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 Objection to an implementing act: Maximum residue levels for thiacloprid |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to the proposal for a Council regulation amending Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards maximum residue levels for thiacloprid in or on certain products (COM(2023)0739), – having regard to Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 February 2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed of plant and animal origin and amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC(1), and in particular Article 14(1), point (a), and Article 49(2) thereof, – having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC(2), and in particular Article 4(1) and Article 4(2), first subparagraph, point (a), and point 3.6.4 of Annex II, – having regard to Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety(3), and in particular Article 5(1) thereof, – having regard to Articles 11, 13, 168 and 191 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to the reasoned opinion adopted by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on 9 February 2023, and published on 15 March 2023(4), – having regard to the conclusion on pesticides peer review approved by EFSA on 17 January 2019, and published on 14 March 2019(5), – having regard to the opinion adopted by the Committee for Risk Assessment (RAC) of the European Chemical Agency (ECHA) on 12 March 2015(6), – having regard to Article 5a(4), point (e), and Article 5a(5) of Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission(7), – having regard to Rule 112(2) and (3), and (4)(c) of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the motion for a resolution by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, A. whereas thiacloprid is an active ingredient in insecticides mainly used on cotton, pome fruit, vegetables, and potatoes; B. whereas the approval of the active substance thiacloprid expired on 3 February 2020, and was not renewed according to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/23(8); whereas the grace period for plant protection products containing thiacloprid expired on 3 February 2021; C. whereas the approval of the active substance thiacloprid was not renewed as it could not be established with respect to one or more representative uses of at least one plant protection product that the approval criteria provided for in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 were satisfied; whereas, in particular, EFSA identified two critical areas of concern; whereas the first critical area of concern related to the indication of the contamination of groundwater with several relevant metabolites of thiacloprid whose carcinogenic potential could not be excluded (M30, M34 and M46) above the parametric drinking water limit of 0,1 µg/L for all the representative uses(9); whereas the second critical area of concern related to the harmonised classification by ECHA of thiacloprid as presumed to damage fertility and the unborn child (toxic for reproduction category 1B) in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council(10) making thiacloprid a ‘cut-off substance’ in accordance with Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009; D. whereas EFSA also concluded that the assessment of the risks to bees and non-target terrestrial plants could not be finalised; E. whereas thiacloprid is also classified in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 as suspected of causing cancer (carcinogenic category 2), very toxic for aquatic life (aquatic acute 1), and very toxic for aquatic life with long lasting effect (aquatic chronic 1); F. whereas the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed (PAFF Committee) has not delivered an opinion on the proposal for a Council regulation; whereas, during the PAFF Committee meeting held on 18-19 September 2023, ‘[e]ight Member States did not support the draft Regulation. Six of them mentioned first and foremost their concerns with maintaining CXLs and import tolerances for a non-approved substance which meets on[e] of the cut-off criteria under Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 (toxic for reproduction). In addition, one Member State that did not support the draft Regulation had concerns that EFSA had indicated exceedances of the acute reference dose for some products in certain non-standard circumstances, another one mentioned the discrimination of EU farmers that may no longer use plant protection products containing this active substance, while farmers in third countries could still do so, thus leading to unfair competition’(11); G. whereas Germany requested the following declaration to be included in the summary report of the PAFF Committee meeting held on 18-19 September 2023: ‘Thiacloprid is a cut-off active substance according to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009. During the re-approval procedure of the active substance, it was determined that it meets the cut-off criteria as it has a classification as toxic to reproduction 1B. Accordingly, the active substance was not re-approved. Germany does in general not support the setting of [maximum residue limits (MRLs)] for active substances that are not approved in the EU due to health concerns. The decisive factor here is that the cut-off criteria have been established within the framework of the (re-)approval procedure of an active substance pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009’(12); H. whereas it is therefore appropriate to delete the existing MRLs set for thiacloprid in Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 in accordance with Article 17 of that Regulation in conjunction with Article 14(1), point (a), thereof; I. whereas, in the proposal for a Council regulation, the Commission is however proposing to maintain the MRLs for thiacloprid above the limit of determination for use on more than 30 products for import purposes based on EFSA’s reasoned opinion(13); J. whereas the uses for which MRLs above the limit of determination are considered safe include uses of thiacloprid on papayas, tea, tree nuts, quinces, medlars, loquats/Japanese medlars, apricots, cherries (sweet), plums, strawberries, blackberries, dewberries, other small fruits and berries, kiwis, potatoes, tomatoes, aubergines/eggplants, melons, watermelons, rice, wheat, animal (swine, bovine, sheep, horse, poultry, and other farm animals) products from tissues (muscle, liver, kidney and edible offal), milk and eggs, raspberries, cucumbers, courgettes, rapeseeds/canola seeds, mustard seeds and cotton seeds; whereas the MRLs proposed for those uses range from twice the limit of determination up to a thousand time the limit of determination (for use on teas); K. whereas, by contrast, the request for import tolerances were refused only for two uses (on peaches and sweet peppers) since an exceedance of the acute reference dose cannot be excluded and the Commission therefore proposed to lower the MRLs for thiacloprid to the limit of determination only for those uses; L. whereas recital (5) of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 provides that residues should not be present at levels presenting an unacceptable risk to humans and, where relevant, to animals; M. whereas Article 4(2), point (a), of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 provides that residues of plant protection products shall not have any harmful effect on human heath, including that of vulnerable groups, or animal health, taking into account known cumulative and synergistic effects; whereas point 3.6.4 of Annex II to that Regulation provides that an active substance classified, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008, as toxic for reproduction category 1A or 1B, shall not be approved unless ‘residues of the active substance [...] concerned on food and feed do not exceed the default value set in accordance with point (b) of Article 18(1) of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005’; whereas Article 18(1), point (b), of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 sets a default value of 0,01 mg/kg; N. whereas Article 3(2), point (g), of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 provides that import tolerance is an MRL set for imported products when ‘the use of the active substance in a plant protection product on a given product is not authorised in the Community for reasons other than public health reasons for the specific product and specific use’; whereas thiacloprid does not meet those criteria as it has been banned for health reasons, since it is classified as toxic to reproduction category 1B; O. whereas Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 provides that food law is to pursue one or more of the general objectives of a high level of protection of human life and health and the protection of consumers’ interests, including fair practices in food trade, taking into account, where appropriate, the protection of animal health and welfare, plant health and the environment; P. whereas the present pollinator crisis is one of the main threats to biodiversity and global and local food security; whereas that crisis can worsen the problems of hidden hunger, erodes ecosystem resilience, and can destabilise ecosystems that form our life support system(14); Q. whereas the Commission announced in its communication of 20 May 2020 on ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’(15) that ‘[t]he EU will support the global transition to sustainable agri-food systems, in line with the objectives of this strategy and the SDGs’, and that ‘[t]he EU can play a key role in setting global standards with this strategy’; whereas the Commission explicitly stated in the strategy that “[a] more sustainable EU food system also requires increasingly sustainable practices by our trading partners. In order to promote a gradual move towards the use of safer plant protection products, the EU will consider, in compliance with WTO rules and following a risk assessment, to review import tolerances for substances meeting the “cut-off criteria” and presenting a high level of risk for human health’; R. whereas, in 2022, the Commission lowered(16) the MRLs for two neonicotinoids that pose a high risk to pollinators to the lowest level that can be measured with the latest technologies, whereby imported products can no longer contain residues of clothianidin and thiamethoxam; S. whereas in that regard the Commission argued that ‘taking into account all the factors relevant to the matter under consideration in accordance with Article 14(2), read in the light of Article 11 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, requiring that “environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development”, all the current MRLs for clothianidin and/or thiamethoxam as set out by Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 should be lowered to the Limit of Determination (LODs)’(17); T. whereas in the PAFF Committee held on 10-11 May 2023, ‘[t]he Commission recalled that thiacloprid belongs to the group of neonicotinoids actives substances [but that] since it has different properties than clothianidin and thiamethoxam, it is currently not envisaged to follow the same approach as for clothianidin and thiamethoxam implementing the Farm to Fork Strategy by lowering all MRLs to the LOQ’(18); U. whereas the fact that thiacloprid would have different properties than other neonicotinoids is disputed in the scientific literature, with results showing that ‘the image of thiacloprid as a relatively benign neonicotinoid should now be questioned’(19); V. whereas, in particular, colonies of bumblebees exposed to thiacloprid have been found to be more likely to die prematurely, and those that survived to suffer from sublethal effects(20); whereas thiacloprid has also been found to affect the behaviour and immune system of honey bees similarly to imidacloprid, clothianidin and thiamethoxam(21),(22); W. whereas there is increasing evidence that the use of thiacloprid has a devastating impact on biodiversity and especially bees and other pollinators(23); X. whereas, in its non-renewal report of 22 October 2019(24), EFSA concluded that ‘the information available is insufficient to satisfy the requirements set out in Article 4(1) to (3) of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009’, and in particular that ‘[t]he risk assessment for bees could not be finalised’; Y. whereas thiacloprid should therefore be subject to the same reasoning and rules that were applied to clothianidin and thiamethoxam; Z. whereas the Commission must protect the environment and Union citizens on the basis of the available scientific information, using the obligations and legal possibilities that Regulations (EC) No 396/2005 and (EC) No 178/2002 provide for to ensure a high level of protection of human and animal health and the environment; AA. whereas the proposed MRLs do not protect the health of citizens in the Union and do not secure a high level of protection for bees and other pollinators, and they are thereby contrary to Regulations (EC) No 396/2005 and (EC) No 178/2002; AB. whereas MRLs should not be set for active substances that are not approved in the Union due to health concerns; whereas therefore no import tolerances should be set for thiacloprid as it is classified as toxic for reproduction category 1B; whereas further the classification of thiacloprid as toxic for reproduction category 1B should have been reason enough for the Commission to refuse the requests for import tolerances with reference to the risks for the health of citizens in third countries; 1. Opposes adoption of the proposal for a Council regulation; 2. Considers that the proposal for a Council regulation is not compatible with the aim and content of Regulations (EC) No 396/2005 and (EC) No 178/2002, as well as with Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, including point 3.6.4 of its Annex II; 3. Calls on the Commission to withdraw the proposal for a regulation; 4. Calls on the Commission to submit a new draft to the committee lowering all MRLs for thiacloprid to the limit of determination for all uses and to refuse any requests for import tolerances; 5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
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| EC/Indonesia Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation: accession of Croatia to the EU |
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(Consent) The European Parliament, – having regard to the draft Council decision (12975/2014), – having regard to the draft Accession Protocol to the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Indonesia, of the other part, to take account of the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union(1), – having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Articles 207 and 209 and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9‑0314/2023), – having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4) and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0428/2023), 1. Gives its consent to the conclusion of the protocol; 2. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Republic of Indonesia.
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| Empowering consumers for the green transition |
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(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading) The European Parliament, – having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0143), – having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9‑0128/2022), – having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 13 July 2022(1), – having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 25 October 2023 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, – having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A9-0099/2023), 1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out(2); 2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; 3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 17 January 2024 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2024/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU as regards empowering consumers for the green transition through better protection against unfair practices and through better information
(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Directive (EU) 2024/825).
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| Mercury: dental amalgam and other mercury-added products subject to manufacturing, import and export restrictions |
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(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)
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| Cultural diversity and the conditions for authors in the European music streaming market |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, – having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC(1), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 establishing the Creative Europe Programme (2021 to 2027) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1295/2013(2), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act)(3), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act)(4), – having regard to its resolution of 14 December 2022 on the implementation of the New European Agenda for Culture and the EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations(5), – having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2021 on Europe’s Media in the Digital Decade: an Action Plan to Support Recovery and Transformation(6), – having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2021 on the situation of artists and the cultural recovery in the EU(7), – having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on artificial intelligence in education, culture and the audiovisual sector(8), – having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a framework of ethical aspects of artificial intelligence, robotics and related technologies(9), – having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2020 on intellectual property rights for the development of artificial intelligence technologies(10), – having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 on the cultural recovery of Europe(11), – having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the report of the Committee on Culture and Education (A9-0388/2023), A. whereas the music sector is a major pillar of culture, as a vital component of cultural and linguistic diversity in the Union, with the widest public outreach of any cultural and creative sector (CCS); B. whereas the music sector is an important part of the CCS, which is recognised as one of the 14 key ecosystems for building the European economy, as it brings growth and the creation of jobs, including for young people; C. whereas composers, songwriters and performers are at the very root of the music sector value chain and are the first and foremost creative driving forces of all music distributed on streaming platforms; D. whereas rapid innovations in digital technologies over the last two decades have profoundly transformed the music sector, in particular the way music is created, produced and distributed and the way people access and consume it; E. whereas the music sector is constantly and rapidly adapting, with new business models, new ways of interacting with audiences and the use of complementary platforms such as social media platforms or short-form video apps, which create both new opportunities and challenges; whereas, in this context, significant challenges need to be addressed, such as the promotion of cultural diversity and fair remuneration for authors; F. whereas the main way that people now enjoy music is via streaming music services through either digital music platforms or platforms where online users upload content, including social media platforms, live performance streaming or short-form video apps, which provide access to up to 100 million tracks that are available anywhere, anytime and on all kinds of devices, either for free or for a comparatively low monthly subscription fee; G. whereas streaming represents 67 % of the music sector’s global revenue(12); whereas the global music sector has experienced sustained growth, culminating in 2022 with an eighth consecutive year of growth and annual revenue of USD 22,6 billion; whereas the increasing number of investors in the music sector reveals its enormous overall economic value; H. whereas authors and performers are frequently not recognised or remunerated in a way that reflects the true extent of their contribution, which results in a majority of authors receiving very low revenue from the music streaming market and often means they are unable to sustain their professional careers, which creates a significant imbalance over time that needs to be addressed(13); whereas there is a need to explore fairer models of streaming revenue allocation for authors and performers, by looking into different available mechanisms, such as pro-rata and user-centred models or totally new ones; whereas the criteria on how streams are counted by platforms may also have an impact on streaming manipulation practices; I. whereas studies point out that the current situation is characterised by new challenges, as well as several long-standing systemic issues that the music sector continues to face, in particular a decline in the overall value of products, a concentration of revenue takings by major labels and the most popular artists, a lack of quality data to properly identify authors, performers or other rights holders, streaming manipulation, the illegal use of music content by online content-sharing service providers and dominant online platforms and apps stores; recalls that all of these factors affect the fairness and sustainability of the revenues generated by the music streaming market; J. whereas the average price of a monthly subscription to a music streaming service has not increased over the years since the launch of such services, especially when taking into account inflation and the vast increase in the content available; K. whereas authors’ rights should not be considered as a free asset for music services’ own commercial and promotional strategies; L. whereas music streaming platforms, through their use of algorithms and recommendation systems, play an essential role in the discovery of content and therefore have a significant impact on cultural diversity; whereas they may also influence, select or inflate the visibility of certain tracks and therefore the revenues of authors and composers, as well as other players in the European CCS; M. whereas music streaming platforms should continue their efforts to increase overall transparency and traceability on many operational aspects of high relevance to authors, performers and other rights holders; whereas music streaming platforms are under no obligation to provide transparency on their algorithms and recommendation tools or to ensure the promotion of European musical works; N. whereas the promotion of cultural diversity in the European music streaming market, including the promotion of European artists worldwide, needs to be further analysed to unleash the full potential of the European CCS, which cannot depend solely on the commercial decisions of dominant private global operators; O. whereas the music sector is increasingly confronted with the rise of AI-generated content, with a growing number of tracks flooding streaming platforms on a daily basis, which risks aggravating existing imbalances as regards discoverability and the remuneration of authors; whereas the development of AI technologies should instead serve and enhance human creativity and their use should be transparent; P. whereas several studies have identified cases of streaming fraud and manipulation, as certain players work to manipulate the system to skim off revenues that should go to authors and performers, for example, by using bots to artificially inflate the number of listeners for certain uploaded tracks(14); whereas detection systems and identification mechanisms to mitigate this fraudulent behaviour on music streaming platforms are so far limited; Q. whereas it is important to ensure a functioning single market for the online distribution of music; whereas, therefore, more dedicated efforts should be made to tackle and eliminate discrepancies and imbalances, given their impact on the market, in particular with regard to revenue share from streaming platforms; whereas to this end, further investigation and analysis should be conducted to collect data and identify factors that could create obstacles to the circulation of music content across Europe; R. whereas the proper identification of authors is crucial not only for their recognition and better remuneration, but also for ensuring diversity and transparency on platforms; 1. Stresses the need to support and create rules ensuring a fair and sustainable ecosystem for music streaming in the Union that both promotes cultural diversity and addresses the imbalances that negatively affect the sector, especially its authors and performers, and may prevent it from flourishing; 2. Highlights that all actors in the music streaming value chain need to engage in an effective dialogue that includes authors and performers and make the necessary changes to ensure a fair, inclusive and sustainable ecosystem in the sector, so that it can contribute to cultural diversity, by providing opportunities to discover artists, as well as by promoting local repertoires; 3. Notes with concern that the current imbalance in revenue allocation in the music streaming market disfavours both authors and performers and puts the sustainability of their professional careers in the digital market at risk; welcomes any efforts towards fairer remuneration for authors and performers, in recognition of the importance of their role in the European music sector; 4. Calls on the Commission to assess the impact of existing contractual practices in the European music streaming market, as well as of the current revenue distribution model for music streaming services, on cultural diversity and the principle of appropriate and proportionate remuneration for authors and performers, and calls on it to explore, in cooperation with the relevant stakeholders, appropriate measures, including alternative and fairer models to reallocate streaming revenues; calls on the Commission to examine whether there is a high level of concentration in the music industry and to assess its impact on cultural diversity, on the remuneration of authors and on competition; 5. Urges all stakeholders to take all necessary steps to overcome the current imbalances and asks the Commission to monitor and encourage progress in this regard and to consider appropriate policy proposals, should voluntary stakeholder initiatives fail to produce meaningful solutions; Towards a sustainable ecosystem for authors 6. Emphasises that the key role of authors should be reflected through greater visibility on the music streaming services and a more balanced distribution of streaming revenues; calls on the industry to explore new models for allocating streaming revenue in order to ensure the most equal and fairest distribution possible for authors and performers; 7. Encourages the Commission to evaluate whether the use of new technologies, such as blockchain, and the international identification codes of rights holders, musical works and sound recordings have the potential to improve transparency and cost efficiency within the music streaming market, in particular for the accuracy of metadata and remuneration, especially for authors and performers; regrets that, in general, music streaming services significantly lack such transparency and identification requirements; 8. Underlines the importance of authors becoming members of collective management organisations to ensure the right to collective agreements and collective representation; emphasises that collective negotiations through authors’ societies aim to ensure proper value for the use of authors’ works in the music streaming market, as well as to facilitate fairer access to markets and cultural diversity within the Union; recalls the importance of Directive 2014/26/EU(15), which provides the framework for the online multi-territorial licensing of authors’ rights for music streaming services, ensures authors´ free choice in selecting the most efficient way of managing their remuneration rights, and sets a high level of transparency and good governance rules for collective management organisations, which are crucial for the effective management of repertoires on music streaming platforms; 9. Emphasises that it is essential to improve the identification of anyone involved in the creation process, in particular authors and performers, on music streaming services, by ensuring the comprehensive and accurate allocation of metadata from the time of creation for any track uploaded to a music streaming service; encourages, in this regard, the use of all international identification codes (IPI(16), ISWC(17), ISRC(18), IPN(19) and ISNI(20)); highlights that proper identification of creators plays a key role in the search for and discoverability of works, and enables proper remuneration for creators in the distribution of revenues; 10. Calls on all music industry players to intensify their efforts to ensure the comprehensive and correct metadata allocation of songs by identifying and accurately reporting authors’ data for their musical works on streaming services, including when the uploaded content is done by fully independent authors; 11. Stresses the need to raise awareness, in particular among young authors, of the importance of accurately getting credited and paid for their music in the streaming market; welcomes relevant research programmes and initiatives, including at international level, and calls on the Commission to explore ways to support such initiatives; 12. Recalls the need to ensure the value of authors’ rights, regardless of what music streaming services offer; notes that several recent studies(21),(22) show that a majority of authors and performers do not receive sufficient revenue from music streaming; calls for the revision of pre-digital royalty rates to bring them into line with fair and modern rates; condemns the existence of any schemes, such as so-called payola schemes, that would force authors to accept lower or no revenue in exchange for greater visibility, thereby further reducing authors’ already very low streaming revenue, especially given that the promise of greater visibility remains unfulfilled in most cases; 13. Notes that the competition between music streaming providers on the European market is dominated by a few global players; recalls the need to rapidly implement the Digital Market Act and the Digital Services Act in order to ensure a fair ecosystem, by putting an end to unfair competition practices by online content-sharing platforms and music streaming service providers in the music streaming market, such as those enabling users to illegally stream or download protected content; stressed the need for transparency and efficient auditing in this regard; highlights the necessity of eliminating such infringements on and by platforms, as well as on app stores; 14. Stresses the importance of ensuring investment in new European talent and music, including local artists, niche artists and artists from vulnerable communities, through appropriate funding instruments, including the Creative Europe programme to boost investment in more diverse forms of repertoire in terms of language or genre, in the provision of digital skills and in the digital transformation of business models and stresses the need to raise authors’ awareness of their rights; 15. Supports promoting the sharing of information about artists’ live performances on platforms, especially for local artists, to facilitate new discoveries and further visibility; 16. Asks all stakeholders in the music streaming sector to work together to assess and reduce the carbon footprint of digital music; Prominence and discoverability of European musical works 17. Calls for action to be taken at Union level to guarantee the visibility and accessibility of European musical works, considering the overwhelming amount of content constantly growing on music streaming platforms and the lack of Union rules to regulate them in a harmonised manner; 18. Welcomes the study launched by the Commission that aims to assess the discoverability of European musical works in the music ecosystem, including through music streaming services; asks the Commission, based on these results, to propose adequate measures, including a legal framework to ensure the visibility, accessibility and prominence of European musical works on music streaming platforms; 19. Calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure that such a legal framework includes specific diversity indicators that would allow for an independent assessment of the use and visibility of European musical works and its diversity of genres, languages and independent authors; 20. Stresses, moreover, that such a legal framework would require the Commission to identify best practices to test diversified content promoted on platform interfaces and to regularly monitor and report on this with a clear methodology to comprehend and assess the visibility of European musical works in, among others, curated playlists, user interfaces, algorithmic choices and recommendation systems to ensure prominence and discoverability; 21. Calls on the Commission to collect data and conduct a thorough analysis aimed at ensuring the discoverability of European musical works through music streaming services, as well as to create a structured dialogue between all parties involved; asks the Commission, based on the findings, to reflect on the possibility of imposing concrete measures, such as quotas for European musical works, on music streaming platforms; 22. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to assess adequate ways to preserve the digital European musical heritage, while reducing the de facto dependence on commercial music streaming platforms so as to ensure the availability and accessibility of European musical works in the long term; Towards the ethical use of AI 23. Calls for the ethical use of AI in the CCS, including music, and highlights that AI can be a tool for artists to explore, innovate and enhance their own creations; calls for maximum transparency and stresses the need to ensure compliance with all Union legal requirements on the development, production and delivery of musical works by means of AI technologies; stresses the need to address the specific implications of AI uses in in the CCS; 24. Calls on the Commission to propose legal targeted provisions to ensure the transparency of the algorithms and content recommendation systems on all relevant music streaming platforms, with a view to preventing unfair practices and streaming fraud that are used to reduce costs and further lower value for professional authors; asks the music services to continue investing in adequate tools to identify such activities; 25. Emphasises that the rise of AI-generated content has led to a growing number of tracks uploaded to streaming platforms, which makes ensuring the prominence and discoverability of European musical works even more important; highlights that the public should be aware of whether the musical works, songs or artists they listen to on music streaming platforms have been generated mainly by AI and/or without the substantial contribution of human authors; stresses, in this regard, the need to work towards ensuring that consumers are well-informed, and stresses the need to set up a clear, timely and visible label to inform the public about purely AI-generated works that do not involve the expression of the author’s personality or creativity; 26. Welcomes the dialogue between stakeholders on tackling the spread of deepfakes on music streaming platforms, and calls for the interests of all authors and performers to be considered; recalls that deepfakes are outputs produced by AI models and applications that may use authors’ and performers’ identities, voices and likenesses without their consent; calls for the increased deployment of identification tools to detect deepfakes and manipulated content and calls for easily accessible reporting mechanisms for authors, performers and other rights holders; 27. Stresses that authors, performers and other rights holders should be allowed to reserve and license the rights for the use of their work for AI training, development or design beyond scientific research; emphasises, in this regard, the need for transparency on the training content protected under copyright law for the purposes of generative AI systems in order to ensure it is in compliance with applicable Union or national copyright law and stresses that, therefore, the providers of such AI generative systems must document and make publicly available a sufficiently detailed summary on the use of such training data, regardless of where such training took place, in order to allow for the proper application of the text and data mining exception provided for under Union copyright law; Perspectives 28. Calls on the Commission to set up a European music observatory to provide information on music markets in the Union by collecting and analysing data in the Member States, as well as to analyse and report on legal issues affecting the music sector, in particular the music streaming market, with a view to developing the sector; 29. Calls on the Commission to further improve the Creative Europe programme, in particular through comprehensive action on music; 30. Stresses that music has great potential to further promote European culture, history, heritage, values and diversity; believes that music also has the potential to contribute to the Union’s soft power; highlights that the promotion of European artists in third countries should be a strong focus of the Union; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to develop a comprehensive European export strategy on European musical works; 31. Invites the Commission to establish a structured dialogue between all stakeholders in order to discuss current issues affecting the music streaming market and to work together to find common solutions towards a fairer distribution of the revenues from music streaming platforms, in particular for authors, performers and small and micro independent producers, in parallel to its expected legislative proposals regarding the transparency of algorithms and the prominence of European musical works; 32. Invites the Commission to consider introducing a European industrial strategy for music to make the Union play a role in promoting the diversity of its artists and musical works, focusing on the strength and diversity of the European music sector, boosting smaller players, acquiring more investment, providing more exposure to artists and quantifying the results; o 33. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and to the Commission.
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| Planned dissolution of key anti-corruption structures in Slovakia and its implications on the Rule of Law |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to Articles 2, 4, 6, 7 and 10 of the Treaty on European Union, – having regard to Article 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to Articles 11, 12, 41 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, – having regard to its resolution of 28 March 2019 on the situation of the rule of law and the fight against corruption in the EU, specifically in Malta and Slovakia(1), – having regard to its resolution of 19 April 2018 on protection of investigative journalists in Europe: the case of Slovak journalist Ján Kuciak and Martina Kušnírová(2), – having regard to the Commission communication of 5 July 2023 entitled ‘2023 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union (COM(2023)0800), – having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure, A. whereas over the past several years Slovakia has stepped up its efforts to combat high-level corruption and organised crime, with several former high-ranking officials charged with bribery offences and final court decisions; whereas the Slovak Special Prosecutor’s Office, which started its activity on 1 September 2004, and the Slovak police have been instrumental in handling cases connected to corruption and serious crimes, including those related to the misuse of EU funds; B. whereas the low number of cases investigated and the absence of an effective mechanism for fighting corruption and organised crime in Slovakia were the key reasons behind the creation of the Special Prosecutor’s Office in Slovakia; whereas a similar specialised institute exists in several other Member States, including the recently established specialised European Prosecutor at EU level, which Slovakia endorsed in the Council; C. whereas the new government decided to dismantle the Special Prosecutor’s Office and to reduce criminal penalties for serious crimes, including corruption and environmental crimes, by amending the criminal code through a fast-track legislative procedure at the beginning of its mandate. D. whereas the expedited procedure has removed the possibility for a meaningful public debate or due democratic process; whereas more than 20 000 citizens have repeatedly taken to the streets to protest against the controversial proposal; whereas more than 100 000 citizens have co-signed two petitions against the government proposals and fast-track legislative process; whereas the Slovak President has expressed deep concerns about the proposal and fast-track legislative procedure and has indicated that she would veto the law; whereas in the 2023 Rule of Law Report, the Commission recommended that Slovakia ensure effective public consultation and stakeholder involvement in the law-making process; E. whereas throughout the accelerated legislative process, the Slovak Government has refused to take into account expert analysis and opinions of civil society and the Commission, including strong concerns expressed about how the proposed changes would undermine the fight against corruption; F. whereas, in parallel, the Interior Minister has made substantial staff changes and announced significant structural and organisational changes to the Slovak police and other independent democratic institutions, including concerning investigators working on serious criminal and high-level corruption cases in Slovakia’s National Criminal Agency, raising doubts about the motivations behind such changes; whereas the Slovak Government has replaced members of the Judiciary Council of the Slovak Republic before the end of their mandate and without proper justification; G. whereas the Slovak Government has proposed legislation to Parliament that would eliminate whistleblower protection for police officers, undermine freedom of expression and limit the rights of all people in Slovakia based on the introduction of arbitrary, subjective assessment, which goes against the principles of the EU’s Whistleblower Directive(3); H. whereas the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) stated on 18 December 2023 that some legislative amendments proposed by the Slovak Government concerning key legal and prosecutorial frameworks could pose risks to the effective protection of the European Union’s financial interests, as well as to its anti-corruption framework, and would no longer ensure that offences against the EU budget are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal sanctions in Slovakia; whereas dismantling the Special Prosecutor’s Office could undermine collaboration and coordination with the EPPO, the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation and the European Anti-Fraud Office; I. whereas the Slovak Prime Minister often resorts to divisive language in order to polarise Slovak society; whereas a respectful exchange of views between political leaders and all citizens, including students, is essential for the healthy functioning of democracy; J. whereas in the past, public attacks by politicians in Slovakia against journalists, civil society and vulnerable groups have created a permissive environment for hate speech, in which serious violent crimes have been committed, including the murders of Ján Kuciak and Martina Kušnírová; whereas Ján Kuciak specialised in reporting on large-scale tax evasion, tax fraud, corruption and money laundering, and conducted investigations on several businessman with connections to high-level politicians; whereas the murder of Ján Kuciak and Martina Kušnírová is one of the most complex cases being investigated and supervised by the Special Prosecutor’s Office; whereas there is a risk of the file being transferred to a new prosecutor if the Special Prosecutor’s Office is dismantled; 1. Expresses deep concern over the Slovak Government’s unjustified accelerated legislative process, particularly regarding the proposed amendments to the criminal code and the dissolution of the Special Prosecutor’s Office, which threatens the integrity of judicial processes, undermines the European Union’s fight against fraud and jeopardises the protection of the EU’s financial interests and the natural environment in Slovakia; calls on the Slovak Government to reconsider these amendments in the light of their potential consequences for the rule of law, the EU’s financial interests and the EU anti-corruption framework; calls on the Slovak Government to respect the binding principles of the EU Whistleblower Directive and reconsider the proposed changes to whistleblower protection in Slovakia; expresses particular concern about whistleblowers being retroactively stripped of their protection, resulting in a lack of legal certainty; notes that the Slovak Whistleblower Protection Office has flagged up these issues to the Commission; 2. Recalls that any criminal reform must contain sufficient and adequate safeguards to ensure the continuation and effectiveness of new and ongoing criminal cases, especially in relation to high-level corruption, as well as to guarantee the independence of the judiciary and the autonomy of the prosecutorial service in line with the Commission’s recommendations in successive rule of law reports; expresses concern that the re-assignment of the Special Prosecutor’s cases may lead to considerable delays, and that some cases may collapse in view of the statute of limitations; urges the government to address the long-standing call for a reform of paragraph 363 of the Slovak Criminal Procedural Law and to introduce the possibility of challenging a decision of the General Prosecutor not to prosecute and other measures or safeguards to prevent the misuse of this provision; 3. Emphasises the need for a thorough public process that would take into account opinions of experts and relevant institutions, such as the Venice Commission, and include adequate stakeholder and public consultations at national and EU level about any changes to the current criminal code and structures tasked with investigating and prosecuting serious crime, including cases of corruption in Slovakia; 4. Calls for a more adequate level of human and financial resources for corruption cases and better coordination between corruption investigators and prosecutors, in line with the EPPO’s recommendation, for the more effective investigation of corruption-related crimes. 5. Calls on the Commission to closely monitor and provide information about these developments, taking the necessary actions to safeguard the rule of law and judicial independence, especially with respect to cases of high-level corruption, and to protect the EU’s financial interests; 6. Recognises and supports the important role and engagement of citizens and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in protecting and promoting democracy and the rule of law; calls for stakeholders to be involved in the law-making process, especially in connection with the use of fast-track procedures; 7. Pays tribute to Ján Kuciak six years after his assassination and to his essential work as an investigative journalist; calls on the Slovak authorities to ensure that justice is served; 8. Urges all political leaders to engage constructively and respectfully with citizens by upholding the principles of democratic debate and respecting public institutions, the rule of law and academic freedom; calls, therefore, on government officials to refrain from verbal attacks on individuals, journalists and civil society organisations; underscores the duty of public and government officials to serve all citizens, especially in a country with a history of hate crime and where a journalist has been murdered; 9. Condemns the inappropriate and disrespectful remarks made by the Prime Minister, including against a student who has been part of an initiative to foster an academic exchange on the state of the rule of law in Slovakia; calls on government officials to refrain from questioning the legitimacy of court decisions; is strongly concerned about plans announced to adopt legislation which would undermine the civic space, including by restricting the work of NGOs and stigmatising organisations which receive foreign funding; 10. Warns against any political interference in editorial independence and journalistic integrity; notes with concern the planned restructuring of Radio and Television of Slovakia, the country’s main public broadcaster; underscores the importance of maintaining free, independent media as a cornerstone of a democratic society; 11. Regrets the decision of the Prime Minister and several government officials to halt communication with key media outlets, recognising that this as a significant impediment to the public’s right to receive relevant government information; emphasises that such actions curtail media freedom and transparency and contribute to the spread of manipulative disinformation in the public space; 12. Calls on the Slovak Government to uphold the principle of sincere cooperation with the EU institutions; 13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.
