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 Approval of the appointment of Wopke Hoekstra as Member of the European Commission |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to Article 246, second paragraph, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, – having regard to point 6 of the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission(1), – having regard to the resignation of Frans Timmermans as a Member of the Commission, – having regard to the Council's letter of 8 September 2023, whereby the Council consulted Parliament on a decision, to be taken by common accord with the President of the Commission, on the appointment of Wopke Hoekstra as a Member of the Commission (C9-0335/2023), – having regard to the letter of the President of the Commission of 1 September 2023, – having regard to the hearing of Wopke Hoekstra on 2 October 2023, led by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, with the association of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, and to the evaluation letter drawn up following that hearing, – having regard to the examination by the Conference of Committee Chairs concluded by written procedure on 4 October 2023, and the examination by the Conference of Presidents at its meeting on 4 October 2023, – having regard to Rule 125 of, and Annex VII to, its Rules of Procedure, 1. Approves the appointment of Wopke Hoekstra as a Member of the Commission for the remainder of the Commission’s term of office until 31 October 2024; 2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Council, the Commission and the governments of the Member States.
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| Approval of the allocation of new responsibilities of Executive Vice-President of the Commission Maroš Šefčovič |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to Article 17(6) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 248 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, – having regard to point 7 of the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission(1), – having regard to the letters of the President of the Commission of 22 August and 1 September 2023, – having regard to the hearing of Maroš Šefčovič on 3 October 2023, led by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, with the association of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Transport and Tourism and the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, and to the evaluation letter drawn up following that hearing, – having regard to the examination by the Conference of Committee Chairs concluded by written procedure on 4 October 2023, and to the examination by the Conference of Presidents at its meeting on 4 October 2023, – having regard to Rule 125 of, and Annex VII to, its Rules of Procedure, 1. Approves the allocation of new responsibilities to Executive Vice-President of the Commission Maroš Šefčovič for the remainder of the Commission's term of office until 31 October 2024; 2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Council, the Commission and the governments of the Member States.
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| Human rights situation in Afghanistan, in particular the persecution of former government officials |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, – having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure, A. whereas following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, it announced a general amnesty for former government officials and former armed force members (ANDSF); whereas the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has documented at least 800 human rights violations, including arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and torture, against former government officials and ANDSF members carried out by the de facto authorities; B. whereas former government officials and ANDSF members have been killed in detention facilities, unknown locations and public places; whereas families are often unaware of the fate or whereabouts of detained relatives for days or weeks until their bodies are returned; 1. Deplores the level of human rights abuses in Afghanistan, which have risen exponentially since the Taliban takeover; denounces in the strongest terms all human rights violations in the country, including the widespread persecution of former government officials and ANDSF members, the staggering oppression of women and girls and policy of gender apartheid, and the targeting of civil society organisations and human rights defenders; 2. Calls on Afghanistan’s de facto authorities to fully enforce their publicly announced commitment to the general amnesty of former government officials and ANDSF members; 3. Calls for the urgent creation of a UN-led accountability mechanism to investigate alleged human rights violations, including those against former government officials and ANDSF members, and breaches of international law; 4. Urges the de facto authorities to reverse the severe restrictions on the rights of women and girls, in line with Afghanistan’s international obligations; 5. Reiterates its call on Afghanistan to immediately and unconditionally release Matiullah Wesa, Zholia Parsi, Neda Parwani, Murtaza Behboudi, Rasul Parsi and all others unjustly imprisoned and to conduct a thorough investigation into Alia Azizi’s enforced disappearance; 6. Insists on maintaining a strict conditional engagement with the Taliban in accordance with the five Council benchmarks for engagement with the de facto authorities; 7. Urges the EU and the Member States to step up their support for Afghan civil society, including by funding specific assistance and protection programmes for human rights defenders and by issuing humanitarian visas for persecuted women and girls; 8. Deplores the fact that religious freedom in Afghanistan has dramatically deteriorated under Taliban rule; condemns the Taliban for brutally persecuting Christians and other religious minorities in order to eradicate them from the country; 9. Reiterates its solidarity with and commitment to the people of Afghanistan, including their call for justice, accountability and reparation for all human rights violations in Afghanistan; calls for the EU to support the ongoing International Criminal Court investigation in this regard; 10. Reiterates its concern about the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in Afghanistan and the lack of funds to provide food for those suffering from extreme hunger; calls on the Commission and the Member States to bolster humanitarian aid, as well as funding for basic needs and livelihood support; 11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN and the de facto authorities of Afghanistan. | |||||||
| The case of Zarema Musaeva in Chechnya |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to its previous resolutions on the Russian Federation and, particularly, on Chechnya, – having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure, A. whereas the human rights situation remains catastrophic owing to the abuses perpetrated by the Russian-installed Kadyrov regime against human rights defenders and vulnerable groups; B. whereas in January 2022, under the pretext of requiring her testimony in a criminal case, Zarema Musaeva was unlawfully abducted from elsewhere in Russia and placed in pre-trial detention in Chechnya; C. whereas after having been denied proper legal defence, she was sentenced to five years in prison on charges of fraud and assaulting the authorities; whereas her health has deteriorated since her detention; D. whereas Ms Musaeva is the wife of former Chechen Supreme Court judge Saidi Yangulbaev and mother of human rights defender Abubakar and opposition bloggers Ibrahim and Baysangur Yangulbaev; E. whereas her three sons are vocal critics of the Head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, and his autocratic rule; whereas Kadyrov has publicly threatened to ‘eliminate’ the Yangulbaev family members; whereas the EU and the United States have placed Kadyrov and his closest associates on the sanctions list for serious human rights violations; F. whereas on the day of Ms Musaeva’s verdict, Novaya Gazeta journalist Elena Milashina and human rights lawyer Aleksandr Nemov were attacked and brutally beaten on their way to court; 1. Strongly condemns the kidnapping and politically motivated detention of Zarema Musaeva and regards these as acts of retaliation for her sons’ legitimate human rights work and political views; 2. Urges the Chechen authorities to immediately and unconditionally release Ms Musaeva, to provide her with proper medical care and to put an immediate end to all harassment of civil society and the opposition; 3. Expresses its concern that throughout the pre-trial and trial proceedings against Musaeva, human rights lawyers working on the case, Aleksandr Nemov, Aleksandr Savin, Natalia Dobronravova and Alexandr Karavaev, were targeted with surveillance as a form of intimidation; 4. Strongly condemns the brutal attack on 4 July 2023 against lawyer Aleksandr Nemov and journalist Elena Milashina and the brutal repression of human rights defenders and independent media, including the cases of lawyers Natalia Dobronravova, Sergey Babinets and Oleg Khabibrakhmanov; urges the competent authorities to conduct a transparent and thorough investigation into these attacks and to hold those responsible accountable; 5. Calls on the international community, the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to react to the alarming human rights situation in Russia and, in particular, in Chechnya, increase assistance to Chechen political prisoners, dissidents, Chechens opposing the brutal regime, oppressed women and LGBTIQ+ people, as well as their families, to grant humanitarian visas to Chechen human rights defenders at risk and to keep cooperating with human rights organisations; 6. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the VP/HR, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Russian authorities, and the Head of the Chechen Republic. | |||||||
