzerland still apply to jurisdictions that are not part of the CRS and to Swiss nationals, including Swiss journalists, which explains why Swiss journalists were not initially allowed to report on the Pandora Papers or be part of the investigative consortium; welcomes any future reform of Article 47 of Switzerland’s Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks in order to safeguard proper freedom of the press;

8.  Regrets the fact that 24 Member States failed to transpose and communicate the transposition of the Whistleblower Directive(14) within the deadline; welcomes the fact that the Commission has initiated infringement procedures against at least 19 Member States for their failure to transpose the directive; points out that the implementation and application of current rules is crucial; regrets the extended use of non-disclosure agreements for employees in the corporate sector without the provision of accurate legal advice; calls on the Member States that have not yet done so to transpose the directive into their national law as a matter of urgency; calls on the Commission to use all the tools at its disposal to address Member States’ failure to transpose this directive;

9.  Looks forward to the Commission’s report, due to be published in December 2023, on the implementation of the 2019 EU Whistleblowers Directive; calls on the Commission to consult stakeholders, when appropriate, on how to improve the directive;

10.  Emphasises the fact that illicit financial flows are a matter for global governance; urges the EU to show strong political will and determination against tax avoidance and evasion to protect the single market, in line with the principle of policy coherence for development and as enshrined in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU);

11.  Emphasises the fact that the practices brought to light by the Pandora Papers revelations have an especially severe impact on the fiscal space and public expenditure, in particular in developing countries, and undermine the rule of law and confidence in the global financial system for raising living standards in developing countries around the world; highlights the need to work in global international forums;

12.  Highlights the international commitment to significantly reduce illicit financial flows by 2030, as set out in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; notes that the use of existing official development funds for subsidising private investment can be associated with trade-offs in relation to their effectiveness in achieving the sustainable development goals;

13.  Notes the several international initiatives on the automatic exchange of information for tax compliance purposes, as well as the OECD Common Reporting Standard for automatic reporting of information on the offshore financial accounts of non-residents to their jurisdiction of residence and the work of the OECD’s Joint International Taskforce on Shared Intelligence and Collaboration network, in which 19 EU Member States currently participate;

14.  Stresses that tax transparency and the exchange of information are essential for stemming illicit financial flows and increasing the mobilisation of domestic resources, which is of particular importance for achieving the sustainable development goals and the African Union Agenda 2063, especially in the current context, which is marked by rising debt, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequences of the war in Ukraine on African economies;

15.  Calls for the EU to support developing countries in combating illicit financial flows and tax evasion by companies and multinationals, and to ensure that taxes are paid where real economic value and profits are created in order to stop base erosion and profit shifting;

16.  Stresses that in 2019, the Africa Group at the United Nations called for a UN convention on tax to help tackle illicit financial flows; believes that a universal intergovernmental body under the auspices of the UN with a mandate to deal with all aspects of IFFs could help to include all developing countries in the decision-making process on tax matters and could be an effective tool for fighting tax avoidance, trade mis-invoicing, profit shifting and all forms of illegal commercial and fiscal activities at global level;

17.  Calls for the EU to support the setting up of a UN framework convention on tax, with the aim of strengthening international cooperation and governance on tax and trade-related illicit financial flows; highlights the need to introduce transparent and inclusive decision-making where all countries can negotiate as equals;

18.  Recalls that tax avoidance shifts the tax burden from larger businesses to smaller and medium-sized businesses, as well as to consumption through personal income tax and value-added tax, which is particularly problematic in least developed countries where small, medium-sized and micro enterprises and informal traders make up the bulk of economic activity and are more vulnerable to significantly reduced income and insecurity; recalls that massive financial losses for developing countries due to tax evasion is one of the main factors that seriously worsen the indebtedness of many of them;

19.  Deplores the fact that a number of EU high-level decision-makers have been featured in the Pandora Papers and recent media investigations, involving allegations of illegally obtained property, interests in fossil fuel companies or assets in tax havens; points out, in addition, that the names in the Pandora Papers include political leaders in developing countries that heavily depend on aid from the European Union;

20.  Considers that, due to the unanimity rule laid down in the TFEU to adopt tax legislation in the EU, high-level decision-makers accused of wrongdoing may have significantly more leverage in either blocking legislation to counter tax evasion or avoidance or determining the effectiveness of its outcome;

21.  Notes that government ministers and lawmakers have the fundamental duty to uphold the law to its fullest extent and act in line with the spirit of the law at all times; points out that failing to do so erodes public trust in government, the very fundament of a state; points out that family members of politically exposed persons may be involved in fraud and tax evasion cases and are therefore subject to anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing legislation;

22.  Highlights the importance of safeguarding high standards of integrity, honesty and responsibility among public officials in the EU and in the Member States, as well as fostering, within that environment, an ethos of a sense of duty and personal honesty; recalls the obligation for Members of the European Parliament to disclose any ‘financial interests which might influence the performance of the Member’s duties’;

23.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that they have measures and systems in place, with sufficient human and financial resources, requiring politically exposed persons to declare any relevant outside activities, employment, investments, assets and substantial gifts or benefits which may give rise to a conflict of interest with respect to their functions; highlights the importance of having systems in place for reporting and verifying this information and independently assessing conflicts of interest when they arise, as well as for providing dissuasive sanctions for failure to comply with disclosure obligations;

24.  Takes note of Article 12 of Regulation No 31 (EEC)(15), which prohibits public officials in the EU from carrying out any action or behaviour which might reflect adversely upon their position;

Role of intermediaries in facilitating tax evasion and avoidance

25.  Points out that, according to research carried out in 2018, the so-called Big Four major accountancy firms – PwC, EY, Deloitte and KPMG – accounted for 87 % of the global tax advisory market share(16); highlights the risks that a de facto oligopoly may pose to the accountancy and advisory market itself and the influence that these firms can wield over tax regulations; calls on the Commission to carry out a study on the tax advisory market in order to have up-to-date information on the market share of the major accountancy firms;

26.  Regrets the fact that, as exposed by the Pandora Papers(17), PwC, along with other major accountancy firms, had a central role in assisting Russian oligarchs with their investments in the West through their networks of offshore shell companies(18); highlights that such networks may be hindering the application of EU sanctions on Russian individuals; regrets the absence of visible investigations into the intermediary sector in the EU following the publication of the Pandora Papers and the EU’s sanctions on Russian oligarchs; calls on the authorities in the Member States to investigate any wrongdoing by these firms;

27.  Points out that, in view of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its hybrid actions against EU countries, investigations into the assets and investments of Russian oligarchs should be a top priority, as they are strategically important for the EU’s security;

28.  Takes note that, according to research(19), global professional services firms (GPSFs) serve as ‘career hubs’, where 68 % of transfer pricing professionals in multinational corporations have worked in a GPSF before; calls on the Commission to provide information on revolving doors between GPSFs and the employment of tax authority officials in such firms; calls on the Member States to ensure the adoption of revolving doors regulations, including cooling-off periods, with regard to officials in tax administrations, with adequate enforcement mechanisms;

29.  Is concerned about the recent departure of the former OECD tax director to the private sector; calls on the Member States and the Commission to put pressure on the OECD to uphold its own 2010 Recommendation Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying and introduce clear cooling-off periods and strict policies on revolving door situations; calls on the Member States also to uphold these standards on international organisations of which they are members, so as to avoid conflicts of interest and revolving doors;

30.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to further analyse and, where appropriate, address the potential conflicts of interest stemming from the provision of legal advice, tax advice and auditing services when advising both corporate clients and public authorities; reiterates its calls on the Commission to consider introducing measures to clearly separate accountancy firms from financial or tax service providers, as well as all advisory services, as a way of tackling conflicts of interest;

31.  Is concerned by the ongoing PwC Australia tax leaks scandal, whereby a PwC partner involved in developing laws designed to crack down on multinational tax avoidance in Australia allegedly shared confidential information with colleagues, who won business on the back of his guidance; calls on the Commission and the EU Member States’ authorities to cooperate with their Australian counterparts and to assess whether similar cases of conflicts of interest have taken place in the EU;

32.  Highlights the current prohibition on auditors to provide advisory services, including tax advice(20), to public-interest entities; welcomes the recently announced division of activities of one of the Big Four major accounting firms into separate audit and advisory businesses, demonstrating that such separation is achievable(21);

33.  Highlights the Court of Auditors’ report which concludes that the use of external consultants by the Commission ‘gave rise to potential risks of overdependence, competitive advantage, a concentration of suppliers and potential conflicts of interest’ and that the ‘Commission does not sufficiently monitor, manage or mitigate these risks at the corporate level’(22); calls on the Commission to implement all the recommendations from the Court; calls on the Commission to duly assess any risks of conflicts of interest in the process of awarding contracts to private firms and ensure diversified sources of advice; highlights the importance of public authorities having in-house resources and expertise to carry out their functions;

34.  Highlights the limitations of self-regulation of the non-financial intermediary sector; welcomes the fact that the Commission is preparing a new legislative proposal on regulating intermediaries through an act securing the activity framework of enablers in order to tackle the role of enablers involved in facilitating tax evasion and aggressive tax planning; urges the Commission to ensure that the framework includes robust enforcement against intermediaries creating and operating schemes which enable tax evasion and aggressive tax planning, as well as facilitating and contributing to the concealment of wealth and assets; in this context, urges the Commission to continue to improve information-sharing among Member State tax administrations and cooperation on the global stage; awaits the Commission proposal, which should be targeted and proportionate;

35.  Highlights the Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC8) proposal from the Commission, which extends the automatic exchange of advance cross-border rulings in DAC6 to cover high-net-worth individuals; emphasises the importance of honest and fair cooperation between national tax authorities to make the system of exchange of information failproof;

36.  Welcomes the fact that the Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC6) has already introduced a mandatory disclosure regime for certain cross-border tax arrangements; notes that more than a full year of reporting has been completed; calls on the Commission to analyse the depth and breadth of the reporting and identify possible shortcomings; calls on the Commission to keep the European Parliament informed about its findings;

37.  Insists that tax avoidance only benefits the few; takes note of the OECD’s observation that base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) affects all countries and that ‘developing countries’ higher reliance on corporate income tax means they suffer from BEPS disproportionately(23)’, fuelling domestic inequality;

Harmful practices in non-corporate tax regimes

38.  Takes note of the fact that, as the Pandora Papers have exposed, schemes to shield the assets of high-net-worth individuals from state authorities through corporate offshore services have become highly sophisticated; notes that the revelations showed how wealthy individuals pay little to no taxes by changing their country of tax residency and reallocating capital across borders;