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| Promotion of the freedom of scientific research in the EU |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to Articles 49, 56 and 179(1) and 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to Articles 12 and 13 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, – having regard to the Bonn Declaration on Freedom of Scientific Research adopted at the Ministerial Conference on the European Research Area on 20 October 2020 in Bonn (the ‘Bonn Declaration'), – having regard to Commission communication of 30 September 2020, entitled ‘A new ERA for Research and Innovation’, – having regard to Commission communication of 18 May 2021 on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation, entitled 'Europe's strategy for international cooperation in a changing world', – having regard to the European Research Area Policy Agenda, Action 6, – having regard to Commission communication of 3 December 2020 on the European Democracy Action Plan, – having regard to recital 72 of Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013(1), – having regard to the 2023 European Added Value Assessment on Promotion of the freedom of scientific research presented by the European Added Value Unit to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy on 18 September 2023, – having regard to Rome Ministerial Communiqué of 19 November 2020 by the European ministers responsible for higher education, in the framework of the European Higher Education Area, in particular Annex I on Academic Freedom, – having regard to the SFIC Opinion on the implementation of the Bonn Declaration in International Cooperation in Research and Innovation (ERAC-SFIC 1356/21) (2021), – having regard to the UNESCO Recommendation on Science and Scientific Researchers (2017), – having regard to the Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher Education Teaching Personnel, adopted by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), at its 29th session from 21 October to 12 November 1997, – having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, – having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, – having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, – having regard to Rules 47 and 54 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the recommendations of Strategic Forum for International S&T Cooperation, – having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A9-0393/2023), A. whereas the freedom of scientific research, which is an essential element of democracy and one of the constituent parts of academic freedom, is under pressure in the Union and is gradually eroding(2), which is exemplified by the fact that on the Academic Freedom Index all Member States had a score above 0,85 on the index in 2008 while in 2022 some Member States have dropped significantly, the lowest score for 2022 being 0,34; B. whereas restrictions to the freedom of scientific research have negative impacts for the Union economy by stifling innovation, slowing scientific progress, and reducing Europe's global competitiveness; C. whereas erosion of the freedom of scientific research contributes to brain drain of top researchers, self-censorship among academics, less critical analysis on social and political issues, less interdisciplinary collaboration, less public discourse and debate; D. whereas job insecurity affects the ability to fully enjoy the freedom of scientific research; whereas thousands of researchers work with limited-duration project funding, by way of individual or project research grants, fixed-term employment contracts or by performing specific tasks as self-employed persons, and have poor job security and labour protection; E. whereas the Bonn Declaration includes a definition of the freedom of scientific research and recognises the responsibilities for both governments and research organisations to promote the freedom of scientific research; F. whereas defending the freedom of scientific research ensures that scientific research contributes to the public interest and contributes to development and improved living conditions for people; G. whereas the Bonn Declaration lacks implementation instruments at European level; H. whereas a solid body of case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on academic freedom, including the freedom of scientific research, exists which sets out a number of legal standards and principles for the protection and promotion of academic freedom; I. whereas, in its judgement of 6 October 2020 in Case C-66/18(3), the Court of Justice found that Hungarian Law on national higher education deprived the affected organisations of the organisational structure that is necessary for conducting their academic research, illustrating the erosion of academic freedom in Hungary; J. whereas specific Union legislative acts limit the freedom of scientific research by submitting the academic sector to regimes primarily designed for regulating the internal market; K. whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, prior to her confirmation by Parliament, pledged in the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024 to support a right of initiative for Parliament and committed to respond with a legislative act when Parliament adopts resolutions requesting that the Commission submit legislative proposals; 1. Reaffirms the Union's commitment to upholding fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, academic freedom as well as the freedom of scientific research in all scientific disciplines and the arts as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; 2. Acknowledges the fundamental importance of freedom of scientific research in advancing our knowledge of natural and social phenomena, thereby contributing to the promotion of innovation, societal progress, and enhancing the overall wellbeing of Union citizens, both within and outside of the Union, and recalls that freedom of scientific research is a universal right and public good, to be applied to all scientific disciplines; underlines that in the global competition of research, development and innovation, freedom of scientific research is a prerequisite for attracting talent with competitive new ideas; regrets in that regard that the Bonn Declaration lacks concrete implementation at European level; 3. Acknowledges the profound impact of precariousness on the freedom of scientific research while precariousness in the sector persists; defends the labour rights of scientific researchers, enhancement of their careers, stable job contracts and access to comprehensive social protection systems; believes scientific researchers should be provided with quality jobs, decent working conditions, decent wages and healthy work places, including good work-life balance; 4. Highlights that equal opportunities, in particular those fostered by gender equality, are essential for the promotion of the freedom of scientific research as well as for ensuring that solutions to various challenges for advancing sustainable and equitable development incorporate diverse perspectives; 5. Emphasises the particularly precarious situation for early-career researchers and that, in order to increase the number of early-career researchers, clearer and more structured career opportunities should be established; stresses that this should also be guaranteed through fostering transparent recruitment procedures, free from any biases, and providing appropriate social security coverage to all researchers, including doctoral candidates who are engaged in remunerated research activity; 6. Notes that it is the management bodies of scientific research organisations that set those institutions' scientific research priorities; acknowledges that instances of degradation of democracy in scientific research organisations undermine the freedom of scientific research; emphasises therefore the importance of academic self-governance which should include the right of scientific researchers to have a say on the governance of their scientific institution, including on the labour conditions at the institution; emphasises that scientific researchers are entitled to all the rights under Article 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; 7. Believes that scientific research organisations should be encouraged, while fully respecting their institutional autonomy, to engage in international cooperation to strengthen bilateral and multilateral relations to further develop a strong science diplomacy component addressing the freedom of scientific research and possible consequences in case of breaches; 8. Insists that the Union should be a safe haven for all researchers at risk and should set up a European Fellowship Scheme for Researchers at Risk providing financial support for emergency placements of researchers at risk at European research organisations; believes that this Scheme should also be a solidarity mechanism to support European researchers that face breaches of their freedom of scientific research; 9. Recognises, in line with the Bonn Declaration, that freedom of scientific research stands for openness, exchange, excellence, internationalism, diversity, equality, integrity, curiosity, responsibility and reflexivity and that it is, therefore, a pillar of any democracy; 10. Takes note of the definition of the freedom of scientific research in Annex II, point (2) of the Commission proposal of 13 July 2023 for a Council Recommendation on a European framework(4) to attract and retain research, innovation and entrepreneurial talents in Europe; 11. Believes that freedom of scientific research must come with the responsibility to respect highest ethical standards and integrity in scientific research and should foster Open Science; emphasises that integrity of scientific research requires transparency of funding, and that the freedom of scientific research brings a responsibility towards society to provide this transparency; strongly supports, therefore, the common practice of transparent communication on sources of funding for research activities and calls on the scientific sector to safeguard this practice; 12. Emphasises the decisive role of a properly designed and well implemented enabling framework to effectively protect and promote freedom of scientific research throughout the Union, taking into utmost account of available public support to facilitate production, sharing and spreading of knowledge, as a public good, and to avoid any risk of interference or undermining of independence of scientific research; 13. Insists on the relevance of open knowledge to ensure the freedom of scientific research; calls for efficient and transparent creation of knowledge without artificial barriers hindering the access to information and its dissemination; estimates that sharing results of scientific research for non-commercial purposes must be protected by Union law and actively promoted; stresses that publicly funded scientific results must be published in open-access academic journals and the results must be easily accessible for everyone; 14. Is concerned about the recent backsliding of this fundamental right in the Union, which is essential for political freedom and social participation and threatens to undermine the development of a functioning and competitive European Research Area (ERA); 15. Notes that the Commission's communication of 30 September 2020, entitled ‘A new ERA for Research and Innovation' confirms that the completion of the ERA requires the full respect of the freedom of scientific research, which includes, but is not limited to, non-interference in research agendas, institutional autonomy, and adequate funding as well as the means needed for disseminating research results; 16. Is deeply concerned that the Commission, despite its strong words in that communication, is failing to use its legal authority to protect this freedom in the Union; reaffirms the Union's commitment to upholding fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, academic freedom as well as the freedom of scientific research and the arts as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; is deeply concerned about the fact that freedom of research is under pressure to adhere to moral and political reservations; 17. Urges the Commission to take all steps within its power to protect and promote the freedom of scientific research in the Union and to ensure that research ethics and integrity are not compromised, including using its legal authority to prevent any further backsliding regarding this fundamental right; calls upon the Commission to actively promote and fund scientific pluralism by supporting projects across the full spectrum of scientific research; 18. Calls on the Member States to fully respect and uphold the freedom of scientific research, and to ensure that any measures taken in the name of public interest, for example in the interest of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary, do not unduly restrict the freedom of scientific research; 19. Stresses that the completion of the ERA requires the due respect and active promotion of the freedom of scientific research throughout the Union, and believes that any attempts to undermine or failure to actively promote this freedom negatively impacts the development of a competitive and innovative ERA; calls on the Member States and the Commission to further empower the scientific research community in their access, use and dissemination of any information relevant for its activity, including by leveraging open source digital tools; 20. Expresses its concern with regard to the Commission's failure to use its legal authority under the Treaties to protect the freedom of scientific research as one of the fundamental rights of Union citizens, which represent a serious abdication of its responsibility to uphold the rule of law in the Union, and calls on the Commission to take immediate action to remedy that situation; 21. Calls on the European Council to support the protection and promotion of the freedom of scientific research, and to ensure that this fundamental right is duly respected in all Member States; 22. Calls for the recognition of the need to mobilise additional public funds in order to finance independent scientific research, avoiding undue interference that could drive its ends or influence its methods or results; 23. Calls on the Commission and Member States to promote public awareness of the importance of freedom of scientific research through education, public outreach, and support for science journalism; 24. Requests that the Commission submit, on the basis of Article 182(5), in conjunction with the Article 179(1), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, a proposal for an act on the freedom of scientific research, following the recommendations set out in the Annex hereto, to guarantee, protect and promote this freedom at the level of research organisations and of researchers all along their careers; 25. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the accompanying recommendations to the Commission and the Council, and to the national parliaments. ANNEX TO THE RESOLUTION: RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSAL REQUESTED Defining the Freedom of Scientific Research 1. The freedom of scientific research is a constituent part of academic freedom and scientific integrity in Europe, while also having an independent value, as exemplified by the specific reference in Article 13 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 2. The freedom of scientific research provides rights to individual scientific researchers, rights and obligations for scientific research organisations, and obligations for public authorities. 3. The exercise of the freedom of scientific research, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. The freedom of scientific research may also be limited as a result of particular research circumstances or operational constraints. The freedom of scientific research must be carefully balanced with other legitimate interests, such as obtaining legitimate competitive advantages and intellectual property protection. Such limitations should not, however, contravene recognised ethical principles and practices, to which researchers have to adhere. 4. The proposal should build on the definition of the freedom of scientific research as set out in the Bonn Declaration, and under point 2 of Annex II of the proposal for a Council Recommendation on a European framework to attract and retain research, innovation and entrepreneurial talents in Europe. Freedom of scientific researchers 5. Scientific researchers should be defined broadly in line with the proposal for a Council Recommendation on a European framework to attract and retain research, innovation and entrepreneurial talents in Europe. 6. The freedom of scientific research entails the right for individual researchers to freely define research questions, choose and develop theories, gather empirical material, and employ sound scientific research methods, to maintain scientific integrity, to challenge conventional wisdom, to publish and communicate freely, and to propose new ideas and theories as well as disseminate them freely. 7. The rights of individual researchers include at least: (a) the right to associate in representative professional or academic organisations; (b) the right to freely access public information, and the right to access private information needed for scientific purposes, which is to be balanced with the rights of information holders and the nature/sensitivity of information; (c) the right to keep specific information or data, as well as the source for that information or date confidential in order to abide by ethical and scientific standards, to achieve a scientific or other legitimate objectives; (d) the right to publish, share, disseminate and communicate openly, both intramural and extramural, the right to speak freely and critically about work and politics of scientific research institutions and the results and data of their research, without fear of reprisal; (e) the right to freely define research topics, to choose, develop and collect empirical material and to interact with other researchers. 8. Individual researchers should be able to enjoy those individual rights without fear of reprisal. Rights and obligations of scientific research organisations 9. In order to guarantee the freedom of scientific research for scientific researchers, scientific research organisations should enjoy effective institutional autonomy. While institutional autonomy is a prerequisite for the freedom of scientific research for scientific researchers and for the self-governing nature of research, it is not by definition subordinate to the rights of individual researchers. Beyond its role to protect the freedom of scientific research, institutional autonomy is required for the proper functioning of the scientific sector. Therefore, the proposal should strike a careful balance in order to harmonise the individual rights with institutional autonomy. 10. Scientific research organisations should have the freedom to engage in international collaboration. 11. Within the framework of their institutional autonomy, research organisations have to provide transparent, fair, and excellence-based procedures for research careers. 12. Aspects to be considered for establishing institutional autonomy include organisational autonomy, financial autonomy, staffing autonomy and scientific autonomy. 13. Institutional autonomy is highly contextual and can be achieved in many different ways with different combinations of autonomy. For effective institutional autonomy to exist, not all these different aspects of institutional autonomy need to be uniformly fulfilled. Therefore the definition of institutional autonomy in the proposal should not be static, but rather should allow adaptation to different national, regional and institutional contexts in particular by allowing for emphasis to shift between different aspects of institutional autonomy by incorporating a gradual rather than binary appreciation of the different aspects. 14. Institutional autonomy should come with an obligation for research organisations to provide some form of involvement of scientific researchers in decision-making. 15. That includes the rights to publicly comment on the governing of the organisation and system without fear of reprisal. This also includes the responsibility for research organisations to create a culture of open debate. It also includes having in effective procedures to report misconduct, to protect, in accordance with the standards set out in Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5) , people reporting misconduct, breaches of academic standards or ethical standards, as well as discrete procedures, based on protecting privacy and the presumption of innocence, to handle misconduct reported. Governmental obligations 16. Governmental bodies in Member States, at all levels of government including Union institutions, agencies and bodies, should have the obligation to respect, protect, promote and ensure the freedom of scientific research, including institutional autonomy. 17. Respect for the freedom of scientific research means that governmental bodies refrain from arbitrary interferences in and imposing undue restrictions on the freedom of scientific research, as well as refrain from active or complicity participation in violations of the right. 18. Protecting the freedom of scientific research means that governmental bodies have an obligation to take active measures to protect against third parties unduly interfering with any dimension of the freedom of scientific research. 19. Ensuring the freedom of scientific research means that governmental bodies have to actively create all the preconditions needed for the exercise all aspects of the freedom, including institutional autonomy. This includes policies for sustainable research careers providing quality jobs at all career stages as well as long term, reliable and stable institutional financing. 20. Promoting the freedom of scientific research means that governmental bodies have to engage actively with third parties to advocate for the respect, protection and ensuring of the freedom of scientific research, and potentially to disengage from cooperation with third parties not abiding by the same set of principles and values. General considerations 21. The legislative proposal should reflect that the freedom of scientific research has to be considered comprehensively, including freedom from interference and ensuring that enabling framework conditions exist. Scientific research should be free from undue government interference and there should be a strong scientific community as well as a civic body receptive to scientific knowledge for the exercise of the freedom of scientific research. Public authorities should have the responsibility to investigate alleged violations of the freedom of scientific research and to hold perpetrators of violations accountable. 22. The legislative proposal should include the creation of a monitoring system for reporting breaches of scientific research once identified. 23. The legislative proposal should recognise that while the freedom of scientific research has its independent value, within the framework of modern universities the freedom of scientific research is inseparable from the freedom to teach. This means that, given the legal base of the proposal and the core competences of the Union on research, and with due respect to the limited competences of the Union to legislate on education, the proposal should aim to protect the fullest possible scope of intramural dissemination. 24. The proposed act should be legally binding across the Union. The proposal should aim to create a legal framework which offers sufficient flexibility to balance the rights and obligations on a case-by-case basis and can be applied throughout the Union despite the vast diversity in the national and regional scientific research systems. It should create a starting point for the development of legal minimum standards for the freedom of scientific research through case-law from European courts, including the Court of Justice of the European Union.
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| Implementation of the Treaty provisions on national parliaments |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Article 5 on the conferral of competences and subsidiarity, Article 10(1) on representative democracy, Article 10(2) on the representation of EU citizens, Article 10(3) on the right of EU citizens to participate in the democratic life of the Union, Article 10(4) on the role of European political parties, Article 11 on participatory democracy, Article 12 on the role of national parliaments, Article 48(3) on the ordinary revision procedure and Article 48(7) (passerelle clause) thereof, – having regard to Protocol No 1 on the role of national parliaments in the European Union(1) annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam and to Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiary and proportionality(2) annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, – having regard to Article 15 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, – having regard to its resolutions of 7 May 2009 on the development of the relations between the European Parliament and national parliaments under the Treaty of Lisbon(3), of 16 April 2014 on relations between the European Parliament and the national parliaments(4) and of 19 April 2018 on the implementation of the Treaty provisions concerning national parliaments(5), – having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations (COM(2021)0734), – having regard to the Commission’s annual report on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on relations with national parliaments for 2018 of 11 July 2019 (COM(2019)0333), for 2019 of 30 June 2020 (COM(2020)0272), for 2020 of 23 July 2021 (COM(2021)0417) and for 2021 of 1 August 2022 (COM(2022)0366), – having regard to the annual reports of the European Parliament’s Directorate for Relations with National Parliaments, in particular the 2022 report on relations between the European Parliament and EU national parliaments, – having regard to its resolutions of 20 January 2021 on monitoring the application of EU law 2017, 2018 and 2019(6) and of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report(7), – having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on European Union regulatory fitness and subsidiarity and proportionality – report on Better Law Making covering the years 2017, 2018 and 2019(8), – having regard to the report of the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ‘Doing Less More Efficiently’ of 10 July 2018 entitled ‘Active subsidiarity – a new way of working’(9), – having regard to its resolutions of 15 January 2020 on the European Parliament’s position on the Conference on the Future of Europe(10) and of 4 May 2022 on the follow-up to the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe(11), – having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the call for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties(12), – having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties(13), – having regard to Article 13 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), which enshrines the organisation of inter-parliamentary conferences for the purposes of discussing budgetary policies and other issues covered by the Treaty, – having regard to its resolution of 15 March 2023 on the European Semester for economic policy coordination 2023(14), – having regard to the conclusions of the Presidency following the Conference of Speakers of the European Union Parliaments held in Prague on 24 and 25 April 2023(15), – having regard to the conclusions of the Plenary Meeting of the LXIX Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs (COSAC) held in Stockholm on 14-16 May 2023(16), – having regard to the Declaration of Léon on parliamentarism adopted at the Conference to Commemorate the International Day of Parliamentarism – Strengthening Parliaments to Enhance Democracy, held in Léon on 30 June and 1 July 2023(17), – having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as to Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports, – having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A9-0429/2023), A. whereas national parliaments’ active participation in European affairs and enhanced scrutiny of national governments by national parliaments are instrumental in ensuring the democratic accountability and legitimacy of the EU institutional system; B. whereas national parliaments ‘contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union’ (Article 12 TEU) and, together with the European Parliament, play an essential role in strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the EU project, fostering citizens’ trust and contributing to the sustainability and resilience of the European project; C. whereas the current tools for national parliaments’ participation in European affairs are largely unknown both among decision-makers and the general public; whereas there is a need to raise awareness of these tools; D. whereas the parliamentary accountability and scrutiny of national governments within the framework of European affairs, which depends on individual national practices, is the cornerstone of the role of national parliaments in the current European Treaty framework; E. whereas this accountability and scrutiny can be facilitated by increased transparency in the Council, especially with regard to the voting record and positions of Member States; whereas national parliaments and the European Parliament should increase pressure on the Council to act more transparently and be more accountable throughout the legislative process; whereas, further, access to documents of other EU institutions enables national parliaments to properly exercise scrutiny; F. whereas a lack of transparency in the EU legislative and decision-making processes risks undermining both the prerogatives of national parliaments under the Treaties and relevant Protocols and, in particular, their role in scrutinising their national governments as represented in the Council; G. whereas parliamentary pluralism enriches the debate at European level and is therefore highly beneficial to the Union and the representation of parliamentary minorities in European affairs and helps to counterbalance the majorities in each parliament while fully respecting them and in accordance with their proportions; whereas the views and representation of national parliamentary minorities should be taken into account at EU level and could prove useful, inter alia, in a future process for the revision of the EU Treaties, while respecting the competences of national parliaments in regard to their representation; H. whereas Protocol No 2 (Article 6) acknowledges that national parliaments may consult regional parliaments with legislative powers, yet the role of regional parliaments is largely dependent on the national arrangements and very often remains advisory; whereas the Commission, the Council, the Member States and their national parliaments should take into account the role and promote the involvement of regional parliaments with legislative powers, especially when regional exclusive competences may be affected; I. whereas many of the members of the Committee of the Regions hold a regional electoral mandate; whereas a debate could be held on the role of the Committee of the Regions in bringing regional parliaments closer to the overall integration process and in strengthening European democracy; J. whereas national parliaments and their role within the EU institutional framework were addressed by a number of proposals contained in the report on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE); whereas the experience of the CoFoE showed the fruitful alliance between national parliaments and the European Parliament; K. whereas national parliaments play a role in any revision of the European Treaties, in particular in the goal of strengthening the parliamentary dimension and the democratic life of the EU; whereas the European Parliament in its resolution of 9 June 2022 called for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties; L. whereas a European public sphere could be fostered by a series of forums on the European agenda and such forums could be endorsed through a common ‘European Week’, in which members of national and regional parliamentary chambers would simultaneously discuss European affairs with Commissioners, Members of the European Parliament and ministers from the sitting Council presidency; whereas the development of a true European public sphere would also benefit from greater awareness among and participation and dialogue with citizens; M. whereas the involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs should also be strengthened on a thematic, committee-based or ad hoc approach; whereas the format of Interparliamentary Committee Meetings (ICM) should be further fine-tuned; N. whereas national parliaments show interest in being involved more closely on the substance of EU policies and legislation rather than only in the framework of the early warning system (EWS), which exclusively concerns subsidiarity; O. whereas the implementation of the right of national parliaments to scrutinise compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, on the basis of the EWS, has strengthened the involvement of national parliaments in EU decision-making; P. whereas the reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments strengthen the European legislative process by assessing compliance with the principle of subsidiarity; whereas the eight-week period laid down in Article 4 of Protocol No 1 has proved to be inadequate for the timely monitoring of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity and should be extended in the framework of the next Treaty revision; Q. whereas European political parties play a critical role in bridging the gap between the EU and national parliaments; whereas regulatory obstacles prevent a more meaningful engagement between European political parties and national parties; whereas innovative and stronger tools of cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament can be considered, including a more intensive dialogue among political families and groups; R. whereas the 2018 implementation report recommended that national parliaments be given the possibility to submit constructive proposals for the Commission’s consideration and with due regard to the Commission’s right of initiative; S. whereas the CoFoE recommended that national parliaments and regional parliaments with legislative powers ‘be granted the possibility to suggest a legislative initiative to the European level’, an instrument which would afford them the opportunity to suggest constructive proposals for the Commission’s consideration and with due regard for the Commission’s right of initiative, having first secured Parliament’s support; whereas the goal of achieving a full right of initiative for the European Parliament has been highlighted on numerous occasions during the current legislature; T. whereas in its resolution of 9 June 2022, Parliament called for the establishment of a general direct right of legislative initiative for the European Parliament; whereas, following the granting of this right, ‘green card’ procedures should be directed at Parliament; U. whereas the implementation of a ‘red card’ procedure cannot be considered a suitable and constructive tool in respect of the goal of increasing the participation of national parliaments in the European integration process; V. whereas the IPEX, a platform for continuous exchange of information among national parliaments and between national parliaments and the European institutions, should be further developed in accordance with its digital strategy; whereas the European Parliament plays a major supporting role in this; W. whereas national parliaments have relevant competencies in the areas of freedom, security and justice pursuant to Articles 70, 85 and 88 TFEU and should therefore play an important role in the future regarding the Union’s security and defence policy, also by building on the Interparliamentary Conference (IPC) on the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/CSDP) as established by Article 10 of Protocol No 1; Scrutinising governmental activity in European affairs 1. Considers that the implementation of the rights and obligations of national parliaments deriving from the Treaty of Lisbon has enhanced their role within the European constitutional framework, thus providing for more pluralism, democratic legitimacy and the better functioning of the Union; 2. Takes the view that the accountability of national governments to national parliaments as acknowledged by Article 10(2) TEU is the keystone of the role of national parliamentary chambers in the European Union; considers that national parliaments are partners in maintaining the EU institutional balance; encourages national parliaments to fully exercise their European functions in order to directly influence and scrutinise the content of European policies, in particular via the monitoring of their national governments acting as members of the European Council; calls on members of national and regional parliaments to foster a European conscience in their decision-making and to recognise the direct impact of EU policies on their constituents; praises the good experience of cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament and considers that national parliaments and the European Parliament have the potential to be natural allies in shaping a stronger parliamentary dimension of the EU; 3. Calls on the Member States to ensure that national parliaments are granted enough time, the capacity, the resources and the necessary access to information in order to fulfil their constitutional role of scrutinising and thus legitimating the activity of national governments when these governments act at European level; recalls the importance of access to information and recognises that the Council must adopt the necessary document security safeguards while ensuring that national parliaments are able to carry out democratic scrutiny over their respective governments, among other things through access to the Council’s legislative database, while also fully respecting confidentiality; 4. Considers that transparency of the working methods and decision-making processes of the EU institutions represents a precondition for enabling national parliaments to effectively fulfil their institutional role deriving from the Treaties; calls, therefore, for the voting records and positions of Member States in the Council to be made public; calls, furthermore, for national parliaments to make full use of their respective competences, inter alia by adapting their internal organisation, timetables and rules of procedures to enable them to do so; commits itself and encourages national parliaments to introducing more innovative and stronger tools of cooperation at political and administrative level, including more intensive forms of exchange and dialogue with European political families and groups; 5. Encourages strengthened political dialogue between the European institutions and national parliaments and recalls that decisions must be taken in accordance with constitutional competences, the EU Treaties and the EU acquis and taking into account the clear delineation between the respective decision-making competences of the local, regional, national and European bodies; 6. States that the alignment of the European Semester with the agendas of national parliaments could further contribute to the coordination of economic policies, while underlining that such alignment should not disregard the powers of self-governance and the specific rules of procedure of each parliamentary chamber; 7. Calls for national parliaments to have a stronger role in the implementation of a national period for budgetary and economic policy dialogue, during which national parliaments would be able to cooperate, deliberate upon and contribute to the European Semester by providing their governments with a mandate in their relations with the Commission and the Council; Developing a European public sphere 8. Stresses the relevance of the principle of proportional representation of members from different political parties in this regard; recommends, therefore, that national parliamentary delegations acting before the European institutions should reflect political diversity; 9. Notes the fact that the binding will of parliamentary majorities could be expressed in the opinions issued by national parliaments, within or outside the framework of the EWS; endorses the idea, however, of national parliamentary political minorities being given the possibility to express dissenting points of view, which could then be incorporated into the annexes to such opinions; 10. Believes that interaction with national parliaments can be indirectly strengthened by empowering European political parties; reiterates its long-standing call to enable these parties to actively engage in the Member States’ political spheres and support their member parties when EU issues are at stake; calls for the swift conclusion of the recast Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations(18) to enable European political parties to support their member parties in campaigning for the European elections and referendum campaigns about EU matters; 11. Believes that the establishment of an annual European Week would allow Members of the European Parliament, Commissioners and ministers of sitting Council presidencies to stand before all national and, where appropriate, regional parliaments in order to discuss and explain the European agenda alongside national parliamentarians; suggests opening a discussion on drawing up a common political declaration or framework agreement between the national parliaments and the European Parliament concerning the organisation of the proposed European Week in order to provide a more coherent framework of cooperation at political, institutional and administrative level; considers that the proposed European Week should draw lessons from current and previous forums, such as the parliamentary week held by the European Semester Conference and the IPC on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in the European Union, as well as the CoFoE; believes, further, that political family meetings and caucuses between and within national and European political groups in the framework of EU interparliamentary cooperation could bring added value in the form of authentic European political debate; 12. Considers the stronger involvement of national parliaments from candidate countries to be an essential tool for making the EU enlargement strategy successful; suggests the involvement of representatives of national parliaments from candidate countries in the proposed European Week; Backing reform of the Early Warning System 13. Underlines that the most substantial prerogative for national parliaments brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon was their ability to scrutinise compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in the early stages of EU legislative procedures; 14. Notes that procedures such as the ‘yellow’ or ‘orange’ cards have not been used extensively; suggests that all EU institutions and Member States agree on a common understanding of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality originally attached to the Amsterdam Treaty, the relevant case-law of the European Court of Justice and the Commission’s own practice; considers that the development of this common understanding should include all elements of subsidiarity and could be fostered through new tools of cooperation; 15. Acknowledges the request by national parliaments to extend the eight-week period during which they can issue reasoned opinions under Article 3 of Protocol No 1; underlines, however, that the current Treaty framework does not provide for such an extension; notes that as a mitigation measure, from 2019, the Commission began excluding the end-of-year festive period when setting the eight week period for national parliaments to send reasoned opinions; believes, therefore, that the introduction of a twelve-week period should be considered in the framework of the next Treaty revision; 16. Calls for national parliaments to include the reasoned opinions of regional parliaments with legislative powers into their final reasoned opinions that are sent to the Presidents of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission when regional exclusive competences are affected; 17. Suggests setting up a system, sometimes called a ‘green card’ procedure, whereby at least one third of national parliaments can request that the Commission or the European Parliament, once the latter has been granted a general direct right of initiative, submit proposals with the aim of positively influencing the European debate; suggests, in this regard, that the Commission or the European Parliament could enjoy the discretion either to take on board such proposals or to issue a formal response underlining its reasons for not doing so; points out that such a procedure cannot consist of a right of initiative or the right to withdraw or amend legislation as this would subvert ‘the Union method’ and the distribution of competences between national and European level, thus violating the Treaties; Implementing the right to information 18. Reaffirms that Article 12 TEU and Protocol No 1 give national parliaments the right to receive information directly from the European institutions; suggests that the right to be informed be extended also to regional parliaments with legislative powers; 19. Recommends that national parliaments use the IPEX platform in a timely fashion to ensure an early start to the national scrutiny mechanism; recommends using IPEX as a channel for the systematic sharing of information and the early flagging of subsidiarity concerns; welcomes the updated version of the IPEX Guidelines, approved at the Secretaries-General meeting in February 2023, which reflects the new version of the IPEX platform and the opportunities and tools offered by this new version; Envisaging better interinstitutional cooperation 20. Takes note of the current cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments in the COSAC, in the IPC on CFSP and within the framework of Article 13 TSCG; takes note, further, of more recent forms of interparliamentary cooperation such as the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group on Europol and the ICM on the Evaluation of Eurojust; stresses that such cooperation should be developed on the basis of the principles of consensus, information-sharing and consultation in order for national parliaments to exercise scrutiny over their respective governments and administrations; 21. Reiterates that the current framework of relations between the Union and the national parliaments could be simplified and harmonised in order to make it more efficient and effective; calls, in this context, for a review of the engagement between the Union and its national parliaments across existing platforms and forums, with the aim of strengthening these relations and adapting them to current needs; encourages the European institutions and regional parliaments with legislative powers to have more active engagement and direct interaction between each other, while fully respecting the role and competences of national parliaments; 22. Points out that strengthening political and technical dialogue between parliamentary committees, as well as political groups, both at national and at European level, would be a highly productive step towards full interparliamentary cooperation; suggests, to this end, raising more awareness at national level about possible cooperation tools; proposes, therefore, the allocation of additional resources to achieve this aim, inter alia, to fund the use of videoconferences, staff exchanges or pilot projects; 23. Acknowledges the relevance of the ICMs established in Articles 9 and 10 of Protocol No 1 and the sectorial success of a ‘committee method’ in interparliamentary cooperation; believes that better interinstitutional cooperation could be attained if the ICM were accorded more relevance by the Members of the European Parliament and the national parliaments and if they were prepared for closer cooperation; considers that the rules of procedure could be changed in order to regulate stronger forms of cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament, in full respect of their institutional competences and the distribution thereof; 24. Recommends that national parliaments be fully involved in the continuing development of the CSDP; believes that such involvement should be promoted in close cooperation with the European Parliament, in line with Article 10 of Protocol No 1 and with full respect for the provisions of national constitutions regarding security and defence policies; invites national parliaments to reflect in more detail on defence capability prioritisation at EU level, including through joint interparliamentary meetings between representatives from national parliaments and Members of the European Parliament, within the context of the IPC on the CFSP/CSDP and via political dialogue; 25. Recalls the importance of enhancing cooperation and dialogue between the national parliaments and the European Parliament on the right of inquiry; o 26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