| Egypt, in particular the sentencing of Hisham Kassem |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to its previous resolutions on Egypt, – having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure, A. whereas Hisham Kassem is an important liberal voice in Egypt, publisher and advocate for media freedom and the rule of law; B. whereas in June 2023, ahead of the December 2023 presidential elections, he played a pivotal role in founding the Free Current coalition of liberal opposition parties and figures, criticising the government’s economic and political record; whereas he was detained on defamation and slander charges for an online post criticising former minister Abu Eita and refused to pay the equivalent of EUR 150 for his bail; whereas on 20 August 2023, he was arrested on similar charges and, on 16 September 2023, he was sentenced to six months in prison and fined by the Cairo Economic Misdemeanours Court; whereas he appealed and the court postponed his hearing to 7 October 2023; C. whereas his defence rights were not adequately protected, his lawyers were not given access to his case file before the trial and authorities denied his right to a public hearing and prevented the media and diplomatic representatives from attending; D. whereas Nasserist Left Party leader Ahmed El Tantawy has faced harassment by authorities since his presidential candidacy announcement in August; whereas at least 73 of his campaign staff and supporters have since been arrested, while Citizen Lab found that his phone was hacked using Cytrox’s Predator spyware; E. whereas a limited number of political prisoners have been pardoned since May 2022, while twice as many have since been arrested and thousands remain imprisoned; 1. Calls on the Egyptian authorities to immediately and unconditionally release Hisham Kassem and drop all politically motivated charges against him; calls for the EU Delegation and Member States to visit him in prison; 2. Underlines the importance of holding credible, free and fair elections; urges authorities to stop harassing peaceful opposition figures such as aspiring presidential candidate and former member of parliament Ahmed El Tantawy; expresses deep concern over Egypt’s restrictive electoral process; recalls that defamation laws cannot be used to imprison political opponents; 3. Urges authorities to uphold the rule of law, freedom of expression, press, media and association, and judicial independence, to stop stifling opposition voices through arbitrary detention, digital surveillance, enforced disappearances and torture, to immediately and unconditionally release the tens of thousands of prisoners arbitrarily detained for peacefully expressing their opinion, including award winner Alaa Abdel Fattah and 20 journalists, and to lift online censorship against independent media; welcomes the limited release of unjustly detained political prisoners like Patrick Zaki; 4. Urges EU Member States to raise Egypt’s human rights violations in the upcoming EU-Egypt Association Council and to support a monitoring and reporting mechanism at the UN Human Rights Council; 5. Calls for effective implementation of the Dual-Use Regulation(1) to protect opposition voices; 6. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Egyptian authorities, and translate it into Arabic.
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| European green bonds |
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(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading) The European Parliament, – having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0391), – having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9‑0311/2021), – having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 November 2021(1), – having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 8 December 2021(2), – having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the responsible committee under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 10 May 2023 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, – having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A9-0156/2022), 1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; 2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; 3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 5 October 2023 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2023/… of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Green Bonds and optional disclosures for bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable and for sustainability-linked bonds
(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2023/2631.)
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| Scheme of generalised tariff preferences |
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(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading) The European Parliament, – having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2023)0426), – having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 207(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9‑0226/2023), – having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 6 September 2023 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0267/2023), 1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; 2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; 3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 5 October 2023 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2023/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences
(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2023/2663.) | ||||||||
| Financial services contracts concluded at a distance |
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(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading) The European Parliament, – having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0204), – having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9‑0175/2022), – having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 21 September 2022(1), – having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the responsible committee under Rule 74(4) and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 21 June 2023 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, – having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A9-0097/2023), 1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; 2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; 3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 5 October 2023 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2023/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2011/83/EU as regards financial services contracts concluded at a distance and repealing Directive 2002/65/EC
(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Directive (EU) 2023/2673.)
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| Urban wastewater treatment |
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(Ordinary legislative procedure – recast)
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| Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh after Azerbaijan’s attack and the continuing threats against Armenia |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to its recent resolutions on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan and Armenia, in particular those of 19 January 2023 on the humanitarian consequences of the blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh(1), of 10 March 2022 on the destruction of cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh(2), and of 20 May 2021 on prisoners of war in the aftermath of the most recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan(3), – having regard to the relevant documents and international agreements, including but not limited to the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991, – having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Geneva Conventions and the subsequent protocols thereto, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the European Convention on Human Rights, the UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage of 16 November 1972, and the UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage of 17 October 2003, – having regard to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group’s 2009 Basic Principles, – having regard to the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020 signed by the leaders of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, – having regard to the joint statement of 19 September 2023 on Azerbaijan’s attack on Nagorno-Karabakh by the Chair of its Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Chair of its Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus, and its Standing Rapporteurs on Armenia and Azerbaijan, – having regard to the statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 September 2023 on Azerbaijan’s military escalation and of 21 September 2023 on developments in Nagorno-Karabakh and to the address by the High Representative of 21 September 2023 to the UN Security Council on Nagorno-Karabakh, – having regard to the statement by the European External Action Service (EEAS) Spokesperson of 29 September 2023 on the displacement of people from Nagorno-Karabakh, – having regard to the call of UN Secretary-General António Guterres of 19 September 2023 for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the comment by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk of 26 September 2023, – having regard to the orders of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 22 February 2023 and 6 July 2023 on the request for the indication of provisional measures for the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v Azerbaijan), – having regard to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, to which Armenia and Azerbaijan are parties, to the first protocol thereto, as applicable to occupied territories, and to the second protocol thereto, on the enhanced protection of cultural property, – having regard to the statement of 11 November 2021 by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group reiterating the importance of protecting historic and cultural sites in the region, – having regard to the UN Security Council final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), – having regard to the report of 29 March 2023 by the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Azerbaijan and to the memorandum of 21 October 2021 by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights on the humanitarian and human rights consequences following the 2020 outbreak