39.  Draws attention to the impact of new technologies (e.g. crypto-assets) which create new challenges in the area of tax avoidance and money laundering and for which new, appropriate and targeted regulations may be needed;

40.  Stresses that base erosion is facilitated by the fact that outbound dividends, royalties and interest across borders are not subject to withholding tax and that there are no common rules and procedures ensuring the effective taxation of intra-EU flows; recalls recent research showing vast differences between the Member States in their application of withholding taxes, with rates varying between 0 % and 35 %; points to the fact that rates applied to withholding tax in bilateral tax treaties are often lower than the standard rates; calls on the Commission and the Member States to coordinate a withholding tax framework that ensures that all dividends, interest and royalties are taxed at least once at an effective rate;

41.  Points out that the dividend-stripping scandals known as ‘cum-ex’ and ‘cum-cum’ were two of the largest tax fraud scandals in EU history, which cost EU Member states EUR 140 billion; stresses that a harmonised EU withholding tax system would help prevent tax fraud, double taxation and double non-taxation; reiterates the need for a common withholding tax system;

42.  Observes, in parallel, a trend for countries, including EU Member States, to adopt legal frameworks designed to attract high-net-worth individuals, foreign pensioners and highly skilled workers to invest or live in their territory, notably granting them generous tax benefits and exemptions which do not apply to nationals, in addition to offering golden visas and selling citizenship opportunities; points out that these kinds of opportunities may have benefited Russian oligarchs who have since had targeted sanctions imposed on them;

43.  Reiterates its concerns that schemes granting nationality or residency on the basis of a financial investment, also known as ‘golden passports’, are objectionable from an ethical, legal and economic point of view and pose several serious security risks for Union citizens, such as risks stemming from money-laundering and corruption;

44.  Urges the Commission to provide detailed information on the progress made by Member States in repealing or withdrawing the citizenship or residence permits of Russian or Belarusian individuals who have obtained their status through investment;

45.  Is particularly concerned by the apparent short-term increase of USD 14 billion in cross-border deposits held in countries offering citizenship and residence through investment schemes, which suggests that these schemes are being used as regulatory arbitrage to circumvent the disclosure mandated under DAC6(24);

46.  Notes that governments generally use two instruments to attract taxpayers and mobile tax bases for personal income and wealth taxation: (top) tax rates and preferential tax arrangements targeted at income- and wealth-rich foreigners;

47.  Takes note of the increasing number of tax regimes in EU Member States which aim to attract foreign ‘digital nomads’, high-net-worth individuals or pensioners; notes that some tax regimes present significant potential for abuse, which erodes the tax bases of other countries; highlights that, according to research by the EU Tax Observatory(25), many Member States have specific tax regimes designed to attract foreign-earned income or wealth which, according to the researchers, pose varying degrees of harmfulness;

48.  Notes that, according to the Tax Observatory, these kinds of preferential schemes generate a loss of revenue of over EUR 4,5 billion per year for the EU as a whole; regrets that some Member States are ending golden visa schemes while creating special tax regimes for foreign-earned income or wealth;

49.  Is concerned that there is considerable scope for harmful competition in this field and widening social and economic inequalities, as tax-induced mobility is high among income - and wealth-rich taxpayers(26) - and non-mobile income earners end up paying proportionately higher taxes than mobile income earners;

50.  Calls on the Commission, without prejudice to its powers under the Treaties, to assess the impact of these tax regimes on the single market and Member States’ revenues, as well as of all harmful tax practices distorting competition outside the area of corporate taxation in the EU;

51.  Highlights the possible impact of teleworking on the allocation of personal income tax rights and tax residence in the EU; calls on the Commission to take the necessary legislative measures to ensure legal certainty and tax fairness for cross-border workers and self-employed persons in the EU in this regard; notes that personal income tax is the biggest source of tax revenue for most EU Member States;

52.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to take the lead in the OECD, and in particular in the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework, in creating a level playing field in the taxation of capital gains and to limit harmful tax practices aimed at attracting foreign-earned income, wealth and assets;

53.  Highlights that, given the single market and freedom of movement of capital within the EU, the disparity of capital gains taxation across the EU(27) may generate wealth shifting and tax avoidance across Member States;

54.  Notes that real estate has been widely misused for money-laundering and tax-evasion purposes, as revealed by the Pandora Papers; notes, furthermore, that real estate taxation in the EU is not at all coordinated; notes with concern the sharp increase in real estate prices in the EU and the financialisation of housing; is concerned about the potentially distortive effect of regimes providing for low-tax real estate investment funds; calls on the Commission to assess the impact of a lack of coordination of real estate taxation in the EU, as well as the impact of low-tax regimes, on the financialisation of the housing sector; recalls the important role of national digital land registers in strengthening the fight against tax crime across the EU;

Misuse of shell companies and opaque structures and the fight against tax evasion and avoidance, particularly in jurisdictions that figure prominently in the Pandora Papers

55.  Recalls that tax crime is recognised as a predicate offence of money laundering, which is often linked to organised crime, corruption and the financing of terrorism; stresses that the main challenge identified for the application of Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing(28) is the lack of direct applicability of the rules and the fragmentation resulting from diverging national approaches; welcomes the proposed anti-money laundering legislative package; stresses the importance of increasing the coordination between national legal frameworks to address loopholes and of improving supervision through the establishment of a European anti-money laundering authority with adequate resources and competences;

56.  Notes that some jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, have in place a control mechanism for unexplained wealth aimed at detecting the proceeds of criminal activities; stresses that this mechanism consists of a court order requiring a person who is reasonably suspected of being involved in serious crime, or of being connected to a person involved in serious crime, to explain the nature and extent of their interest in a particular property and to explain how that property was obtained, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the respondent’s known lawfully obtained income would be insufficient to enable the respondent to obtain that property; invites the Commission to assess the effects and feasibility of such a measure at Union level in order to enable law enforcement agencies to better investigate the origin of ill-gotten assets and recover the proceeds of crime, while ensuring proportionality and the rights of defendants;

57.  Notes the lack of transparency by the Commission and the Member States with regard to the progress made in freezing and seizing the assets of sanctioned persons; urges the Member States and the EU authorities to make a genuine effort to recover illicit money; calls on the Commission to publish a list of assets that have been frozen or confiscated following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; welcomes the Commission’s 2022 proposal on asset recovery and confiscation;

58.  Calls on the Commission to make full use of the revised methodology for identifying high-risk third countries under Directive (EU) 2015/849 and, after its own thorough assessment and where applicable, taking into account Financial Action Task Force (FATF) assessments, to place on the list of high-risk third countries, without hesitation, jurisdictions not named on the FATF lists;

59.  Stresses the importance of strengthening tools for authorities to access information on ownership of specific high-value assets and thereby effectively curb efforts to circumvent targeted financial sanctions and fight money laundering and tax evasion and avoidance;

60.  Notes that despite the implementation of European and national legislation on beneficial ownership transparency, as reported by non-governmental organisations(29), the quality of data in some EU public registers requires improvement; urges the Member States to dedicate the appropriate resources, including sufficient staff and technology, to process and make full use of the data; calls on the Commission to issue guidance or provide support to Member States and reporting entities to guarantee the quality of data in the registers;

61.  Recalls the importance of transparency concerning beneficial ownership information (BOI) across the world; stresses that transparency concerning the ownership and control of companies, trusts and other legal entities is critical for combating illicit financial flows; notes that the Pandora Papers identified examples of individuals circumventing beneficial ownership transparency in Member States; regrets, however, the delay in the setting up of the Beneficial Ownership Registers Interconnection System in the EU due to technical difficulties; deplores the fact that delays in Member States and the overall lack of coordination in the implementation process are undermining the effectiveness of a functioning interconnection system and calls on all actors to address this delay as a matter of urgency; highlights that access to adequate, accurate and up-to-date BOI and checks on legal persons is a valuable tool in the fight against tax evasion and avoidance;

62.  Welcomes the revision of Recommendation 24 by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which requires countries to prevent the misuse of legal persons for money laundering or terrorist financing; highlights that, henceforth, countries should require beneficial ownership information to be held by a public authority or body functioning as a beneficial ownership registry or an alternative efficient mechanism;

63.  Stresses that progress in tackling the use of anonymous companies can only be possible if information about beneficial owners is easily made available in a timely manner in all jurisdictions and if authorities are able to make use of that information and cross-check data for investigative purposes;

64.  Welcomes, further, the fact that the Financial Action Task Force is conducting a review of Recommendation 25 on the transparency and beneficial ownership information (BOI) of legal arrangements; considers, in this regard, that, similar to what is already provided for in EU law, this recommendation should determine that trusts or other similar legal arrangements be registered and that access to BOI on trusts be at least as comprehensive as currently determined by EU law;

65.  Takes note of the CJEU ruling in joint cases C-37/20 and C-601/20 of 22 November 2022 regarding access to BOI by the general public as provided for under the 5th EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, which the Court deemed invalid except for those who can claim a legitimate interest in accessing the information; calls on the Member States which removed access to beneficial ownership data for financial intelligence units (FIUs), competent authorities and obliged entities as a result of the ruling to reinstate it without delay;

66.  Reiterates its conclusions regarding the fact that, as exposed by the Pandora Papers, some US states, such as South Dakota, Alaska, Wyoming, Delaware and Nevada, have become hubs of financial and corporate secrecy; regrets the lack of visible progress or political will in these states to enact the necessary reforms since the revelations;

67.  Welcomes the adoption of the first final rule on beneficial ownership reporting under the US Corporate Transparency Act; regrets the lack of political will in the US to share information regarding the financial accounts of non-US citizens; reiterates its call on the US to join the OECD Common Reporting Standard as soon as possible and calls on the Commission and the Member States to enter into fresh negotiations with the US within the framework of the OECD in order to achieve total reciprocity within an agreed and strengthened CRS framework;

68.  Recalls that the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions assesses whether a jurisdiction has at least a ‘largely compliant’ rating with the CRS according to the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes; calls on the Council to reassess the US in the framework of the EU list, with particular regard to the tax transparency criteria;

69.  Calls on the US Congress to pass the bill for the Establishing New Authorities for Businesses Laundering and Enabling Risks to Security Act (ENABLERS), which would require the non-financial and intermediary sector to carry out due diligence obligations on their customers, as recommended by Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards;