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| Implementation of the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to Articles 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 21 and 23 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), – having regard to Articles 15, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 45, 46, 47, 48, 153 and 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), – having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, – having regard to Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC(1), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014(2), – having regard to Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union(3), – having regard to Regulation (EU) No 2019/1149 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 establishing a European Labour Authority, amending Regulations (EC) No 883/2004, (EU) No 492/2011, and (EU) 2016/589 and repealing Decision (EU) 2016/344(4), – having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/957 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 June 2018 amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services(5), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/589 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 April 2016 on a European network of employment services (EURES), workers’ access to mobility services and the further integration of labour markets, and amending Regulations (EU) No 492/2011 and (EU) No 1296/2013(6), – having regard to Directive 2013/55/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 amending Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications and Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System(7), – having regard to Council Directive (EU) 2015/637 of 20 April 2015 on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries and repealing Decision 95/553/EC(8), – having regard to Council Directive (EU) 2019/997 of 18 June 2019 establishing an EU Emergency Travel Document and repealing Decision 96/409/CFSP(9), – having regard to the Commission communication of 2 July 2009 entitled ‘Guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’ (COM(2009)0313), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the European citizens’ initiative(10), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/1042 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2020 laying down temporary measures concerning the time limits for the collection, the verification and the examination stages provided for in Regulation (EU) 2019/788 on the European citizens’ initiative in view of the COVID-19 outbreak(11), – having regard to the Commission communication of 2 December 2020 entitled ‘Strategy to strengthen the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU’ (COM(2020)0711), – having regard to the Commission communication of 3 December 2020 entitled ‘The European democracy action plan’ (COM(2020)0790), – having regard to the Commission communication of 25 November 2021 entitled ‘Protecting election integrity and promoting democratic participation’ (COM(2021)0730), – having regard to the Commission report of 15 December 2020 entitled ‘EU Citizenship Report 2020 – Empowering citizens and protecting their rights’ (COM(2020)0730), – having regard to the Commission report of 15 December 2020 under Article 25 TFEU on progress towards effective EU citizenship 2016-2020 (COM(2020)0731), – having regard to its position of 14 February 2023 on the proposal for a Council directive laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals(12), – having regard to its position of 14 February 2023 on the proposal for a Council directive laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal elections by Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals(13), – having regard to its resolution of 12 February 2019 on the implementation of the Treaty provisions related to EU citizenship(14), – having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 with proposals to the Commission on citizenship and residence by investment schemes(15), – having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the EU Citizenship Report 2020: empowering citizens and protecting their rights(16), – having regard to its resolution of 13 June 2023 on the implementation of the Regulations on the European citizens’ initiative(17), – having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2023 on Parliamentarism, European citizenship and democracy(18), – having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on Citizens’ dialogues and Citizens’ participation in the EU decision-making(19), – having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on engaging with citizens: the right to petition, the right to refer to the European Ombudsman and the European Citizens’ Initiative(20), – having regard to its resolution of 15 March 2017 on obstacles to EU citizens’ freedom to move and work in the internal market(21), – having regard to the Fundamental Rights Report 2023 of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, – having regard to the report on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe, – having regard to the results of Flash Eurobarometer 485/2020 and standard Eurobarometer 99/2023, – having regard to the Commission report under Article 25 TFEU of 6 December 2023 on progress towards effective EU citizenship 2020-2023 (COM(2023)0931) (the EU Citizenship Report 2023), – having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as to Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports, – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, – having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A9-0436/2023), A. whereas EU citizenship was established with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and further enhanced by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009; whereas thirty years have passed since its establishment and major social, digital, economic and political changes have taken place; B. whereas, according to Article 20 (1) TFEU, EU citizenship is additional to and does not replace national citizenship; whereas EU citizenship does not as yet entail any duties for citizens of the Union; C. whereas EU citizenship is a unique construct reflecting the common democratic identity and shared values of EU citizens, and has contributed to forging connections, promoting equality and rejecting all forms of racism and discrimination; whereas EU citizenship has not yet reached its full potential; D. whereas freedom of movement has enabled over 15 million EU citizens(22) to live and work in another Member State and all EU citizens to travel freely across the EU, making EU citizenship more important than ever; E. whereas, too often, EU citizens lack sufficient awareness, knowledge and understanding of the rights, civic duties and freedoms deriving from EU citizenship; whereas there are still substantial shortcomings in the practical application of EU citizenship and in the full exercise of its derived rights and freedoms, some of which are caused by the non-uniform implementation of EU legislation by the Member States; F. whereas the results of the 2020 public consultation on EU citizenship revealed that over 60 % of those who took part did not consider themselves well informed about their EU citizenship rights(23); whereas the 2023 Flash Eurobarometer survey on citizenship and democracy shows that half of respondents consider themselves well informed about their rights as EU citizens; G. whereas EU citizens have been facing unprecedented challenges as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, in addition to the digital revolution and the social and economic transformations linked to it; H. whereas the compilation and consolidation of existing and future rights would facilitate a better and more informed exercise of the rights and freedoms deriving from EU citizenship; I. whereas the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFE) represents a concrete example of citizens’ participation in the democratic life of the Union; whereas its conclusions include proposals and measures that reflect the agreement between the European institutions and EU citizens to strengthen EU citizenship; J. whereas existing obstacles to the exercise of EU citizenship rights create situations of inequality and discrimination among EU citizens, in particular mobile EU citizens and their family members, especially children, persons living in EU cross-border regions and rural areas, and members of vulnerable and marginalised groups, such as minorities, low-income individuals, homeless people, the elderly, people with disabilities as well as people at risk of digital exclusion; K. whereas almost 87 million EU citizens live with some form of disability(24) and experience difficulties exercising their citizenship rights, with these difficulties sometimes entailing a direct denial of their rights to free movement and residence and restrictions on the enjoyment of their political rights; L. whereas some Member States are still offering so-called golden visa programmes and investor schemes as a means of obtaining nationality and, consequently, EU citizenship; Introduction 1. Considers that EU citizenship comprises the shared and common European democratic identity and the specific rights, civic duties and freedoms attached to it, and that the exercise of those rights, both online and offline, strengthens citizens’ link with the EU and its democratic legitimacy, as well as offering them additional rights; 2. Points out that the construction of EU citizenship must move forward to address the needs and challenges of the EU in the 21st century, recognising the potential of digital innovation and the need for a balanced approach to address the complexity generated by globalisation and new technologies; stresses that the digitalisation of democratic processes, combined with insufficient digital literacy and access to information and communication technology, risks contributing to a growing digital divide in the exercise of citizenship rights, leaving a section of the public alienated from the European project; 3. Considers that multilingualism within the EU institutions and in their interaction with citizens is an essential aspect to reinforce the notion of EU citizenship; highlights, in this regard, that the Council conclusion of 13 June 2005 envisaged that non-official EU languages recognised in a Member State or in a part of its territory could be used by EU citizens in their interaction with EU institutions, as well as officially used in EU institutions or bodies, including the European Parliament; 4. Points out that Parliament called for the creation of an EU citizenship statute in its resolution of 12 February 2019 on the implementation of the Treaty provisions related to EU citizenship and in its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the EU Citizenship Report 2020: empowering citizens and protecting their rights; recalls that the CoFE underlined the importance of reinforcing EU citizenship by mentioning in its conclusions that such a statute would be a useful tool for making the EU’s principles and values more tangible; 5. Regrets the fact that the Commission did not specifically mention the reinforcement of EU citizenship and potential ways to achieve this in its communication following up on the CoFE(25); recalls that the Council did show willingness to strengthen citizenship in the technical assessment it published in relation to the CoFE, but it has not yet proposed, undertaken nor carried out measures in order to meet this goal; 6. Recalls that the Commission will publish its EU Citizenship Report 2023 before the end of the year and expects it to propose new initiatives to reinforce EU citizenship and address the shortcomings of its implementation; regrets that this time, the Commission has chosen to publish a call for evidence and not a public consultation as it did in previous years; recalls that the results of the call for evidence do not contain a comprehensive overview of the latest developments and implementation gaps; stresses that the report should be prepared on the basis of updated data; Problems around EU citizenship 7. Is concerned about specific difficulties impeding the full exercise of the rights and freedoms deriving from EU citizenship; Political rights 8. Deplores the fact that mobile citizens are less likely to exercise their right to vote and run for office in European and municipal elections in their Member States of residence, with the reasons for this including insufficient information, language barriers, difficulties in registering to vote and the low success rate of non-national candidates; 9. Is highly concerned by the practice of certain Member States of depriving their citizens of the right to vote in national parliamentary elections when they live abroad permanently or temporarily, which leads to their exclusion from political life in both their country of origin and their country of residence; Freedom of movement and residence 10. Highlights that the Schengen area is one of the greatest achievements of the EU; stresses that all barriers to freedom of movement within the EU should be removed to achieve equal EU citizenship rights for all European citizens; calls for the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the Schengen area, in line with Parliament’s resolutions; 11. Is concerned by the fact that mobile EU citizens, especially those from vulnerable groups, are treated differently to nationals by their Member States of residence as regards access to benefits; calls on the Member States to properly implement the case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) prohibiting such discrimination; 12. Is concerned by the difficulties and challenges faced by citizens living in EU cross-border regions, especially in the event of border closures as a result of EU-wide or regional crises; calls, in such cases, on the Member States to maintain cross-border cooperation and, where appropriate, close interaction with the relevant local and regional authorities; Consular protection 13. Is concerned by the existence of deficiencies in the implementation of the Consular Protection Directive and of shortcomings in the functioning of the Member States’ consular networks, noting that these increased following the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU; deplores, in this regard, the fact that EU citizens have limited access to consular protection and assistance in some non-EU countries; 14. Points out that there have been cases where two people who are nationals of two different Member States have been unable to complete certain formalities, such as getting married, at the consular representation of one of the Member States, even if the other Member State has no accessible consular representation in that country; Discrimination 15. Considers that the lack of uniformity in Member States’ rules on the acquisition and loss of national citizenship has led to differences as regards the acquisition and loss of EU citizenship, and that these differences have resulted, in some cases, in the violation of EU principles and values; 16. Stresses that there are still several cases where the acquisition of a derived right of residence for non-EU nationals whose minor dependants are EU citizens is refused, despite the developments in CJEU case-law; 17. Reiterates its concern about the discrimination suffered by same-sex couples and their children when exercising the fundamental right to freedom of movement within the EU; Recommendations 18. Calls on the Member States and regional and local authorities to fully implement the existing directives on mobile citizens’ rights and to promptly address the different existing shortfalls in the light of the upcoming European elections; calls for the creation of targeted awareness campaigns in the country of residence to inform mobile EU citizens about their right to vote and run for office in European and municipal elections in that country; reiterates its call to expand mobile citizens’ rights to national and regional elections; 19. Calls on the Member States to guarantee the right of their expatriate nationals to vote in their country of origin, where recognised, by creating the regulatory conditions to allow for their vote and by removing any bureaucratic obstacles that hinder and sometimes prevent the exercise of this right; calls on the Member States, in particular, to equally guarantee such rights and to eliminate any kind of differential treatment among their expatriate nationals when it comes to remote voting, especially postal voting, when applicable; calls for the uniform application of the right to vote in the European elections for EU citizens residing outside of the EU; 20. Calls on the Commission to adopt a new communication clarifying certain key concepts contained in Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of EU citizens and their families to move and reside freely within the EU, in order to provide the Member States with up-to-date guidelines that could contribute to improving the Directive’s implementation at national level, thus benefiting EU citizens and their family members; 21. Calls for the EU to promote the adoption of a binding European Charter on Digital Rights, including digital citizenship rights, building on the European Declaration of Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade; 22. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal to update and improve the Consular Protection Directive in order to strengthen the right of EU citizens to consular protection, particularly in crisis situations, including by giving EU delegations a more active role in assisting under-represented EU citizens; 23. Calls on the Member States to put an end to ‘golden visa’ programmes and investor schemes and any other similar national schemes that lead to the acquisition of their citizenship and involve the direct or indirect sale and abuse of EU citizenship, as these undermine the very concept of EU citizenship and violate EU principles and values; urges the Member States to safeguard the integrity and value of EU citizenship; calls on the Commission to take any necessary action, such as referring the relevant Member States to the CJEU; 24. Calls, in the context of the next revision of the Treaties, for Parliament and the Council to be able to, in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, adopt common provisions on preventing the sale of passports, or other abuses regarding the acquisition and loss of EU citizenship by third-country nationals, with a view to approximating the conditions under which such citizenship can be acquired; 25. Calls on the Member States and relevant authorities to adapt existing school curricula or to create new ones to teach the history of Europe and of the European Union and its functioning in order to promote active citizenship and common European values and increase awareness of the added value of being a European and an EU citizen; stresses that enhancing the European dimension of citizenship education and ensuring equal access for all, also by using all the digital tools at our disposal, will enable EU citizens to act as informed citizens and to fully participate in civic, political and social life at both European and national level; stresses that Erasmus+ can play an important role in boosting EU citizenship education through learning mobility for all, regardless of age, gender, employment or education level; 26. Calls on the Commission to develop public consultations tailored to all EU citizens, especially young people, in order to increase EU citizens’ participation; urges the Commission to update the way in which public consultations are conducted in order to enhance civic engagement and participation by a wider variety of European citizens, in line with the successful example of the CoFE; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to further improve the ‘Have your say’ portal, taking advantage of new technologies, and to communicate on how citizens’ feedback contributes to the different initiatives; 27. Calls for the creation of a one-stop shop for all EU participatory tools, such as the European Citizens’ Initiative, petitions to Parliament, complaints to the European Ombudsman, public consultations and Citizens’ Dialogues, and for the efficiency of these tools to be enhanced, notably by ensuring that they contribute to European agenda-setting, while also guaranteeing that representative democracy is reinforced in the decision-making process; calls on the Commission, the Member States and regional and local authorities to increase their efforts in communicating to the public the existing participatory instruments; 28. Reiterates its proposal to create a permanent citizens’ consultation mechanism allowing citizens, especially young people, to deliberate on EU priorities and policies, contributing to the application, among other things, of a ‘youth check’ in the legislation with a view to complementing and not replacing representative parliamentary democracy; proposes that Parliament’s representatives should be informed about these deliberations so that they may assess whether to provide a follow-up, if appropriate; 29. Proposes to consider the introduction of a European citizens’ card, which could, for example, facilitate the exercise of citizenship rights and the vote in European elections as well as the use of participatory instruments; 30. Underlines the significant role of Europe Direct offices in increasing the participation of citizens at local level in EU democratic life; encourages the Member States and entities at regional and local level to increase cooperation with these offices; 31. Calls on the Commission to increase its use of social media and digital tools, with a particular focus on enhancing the involvement of young people and people with disabilities in the democratic process, thus promoting their engagement, while also recognising the lowered voting age in Member States for the European elections; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to bolster the promotion of democratic participation by increasing its dialogue with citizens and raising awareness among citizens about the impact of EU legislation on their daily lives; 32. Considers that, in the light of the growing influence of the digital sphere on citizens’ lives, especially social media and AI, it remains essential for the Member States and the European institutions to maintain their focus on creating new public policies and implementing effective mechanisms aimed at safeguarding fundamental rights online and at fighting foreign interference and disinformation, as they represent existential threats to democracy and the very exercise of citizens’ rights; 33. Urges the Council and the Commission to resume negotiations on the revision of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001(26) with the aim of ensuring that EU citizens are able to fully exercise their right to access documents and scrutinise the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. 34. Reiterates the need to draw up an EU citizenship statute, on the basis of Article 25 TFEU, that compiles existing and future citizenship rights in order to enhance the enforceability of citizenship rights and ensure citizens’ equality, improving cohesion and responding to social, economic, political and digital changes; recalls that this should be carried out within the framework of the Treaties; 35. Suggests that, in the area of participation and political rights, freedom of movement and digital citizenship, and in line with existing and future EU legislation, citizens should have, in particular:
36. Calls for a horizontal non-discrimination clause to be included in the EU citizenship statute as an additional safeguard of equality in the exercise of citizenship rights, with a view to ensuring non-discrimination and protecting citizens, in particular members of vulnerable and marginalised groups and persons living in EU cross-border regions; 37. Calls on the Commission to run targeted awareness-raising campaigns around rights and civic duties deriving from EU citizenship and the statute, including by introducing an EU package to provide information about EU citizenship, and to dedicate more resources to EU citizenship; emphasises that with the digital and technological revolution, citizens have become the true pillars of our democratic systems and will be the ones to defend them; 38. Takes note of the citizenship package, particularly the EU Citizenship Report 2023, published by the Commission on 6 December 2023 to further advance EU citizenship and make it more tangible for EU citizens; calls on the Commission to take into account the recommendations included in this report and to take the necessary steps to implement them following the procedure under the Treaties; 39. Reiterates its call for the convening of a Convention for the revision of the Treaties, as provided for in Article 48 TEU; strongly believes that the Convention should carefully assess how EU citizenship could be further strengthened; o 40. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.
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| Building a comprehensive European port strategy |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Title XVIII thereof, – having regard to the Commission communication of 1 June 2023 entitled ‘Maritime safety: at the heart of clean and modern shipping’ (COM(2023)0268), – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on the update of the EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan entitled ‘An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats’ (JOIN(2023)0008), – having regard to the Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan adopted by the European Council on 24 June 2014, – having regard to Council conclusions on the revision of the EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan adopted by the European Council on 26 June 2018, – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030), – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 12 March 2019 entitled ‘EU-China – A strategic outlook’ (JOIN(2019)0005), – having regard to the Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’ of 20 June 2023 (JOIN(2023)0020), – having regard to the Commission’s ‘Fit for 55’ package of 14 July 2021 to deliver the European Green Deal, – having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement), – having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380), – having regard to Directive 2007/60/EC of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks, – having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, – having regard to the Commission communication of 23 May 2013 entitled ‘Ports: an engine for growth’ (COM(2013)0295), – having regard to the Commission communication of 18 October 2023 on the EU Roadmap to fight Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime, – having regard to the EU Action Plan: ‘Towards Zero Pollution for Air, Water and Soil’, – having regard to the Ambient Air Quality Directive (2022/0347(COD) [under negotiation], – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1804 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure, and repealing Directive 2014/94/EU(1), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on the use of renewable and low-carbon fuels in maritime transport, and amending Directive 2009/16/EC(2), – having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC(3), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014(4), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union(5), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market(6), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/352 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 February 2017 establishing a framework for the provision of port services and common rules on the financial transparency of ports(7), – having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network and repealing Decision No 661/2010/EU(8), – having regard to the Commission Regulation (EC) No 906/2009 of 28 September 2009 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices between liner shipping companies (consortia), and the Communication to the Commission of 10 October 2023 on its expiry on 25 April 2024, – having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 and Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) 1315/2013 (COM(2021)0812), – having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy(9), – having regard to its resolution of 27 April 2021 on technical and operational measures for more efficient and cleaner maritime transport(10), – having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2019 on security threats connected with the rising Chinese technological presence in the EU and possible action on the EU level to reduce them(11), – having regard to the study of September 2023 entitled ‘Chinese Investments in European Maritime Infrastructure’, requested by the Committee on Transport and Tourism(12), – having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade, – having regard to the report of the Committee on Transport and Tourism (A9-0443/2023), A. whereas our ports are the EU’s gateways to the world and as such play a crucial role in its economy, providing wealth and jobs, by facilitating external trade, connecting to the hinterland, ensuring growth in the blue economy and industrial production, the energy transition and security of energy supplies, as well as the EU’s strategic autonomy; B. whereas ports provide a vital public service, for which they should be recognised and valued; C. whereas, while competition between ports is beneficial, a race to the bottom between them at the cost of security or increased political influence or foreign control via investments by non-EU entities, in particular state-owned-controlled-or-influenced enterprises, should be avoided; D. whereas non-EU state-owned enterprises, or enterprises directly or indirectly controlled by foreign states have strategically increased their financial and operational stakes in European ports, terminals, companies and port infrastructure; E. whereas the European Union has highlighted its desire for more autonomy in strategic sectors, but has done little to respond to China’s growth in the maritime sector and its security repercussions; F. whereas ports are highly complex environments with many different stakeholders and interests, making recognising and assessing the risks of foreign influence an arduous but crucial exercise; G. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has demonstrated the unacceptable risks of being dependent on single non-EU countries in strategic sectors as well as the crucial need to strengthen the security and the resilience of maritime infrastructure and value chains so as to ensure the flow of vital goods; H. whereas ports have taken on renewed importance from a military and defence point of view, including the dual use of port infrastructures; I. whereas European ports often compete with third-country ports in which third-country foreign investments are further exacerbating the lack of a level playing field when it comes to competitiveness and respect for sustainability standards, workers’ rights and fiscal burdens; J. whereas particular attention should be paid to the negative effects of evasive behaviours via the relocation of transhipment activities to ports outside the EU, both in terms of undermining the competitiveness of EU ports and increasing carbon leakages; K. whereas ports have played an indispensable role in EU crisis management by ensuring the continuity of supply chains and enabling alternative routes to be set up, including by establishing alternative routes for the provision of liquefied natural gas (LNG) at short notice and increasing Europe’s gas storage; L. whereas in outermost regions and islands ports often provide a lifeline by serving as the main social and economic connection to the rest of the EU; M. whereas ports are essential for the decarbonisation of waterborne transport, taking into account the Green Deal and pollution reduction goals and the essential role of offshore renewable energy; whereas it is important to reduce air pollution from ships in port areas, including black carbon emissions; N. whereas port areas and port operations throughout the EU will be vulnerable to sea level rise; O. whereas ports combine and safeguard a variety of different coastal activities for the benefit of citizens, coastal communities and the marine environment by helping to maintain coastal habitats and improve air quality in conurbations around ports; P. whereas improved logistics planning between ports and customers, including shipping lines, could avoid unnecessary road transport across Europe; whereas more cooperation between ports, with the aim of tightening intra-regional links and shortening connections, could lead to more efficient investments in port infrastructure, more resilient import/export routes, and a more efficient use of resources, of public and private money, and of underutilised capacities; Q. whereas ports are part of a wider waterborne ecosystem comprising a wide range of activities, including shipping, shipbuilding, maritime equipment manufacturing, inland navigation and logistics; R. whereas the apparent need for a multi-disciplinary and holistic approach to European ports has not been translated into concrete measures by the Commission, resulting in a patchwork of port-related regulations that has built up over time; Foreign influence 1. Highlights repeated warnings by intelligence agencies about the risks of economic dependence, espionage and sabotage caused by the economic presence and operational involvement of entities from non-EU countries in our critical infrastructure and strategic sectors, such as ports(13), including the activities of foreign vessels; 2. Calls on the Commission to present an EU strategic policy framework to reduce and limit the influence and financial and operational control exerted over the EU’s ports and in their processes and hinterland operations by non-EU countries, including cases of participation and control in the management of a port authority, in the spirit of finding a balance between keeping an open investment environment and mitigating risks; calls on the Commission and Member States to also monitor the involvement of third countries in the ports of neighbouring countries within the scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Enlargement Policy; 3. Calls on the Commission to propose a framework for the continuous monitoring and reporting, jointly with the Member States, on the influence of non-EU countries in EU ports, in particular TEN-T ports, EU terminal management and global container shipping and assess the potential links between the actions of a given non-EU country in these sectors; 4. Stresses that limiting foreign investments, in particular by state-owned-controlled-or-influenced enterprises, in an individual port in one Member State can negatively affect the competitive position of that port relative to neighbouring ports that do not have these limitations, which underlines the need for a joint European strategy for ports; considers that an asymmetrical spread of foreign investments between EU countries may threaten the unity, the crisis management capabilities and the resilience of the EU; asks the Commission to analyse the potential impact on employment and trade at local and EU level that may result from limiting non-EU investments in European ports; 5. Encourages national port authorities, the Member States and the Commission to develop an adequate format for strategic cooperation between European ports in order to minimise the risk of their being played off against each other by external actors; 6. Stresses that despite the existence of protective mechanisms at EU level, such as the screening of foreign direct investments and competition rules, these instruments are insufficient to address the increasing economic strength of external powers through individual companies, including state-owned-controlled-or-influenced enterprises, and are heavily reliant on implementation by individual Member States; 7. Underlines the importance of stepping up EU cooperation in screening and blocking inbound investments in critical infrastructure where major negative impacts on other Member States or the EU as a whole cannot be excluded, and that this cooperation should include sharing information about threats and opportunities; 8. Strongly encourages the Commission to strengthen the role of the protective measures for ports via an ambitious revision of the Foreign Direct Investments Regulation(14) (FDI Regulation), including by making a foreign direct investment screening system mandatory in all Member States, ensuring that screening processes are clear and objective and that the definitions, scope and procedural aspects are consistent across Member States, in order to ensure an EU-wide level playing field; 9. Underlines also the crucial importance of the mechanism in Article [47] of the revised TEN-T Regulation [xxx/2024], mandating that Member States screen third-country investments in TEN-T infrastructure for their potential risks to security or public order which must be considered as complementary to the provisions of the FDI Regulation, as this mechanism applies both to investments in infrastructure (e.g. acquisition of shares in a terminal) as well as to infrastructure works performed in the EU by a third country company (e.g. in a public procurement to build a terminal in a European port), and stresses that its effective application for the port infrastructure concerned should be a cornerstone of a European port strategy; 10. Underlines the importance of monitoring the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market; calls on the Commission to closely monitor the port sector’s market and, if necessary, intervene ex officio as provided for under Article 9 of this Regulation; 11. Calls on the Commission to research and assess the impact of vertical integration in maritime logistics, the Consortia Block Exemption Regulation, which is due to expire in 2024, and the formation of container shipping alliances on non-EU country influence in EU ports; calls on the Commission to intervene when necessary, in order to ensure fair competition, a fair power balance and a level playing field for all actors in the port ecosystem; 12. Underlines that, in particular, the aggregated presence of enterprises under the control and/or influence of the Chinese state in the core network ports and nodes of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) has important implications for the resilience and security of individual nodes and the network as a whole; recalls that the presence of third-country investors in ports may hamper their dual use role; 13. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to urgently carry out a risk assessment of China’s involvement in maritime infrastructures that includes its impact on labour and the environment, dependencies and an assessment of bottlenecks in the shipping of goods from China to the EU and transhipment and that this assessment should also include other non-EU countries; 14. Recalls that the maritime and port sectors in Europe are characterised by a patchwork of different governance structures – with different means to allow investments, ranging from licensing and concession schemes, over the granting of ownership of port infrastructure, to full operational power over port authorities; highlights in this respect the importance of port managing bodies’ risk mitigation measures to safeguard control through setting multiple conditions (operational, social, environmental, etc.), under which a terminal should be operated; underlines, however, the limits of an approach exclusively based on port concessions and/or lease contracts; 15. Suggests that all Member States introduce laws and develop contingency plans for a major conflict scenario or other state of emergency, or for cases of clear misuse or dual use of critical infrastructure with negative repercussions for security or public order, so as to be able to retake control of ports, terminals and other maritime infrastructure, including the cancellation of rights of concession and/or the suspension of the capacity of domain in the cases of property and participation; 16. Calls for significant public and private investments in ports located in overseas territories and outermost regions to turn them into strategic clusters for multi-modal transport, energy generation, storage and distribution, as well as defence; calls on the Commission to include provisions to limit influence and operational control by non-EU countries in those ports in its proposal; Security 17. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to specifically address the need to prevent and reduce the risks of espionage and sabotage in ports with a dual use or military function, such as ports that are used by NATO, including via foreign vessels; 18. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the use of trusted technology in maritime logistics and in the functioning of container terminals; expresses its concern about the increasing dependence on non-EU producers for (border) security equipment in ports, as well as ship-to-shore cranes that are able to collect data on the origin and destination of containers; encourages investments in research and development in these areas so that EU companies could take the lead in the production and sale of these technologies; 19. Considers that complex and highly digital logistics operations lead to an increased vulnerability to interruptions of entire logistic chains; therefore asks for the access of foreign state-owned-controlled-or-influenced entities to port operations and information to be limited and monitored; 20. Calls on the Commission to pay particular attention to the threat that foreign investments may pose to intellectual property, in particular through forced technology transfers; 21. Emphasises that a high level of cybersecurity and cyber resilience of all actors in our ports is crucial to prevent espionage and severe disruptions of port systems and operations, while the risk of cyber threats has increased significantly in the last few years; asks the Commission to do further research and to collect data on the coverage and risks of non-EU companies’ involvement in cyber and data security in critical infrastructure and to support the development of comprehensive contingency plans for ports with technical and operational support from the European Maritime Safety Agency; considers that the risk of negative spillover effects from a lack of cybersecurity from one port to another is high and that therefore high standards should be maintained by all Member States and that the sharing of best practices and experiences is recommended; 22. Highlights the growing importance of critical infrastructure protection at sea and underwater (including energy pipelines, communication networks and offshore renewable energy facilities) for the safety and security of EU waters and operations therein; 23. Underlines that while data-sharing in logistics contributes to the efficiency, agility and resilience of supply chains, the use of non-EU state-owned-controlled-or-influenced platforms in ports poses economic and strategic risks for the EU and should be prevented; 24. Deplores the fact that EU ports are misused by criminal organisations as key entry points for illicit drugs, which has an effect on society as a whole and undermines the safety of ports, nearby cities and their residents; calls on the Commission to present measures for effective European cooperation to combat drug trafficking, extraction and criminal subversion; welcomes in this respect the Commission’s 18 October 2023 roadmap to fight Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime and underlines the need for a coordinated EU approach to combat all kinds of transnational organised crime; 25. Stresses that European ports are particularly exposed to the trafficking of other illicit products such as weapons or counterfeit items, as well as to customs and VAT fraud and that it is also necessary to step up the fight against these activities; underlines in this respect the importance of cooperation between port management bodies and law enforcement authorities, including in the usage of digital tools and data to ensure safe and secure port operations; considers that, when there is sufficient legal justification, ports should be able to access to all tools they need to contribute to their security; 26. Underlines that the security of ports depends on their resilience to climate and environmental change; therefore calls on the Commission to conduct a study to analyse the climate risks for European ports and related transport infrastructure, setting out categories of risks, e.g. rising sea levels, flooding, extreme heat, to analyse the risks by region and to identify the measures to address these risks, including the costs of these measures and the investments needed; calls on the Member States to undertake a long-term environmental risk assessment of their critical port infrastructure and take adaptive measures in a timely way; Role of ports in the energy transition 27. Stresses the vital role ports play in the energy transition as set out in the EU Green Deal, as energy hubs for the conversion, conditioning and storing of energy carriers, for energy generation, for the import of critical raw materials, as carbon capture and storage hubs, as servicing stations and manufacturing hubs for offshore energy facilities and as nodes in transport systems supporting the energy transition; 28. Recalls that by 2030, the EU aims to import 10 million tonnes of green hydrogen and that to achieve this goal, a comprehensive strategy on importation, coordination, and infrastructure development is essential to the European Port Strategy and should be established promptly; 29. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the increasing need for investments in ports and terminals and their infrastructure so that they can assume their role in the energy transition; calls on the Commission to analyse and address the need for fast track permitting of port expansions in the context of the energy transition, such as offshore wind deployment, so the ports will not become a bottleneck in the energy transition; highlights the need for a more sustainable management of the maritime space and coasts to unlock the potential of offshore renewable energy; encourages the use of harbour areas for photovoltaic and wind energy deployment; 30. Stresses the importance of increasing synergies between the trans-European transport network and the trans-European energy network; 31. Asks the Commission to include ports in its Circular Economy strategy and assist the Member States and local port authorities by providing guidance on implementing projects related to circularity; calls on the Commission to address the increasing problem of oil slick in ports and shipping channels; 32. Asks the Commission to deliver on its modal shift ambition as put forward in the Green Deal and tackle the remaining challenges for inland waterways and, especially, rail freight to boost their uptake in ports and their connectivity to the hinterland; 33. Underlines that an energy transition in ports, in the shipbuilding industry as well as the maritime sector, will not be possible without a skilled workforce and adequate public and private funding; urges the Commission to provide future-proof training, education and life-long learning opportunities, and to promote social dialogue, to put port workers in the centre of the digital and green transition, and to make the industry more attractive to women; reiterates the important societal role of ports in providing many direct and indirect jobs and stresses the need to safeguard fair and safe working conditions for all port and maritime workers; highlights that recent crises have shown that seafarers, crew members, fishers and port workers are essential ‘front line’ workers and their well-being is vital to keep the world moving; Competitiveness of EU ports and companies 34. Stresses that a European Port Strategy should have the competitiveness of ports among its main priorities; 35. Stresses that strengthening the economic position of EU ports and improving their competitiveness in a global economy is crucial for limiting foreign influence and security risks as well as for Europe’s supply chain sovereignty; considers that European legislation should not undermine the competitiveness of EU ports and create carbon and business leakage to ports outside the EU; 36. Underlines the risks of delocalisation of container transhipment activities to non-EU ports with the aim of evading the requirements of the EU emission trading system (ETS) Directive(15) and the FuelEU Maritime Regulation(16); calls for the strict application of the transhipment monitoring provisions of these two pieces of legislation to detect and prohibit such behaviour as well as for an assessment as to whether these provisions are sufficient to effectively deter evasive behaviour to the detriment of both the environment and of growth and jobs in Europe and whether additional measures are necessary; 37. Calls on the Commission to analyse and address the investment needs of European ports in order for them to remain competitive in the future and to work towards a more stable investment climate including transparency and predictability of assessments of investments, both public and private; 38. Underlines that in order to maintain the competitiveness of EU ports and the functioning of a possible European Port Strategy, excessive administrative burdens that could undermine the working of such a strategy should be avoided; 39. Emphasises that a consistent European port strategy is essential to ensure fair competition; encourages increased cooperation between European ports and the elimination of harmful practices such as underpricing; 40. Considers that a well-functioning customs union is fundamental to the EU’s competitiveness, sustainability and resilience; believes that a reformed and strengthened customs union with a common customs code will preserve the integrity of the single market, helping to maintain EU competitiveness in the twin green and digital transitions and avoid unfair competition between European ports; 41. Stresses that differences in customs procedure policies at the EU’s points of entry into the customs union often distort trade flows and jeopardise the integrity of the European single market; 42. Recalls the importance of having in place harmonised customs controls in all European ports to avoid different application of sanitary or due diligence standards; insists that the Commission ensure that custom controls throughout the EU follow the same standards, by means of a direct unified customs control mechanism, in coordination with Member States and in full compliance with the principle of subsidiarity; 43. Recalls that ports are not stand-alone assets as they have their place in a vast waterborne ecosystem of maritime logistics and industry and supply chains driven by demand from European importers and exporters; 44. Is concerned about EU shipping companies facing restrictive maritime cabotage legislation in China, which effectively forbids them from carrying out cabotage operations between Chinese ports, while cabotage operations constitute a core element of the business model of Chinese shipping companies in and between certain EU ports; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of introducing a reciprocal EU maritime cabotage law that could apply to certain non-EU shippers, such as China; recalls that the lack of investment reciprocity in ports harms EU interests; 45. Underlines the importance of the EU Global Gateway initiative as a strategic global alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative; emphasises the potential of Global Gateway projects in the maritime industry (e.g. port infrastructure, hinterland road and rail connection, green hydrogen) to create a network of ports that facilitate trade and investment and mutually beneficial partnerships; 46. Stresses the urgent need to improve the strength, capacity and resilience of hinterland connections of European ports, particularly those that are part of TEN-T, taking into account the need for emission reduction and energy efficiency and aiming to shift inland transport to rail and inland waterways as far as possible while also preparing for the impacts of climate change, such as extreme weather events and low water levels in inland waterways; 47. Suggests that the Commission establish an ’atlas’ of European ports, that maps, among other things, European commercial ports’ availability of on-shore power supply and alternative fuels, hinterland infrastructure (particularly rail) and shipping lanes, which could possibly build on the TENtec interactive maps and the European Alternative Fuels Observatory, but should also include smaller ports and further information; considers that such a mapping could help form an overall factual basis for the continued development of EU ports and related industries, such as freight and passenger transport, cruise traffic, fishing, offshore wind, fuel bunkering and manufacturing; 48. Underlines the importance of maritime manufacturing, such as shipbuilding and its supply-chain, in the EU as a foundation for maintaining a thriving waterborne sector; calls on the Commission to research and assess the impact of Europe’s dependence on foreign maritime manufacturing, to urgently define an ambitious European industrial maritime strategy and take adequate measures to enhance the competitiveness and resilience of Europe’s shipyards and their entire supply chains; 49. Calls on the Commission to introduce an enabling digital framework to stimulate programmes for innovation and further port digitalisation, such as smart ports programmes, with a view to improving the efficiency, productivity and sustainability of ports; underlines, in particular, the potential of digitalisation for port call optimisation (to reduce waiting times in coastal waters and ports), just-in-time arrivals, advanced navigation systems (for fuel savings and emissions reduction), automatic identification systems (for increased safety at sea and better enforcement of environmental provisions) as well as for drones and artificial intelligence solutions leading to better decisions on port infrastructure; 50. Emphasises that adequate funding and financing instruments will need to be allocated to ports for them to remain competitive, play an enabling role in the green transition, and contain risks of foreign influence; asks for the funding designated to ports under the Connecting Europe Facility to be increased; underlines the importance of private investments in ports and that companies are the ones providing employment and innovation in and around ports; Conclusion 51. Calls for a European Port Summit to further develop the aforementioned issues and to explore the possibilities for enhanced cooperation between European ports to this end; 52. Calls on the Commission to present a comprehensive European Port Strategy addressing the aforementioned issues by the end of 2024; o 53. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.