of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, – having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, A. whereas the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has various historical and geopolitical complexities; whereas on 19 September 2023 Azerbaijan launched a pre-planned, unjustified military attack against Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to significant loss of life; whereas a ceasefire was agreed on 20 September 2023, but the security situation of civilians remaining in Nagorno-Karabakh is not guaranteed; whereas there are reports that hundreds of Armenian civilians were killed and wounded during Azerbaijan’s military operation against Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas there are reports that people are missing; whereas in the ceasefire agreement with Azerbaijan, the de facto authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh agreed to dismantle their civilian institutions as well as to disarm the self-defence forces, surrender all weapons and withdraw from all combat positions and military posts; whereas there have, however, been repeated reports about violations of the ceasefire; B. whereas this attack represents a gross violation of human rights and international law, and a clear infringement of the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020 and of the commitments that Azerbaijan made in the negotiations mediated by the EU; whereas on 22 May 2023 Nikol Pashinyan, the Prime Minister of Armenia, expressed his country’s readiness to recognise the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, including Nagorno-Karabakh, in return for security guarantees for the Armenian population of the region, as part of the peace process between the two countries; C. whereas over 100 000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh have been forced to flee to Armenia since the Azerbaijani offensive on 19 September 2023; whereas as a result, Nagorno-Karabakh has been almost entirely deprived of its Armenian population, who have been living there for centuries; whereas the Azerbaijani Government stated that it would guarantee the rights of the civilian population, including educational, cultural, religious, and municipal electoral rights; whereas Azerbaijan’s promises to respect the rights of the local population were not considered credible by Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian inhabitants, who fear reprisals or the loss of the freedom to use their language and practise their religion and customs; whereas there have been credible reports of looting, destruction, violence and arrests committed by Azerbaijani troops since the beginning of the offensive; whereas several officials and former officials from Nagorno-Karabakh have been arrested by Azerbaijan since 19 September 2023; D. whereas ethnic cleansing is described by the UN Security Council as rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons of another ethnic or religious group and is contrary to international law; whereas there is a pressing need to stop and reverse the ongoing forced exodus of the local Armenian population, which amounts to ethnic cleansing, and to ensure the conditions for their safe return to Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians have the right to live in their homes in dignity and security; whereas the Azerbaijani authorities have announced the registration of all Armenian residents of Nagorno-Karabakh; E. whereas both Azerbaijan and Armenia are bound by international humanitarian law; whereas the Third Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war from all forms of torture and cruel treatment; whereas such acts perpetrated during an armed conflict amount to war crimes; whereas the Fourth Geneva Convention protects civilians in international armed conflicts and establishes that the unlawful confinement, wilful killing and inhuman and degrading treatment of a protected person constitute war crimes; F. whereas this military aggression was preceded by Azerbaijan’s nine-month blockade, in place since 12 December 2022, of the Lachin corridor, the only land corridor linking the mostly Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh region with Armenia, depriving more than 100 000 Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians of freedom of movement and access to food, medication, hygiene products and other goods, as well as by the establishment of a check point on the same corridor in April 2023 in violation of the November 2020 trilateral statement, by a military build-up around Nagorno-Karabakh and along the border with Armenia, and by aggressive and inflammatory rhetoric by Azerbaijan’s leadership; G. whereas on the basis of the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020, which brought an end to the 44-day war, the Lachin corridor was to remain under the control of Russian peacekeeping forces, while Azerbaijan was to guarantee the security of persons, vehicles and cargo moving along the Lachin corridor in both directions; whereas the Russian so-called peacekeeping forces have not acted according to their mandate, taking no action against Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin corridor, or upon its establishment of a check point, or against Azerbaijan’s most recent military aggression; whereas by sustaining the blockade of the Lachin corridor, Azerbaijan breached its international obligations under the November 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement; H. whereas these more than nine months of organised starvation and isolation have particularly affected vulnerable groups in Nagorno-Karabakh, such as children, elderly people and people with disabilities and chronic health conditions; whereas this has led, among other things, to a rise in miscarriages and premature births due to pregnant women not having access to proper nutrition and prenatal care; whereas Azerbaijan has also cut off the region’s gas and electricity supply, significantly impacting living conditions in the region, including the functioning of medical and educational institutions; whereas, owing to the blockade, the medical institutions in Nagorno-Karabakh have had insufficient capacity to deal with the people injured by the Azerbaijani attack; I. whereas in its Order of 22 February 2023 in Armenia v Azerbaijan, the ICJ ordered Azerbaijan to allow free passage through the Lachin corridor and to take all measures at its disposal to ensure the unimpeded movement of persons, vehicles and cargo along the Lachin corridor in both directions; J. whereas on 28 September 2023 the de facto president of Nagorno-Karabakh, Samvel Shahramanyan, was forced to sign a decree dissolving all structures and institutions of the self-proclaimed republic as of 1 January 2024, with the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh ceasing to exist; K. whereas the EU has provided EUR 5 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross in humanitarian aid; whereas the funds will assist people displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia and assist vulnerable people in Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas the Armenian Government has asked the EU for assistance to help deal with the influx of refugees arriving from Nagorno-Karabakh; L. whereas the President of the European Council established one of the three strands of peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan; M. whereas numerous churches, mosques, cross-stones and cemeteries are located in Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas after considerable deliberate damage was caused by Azerbaijan to Armenian cultural heritage during the 2020 war, the ICJ indicated, in its Order of 7 December 2021(4), that Azerbaijan must ‘take all necessary measures to prevent and punish acts of vandalism and desecration affecting Armenian cultural heritage, including but not limited to churches and other places of worship, monuments, landmarks, cemeteries and artefacts’; N. whereas other states, such as Türkiye, have provided political, diplomatic and military support to Azerbaijan, further escalating the conflict; whereas under point 9 of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement, Armenia was to guarantee the security of transport connections between mainland Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave, connections which have been promoted by Azerbaijan and Türkiye as the ‘Zangezur corridor’ and have been employed by officials of the two countries in ways that threaten Armenia’s sovereignty; O. whereas in recent years the Azerbaijani leadership has made irredentist statements on several occasions with reference to the sovereign territory of Armenia; whereas, on several occasions over the past two years, the Azerbaijani army has occupied various parts of the sovereign territory of Armenia and bombed civilian targets on the territory of Armenia; P. whereas previous warnings from Parliament regarding the situation have not led to any significant change in the EU’s policy towards Azerbaijan; whereas three decades of diplomacy and peacebuilding efforts by the OSCE, the EU and other international actors have failed to deter Azerbaijan’s use of military force; 1. Condemns in the strongest terms the pre-planned and unjustified military attack by Azerbaijan against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and calls for an immediate and complete end to the violence against the people who have remained in the region; highlights that Azerbaijan was on a clear path to re-establish its control over Nagorno-Karabakh through diplomatic negotiations and that this attack contradicts Azerbaijan’s stated intentions of working towards a sustainable peace with Armenia and undermines the ongoing peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan; 2. Stresses that this attack represents a gross violation of international law and human rights and a clear infringement of the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020 and of the commitments that Azerbaijan made in the negotiations mediated by the EU; recalls that the attack took place in the context of a major humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh, following Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin corridor for the past nine months, in violation of Baku’s commitments and of the legally binding orders of the ICJ; reminds Azerbaijan