70.  Notes that shell companies may be misused for aggressive tax planning or tax evasion purposes; welcomes the Commission proposal for a Council directive laying down rules to prevent the misuse of shell entities for tax purposes and amending Directive 2011/16/EU(30); regrets the fact that, despite progress having been made on technical issues, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council did not discuss the text during its meeting of 16 May 2023 and no agreement will be found under the Swedish Presidency; calls on the Council to adopt the proposal without further delay, taking into account the opinion of Parliament; underlines that establishing new transparency standards around the misuse of shell entities will help to make sure that their abuse can be more easily detected by tax authorities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to further promote global regulation on mandatory substance requirements for companies as a tool to prevent tax avoidance;

71.  Notes with concern that the latest results of the peer review of the Global Forum on the legal implementation of the Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information (CRS) and, for the first time, the results of the first reviews of the effectiveness of the practical implementation of CRS indicate that the framework put in place by several Member States needs to be improved in order to be fully consistent with the requirements(31); calls on the Commission to take into consideration the results of the peer review in its monitoring of the implementation of the DAC Directives in the Member States;

72.  Takes note of the Council agreement on broadening the scope of the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation; highlights that the revision of this Code of Conduct introduces the concept of ‘tax features of general application’ which are to be regarded as harmful if they lead to double non-taxation or the double or multiple use of tax benefits, as requested by Parliament; calls on the Code of Conduct Group on Business Taxation to make full use of its revised mandate;

73.  Welcomes the fact that the EU’s listing of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions for tax purposes has enabled better legislation and tax practices in some developing countries through technical cooperation and political dialogue in order to address identified tax issues;

74.  Deplores, however, the Council’s lack of willingness to agree on the forthcoming transparency criterion with regard to ultimate beneficial ownership, the concealment of which was a common feature in the schemes exposed by the Panama Papers and which was a key contributing factor to the continuation and success of such schemes;

75.  Reiterates its call on the Council to expand the mandate of the Code of Conduct Group on Business Taxation to include preferential personal income and capital tax regimes, and personal income and wealth tax regimes that are considered harmful;

76.  Recalls, in addition, Parliament’s resolutions on reforming the EU list of tax havens and on reforming the EU policy on harmful tax practices (including the reform of the Code of Conduct Group); calls on the Council to relaunch discussions on a comprehensive reform of the Code and to implement Parliament’s recommendations, in particular to address the fact that several individual Member States have more comprehensive blacklists than the EU as a whole, which indicates that more robust criteria could be applied at EU level;

77.  Calls on the Council, in particular, to include the automatic listing of non-EU jurisdictions with a 0 % corporate tax rate or with no taxes on companies’ profits or individuals as a standalone criterion; notes with concern that non-EU countries may repeal non-compliant tax regimes but substitute them with new ones that are potentially harmful to the EU;

78.  Regrets the lack of democratic accountability in the process of drawing up the ‘EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes’; recalls that the Council seems sometimes to be guided by diplomatic or political motives rather than objective assessments when deciding to move countries from the ‘grey list’ to the ‘black list’ and vice-versa; stresses that this undermines the credibility, predictability and usefulness of the lists; calls for Parliament to be consulted in the preparation of the list and for an extensive revision of the screening criteria;

79.  Stresses that the Pandora Papers are a further reminder of the need to make the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions more effective so that it not only serves as an instrument to help EU entities and authorities to identify risky entities and take precautionary measures, but also to actively encourage and cooperate with countries to make reforms to comply with international tax standards;

80.  Stresses that, while listing needs to occur and defensive measures need to be applied without hesitation where appropriate, the EU needs to engage in more systemic, transparent cooperation and consultation procedures with developing countries that do not have appropriate tax practices before applying any coercive measures, especially with regard to ensuring that knowledge and capacity-building opportunities have been previously provided to the authorities of those countries;

81.  Welcomes the OECD/G20 agreement of October 2021 on the reform of the international corporate tax rules; points out that Pillar II of the agreement, once implemented, will introduce a global minimum effective corporate tax rate of 15 % applicable to companies with a yearly revenue above EUR 750 million, which should help reduce the use of tax havens globally; highlights the importance of applying the 15 % effective tax rate as agreed in the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework at EU level;

82.  Recalls that the upcoming global corporate minimum tax will determine a fixed baseline for corporate taxation, thereby combating corporate tax avoidance; welcomes the progress made and encourages efforts to build on it; calls for the resulting fiscal capacities to be used to build more resilient, sustainable and equal societies; calls for international cooperation on the corporate minimum tax and the introduction of better transparency measures in order to facilitate the prosecution of tax evaders; stresses that multinational corporations should pay taxes in the countries where they conduct their economic activities and where value is created; considers that the distribution of taxing rights between countries must be fair, equitable and in line with the goal of reducing inequalities between countries; calls on the EU Member States to live up to this ambition and give their political backing to this global project;

83.  Points out that several Member States have maintained preferential corporate tax systems which may have led to billions of losses in tax revenue for other Member States; calls for more transparency concerning preferential tax systems, as well as more tax solidarity among EU Member States; notes, moreover, that a few disproportionate inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment and passive income go through some Member States and that these flows reflect, at least partly, phantom investment, as concluded by IMF researchers(32), which may be intended to avoid taxation and possibly launder money;

84.  Calls on the Commission to continue to monitor Member States which enable aggressive tax planning, report to the European Parliament on the issue and come forward with country-specific recommendations to fight aggressive tax planning and to exert pressure on those Member States to implement the reforms;

85.  Insists that in order to carry out future legislative reforms of tax policy which are necessary to effectively address the issues highlighted in the Pandora Papers, the Commission should explore all possibilities offered by the TFEU to make decision-making more efficient;

86.  Stresses that while international cooperation is essential to put an end to tax avoidance and vital for achieving fair and effective domestic tax systems, Member States should be able to take unilateral measures to protect their tax base within the boundaries of their tax sovereignty and EU law, such as, in particular, imposing the non-deductibility or limited deductibility of costs (interests, royalties and services payments), adopting withholding measures, limiting the participation exemption or imposing special documentation requirements;

o
o   o

87.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Member State governments and parliaments, the Council, the Commission, the US Congress, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Financial Action Task Force.

(1) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 97. (2) OJ C 371, 15.9.2021, p. 92. (3) OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 177. (4) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 120. (5) OJ C 132, 24.3.2022, p. 167. (6) OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 141. (7) OJ C 270, 7.7.2021, p. 113. (8) Gabriel Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations: the scourge of tax havens, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2015; https://www.taxobservatory.eu/publication/european-tax-evasion-in-the-light-of-the-pandora-papers. (9) Alstadsæter, A., Johannesen, N., and Zucman, G., ‘Tax evasion and inequality’, American Economic Review, Vol. 109, No 6, 2019, pp. 2073-2103. (10) ‘Corporate tax remains a key revenue source, despite falling rates worldwide’, https://www.oecd.org/tax/corporate-tax-remains-a-key-revenue-source-despite-falling-rates-worldwide.htm. (11) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report entitled ‘Tackling Illicit Financial Flows for Sustainable Development in Africa’, 2020, p. 21: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/aldcafrica2020_en.pdf. (12) Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2022 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) (COM(2022)0177). (13) OJ L 331, 20.9.2021, p. 8. (14) Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17). (15) Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (OJ 45, 14.6.1962, p. 1385). (16) ‘Global tax advisory revenues top $20bn’, Accountancy Daily, 28 January 2019. (17) ‘The oligarch’s accountants: How PwC helped a Russia steel baron grow his offshore empire’, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Pandora Papers, 11 April 2022. (18) ‘How Western Firms Quietly Enabled Russian Oligarchs’, The New York Times, 9 March 2022. (19) Christensen, R.C., ‘Transnational Infrastructural Power of Professional Service Firms’, SocArXiv, 9 September 2022. (20) Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on specific requirements regarding statutory audit of public-interest entities and repealing Commission Decision 2005/909/EC (OJ L 158, 27.5.2014, p. 77). (21) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/sep/08/ernst-young-splits-into-separate-audit-and-advisory-businesses. (22) European Court of Auditors special report 17/2022 entitled ‘External consultants at the European Commission’. (23) ‘BEPS Project Explanatory Statement’, p. 4, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264263437-en.pdf?expires=1677755281&id=id&accname=ocid194994&checksum=811ACCCE3426A6CAC2528C8DD73B0628. (24) Casi, E., Mardan, M. and Muddasani R. R., ‘So close and yet so far: the ability of mandatory disclosure rules to crack down on offshore tax evasion’, UNU-WIDER Working Paper 2022/116, Helsinki, https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/so-close-and-yet-so-far-ability-mandatory-disclosure-rules-crack-down-offshore-tax. (25) Godar, S., Flamant, E. and Richard, G., ‘New Forms of Tax Competition in the European Union’, November 2021, https://www.taxobservatory.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/EU-Tax-Observatory-Report-3-Tax-Competition-November-2021-3.pdf. (26) European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, ‘Harmful Practices and Competition in the Area of Personal Income and Wealth Taxation’, January 2022. (27) ‘Capital Gains Tax Rates in Europe’, https://taxfoundation.org/capital-gains-tax-rates-in-europe-2022/#:~:text=A%20number%20of%20European%20countries,lowest%20rates%2C%20at%2015%20percent. (28) Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73). (29) For example: https://www.transparency.org/en/news/open-lux-authorities-in-the-dark-over-luxembourg-private-investment-fund-beneficial-owners; https://www.transparency.org/en/news/eu-beneficial-ownership-registers-public-access-data-availability-progress-2021. (30) COM(2021)0565. (31) The Member States whose overall determination on the legal framework was deemed ‘In Place But Needs Improvement’ are Belgium, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland. Countries whose overall rating in relation to the effectiveness in practice is deemed as ‘Non-Compliant’ are Croatia. Countries whose overall rating in relation to the effectiveness in practice was deemed ‘Partially Compliant’ are Estonia, Malta, Romania. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/peer-review-of-the-automatic-exchange-of-financial-account-information-2022_36e7cded-en. (32) ‘The Rise of Phantom Investments’, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2019/09/the-rise-of-phantom-FDI-in-tax-havens-damgaard.