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| Implementation of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part(1), – having regard to the Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its Member States(2), – having regard to the Strategic Partnership on Critical Raw Materials between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, which was agreed and launched at the EU-Canada Summit of 14-15 June 2021, – having regard to Decision No X/2023 of the CETA Joint Committee on the interpretation of certain terms in Article 8.10, Annex 8-A and Article 8.39, – having regard to its position of 15 February 2017 on the draft Council Decision on the conclusion of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part(3), – having regard to the Opinion 2/15 of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 16 May 2017 pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU on the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore(4), – having regard to the Joint Declarations of the EU and the Canada Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs), – having regard to the Commission report of 11 October 2022 entitled ‘Implementation and Enforcement of EU Trade Agreements’ (COM(2022)0730), – having regard to the Commission communication of 22 June 2022 entitled ‘The power of trade partnerships: together for green and just economic growth’ (COM(2022)0409), – having regard to the report of the CETA Joint Committee of 31 March 2023 following its third meeting, – having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the future of EU international investment policy(5), – having regard to the CETA Joint Committee recommendations of 26 September 2018 on trade, climate action and the Paris Agreement, on Trade and Gender and on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), – having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0152), – having regard to the reports of the different specialised committees, the Civil Society Forum and the Regulatory Cooperation Forum, – having regard to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), published on 20 March 2023, – having regard to the successive audits carried out in 2014, 2019 and 2022 by the Commission’s Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety on the traceability and quality of the control systems in place governing the production of beef and pork intended for export to the European Union, – having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports, – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, – having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0400/2023), A. whereas CETA was among the first trade agreements the EU completed with another major established OECD economy after South Korea: whereas it was also the most ambitious and comprehensive agreement either the EU or Canada had concluded at the time, including unprecedented access to public procurement at sub-federal as well as federal level; B. whereas CETA has been provisionally applied since 21 September 2017, i.e. for more than six years; C. whereas important provisions, in particular relating to investment protection, have still not been applied, as not all Member States have ratified the agreement; D. whereas Canada and the EU are finalising a draft Decision of the CETA Joint Committee on the interpretation of certain terms in Article 8.10, Annex 8-A and Article 8.39 specifying the remit of the right to regulate in the context of the investment protection chapter and on the facilitation of the access by SMEs to the investment court system under CETA; E. whereas the EU was Canada’s third largest trading partner after the United States and China, accounting for 8,2 % of its trade in goods with the world in 2022; whereas Canada ranked 14th among the EU’s international trading partners for the same year, accounting for almost 1,4 % of the EU’s total external trade in goods; F. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has demonstrated the need to diversify trade agreements and reduce dependence on imports and exports from a limited number of trade partners, as well as the importance of concluding trade agreements with like-minded partners; G. whereas the effective implementation and the monitoring of the EU’s trade agreements is a key priority for Parliament, the Council and the Commission in order to monitor, assess and calibrate the EU’s common commercial policy (CCP); whereas reporting on the implementation of the agreement with Canada is a timely and useful contribution to the reflection on the functioning of EU trade agreements; H. whereas the institutional framework under CETA is now fully in place, with 19 specialised committees, a regulatory cooperation forum and a civil society forum, and their agendas and reports are publicly available; I. whereas Canada was the first country with which the EU established a Strategic Partnership on Critical Raw Materials, which has been subsequently complemented by a Green Alliance Initiative, an EU-Canada Digital Partnership and an Ocean Partnership; J. whereas Canada is an active participant in the WTO Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade and the WTO Trade and Environment Committee, but is not a member of the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR) initiative; K. whereas there is now sufficient experience, data and statistical information to assess the provisional implementation of CETA; L. whereas Canada is a world leader in the co-construction of public policy for the social and solidarity economy, and whereas the social and solidarity economy represents almost 10 % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in certain provinces, such as Quebec, accounting for approximately 210 000 jobs; Main conclusions and recommendations 1. Highlights that CETA relies on a rules- and values-based relationship which promotes a more secure and stable economic environment between the trading partners, which is particularly important in the context of heightened geopolitical uncertainties, built on the principles of sustainable development and respect for human rights and labour and environmental standards; considers that such predictability can foster economic growth, the exchange of goods, the provision of services, participation in public procurement, the attractiveness of investment, quality employment, the creation of more and better-paid jobs, and improved working conditions and living standards; notes, however, that CETA needs to further strengthen sustainable development, respect for human and labour rights and to protect the climate; 2. Notes with satisfaction that trade in goods between the EU and Canada increased by 66 % between 2016 and 2022, while EU-Canada trade in services increased by 46 %, outperforming other extra-EU trade; notes the fact that EU goods exports to Canada increased by 47 % during the first five years of provisional application, where the biggest gains were registered in the cases of manufactured products, chemical products as well as food and animal products; notes that most of the concerns expressed before the provisional application of the agreement regarding the influx of Canadian agricultural products into the EU market, have not materialised; observes that Canadian exports to the EU saw an increase of 46,4 %, where the biggest gains were registered in ores, precious stones and metals, and mineral fuels and oils; 3. Underlines the considerable growth in bilateral trade in food and agricultural products between the EU and Canada, with EU agri-food exports to Canada increasing by 62 % and EU imports of such products from Canada by 52 % since the start of the provisional application of CETA; notes that this has significantly benefited producers and exporters on both sides and has also contributed to job creation; welcomes the substantial increase in the number of the Union’s micro, small and medium-sized enterprises exporting to Canada, as well as in the value of their exported products, noting that the agreement thus significantly serves their interests; 4. Stresses that, in the implementation of CETA, as with all other EU trade agreements, due account must be taken of respect for sustainable agricultural production, reciprocity and maintaining high standards, in particular sanitary, phytosanitary and veterinary standards, as well as of adequate controls and monitoring mutual compliance with those standards; 5. Welcomes the fact that trade flows between the parties have generally proven to be resilient throughout the pandemic, as well as the difficult situation created by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, thereby resisting pressure on supply chains and contributing to strengthened food security; takes the view that CETA should serve as a tool to facilitate cooperation and joint action in the reconstruction of Ukraine once the war is over; 6. Underlines that EU exports are key to employment; welcomes the fact that CETA has contributed to creating new job opportunities, as the number of jobs supported by EU exports to Canada rose from 624 000 in 2017 to more than 700 000 in 2021; 7. Stresses the importance of labour mobility facilitation granted under CETA, as it helps ensure an adequate skills transfer between the EU and Canada and avoid shortages of qualified labour; welcomes, in this regard, the successful conclusion in 2022 of the first Mutual Recognition Agreement under CETA for architects’ qualifications; takes the view that the EU Blue Card could further facilitate exchanges between two competitive economies with a highly educated population; underlines that exchange programmes between EU and Canadian academic institutions can further contribute to the necessary labour mobility in the long run; 8. Notes that the two most important product categories that the EU and Canada export to each other are machinery and transport equipment, accounting for around 34 % of both exports and imports, and chemical, pharmaceutical and plastic products, making up around 20 % of total exports and imports; notes, however, that the mining and extraction sector, in particular fertilisers, nickel, uranium and sand oils is highly significant when it comes to imports from Canada, compared to other trading partners, accounting for nearly 20 % of the EU’s total imports from Canada; highlights that access to critical raw materials from reliable trading partners, including Canada, is a key element of the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Strategy and vital to delivering a sustainable green transition; 9. Stresses that cooperation on access to critical raw materials is essential in the current geopolitical landscape, as well as for the green and just transitions, and welcomes the signing in July 2021 of the EU-Canada Strategic Partnership on Critical Raw Materials within the framework of CETA, which should help to integrate EU-Canada raw material value chains and foster collaboration in science, technology and innovation; notes that this constitutes an important component of the European economic security strategy; is convinced that raw materials extraction needs to occur with respect for environmental standards and labour and human rights, including the rights of indigenous peoples; 10. Welcomes the fact that European and Canadian firms are making increasing and continuous use of preferences granted by CETA, with preference utilisation rates for both the EU and Canada standing at 60 % in 2022 compared to 40 % and 52 % respectively in 2018; notes with interest that smaller companies are using the preferences to a larger extent than large companies and that utilisation rates are significantly higher for agri-food industries compared to manufacturing industries; stresses that the low utilisation rates in key sectors for several EU members indicate foregone cost savings and diminished welfare gains from the agreement; encourages both partners to continue to promote actions to raise awareness of CETA among stakeholders in both regions, including through the EU’s ‘Access2Markets’ platform; underlines the importance of facilitating new opportunities for businesses and consumers through digital trade in line with EU standards; 11. Notes that the utilisation rate of the tariff rate quota (TRQ) for beef and veal imports to the EU was only 3 % in 2021, and that EU exporters have expanded their market share in Canada, such that the EU exports more frozen beef to Canada than it imports from it; notes, however, that the utilisation rate of this TRQ may change over time as a result of variations in Canada’s other export markets, in particular the US and China; 12. Highlights that according to the audit report of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety, Canada has yet to satisfactorily implement the recommendations made in the Directorate-General’s audit on the traceability and quality of the control systems in place governing the production of beef and pork intended for export to the European Union; 13. Welcomes the introduction of a harmonised EU export certificate for the export of fresh poultry from authorised Member States, which became operational in 2021; calls on the Commission to pursue further progress on similar certificates for processed meat and sheep or goat meat, while increasing efforts to ensure stronger traceability systems for meat products; calls on the Commission, in the framework of the Management Committee and in cooperation with the Canadian authorities and Member States, to make progress on the recognition of the remaining meat inspection systems in order to allow the remaining Member States to export meat to Canada; 14. Notes, with regret, that CETA does not apply the principle of regionalisation in general, solely considering the EU as a single area with regard to livestock production, but not with regard to the fruit and vegetables sector, which means that each Member State has to individually negotiate and agree on export requirements for each product; calls for this flaw to be remedied as soon as possible within the framework of the EU-Canada Joint Management Committee; 15. Calls on the Commission to facilitate ongoing cooperation with the Canadian authorities aimed at increasing attention to safeguards for animal welfare standards in CETA and evaluating the feasibility of establishing, in the future, mirror clauses in this area to guarantee the equivalence of animal welfare standards and thus a level playing field between EU and imported animal products; 16. Points out that EU trade policy, and CETA in particular, has a significant economic impact on the outermost regions (ORs), and therefore stresses the need to protect the interests of those regions in future negotiations or a possible review of the agreement; 17. Maintains that part of the tariffs and TRQs assigned to EU products should be allocated to operators registered in the ORs, taking account of their economic situation; stresses that differential treatment for operators in the ORs is key to ensuring the competitiveness of businesses and the fair distribution of tariffs and TRQs among commercial agents by avoiding the restriction of benefits to a small number of operators; 18. Takes note of the fact that the TRQ utilisation rate stands at 98 % for EU cheese exports on average; calls, nevertheless, for a more transparent and flexible Canadian TRQ management system for dairy products, in particular the cheese quota, and urges the Canadian authorities to move forward with a potential review of the system as soon as possible; 19. Highlights the importance of recognising the system of geographical indications (GIs) as a key component of the agreement; underlines the need for further effective enforcement of GIs protection for EU rights holders in Canada, in order to ensure trust in the correct functioning of the agreement; 20. Takes note of the fact that during the first six years of provisional application of CETA, the EU’s exports to and imports from Canada in services have grown by 54 % and 74 %, respectively, with the highest gains in transport services, business services and information, computer and telecommunications services, in particular benefiting smaller EU Member States where services features significantly in the economic structure of the country; 21. Welcomes the concrete efforts to facilitate access to public procurement, such as the Single Point of Access in Canada; takes the view that even if many more EU businesses are successfully participating in Canadian tenders, such as for regional rail passenger transport in Ontario or bridges in Montreal, EU suppliers could take even further advantage of the opportunities offered, in particular as regards infrastructure projects and bidding for provincial and municipal contracts; 22. Calls on the parties to make available all the legal and administrative support and tools SMEs need to engage in trade and investment under CETA, in order to foster an increase in exchanges and to enhance participation so they can reap the benefits of CETA, including through active measures to facilitate the internationalisation of SMEs, simplify procedures and address technical barriers to trade that disproportionately affect SMEs; welcomes, in this regard, the recommendation on SMEs adopted by the Joint Committee in 2018, and the subsequent action plans, including concrete actions such as the launch of the Access2Markets platform in October 2020, which supports SMEs with practical information on trade agreements and trade barriers; expects the expost evaluation to provide data on the evolution of the share of trade between EU and Canada carried out by SMEs; calls on the Parties to contemplate the possibility of a fully fledged chapter on SMEs analogous to those in the agreements with New Zealand and Chile; 23. Given the importance of the social and solidarity economy sector in Canada and the action plan for the social economy adopted by the Commission on 9 December 2021(6), calls on the Joint Committee to identify what concrete measures could be put in place to promote more cooperation between social and solidarity actors across the Atlantic; 24. Encourages both parties to continue their outreach activities, in particular focusing on SMEs and on Social and Solidarity Economy actors, to raise awareness about the opportunities offered by CETA through targeted information campaigns, while ensuring that the benefits of the agreement are shared equally between men and women; 25. Welcomes the adoption of the recommendation on Trade and Gender by the CETA Joint Committee as early as 2018, which includes a commitment to share methods and procedures for the collection of gender disaggregated data, the use of indicators, monitoring and evaluation methodologies, and the analysis of gender-focused statistics related to trade; underlines that trade should benefit all, and specifically strengthen women’s economic empowerment; strongly encourages the CETA Joint Committee to continue monitoring the impacts of the agreement on gender; takes the view that the work carried out under the jointly adopted action plan can serve as an example for other trade agreements, even when there are no dedicated chapters on trade and gender in the agreement itself; recalls Parliament’s resolution on the Gender Action Plan III(7) and encourages the Commission to publish more easily accessible gender disaggregated data on the usage of the agreement, particularly in relation to the chapters on public procurement and on trade and labour; 26. Calls on the Commission to prevent the precautionary principle from being weakened as a basic principle of the European Union enshrined in the Treaties and a guarantor of the protection of European farmers and citizens; highlights the importance of promoting the precautionary principle in all aspects of trade and ensuring its application, while avoiding unjustified barriers to trade; 27. Underlines that CETA provides a framework that fosters both trade and climate action by including commitments to cooperate on trade-related environmental issues of common interest such as climate change, as demonstrated by the recommendation on trade, climate action and the Paris Agreement, notably with the promotion of clean technologies; underlines the importance of Canadian-based global power production accelerating the clean energy transition by producing energy from renewable resources; welcomes the growth of the environmental goods trade by 27 % since provisional application started; notes, however, that Canada has considered elements of European legislative and non-legislative initiatives with regard to the European Green Deal as technical barriers to trade; invites the Parties to find synergies with the implementation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and other initiatives in the EU, and to jointly support work to develop joint or comparable carbon emissions methodologies at international level; 28. Welcomes the launch of the EU-Canada Digital Partnership as a key enabler of the green and digital transitions; calls on both parties to strengthen their cooperation in the framework of CETA implementation on issues of strategic mutual interest such as artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and the fight against disinformation; 29. Welcomes the active involvement and monitoring of CETA implementation by the DAGs and the Civil Society Forum, which gathers hundreds of representatives from across the EU and Canada, including businesses, environmental and labour organisations, civil society, academia as well as indigenous peoples’ representatives from Canada, and actively contributing to the work of in particular the Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) Committee through their joint statements; urges the Commission and the TSD Board to follow up on their proposals; stresses that the mandate of the DAGs should also be to consider the sustainability impact of the full agreement; underlines the value of including considerations about the impact on sustainability and human rights of the investment protection chapter in their work; 30. Calls on both parties to ensure better integration of small-scale farmers and consumers in the DAGs in the context of the renewal of these groups; 31. Insists on the effective implementation of the specific commitments related to the TSD provisions, including the early TSD review committed to in the Joint Interpretative Instrument, which has not been forthcoming, as integral parts of CETA and essential to the accomplishment of the objectives set; takes note that in 2024, the Commission will conduct an ex post evaluation of CETA, including its TSD chapter, involving independent experts, which will be an opportunity to assess it against the Commission’s new approach of June 2022 and to consider taking on board concrete proposals put forward by Canada in 2020 to give a more binding scope to certain provisions of this chapter; recalls that the Joint Committee can provide a binding decision establishing implementation roadmaps to strengthen cooperation in areas where the ex post evaluation would identify shortcomings and expects them to actively do so; believes that efforts targeting better implementation of the TSD chapter or its review should be preceded by a meaningful consultation of all stakeholders; 32. Notes that the UK ceased to be a member of the European Union following the provisional application of CETA; notes that the UK and Canada have agreed a series of bilateral trading arrangements to take account of this, including with regards to TRQ use and cumulation; notes that some of these agreements will cease to apply after 2024, which may present minor disruptions to established supply chains; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility for new agreements where these disruptions may negatively affect Union economic operators; 33. Calls on the parties to review CETA, once ratified, making use of the review clause, in order to introduce a suitable and effective dispute settlement mechanism for the TSD, including the consideration of, among various enforcement methods, sanctions as a deterrent to be used, as a last resort, in the case of serious breaches; highlights its wish to contemplate institutionalising the ongoing cooperation on trade and gender in this review; stresses that this review should consider introducing specific strong provisions on the rights of indigenous peoples, including International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; 34. Urges Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland and Slovenia to swiftly ratify CETA, as this will also be essential in order to update the agreement, and reiterates the importance of full application of CETA, including its investment protection provisions; 35. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the Government and Parliament of Canada.