that the use of coercive practices to remove a civilian population from a territory may amount to a crime against humanity and could fall under the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; 3. Deplores the loss of life and injuries resulting from the recent attack by Azerbaijan, including after an explosion at a fuel depot on 25 September 2023; expresses its solidarity with the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh who have been forced to flee their homes and ancestral lands; considers that the current situation amounts to ethnic cleansing and strongly condemns the threats and acts of violence committed by Azerbaijani troops against the population of Nagorno-Karabakh; commends the authorities of Armenia for their efforts to provide aid and shelter to the refugees; calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to immediately offer all necessary assistance to Armenia to deal with the influx of refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh and the resulting humanitarian crisis; 4. Calls for the EU and its Member States to adopt targeted sanctions against the individuals in the Azerbaijani Government responsible for multiple ceasefire violations and violations of human rights in Nagorno-Karabakh; calls for investigations into the abuses committed by Azerbaijani forces that could constitute war crimes; 5. Reminds Azerbaijan that it bears full responsibility for the safety and well-being of all people in Nagorno-Karabakh and must be held accountable; demands that Azerbaijan ensure the safety and security of the people in Nagorno-Karabakh, respecting the UN Charter and all relevant international conventions, the principles of international humanitarian law and human rights, its international commitments and the OSCE principles; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh, to offer solid guarantees regarding the protection of their rights and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric that could incite discrimination against Armenians; reminds the Azerbaijani authorities that the right to return to one’s home is a fundamental precept of international human rights law; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to urgently and genuinely engage in a comprehensive and transparent dialogue with the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to ensure respect for their rights and guarantee their security, including their right to live in their homes in dignity and safety, and their land and property rights, to maintain their distinct identity and fully enjoy their civic, cultural, social and religious rights; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to closely consult the Council of Europe, the UN, the OSCE and other international organisations concerning best practices to guarantee the rights of ethnic Armenians, stressing that this is particularly important given Azerbaijan’s disastrous track record on human rights; 6. Demands the immediate lifting of the blockade of the Lachin corridor in order to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need in Nagorno-Karabakh and calls for the Lachin corridor to be opened fully, as it provides a physical connection for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to their land, property, culture and heritage; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to make every effort to ensure that the Armenians who have left are able to access all the necessary information on how to restore their residency in Nagorno-Karabakh and avail themselves fully of all other rights to property, social benefits, education and the like, should they decide to return; 7. Calls for the EU and its Member States to urgently work towards securing international guarantees ensuring the safety and well-being of Armenians who are continuing to live in Nagorno-Karabakh and the immediate restoration of full humanitarian access to the region; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their presence on the ground and substantially increase humanitarian aid to people displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia or living in Nagorno-Karabakh; expresses disappointment at the way in which the first UN mission to Nagorno-Karabakh in 30 years was organised and conducted; call for the establishment of an international presence in Nagorno-Karabakh under the auspices of the United Nations, in order to monitor the situation on the ground and provide transparency, reassurance and confidence to the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh, with a focus on humanitarian needs and protection and on the preservation of cultural and historical heritage sites; calls for the urgent replacement of the Russian peacekeeping forces with a UN peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the international border between Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to effectively protect the safety and security of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh; 8. Expresses deep concern for the preservation of cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh after the massive exodus of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians; urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destroying, neglecting or altering the origins of cultural, religious or historical heritage in the region, bearing in mind the destruction of cultural, religious and historical heritage since the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and calls on it to instead strive to preserve, protect and promote this rich diversity in line with the ICJ Order of 7 December 2021; demands the protection of the Armenian cultural, historical and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh in line with UNESCO standards and Azerbaijan’s international commitments; insists that Azerbaijan allow a UNESCO mission to Nagorno-Karabakh and give it the necessary access to heritage sites to establish a record of their current state and proceed with an inventory; 9. Demands the safeguarding of the property of those members of the Armenian community who were forced to leave and calls on Azerbaijan to release and commit to a broad amnesty for all the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh who have been arrested since 19 September 2023, including former officials from the region, and for all others who were arrested before and after 19 September 2023; 10. Reiterates its condemnation of the Azerbaijani military incursions into the internationally recognised territory of Armenia; reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of the sovereign territory of Armenia; rejects and expresses its grave concern regarding the irredentist and inflammatory statements made by the Azerbaijani President and other Azerbaijani officials threatening the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Armenia, including those in connection with the ‘Zangezur corridor’; warns Azerbaijan against any potential military adventurism against Armenia proper; condemns Türkiye’s involvement in arming Azerbaijan and its full support for Azerbaijan’s offensives in both 2020 and 2023 and calls on Türkiye to restrain its ally Azerbaijan from undertaking any such irresponsible actions; condemns the support provided during this crisis to Azerbaijan by other countries and calls for an end to this support in order to prevent further escalation; warns that Azerbaijan could be emboldened by the lack of serious deterrence efforts by the international community; 11. Calls for a comprehensive review of the EU’s relations with Azerbaijan, taking into account recent developments and the worsening human rights situation in the country; regrets the fact that the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, had characterised Azerbaijan as a ‘trustworthy energy supplier’; calls on the Commission to quickly reconsider the ‘strategic partnership’ with Azerbaijan in the field of energy, given Azerbaijan’s repeated violations of its international commitments, including commitments made in talks mediated by the EU and binding provisions under international law; notes that, in the light of Azerbaijan’s aggression against Armenia in September 2022 and its unjustified use of force against and forced displacement of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, as well as the country’s alarming human rights record, developing such a ‘strategic partnership’ is incompatible with the objectives of EU foreign policy as defined in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union; states its conviction that the EU cannot morally accept negotiating a future partnership agreement with a country that blatantly violates principles of international law as well as its international obligations and is therefore neither a reliable nor a trustworthy partner; urges the High Representative and the EEAS, therefore, to suspend the negotiations for a renewed partnership agreement until Azerbaijan has demonstrated its genuine readiness to respect the rights and security concerns of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh; calls for the EU and its Member States, if Azerbaijan continues to disregard its commitments, to consider suspending the visa facilitation agreement with Azerbaijan and lowering the level of cooperation with the country in other areas; finds unacceptable any comments and threats addressed to MEPs by the Azerbaijani authorities, including the Ambassador of Azerbaijan to the EU; 12. Calls for the EU’s dependency on gas exports from Azerbaijan to be reduced; is seriously concerned about Azerbaijan’s import of Russian gas and the notable Russian share in the production and transportation of Azerbaijani gas for the EU, which contradicts the EU’s objective of undermining Russia’s capacity to continue its war of aggression against Ukraine by cutting its revenues from oil and gas exports to the EU; urges the Commission to investigate suspicions that Azerbaijan actually exports Russian gas to the EU; calls for the suspension of all imports of oil and gas from Azerbaijan to the EU in the event of military aggression against Armenian territorial integrity or significant hybrid attacks against Armenia’s constitutional order and democratic institutions; calls, in the light of Azerbaijan’s recent invasion of Nagorno-Kabarakh, for the suspension of the Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy between the European Union and Azerbaijan; 13. Condemns the inaction of Russian ‘peacekeepers’ and the overall role played by Russia, which for decades has fuelled the conflict and used it for its own political gains; 14. Condemns Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for exploiting the armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh to promote an imperialistic agenda and for encouraging further attacks against Armenia’s sovereignty; urges Türkiye to adopt a constructive and responsible approach regarding Armenia’s territorial integrity and to foster peace in the region; 15. Commends Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan for his commitment to peace; reiterates the EU’s commitment to supporting Armenia’s sovereignty, democracy and territorial integrity; strongly condemns Russia’s increasing hybrid attempts to destabilise the political situation inside Armenia; welcomes Armenia’s ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; believes that the EU must seize the opportunity of a potential geopolitical vacuum, provide Armenia with an ambitious plan for cooperation by upgrading the current Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement, anchoring Armenia more strongly in the community of Western democracies and helping it unlock relations with neighbours, in particular Türkiye; 16. Calls for the EU to respond favourably to Armenia’s request for support via the European Peace Facility should Armenia reconsider its current military alliances; calls for the EU to substantially increase its humanitarian and financial assistance to Armenia, which faces the arrival of tens of thousands of refugees; calls for the EU, in the light of the disruption to the education of thousands of ethnic Armenians, to help establish and fund scholarships for pupils and students who have been evacuated, so that they can continue their studies; 17. Reiterates its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia; calls on Azerbaijan to reaffirm its unequivocal commitment to Armenia’s territorial integrity; believes that genuine dialogue between Azerbaijan, Armenia and representatives of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians is the only sustainable way forward and calls for the EU and its Member States to support such efforts; supports the ongoing peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have been seriously hampered by the recent military operation against Nagorno-Karabakh; underlines the need for a comprehensive peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which must include the mutual recognition of territorial integrity, guarantees for the rights and security of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population and the release of prisoners; highlights that a dignified and durable regional peace that maintains sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity for both countries is a prerequisite for stability in the neighbourhood; 18. Calls on the EU civilian mission in Armenia (EUMA) to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size, extend its duration and also place monitors along the border with Türkiye; deplores the fact that Azerbaijan has never allowed EUMA to be deployed on its territory and calls on Azerbaijan to allow EUMA’s presence on its side of the border and in Nagorno-Karabakh; 19. Expresses deep dissatisfaction at the fact that regular alerts by Parliament regarding the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and the risks of a catastrophic outcome have been disregarded by the Commission and the Council; deplores that EU action has so far not led to any positive results; demands that the EEAS reconsider its action in the South Caucasus and replace dedicated staff; regrets the slow response by the EU institutions, with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy only releasing a statement two days after Azerbaijan launched its attack against Nagorno-Karabakh; 20. Regrets the fact that Members of the European Parliament have accepted and failed to declare trips to Azerbaijan, visits to the Nagorno-Karabakh region and luxury hotel stays that were organised and paid for by Azerbaijani officials; reiterates its call for stricter rules on trips by officials that are paid for by foreign countries and entities; regrets the fact that this commitment was not implemented through its decision of 13 September 2023 on amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure with a view to strengthening integrity, independence and accountability; calls for its Committee on Constitutional Affairs to propose a revision of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure in order to introduce a ban on Members of the European Parliament accepting trips and accommodation paid for by third parties, including officials from non-EU countries and corporate interest representatives; 21. Calls for the EU and its Member States to urgently reassess the EU’s diplomatic and security architecture and the geopolitical configurations in the wider South Caucasus region in the light of the new facts on the ground and the interests of countries like Russia, Türkiye and Iran, but also to develop a strategy in response to the growing trend of autocratic regimes pushing aside diplomatic efforts in favour of violent military force; 22. Deplores the Hungarian Government’s decision to block a joint statement by all EU Member States condemning the military operation by Azerbaijan against the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh; urges the Council to unite in support of the EU having more active involvement in the protection of human rights and the promotion of peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia; 23. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the Director-General of UNESCO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the UN and the Council of Europe.
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| Taking stock of Moldova's path to the EU |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to its recent resolutions on the Republic of Moldova, – having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part(1), which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), – having regard to the Republic of Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, and the European Council’s consequent granting of candidate status on 23 June 2022 based on a positive assessment by the Commission and in line with the views expressed by Parliament, – having regard to the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 on the Republic of Moldova’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2022)0406) and the joint staff working document of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova’ (SWD(2023)0041); – having regard to the Commission analytical report of 1 February 2023 on Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis (SWD(2023)0032), – having regard to the joint statement following the seventh meeting of the EU-Moldova Association Council of 7 February 2023 and to the final statement of the 13th meeting of the EU-Moldova Parliamentary Association Committee of 23 March 2023, – having regard to Articles 2 and 49 of the Treaty on European Union, – having regard to the European Council conclusions of 23 and 24 June 2022, 23 March 2023 and 29 and 30 June 2023, – having regard to the updated EU-Moldova Association Agenda for 2021-2027 of 22 August 2022 and to the Support Package for the Republic of Moldova presented by the Commission on 28 June 2023, – having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, A. whereas the Republic of Moldova submitted its application to join the EU on 3 March 2022 and has been an EU candidate country since 23 June 2022; B. whereas EU-Moldova relations have intensified since then, based on a mutual commitment to strengthening their political association; whereas the Council conclusions of 13 December 2022 on enlargement and stabilisation and association process put emphasis on further deepening the EU’s sectoral cooperation with Moldova and its integration into the EU internal market; C. whereas the Government of the Republic of Moldova has been pursuing an ambitious political, judicial and institutional reform process and has demonstrated its determination and ability to fulfil the nine steps identified in the Commission opinion to meet the conditions set for the opening of accession negotiations; whereas EU accession remains a merit-based process that requires fulfilment of the EU membership criteria; D. whereas on 22 June 2023, the Commission provided an oral update to the Council on Moldova’s progress and a more detailed review will form part of the 2023 Enlargement Package reports on the 10 enlargement countries; whereas the Commission, in its oral update provided to the Council in June, as requested by the EU Member States, assessed that three steps had been fulfilled (2, 8 and 9) and that there had been significant progress on three other steps (1, 4, 7); E. whereas the Republic of Moldova has been making tremendous efforts and significant progress in implementing all the conditions laid out by the Commission, namely by addressing the shortcomings identified by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Venice Commission on the judicial reform and the reform of the electoral code, by increasing the involvement of civil society in decision-making processes, strengthening the protection of human rights, particularly of vulnerable groups, enhancing gender equality and combating violence against women; whereas the upcoming Commission assessment on the progress made by the Republic of Moldova will send a clear political message and have a significant impact on the country’s future; F. whereas the EU-Moldova Priority Action Plan was also agreed on in June 2023 and will function as a roadmap for the full implementation of the EU-Moldova DCFTA and Moldova’s further integration into the EU single market, with jointly agreed priorities for 2023-2024; whereas on 28 June 2023, the Commission presented the Support Package for the Republic of Moldova, which addresses the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and aims to bring Moldova closer to the EU; G. whereas despite the dramatic effects of the war on Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova has managed to significantly consolidate its democracy and maintain the reform trajectory; whereas the improvements in the country’s democratic system have been reflected in its progress on various international indexes: 28th place out of 180 countries in the 2023 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index (up from 40th place in 2022); 91st place out of 180 countries in the 2022 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (up from 105th place in 2021); 68th place out of 140 countries in the World Justice Project’s 2022 Rule of Law Index (up from 73rd place in 2021); H. whereas the Russian Federation has been using provocation, disinformation, illegal funding of political parties, cyberattacks and other hybrid means to undermine the stability, sovereignty, constitutional order and democratic institutions of the Republic of Moldova; whereas Russia’s subversive activities in Moldova seek to undermine popular support for the European path chosen by the Moldovan people and foster destabilisation; whereas Russia has used its gas exports as a tool to pressure the Moldovan Government, including as regards its pro-European orientation; whereas Russia’s weaponisation of energy has further exposed the fragility of the Moldovan energy sector, while the country’s connections to the EU gas and electricity market and mechanisms have helped it to tackle the crisis; whereas high energy prices led to inflation rising to over 30 % and Moldova’s economic output fell by 5,9 % year-on-year in real terms in 2022; whereas although the Republic of Moldova has diversified its natural gas supplies away from Russia, its electricity supply remains largely dependent on the Russian-owned Cuciurgan power station in the Transnistria region; whereas, despite all these attempts at destabilisation, the Moldovan people and the Moldovan leadership have remained determined to follow their chosen pro-European path; I. whereas Russian missiles targeting Ukraine have flown over the Republic of Moldova’s territory on several occasions, in clear violation of Moldova’s sovereignty, and on several occasions Russian missile debris has fallen on Moldovan territory, causing damage and endangering the lives of civilians; whereas Moldova’s air surveillance and defence is in urgent need of investment and modernisation and the Moldovan Government has asked its Western partners for air-defence systems; J. whereas on 20 July 2023, the EU granted another one-year extension, until 24 July 2024, of its temporary suspension of tariffs and entry-price systems still applicable to seven Moldovan agricultural products; K. whereas on 24 April 2023, the EU set up the Partnership Mission in Moldova under the common security and defence policy, with the objective of enhancing the security sector’s resilience in the areas of crisis management, hybrid threats and countering foreign information manipulation and interference; L. whereas on 18 September 2023, Moldova joined the EU Civil Protection Mechanism as a participating state; 1. Reaffirms its commitment to the Republic of Moldova’s future membership of the EU and acknowledges that its place is in the EU; believes that it would constitute a geostrategic investment in a united and strong Europe; looks forward to the Commission’s assessment on the Republic of Moldova’s fulfilment of the steps identified in the Commission’s opinion as part of the 2023 enlargement package; 2. Reiterates its call on the Commission and the European Council to start the EU accession negotiations with the Republic of Moldova by the end of 2023; 3. Underlines the importance of continuing the country’s reform process, not only in order to achieve the political objective of EU membership, but above all to tangibly improve the living standards of the population, especially of the more vulnerable groups, and to provide the younger generations with attractive prospects for life and work in the country; welcomes the broad popular support in the Republic of Moldova for its European integration, as shown in the most recent opinion polls and as seen at the European Moldova National Assembly on 21 May 2023, where over 80 000 people gathered in the Great National Assembly Square in Chișinău to express their support for the European future of Moldova; 4. Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase financial and technical assistance to the Republic of Moldova to facilitate the process of the country’s swift and effective integration into the EU; calls on the Commission to swiftly disburse the next instalment of the ongoing macro financial assistance for the Republic of Moldova and to identify additional funds for Moldova during the revision of the multiannual financial framework in 2023; welcomes, in this regard, the decision by the European Council to increase macro financial assistance to Moldova; calls on the Commission to ensure that all its future requirements remain clear and precise and to avoid setting moving targets for candidate countries; underlines that the Commission’s engagement with the authorities at an early stage of elaboration of policies and reforms, accompanied by its providing technical assistance, will enable the Republic of Moldova to maintain the speed and quality of the reforms required for EU accession; 5. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal to create a dedicated Ukraine facility to support the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of the country; notes that the planned allocation of up to EUR 50 billion for the facility between 2024 and 2027 for both grants and loans will replace the planned support for Ukraine under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) - Global Europe; calls for all bilateral support for Ukraine provided for in the NDICI - Global Europe to be redirected to the Republic of Moldova, as an EU candidate country neighbouring Ukraine that has also suffered the most from the consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; 6. Calls on the Commission to work towards the inclusion of the Republic of Moldova in the revised IPA III Regulation(2), including by sufficiently increasing the overall IPA III budget and by providing support to help the country adequately prepare for optimal utilisation of pre-accession funds; welcomes the ongoing implementation of the wider AA/DCFTA and calls on the Moldovan authorities to continue work towards its full and effective implementation, as well as on democracy, governance and rule of law reforms in general, as a demonstration of their ambition to prepare for EU membership and to fulfil the obligations of an EU Member State; is pleased with the presentation of the EU-Moldova Priority Action Plan in June 2023, which will function as a roadmap for the full implementation of the DCFTA and Moldova’s further integration into the EU single market, with jointly agreed priorities for 2023-2024; 7. Reiterates its call for an innovative, complementary and flexible interaction between the implementation of the Association Agreement and the accession negotiation process, allowing for the Republic of Moldova’s gradual integration into the EU single market, based on a priority action plan and relevant sectoral programmes and providing access to relevant EU funds, enabling Moldovan citizens to reap the benefits of accession during the process rather than only at its completion; 8. Welcomes the Moldovan authorities’ considerable efforts to advance the reform agenda in order to progress towards EU membership; commends the progress made by the Republic of Moldova on justice-sector reform, especially in the context of the implementation of the Commission recommendations on Moldova’s accession application; encourages the government to work with all stakeholders towards a sustainable and comprehensive justice and anti-corruption reform, in line with EU and Venice Commission recommendations; calls on the government to continue its work on de-oligarchisation, the public finance management reform, the fight against organised crime and the public administration reform; 9. Emphasises the absolute priority of strengthening the rule of law, which has substantially gained in importance in the EU accession process and remains one of the most important conditions for EU membership to ensure that EU enlargement strengthens rather than weakens the EU and its single market; expects, therefore, the Republic of Moldova to continue and complete the vetting process of its judiciary and recommends that it strengthen coordination among all institutions established for and involved in the fight against corruption and develop a holistic anti-corruption approach that would cover all stages from prevention to prosecution; 10. Recalls the rapid pace of transformative economic reforms that the Republic of Moldova has embarked on, including spearheading a massive deregulation process for its economy, cutting red tape and limiting bureaucracy, while accelerating the pace of digital transformation, in order to improve Moldova’s business climate and make it easier to do business in Moldova; recalls that trade synergies between the Republic of Moldova and the EU are significant, constituting nearly half of Moldova’s commerce last year, with more than 58 % of its exports going to EU countries; 11. Welcomes the efforts undertaken to enhance the involvement of civil society in decision-making processes; notes that the consultations portal particip.gov.md has been updated and now allows for automatic forwarding of policy and legal drafts to stakeholders and collection of their comments and proposals; encourages the authorities to continue improving the transparency of decision-making and involving civil society at all levels, as this will strengthen public support for the reforms; welcomes all initiatives by civil society and the international community to support judicial integrity and reform in the country, in particular those efforts that make the general public aware of the positive impact that an independent, competent and efficient judiciary has on the everyday lives of citizens; 12. Welcomes the agreement associating the Republic of Moldova with the Connecting Europe Facility, signed on 9 May 2023, and the agreement on its participation in the EU single market programme, signed on 8 September 2023; reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to support the Republic of Moldova’s integration by incorporating the country into EU programmes, instruments and agencies such as the Digital Europe programme, the European Environment Agency, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), DiscoverEU and the Justice Programme (JUST), as well as strengthening the country’s participation in programmes it has already joined, such as Erasmus Mundus; welcomes recent developments regarding ‘roam like at home’ and security, which will accelerate legislative harmonisation and result in the concrete benefit of closer ties between the EU and citizens of the Republic of Moldova; 13. Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue to provide political, economic, and humanitarian support to the Republic of Moldova, including through the Moldova Support Platform; 14. Welcomes the renewal of the temporary trade liberalisation measures to support the Republic of Moldova’s economy by suspending all tariff-rate quotas and calls for their further extension; calls for the EU to take swift and significant steps towards the permanent liberalisation of its tariff-rate quotas in order to ensure predictability and increase the country’s medium-to-long-term attractiveness for investors; reiterates its call for the EU, given the structure of the small Moldovan economy and based on positive audit assessments, to further permit the import of Moldovan goods of animal origin and to increase its financial assistance to Moldovan farmers affected by the market disruption as a consequence of the war in Ukraine; notes that the aforementioned measures should also be accompanied by support for the sustainability of Moldova’s agricultural production; 15. Strongly condemns the unprecedented hybrid operations orchestrated by the Russian Federation, conducted through its criminal proxies, which are subverting electoral processes in the Republic of Moldova by means of illicit financial support to political parties, with a view to undermining the security, sovereignty, and democratic foundations of the country; calls, in this context, for the EU to increase its support for the Moldovan Government’s efforts to prevent such interference in the country’s democratic processes, including through additional targeted sanctions listings; 16. Calls on all political actors to contribute towards fulfilling the European aspirations of the people of Moldova, by seeking to establish consensus over the most important and urgent reforms, actively engaging in the legislative work of the Parliament of Moldova with the aim of further harmonising Moldova’s legislation with EU standards, and engaging with civil society over all major reforms as well as the country’s European orientation; expresses its willingness to contribute to supporting and strengthening parliamentary democracy in the Republic of Moldova, including through the Jean Monnet Dialogue, when appropriate within its domestic context; welcomes, in this respect, the ongoing work to revise the rules of procedure and code of conduct of the Parliament of Moldova; calls in this regards for consideration to be given to strengthening the everyday cooperation between the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova and the European Parliament by establishing the permanent presence of staff in each other’s parliaments, which could entail appointing a permanent European Parliament representative to the Moldovan Parliament and inviting the Moldovan Parliament to appoint a permanent representative in Brussels; believes that such a decision would be a proactive sign of that the EU and Moldova are making the best use of the current opportunities between them and will strengthen information exchanges, the implementation of joint projects and future EU accession talks; calls on the Moldovan Government to invite civil society representatives to also be part of the 35 working groups responsible for negotiating the EU accession chapters and to intensify cooperation with civil society in helping the country to advance along the European path; 17. Welcomes the adoption by the Council of a new sanctions framework to target actions aimed at destabilising Moldova, including attempts to undermine its sovereignty and independence by means of corruption; welcomes the Council’s decision to use this framework to sanction Ilan Șor, Vladimir Plahotniuc, Igor Ceaika, Gheorghe Cavcaliuc and Marina Tauber; calls for the EU and national authorities to make sure those sanctions are duly implemented; calls on the respective hosting states and territories to extradite Ilan Șor and Vladimir Plahotniuc to stand trial in the Republic of Moldova; calls on the Commission and the Council to strengthen the policy targeting legal entities and individuals who attempt to obstruct or undermine the democratic political process of the Republic of Moldova; 18. Reiterates its call on the Russian authorities to respect the Republic of Moldova’s independence, its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to cease its provocations and attempts to destabilise the country and undermine its constitutional order and democratic institutions, to withdraw its military forces from the territory of the Republic of Moldova and to support a peaceful resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, in line with the principles of international law and with the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit decisions; 19. Calls for the EU and its institutions to continue to support the Republic of Moldova’s efforts to modernise its payments system so as to enable it to meet the conditions for integration into the Single Euro Payments Area; 20. Calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure that all necessary assistance is provided to the Republic of Moldova to strengthen its institutional mechanisms and its ability to respond to hybrid threats; calls for the EU and its Member States to fully operationalise and strengthen the EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova (EUPM Moldova) so that it can fulfil its mission to enhance the Republic of Moldova’s resilience; welcomes, in this regard, the signature on 29 September 2023 of the Agreement on the Status of the EUPM as an important step towards enabling the Mission to fully implement its mandate; calls for the necessary financial resources to be ensured to efficiently implement projects, particularly in the field of training and equipping, so as to strengthen the Republic of Moldova’s capabilities; 21. Notes, with satisfaction, the continued work under the high-level political and security dialogue between the EU and the Republic of Moldova to enhance cooperation on foreign and security policy, raise relevant issues of concern for regional security and stability and discuss possibilities for close coordination and effective assistance and support measures; stresses the importance of such dialogue in the context of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine and its direct consequences for the security of the Republic of Moldova and the stability of the political, economic and social situation in the country; commends the Republic of Moldova’s ability to withstand these destabilising circumstances and actions; commends, in particular, the Republic of Moldova’s gradually increasing coordination on, and alignment with, the common foreign and security policy, which testifies to the country’s willingness and preparedness to contribute to the policy and positively distinguishes it from certain other candidate countries; 22. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to improve strategic communication about the EU in the Republic of Moldova; calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue to support media literacy and the independence of the media in the Republic of Moldova, as well as to support the digital hardening of its critical infrastructure and the replacement of Russian-origin ICT systems; 23. Welcomes the signature on 29 September 2023 of the Agreement allowing the Republic of Moldova to become a participating state in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism; underlines that the country has already proven to be a reliable partner by hosting and sheltering Ukrainians fleeing the war and that, by joining the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, the Republic of Moldova will contribute directly to enhancing emergency preparedness and building a more resilient disaster risk management system in Europe; 24. Calls for the EU and its Member States to consolidate the EU Support Hub for Internal Security and Border Management in Moldova, which will coordinate the support that the EU and its Member States provide to Moldova to strengthen law enforcement and thus also better deal with the criminal and security implications of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; 25. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to continue to help the Republic of Moldova to ensure its energy independence, including by increasing its generating capacity, connectivity, diversification and energy efficiency; urges the EU to use emergency funding to enhance the connection of the Republic of Moldova to the EU’s electricity grid, through projects such as the Bălți-Suceava interconnection; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their support for the rehabilitation and upgrading of the Republic of Moldova’s transport infrastructure, including through the laying of a European-gauge track connection from Chișinău to Iași (Romania), as a way of supporting the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes and Moldova and Ukraine’s economies; 26. Reiterates its call on the Commission, in the light of the Republic of Moldova’s challenges and status as an EU candidate country, to further increase its staff capacity dealing with and supporting the country’s accession process, both in Brussels and in Chișinău and to establish a dedicated unit for the Republic of Moldova within the Commission’s Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations; calls on the Commission to expand the opportunities for Moldova to participate in and observe the work of the EU institutions, as well as to enhance structured political dialogue, including dialogue on the margins of the European Council; 27. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe.