European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2023 on the implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals (2023/2010(INI))

P9_TA(2023)0250 A9-0213/2023

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to UN Resolution 70/1 entitled ‘Transforming our World – the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (Agenda 2030), adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit on 25 September 2015 in New York and establishing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

–  having regard to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ publication of January 2022 entitled ‘SDG Good Practices: A compilation of success stories and lessons learned in SDG implementation – Second Edition’,

–  having regard to the UN Global Sustainable Development Report 2019, entitled ‘The Future is Now: Science for Achieving Sustainable Development’,

–  having regard to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, agreed at the 15th meeting of the Conference of Parties to the UNCBD,

–  having regard to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, adopted by UN member states at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction on 18 March 2015,

–  having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 and the agreement on new ‘loss and damage’ funding for vulnerable countries adopted at COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh on 20 November 2022,

–  having regard to the IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate of 24 September 2019,

–  having regard to the IPCC sixth assessment report (AR6) of 28 February 2022 and its Synthesis Report of 20 March 2023,

–  having regard to the Human Development Report 2021/22, entitled ’Uncertain Times, Unsettled Lives: Shaping our Future in a Transforming World’,

–  having regard to the third International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Addis Ababa from 13 to 16 July 2015,

–  having regard to the 6th European Union – African Union Summit of 17-18 February 2022 and the related final statement entitled ‘A Joint Vision for 2030’,

–  having regard to the negotiations on a new Partnership Agreement between the EU and the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), to replace the Cotonou agreement,

–  having regard to the 2022 UN Transforming Education Summit held on 16-19 September in New York,

–  having regard to the 2023 SDG Summit which will be convened in September 2023, during the United Nations General Assembly high-level week,

–  having regard to the Summit of the Future, scheduled for September 2024, to adopt major reforms of multilateral institutions and financing for sustainable development at global level,

–  having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Report 2021, entitled ‘The Decade of Action for the Sustainable Development Goals’, and the UN Sustainable Development Report 2022, entitled ‘From Crisis to Sustainable Development: the SDGs as Roadmap to 2030 and Beyond’,

–  having regard to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals Report 2022,

–  having regard to the ‘SDG Acceleration Actions’ online database,

–  having regard to the initiative by the UN Secretary-General ‘SDG Stimulus to Deliver Agenda 2030’ of February 2023,

–  having regard to the resolution of 8 October 2021 of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and the resolution of 28 July 2022 of the UN General Assembly, on the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment,

–  having regard to the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) resolution ‘5/10. The environmental dimension of a sustainable, resilient and inclusive post-COVID-19 recovery’, adopted on 2 March 2022,

–  having regard to the WHO One Health Initiative,

–  having regard to the draft agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) of 4 March 2023 (UN High Seas Treaty),

–  having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the EU Strategy on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030,

–  having regard to the UN Secretary-General’s report entitled ‘Our Common Agenda’, presented to the UN General Assembly, and to the mandate that UN General Assembly Resolution 76/6 of 15 November 2021 gave the UN Secretary-General to follow up on his report,

–  having regard to the joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission of 30 June 2017 on the New European Consensus on Development – ‘Our world, our dignity, our future’(1),

–  having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/591 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030(2),

–  having regard to the European Environment Agency report of 4 December 2019 entitled ‘The European environment – state and outlook 2020: Knowledge for transition to a sustainable Europe’,

–  having regard to the OECD report of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2023: No Sustainability Without Equity’,

–  having regard to the opinions of the European Economic and Social Committee of 19 September 2018 entitled ‘Indicators better suited to evaluate the SDGs – the civil society contribution’, 30 October 2019 entitled ‘Leaving no one behind when implementing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda’, and 8 December 2021 entitled ‘Renewed sustainable finance strategy',

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 February 2023 entitled ‘Progress in the implementation of the SDGs’,

–  having regard to the ‘Green Deal’ and the ‘Global Gateway’ initiatives, launched on 11 December 2019 and on 1 December 2021, respectively,

–  having regard to the Commission work programmes for 2020 (COM(2020)0037), 2021 (COM(2020)0690), 2022 (COM(2021)0645) and 2023 (COM(2022)0548), and their references to the SDGs, in particular the EU’s first voluntary review of SDG implementation,

–  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 18 November 2020 entitled ‘Delivering on the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals – A comprehensive approach’ (SWD(2020)0400),

–  having regard to the integration of the SDGs into the better regulation framework, including the Commission communication of 29 April 2021 entitled ‘Better regulation: Joining forces to make better laws’ (COM(2021)0219),

–  having regard to the Commission communication on decent work worldwide for a global just transition and sustainable recovery (COM(2022)0066), in particular its commitments to achieve the SDGs,

–  having regard to the European Commission Social Economy Action Plan adopted on 9 December 2021,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 October 2019 on the Economy of Wellbeing(3),

–  having regard to the Council recommendation of 16 June 2022 on Learning for the Green transition and sustainable development,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 June 2021 entitled ‘A comprehensive approach to accelerate the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for sustainable development – Building back better from the COVID-19 crisis’,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 June 2022 entitled ‘The transformative role of education for sustainable development and global citizenship as an instrumental tool for the achievement of the sustainable development goals (SDGs)’,

–  having regard to Eurostat’s 2021 monitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an EU context, published on 15 June 2021,

–  having regard to its resolution of 8 September 2015 on the follow-up to the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water(4) and its resolution of 5 October 2022 on access to water as a human right – the external dimension(5),

–  having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2017 on EU action for sustainability(6),

–  having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2019 on the Annual strategic report on the implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)(7),

–  having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency(8),

–  having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives(9),

–  having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the European Semester for economic policy coordination: annual sustainable growth survey 2022(10),

–  having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)(11),

–  having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2022 on the EU action plan for the social economy(12),

–  having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the future European Financial Architecture for Development(13),

–  having regard to the joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission entitled ‘EU Legislative Priorities for 2023 and 2024’(14),

–  having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2023 on Policy Coherence for Development(15),

–  having regard to Article 3(5) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 208(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009(16),

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Development and the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Development and the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A9-0213/2023),

A.  whereas, with less than seven years to go until the deadline for the implementation of Agenda 2030 , the new geopolitical landscape and the multiple crises in various areas have further slowed the achievement of the SDGs; whereas collective action on a new scale is urgently needed to respond to poverty, which is blighting hundreds of millions of lives, and to respond to the unprecedented threats to the habitability of our planet posed by the interlinked climate and biodiversity crises;

B.  whereas Agenda 2030 and the 17 SDGs, 169 targets and accompanying indicators represent the only globally shared and politically agreed framework for evidence-based policies, thus making them crucial to addressing today’s challenges and reorienting the global compass towards a socially and environmentally just transition within planetary boundaries that leaves no one and no place behind;

C.  whereas the SDGs, being universal and indivisible, are applicable to all actors, including civil society and social partners, and to both the public and private sectors; whereas these actors should be systematically involved in devising and implementing policies related to the SDGs;

D.  whereas, despite some progress on certain SDGs before the crises, some trends have since reversed; whereas, according to the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) Sustainable Development Report 2022, for the second year in a row, the world is no longer making progress on the SDGs and the average SDG Index score further declined in 2021, with no country being on track to achieve all 17 SDGs by 2030;

E.  whereas in 2020 and 2021 the Human Development Index (HDI) recorded the only declines in the 30-year history of the index, erasing the gains made in the previous five years;

F.  whereas Europe is on track to meet 26 SDG targets, has to accelerate its efforts to meet 64 targets and reverse the current trend for 15 targets; whereas EU countries are closest to achieving the Agenda 2030 targets, yet are responsible for larger negative spillovers, which undermine the ability of other countries to achieve their targets; whereas if the world’s population were to consume as much as the EU, 2,8 Earths would be needed to sustain the demand for natural resources required by this lifestyle;

G.  whereas the EU Institutions and the 27 EU Member States together constitute the largest donor for developing countries, responsible for approximately 46 % of the total Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by all OECD members to developing countries; whereas prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the annual SDG global financing gap was estimated at USD 2,5 trillion; whereas the pandemic is estimated to have widened this gap to at least USD 3,9 trillion per year;

H.  whereas the fiscal space for relevant policies in developing countries is critically reduced by huge and ever-growing debt burdens, with 37 out of 69 of the world’s poorest countries either at high risk or already in debt distress as of November 2022, limiting their capacity to invest in achieving the SDGs; whereas that fiscal space is furthermore reduced by external shocks related to the cumulating crises and the absence of a conducive international environment for domestic resource mobilisation;

I.  whereas the United Nations estimate that at least USD 500 billion annually needs to be delivered to provide the necessary SDG stimulus; whereas the UN’s SDG Stimulus Plan aims to tackle the high cost of debt and rising risks of debt distress, to massively scale up affordable long-term financing for development and to expand contingency financing to countries in need;

J.  whereas the private sector will continue to play a critical role in the achievement of the SDGs;

K.  whereas France will host an international summit on 22 and 23 June 2023 on the theme of a ‘New Global Financial Pact’ in order to take stock of all the ways and means to strengthen financial solidarity with the countries of the Global South; whereas the current context demands an extraordinary sustained response from all EU actors and a system-wide review of the European Financial Architecture for Development (EFAD);

L.  whereas, with the compound shocks and permanent crises ranging from climate change and the biodiversity emergency, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine to the rising prices of energy, food and fertilisers, fragile supply chains, higher inflation, unsustainable debt burdens and tightened monetary policy, a general trend is emerging of a ‘two-track recovery’ between advanced economies and developing countries, characterised by a wide financial divide, with high borrowing costs for developing countries as one symptom of an imbalanced international financial and monetary system, worsening the lack of progress towards the achievement of the SDGs;

M.  whereas the international system does not have the tools to address a systemic debt crisis or to effectively facilitate debt restructurings that sufficiently reduce countries’ debt burdens;

N.  whereas 2023 is a pivotal year for the review of the SDGs and a push for their realisation by 2030, especially with the EU presenting its first Voluntary Review report at the High Level Political Forum (HLPF) in July 2023 and the global SDGs Summit on 19-20 September 2023 marking the mid-point of Agenda 2030 and the SDGs and bringing together political and thought leaders from governments, international organisations, the private sector, civil society, women and youth and other stakeholders; whereas the 2023 SDG Summit will be a crucial moment for a renewed political commitment to the SDGs to salvage Agenda 2030, given that it takes place just once every four years;

O.  whereas the Commission has not yet devised an overarching strategy for the EU’s implementation of Agenda 2030 or a financing plan for the SDGs, as requested on repeated occasions since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015 by the Parliament, the Council and the European Council; whereas the Commission has committed to taking a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to SDG implementation; whereas a European governance strategy integrating the SDGs in a transversal approach would allow greater alignment between, and efficiency in, public policies;