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| EU strategy on Central Asia |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 May 2019 entitled ‘The EU and Central Asia: New opportunities for a stronger partnership’ (JOIN(2019)0009), – having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 June 2019 on the New Strategy on Central Asia, – having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 September 2018 entitled ‘Connecting Europe and Asia – Building blocks for an EU Strategy’ (JOIN(2018)0031), – having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030), – having regard to the outcomes of the 18th EU-Central Asia Foreign Ministers’ meeting, held on 17 November 2022 in Samarkand, which focused on finding solutions to common challenges, – having regard to the joint press communiqué by the heads of state of Central Asia and the President of the European Council, issued following the second regional high-level meeting held in Cholpon-Ata on 2 June 2023, – having regard to the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the other part(1), – having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part(2), – having regard to the Commission proposal of 13 June 2022 for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part (COM(2022)0277), – having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tajikistan, of the other part(3), – having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Uzbekistan, of the other part(4), – having regard to the outcomes of the EU-Central Asia Connectivity Conference, held on 18 November 2022, the second EU-Central Asia Economic Forum, held from 18 to 19 May 2023, the fourth EU-Central Asia Civil Society Forum, held on 10 March 2023, and the seventh EU-Central Asia High-Level Conference on Environment and Water Resources, held from 23 to 24 February 2023, – having regard to the EU-funded study entitled ‘Sustainable transport connections between Europe and Central Asia’, conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and published on 30 June 2023, – having regard to the Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and Kazakhstan on a strategic partnership in the field of raw materials, batteries and renewable hydrogen, signed on 7 November 2022, – having regard to the outcomes of the human rights dialogues with the Central Asian states, – having regard to the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia, endorsed during the 19th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting held on 23 October 2023, – having regard to the joint declaration by the heads of state of Central Asia and the Federal Chancellor of Germany following their summit on 29 September 2023 in Berlin, – having regard to its previous resolutions on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, – having regard to the EU Gender Action Plan III 2021-2025, – having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy(5), – having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0407/2023), A. whereas since the adoption of the EU strategy on Central Asia in 2019, the region has been affected by significant external factors, such as Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy, as well as by internal instability, particularly the violent unrest in Kazakhstan in January 2022, the violent crackdown following protests by the Pamiris in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan in November 2021 and May 2022 and in the Republic of Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan, in July 2022, and repeated clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border; B. whereas Central Asia is a region of strategic interest to the EU in terms of security and connectivity as well as energy and resource diversification, conflict resolution and the defence of the multilateral rules-based international order, which has been challenged by Russia’s attack on our values, the exacerbation of the global food crisis, aggression and atrocities, the spread of disinformation, weaponised corruption and meddling in elections; C. whereas none of the Central Asian states support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and do not recognise Ukrainian regions annexed by Russia as parts of the Russian Federation; D. whereas on 28 March 2023, the EU’s Special Envoy on Sanctions called on the countries in the region to avoid assisting Moscow’s attempts to evade sanctions imposed on Russia over its war of aggression against Ukraine; E. whereas Russian officials and propagandists continue to use aggressive rhetoric against some Central Asian states, in particular against Kazakhstan, questioning its territorial integrity and national identity; F. whereas circumstances such as Russia’s isolation as a result of its war of aggression against Ukraine, the strengthening of trade routes through Central Asia bypassing Russia, the planned enlargement of the EU in Eastern Europe and the growing influence of China in the region call for a complete rethink of the EU’s Central Asia strategy and a more active presence of the democratic EU in the region as an alternative to established autocratic actors; G. whereas there is a need to ensure connectivity between Europe and Asia in a way that avoids crossing Russian territory; whereas the EU has a strong interest in the deployment of efficient trade and energy corridors between Europe and Asia, as demonstrated by the EU-Central Asia Connectivity Conference held in Samarkand on 18 November 2022; H. whereas all five Central Asian states ratified the Paris Agreement; whereas they are particularly vulnerable to the consequences of climate change; whereas reckless water mismanagement and pollution of major rivers for the irrigation of cotton fields resulted in the ineffective use and exploitation of water resources in the region; whereas glaciers in Central Asia continue to shrink rapidly, exacerbating one of the most severe water crises on Earth and exposing the vulnerable population of the area to disastrous health, ecological and social problems; whereas frequent water conflicts and political instability have limited unified planning and efficient allocation of transboundary rivers; whereas the geopolitical shifts in the wider region pose opportunities for more meaningful regional cooperation; whereas such regional cooperation has proven impactful in the context of water diplomacy and resolving border disputes, and will be even more crucial to address the growing transboundary threats posed by climate change; I. whereas Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCAs) are new‑generation agreements that are the cornerstone of the EU’s engagement with Central Asia; whereas Kazakhstan was the first Central Asian state to sign an EPCA in 2015, which came into force on 1 March 2020 following its ratification by all Member States, and should be periodically reviewed; whereas negotiations on the EU-Kyrgyzstan EPCA were concluded on 6 July 2019, but the agreement has still not been signed as a result of a legal dispute between the Council and the Commission; whereas negotiations on the EU-Uzbekistan EPCA were concluded on 6 July 2022; whereas at the beginning of 2023, the EU and Tajikistan started negotiations on an EPCA; whereas a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Turkmenistan was signed in 1998, but Parliament has not given its consent to ratify the agreement because of its deep concern over the short-term benchmarks for Turkmenistan’s progress on human rights and fundamental freedoms; J. whereas the first EU-Central Asian leaders’ meeting took place in Astana on 27 October 2022, followed by a second such meeting in Cholpon-Ata on 2 June 2023; whereas a leaders’ summit is planned for 2024; whereas these meetings represent further institutionalisation of EU-Central Asian relations and complement the work of existing regional dialogues and platforms; K. whereas the first C5+1 summit between Central Asian leaders and the President of the United States was held in New York on 19 September 2023; whereas the C5+Germany summit took place in Berlin on 29 September 2023; L. whereas all five Central Asian states have low and declining democracy scores and are classified as authoritarian regimes and as ‘not free’ by Freedom House’s 2023 Freedom in the World report; whereas the 2023 World Press Freedom Index has reported a marked deterioration in the press freedom situation in Central Asia and the average score for Central Asia in the 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index was well below the global average; whereas Reporters Without Borders has reported numerous cases of Central Asian authorities pressuring their media to either cover Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in a ‘neutral’ manner, or to ignore it altogether; M. whereas Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs visited Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on 21-25 February 2022 and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on 21-25 August 2023; whereas its Delegation to the EU-Kazakhstan, EU-Kyrgyzstan, EU-Uzbekistan and EU-Tajikistan Parliamentary Cooperation Committees and for relations with Turkmenistan and Mongolia maintains regular inter-parliamentary relations with the Central Asian countries; N. whereas in Central Asia, there are well grounded fears of radicalisation, growing extremism and a terrorist threat, with a very high number of former ISIS fighters returning to the region and a dire security situation in Afghanistan; O. whereas women and girls in Central Asia remain highly vulnerable to abuse, especially as there is a high level of acceptance of violence against women and low awareness of gender stereotypes; P. whereas child marriage remains common in Central Asia, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan where one in every eight girls is married before 18 years of age; EU engagement with Central Asia 1. Underlines that the EU and Central Asia are facing profound global and regional geopolitical shifts and challenges, which provide significant impetus for them to work towards long-term, structured and mutually beneficial cooperation in matters of common interest; strongly encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia, given the geostrategic importance of the region, and to promote a strategic partnership with these countries by expanding cooperation at political and economic level; welcomes the increased high-level contact between the EU and Central Asia, in particular the meetings between the Central Asian heads of state and the President of the European Council, and the work of the EU Special Representative for Central Asia; calls for follow-up to all these high-level meetings and declarations with concrete actions; welcomes, in this context, that the first EU-Central Asia summit is planned for 2024, as well as the endorsement of the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia, which serves as a strategic blueprint to advance dialogue and cooperation in specific areas, including building cultural, social and economic resilience; encourages the EU to continue promoting political and economic reforms that strengthen the rule of law, democracy, good governance and respect for human rights; notes that Parliament is ready to promote parliamentary cooperation with Central Asia; 2. Notes that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its increased nationalistic narratives have weakened Russia’s standing in the region and have encouraged Central Asia to pursue cooperation with other actors, and that these actors have stepped up their cooperation with Central Asia; takes note also of Chinese engagement in the region; stresses that the EU now has the opportunity to expand its ties with Central Asia and play a more prominent role in the region; underlines that the EU should use this window of opportunity to foster mutually beneficial cooperation and offer Central Asia a partnership that can become a special track in a broader strategy towards the EU’s Eastern neighbours; considers that strengthening this cooperation would also contribute to counteracting Russia’s influence in the region; 3. Underlines the importance of transatlantic cooperation on Central Asia and invites the EU to take initiative in working out a joint strategy for Central Asia with the United States, which should include cooperation in the areas of democracy promotion, investments and trade, economy and regional security; 4. Reiterates the commitment of the EU to work together with the countries of Central Asia for peace, security, stability, prosperity and sustainable development in full respect of international law, as well as the principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, non-use of force or threat of its use and the peaceful settlement of international disputes; 5. Rejects any attempt to facilitate or assist in any way the international recognition of the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus, including in relation to its alleged acceptance as an observer in the Organization of Turkic States; encourages the Central Asian states concerned to effectively uphold the respect of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states and to not ratify the amended Statute of the Organization of Turkic States, which would put into effect the decision to grant observer status; 6. Recognises that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its implications present both challenges and opportunities for the Central Asian states, which have traditionally maintained close relations with Russia; underlines the EU’s interest in increasing economic relations and intensifying political ties with the countries of Central Asia, in part to minimise the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus; emphasises the significance of continued close exchange on sanctions and calls on the authorities of the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, to cooperate closely with the EU, in particular its Sanctions Envoy, in order to intensify their efforts to prevent sanctions circumvention; condemns the procedure of Russia recruiting Central Asian migrants and citizens to fight in Ukraine and supports actions aimed at putting an end to it; notes the individual efforts of the Central Asian states to ensure that their territories are not used to circumvent the EU sanctions and welcomes Kazakhstan’s administrative measures and high-level political commitment in this regard; invites the EU to use a differentiated approach in its Central Asia strategy, which will assess the level of cooperation with the EU on the sanctions policy towards Russia; notes the role that Member States themselves play in ensuring that export goods that will likely still make their way to Russia via Central Asia undergo the appropriate preventive controls; 7. Considers that a review of the EU-Central Asia strategy is necessary in order to update it in the light of the geopolitical events that have taken place in recent years; reiterates the key role of EPCAs as the framework for cooperation with the Central Asian states; notes, with concern, that the EPCA with Kyrgyzstan, negotiations on which were concluded in 2019, remains unsigned; calls on the Council and the Commission to rapidly advance the ongoing negotiations on an EPCA with Tajikistan, and to resolve the outstanding issues and sign the EPCAs with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan without further delay in order for Parliament to exercise its prerogatives regarding the ratification of these agreements; stresses that failure to sign such agreements after the conclusion of negotiations calls into question the EU’s credibility as a global actor; 8. Notes that the EPCAs with the Central Asian states negotiated to date put a strong emphasis on respect for democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law; stresses the importance of mainstreaming human rights, democratic values, gender equality, free media and the green transition in interactions with the Central Asian governments; Regional cooperation 9. Underlines the great potential of mutually beneficial cooperation on sustainable development, connectivity, energy, critical raw materials and security, with Central Asia being a key region for connectivity between East and West; recalls, in this context, the significant geopolitical consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which have reinvigorated the Middle Corridor not only as a regional economic zone, but also as an alternative and sustainable route between Asia and Europe that avoids crossing Russian territory; recalls that the New Eurasian Land Bridge passes through sanctioned Russian and Belarusian territory; stresses the significance of promoting regional integration along the Middle Corridor and notes that in order to attract much needed financing for infrastructure projects under the Global Gateway, the bottlenecks identified in the study conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development must be eliminated; calls on the Commission to investigate the possibility of the European Investment Bank’s support for investments in infrastructure development in Central Asian states, especially in the Middle Corridor; 10. Believes that the EU’s policy towards Central Asia in the fields of energy, connectivity and resource diversification should be inspired by the European Green Deal and based on mutually beneficial strategic partnerships that take into account the peculiarities of each of the Central Asian states, ensuring their access to modern technologies and quality jobs, while guaranteeing secure and competitive access to raw materials and energy for the EU; is concerned, in this regard, with the creation of dependency on Russia as a result of the signing of the natural gas deal between Gazprom and Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan; 11. Recognises the crucial role of the EU in financing Central Asia’s sectoral reforms, improving its energy efficiency and reducing its greenhouse gas emissions; welcomes the launch of the Sustainable Energy Connectivity in Central Asia (SECCA) project in 2022, and looks forward to its positive impact on strengthening national policies for transitioning to a sustainable energy system and increasing investment, capacity and awareness in renewable energy and energy efficiency in the region; 12. Underlines the importance of a positive investment climate for the economic development of Central Asia and EU-Central Asian trade and cooperation; highlights that a positive investment climate leading to the creation of quality workplaces with adequate salaries and decent working conditions depends on stable democratic institutions, respect for human rights and the rule of law, as well as the capacity of businesses and civil society for due diligence application; 13. Notes the Central Asian states’, with the exception of Tajikistan, long-standing approach of maintaining relations with Afghanistan and their evolving pragmatic engagement with the Taliban, which they nevertheless do not recognise, since the takeover in 2021; underlines that countries in the region, in particular Pakistan and China, but also the Central Asian states, play a key role in ensuring stability in Afghanistan through the provision of humanitarian aid, electricity, trade opportunities and joint connectivity projects; encourages the EU Special Envoy for Afghanistan to continue cooperating closely with counterparts in the Central Asian states as part of the EU-Central Asia dialogue on Afghanistan; recognises that Central Asia is a crucial area for containing religious extremism, terrorism and drug trafficking networks and faces increased migratory pressure due to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan; reiterates its outrage at the Taliban’s treatment of women as less than secondary citizens and calls on the European External Action Service and the EU Special Envoy for Afghanistan to cooperate with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in assisting women who try to flee Afghanistan; 14. Highlights the EU’s role as an important donor of aid to the region; underlines the importance of taking a united approach as Team Europe, as this makes it possible to create synergies and maximise the impact of the action taken and showcases the benefits of multilateral cooperation, and brings together the best tools and partners, such as civil society organisations, human rights defenders, independent media and experts, and the public and private sector, to deliver the intended impact; stresses the need to ensure the visibility of EU assistance and investment and calls for EU assistance and budget support to the Central Asian states to be linked to concrete benchmarks for progress on democratic reforms, human rights, protection, the rule of law and sustainable development; stresses the importance of coordinated cooperation with other partners and international organisations to enable synergies and avoid duplication; 15. Notes that climate change, a growing population and economic needs are putting increasing strain on water resources in Central Asia; stresses the need for closer regional cooperation on this matter between upstream and downstream countries in order to prevent conflicts over the distribution and use of water resources; welcomes regional platforms, such as the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, which encourage dialogue and cooperation between Central Asian states; recalls that the EU-Central Asia environmental dialogue was established in order to support the stabilisation of the Aral Sea and foster better management of water resources; calls for the implementation of the Paris Agreement on climate change and stands ready to provide expertise and cooperation in order to achieve this; 16. Highlights that settling conflicts, including those concerning water distribution, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations, and avoiding at all costs the use or threat of force are crucial for achieving both long-term regional stability and the Sustainable Development Goals; underlines the importance of the delimitation and demarcation of disputed border areas between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to prevent further military clashes between the two countries and welcomes the steps taken by both sides in this regard; reiterates the EU’s offer to support the peaceful settlement of the conflict through technical assistance and confidence-building measures; welcomes the settlement of the border delimitation issue between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in January 2023; reiterates that the EU is committed to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the area; Democracy and human rights 17. Insists that respect for human rights and compliance with international obligations are important for the EU’s relations with Central Asia; urges the Central Asian states to adhere to their democracy and human rights obligations, noting that this is also in line with the PCAs and the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+); stresses the importance of maintaining regular human rights dialogues with the Central Asian states, as these dialogues are an instrument to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and political pluralism, and a forum to raise issues of concern; calls on the EU delegations and the Member States’ representations in Central Asia to continue playing an active role in monitoring the situation on the ground, working with human rights defenders and reacting to human rights violations and politically-motivated persecution, including by attending trials and visiting political prisoners; encourages cooperation with UN treaty bodies and special procedures as well as in multilateral human rights forums such as the UN Human Rights Council; 18. Is concerned about the lack of accountability for serious human rights violations on a large scale, including the employment of harsh measures by authorities to end mass protests and ensuing unrest during the so-called ‘Bloody January’ events in Kazakhstan, as well as in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) in Tajikistan and in the Republic of Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan; calls on the authorities in all five Central Asian states to take effective measures to launch independent and thorough investigations into all allegations of torture and ill-treatment and other serious human rights violations, and to prevent the use of excessive force and torture by police and security forces; calls on the governments of Central Asian states to carry out judicial reforms with a view to ensuring greater independence and transparency; 19. Underlines the fundamental democratic shortcomings in Central Asia, with regard to democratic governance, the rule of law and human rights protection, which still persist and have worsened in several respects recently; underlines the need to make election processes more transparent, open and fair for all political actors; highlights the important role that civil society can play in supporting and advancing democratic reforms, good governance and human rights protection in Central Asia; regrets the restrictive approach taken in legislative initiatives on non-governmental organisations and the media, which reduce the space for civil society activities; calls on the Central Asian states to take meaningful steps to address these shortcomings, to implement relevant International Labour Organization conventions and ensure compliance with their international obligations concerning democratic governance and human rights protection, while noting that they have committed to do so under the PCAs with the EU, the negotiated EPCAs and the EU’s GSP+; notes that the Central Asian states have young and dynamic populations that should be given opportunities to get meaningfully involved in shaping their countries’ future; welcomes the activities of the EU-Central Asia Civil Society Forum and calls for the EU to enhance its support to civil society; 20. Notes the need to boost Central Asia’s resilience against disinformation by promoting independent media and content in local languages, increasing media literacy and organising targeted courses for local journalists; stresses the need to strengthen media independence and pluralism and freedom of expression in Central Asia in line with the highest democratic standards; calls for greater transparency of media ownership and financing with the aim of enhancing media independence and pluralism; regrets that Central Asian authorities have exploited the fight against disinformation to restrict the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression, including by accusing those who speak out on corruption, injustice and government abuse of allegedly spreading ‘false’ information, inciting ‘discord’ and promoting ‘extremism’; is concerned about the increasing number of arrests of journalists and bloggers and about threats to close independent media outlets; insists that respect for the rights of journalists, independent bloggers, human rights defenders and civic and environmental activists must be ensured, that they must be guaranteed protection against harassment, pressure and threats, that any attacks against them must be investigated and that all those unjustly detained and imprisoned are immediately and unconditionally released; condemns the number of recent government initiatives to shut down independent media services and block access to their sites in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the draft media legislation currently under consideration in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan that threaten to increase state control over media operations; 21. Calls on the Central Asian authorities to release all political prisoners; calls specifically on the authorities of Kazakhstan to release: Aigerim Tleuzhan, Marat Zhylanbayev, Bekizhan Mendygaziyev, Timur Danebayev, Kairat Klyshev; calls on the authorities of Kyrgyzstan to release: Azimbek Beknazarov, Aibek Buzurmankulov, Aidanbek Akmatov, Temir Makhmudov, Marat Bayazov; calls on the authorities of Uzbekistan to release: Dauletmurat Tazhimuratov, Allabai Tokymbetov, Nurlan Naiypov, Amirbek Adilbekov; calls on the authorities of Tajikistan to release: Faromuz Irgashov, Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, Khursand Mamadshoev, Khushruz Djumaev; calls on the authorities of Turkmenistan to release: Omruzak Omarkuliev, Murat Dushemov, Murat Ovezov, Mansur Mingelov, Nurgeldy Khalykov; 22. Is concerned that, even though gender equality is supposedly protected by law in all countries, gender-based violence, domestic violence, child marriage, discrimination and harassment of ethnic and religious minorities and LGBTIQ people are still widespread in Central Asia; urges the Central Asian governments to prevent these human rights violations through appropriate laws, education campaigns and measures, including increasing the awareness and qualifications of public officers, notably police officers, strengthening the capacity of civil society organisations to advocate for legislative changes, improving frontline support services for survivors and raising awareness to combat existing stereotypes and promote equality in society; expresses concern that criminalisation of LGBTIQ people remains in place, basic anti-discrimination legislation is lacking in most countries, corrective rape is being used against lesbians and there is a lack of safe spaces for LGBTIQ people to gather, with ongoing raids on bars and social spaces, and police brutality rife; stresses that any EU strategy on Central Asia must be in line with the EU’s Gender Action Plan III; 23. Reiterates its concerns about rampant corruption and kleptocracy in Central Asia, which erodes trust in government, fuels inequality, deprives citizens of public services and slows down economic growth; calls on the Central Asian governments to take action beyond widespread anti-corruption rhetoric and to finally commit to fighting corruption and kleptocracy and to adopt national strategies focusing on an integrated approach to the prevention and repression of corruption as well as to increase transparency and access to information, and to limit private influence; 24. Underlines that the EU should capitalise on its positive image in Central Asia by engaging in more cultural and public diplomacy; advocates for strengthening ties and increasing opportunities for collaboration between European and Central Asian institutions and fostering people-to-people contact and mobility, offering opportunities in education and science, such as academic-level exchange through the Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 programmes, and increasing sustainable tourism; 25. Notes the willingness of Central Asian states to start a visa liberalisation dialogue with the EU and calls on the Commission to intensify consultations on developing targeted and comprehensive reform roadmaps for the Central Asian states to pave the way for visa facilitation and readmission agreements; Bilateral cooperation 26. Notes that Kazakhstan is the first Central Asian state with a ratified EPCA, which provides a solid foundation for expanding cooperation in key areas of mutual interest, such as connectivity, energy efficiency, green economy and digitalisation; welcomes the signing of the memorandum of understanding between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the EU on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, batteries and renewable hydrogen value chains; calls on the Kazakh authorities to continue implementing political and economic reforms, which should strengthen democracy, the rule of law and good governance; underlines that implementation of the vision of ‘Just and Fair Kazakhstan’ must ensure respect for human rights and freedoms of expression, association and assembly, and improve the electoral framework in line with the recommendations of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; calls on the Kazakh authorities to complete the investigation into the January 2022 events, to publish their findings and to ensure justice for victims of torture; notes the potential benefits of increased people-to-people exchanges with Kazakhstan through a visa facilitation agreement, the consultations on which started in May 2023; 27. Underlines that the upcoming signing of the EPCA and the ongoing GSP+ implementation put further emphasis on the need to ensure the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kyrgyzstan in line with its international commitments; observes, with concern, the deterioration of democratic standards and human rights in recent years, considering that Kyrgyzstan has been regarded as the most democratic country in the region with a vibrant civil society and free media; is concerned about the persecution of the political opposition, among others representatives of the Social Democrats Party, and the negative impact of legislative initiatives that target the activities of independent media and civil society, notably the law on ‘false information’ and draft laws on ‘foreign representatives’, ‘mass media’ and ‘protecting children from harmful information’, and the increasing number of cases against human rights defenders, media workers and journalists as well as media outlets; calls for the EU to continue supporting civil society and independent media; 28. Notes that the start of negotiations on the EPCA agreement with Tajikistan is an opportunity to broaden the scope of bilateral cooperation and exchanges; underlines the need for continued close cooperation on security issues as Afghanistan continues to be a source of instability and security concerns owing to harsh rule by the Taliban and ongoing humanitarian crises in the country; reiterates that the legitimate fight against terrorism and violent extremism should not be used as a pretext to suppress opposition activity, hinder freedom of expression or hamper the independence of the judiciary; welcomes Tajikistan’s interest in joining the GSP+, which can support sustainable economic growth and boost trade, and requires effective implementation of international human and labour rights standards; calls on Tajikistan to improve the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular freedom of expression, and to stop intimidating and persecuting media workers, human rights defenders, independent lawyers and civil society as well as the repression of the Pamiri minority in the GBAO; 29. Notes that Turkmenistan remains the only Central Asian state without a PCA with the EU, which limits the scope for bilateral engagement; stresses that Turkmenistan needs to demonstrate an improvement in its dire democracy and human rights record in order for Parliament to reconsider its position and ratify the PCA; urges the Turkmenistan Government to decriminalise consensual sexual relations between men; notes that it should be in Turkmenistan’s interest to open up in order to avoid being the outlier in the region with limited options for cooperation; recognises the potential of mutually beneficial cooperation in areas such as energy, connectivity and trade, and welcomes Turkmenistan’s expressed interest in supplying gas to Europe by means of building a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline; 30. Notes the announced reforms in Uzbekistan aimed at achieving genuine change in the country in terms of socio-economic development, efficient administration, a more independent judicial system and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; stresses that the constitutional reform is an opportunity to strengthen the rule of law and to give the reforms a solid legal foundation; reiterates, nevertheless, its deep concern over Uzbekistan’s poor record on democracy, media freedom, human rights and the rule of law, including the brutal crackdown on the Karakalpakstan protest, restrictions on freedom of association for both non-governmental organisations and political parties, and persecution of and threats against journalists, independent bloggers, content producers and human rights defenders; reminds the authorities of the importance of upholding the freedom of expression, both online and offline, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of association and the independence of the media; welcomes some noteworthy improvements in women’s rights in Uzbekistan; urges the Uzbekistan Government to decriminalise consensual sexual relations between men; welcomes the completion of negotiations on the EU-Uzbekistan EPCA and reiterates its call for a swift completion of the necessary legal and technical procedures for the signature of the EPCA; welcomes Uzbekistan’s leading role in promoting regional cooperation in various fields, including connectivity and the use of water resources; o 31. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and to the presidents, governments and parliaments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
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| Security and defence implications of China's influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union, in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy, – having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022, – having regard to the Versailles Declaration, adopted at the informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government on 11 March 2022, – having regard the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on European economic security strategy (JOIN(2023)0020), – having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market(1), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union(2), – having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC (Resilience of Critical Entities Directive)(3), – having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)(4), – having regard to the Commission proposal of 15 September 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 (COM(2022)0454), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of 13 September 2023 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act)(5), – having regard to its position in first reading on a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials (Critical Raw Materials Act) in the TA adopted with the non-finalised version(6), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 of 22 November 2023 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries(7), – having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy (2021/2037(INI))(8), inter alia aimed at strengthening the EU’s ‘trade toolbox’ to help mitigate the current imbalance in bilateral economic and trade relations between China and the EU, – having regard to Parliament’s resolutions of 9 March 2022(9) and of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation(10), – having regard to the joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030), – having regard to the Commission recommendation of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States (C(2023)6689), – having regard to the Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on a Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure(11), – having regard to the Vilnius Summit Communiqué, issued by the NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius on 11 July 2023, – having regard to the Final Assessment Report of the NATO-EU Task Force of 29 June 2023 on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, – having regard to the Joint Declaration of 10 January 2023 on EU-NATO Cooperation, – having regard to the G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué of 20 May 2023, – having regard to the Council conclusions on the Revised EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and its Action Plan of 24 October 2023, – having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade, – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0401/2023), A. whereas the recent joint communication on a European economic security strategy focuses on minimising and managing the risks arising from certain economic flows and the EU’s dependency on authoritarian and totalitarian regimes such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the context of increased geopolitical tensions and accelerating technological shifts, while protecting free market principles from distortion by such regimes and, thereby, preserving maximum economic openness and dynamism; B. whereas disruptions to critical infrastructure can have significant negative consequences for vital government functions, essential services for the population, economic activity as well as the security and defence of the EU; whereas it is crucial that Member States and the Commission be vigilant with regard to financial investments that foreign countries make in the operation of critical entities within the EU and the consequences that such investments could have on the ability to prevent significant disruptions; C. whereas the Resilience of Critical Entities Directive(12) and the NIS 2 Directive(13) provide a comprehensive legal framework to strengthen both the physical and digital resilience of critical infrastructure, including that related to energy, transport, health, digital infrastructure, water and food; D. whereas since the Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 was issued, targeted actions have already been carried out to ensure a common EU response to incidents, including by strengthening coordination with NATO through the EU-NATO Task Force on the resilience of critical infrastructure embedded in the NATO-EU Structured Dialogue on Resilience; E. whereas European ports in which Chinese state-owned companies have stakes handle more than 10 % of Europe’s total shipping container capacity; whereas the three largest Chinese shareholders in European ports have assets in almost half the ports (14 out of 29) that are located either close to naval bases or provide logistical support to NATO forces, greatly increasing the risk of espionage; F. whereas the coercive policies and the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its increasingly aggressive stance towards Taiwan and the aggressive posture assumed in the South China Sea, as well as the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities and reaffirmed the need to ‘de-risk’ its relations vis-à-vis the PRC and other undemocratic third countries; G. whereas the Chinese government has demonstrated that it is willing to weaponise its overwhelming control of global rare earth supplies for political ends and to obtain unfair economic concessions and advantages; H. whereas China is restricting non-Chinese companies from participating in infrastructure projects on account of the security risks and is putting forward legislation with regard to critical infrastructure, such as the Critical Information Infrastructure Security Protection Regulations; whereas China is involved in constructing EU-funded infrastructure in various EU Member States; whereas pursuant to international commitments, it is possible for the EU and the Member States to adopt restrictive measures relating to foreign direct investment (FDI) on the grounds of security or public order, subject to certain requirements; whereas in 2021-22, China engaged in an economic blockade against Lithuania in response to Lithuania’s decision to withdraw from the Belt and Road Initiative and to open a Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania, resulting in the Commission’s request to establish a panel at the World Trade Organisation to examine the legality of China’s trade restrictions against Lithuanian and EU exports containing Lithuanian content, and whereas this demonstrates China’s assertiveness in targeting specific EU countries, not only through direct economic coercion, but also through the threat of secondary sanctions; I. whereas the spread of China’s digital authoritarianism and mass surveillance continues to intensify both within China and beyond, targeting democratic institutions and societies, and it risks establishing a new international order that would endanger freedom and democracy around the world; whereas a large number of Chinese students study in Member States’ universities, especially in the field of dual-use technologies, potentially leading in some cases to a high risk of espionage; whereas former European fighter pilots have been employed by the Chinese army and such recruitment creates a serious risk of transfer of critical information putting the military-strategic interests of the countries concerned at risk; whereas Chinese ambitions are growing in strategic areas such as AI, cloud computing, semiconductors, or hardware; whereas these instruments, particularly AI, could be developed for military purposes, driving the next revolution in military affairs; J. whereas China’s acquisition of critical infrastructure, especially within the EU and in its neighbourhood, including the Western Balkans and Africa poses an increasing multi-dimensional risk to the EU’s security; K. whereas China’s national security related legislation, such as the 2015 National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China, requires citizens and organisations to provide support and assistance to the PRC’s public security, state security or military bodies; L. whereas the Sino-Russian strategic partnership formalised with the Joint Statement ‘on the international relations entering a new era and the global sustainable development’ of 4 February 2022 continues to grow, including in the areas of technology and military know-how and capability transfers, posing an increasing threat to European security; The core of the problem: understanding China’s military-civil fusion strategy 1. Underlines that China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy is a state-led, state-directed programme and plans to instrumentalise all levers of state and commercial power to strengthen and support the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its armed wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), particularly by acquiring and diverting the world’s cutting-edge technologies, with the objective of strengthening the totalitarian regime and achieving military dominance; 2. Considers that China’s party-driven political system and economy often require private companies to align their commercial interests with the CCP, including its military activities, repression, influence and political interference activities; notes that CCP party cells inside private companies are commonly used as tools of direct party control; highlights that, consequentially, Chinese companies’ international activities support the CCP’s goals of expanding its influence in third countries, undermining geopolitical rivals and increasing China’s influence; 3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger geopolitical, economic and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Digital Silk Road (including Made in China 2025, China Standards 2035), the Global Security Initiative, Dual Circulation strategy) and China’s increasing assertiveness and aggressive posturing abroad; believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance the party-state’s long-term strategic goal to become the world’s leading power in terms of political influence, economic capacities, technological dominance and military might, and to undermine the rules-based international order; 4. Recalls that achieving primacy in science and technology has been one of the CCP’s top priorities in recent years and that the CCP’s MCF strategy incentivises the sharing of research and development results between market-oriented and Chinese defence industries; stresses the repeated warnings by intelligence agencies against the risks of economic dependence, espionage and sabotage caused by the economic presence of entities from certain non-EU countries, in particular China, in critical infrastructure and strategic sectors across the EU; is, in this regard, concerned by the political pressure asserted in the approval of specific Chinese investments into critical infrastructure, as in the case of the German government’s decision to agree to the acquisition of a stake at the port of Hamburg by COSCO, contrary to the advice of the competent institutions; Consequences of the PRC’s military-civil fusion strategy 5. Warns of the risk of Chinese companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s political-military or intelligence systems; underlines, in this regard, its concern that technology and technological expertise used in civilian activities, particularly in the economic sphere, continues to be transferred to China’s military, increasing the PLA’s ability to develop the next generation of military technology, which may be used to coerce partners in Asia and around the world; urges EU Member States to increase regulatory oversight and introduce specific background checks over individuals and legal entities with direct ties to the Chinese government; 6. Is concerned that that 98 % of EU demand for rare earths is being met by the PRC; emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, as well as 94 % the global production of gallium and around 60 % of germanium production, and is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in Serbia (copper and gold), the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly in the production and processing of these critical commodities creates crucial dependencies and therefore presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other key industrial sectors as well as its open strategic autonomy and European economic security strategy; 7. Welcomes, in this regard the Commission proposal for the Critical Raw Materials Act and calls for the speedy implementation of its goals in order to strengthen the EU’s supply chain resilience; recalls that critical raw materials are essential to the security and defence sector as well as for the success of the EU’s digital and green transitions; calls on the Commission and the Member States, in coordination with industry stakeholders to implement the decision to gradually reduce the dependence on China by diversifying the sources of critical raw minerals and rare earth elements, establishing strategic partnerships with reliable third countries with a view to ensuring a secure and reliable supply of critical raw materials; urges the EU to assist Member States in developing projects that will aim for greater independence from Chinese production; 8. Strongly advocates for the diversification of suppliers and partners in critical infrastructure initiatives to reduce the vulnerability to external influences, ensuring that reliance on any single source is minimised; 9. Is concerned that privately owned undersea cables provided by Chinese companies, such as HMN Technologies, a PLA cyber intelligence–affiliated entity, are used to support EU and Member States’ diplomatic and military communications; expresses its grave concern over the undersea data cable systems operated by Chinese company HMN Technologies, which connect EU Member States’ territories and the Indo-Pacific region, including Member State and NATO military bases, creating security vulnerabilities as regards cybersecurity, underwater surveillance, data collection, and gathering of intelligence; in this regard, is further concerned by the sale of a Dutch company, the backbone of Estonia’s internet infrastructure, to a Chinese company linked to the PLA; highlights the need for a joint effort among the Member States to prevent similar cases; 10. Recalls the need to perform a thorough evaluation of the EU institutions’ information security infrastructure and services, in particular regarding classified communications between the institutions and missions and operations abroad; recalls that the full supply chain should be taken into account to ensure that the companies do not have any direct or indirect links with the PRC; calls for specific provisions in EU institutions procurements procedures to limit the risk of interference, including the acquisition, maintenance or vetting by a third party; 11. Warns that major investments in seaports, railways and airports give Beijing the opportunity to monitor and control activities in key logistical nodes with a fundamental strategic dimension; 12. Highlights the fact that, in 2022, China was the EU’s second largest trading partner for goods; expresses concern about the increasingly imbalanced trade and investment relationship between the EU and China, which is also highlighted by the EU’s record trade deficit of EUR 396 billion in 2022 and its dependence on Chinese imports and investments in some critical sectors; highlights China’s imbalanced international trade policy in the context of its dual circulation strategy; asks the Commission to raise the EU’s concerns with China on its managed trade practices; Developing responses: expanding the toolkit to respond to security and defence concerns 13. Argues that a key area of EU critical infrastructure is its network of research institutes and research and development facilities, which play an important role in the EU’s ability to deliver on its green and digital transition commitments, alongside key arenas such as space defence; recalls the security vulnerabilities linked to forced technology transfers, intellectual property theft and knowledge leaks, both in the EU and abroad; calls for increased vigilance when accounting for such threats to the EU’s ability to innovate and foster growth; 14. Notes that Chinese companies are already leaders in key technologies used in sectors such as 5G wireless infrastructure, drones, batteries, hypersonic missiles, solar and wind energy, as well as cryptocurrency; expresses its concerns over the uses of these technologies and the dependencies they create; notes, in this regard, that 100 % of the 5G RAN in Cyprus is composed of Chinese equipment, and 59 % in the case of Germany; stresses that this runs counter to the EU’s ‘5G security toolbox’ guidelines to mitigate security risks in networks and calls on the Council and the Commission to exclude the use of equipment and software from manufacturers based in the PRC in core network functions; recalls that Huawei has been participating in 11 projects under Horizon Europe until June 2023, thus receiving EUR 3,89 million of funding in total; therefore, urges the EU and European institutions to carry out a systematic screening of Chinese companies benefiting directly or indirectly from European programmes of strategic importance for the EU and, where necessary, terminate their participation; furthermore, calls on the Commission to propose additional security standards for Chinese suppliers of 5G and the next generation 6G network; 15. Considers the TikTok app, owned by Chinese conglomerate ByteDance, to be in breach of the European data privacy framework, making it a potential risk and a source of Chinese-backed disinformation; welcomes the decision of EU institutions and those of several EU Member States to suspend the use of the TikTok application on corporate devices, as well as personal devices enrolled in the institutions’ mobile device services; 16. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe, in its neighbourhood, and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s open strategic autonomy and reduce its dependence on countries such as the PRC and systemic rivals that pose a security threat to the EU; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items, especially those that are critical to the EU’s security and defence from being transferred to destinations of concern that pursue or collaborate in MCF strategies; regards the establishment of EU-wide electronic customs and export licensing systems to be a critical step towards effective common European export controls and urges all Member States to make these systems operational by the end of 2024; furthermore calls on the EU institutions and the Member States to strengthen cooperation with the transatlantic and other like-minded partners in the protection of critical infrastructure, and to defend democracy and preserve our shared values, security and prosperity; 17. Remains concerned that European critical infrastructure, from telecommunications networks to port facilities, is becoming increasingly vulnerable to external influence; commends, in this regard, recent legislative steps to enhance the resilience of critical entities in the EU; notes with concern, however, that such initiatives are largely limited to FDI screening procedures, leaving other channels open for the CCP to gain access to and influence over critical assets, including through elite capture, technology and intellectual property transfers, as well as supply chain and sales market dependencies; notes that the establishment of a thorough risk assessment and mapping framework is imperative to identifying critical infrastructure assets and their susceptibilities; considers it necessary to map, track and assess China’s and other third countries’ access to critical infrastructure in the EU and to jointly proceed with mitigating measures where necessary; in this regard, calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to compile an exhaustive inventory of critical assets and systematically evaluate their vulnerability to external influences; and therefore calls for the expansion of the legislative initiatives to address such risks; 18. Calls on the Commission to share with Parliament, before the end of this parliamentary term, a detailed analysis of the trade risks linked to technologies such as semiconductors, quantum computing, block chains, space, artificial intelligence and biotechnologies and the possible need for EU action in these fields; 19. Recalls that the FDI screening regulation(14) addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside the EU; notes the key added value of the screening mechanism as a pertinent tool that gives the EU and the Member States a better strategic overview and situational awareness of the trends, targets, means and methods deployed by foreign actors to increase their economic and political influence; calls for the current instruments that address FDI and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects encompassing all modes of participation in critical infrastructure endeavours, including collaborative ventures, partnerships and technology transfers; also underlines that routine evaluations of critical infrastructure projects that involve non-EU stakeholders are essential and believes that this process should encompass scrutiny of ownership structures, dependencies within supply chains, and the transfer of technology associated with these projects; also, considers it necessary to establish due-diligence standards to identify China’s leverage over investors in EU critical infrastructure, and underlines that this approach should apply equally to candidate and potential candidate countries; stresses that the Member States are ultimately responsible for infrastructure protection, but have not consistently implemented current guidelines on FDI; is greatly concerned, in this regard, by the fact that not all Member States have in place or use mechanisms for screening foreign investment in critical infrastructure; urgently calls on the Member States to consistently implement current legislation related to FDI and on the resilience of critical entities; 20. Regrets in this regard the lack of adequate screening of risks of interference in public procurement related to security equipment, such as the case of the contract signed by Strasbourg airport to install airport security scanners and gates supplied by the European subsidiary of the Chinese company Nuctech, partly owned by the Chinese government and bound by the ‘United Front’ policy; warns that any such technologies could incorporate in-built security gaps or be accessed during their maintenance; on the other hand, welcomes the decision of the Romanian government to terminate negotiations with China General Nuclear Power Corporation, CGNPC, on the construction of nuclear reactors 3 and 4 at Cernavoda; 21. Stresses, however, that a strategic balance must be found between, on the one hand, the openness of the EU single market and its attractiveness for investments, and, on the other, the defence of the EU’s critical infrastructure and autonomy, considering the EU’s security vulnerabilities, especially as regards economic coercion or threats to the integrity of the EU’s critical infrastructure; 22. Calls on the Commission to consider ways of making its opinions on FDI screening more impactful, in order to avoid distortions of the single market and a race to the bottom among Member States; calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase harmonisation, including by building appropriate expertise, and to fully implement the FDI screening regulation; believes that there is scope and the need for the regulation to be strengthened in its upcoming review at the end of the year; encourages the Commission to present an ambitious legislative proposal on a revised regulation addressing all the loopholes that have emerged during its implementation, and to swiftly evaluate the possibility of a legislative proposal on a screening mechanism for outbound investments; recommends building any proposed outbound investment screening mechanism on an impact assessment that includes appropriate consultation with businesses to minimise any potential negative consequences for European competitiveness; 23. Welcomes the new ‘de-risking’ approach in the proposed European economic security strategy of 20 June 2023, which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU’s economic openness and to protect, promote and strengthen the EU’s open strategic autonomy, while minimising the risks resulting from economic dependencies and their possible weaponisation, including investments and research collaboration in key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the High Representative’s and the Commission’s proposals and calls on Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF and to find alternatives for Chinese-financed projects in the EU through the development of a comprehensive approach to commonly identifying, assessing and managing risks to European economic security; 24. Further welcomes the High Representative and Commission’s proposal to prevent the leakage of sensitive emerging technologies by establishing a list of dual-use technologies, based on narrowly defined and forward-looking criteria, such as the potential enabling and transformative nature of a technology, the risk of MCF and the risk of the technology being misused to violate human rights; calls on the Commission and the Member States to identify and implement the relevant protection measures for these dual-use technologies as soon as possible; 25. Calls, in this regard, on the Commission, in coordination with the Member States, to design a rapid response mechanism for the detection of the dual use, or misuse, of infrastructures in the EU under Chinese ownership, participation or concession, that could be used to terminate the rights of concession and/or suspend the capacity of domain in the cases of ownership and participation; calls on the Commission to annually report to Parliament on:
26. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and materials within the EU; further calls on the Commission and Member States to develop additional initiatives aimed at enabling closer coordination and collaboration with like-minded partners and allies, and to monitor and further develop, where possible and in line with the EU’s aim to reduce further dependencies, global production capacities and supply chains in critical infrastructure and materials that are crucial to the security and defence of the EU; draws particular attention to Taiwan, which plays a significant role in the global supply chains and in the international rules-based order; reiterates its long-standing support for the EU-Taiwan Bilateral Investment Agreement and any arrangements mutually beneficial to bilateral trade and investment; 27. Calls on the Commission to propose a new legislative framework to mitigate the security risks coming from the suppliers of undersea cable systems, including through stricter monitoring and frequent review of the ownership structures of such suppliers, their previous investments in undersea cable systems and the proximity of the undersea cable systems to European and allied military bases; stresses the need to prevent cable system suppliers, such as Chinese companies, from sharing data with intelligence services other than to protect the infrastructure from outside intrusions or malign attacks; calls in this regard for initiatives aimed at the further development of European owned or based companies in the field of undersea cable systems; 28. Underlines that EU responses must be built around an augmented understanding of the relevant strategic picture centred on cross-policy and cross-national threat assessments and vulnerability studies on critical infrastructure; is of the opinion that a decentralised or neglectful approach, lacking clear visibility and scrutiny over projects with strategic significance for Europe’s defence and security, could greatly harm the EU’s geopolitical interests(15); recalls vulnerabilities linked to foreign interference, specifically in the information space, and the interplay between FDI projects and information manipulation operations by malign foreign actors; Internal-external nexus: strengthening the resilience of the EU’s closest partners 29. Expresses concern regarding the PRC’s penetration of the EU market and its wider neighbourhood; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to ensure that the measures taken to strengthen the resilience of the EU in the face of Chinese influence, including de-risking, diversification and reduction of critical dependencies, are also extended to the EU’s closest partners, in particular accession countries and those part of the EUs neighbourhood policy; 30. Recalls that the PRC’s naval forces have means and legal tools to ensure that China’s civilian ships and infrastructure can be used for military and security purposes; considers that China is able to use its civilian commercial infrastructure to support the PLA’s presence in third countries; warns that such MCF provides the PLA with access to foreign ports, enabling it to pre-position logistics support to sustain naval deployments as far afield as the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean; underlines that the risks of espionage are highest when Chinese civilian commercial assets are located in logistical hubs close to EU and NATO naval bases or port operators that have signed agreements to provide logistical support to European companies; calls on the Member States to urgently address the need to reduce the risks of espionage and sabotage in critical infrastructure, in particular those with a military function, such as ports that are used by NATO; stresses, in this regard, that the EU and NATO must work together to develop a long-term plan to counter China’s MCF strategy in Europe and calls on the full implementation of the final assessment report of the EU-NATO task force(16); 31. Notes that ports are gateways to the world and as such play a crucial role in the EU’s economy; notes with concern that Chinese-owned or controlled entities have strategically increased their stakes in European ports and port infrastructure; calls on the Commission to present an EU strategic policy framework to reduce and limit influence and operational control by China and other regimes; recalls also that PRC projects power overseas by using a network of commercial ports and dual-use facilities that provide logistics and intelligence support to the Chinese navy; notes that in 2022, Chinese companies owned or operated terminals in 96 ports across 53 countries; further notes that in at least nine ports, two of which are in Europe, People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships have undergone significant repairs or maintenance for vessels and equipment; points out that naval visits reveal areas of influence, prioritised operational zones, intelligence collection objectives and cooperation priorities; 32. Emphasises the need for a geopolitical approach to global cooperation on critical infrastructure in order for the EU to successfully face up to the new security challenges; notes that one third of all African infrastructure built since 2010, including around 50 % of Africa’s 3G networks and 70 % of its 4G networks, has been financed and constructed by Chinese state-owned enterprises; underlines that, over the past 20 years, China has increased its trade, investment and loan commitments by USD 160 billion with African Governments and their state-owned enterprises with few, or opaque, contractual obligations, predominantly in transportation, power generation, mining and telecommunications; highlights in particular the fact that a single Chinese telecommunication company has constructed up to 70 % of Africa’s information technology infrastructure, as well as the role played by Chinese companies in the financing, building, expansion and renovation of at least 14 sensitive intra-governmental African telecommunication networks; expresses concern that the Chinese model is clearly attractive to many countries that cannot or are unwilling to satisfy EU requirements for access to equivalent levels of finance, thereby expanding Chinese influence to the detriment of EU partnerships and triggering risks of unsustainable debt for these countries, harming their long-term development to the detriment of their local population; calls on the Commission, the EEAS and Member States to intensify efforts, including attracting investments from the private sector, to implement the Global Gateway Investment Package of EUR 150 billion, agreed at the 6th EU-AU Summit in February 2022; urges the Council and the Commission to swiftly implement projects, especially lighthouse projects, under the initiative; 33. Underlines its concern that the PRC’s strategy to build a ‘blue economy cooperation base’ along the coast of Africa, including through the construction of fishing vessels and vessel repairs facilities, could also be used for military purposes; stresses that there is a general lack of detail and transparency regarding these agreements and licences with African countries; outlines the potential geopolitical consequences for the EU, especially in third countries where the EU is engaged; o 34. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council and the Commission.