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| The new European strategy for a better internet for kids (BIK+) |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), – having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, – having regard to Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography(1) (The Child Sexual Abuse Directive), – having regard to Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (The Audiovisual Media Services Directive)(2), – having regard to Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’)(3), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)(4), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act)(5), – having regard to the Commission proposal of 11 May 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse (COM(2022)0209) and the opinion of the Committee on Culture and Education, – having regard to the Commission communication of 11 May 2022 entitled ‘A Digital Decade for children and youth: the new European strategy for a better internet for kids (BIK+)’ (COM(2022)0212), – having regard to the Commission communication of 9 March 2021 entitled ‘2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade’ (COM(2021)0118), – having regard to the Commission communication of 24 March 2021 entitled ‘EU strategy on the rights of the child’ (COM(2021)0142), – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 September 2020 entitled ‘Achieving the European Education Area by 2025’ (COM(2020)0625), – having regard to the joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 23 January 2023 entitled ‘The European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade’(6) (The European Declaration), – having regard to its resolution of 20 November 2012 on protecting children in the digital world(7) and the Commission follow-up adopted on 20 February 2013, – having regard to the study by the Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies of the Directorate-General for Internal Policies of 15 February 2023 entitled ‘The influence of social media on the development of children and young people’(8), – having regard to the study by EU Kids Online of 12 February 2020 entitled ‘EU Kids Online 2020: Survey results from 19 countries’(9), – having regard to the study by the Joint Research Centre of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘How children (10-18) experienced online risks during the COVID-19 lockdown: Spring 2020’(10), – having regard to the question to the Commission on the new European strategy for a better internet for kids (BIK+) (O‑000030/2023 – B9‑0029/2023), – having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Culture and Education, A. whereas a child is entitled to all the rights and values enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Charter and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, including their digital rights; whereas the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration in all digital actions and decisions concerning them and their physical and mental health, safety and well-being; B. whereas the General Data Protection Regulation, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the Digital Services Act and the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive recognise that children merit specific protection with regard to their online experience in the constantly evolving digital environment; C. whereas ensuring appropriate protection for children online requires specific measures and education programmes targeting not only children, but also their teachers, parents and caregivers; whereas these measures should primarily seek to develop and implement prevention techniques and awareness-raising and digital literacy campaigns; whereas parents and caregivers should be informed of the existence and functioning of the digital tools in order to limit and direct their child’s/children’s experience online and restrict access to age-inappropriate or harmful content online; D. whereas children should not be passive technology consumers, but be actively in charge of the technologies they use; whereas, in this regard, promoting digital education and enhancing the digital skills and competences, including media literacy, of children, parents and educators, particularly children from vulnerable groups, in line with the Charter, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the European Declaration and the 2030 Digital Compass, are key to ensuring safe digital experiences for children, as well as their digital empowerment and active participation online; E. whereas targeted measures to combat the digital divide and enhance equal opportunities should be made available so as to offer inclusive and accessible digital environments for every child in the EU, particularly those from vulnerable groups, such as children with disabilities or from disadvantaged backgrounds, including by equipping them with modern digital infrastructure, also in remote or rural areas; F. whereas lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic have highlighted the educational and digital divides, impacting children’s access to digital education tools and information, and their social participation and inclusion, and have also had negative effects on their physical and mental health; whereas it also led to an increase in domestic and gender-based violence and child sexual abuse and exploitation online, on both the surface web and the dark web; G. whereas several monitoring studies have found evidence of children being active on social media from an early age, with significant numbers under the minimum age set by most social media platforms; H. whereas the constantly evolving digital environment is central to children’s everyday life, including their education, communication and data sharing; whereas children’s access to and experience on the internet and social media platforms have many benefits, but also pose some risks and expose children to dangerous behaviours and content, due to their pervasiveness, such as online child sexual abuse and solicitation (grooming), cyberhate, different forms of cyberbullying, sexualised content, violent images, content that promotes eating disorders, and disinformation; whereas this may affect children’s physical and mental health, including increased aggression, problematic sexual behaviours, unhealthy eating habits, body image dissatisfaction and distorted values and attitudes; I. whereas the EU Kids Online 2020 survey estimates that 23 % of children between the ages of 9 and 16 have been bullied online; whereas the study on ‘How children (10-18) experienced online risks during the Covid-19 lockdown: Spring 2020’ found that 49 % of children have experienced at least one form of online aggression or bullying; whereas, even if there is no streamlined approach, some Member States have already taken measures such as Coco’s Law in Ireland; J. whereas the new European strategy for a better internet for kids (BIK+) is one of the cornerstone actions of the EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child, which includes initiatives to ensure that children are protected and empowered online within its thematic areas; 1. Welcomes and endorses the Commission’s new European strategy for a better internet for kids (BIK+); 2. Stresses that all children need protection online, but certain children are in a more vulnerable situation, such as those with disabilities or from disadvantaged backgrounds, and should be able to benefit from targeted measures, where appropriate, to bridge the digital divide and enhance their digital skills and competences, including media literacy; 3. Reiterates its call for the EU to step up its action to keep children safe online and raise awareness on and prevent child sexual abuse, including online solicitation of children (online grooming); 4. Emphasises that digital skills and competences, including media literacy, should be recognised as mandatory skills and should be included in the school curriculum across the EU; underlines that they are an essential part of education and lifelong learning and should focus on educating children, parents, carers, educators and the general public on online safety, including online parental control and how to recognise and report online solicitation of children; 5. Calls for the EU and the Member States to allocate more investment to education and training to ensure digital literacy, including protection from peer-to-peer bullying and cyberbullying in and outside schools, for children of different age groups, while taking into account new technological developments, such as the metaverse; 6. Calls on the Member States and educational institutions to guarantee the right to inclusive education and to promote, in an age-appropriate manner, sex education, digital skills and competences, including media literacy, and cyber safety through formal, non-formal and informal education, targeting educators, parents, carers and pupils; 7. Calls on the Commission to develop, in coordination with the European Education Area, a European strategy against bullying and cyberbullying in schools, establishing a package of measures to improve data collection, and to propose the necessary solutions in cooperation with the Member States; 8. Stresses that the strategy should call on the Member States to allocate all the necessary resources to strengthen the capacities of hotlines, helplines and Safer Internet Centres, and to develop and implement meaningful prevention and awareness-raising campaigns in their schools, with demonstrable results, as a vital part of their early education curricula and educational institutions; believes that cooperation between researchers and practitioners is key in this regard; 9. Stresses that it is important that the strategy introduce measures to update the existing EU framework for action on mental health and well-being, which should be fully inclusive, in order to also meet the needs of children experiencing online sexual abuse or solicitation, especially those from vulnerable groups; calls for the availability and adequacy of mental health care providers for children to be assessed by conducting a thorough mapping of existing services in the light of the deteriorating mental health situation, which has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the unique set of challenges posed by the online environment, including cyberbullying and exposure to harmful content; 10. Takes note of the creation of a European standard on online age verification by 2024 and the recent setting up of the special group on the EU Code of Conduct on age-appropriate design (The Code); emphasises the importance of developing the Code in a timely manner, by ensuring its full alignment with the Audiovisual Media Services Directive and the General Data Protection Regulation; stresses the importance of involving civil society, academia and young people in the Code development process; underlines the obligation, under the General Data Protection Regulation, of social media platforms that rely on user consent to make reasonable efforts to verify parental consent before children under the relevant age limit may create an account; 11. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to scale up investments in the provision of support to victims of online child abuse or solicitation, including anonymous public reporting, and mental health and psychosocial services for victims and their families; calls for training to be made available for professionals and officials, including in law enforcement authorities, who deal with cases involving children, depending on their specific needs; 12. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide more systematic data collection on prevention measures and victim assistance programmes, including the number of children in primary education who are taking part in awareness-raising campaigns, and through education programmes on the risks of all forms of sexual exploitation of children, including in the online environment; 13. Underlines the lack of sufficient comparative research at EU level, as well as studies on children’s development in the context of digitalisation; highlights, in this regard, that the fast-paced development of technologies may rapidly overtake policies, thus creating new vulnerabilities for children; recalls, therefore, the need to develop a large-scale research activity at EU level; 14. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the BIK+ Strategy is consistent with other priorities and legislative proposals, that information is presented to children in child-friendly language, that children of all ages are involved in the monitoring process and the effective implementation of the strategy and that there is adequate follow-up to compare best practices and results across the Member States; 15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
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