P.  whereas the joint statement on legislative priorities for 2023 and 2024 sets the overarching objective of accelerating the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for sustainable development through the legislative proposals put forward;

Q.  whereas any EU strategy proposed by the Commission with the objective of achieving the SDGs should contain EU wide, measurable, time-bound targets and concrete measures for achieving the SDGs, which should include an updated monitoring system which takes into account the EU’s internal and external impact on the SDG process;

R.  whereas there is a lack of integration of the SDGs into the National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs); whereas, in particular, very few Member States have explicitly linked NRRPs to the SDGs;

S.  whereas the capacity to retrieve data to fill in the SDG indicators is limited in several developing countries, which can seriously hinder the evaluation of progress;

T.   whereas, in 2021, the EU’s collective ODA represented 0,49 % of EU Gross National Income (GNI), which still falls short of the agreed target of 0,7 % of donor country GNI; whereas, with the adoption of the EUR 79,5 billion Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE) under the EU budget for the period 2021-2027, the EU can deploy this single unified development instrument strategically and flexibly to support developing countries more effectively;

U.  whereas the establishment of the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) provides an open architecture for public development banks (PDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) to leverage public and private finance through EU guarantees and blended finance, to achieve more ambitious inclusive development and green impact;

V.  whereas there are serious doubts as to whether the EU’s new Global Gateway strategy aligns with development effectiveness principles or is a suitable tool to fill the SDG financing gap;

W.  whereas reducing inequalities (SDG 10) is inextricably linked to the overall implementation of Agenda 2030 and to effective climate action;

X.  whereas sustainable resource mobilisation is essential for transformative public action; whereas it is crucial to scale up efforts related to tax justice, climate justice and intergenerational justice both within developed and developing countries;

Y.  whereas the EU’s political commitment to Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) was reaffirmed in the 2017 New European Consensus on Development, which identified PCD as a ‘crucial element of the [EU’s] strategy to achieve the SDGs and an important contribution to the broader objective of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD); whereas PCSD is an approach to integrate the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development at all stages of the policymaking cycle, in order to foster synergies across policy areas, and identify and reconcile potential trade-offs, as well as address the international spillover effects of EU policies;

Z.  whereas close cooperation between all development finance institutions, governments, EU institutions and all partners is urgently needed to ensure that limited public funds are used in the most effective and efficient way, keeping in mind that the successful mobilisation of further capital, both public and private, is essential;

AA.  whereas, notably, Article 208 TFEU requires the EU to incorporate development cooperation objectives into all internal and external policies that are likely to affect developing countries;

AB.  whereas the success of the European Green Deal and the pledge of a just green transition is inextricably linked to the achievement of the SDGs; whereas the 2019 IPBES Global Assessment provides evidence that the current negative trends in biodiversity and ecosystems will undermine progress towards 80 % of assessed SDG targets relating to poverty, hunger, health, water, cities, climate, oceans and land; whereas the climate and biodiversity crises are intertwined and need to be addressed in tandem and consistently;

AC.  whereas the external dimension of the Green Deal and the Global Gateway strategy should allow Europe to better project itself abroad, articulating a green vision for climate mitigation and adaptation, nature protection and biodiversity, addressing infrastructure development and broader development needs anchored in European strategic objectives; whereas in doing so, the EU is also committed to inclusive approaches, supporting women and youth, and leaving no one behind;

AD.  whereas the 8th Union Environment Action Programme is the EU’s common legally agreed climate and environmental agenda until 2030 and forms the basis for achieving the environmental and climate objectives defined under the UN 2030 Agenda and its SDGs, pursuing a well-being economy as a priority; whereas, however, the action programme requires the strengthening of environmentally positive incentives and the phasing out of environmentally harmful subsidies, in particular fossil fuel subsidies, at EU, national, regional and local levels, without delay;

AE.  whereas only 24 % of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the EU have a specific plan to reduce their carbon footprints(17);

AF.  whereas education is a key factor in achieving the SDGs and a lifeline for people in crisis situations; whereas hundreds of millions of the most vulnerable children, youth and adults are still excluded from education today; whereas the education-related goals and targets of Agenda 2030 have been derailed and risk leaving learners and societies ill-equipped to face an uncertain future;

AG.  whereas globally 760 million people still have no access to electricity and 2,4 billion people rely on harmful fuels for cooking detrimental to their health and the environment;

AH.  whereas seven out of every 10 buildings in the EU are energy inefficient while 11 % of the EU’s population is affected by energy poverty, leading to possible delays in access to basic needs, care, education and healthcare, in particular for children and young people; whereas buildings represent approximately 40 % of the EU’s energy consumption and 36 % of carbon emissions;

AI.  whereas 3,6 billion people worldwide live without safely managed sanitation and 2,3 billion lack basic handwashing facilities at home; whereas 2018-2028 has been declared the International Decade for Action on Water for Sustainable Development; whereas, in particular, Resolution 64/292 of the UN General Assembly explicitly recognised the human right to water and sanitation; whereas, in developing countries and emerging economies, demand for water is increasing from all sectors, in particular for energy and agriculture;

AJ.  whereas the developed world and China import large quantities of virtual water, that is water used for the production of food and goods, including from countries suffering from water scarcity;

AK.  whereas ‘Right2Water’ was the first successful European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) with 1,9 million signatures; whereas, in its resolution on the Follow Up to the ECI, Parliament considered it regrettable that the Commission’s communication in response to the ECI lacked ambition;

AL.  whereas, according to the NGO ‘Global Witness’, more than a third of the land and environmental defenders murdered worldwide between 2015 and 2019 belonged to indigenous communities, whose land and water management skills are crucial in combating the climate crisis and biodiversity loss;

AM.  whereas, according to the One Health approach, there is evidence that human health depends on planetary health and that a healthy environment is a fundamental pillar for sustainable development and human well-being;

Status update at the halfway mark

1.  Recognises that SDGs are a common concern for humanity as a whole; stresses its commitment to Agenda 2030 and the 17 SDGs with their 169 accompanying measurable targets, especially in the light of the new deteriorating geopolitical landscape such as, among other things, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, and the ongoing climate, biodiversity, health, debt and food security crises, as well as the growing backlash against women’s rights and gender equality and the violent conflicts that continue to affect many parts of the world, especially the developing countries; recalls that it is crucial to take into account the strong interdependence between such crises;

2.  Warns against an ever-widening gap in the distribution of wealth and income, which would lead to further inequality and poverty and has already resulted in fragmented societies in many parts of the developed and developing world in recent years; warns also against any delay in tackling the environmental and climate challenges Europe and the global community are facing;

3.  Highlights, against this backdrop, the importance of implementing an integrated approach to the SDGs, which provide the only evidence-based universal policy roadmap, for protecting the planet and averting the climate crisis and providing the tools to achieve prosperity for all; recalls that the pledge to leave no one and no place behind lies at the heart of Agenda 2030 and that the achievement of the SDGs would benefit all countries, regions, peoples and segments of society by focusing on issues of equality and non-discrimination and addressing the root causes of these issues, paying particular attention to those who are most marginalised and vulnerable, and that it should enhance cultural sustainability and the rights of indigenous people;

4.  Stresses that the SDGs should be achieved in a social and climate-just way while respecting a fair distribution of scarce resources within the planetary boundaries; reiterates that peace, diplomacy, and international cooperation are fundamental conditions for the world to make progress on the SDGs towards 2030 and beyond;

5.  Highlights the fact that, at the halfway point in the Agenda 2030 timeline, EU leadership in the global implementation of the SDGs remains crucial and must be further credibly demonstrated, for instance by taking the lead to mobilise adequate financial resources to support SDG-relevant transformations; recalls that the 2020s have been declared to be the UN Decade of Action on Sustainable Development;

6.  Emphasises the need for EU Members and the European Commission to promote policy coherence and inclusiveness at all levels of governance, prioritising and including SDGs in all impact assessments;

7.  Underlines that 2023 offers a unique opportunity to build momentum and undertake the urgent transformative action required to place our societies firmly on course to achieve the SDGs; warns that the consequences of inaction and losing another year would primarily be borne by the most vulnerable people and communities; calls upon all EU leaders to do their utmost to advance progress on EU commitments, policies, and financing without delay;

8.  Recalls that, by 2050, the EU needs to be fully respecting planetary boundaries; stresses that this can only be achieved if it multiplies its efforts in environmental actions, such as those relating to climate and biodiversity, energy efficiency and the green transition, and increases its resource efficiency tenfold while using its non-renewable materials in totally closed loops and renewables at least in tenfold loops while respecting the non-toxicity and ‘do no significant harm’ principles; stresses that the EU should not only stop destroying but also preserve and restore its natural ecosystems to achieve healthy, vital and resilient ecosystems;

9.  Notes that the implementation process for almost all the SDGs is behind schedule and that two consecutive years of regression have been recorded for many indicators(18); reaffirms the importance of each SDG and highlights the key challenges that persist for sustainable development, particularly in relation to poverty (SDG 1), hunger (SDG 2), health (SDG 3), education (SDG 4), gender equality (SDG 5), safe water and adequate sanitation for all (SDG 6), clean and affordable energy (SDG 7), climate change (SDG 13), life below water including oceans (SDG 14) and biodiversity (SDG 15); underlines the strategic role that SDG 10, on reducing inequality, and SDG 17 on global partnerships can play in the global implementation of Agenda 2030;

10.  Highlights the importance of the 2023 High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development and the SDG Summit, which are both due to take place in New York, as opportunities to review progress of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at the halfway point; believes these meetings must give high-level political guidance and new impetus to an intensified effort and accelerated action to achieve the goals by 2030; acknowledges, in this regard, the SDGs being focused on in 2023 (SDGs 6, 7, 9, 11 and 17)(19);

11.  Reaffirms that access to water and sanitation is a fundamental right and that improving this access is crucial for pursuing poverty eradication, social equality, public health, food security, and sustainable development objectives; recalls that, as the EU Water Framework Directive(20) recognises, water is not a mere commodity but a public good that is vital to human life and dignity;

12.  Stresses that water policies must prioritise the sustainable management of rivers, lakes, wetlands, springs, and aquifers, and support sustainable water management in the agricultural sector as key to confronting ongoing crises of pollution, deforestation, desertification, biodiversity loss, and climate change; highlights the potential risks of water grabbing and water pollution in large-scale land acquisitions for agriculture and the extractive industries;