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| Policy implications of the development of virtual worlds – civil, company, commercial and intellectual property law issues |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 4, 16, 26, 81, 114 and 118 thereof, – having regard to the Berne Convention of 1886 for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, – having regard to the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, as both amended on 28 September 1979 and updated in its twelfth edition (12-2023), – having regard to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty of 1996 and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty of 1996, – having regard to Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases(1), – having regard to Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’)(2), – having regard to Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II)(3), – having regard to Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I)(4), – having regard to Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs(5), – having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast)(6) (Brussels I Regulation), – having regard to Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC(7), – having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure(8), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC(9), – having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data(10), – having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/2102 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2016 on the accessibility of the websites and mobile applications of public sector bodies(11), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark(12), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC(13), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2018/1807 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on a framework for the free flow of non-personal data in the European Union(14), – having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC(15) (Copyright Directive), – having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the accessibility requirements for products and services(16), – having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information(17), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services(18), – having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and amending certain union legislative acts (COM(2021)0206), – having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing a framework for a European Digital Identity (COM(2021)0281), – having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data (Data Act), (COM(2022)0068), – having regard to the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on liability for defective products (COM(2022)0495), – having regard to the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence (AI Liability Directive) (COM(2022)0496), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/868 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on European data governance and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 (Data Governance Act)(19), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act)(20), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a single market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act)(21), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/988 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 on general product safety, amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of the European Parliament and the Council, and repealing Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 87/357/EEC(22), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on markets in crypto-assets, and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 and Directives 2013/36/EU and (EU) 2019/1937(23), – having regard to its Resolution of 20 October 2020 on Intellectual property rights for the development of artificial intelligence technologies (A9-0176/2020)(24), – having regard to Commission communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘Making the most of the EU’s innovative potential – An intellectual property action plan to support the EU’s recovery and resilience’ (COM(2020)0760), – having regard to its Resolution of 11 November 2021 on an intellectual property action plan to support the EU’s recovery and resilience(25), – having regard to the Commission communication of 11 July 2023 entitled ‘An EU initiative on Web 4.0 and virtual worlds: a head start in the next technological transition’, – having regard to the Commission communication of 11 May 2022 entitled ‘A Digital Decade for children and youth: the new European strategy for a better internet for kids (BIK+)’ (COM (2022)0212), – having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs (A9-0442/2023), A. whereas virtual worlds have not yet been widely taken up, although their deployment in a number of use cases in various sectors has raised general awareness and has attracted the attention of public authorities; B. whereas it is essential that we continue to promote and develop new technologies, recognising their transformative potential in fields such as education, culture, healthcare, gaming and many others, while addressing the risks that these new technologies may pose; C. whereas experts say it might still take 10 to 15 years for virtual worlds to reach their full potential and that their development can significantly impact the digital landscape in future years, bringing both opportunities and risks that need to be addressed; D. whereas digital sovereignty is a means of promoting the notion of European leadership and strategic autonomy and is key to guaranteeing the EU’s ability to shape and enforce legislation in the digital environment, ensuring ethical, sustainable and human-centric virtual worlds and safeguarding the fundamental rights and values of the EU; Definitions 1. Notes that the concepts of ‘metaverse’ and ‘virtual world’ currently lack consolidated definitions; 2. Welcomes in this regard the proposal included in the Commission communication for a definition focusing on the main features of virtual worlds, as follows: ‘virtual worlds are persistent, immersive environments, based on technologies including 3D and extended reality (XR), which make it possible to blend physical and digital worlds in real time, for a variety of purposes such as designing, making simulations, collaborating, learning, socialising, carrying out transactions or providing entertainment’; points out that many of the technologies referred to as ‘virtual worlds’ have existed for years; underlines that a future European strategy should be anchored in research, scientific evidence and societal relevance; 3. Stresses the key importance of promoting standardisation and interoperability for the full development of an ecosystem of interconnected virtual worlds; An appropriate ethical and legal framework 4. Stresses that virtual worlds accessible in the EU should respect ethical values, principles and fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union(26) and existing EU legislation, namely on data privacy, security and safety standards, data sharing, content moderation, the fight against harassment and hate speech, cybersecurity, workers’ rights, consumers’ and child protection, accessibility requirements, respect for intellectual property rights, the protection of know-how and trade secrets, the prevention of online abuse and fraud, and on contestable and fair markets; 5. Recalls that virtual worlds should be developed and deployed in line with the general principle that what is illegal offline should be illegal online, ensuring that people’s rights, with a strong focus on children, as users, consumers, workers, investors, rights holders and creators are fully respected; 6. Points out that, in particular, the following pieces of legislation already apply to different aspects of virtual worlds: the Digital Services Act; the Digital Markets Act; the Data Governance Act; the Data Act; the proposed AI Act; the General Data Protection Regulation(27) (GDPR); the General Product Safety Regulation; the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive; the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation; European Digital Identity; the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market; the Regulation on the EU Trade Mark; the Directive on the Protection of Trade Secrets; the European Accessibility Act; and the Web Accessibility Directive; 7. Highlights the importance of regularly monitoring compliance and ensuring effective enforcement of the applicable legal instruments in force; calls on the Commission to develop guidelines and best practices, in cooperation with different stakeholders, including representatives from civil society and consumer protection organisations, as well as academia, clarifying the legal obligations and responsibilities of each stakeholder involved in virtual worlds, such as platform operators, service providers, developers and users, under the applicable EU law; 8. Underlines that it is paramount that the Commission conducts regular fitness checks of the applicable legal instruments in force, namely regarding a possible review of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Consumer Rights Directive(28) and the Unfair Contract Terms Directive(29), and stresses that any future legislation on virtual worlds should avoid overlaps or inconsistencies, while filling gaps where needed; 9. Notes that some regulatory issues are nonetheless already apparent in the fields of private international, civil and intellectual property law, as specified in the sections below; 10. Highlights that recent research has shown that VR sensor data is as uniquely identifiable as a fingerprint scan and can be used to gain deep insights into users’ personality and infer a variety of attributes such as age, gender, income, ethnicity, disability status, state of mind and emotions; believes that this raises significant ethical and legal concerns, in particular in connection with targeted behavioural advertising, that should be addressed; stresses that part of addressing these ethical concerns around the collection of vast amounts of personal data, including sensitive user data such as biometric and behavioural data, emotional reactions and haptic information, is to guarantee that users are aware of the data being collected and that consent for the collection of such data is not obtained only at the time of entry to the virtual world, but for each use case in line with the principles laid out by the GDPR, such as those of privacy by design and purpose limitation; 11. Stresses that, wherever the user’s identification is not required by Union or national law, namely for liability purposes, and it is technically possible and reasonable, virtual worlds should enable the anonymous use of services as a way of providing a protective shield for privacy and effectively prevent unauthorised data disclosure, identity theft and other forms of abuse of personal data collected online; 12. Notes, in this regard, that the actions put forward by the Commission in its communication aimed at raising awareness, improving digital skills and literacy and increasing users’ access to key technologies, namely by facilitating access to high-speed internet infrastructure and adequate equipment, are crucial to avoid digital divides and should be implemented as swiftly as possible in order to promote an inclusive and competitive digital society and to ensure that no one is left behind in this rapid technological development; Private international law 13. Stresses that certain traditional territorial principles on applicable law and jurisdiction might prove inadequate to virtual worlds, whose non-territoriality is enabled by the use of decentralised technologies such as blockchain, and give rise to problems when it comes to ensuring the applicability of EU law and the protection of the rights of consumers and businesses; 14. Notes more specifically that, since anyone anywhere in the world can access virtual worlds, the ‘mosaic criterion’ established by the Court of Justice of the European Union, by which the injured party may seek compensation in the courts of the countries where at least a part of the harm occurred, might not hold; recalls, however, that the Court established an additional criterion whereby injured parties can claim compensation through the courts of the country in which they have their main interest and affirms that the codification of this criterion into the Brussels I Regulation could be considered; 15. Observes that the definition of ‘consumer’ in the Brussels I Regulation is currently based on a direct contractual relationship, which is missing for instance between the issuer of a non-fungible token (NFT) and the purchaser when the NFT is put on a secondary market; notes that, consequently, in the event of a dispute with the issuer, the final purchaser would be deprived of the jurisdictional treatment that the Brussels I Regulation grants to consumers; 16. Calls on the Commission to take into account these and other potentially problematic situations and to assess the appropriateness of the existing provisions of private international law applicable in the EU, proposing appropriate amendments, where necessary, to guarantee that citizens and businesses do not have to systematically litigate in foreign courts or under foreign laws in order to enforce their rights, thus making sure that their rights under the EU regulatory framework are fully guaranteed, while bearing in mind the risk of forum shopping, in particular on the part of non-EU companies; Civil law 17. Notes that the number and economic relevance of commercial transactions within virtual worlds is expected to increase over the next decade; stresses the need, in this context, to ensure that providers of virtual goods and services can be identified and held liable for any harm caused by their products; 18. Points out the concerns raised by the advertising techniques used when selling so-called virtual real estate, such as a building or a piece of land in a virtual world represented by an NFT, as users might be led to believe that they are actually acquiring property rights, when, in practice, they only obtain a licence to use the virtual ‘land’; emphasises the importance of ensuring that the applicable terms and conditions are transparent, clear, fair and easy to understand, particularly as it has been shown that users often fail to read terms and conditions due to their dense and technical nature; 19. Recalls that liability rules should fully apply to virtual worlds and underlines the importance of putting in place effective measures to prevent and address any form of harmful behaviour and enforce the law in line with fundamental rights in virtual worlds, including, where appropriate and without prejudice to the right of seeking judicial redress, the establishment of reporting and dispute resolution mechanisms; 20. Is concerned that the use of avatars and decentralised systems, such as those built on blockchain technology, might make it extremely challenging to hold tortfeasors accountable; considers that the implementation of effective identity management systems is key in order to allow for their proper and timely identification and to combat fake identities, also taking into account the specificities linked to the governance of decentralised autonomous organisations (DAOs) and to collective liability; welcomes in this regard the Commission’s intention to study the added value of a possible legal framework for DAOs; 21. Recalls that avatars do not have legal personality so any issues regarding their legal capacity, rights, obligations and liabilities needs to be addressed with reference to the natural or legal persons using them; considers that, as virtual worlds evolve and become more complex, consideration should be given to the appropriateness of granting a specific legal status to avatars; considers that the avatar or the person behind the avatar should be identifiable and a know-your-business-customer principle should be applicable; Intellectual property law 22. Underlines that the body of EU law on the protection of intellectual and industrial property rights, including copyrights, trademarks, patents, designs and trade secrets, fully applies to virtual worlds; stresses nevertheless that the development of virtual worlds poses new challenges when it comes to intellectual property enforcement, identification of infringers and issues concerning the conflict-of-law rules on applicable law and jurisdiction; 23. Recalls that platforms operators, service providers and users in virtual worlds are under the obligation to respect right holders’ exclusive rights and their right to fair remuneration; highlights that the use of content protected by intellectual property rights (IPR), including in digital form in an electronic medium, such as an NFT, requires authorisation through licensing or assignment, unless it is covered by any exception or limitation to IPR protection (such as private copy, education, research, quotation, review, parody or pastiche); reiterates the importance in this regard of providers ensuring transparency as to the scope of licences, including territorial licences, so as to ensure that users are able to determine what uses of IPR-protected content in virtual worlds are covered by the licences they hold and that creators and right holders are able to receive accurate and proper reporting on the actual use of protected works; 24. Welcomes the update brought about by the twelfth edition of the ‘Nice classification’, which allows for the registration of trademarks in classes covering their use in virtual worlds; calls for a close follow-up on the concrete application of this classification; is, however, concerned about the use of NFTs referencing trademarks without the authorisation of their owners and calls for effective measures to be implemented to address these and other cases of infringement; welcomes in this regard the Commission proposal to develop a toolbox to fight counterfeiting; 25. Acknowledges the applicability of liability rules as laid down in the Digital Services Act and of the special regime established in Article 17 of the Copyright Directive to cover the uploading of user-generated content; believes, however, that further clarification is needed on how existing rules should apply to online content-sharing services that make content available in virtual worlds and how they should be enforced; 26. Stresses that NFTs do not grant any IPR as such on the digital asset and signals the need for further clarity and transparency in order to avoid fraud and the frequent confusion between the right to the token itself and the right to the underlying protected content; 27. Notes that NFTs and other blockchain-based offers facilitate the continuous resale of assets based on copyright-protected works through online transactions and believes that appropriate and proportionate remuneration of authors for each resale of such assets needs to be ensured; 28. Recalls that, under the current rules, the outputs autonomously generated by AI systems might not be eligible for copyright protection, as the principle of originality is linked to a natural person and the concept of ‘intellectual creation’ presupposes the author’s personality; recalls, further, the difference between AI-assisted human creations and outputs autonomously generated by AI; recalls that, while the current intellectual property framework remains applicable to AI-assisted creations , outputs autonomously generated by AI create new regulatory challenges for intellectual property rights protection, such as questions of ownership, authorship and inventorship, as well as appropriate remuneration and issues related to potential market concentration; welcomes the commitment set out in the IP Action Plan for the Commission to engage in stakeholder discussions on how to address the challenges raised by AI-assisted inventions and creations; calls on the Commission to consider broadening the scope for this dialogue in order to largely cover AI-related issues, including generative AI; Accessibility and digital literacy 29. Emphasises that virtual worlds may provide opportunities for the provision of public services of general interest, to the wider benefit of citizens; underlines, however, that inclusion of and accessibility for all users in the EU must be ensured both in terms of cost and use of hardware and the understanding of software; notes that accessibility is particularly important when it comes to ensuring that vulnerable population groups such as elderly people, persons with disabilities, children and people living in rural and remote areas acquire the essential digital skills to participate in virtual worlds and should take into consideration aspects such as geographical location, gender, level of educational attainment and socio-economic background; 30. Adds, in this context, that digital literacy is of the utmost importance to ensure a safe and socially beneficial uptake and informed and responsible use of virtual worlds, to avoid user addiction, bias and discriminatory practices, to tackle disinformation, manipulation and abuse in the virtual environment and to promote democratic control; 31. Highlights the need to put in place effective educational measures to ensure broad literacy in relation to the virtual world among citizens and to upskill professionals in different fields, namely teachers, and to encourage and promote the development of European talent and technologies, while attracting more people, including more women, into science, technology, engineering and mathematics; 32. Recommends that the ‘virtual worlds toolbox’ intended for the general public, as outlined in the Commission communication, be developed further, in line with the recommendations of the Citizens’ Panel in order to help citizens better understand how to manage their virtual identities, their virtual creations, their virtual assets and their data, and to contribute to a comprehensive EU strategy for virtual worlds that is both sustainable and human-centric; 33. Welcomes, as noted by the Commission, the positive contribution of the EU open-source community in developing key features of virtual worlds, such as in relation to the use of distributed ledger technology and other technologies needed for the authenticity, management and security of virtual objects and identities; o 34. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.
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| European historical consciousness |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe(1), – having regard to its resolution of 2 April 2009 on European conscience and totalitarianism(2), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014(3), – having regard to its resolution of 11 November 2021 on the European Education Area: a shared holistic approach(4), – having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the role of culture, education, media and sport in the fight against racism(5), – having regard to its resolution of 6 April 2022 on the implementation of citizenship education actions(6), – having regard to its resolution of 14 December 2022 on the implementation of the New European Agenda for Culture and the EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations(7), – having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the EU Strategy for Gender Equality(8), – having regard to the Commission communication of 18 September 2020 entitled ‘A Union of equality: EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0565), – having regard to the Commission communication of 14 June 2016 entitled ‘Supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism’ (COM(2016)0379), – having regard to the European Cultural Convention of 19 December 1954(9), – having regard to the study conducted for its Committee on Culture and Education entitled ‘European Historical Memory: Policies, Challenges and Perspectives’(10), – having regard to the study conducted for its Committee on Culture and Education entitled ‘European Identity’(11), – having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the report of the Committee on Culture and Education (A9-0402/2023), A. whereas Europe’s complex, conflict-ridden and contested past poses both a challenge and an opportunity for European integration, acknowledging that a well-informed historical consciousness fosters mutual understanding and tolerance; B. whereas gender-, belief- and ethnicity-based injustices have been embedded in European history over many centuries, including in the form of antisemitism and antigypsyism, having consequences for Europe and the rest of the world; C. whereas mindful engagement with history and historical injustices helps to address different forms of intolerance and inequality and build more inclusive societies; D. whereas history must never be relativised, distorted or falsified for political purposes; E. whereas historical negationism and other forms of biased interpretations of history represent a major threat that kindles distrust and conflict between peoples and nations and undermines efforts to nurture historical justice and reconciliation; F. whereas dealing with the past requires utmost impartiality and objectivity both in historical scholarship and the political realm; G. whereas historical memory incorporates a distinct degree of subjectivity, given that the choice of what to remember and how the past is interpreted necessarily involves value judgements; H. whereas while there are ‘historical facts’ grounded in professional historical work, including research, teaching and the preservation of sources and historical sites, there is no single monolithic, indisputable and everlasting ‘historical truth’ that one specific group or nation can monopolise and exclusively claim for itself, or use to negate the existence of other peoples, nations or states; I. whereas interdisciplinary approaches and contextualisation are essential elements for history education, which needs to be associated with European citizenship education as well as exchange and mobility programmes; J. whereas fostering a critical historical consciousness across borders by educational and other means is central for Europeans to be able to understand and come to terms with their past, confidently deal with the present and work towards a common future; K. whereas European historical consciousness is understood as an individual as well as collective ability and skill to understand, critically assess and reflectively learn from history, which facilitates the recognition of the inextricable connection and interdependency between past, present and future; Dealing with Europe’s past as a risk and an opportunity 1. Acknowledges that the diverse and often conflicting histories of European nations and states make any effort to deal with history at a political level a difficult and potentially dangerous endeavour, and that attempts to steer how to commemorate and interpret the past always prove to be challenging; 2. Emphasises the potential of the principle of historia magistra vitae and considers especially the tragic periods and dark elements of Europe’s history not only to be a vigorous reminder of past mistakes whose repetition is to be avoided, but also as a call to work jointly towards democratic and inclusive societies in the Union and globally; 3. Considers a responsible, evidence-based and critical approach to history, focusing on common European values, to be a sine qua non for any democratic body politic, in order to sensitise current and future generations for achievements and aberrations of the past alike, strengthen a self-reflective public discourse and foster understanding and reconciliation within and among particular social groups, nations and states; Politics of the past in the European Union – a critical assessment 4. Stresses the need for an honest assessment of the EU’s ‘politics of the past’, through which it has striven to add legitimacy to the European project, strengthen a European sense of belonging and foster the peaceful coexistence of the continent’s peoples, by equally acknowledging achievements and existing shortcomings, and by scrutinising the ways in which citizens have been encouraged to engage with the past; 5. Acknowledges the array of past and present initiatives at European level to foster a common European historical memory, including the Holocaust Remembrance Day, the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of all Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, the establishment of a dedicated remembrance strand in the former Europe for Citizens and current Citizenship, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programmes, and various Parliament resolutions such as those of 2 April 2009 on European conscience and totalitarianism and of 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe; 6. Expresses its concern that there continues to be a latent competition and partial incompatibility between different memory frames and remembrance cultures in Europe, including between Western and Eastern Europe, but also between countries and nations within certain parts of the continent; stresses that all European countries have concurring and diverging experiences alike that belong to a shared European history; acknowledges the crimes committed by Nazi, fascist and communist totalitarian regimes as well as under colonialism, and the role these crimes have played in shaping historical perceptions in Europe; emphasises the need to bridge existing regional and ideological divides in historical awareness among European countries and peoples with a view to building a common ground for dialogue as well as mutual understanding and respect; 7. Recognises that the horrors of the past serve as a ‘negative foundation myth’ and provide a strong sense of purpose for the European peace project, yet acknowledges that the Union’s concern mainly with narrating a story about itself ex negativo bears the risk of nurturing a teleological and simplistic black-and-white scheme of history which potentially hampers a fully informed understanding of Europe’s intricate past and reduces incentives to challenge stereotypes and sacred cows of national histories; Towards an informed historical consciousness in Europe 8. Recognises the need for a broader and more holistic understanding of European history for a critical and self-reflective European historical consciousness to emerge, in particular by widening the focus of current European remembrance initiatives, taking into due account also groups that have been underrepresented so far, and by promoting innovative ways of teaching history; 9. Stresses the importance of moving away from a European ‘remembrance culture’ that is predominantly top-down and concerned with defining what Europeans should remember towards a bottom-up and citizens-driven ‘culture of remembering’ based on common European principles and values, concentrating on developing capacities for a critical reworking of the past at local, regional, national and European levels, involving civil-society organisations; 10. Acknowledges the crucial importance of approaching Europe’s past on the basis of the European core values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and the ethical and philosophical traditions that underpin these values, and of creating an open sphere of discussion that also makes it possible to address difficult elements of national histories and that provides for mutual understanding and reconciliation both within and between European nations, as well as between European nations and the rest of the world; 11. Considers the freedom to teach, study and conduct research, including free access to archives and sources, alongside free artistic expression, to be a prerequisite for the generation and dissemination of unbiased and evidence-based knowledge in democratic societies, and for a critical dealing with history in particular; calls on the Commission and the Member States to safeguard those freedoms that are currently at risk, especially due to cases of misappropriation of memory laws, including by means of the EU’s rule of law mechanism; 12. Stresses the vital role of education and calls on the Member States to update current curricula and teaching methodologies with a view to shifting focus from national towards European and global history and in order to allow for more emphasis on a supranational historical understanding, in particular by allowing for multiple perspectives on history and by fostering corresponding teaching styles that favour reflection and discussion over knowledge transfer and that are guided by the overall objective of making students learn ‘how to think’ rather than ‘what to think’; 13. Underscores the vital importance of learning about European integration, the history, institutions and fundamental values of the Union and European citizenship for a European sense of belonging to emerge; calls for the teaching of European history and European integration, which needs to be regarded in a global context, and for European citizenship education to become an integral part of national education systems; acknowledges efforts made at EU level to improve knowledge about the Union and its history, including the so-called Jean Monnet actions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work, including through the European Education Area’s Working Group on Equality and Values, on deliverables that address specifically the development of European historical consciousness, and to jointly develop an ‘EU manual’ in curricular activities providing common guidelines and impartial facts and figures for the teaching of European history; 14. Considers chauvinism, gender-stereotypes, power-asymmetries and structural inequalities to be deeply rooted in European history, and regrets the lack of a sufficiently multicultural and gender-sensitive approach in the teaching of history; deems it vital to address the marginalisation of women and other underrepresented societal groups in history, and calls on the Member States to provide for a stronger corresponding focus in national curricula; 15. Stresses the need for interdisciplinary and intersectional history teaching that applies innovative and learner-centred pedagogy such as interactive, storytelling and lessons-learned approaches for all generations, makes use of a comprehensive set of sources, technologies and learning materials, including cross-border and transnational history textbooks and oral histories, and promotes analytical and critical-thinking skills; 16. Recognises the central role played by teachers in the generation and transmission of competencies required to understand and critically assess historical facts, and emphasises the importance of teachers not only receiving adequate training but also engaging in continuous professional development, including peer-learning activities and the sharing of best practices both at national and transnational level; underlines, in this context, the added value of the Erasmus+ Teacher Academies; 17. Calls on the Member States to provide tailor-made (history) teaching materials and training that enables teachers to better focus on transnational aspects and the multifacetedness of history, imparts adequate didactics and principles of modern teaching and is primarily concerned with forming self-reflective young people; 18. Emphasises that there is great value in collecting data and comparing and evaluating methods and tools for teaching history, and welcomes the work of both specialised governmental and non-governmental organisations active in this area, including the Council of Europe’s Observatory on History Teaching in Europe and EUROCLIO; stresses the need for more EU Member States to participate in the Observatory; 19. Acknowledges the potential of museums critically addressing Europe’s contested history as a tool for learning about the past and building historical awareness, in particular the ‘House of European History’ as a flagship project for which sufficient resources should be made available in order to ensure wider outreach to the European public; 20. Stresses the importance of preserving Europe’s rich cultural and historical heritage and memorial sites, in particular as a means for establishing a critical historical consciousness, provided they are not abused for ideological purposes, and highlights the role that the European Heritage Label and independent institutions promoting European heritage, both tangible and intangible, can play in this regard; encourages the Member States to step up their efforts to define and protect places of democratic memory, especially those related to underrepresented groups; emphasises the potential of Europeana in serving as Europe’s digital library, archive, museum and education platform; 21. Acknowledges the potential of digital media and the rising level of digitalisation in education, while expressing its deep concern about digital channels being increasingly abused for political manipulation and the circulation of disinformation, including concerning history, as highlighted by Russian historical revisionism accompanying Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; calls on the Commission and the Member States to step up their efforts to strengthen media and digital literacy and to endow teachers and students with adequate skills and tools facilitating fact-based history teaching, and enabling them to identify, contextualise and analyse traditional as well as modern historical sources; 22. Stresses that learning mobility opportunities across borders provided by European programmes and other mobility schemes favour the exchange of ideas and promote transversal knowledge as well as intercultural understanding, helping to break down national barriers and providing a better understanding of past and present; 23. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen the tools currently available at European level in order to foster a critical and self-reflective European historical consciousness, in particular the Erasmus+ programme, which supports mobility and intercultural learning as key tools to increase understanding of other cultures and nations, and the CERV programme, which provides support for transnational historical remembrance projects and promotes civic engagement; 24. Requests that the European institutions, the Member States, candidate and prospective candidate countries, educational institutions and civil-society actors step up their efforts to foster reconciliation, abstain from any attempt to instrumentalise history for political purposes, and fight historical revisionism and denialism both in the European Union and beyond; recalls the importance of these aspects for future enlargements of the Union; Outlook: the legacy of the past and the EU’s future 25. Espouses the ideal of a ‘culture of remembering’ and historical consciousness based on shared European values and practices in approaching the past, yet at the same time avoiding any undue levelling or simplification of history; 26. Expresses its hope that on the basis of critical self-reflection relating to history and historical responsibility at national level, a truly European reflective discourse on the continent’s past may emerge, with history not being abused for power-political purposes, and expresses its hope that a ‘community of destiny’ among European peoples will emerge from common historical work; 27. Envisions collective memories eventually contributing to and merging into a European public sphere, with diverging remembrance cultures complementing each other rather than being in competition, and dealings with history becoming an issue of civic rather than political action; o 28. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.
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| EU development cooperation in support of access to energy in developing countries |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular SDG 1 on poverty eradication, SDG 7 on ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all, SDG 9 on industry and infrastructure, SDG 13 on climate action, and SDG 5 on achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls, – having regard to Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which has poverty reduction and, in the long term, poverty eradication, as the primary objective of the EU’s development policy, and which requires that the ‘Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries’, – having regard to Articles 3(5) and 21 of the Treaty on European Union, outlining the Union’s commitment to a value-based approach to development cooperation to ensure the consistency of its external action, respecting the principles of the UN Charter and fostering the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, – having regard to the joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, Parliament and the Commission of 30 June 2017 on the New European Consensus on Development – ‘Our world, our dignity, our future’(1), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009(2), – having regard to the Council conclusions of 4 October 2022 on climate finance in view of the UNFCCC 27th Conference of the Parties (COP27) in Sharm El-Sheikh on 6-18 November 2022, of 25 January 2021 on climate and energy diplomacy – delivering on the external dimension of the European Green Deal, and of 28 November 2016 on energy and development, – having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640), – having regard to the Commission proposal of 16 March 2023 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (COM(2023)0160), – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/1184 of 10 February 2023 supplementing Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council by establishing a Union methodology setting out detailed rules for the production of renewable liquid and gaseous transport fuels of non-biological origin(3), – having regard to the Commission communication of 16 March 2023 on the European Hydrogen Bank (COM(2023)0156), – having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2020 entitled ‘A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe’ (COM(2020)0301), – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘EU external energy engagement in a changing world’ (JOIN(2022)0023), – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030), – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 March 2020 entitled ‘Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa’ (JOIN(2020)0004), – having regard to the report of 5 January 2023 of the UN Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment entitled ‘Women, girls and the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment’, – having regard to the new partnership agreement between the European Union and the members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) (the Samoa Agreement), which will enter into force once the European Parliament consents to it and it is ratified by the Parties, – having regard to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol thereto, to the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the UNFCCC in Paris in December 2015, to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the first-ever universal, legally binding global climate deal, and to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report on Climate Change, – having regard to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s special report of 24 September 2019 on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate, – having regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 September 2007, – having regard to the UN Environment Programme’s 2022 Emissions Gap Report, and to its second synthesis report on fossil fuel production (Production Gap Report 2021)(4), – having regard to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council on 16 June 2011, – having regard to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, – having regard to the 2018 policy brief of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs entitled ‘Policy Brief #12: Global Progress of SDG7 – Energy and Gender’, – having regard to the 2022 report by the International Renewable Energy Agency entitled ‘World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022: 1.5 °C Pathway’(5), – having regard to the 2023 joint report by the World Bank, the International Energy Agency, the International Renewable Energy Agency, the UN and the World Health Organization entitled ‘Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report, 2023’(6), – having regard to the 2021-2027 African Union Green Recovery Action Plan, which provides a comprehensive strategy designed to promote green initiatives, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, protect the environment and enhance resilience to climate change(7), – having regard to the African Leaders Nairobi Declaration on Climate Change and Call to Action of 6 September 2023, – having regard to the African People’s Climate and Development Declaration 2023, – having regard to its resolutions of 14 March 2023 on Policy Coherence for Development(8), of 25 March 2021 on a new EU-Africa Strategy – a partnership for sustainable and inclusive development(9), of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal(10), of 1 December 2016 on access to energy in developing countries(11) and of 2 February 2012 on EU development cooperation in support of the objective of universal energy access by 2030(12), – having regard to the Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in External Action 2021–2025 (GAP III), – having regard to the May 2022 report of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean entitled ‘Energy in Latin America and the Caribbean: access, renewability and efficiency’, – having regard to the report of the World Commission on Dams of 16 November 2000 entitled ‘A new framework for decision-making’, – having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the report of the Committee on Development (A9-0441/2023), A. whereas energy is at the heart of all SDGs, but The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2023(13) concludes that the world is still not on track to achieve universal energy access; whereas energy is an enabling factor in development, particularly the development of agriculture, business, communication, education, healthcare and transportation, and in the functioning of the state; B. whereas SDG 7 stipulates the aim to achieve sustainable access to affordable and clean energy by 2030, notably by calling for greater international cooperation to facilitate access to clean and renewable energy research, infrastructure and technology and to promote investment to these ends; whereas it is essential to strengthen diplomatic efforts to foster greater political ambition in order to effectively address and end energy poverty; C. whereas, according to the UN, as of mid-2023, approximately 733 million people worldwide, 80 % of whom live in sub-Saharan Africa, still do not have access to affordable, reliable, clean, high-quality energy(14); D. whereas access to energy varies greatly across developing countries; whereas 52 % of the population of sub-Saharan Africa lives without access to electricity and it is the only region in the world where the proportion of people without electricity is increasing; whereas this figure conceals deep disparities, with only 30,4 % of the region’s rural population, compared to 80,7 % of its urban population, having regular access to energy; whereas education is recognised as one of the most essential components of poverty reduction; whereas access to electricity also supports quality education, but only 47 % of schools in sub-Saharan Africa have electricity; E. whereas the lack of access to electricity in urban or peri-urban environments affects the populations of large irregular settlements, as well as forcibly displaced people and refugees; whereas even when there is access to electricity, the quality of services is often poor; F. whereas access to affordable, reliable, clean, high-quality energy is even more difficult in countries affected by conflicts and natural disasters; whereas even in regions that have better access to energy, such as Asia and the Pacific or Latin America and the Caribbean, there are great inequalities between countries and among populations; G. whereas the energy crisis triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to take a heavy toll, with high energy prices hitting the most vulnerable the hardest, in particular in developing economies; H. whereas access to energy is essential for humanitarian and development organisations to deliver efficient humanitarian aid, particularly medical and emergency care; I. whereas current projections suggest that in 2030, about 660 million people worldwide will not have access to electricity and around one billion will lack access to clean cooking unless appropriate action is taken; J. whereas better access to affordable and clean energy will unlock sustainable economic growth, attract businesses and entrepreneurship and improve human health, well-being and security; K. whereas energy poverty, defined as the lack of sustainable, clean and safe energy sources, is, among other things, a gender issue, with women and girls spending, on average, up to 18 hours a week collecting cooking fuels(15); L. whereas women are greatly under-represented in the energy sector workforce worldwide, particularly in management roles; whereas engaging women as active agents in renewable energy solutions, in line with the EU’s GAP III, will improve sustainability and increase positive gender outcomes; M. whereas traditional cooking fuels (solid biomass, kerosene and coal) are the main contributors to carbon emissions, deforestation and climate change and represent a threat to people’s health; whereas 2,4 billion people worldwide rely on these fuels, resulting in around 3,7 million premature deaths a year, with women and children being the most affected; whereas in 2019, Africa alone recorded 700 000 deaths from household air pollution; N. whereas EU funding for clean cooking fuels is marginal; whereas even when clean cooking strategies exist, implementation is weak and little finance is available, so even modest gains are hard to obtain, and the adoption and sustained use of improved cookstoves remains low; whereas less than 10 % of people who lack access to clean cooking live in countries that have effective policies and sufficient funding to achieve universal access by 2030; O. whereas the COVID-19 pandemic and the energy price increase have slowed progress on expanding access to clean cooking; whereas in developing countries that rely heavily on biomass for cooking, the EU should support alternatives to the consumption of wood and promote solutions such as solar cookers; P. whereas the lack of access to clean cooking increases the time women and girls spend cooking; whereas this reinforces the unequal distribution of domestic work between men and women; whereas it is estimated that access to clean cooking would give women and girls an average of 1,5 more hours per day, which they could dedicate to leisure and/or education; Q. whereas developing countries have an abundance of renewable energy sources, but often lack an enabling policy and regulatory framework and the necessary industrial and technological conditions for sustainable energy development and use; whereas they also face multiple challenges, such as climate change, over-indebtedness and rapid demographic growth, which all affect energy demand and consumption; whereas countries such as Namibia and Angola are involved in ambitious renewable energy projects; whereas some developing countries have made notable progress in the field of energy access, such as Senegal, Rwanda and Kenya; whereas the different contexts in each country need to be taken into account in order to achieve breakthroughs on energy access, with appropriate levels of political will and EU support; R. whereas the EU has a long tradition of energy cooperation in Africa; whereas the EU together with its Member States provided the vast majority of Official Development Assistance financing for SDG 7 projects in Africa, amounting to EUR 13,8 billion between 2014 and 2020; whereas this is still not enough and more effort needs to be made; whereas an estimated 53 % of the disbursements were in the form of loans, but this additional debt reduces these countries’ ability to invest in the SDGs, including SDG 7; whereas in 2023, 21 low-income countries in Africa are in, or are at risk of, debt distress; S. whereas financial flows for energy remain concentrated in a small group of countries, often leaving least developed countries behind; whereas in terms of geographical targeting, only three of the top ten beneficiaries are least developed countries, which shows that resources for expanding energy access and fighting energy poverty have not been allocated by order of priority; T. whereas the energy transition is severely and persistently underfunded in developing regions, in particular in the least developed countries; whereas the Natural Resource Governance Institute defines the resource curse as the failure of many resource-rich countries to benefit fully from their natural resource wealth, and for governments in these countries to respond effectively to public welfare needs(16); whereas excessive reliance on exports of fossil fuels entails a risk of low economic diversification; U. whereas the EU should increase the financing of renewable energies in developing countries, particularly in the new geopolitical context created by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while addressing corruption and weak institutions, which exacerbate the problems of underfunding, particularly in least developed countries; V. whereas most EU-funded projects aim to promote electricity generation, yet the distribution segment is the weakest, despite being essential in achieving SDG 7; whereas many developing countries continue to rely on coal as the primary energy source for electricity generation; W. whereas the countries most affected by the negative consequences of climate change bear the least responsibility for emissions; whereas Africa is home to almost 18 % of the world’s population but accounts for less than 6 % of global energy use; whereas Africa is responsible for only 3 % of the world’s energy-related CO2 emissions; whereas the countries that make up the G20 account for 80 % of global emissions; X. whereas the Africa-EU Energy Partnership was renewed in February 2022 to reflect the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the EU’s priorities on climate change, energy security, REPowerEU and the Global Gateway, which have as their objective the promotion of renewable energy generation and distribution, including for export to Europe; whereas an investment package of approximately EUR 150 billion was announced to support the continents’ common ambitions, as set out in the 2030 Agenda and the African Union’s Agenda 2063, with the aim, among others, of ensuring an energy transition that is cost-effective, modern, efficient, reliable, fair, just and equitable; Y. whereas the EU’s just energy transition partnership with South Africa is an example of the EU’s willingness to position itself as a global leader in the just energy transition, thus contributing to the external dimension of the EU energy and climate strategy and promoting the ambition of the European Green Deal worldwide; Z. whereas the energy autonomy of Small Island Developing States, building on their high renewable energy potential, should remain a clear objective; AA. whereas what is labelled ‘low-carbon hydrogen’ may also include hydrogen produced using nuclear power and natural gas, meaning it is not necessarily emission-free; whereas green hydrogen from renewable sources is the only type of hydrogen that can truly contribute to climate neutrality in the long term; AB. whereas REPowerEU sets a target of importing 10 million tonnes of green hydrogen annually by 2030; whereas to this end, the Commission signed memorandums of understanding for strategic renewable hydrogen partnerships with Namibia and Egypt in November 2022, among other initiatives; AC. whereas according to the International Energy Agency’s Global Hydrogen Review 2023(17), 99 % of the hydrogen produced worldwide is made from fossil fuels; AD. whereas green hydrogen has the potential to accelerate the path to the decarbonisation of industrial production in partner countries, provided that it does not slow down the local energy transition and is part of a broader strategy to reduce the overall consumption of energy in developed countries in order to respect planetary boundaries; whereas at the same time, however, due account must be taken of the fact that the necessary infrastructure for green hydrogen is capital- and technology-intensive, that the long-distance transport and storage of hydrogen is energy-intensive and expensive, and that the large-scale production of green hydrogen requires vast amounts of land and water; AE. whereas the 2030 and 2050 climate objectives will not be achieved without the decarbonisation of key hard-to-abate sectors; whereas importing green hydrogen from non-EU countries is an important part of new EU strategic partnerships; whereas according to the International Energy Agency’s Global Hydrogen Review 2023, cost challenges are threatening the long-term profitability of the deployment of hydrogen production; whereas the deployment of hydrogen production could entail the risk of extending fossil fuel use and extractivist practices, including the possible large-scale appropriation of land, water and energy in developing producer countries; AF. whereas critical raw materials play a pivotal role in ensuring the accessibility and affordability of clean energy technologies for all, whereas the EU is in the process of establishing a coherent framework to ensure their continuous, secure and responsible supply, while upholding human rights and supporting local development; AG. whereas decentralised mini-grid and off-grid renewable energy offers good solutions for remote communities, particularly in terms of job creation, education and health, but needs to be accompanied by public support to create a viable and responsible business model; AH. whereas the expansion of renewables based on solar and wind power, the production of renewable hydrogen and the construction of hydroelectric dams also raise challenges as they require large areas of land, thus possibly interfering with existing land use and local needs, in particular regarding access to water, and may cause the displacement of local and indigenous communities, as well as harming ecosystems and natural habitats; whereas land and sea areas that could be used for renewable energy generation need to be identified while taking into account respect for biodiversity, the local economy and the consent of indigenous populations; AI. whereas the transition to renewables is projected to create more employment in the renewables sector; whereas new renewable technologies have the potential to generate economic opportunities, which in turn have the ability to support the achievement of the right to livelihood and decent work; whereas Africa has a promising future in renewable energy systems, having 60 % of the world’s best solar resources yet only 1 % of installed solar capacity; whereas Latin America is one of the world’s leading regions for renewable energy use and generation; AJ. whereas according to the International Energy Agency, global hydropower capacity is set to increase by 17 % between 2021 and 2030; whereas most untapped hydropower potential lies in developing economies across Africa, Asia and Latin America; whereas, however, large-scale hydropower projects are associated with negative social and environmental impacts ranging from the displacement of vulnerable human populations to the destruction of unique biodiversity; whereas hydropower raises new challenges in the context of climate change, which will dramatically increase the frequency of floods and droughts on the rivers where hydropower projects operate, increasing risks to both the projects’ safety and their capacity to generate electricity; AK. whereas the EU and partner countries share a common but differentiated responsibility to achieve a sustainable energy transition; whereas EU support for renewable energy projects must, in the first place, meet the local population’s needs before supporting export; AL. whereas the stated desire of certain developing countries to exploit their hydrocarbon resources should also be analysed in the light of the EU’s push for a global pledge at COP28 to phase out fossil fuels; whereas the usage of natural resources for energy generation has the potential to create economic opportunities, however, by prioritising the export of renewable energy, developing countries could potentially jeopardise their domestic energy transition and increase the share of fossil fuel consumption in their own electricity mix; AM. whereas according to the World Resources Institute, 25 % of the world’s population faces extremely high water stress each year; whereas water is central to growing crops and raising livestock, generating electricity, maintaining human health, fostering equitable societies and meeting the world’s climate goals; AN. whereas agri-food systems consume about 30 % of the world’s energy and a third of the sector’s greenhouse gas emissions come from energy use; whereas the energy transition and the transformation of agri-food systems are intertwined; Promote universal access to clean energy 1. Recalls that access to universal, affordable and sustainable energy is a basic human right and a precondition for achieving the SDGs and attaining the objective of leaving no one behind; recognises, to this end, the role of public and private financing; stresses that a net-zero carbon future and the development of renewables must go hand in hand with economic diversification, green industrialisation, decarbonisation, poverty reduction and a human rights-based approach; 2. Stresses that ensuring a stable energy supply is not only an economic and logistical issue, but also a geopolitical one; recalls that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has had a severe impact on global energy markets, particularly in developing countries, and that coordinated action is still needed to ensure stable energy supplies and affordable prices; 3. Calls for the EU to foster access to renewable energy in developing countries through policy, regulatory and administrative support, including capacity-building and transfers of technology; encourages partnerships that move away from the exploitation of fossil resources and focus on clean energy use; stresses the need to make sure that green investments contribute to socio-economic development and greater participation by developing countries in the new net-zero energy geopolitical landscape; 4. Highlights the need to develop solutions to help deliver renewable energy deployment in developing countries, including marine and river energy, while protecting biodiversity; stresses the significant potential for the installation of offshore renewable energy generation facilities in developing countries; emphasises the need for holistic management of maritime areas, involving all relevant stakeholders and respecting the consent of local communities; 5. Strongly encourages developing countries to commit to energy justice through their regulatory frameworks, which should ensure local acceptance, community participation, land rights protection and adherence to internationally recognised human rights standards, with the aim of securing access and affordable energy for all; underlines the necessity of linking energy partnerships to the adoption of regulatory frameworks and of providing technical assistance for their enactment; 6. Points out that energy security requires a gender-specific approach; stresses that energy poverty disproportionately affects women and girls; highlights their daily involvement in collecting firewood and charcoal far from their homes; calls for the inclusion of women as active agents in the energy transition process, including in marine conservation areas; 7. Calls for the EU to step up its technical support in mainstreaming gender in the energy transition, including by prioritising gender-responsive energy projects that involve women-led energy organisations and businesses and also ensure local ownership, paying particular attention to least developed countries and middle-income countries that suffer from significant intra-country inequalities in terms of access to energy and clean cooking; stresses the importance of gathering gender-disaggregated data on access to energy to guide the EU’s external action regarding energy; points out that energy poverty also affects minorities and marginalised communities; 8. Is worried about the health and environmental consequences of household fuelwood emissions, such as respiratory and cardiovascular diseases and cancer, forest degradation, greenhouse gas emissions and biodiversity loss; draws attention to the risk associated with the increasing use of unclean cooking fuels to serve the energy needs of the growing population, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa; 9. Stresses that in many places, people living in extreme poverty no longer have access to firewood and that, consequently, they heat and cook using other materials found around the home or nearby, such as tyres and other substances that are harmful to health; highlights, against this backdrop, that women and girls are disproportionately affected by household air pollution; 10. Points out that the pace at which access to clean cooking fuels is currently being expanded in many developing countries is not fast enough to meet the related targets under SDG 7 by 2030; acknowledges the multifaceted challenges related to the adoption of clean cooking and appropriate cookstoves that are in line with WHO standards; calls for awareness to be raised of the health risks linked to household air pollution from traditional cooking practices and of the benefits of alternatives; urges the EU to support financially, advocate for and encourage national action in partner countries; 11. Further calls for the EU to incorporate access to clean cooking as a priority within its energy partnerships and its multiannual indicative programmes with developing countries and in the programming of cooperation at local, regional and national levels; stresses the importance of consultation with civil society on the ground, particularly with women-led organisations, with a view to achieving gender equality and promoting a more equal division of domestic and care work between men and women in line with the concept of a care society; points out the opportunities presented by Global Gateway initiatives such as the Modern Cooking Facility for Africa and Strengthening the Entrepreneurial Environment for Clean Cooking initiatives; 12. Calls, furthermore, for the EU to pay particular attention to infrastructure and utilities, including construction of and access to sewage systems, and household or community access to wells or water purification systems; 13. Regrets the devastating impact of the lack of access to electricity on the basic needs of populations; calls for the EU and its Member States to make electrification a priority in their cooperation and partnerships with developing countries; stresses, in particular, the need to invest in generation capacity, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, in order to achieve the objective of universal access to energy; 14. Draws attention to opportunities for access to alternative energies, such as unexploited geothermal energy resources; points out that support with the affordability of energy costs is crucial for expanding access to electricity, particularly in Africa, where 30 % of the population cannot afford an essential bundle of electricity services; 15. Expresses concern over the increasing energy needs among refugees and internally displaced persons living in camps; regrets the fact that in isolated areas and humanitarian settings, energy insecurity prevents local health clinics and schools from operating fully; 16. Stresses the need to increase the humanitarian aid budget line in the context of the revision of the multiannual financial framework in order to meet humanitarian needs, including by stepping up financial assistance for ensuring energy provision in camps, including through green off-grid, mini-grid and renewable energy projects, so as to guarantee that humanitarian organisations on the ground can provide basic humanitarian aid, particularly medical and urgent care; Support the energy transition in line with the principle of policy coherence for development 17. Urges the EU and its Member States to ensure policy coherence for sustainable development across the EU external energy agenda, which should be tailored to local specificities and needs; 18. Reiterates its commitment towards energy justice; calls for the EU to support developing countries in implementing rights-based renewable energy regimes that effectively contribute to their sustainable development; believes that the principle of free, prior and informed consent for affected communities is a precondition for a successful green and just energy transition; highlights the importance of promoting energy efficiency and local skills and of encouraging technology innovation, technology transfer and technical cooperation in such energy transition projects; 19. Stresses the need for the EU to support developing countries, where required, in establishing or reinforcing regulatory frameworks that guarantee energy distribution and universal service across their territories, as well as good governance capacity and transparency in any energy transition projects; calls for the EU to enhance technical assistance to reform electricity systems; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to report on progress achieved in improving energy access and energy sector regulation through dedicated EU projects and investments in partner developing countries; 20. Highlights the potential risks of land-use and water-use conflicts, particularly forced resettlement and expropriation for large-scale renewable energy installations; urges the EU, through its partnerships, to support governments of developing countries to:
21. Notes that for some large-scale green energy projects (such as wind and solar power), like those being set up in dryland areas, for example, adequate consultation with the customary land users (such as pastoralists) is essential; recalls that traditional communal rights have a rather weak legal status and are often not implemented, which can potentially increase the risk of land grabbing; calls, against this backdrop, for the EU and its partner countries to recognise and protect indigenous people’s rights to customary ownership and control of their lands and natural resources, as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and International Labour Organization Convention 169, and to comply with the principle of free, prior and informed consent; 22. Recommends that EU Member States that have not done so should ratify International Labour Organization Convention 169 on indigenous and tribal peoples; 23. Acknowledges the impact that water-intensive energy conversion practices, such as hydropower plants and hydrogen production, can have on agricultural communities; highlights the adverse effects of hydropower dams on rivers and biodiversity, particularly in estuaries, as outlined in the report of the World Commission on Dams of 16 November 2000, among others; stresses, however, the potential to develop osmotic power, particularly in estuaries and deltas, to provide solutions for the generation of renewable energy; 24. Recalls that large hydropower projects in developing countries often face a range of challenges, including prohibitive upfront costs, major cost overruns and delays, difficulties in attracting finance, social and environmental footprints, vulnerability to climate change and some poor track records when it comes to delivering the promised power; stresses the importance of promoting sustainable hydropower projects by conducting comprehensive environmental and social impact assessments and ensuring meaningful community participation; is of the opinion that, where possible, priority should be given to other small-scale and different types of renewable energy projects; 25. Stresses that according to the recommendations of the report of the World Commission on Dams of 16 November 2000, any planning of dams should be evaluated according to five values: equity, efficiency, participatory decision-making, sustainability and accountability; highlights, more broadly, that the decision-making process with regard to dams should fully take into account the notion of human rights, as enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the related covenants adopted thereafter, so as to resolve complex issues surrounding water, dams and development; underlines that the EU should work within the remit of its partnerships with developing countries to ensure that the communities affected by dam projects are adequately compensated and provided with appropriate livelihood restoration measures; 26. Is concerned about the fragility of facilities in the face of extreme weather events, as highlighted by the recent floods in Libya, which swept away entire neighbourhoods and damaged critical infrastructure; insists on the paramount objectives of SDG 9, which seeks to build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation; 27. Notes, with concern, that Africa hosts an increasing number of fossil fuel projects, which risks preventing it from making a timely leap to renewable energy; further notes that although Africa is home to 18 % of the world’s population, it only accounts for 6 % of global energy consumption; recalls that a major portion of current oil, gas and coal production in Africa is destined for export, while the continent continues to be plagued by energy poverty; insists that it is necessary to prioritise investment in sustainable renewable energy infrastructure in Africa, particularly in rural and marginalised communities, through the establishment of decentralised energy systems and microgrid networks; 28. Calls for the EU to encourage the development of energy systems that do not involve or rely on the expansion of existing or new fossil fuel projects, in line with the recommendations of the International Energy Agency; stresses the importance of win-win partnerships that also benefit exporting countries and their populations in terms of renewable energy; 29. Denounces the double standards whereby private and public financial institutions in developed countries are increasingly making pledges to reach carbon neutrality by 2050 while financing the development and expansion of fossil fuels; underlines that calls for low- and middle-income countries to reduce their dependence on coal will not be effective as long as developed countries continue to rely decisively on other fossil fuels; 30. Recalls that renewables-based alternatives can increasingly provide a cheaper, more accessible, inclusive and reliable source of energy; stresses the role of renewable energy in increasing the adaptation and efficiency of agri-food systems; calls for the EU and its Member States to make the use of renewables in agri-food systems a priority in their partnership agreements with non-EU countries; 31. Recommends carrying out a joint energy transition planning exercise within the framework of the partnership between the EU and the African Union, drawing on the African, Caribbean and Pacific-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly and African civil societies, while respecting the sovereignty of African nations; recommends drawing up guidelines on the fair sharing of investments, revenues, technologies and skills; 32. Calls for the EU and its Member States to include education and training programmes for the local population in their energy partnerships with non-EU countries in order to support the energy transition on the ground and create employment opportunities for local communities; likewise calls for the EU to step up scientific cooperation with developing countries on access to research and renewable energy technologies; believes that the generation matrix of renewable energies should be changed in order to move away from a purely extractivist perspective; 33. Recalls that the 2021 Glasgow Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition commits signatories to ending new direct public support for the fossil fuel energy sector; calls for the EU and its Member States to lead by example and to stop financing fossil fuel projects; Green hydrogen 34. Stresses the crucial role of green hydrogen as a tool to decarbonise the energy system, achieve net-zero emissions worldwide by 2050 and attain the Paris Agreement goals, but recalls the importance of life cycle assessments that take into account the production and transport modes used; 35. Warns against the potential risk of a new ‘green hydrogen curse’ that would foster developing countries’ reliance on exports and could crowd out investments in the development of local energy markets; states that the green hydrogen industry can play a crucial role in the development of resource-rich developing countries if certain factors are present, such as good governance, the implementation and monitoring of a sound legal framework, corruption prevention, functioning rule of law, and transparency with regard to financial flows; 36. Highlights the need to address global infrastructure related to the production, storage, transport, distribution and consumption of green hydrogen, the long-distance transport costs and climate impact, the limited investments and financial capacities and the risks linked to weak institutions and corruption in some developing countries; 37. Calls for the EU to support, notably through the Global Gateway initiative, win-win partnerships that benefit both importing and exporting countries and their populations; calls, to this end, for the EU to support the development of a green hydrogen value chain when it brings equal social and economic benefits to exporting countries, notably in terms of the training and re-skilling of the local population, job creation, the decarbonisation of hard-to-abate industrial activities and access to cleaner mobility and energy; 38. Calls for the EU to support economic diversification and domestic access to electricity and water, with full respect for ecosystems and with a view to reducing excessive reliance on exports of fossil fuels; emphasises that enhanced collaboration between EU and partner country businesses and SMEs, combining the expertise of different like-minded partners, can create a pathway to sound entrepreneurship in the green hydrogen sector; 39. Acknowledges that the expansion of green hydrogen can have negative social and environmental impacts in the Global South, in particular as it relies on mining and the use of raw materials and rare earths, which require large quantities of fresh water and engender water pollution; stresses the importance of developing a global resource governance system that prioritises sustainability, efficiency and circularity, with a view to reducing global demand for virgin materials, while also recognising the challenges in achieving this; 40. Emphasises the need for a systemic approach to assessing the local opportunities and consequences of green hydrogen production for European needs in developing countries; stresses that the EU should ensure the sustainability of the extracted, processed and recycled critical raw materials that are fundamental for hydrogen and the other net-zero technologies; 41. Notes, with concern, the conflicting use of water associated with mining and the development of large-scale renewable energy plants, such as green hydrogen facilities; reaffirms that access to water is a fundamental human right; underlines the necessity of enhancing water infrastructure in regions where mining and renewable energy plants are prominent by investing in water treatment facilities and water recycling systems; 42. Stresses the need to regulate water as a resource for green hydrogen production in a sustainable way, particularly in arid regions, including by implementing regulations that mandate sustainable water sourcing techniques, efficient water usage, and the minimisation of wastewater discharge, so that it does not jeopardise local populations’ access to water or drive up water costs; 43. Notes the proliferation of desalination plants to deal with water scarcity; acknowledges that desalination plants can benefit local communities and the domestic economy, but points out that seawater desalination can have major environmental impacts, in particular on marine biodiversity; calls for the promotion of a sustainable approach to water desalination and of solutions that have no impact on coastal areas, such as deep sea desalination; highlights that reducing water use and recycling or reusing treated wastewater is often less expensive than desalination; 44. Highlights the potential risks of water grabbing and water pollution associated with foreign direct investments in large-scale land acquisitions for renewable energy; calls for the EU and its Member States to enact mandatory water-related due diligence and reporting standards for corporations; 45. Insists that green hydrogen strategies must follow strong social and sustainability standards; calls for the EU to establish appropriate monitoring frameworks in its partnership agreements that allow for the assessment of their broader impact on SDG performance, notably by identifying environmental, social and governance indicators and setting measurable targets; calls for mandatory environmental impact studies to be conducted, including for desalination, and for biodiversity hotspots to be excluded as sites for green hydrogen facilities; believes that green hydrogen production should demonstrate reliance on materials sourced under environmental and human rights standards for extractive activities (for instance, from countries that are signatories to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative); 46. Urges the Commission to set up an inclusive governance framework for partnership agreements that includes civil society organisations to ensure that the ‘no harm’ principle is respected vis-à-vis local communities and that global human rights standards are met; Scale up funding for a just energy transition 47. Stresses that EU financing for renewable energy should be in line with the principles of equity, sustainability and climate justice, which could comprise, among other things, debt assistance, debt relief and cancellation, debt restructuring and the Loss and Damage Fund; 48. Stresses that investments in renewable hydrogen produced by non-EU countries should be based on international due diligence principles, including but not limited to the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct; 49. Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase the amount of Official Development Assistance devoted to the energy sector, especially under Heading 6 of the next multiannual financial framework, and particularly in Africa, while prioritising grants over loans and reorienting financing towards countries with lower rates of access to electricity with the aim of supporting their clean and renewable energy transitions in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; 50. Encourages the development of public and private partnerships as well as programmes for facilitating the transfer of knowledge and green technologies; highlights that many African countries’ electricity sectors have specific characteristics (such as sharp growth in demand, small grids, fragile national utilities and customers’ limited ability to pay) that have to be taken into account; 51. Stresses that access to financing for a just energy transition must be simplified and accelerated for developing countries; highlights that the EU can offer innovative solutions to speed up the green transition and increase the global share of renewables; calls, to this end, for the EU and its Member States to consider debt-for-climate swaps so that debtor developing countries can use the owed money to finance climate change adaptation and mitigation projects; 52. Calls, more broadly, for a long-term debt-for-climate swap mechanism to be made operational within the framework of the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative and for IMF Special Drawing Rights to be rechannelled; 53. Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase the funding devoted to helping developing countries to adapt to climate change, making energy systems more resilient against climate risks; underlines the relevance of green energy in agroforestry and climate change adaptation projects, such as the Great Green Wall; 54. Urges the Commission to increase the number of programmes under the Global Gateway initiative that prioritise basic access to electricity and clean cooking, particularly in the countries most in need; stresses the importance of the private sector in scaling up funding for basic access to energy and clean cooking while guaranteeing public access and strengthening national public energy suppliers; calls, to this end, on the Commission to use the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus as an instrument to support private-sector investments in developing countries in order to strengthen the energy infrastructure and provide better access to energy and clean cooking for domestic use; 55. Urges the EU to support developing countries in gradually phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and to focus on efficient, modern and affordable cooking technologies; urges the mobilisation of investments and creating enabling environments to drive growth of a robust clean cooking industry; 56. Calls for the EU and European development finance institutions to:
57. Invites the Commission to provide disaggregated data on the amount of investments in energy access in order to track how much is allocated to SDG7, as well as to provide data on the key performance indicator ‘Renewable energy generation capacity installed (MW) with Union support’ identified under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe; 58. Welcomes the conclusions of the 2023 COP28, which call, for the first time in history, for a transition away from fossil fuels and make a clear commitment to the 1.5 degree target, to taking action towards achieving, at a global scale, a tripling of renewable energy capacity and a doubling of energy efficiency improvements by 2030, and to globally promoting a people-centred approach to climate finance and energy infrastructure projects; 59. Calls for the EU to play a key role in negotiations on mitigation measures for developing countries in order to combat the harmful effects of the use of polluting fuels, while promoting sustainable and clean energy development; o 60. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European External Action Service and the European Investment Bank.