13.  Notes that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has disrupted the global energy supply systems, and has underscored the need to rapidly end dependence on fossil fuels and phase out all relevant subsidies and shift to renewable energy sources;

14.  Stresses, in this regard, the urgency for the EU and its Member States to make concerted efforts to progress towards SDG 7 to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all; underlines that in the long term security of energy supply, universal access and affordability can only be attained through renewable energy deployment;

15.  Stresses that achieving SDG 7 will contribute to the attainment of several other SDGs, including in relation to poverty eradication, gender equality, climate change, food security, health, education, sustainable cities and communities, clean water and sanitation, decent jobs, innovation, transport, and refugees;

16.  Highlights that the implementation of SDG 7 should be aligned with a just, inclusive and equitable energy transition with universal energy access, green jobs, diversified economies, people’s well-being and the empowerment of women, local communities and vulnerable groups to leave no one behind;

17.  Welcomes the landmark agreement for a Treaty of the High Seas to protect the ocean, tackle environmental degradation, fight climate change, and prevent biodiversity loss;

Governance, multilateralism and partnerships

18.  Recognises the EU’s decisive role in shaping the 2030 Agenda in 2015 and calls for it and its Member States to take bold action and provide global leadership by setting an example in the implementation of the SDGs, redoubling its efforts to meet the deadline and by leading a political reset of the SDGs at the upcoming SDG summit, such as pushing for binding targets, mandatory review, and a more transformational approach towards achieving the SDGs as a whole;

19.  Invites the presidents of Parliament, the Commission and the Council to come forward with a joint declaration renewing the EU’s commitment to Agenda 2030; stresses that the EU needs to intensify cooperation and accelerate progress on SDG 17, partnerships for the goals; notes that the EU is uniquely placed to accelerate progress on partnerships, given its proven record as a champion of multilateralism;

20.  Highlights the role and resources of local and regional authorities, and especially the key role of regions and cities, with the OECD estimating that 65 % of the SDGs targets cannot be reached without their coordination or involvement; and stresses that multilevel governance is one of the SDGs’ core values; calls on the EU to increase engagement with civil society and the private sector;

21.  Recalls that PCD is a substantive requirement in order to avoid EU policies having negative impacts on poor and vulnerable people in developing countries and to seek and take advantage of opportunities to achieve synergies, in line with the principles of Agenda 2030 entitled ‘Leave no one behind’ and ‘Address the needs of those furthest behind first’ and the SDGs; underlines that PCD should be applied across all policies and all areas covered by Agenda 2030 and the SDGs;

22.  Calls for a step change in the implementation of PCD to ensure that impacts on developing countries are properly identified and analysed, that negative impacts are avoided and that full use is made of possible synergies, for the purpose of achieving development objectives and the SDGs;

23.  Once again calls for an audit by the European Commission to ensure consistency between its internal and external policies;

24.  Stresses the need for better communication on the SDGs, since not all stakeholders are familiar with the framework or prioritise the SDGs at EU, national or local level, such that better communication is needed to strengthen political commitment and raise awareness of SDGs on the ground;

25.  Stresses the significance of the expanding young population in the Global South for sustainable development; reiterates that access to quality education (SDG 4) including vocational training is a critical tool to enable the continent to empower the expanding young population; strongly stresses the creation of stronger linkages between education, skills development and employment, to allow access to decent work in the rapidly changing labour market; emphasises that quality education for all must be ensured, regardless of gender, socio-economic status, cultural background and religion;

26.  Recognises the importance of education for global citizenship and sustainable development as an enabler of all of the goals, and calls on the Commission to include this as a priority in all relevant calls for funding;

27.  Regrets the fact that the Commission has still not presented a comprehensive strategy for achieving Agenda 2030, despite calls from the European Parliament, the Council of the EU, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, even though there are less than seven years left to achieve the SDGs and, hence, urgent implementation is required; insists that the Commission should proceed to adopt such a strategy without further delay; believes that it should define, at a minimum:

28.  Stresses that the strategy should be regularly reviewed and accompanied by corrective measures in areas where progress is deemed to have stalled or be insufficient; calls for the implementation of the SDGs to be an agenda item for the weekly College of Commissioners meeting not less than every three months; urges the future upcoming Council’s Presidency to organise a high-level debate on how to implement the SDGs on time, preferably in the General Affairs Council at ministerial level;

29.  Stresses that the SDGs should form the backbone of European public policies and that all Member States should raise the level of ambition of their national responses on SDG implementation;

30.  Calls on the Commission to use the country-specific recommendations to systematically measure Member States’ progress and set out concrete proposals for necessary changes and improvements, including recommendations for country-specific SDG targets;

31.  Stresses the important role of the European Parliament as well those of national parliaments and regional and local authorities, in promoting the SDGs’ implementation through European policies and heightening the goals’ visibility in public discourse; underlines its scrutiny, legislation and budgetary powers to foster the implementation of Agenda 2030; calls, to this end, on its committees to further integrate SDG considerations in their legislative and non-legislative work;

32.  Also calls for Parliament to appoint a standing rapporteur on the implementation of the SDGs to embed them in EU legislation across committees; welcomes in this regard the efforts made by the Parliament’s SDG Alliance; calls on the President of the European Parliament to appoint a Vice-President for the SDGs to promote the SDGs within the bureau and externally represent the European Parliament on the SDGs;

33.  Encourages the Parliament’s general secretariat to produce a Parliament SDG review to fully assess its contribution to the achievement of the SDGs, following similar commitments by other EU institutions; underlines that coordination and regular structured dialogue within and between the EU institutions is essential to ensure the EU’s leadership and increase the effectiveness of its efforts to implement Agenda 2030; therefore calls for the creation of an interinstitutional task force to assume the responsibility of coordinating the EU’s efforts to deliver the SDGs internally and globally;

34.  Recognises that the SDGs have to be strengthened through the creation of effective legal and regulatory frameworks, policies and practices at EU and Member State level to promote their implementation;

35.  Recalls that voluntary national reviews are the cornerstone of the follow-up and review framework for Agenda 2030 and a key accountability tool; welcomes the commitment of nine EU Member States to present their national voluntary review at the 2023 HLPF and invites all Member States to engage in this process in subsequent years; and to give due consideration to and implement the recommendations that will be formulated on that occasion; emphasises that voluntary national reviews can only provide accountability if they are conducted objectively in a way that focuses on shortcomings as much as on achievements;

36.  Calls on the Commission to encourage Member States as well as third countries to include the social economy in a horizontal and holistic manner in their Voluntary National Reviews, recognising the social economy’s key role in achieving the SDGs; considers that 2023 is the moment for the global community to shift from voluntary reporting to mandatory reporting; calls on the EU to push for further standardisation of national and regional voluntary reviews;

37.  Welcomes the Commission’s initiative to draft and present the first EU voluntary review report in 2023; highlights the importance of the EU voluntary review containing:

38.  Recalls the importance of taking into consideration the regional and local perspective and the contributions provided by civil society during the consultation process; calls on the Commission to include a social economy perspective in its European Voluntary Review;

39.  Highlights that in order to achieve the SDGs, Agenda 2030 requires a strong level of societal legitimacy; reiterates the call on the Commission to establish a new permanent platform, for a ‘whole of society’ approach as an important innovation, for regular and structured engagement with civil society organisations, community-based organisations, the private sector (including SMEs), trade unions, cooperatives, academia and research institutions, regional and local governments and marginalised groups in order to systematically involve them in a meaningful way in the SDG implementation process;

40.  Stresses, in the context of the implementation of the SDGs, the importance of an interdisciplinary approach and openness to the changes the modern world is undergoing, building awareness through education from an early age, promoting attitudes that take account of environmental and climate challenges, encouraging participation in development processes and active citizenship;

41.  Underlines the importance of enhanced cooperation with partners in the Global South, particularly the African Union and representatives of local and regional governments and civil society representatives, in order to implement Agenda 2030 globally; notes that the implementation of Agenda 2030 will enable partner countries to achieve their own development goals (e.g. the African Union Agenda 2063) and strengthen their self-reliance on the path to a just and equal society; stresses in this context that the universality of the SDGs as a common agenda represents an opportunity to restore trust and position the EU as a bridge builder between the Global North and the Global South; stresses, in this regard, the need for sufficient alignment with partner countries’ own efforts and local needs, when it comes to partnerships on development cooperation;

42.  Highlights that it is imperative that the effectiveness and efficiency of European development policies be improved in order to accelerate SDG implementation in developing countries; calls for a stronger EU engagement and greater consistency across all policies and financing instruments for fostering sustainable development; advocates for a regular review with partner countries and relevant stakeholders from the Global South on jointly agreed development objectives in order to address shortcomings;

43.  Stresses the need to promote the social economy in the EU’s relations with third countries, including during trade negotiations; reiterates that trade policy can be an instrument for fostering regional integration and stability, economic development, migration, combating climate change as well as fostering peace and security;

44.  Recognises the important role of the ACP-EU partnership, notably in fostering sustainable development in ACP countries and ensuring the existence of stronger alliances to tackle global challenges; strongly supports the signing of the new agreement (Post-Cotonou Agreement) as soon as possible;

45.  Stresses, in this regard, that the EU and its Member States must avoid negative spillovers adversely affecting the Global South, undermining their efforts to achieve the SDGs and which occur as a result of the Member States’ past economic and technological model; advocates for cooperation with global partners to turn any negative spillovers into virtuous circles;

46.  Calls for all EU policies to be subject to a mandatory check to assess all impacts and expenditure affecting SDG implementation in the Global South and address any negative effects, including by taking mitigating action and revising legislative acts where necessary, and ensuring that change in this area is measurable;

47.  Welcomes the recent agreement reached between the co-legislators on the Deforestation Regulation(21);

48.  Reiterates its calls on the Commission and on the Council to take the actions listed in its recent resolution on policy coherence for development so as to ensure effective implementation of this principle and the ‘do no harm’ principle, paying special attention to trade, finance, environment and climate change, food security, migration and security;

49.  Notes that critical raw material sourcing necessary for the EU energy transition is often associated with potentially severe environmental impacts as well as potential conflicts with local communities and human rights violations against indigenous people in the Global South;

50.  Expresses particular concern about the significant impact of certain mega-projects in third countries, notably in the energy and extractive industries, on indigenous peoples and local communities and urges the EU and the Member States to maintain high social and environmental standards in line with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People and ILO Convention No 169, notably the recognition of the principles of free, prior and informed consent and customary ownership;

51.  Highlights the need to develop and promote multiple solutions that all actors in society can implement to reduce their carbon footprint, such as responsible consumption of resources (from water to food), the transition to the circular economy, investments in green energy, developing green value chains in the private sector, increasing the percentage of green public procurement, prioritising and supporting investments in the research sector dedicated to bio-based solutions, increasing the percentage of green credits to support the transition to low-carbon businesses;

52.  Calls on the EU to learn from innovative projects implemented by certain non-EU countries, such as the African-led ‘Great Green Wall’ initiative, which aims to restore 100 million hectares of currently degraded land by 2030 throughout the Sahel region and to enable the development of agro-ecology and regeneration projects;

53.  Stresses that the EU’s external and trade policy affecting developing countries must be consistent with the principle of policy coherence for development and its development cooperation objective of eradicating poverty, while helping achieve the SDGs;

54.  Stresses the importance of working for the development of peace, justice and strong institutions (SDG 16) especially in the current situation marked by the increase in conflicts, such as the war in Ukraine following Russia’s illegal invasion;

55.  Calls on EU Member States and its global partners to support research and development, innovative green technologies, capacity-building and knowledge-sharing for a sustainable, resilient and inclusive recovery;

56.  Stresses the need to ensure gender-budgeting, gender equality and women’s active participation in promoting the implementation of the SDGs as well as the participation of different minorities and indigenous peoples;

57.  Stresses that women’s contribution in green economic activities is essential to achieve equitable sustainable development and should be seen and valued; believes that women and girls can also benefit from the opportunities in the field of green entrepreneurship;

Data and monitoring

58.  Reiterates its support for the work of Eurostat in relation to annual SDG monitoring in the EU; points out that, in order to assess Member States’ progress on the SDGs, the Eurostat sustainable development indicators must be improved by filling existing gaps for some SDGs, and addressing weaknesses in information systems by strengthening the use of existing statistical data from a variety of sources and by better measuring EU policies’ cross-border and long-term distributional impact on territories and specific marginalised and vulnerable groups, in the EU and globally; believes it is crucial to monitor progress on all 169 sub-goal targets;

59.  Calls on the Member States to enhance their data collection as well as to adopt SDG indicators and monitor their implementation in the NRRPs;

60.  Points out that Eurostat sustainable development indicators do not reflect reality on the ground, since they are used to assess the SDGs at national level and are largely dependent on data provided by national institutes; believes, therefore, that local and regional NUTS-2-level data should also be used and be based on measurable, time-bound targets;

61.  Stresses that a minimum level of data and statistical disaggregation should be ensured and aligned more closely to the global SDG monitoring framework, covering, where appropriate, geographical location and demographic aspects, gender, income, education level, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, impairment and other characteristics;

62.  Calls on Member States to report more thoroughly to the OECD on their development cooperation, so as to fill the data gap regarding the EU’s external impact on third countries’ SDG progress and to develop more evidence-based indicators, in line with the consumption-based spillover indicator included in the Eurostat report;

63.  Notes, furthermore, that important evidence-based data remains unavailable on global, national and regional development policies in the Global South, particularly with regard to their impact on the poorest and most vulnerable and marginalised groups and territories;

64.  Highlights the disruption of data production and data accuracy caused by global crises; highlights that accurate and reliable data is crucial to measuring progress and identifying bottlenecks;

65.  Regrets the lack of comprehensive ODA reporting per SDG by the EU and all Member States;

66.  Calls for strengthening and accelerating human, institutional and infrastructure data capacity building, especially in the developing countries and EU internal monitoring tools, such as the gender marker or the newly established inequality marker;

67.  Calls for the EU to significantly step up technical cooperation with, and technical assistance to, developing countries to address the global data gap created by insufficient monitoring capacities and inconsistent methodologies;

68.  Recalls that SDG implementation is a shared responsibility, requiring action at the national, regional and local levels; highlights, in that regard, the importance of voluntary local reviews (VLRs) and voluntary subnational reviews, as a means of further localising the SDGs and therefore advancing their implementation;

69.  Calls on Member States to put in place comprehensive tools, such as mapping, for the effective implementation of SDGs;

70.  Stresses that regular comprehensive reviews of SDGs’ progress at sub-national and local level can reinforce vertical and horizontal consistency, stimulate local participation, facilitate peer-learning and sharing of best practices between regions and cities at global level and contribute to overall SDG implementation and therefore recommends support for the implementation at all territorial levels;

71.  Welcomes in this regard the work of UN-HABITAT and strongly supports the work of the Joint Research Centre on localising the SDGs inter alia through the ‘REGIONS2030: Monitoring the SDGs in the EU regions - Filling the data gaps’ project and the European Handbook for SDGs Voluntary Local Reviews;

72.  Calls for a European platform for VLRs to foster exchange and learning as well as twinning approaches across Europe for accelerated SDG implementation at local level; suggests that this data be integrated in EU cohesion policies;

73.  Highlights that corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence, when subject to relevant audits, can be an important framework to encourage greater accountability in the private sector regarding the social and environmental impact of companies and their contribution to the achievement of the SDGs;

74.  Encourages all actors across society, including private entities, to engage in regular voluntary reporting on SDG implementation and stresses the need to finance training for capacity building for SMEs in order to learn how to implement the SDGs in their daily activities;

75.  Points out that there is a growing awareness that economic growth, as measured primarily by GDP, has little to do with prosperity and well-being and that sustainability must be at the core of economic systems;

76.  Demands crucial reforms also in the methodology of measuring economic performance, which have to properly indicate progress, based on the well-being of people and the planet;

77.  Calls on the Commission to present the summary dashboard and indicator set measuring ‘beyond GDP’ without delay, as set out in the eighth environment action programme; urges the Commission to develop beyond-GDP indicators that incorporate societal and environmental factors, and to deepen its cooperation with the international community;

Financial framework

78.  Recalls the broad recognition, when the SDGs were adopted, of the need to ‘go from billions to trillions’ in financing for development; is alarmed by the fact that the SDG financing gap has instead grown from USD 2,5 trillion to USD 4 trillion per year(22);

79.  Stresses, in this regard, the need for a reformed global plan to finance the SDGs; draws attention to the fact that, with global GDP now over USD 100 trillion and the capitalisation of global equity and fixed income markets being around USD 250 trillion, global financial resources are sufficient for a big push towards closure of the SDG financing gap and should be made available for this, including through fair effective taxation and effective international measures against tax competition, tax avoidance and evasion;

80.  Underlines the important role of ODA as a catalyst for change and leverage for the mobilisation of other resources and recalls that it remains a major source of finance for the poorest countries and continues to play a crucial role in achieving Agenda 2030; notes with concern that, while being the biggest global ODA provider, the EU and its Member States failed to achieve their collective commitments to provide at least 0,7 % of GNI as ODA and, consequently, urges them to honour their commitment;

81.  Stresses the need for donors to prioritise grant-based financing, especially to LDCs, in view of their unsustainable debt burdens; insists that ODA, as defined by the OECD, should always have as its primary objective the promotion of developing countries’ economic development and welfare and therefore needs to play a key role in financing the SDGs;

82.  Stresses that the principles of development effectiveness should be followed, that human rights must be fully respected by all actors benefiting from blended finance and guarantees;

83.  Calls on the Commission to ensure full transparency in private sector cooperation so that it is open to effective stakeholder, parliamentary and public scrutiny;

84.  Stresses that the absence of a financing plan for the SDGs prevents the overall monitoring of spending on their implementation within the EU budget; calls for the adoption of an EU financing plan for the SDGs under a revised Multiannual Financial Framework;

85.  Underlines that Agenda 2030 should guide all EU financing tools and their programming, especially the MFF, NDICI-Global Europe, EFSD+, the EU’s main development financing tools as well as explore synergies with Horizon Europe, LIFE+, InvestEU, and the Digital Europe Programme;

86.  Underlines that the financing plan for the SDGs should address the lack of margin under Heading 6 of the Multiannual Financial Framework, which does not provide sufficient means for the EU’s external action to help partner countries finance their SDGs strategies;

87.  Stresses that important EU investment strategies like the Global Gateway must be clearly oriented towards and fully assessed against the need to implement Agenda 2030 with its ‘leave no one and no place behind’ principle and encompassing the whole social, economic and environmental dimension; is worried that the Global Gateway lacks a clear development mandate, and that its design and planning lacks transparency and public scrutiny; criticises the absence of fresh funding and its reliance on private finance which is inherently risk averse, and thus, its inability to reach the furthest-behind first;

88.  Highlights that the NDICI-Global Europe mid-term review provides an opportunity to assess the EU’s contribution to achieving the SDGs worldwide and reaffirms its support towards Agenda 2030 by setting out clear and measurable commitments for the coming years;

89.  Takes note of the initial idea outlined in the Taxonomy Regulation(23) for the Commission to publish a report with a view to extending its scope beyond environmentally sustainable economic activities; stresses, however, that regulatory costs have risen and that the macroeconomic environment has changed considerably since the adoption of the Taxonomy Regulation; welcomes, in this context, the Commission communication of 16 March 2023 entitled ‘Long-term competitiveness of the EU: looking beyond 2030’(24), aimed at rationalising and simplifying reporting requirements by 25 % for each of the green, digital and economic thematic areas, and the Commission’s proposal for achieving this by autumn 2023; calls on the Commission to demonstrate this commitment swiftly, including by refraining from introducing any new burdensome requirements, thereby improving the competitiveness of all undertakings in the EU, including SMEs, and enhancing the basic conditions for social justice and prosperity;

90.  Recognises the EIB’s flagship role in the European Green Deal and sustainable blue economy, and its substantial contribution to the EU’s economic response to the COVID-19 pandemic; calls on the EU to further maximise the potential of the EIB as a tool to leverage the EU’s strategic autonomy and its achievement of the SDGs, and to promote its external policy interests and priorities in its relations with non-EU countries;

91.  Highlights the urgency of requiring financial institutions to define and adopt strategies and targets to align financial portfolios and other assets with the SDGs and regularly report on progress inter alia in the context of their ESG reporting;

92.  Underlines the importance of making the EU budget consistent with the 17 SDGs and their respective sub-targets; invites the Commission to examine the details of a dedicated methodology for tracking SDG expenditure in the EU budget, complementary to the climate and biodiversity tracking methodologies already in place; requests that a comprehensive mapping of the financial envelopes of existing and future EU policies, programmes and funds, including of the investments and structural reforms pursued under the Recovery and Resilience Facility, be conducted to ensure consistency with the objectives of Agenda 2030;

93.  Stresses that adequate financing for the achievement of the SDGs, especially in developing countries, requires a thorough overhaul of the global financial architecture to align all of its parts with Agenda 2030 for global development, the Paris Agreement on climate action and the Global Biodiversity Framework;

94.  Calls for the swift operationalisation of the Loss and Damage Fund agreed at COP27 and that new financing commitments are directed swiftly where they are needed most;

95.  Urges the Commission and the Member States to step up their engagement and jointly work towards the necessary reforms of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group and multilateral development banks in order to adjust these financial institutions’ visions and operating models with a focus on strengthening the fight against poverty and rising inequality and promoting a just and sustainable twin transition;

96.  Regrets that, in a number of cases, the structural reforms promoted by the IMF and the World Bank have contributed to the weakening of the ability of developing countries to promote public policies to fight poverty and to strengthen education and health systems;

97.  Urgently calls on the Commission to track inconsistencies among expenditures and identify and phase out all environmentally harmful subsidies without delay, as required by the General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030;

98.  Points out the need to rechannel IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to developing countries and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), with a view to increasing SDG investment capacity without creating additional debt; underlines the need to improve the lending terms of MDBs, including lower interest rates and longer-term loans;

99.  Strongly welcomes the Bridgetown Initiative in this regard and calls on the Commission and the Member States to constructively and proactively engage in the relevant discussions in international forums throughout 2023 so that ambitious reforms can be achieved swiftly;

100.  In this regard, welcomes the fact that a Summit for a New Global Financial Pact is to be held in Paris in June 2023, making it possible to promote an inclusive approach by bringing together all the relevant stakeholders; calls on the EU and international partners to fully engage in real commitments and action during this international summit to facilitate vulnerable countries’ access to the finance they need to address the consequences of current and future crises and to implement Agenda 2030, and make it an opportunity to build a new contract between the North and the South;

101.  Recognises the importance and the potential of Member States’ development banks and other European development finance institutions; stresses the pressing need to boost the private sector in developing countries, in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, and the difficulties encountered in serving this area of development cooperation;

102.  Calls for more effective dissemination of information concerning financing opportunities that may be available to business to support the implementation of SDG strategic plans at local and regional level from the European Investment Bank;

103.  Encourages the private sector and multilateral financial institutions to continue to support countries whose economies have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic to achieve a sustainable, resilient and inclusive recovery;

104.  Is alarmed by the fact that LDCs were already unable to finance the implementation of the SDGs before the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine and are now even more in need of financial support; stresses that more than half of the world’s 69 low and middle income countries face either a debt crisis or are at high risk of one; notes with deep concern that according to the UN, 25 developing countries spent more than 20 % of total government revenue on external debt servicing in 2022, while, at the same time, 16 of the most debt-troubled countries today owe more than 30 % of their public and publicly guaranteed external debt to private creditors; underlines that the high cost of borrowing for developing countries inhibits investment in the SDGs;

105.  Emphasises the need both for rapid global debt relief efforts for developing countries, ending the ‘too little, too late’ syndrome and unnecessary exacerbation of debt situations, and for systemic changes towards a rules-based multilateral order capable of preventing new debt crises;

106.  Reiterates its call on the Commission, in consultation with all major international actors and the countries concerned, to draw up a genuine strategy to save developing countries from excessive indebtedness; in particular, calls for the creation of a multilateral debt workout mechanism, under UN auspices;

107.  Notes that the Common Debt Framework still does not provide concrete debt relief and calls for an enhanced multilateral debt relief initiative with an effective mechanism to engage private creditors, debt relief in return for achieving SDGs and climate action (debt swaps), measures to facilitate lender coordination on new loan contracts and the adoption of automatic debt suspension in the event of pre-defined shock;

108.  Welcomes the UN Secretary-General’s push for a global SDG Stimulus to Deliver Agenda 2030 which calls for additional liquidity, effective debt restructuring and the expansion of development finance, with a view to freeing up significant fiscal space in developing economies and reforming the global international financial architecture; calls for a collective response from the EU and its Member States to the SDG Stimulus initiative and to start without delay on parallel preparation of proposals for such a plan;

109.  Points to the pertinence of its resolution of 17 April 2018 on enhancing developing countries’ debt sustainability(25), which has only increased since new pressures and the lack of adequate action are now resulting in a major new debt crisis; reaffirms the calls made in this resolution for the systematic consideration of resource needs in the context of human rights, including the right to development, and the prioritisation of these needs, for the establishment of an international debt repayment mechanism, for the transformation of the UNCTAD Principles to Promote Responsible Lending and Borrowing into legally binding and enforceable instruments, for the sanctioning of lenders who lend to manifestly corrupt governments or in violation of the law established by the national parliament of the borrowing state;

110.  Recognises the importance of domestic resources being mobilised in developing countries as well as the structural challenges of their mobilisation and draws attention to the fact that this is contingent on an enabling international environment; recalls that illicit financial outflows and tax havens have a severe impact on the fiscal space of developing countries and seriously undermine the Rule of Law and institutional resilience in these countries, which is an essential precondition to achieve sustainable development;

111.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to take the lead to clamp down on tax evasion and tax avoidance practices, including listing of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, to scale up its cooperation with developing countries on tax matters to enable them to enhance mobilisation of public resources, and to take the initiative and push for the establishment of a UN intergovernmental commission for international cooperation on tax matters, in order to fight illicit financial outflows and cross-border tax evasion, and to close tax havens;

112.  Reiterates the critical role of public and private investments and public-private partnerships to increase developmental investments in developing countries and LDCs, where needs are the greatest, in closing the annual SDG funding gap of USD 4 trillion; therefore calls on the Commission to enter into in-depth discussions and to engage with the private sector to encourage private financing;

113.  At the same time, also warns of the risks involved, for example the erosion of universal access to quality critical public services (such as health, education and social protection, or local renewable energy production) or the overcompensation of private investors; notes in that regard that the overall evidence of the development effectiveness of subsidising private investment remains weak and that there is currently a lack of evidence that blended finance has had a large impact in the attainment of the SDGs;

114.  Therefore calls on the EU to push for a new approach in blended finance that is based on SDG-targeted impact, fair sharing of risks and rewards, clear accountability mechanisms, and consistent social and environmental standards, in line with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, and to prioritise partnerships with domestic enterprises in LDCs that pursue sustainable and inclusive business models;

115.  Highlights the role of private philanthropy in financing sustainable development; calls on the Commission to promote a better enabling framework for foundations both in its internal policies and in its relations with third countries;

116.  Recalls that developing countries are historically vulnerable to external shocks owing to narrow export bases and less diversified economies; stresses, therefore, that one of the main challenges for developing countries is to climb up the global value chain through economic diversification and to shift from an export-oriented production model towards development based on domestic and regional markets; to this end, emphasises the crucial role of multilateral forums and institutions to advance those objectives, with a view to harnessing resilience and to increasing national or regional autonomy in the production of essential goods and services;

117.  Recognises the role of local micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, cooperatives, inclusive business models and research institutes as engines of growth, employment and local innovation, which will in turn contribute to the achievement of the SDGs;

Sectoral policies related to the SDGs under review at the 2023 High Level Political Forum

118.  Regrets that many cases of policy inconsistencies persist in various EU sectoral areas, notably related to food, energy, trade and taxation policy, with particularly worrying negative consequences for developing countries;

119.  Urges the Member States to ensure access to affordable and clean heating and electricity; highlights that reducing energy demand through increasing the efficiency of buildings, consumer goods and transport can also contribute to limiting global warming to 1,5°C as committed to under the Paris Agreement, while supporting global health, education, poverty, employment and food security goals;

120.  Highlights that 70 % of the EU’s population lives in cities today and this is projected to reach almost 84 % in 2050; therefore stresses the importance of sustainable urban development in the EU, including through, inter alia: a modal shift to more sustainable modes of transport; an ambitious renovation wave to renovate the EU’s building stock and thereby reduce energy consumption and emissions, cut energy bills, create local employment and ensure safer, healthier buildings for people to live in; and the establishment and expansion of green and blue infrastructure in cities which serve to reduce air, water and noise pollution, provide protection from flooding, droughts and heat waves, and provide a refuge for nature as well as recreational amenities for people;

121.  Stresses the importance of achieving universal access to energy for all in the Global South; insists upon the need to support renewable decentralised solutions, such as small-scale, off-grid and mini-grid energy solutions, to reach all parts of developing countries’ populations, particularly poor and rural populations; calls on the EU to target its efforts, financially and technically, towards these small-scale solutions to energy poverty in remote areas;

122.  Notes the Commission’s proposal to conclude new Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreements; stresses that the EU must aim to negotiate with its partners to develop sustainable trade and cooperation agreements that uphold the right of each party to regulate, create added-value for both parties, while ensuring a high level of climate and human rights protection;

123.  Recalls that the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services will undermine progress in approximately 80 % of the assessed targets for the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and calls on the EU to address the root causes of biodiversity loss and to mainstream obligations on conservation, restoration and the sustainable use of resources into broader development policies; recalls that ecological restoration is critical for the implementation of the ‘One Health’ approach; stresses that conservation efforts must not violate human rights, notably those of indigenous peoples and local communities; accordingly, calls on the EU to develop a conservation programme in consultation with local communities, indigenous peoples and women, as well as other marginalised groups to truly contribute to the fight against deforestation and biodiversity loss;

Outlook

124.  Reiterates that the SDGs are the only globally agreed and comprehensive set of goals on the major challenges ahead for both developed and developing countries and Agenda 2030 should therefore serve as a guiding light when navigating through the current uncertainties; strongly advocates for SDG 17 (Partnership for the goals) for the urgent revitalisation of global partnerships particularly between governments, the private sector, and civil society with a view to implementing Agenda 2030; highlights the opportunity that the SDGs provide to establish a true well-being economy centred on people and the planet and to work towards a sustainable world beyond 2030;

125.  Suggests that the UN should push all Member States to support the introduction of concrete timelines and implementation plans that are binding for the signatory states towards 2030 and beyond; calls furthermore on the UN to prepare a post-Agenda 2030 strategy well ahead of time;

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126.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission as well as to the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President of the United Nations General Assembly.

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