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| Virtual worlds – opportunities, risks and policy implications for the single market |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to Article 24 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child as elaborated upon in its General Comment No. 25 on children’s rights in relation to the digital environment, – having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Culture and Education, – having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A9-0397/2023), A. whereas the world is undergoing an unprecedented transformation marked by digitalisation, which is imprinting profound changes in all spheres of our economic, political and social life; B. whereas digitalisation brings with it a wealth of opportunities in fields such as medicine, culture, education, the economy, security and law enforcement and has the potential to contribute to solving global problems related to poverty and inequality, sustainability as well as to democratise processes and access to education and knowledge; whereas it also offers new possibilities to advance the transition process towards more sustainable and just societies if guided in the right direction by appropriate policies; whereas addressing the digital divide, which currently affects 46 % of Europeans, still requires significant investment; C. whereas the digital transformation also entails significant challenges that might lead us to review the concepts and norms that have hitherto underpinned our economic and social progress while keeping intact our fundamental core principles and values such as cultural policies and copyright law; whereas excessive market concentration has been observed in the digital economy; stresses the need to reduce technological dependencies on non-EU countries by moving towards a European approach to virtual worlds, including both larger and smaller operators at various levels of the value chain; D. whereas in the EU, awareness of both the potential of emerging technologies and the challenges posed by the accumulation of power by digital giants has triggered the need to re-establish a level playing field in the digital market, leading to political and legislative action; whereas the EU institutions have made the green and digital transitions a priority area of action and policy formulation, establishing rules in line with EU values, principles of equity and fair competition, and fundamental rights, while ensuring strategic autonomy and independence; E. whereas the transition to Web 4.0 and the development of virtual worlds may be a significant part of the future of digitalisation and may be one of the significant potential building blocks for the completion of the digital single market; considers that digitalisation, integral to Web 4.0, should be harmoniously integrated into the Digital Single Market without creating barriers; acknowledges that while virtual worlds can complement the real world as an additional tool, they should not replace it and should not lead to exclusion of consumers; F. Whereas virtual worlds pose significant risks in various domains, such as mental health, competition, data protection, and consumer protection, including for vulnerable groups such as minors, the elderly, and people with disabilities; whereas further research in this field is also needed; whereas virtual worlds also present multifaceted challenges that include but are not limited to user-generated content, intellectual property rights, cybersecurity measures and fundamental human rights; whereas the experience of virtual worlds can pose challenges to women; according to the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), one in 10 women have experienced some form of cyber violence since the age of 15; whereas the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women has stated that new technologies ‘will inevitably give rise to different and new manifestations of online violence against women’; considers that the imbalance between the online consumer and trader might be exacerbated in virtual worlds; underlines that technologies must not be designed to manipulate consumers’ behaviour; notes the growing number and variety of products, including financial products, linked to virtual worlds such as buying virtual assets, avatars, and others; highlights the need to have targeted studies and extended consultation with experts in different fields, from economy to psychology to neuro-specialists, in order to develop a legislative framework fit for the purpose; welcomes the work of the industry in this regards while underlining that more can be done; General principles 1. Welcomes the Commission communication of 11 July 2023 entitled ‘An EU initiative on Web 4.0 and virtual worlds: a head start in the next technological transition’ (COM(2023)0442); underlines that any strategy must be sustainable and human-centric, while protecting the values of the European Union; 2. Notes the challenges associated with the absence of a universally recognised or agreed definition of virtual worlds, which also leads to a lack of policy coordination at the national level and above; acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to define virtual worlds in a way that is aligned with consensual characteristics such as immersivity, synchronicity and persistence; 3. Underlines the need to make a clear difference between the existing digital instruments, and other possible emerging technologies, based on research, strong scientific studies and technical specificities, while exploring the need for standardisation of the sector; Internal market and consumer protection 4. Observes that, although the European Commission’s communication does not yet indicate the need for precise legislative action, it is nevertheless important to make a careful assessment of all the issues relating to the development of virtual worlds and their effective coverage by existing legislation; underlines that a true digital single market can contribute decisively to the development of virtual worlds and strengthen the EU’s ability to compete globally; considers that a clear, comprehensive, regulatory framework is of vital importance, particularly when the technology reaches maturity, to ensure a level playing field that harnesses the full potential of virtual worlds and enables their economic growth; 5. Welcomes the latest regulatory developments in this regard, such as the Digital Services Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065(1)), the Digital Markets Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/1925(2)), and the Data Act (2022/0047(COD)) that is about to be endorsed by the Council and the European Parliament; notes also the proposal for an artificial intelligence act, and cyber resilience act and the ongoing negotiations thereon; considers that the Commission should conduct regular checks on the adequacy and consistency of the legislative framework of the digital single market, to address new opportunities, risks or other issues that may arise with virtual worlds and where necessary, put forward legislative proposals; believes that the outcome of such checks should be made public; 6. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to monitor the development of virtual worlds; invites the Commission to draft a report on this subject every two years and to forward it to Parliament and the Council; asks the Commission to pay attention to the potential emergence of problems in the Web 4.0 that already exist in the Web 3.0, such as the proliferation of disinformation, spread of illegal content, digital identity theft, cybercrime, infringement of intellectual property rights, cyberterrorism, misuse of personal data, manipulative behavioural or addictive design of digital services, fraud, online terrorist content, sexual abuse of minors and cyberbullying, among others, and to consider relevant existing, such as the Digital Services Act, and forthcoming legislation which aim to address these issues; 7. Points to the significant economic potential of virtual worlds, and the growing needs for investment in the necessary infrastructure and in related research, innovation, and re- and up-skilling; stresses that the overall costs of such investments should aim to have a neutral impact on final consumer prices; acknowledges the need to increase available resources at EU-level to fulfil these objectives; highlights the role of virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR), and mixed reality (XR) as crucial technologies for the development and growth of virtual worlds, providing users with immersive and interactive experiences, while also noting that industrial applications and consumer use present different challenges and require differentiated approaches; notes also the development of some AI models such as generative AI can play a crucial role in creating and enriching virtual environments; in this regard, call on the Commission to closely monitor also the rapid development of this technology and its impact in the digital ecosystem; 8. Signals also the potential positive impact that these developments could have on employment, including the creation of new jobs in domains such as virtual world architecture or content creation; stresses the need to invest in reskilling initiatives to educate the existing workforce in the EU, paying specific attention to under-represented groups in this sector; highlights the importance of investing in and promoting the development of appropriate skills to ensure the supply of talented and skilled workers fit for these jobs in the EU, as well as of creating appealing conditions to retain EU talent, attract foreign talent, and promote entrepreneurship and innovation in the territory of the EU; 9. Signals the positive as well as the negative potential impact of the new technologies and products on consumers, on their health, on their social and economic life; highlights the potential of virtual worlds in industrial and professional settings, in particular for training and prototyping, while acknowledging broader impacts on workers; stresses the need to ensure compliance with labour rights and a high level of worker protection; 10. Recalls that while most companies that are leading the development of virtual worlds are established outside the EU, there exists a vibrant, evolving ecosystem within the EU; emphasises the need for the EU to take the lead in shaping virtual worlds as ecosystems that respect and promote EU values, fundamental rights, and the highest level of consumer protection; signals the importance of fostering a level playing field that promotes the expansion of European small and medium-sized enterprises and the emergence of competitive European companies, as well as decentralised and interoperable ecosystems; 11. Underlines the necessity of creating an appropriate policy framework and engaging in international dialogues in particular with like-minded non-EU countries for coordinated approaches to virtual worlds; stresses the importance of raising European citizens’ awareness about responsible usage in these digital domains; 12. Acknowledges that multiple virtual worlds have been developed by different undertakings in the absence of open and common standards, regulations and interoperable platforms; underlines that these virtual worlds are currently being developed by a limited number of undertakings that have the resources and funds necessary to develop them; considers that interoperability and open standards can contribute to the prevention of quasi-monopolies or abuses of dominant position to the detriment of consumers and to European businesses, especially SMEs; 13. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to engage with existing multi-stakeholder internet governance institutions to develop common governance standards and rules; and encourages the Commission to support ongoing multi-stakeholder initiatives currently developing standards, including those of consumer associations and other civil society organisations; recommends a comprehensive study on interoperable virtual worlds; highlights the potential represented by the creation of European data spaces for the development of virtual worlds; 14. Stresses the need to ensure that virtual worlds are open, inclusive, and accessible, contributing to the greater participation of people with disabilities in the new digital environment; signals the potential of virtual worlds to increase the participation of people with disabilities in different activities such as virtual tourism; warns of the potential challenges that users with disabilities will face in interacting with virtual worlds, arising from inadequate accessibility features or designs that do not cater to their specific needs; calls on the Commission to monitor the fitness of the European Accessibility Act(3) and Web Accessibility Directive(4) in ensuring accessibility in virtual worlds . stresses also the need to recognise the specific needs and rights of children; 15. Believes that the debate over the need for the identification of users in virtual worlds should be a priority area in the development of virtual worlds and that there should be a profound reflection on the possible configuration of this digital environment, bearing in mind that, in some cases, anonymity may be preferable; points out that anonymity in the digital environment is always possible under a username (alias), and calls on the Commission to assess the potential use of the European Digital Identity (eID) and wallet in virtual worlds; 16. Reiterates the importance of protecting users’ personal data and privacy; points out that the General Data Protection Regulation(5)might not be sufficient to address all the challenges posed to data protection in interconnected virtual worlds; calls, while ensuring an innovation-friendly environment, for special attention to be paid to the data protection implications of user-generated content, as well as the processing of sensitive data such as biometric and behavioural data, emotional reactions and haptic information; 17. Underlines that participation in the virtual world is voluntary and calls for the Commission to consider installing the right to permanent deletion so that consumers can ask for their data and profile to be erased from any applications, online games and virtual environments; 18. Considers that particular attention should be given to addictive design and dark patterns in these virtual environments; warns of the potential health issues that may arise from interacting with virtual worlds, such as addiction, cyber sickness or disturbances in sleep patterns; emphasises the special vulnerability of minors and young people to these health problems, including potential impacts on their cognitive development, and underscores the need for age-appropriate design and parental control measures to safeguard them; also considers that research on the impact of technologies that imply direct and permanent modifications to the body is needed; 19. Recalls the potential of virtual worlds and immersive education to promote children’s rights online with regards to their education, empowerment, participation and play, and that it can offer unique experiences that can help minors develop their appetite for learning through, for example, learning through play; notes that this engagement can help them develop skills in collaboration, communication, critical thinking, innovation, and confidence; stresses the opportunity to address the EU’s skills gap and train future talent; underlines the necessity of educational programmes to help children and young people adapt to technological changes and to adopt a healthy and balanced approach combining traditional social interaction with the time spent in the virtual environment, also giving parents the necessary tools to supervise and make informed decisions when allowing or involving their children in the virtual environment; 20. Notes the need for research on the impact of virtual reality and other technologies on cognitive and behavioural development; underlines the possible risks inherent to early exposure and excessive screen time, which might affect their well-being and proper cognitive, physical, psychological, and social development; insists on the implementation of information campaigns on responsible screen use; highlights the need for educators to be trained appropriately to ensure they have the necessary digital skills and literacy; calls on the Commission to encourage initiatives where universities, engineering schools and industry players partner to assess the skills gaps, co-design roadmaps and strengthen public-private cooperation for the benefit of the EU’s youth; underlines the importance of extending the highest level of protection afforded to minors in other offline and online environments to virtual worlds against various risks, including but not limited to abuse, harassment, bullying, and exposure to violent, sexist, racist or pornographic content; stresses the need to recognise the specific needs, vulnerabilities and the rights of children in virtual worlds; underlines the importance of designing and operating online services and products accessed mostly by children that are safe for children by design and default; 21. Notes that virtual worlds will generate high-resolution images, graphics, and video to enable immersive user experiences, further requiring high-performing infrastructure; notes that, in particular, next generation mobile networks, as well as efficient Wi-Fi connections, such as Wi-Fi 6, with low latency and high bandwidth will be key, as will technologies such as edge computing; reminds of the European Court of Auditors report from January 2022 estimating the total cost of deploying 5G in all EU Member States to be between 281 and 391 billion euros by 2025, including the construction of new 5G infrastructure and the modernisation of existing infrastructure; 22. Notes with concern that growing use of virtual worlds could also exclude certain groups of people who lack basic skills or resources to participate in this environment, but also people living in rural and remote areas, such as outermost regions; emphasises that fostering digital literacy and access to quality and affordable internet is a precondition for any EU-level framework on virtual worlds; calls on the Commission to conduct an evidence-based assessment of how to ensure that the infrastructure needed and devices needed to support the development and functioning of virtual worlds, and the transition from Web 3.0 to Web 4.0 are delivered to consumers, including in remote areas and lower-income households; highlights that a true single market for telecoms is key in this regard; warns of the dangers of financial transactions involving cryptocurrencies, particularly fraud and scams, which might be exacerbated in virtual worlds; recalls also that the irreversibility of many cryptocurrency transactions also means new channels for the parallel economy with victims of fraud having little or no recourse of possibility of recovering lost funds; welcomes the European Union Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation(6), aimed at establishing a legal framework for cryptocurrencies and digital assets; Sustainability 23. Points out that the production of the devices needed to access virtual worlds requires resources such as rare earths and other mineral raw materials; welcomes in this regard the presentation of the Commission proposal for a regulation establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials (COM(2023)0160); 24. Notes the potential for virtual worlds and Web 4.0 to make a positive contribution to the fight against climate change and for environmental sustainability, for example by facilitating remote working, thereby reducing commuting and associated carbon emissions; notes that network infrastructures that enable digital solutions and new business models play a crucial role; 25. Considers that the development and deployment of virtual worlds should take into account the impact on the environment; highlights the importance of raising consumers’ awareness about the environmental impact and sustainability of these new technologies, including electronic waste; notes that, according to the International Energy Agency, electricity consumption by large data centres currently accounts for 1-1,5 % of global electricity use points out that data centre electricity consumption may increase in the event of large-scale adoption of virtual world technologies; recalls the need to use, accelerate and incentivise technological advances to reduce the energy consumption and environmental footprint of the activities related to the production, use and development of virtual worlds, such as advanced recycling techniques and renewable energy sources; o 26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, and to the parliaments and governments of the Member States.
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| EU-India relations |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to the EU-India Strategic Partnership established in 2004, – having regard to the joint statement of the 15th EU-India summit of 15 July 2020, to the document entitled ‘EU-India Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025’ adopted at the summit and to the other joint statements signed recently by the EU and India, – having regard to the Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of India on partnership and development of 1994(1), – having regard to the joint communication of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Commission of 20 November 2018 entitled ‘Elements for an EU strategy on India’ (JOIN(2018)0028) and the related Council conclusions on the EU Strategy on India of 10 December 2018, – having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘The EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ (JOIN(2021)0024), – having regard to the joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the update of the EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan ‘An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats’ of 10 March 2023 (JOIN(2023)0008), – having regard to the ‘Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy - Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’ of June 2016, – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe(2), – having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence approved by the Council on 21 March 2022, – having regard to the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine, – having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 February 2023 on EU priorities in UN human rights fora in 2023, – having regard to the EU thematic guidelines on human rights, including those on human rights defenders, on human rights dialogues and on the protection and promotion of freedom of religion or belief, – having regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, – having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution on aggression against Ukraine adopted on 2 March 2022, – having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and to the Paris Agreement, – having regard to the 2022 United Nations Universal Periodic Review of India, – having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on connectivity and EU-Asia relations(3), – having regard to its resolution of 5 July 2022 on EU-India future trade and investment cooperation(4), – having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific(5), – having regard to its resolution of 13 September 2017 on EU political relations with India(6), – having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on India, the situation in Manipur(7), – having regard to its recommendation of 29 April 2021 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning EU-India relations(8), – having regard to the press statement of the Delegation to India and Bhutan on the 10th round of the EU-India Human Rights Dialogue held on 15 July 2022, – having regard to the conclusions of the G20 Summit held in New Delhi on 9 and 10 September 2023, – having regard to the forthcoming EU-India summit to be held in New Delhi, – having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0435/2023), A. whereas the EU and India intend to convene at leaders’ meeting in New Delhi in early 2024, in particular to reaffirm the commitments of both sides to their strategic partnership and to review the implementation of the EU-India Roadmap 2025; B. whereas India is set to hold parliamentary elections in May and June 2024 and the European Parliament will hold its elections in June 2024; C. whereas in 2022, the EU and India marked the 60th anniversary of their bilateral partnership; whereas this partnership has gained momentum in recent years, reflecting the strong political, economic, social and cultural ties and a renewed political will to strengthen their partnership across a number of sectors and policy areas; whereas this partnership has, however, not yet reached its full potential; D. whereas bilateral relations between EU Member States and India on issues such as connectivity and climate contribute to the EU-India partnership; whereas geopolitical challenges have strengthened the shared interest of the EU and India in ensuring security, prosperity and sustainable development; E. whereas bilateral and multilateral cooperation with India is particularly warranted in the current context of a polycrisis, including geopolitical challenges, democratic backsliding worldwide, a spiralling climate crisis, heightened inequalities and increasing great power competition; whereas the EU seeks a partnership based on a level playing field with India as this partnership has the potential to allow for the diversification of its supply chains and to positively contribute to global and regional prosperity and stability and the upholding of a shared vision of effective multilateralism and a rules-based multilateral order; F. whereas India’s regional and global importance and relevance are growing as it has surpassed China as the most populous country in 2023 and as it is positioning itself as a regional economic and military power and is strengthening partnerships as well as boosting economic and defence ties in particular across Southeast Asia; whereas the EU is India’s largest trading partner and it is in the mutual interest of both sides to foster closer economic ties; G. whereas through its strategic framework vested in its Global Strategy, its Strategy on India, its Strategy for EU-Asia Connectivity and the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy the EU recognises India’s growing geostrategic importance and underlines the need to cooperate in the global arena and converge on a common agenda; H. whereas India’s growing regional and global significance is reflected by its G20 Presidency in 2023, which began on 1 December, and its membership of the UN Security Council in 2021-2022 as well as of the UN Human Rights Council in 2019-2022 and 2022-2024; I. whereas the Indian Ocean has become a global centre of interest with strategic importance for global trade and of vital economic and strategic interest for both the EU and India; whereas one of the Member States of the European Union has outermost regions and overseas countries and territories in the Indo-Pacific; whereas the EU and India share a common interest in de-risking the relationship with China and positioning themselves jointly on the latter’s increasing influence in the Indo-Pacific and globally; whereas the EU’s Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific of 2021 emphasised partnerships and cooperation as ways to respond to geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific and identified cooperation with India as one of the EU’s priorities in the region; whereas the EU and India have a convergent interest in keeping the Indo-Pacific region open, free and safe, focusing on sustaining the region as an area of fair competition, undisrupted sea lines of communication (SLOC), stability and security; whereas on 5 October 2023, EU and India held their third India-EU Maritime Security Dialogue; J. whereas over one third of all European exports go to the Indo-Pacific region most of them transit through the sea lanes in the Indian and Pacific Oceans; whereas the EU is dependent on unimpeded maritime highways that pass through the Indo-Pacific and has therefore a clear interest in maintaining stability in the Indian Ocean region; K. whereas India has sought to diversify partnerships and has strengthened relations among others with Japan, Australia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the economic, security, maritime and diplomatic fields, seeking further integration with Southeast Asia and deepening strategic cooperation; L. whereas EU and Indian leadership is needed to promote effective climate diplomacy, a global commitment to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the global protection of the climate, the environment and biodiversity; M. whereas local and international human rights monitors report that human rights defenders and journalists in India are subjected to reprisals for their work, including harassment, arbitrary detention, serious criminal charges under repressive legislation (including counter-terrorism legislation); whereas, despite being prohibited, caste-based discrimination remains a systemic problem in India; N. whereas the India-EU Trade and Technology Council was established on 6 February 2023; O. whereas negotiations with India on a free trade agreement (FTA) are ongoing; whereas separate negotiations on an Investment Protection Agreement and an Agreement on Geographical Indications (GIs) with the aim of strengthening the strategic partnership are also ongoing; 1. Recommends that the Council, Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:
2. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the legislative bodies and Government of India.
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| Role of preventive diplomacy in tackling frozen conflicts around the world – missed opportunity or change for the future? |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, – having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 June 2011 on conflict prevention and of 22 January 2018 on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises, – having regard to the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy of 28 June 2016, – having regard to the Council conclusions and Concept on EU Peace Mediation of 7 December 2020, – having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence — For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’ action plan, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022, – having regard to the joint staff working document from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 September 2023 entitled ‘Updated toolset for EU Conflict Analysis and Conflict Early Warning – Objectives, processes and guidance’ (SWD(2023)0295), – having regard to its recommendation of 10 February 1999 on the establishment of a European Civil Peace Corps(1), – having regard to the UN New Agenda for Peace of 20 July 2023, – having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security of 31 October 2000, – having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy(2), – having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2019 on building EU capacity on conflict prevention and mediation(3), – having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2023 on the implementation of civilian CSDP and other EU civilian security assistance(4), – having regard to the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on EU Climate Diplomacy of 6 October 2023, – having regard to its resolution of 14 June 2018 on Georgian occupied territories 10 years after the Russian invasion(5), – having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0404/2023), A. whereas preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security are among the key external action objectives of the EU as laid down in Article 21(2) of the Treaty on European Union; B. whereas a changing geopolitical context stemming from emerging powers confronting long-dominant actors, attacks on the multilateral system, democracy and the rules-based order, violence resurging in previously protracted conflicts, emerging technologies, cyber threats, malign third-party interference, the climate and biodiversity crises, unprecedented global levels of economic inequality, the reversal of rights, notably for women, the persistent and systematic exclusion of and discrimination against entire social groups, global backsliding on human rights and democracy, food security issues and migration are among the factors contributing to conflicts and instability around the world, especially considering Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and the growing tensions in the Middle East; C. whereas the UN defines ‘preventive diplomacy’ as ‘diplomatic action taken to prevent disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of conflicts when they occur’; D. whereas preventive diplomacy in the EU encompasses political and financial support for the multilateral system, trade, development, humanitarian assistance and human rights, focusing on identifying opportunities to address the causes of conflict and creating spaces for dialogue, often in partnership with international and regional organisations as well as concerned parties; E. whereas frozen conflicts fuel and normalise nationalist narratives and sentiments, and perpetuate the rise of the far right; F. whereas emerging powers are confronting traditional players and, together with new technologies and further globalisation, are leading to increased international competition, which, together with climate change, food security and migration, causes rising tensions and leads to conflicts across the world that are also challenging for the EU; G. whereas the multilateral, rules-based order is currently under threat and being challenged in the volatile geopolitical situation, which makes it imperative that the EU responds to international conflict situations in line with its proclaimed values of human rights, equality, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human dignity, in order not to further weaken support for multilateralism; whereas some former alliances based on the common interest of disrupting this system are beginning to re-emerge, such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS); whereas Russia’s unilateral actions have had a significant impact on the formation of alliances and the establishment of its spheres of influence; H. whereas it is urgent, in the interest and for the advancement of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, to uphold and defend multilateralism and a rules-based international order; I. whereas autocratic actors challenge the universality of human rights and undermine democratic standards worldwide; whereas a world of healthy democracies, understood as a world of strong democratic systems, is a safer world, as they have significant check and balances in place that prevent the unpredictability of autocracies; J. whereas the main conflicts come from state and non-state actors using hybrid strategies, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and direct interference in elections and political processes, economic coercion and the instrumentalisation of irregular migration flows; K. whereas the EU needs to step up its preventive tools and acknowledge the vital role it plays in preserving peace, stability and security both within the EU and outside its borders; L. whereas the EU is the biggest international aid donor in the world, providing help to overcome poverty and advance global development; whereas it has not achieved the same impact in the public diplomacy sphere and should therefore improve its ambition and visibility in the area of preventive diplomacy around the world, primarily by communicating its achievements and success in its diplomatic activities undertaken so far, and in the outcomes of its financial support; whereas the EU is conducting a thorough evaluation of the instruments financing international cooperation; M. whereas the EU’s approach to preventive diplomacy is aimed at preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, involving multi-dimensional, multilevel and multi-actor actions, while, at the same time, addressing various aspects and stages of conflicts and facilitating spaces for dialogue; N. whereas the sole reliance on political, diplomatic or military strategies often proves to be inadequate for conflict prevention and, therefore, a comprehensive, ambitious, inclusive, gender-responsive conflict prevention and peacebuilding approach is needed, involving humanitarian aid, development cooperation, trade and foreign and security policies, restoration and maintenance of the internal legal order, the creation or re-creation of administrative structures, interethnic and inter-religious dialogue and other approaches to conflict settlement, including by fighting impunity; whereas the EU’s actions on preventive diplomacy must be primarily guided by an unwavering commitment to cooperation for democracy and development and trust-building measures between different parties; O. whereas the EU’s international development efforts and democracy support are key EU foreign policy tools; whereas election observation missions play an important role in enhancing the EU’s engagement with partner countries, including in supporting their efforts to fulfil their international human rights obligations; P. whereas, in accordance with the new European consensus on development, the EU and its Member States recognise the nexus between sustainable development, humanitarian action, peace and security in the pursuit of the objectives of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular SDG 16 on promoting peaceful and inclusive societies; Q. whereas the Council has appointed nine EU special representatives for different unstable and conflict-affected regions, with some of them acting as mediators and peace facilitators to prevent disputes from escalating and to limit the spread of conflicts when they occur, but their initiatives and the effects of their actions are not always sufficiently visible or effective; whereas it is important that EU special representatives have a broad, flexible mandate, capable of adapting to evolving geopolitical circumstances in order to promote the EU’s policies and interests in specific regions and countries and to play an active role in preventive diplomacy efforts; R. whereas the EU does not have the necessary confidence, means, resources or tools to develop its full mediation potential in areas of strategic importance and might not be considered unbiased by one or more of the warring parties; whereas this could lead to a rise in anti-European narratives in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and non-EU countries; S. whereas Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, and against Georgia in August 2008, and its consequences around the world highlight the need for stronger and more ambitious, credible, strategic, tangible and unified EU action on the world stage, and accentuates the necessity of the EU autonomously setting its own strategic objectives and developing and using the capabilities needed to pursue them in order to avoid repeating prior mistakes and learning from them for future challenges; whereas the EU should commit all the necessary financial resources to tackle the rapidly increasing geopolitical challenges and invest more in preventive diplomacy and other conflict prevention measures to prevent conflicts from spreading, as they are detrimental to the social and economic development of the affected areas; T. whereas security in the Eastern neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, and the Sahel region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa is greatly threatened by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its hybrid malign actions, and the possibility of this aggression spilling over into neighbouring countries; whereas the destabilisation of our immediate neighbourhood threatens the stability, peace and security of the EU’s external borders and thus of the EU and its Member States; whereas the EU needs to increase the effectiveness of the EU’s security and defence policy, in particular in the Eastern Partnership countries; U. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is a wake-up call for the EU, as it presents an immediate threat to the European and global security order and to the security of the EU and its Member States, as well as its candidate and potential candidate countries; whereas Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its consequences around the world have galvanised the momentum towards achieving a geopolitical redefinition of the EU’s foreign policy, including a reconsideration of its response mechanisms, including its preventive diplomacy toolbox, as well as triggering public calls for the EU to act in a consistent manner in response to international conflicts; V. whereas the EU should actively pursue preventive diplomacy in regions of frozen conflict to prevent escalation and promote stabilisation; W. whereas the EU has always strived to facilitate direct talks and reduce the risk of escalation in different regions of the world, offering support for peace processes, peacebuilding initiatives and regional early warning systems in a complex geopolitical context; X. whereas the lack of will on the part of the Member States to step away from their individual, political or economic interests in external relations in order to build joint capacity together and fully develop strategic autonomy is one of the main obstacles to the EU’s global leadership in preventive diplomacy; Y. whereas the EU should continue moving forward towards fully developing its own autonomous and permanent instruments in its external action, common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP); Z. whereas civilian crisis management is a fundamental component of the CFSP; AA. whereas coordination between the European External Action Service (EEAS), Parliament and the Member States needs to be reassessed and strengthened in order to build joint capacities and modernise current approaches to deliver tangible results and launch meaningful initiatives in preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding and peacemaking; whereas the EU needs to speak with a single voice and its action on the ground should be aligned with that of its Member States, in terms of early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management; whereas conflict prevention is a common objective of all Member States; AB. whereas the EU’s credibility is a paramount requirement for the correct implementation of its preventive diplomacy actions as it reinforces trust towards the EU among the different actors involved in a conflict; whereas, in this regard, it is necessary to ensure the highest level of coordination and coherence in the EU’s external action, particularly by ensuring the leading role of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP / HR) as a bridge builder between the CFSP and EU external relations; whereas the Commission needs to strengthen its coordination with the EEAS, including in the EU’s preventive diplomacy initiatives and actions, by guaranteeing full compliance with Articles 3(2) and 9 of the EEAS Decision(6); AC. whereas global funding for conflict prevention and peacebuilding is at a 15-year record low(7); AD. whereas, within the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation (NDICI – Global Europe) instrument, there is a thematic programme on peace, stability and conflict prevention; whereas the Commission has published a multi-annual indicative programme that allocates EUR 870 970 044 for the 2021-2027 period to this thematic area, of which only 13 %-18 % will be allocated to conflict prevention; AE. whereas the EU’s civilian and military operations have a mandate for conflict prevention, peacekeeping and crisis management; whereas their preventive toolbox capacity should be expanded and additional staff training should be provided; AF. whereas, regretfully, the EU has demonstrated on different occasions a lack of clarity in its external representation, clearly affecting its coherence and, therefore, its credibility worldwide; whereas it is necessary to clearly define the competences of the VP / HR, the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council on the EU’s external action and representation, as the current regulatory framework is unclear concerning the competences of each institutional figure; AG. whereas research shows that women and men experience, engage in and are affected by violent armed conflict differently and have a different understanding of peace(8); AH. whereas the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda represents an essential tool for confirming that a meaningful and equitable role in decision-making is secured for women of all ages during all stages of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding and post-conflict rehabilitation; whereas, in the EU Strategic Compass, Women, Peace and Security forms an integral part of the document; AI. whereas emblematic and cultural heritage monuments in war-affected areas contribute to peacebuilding and reconciliation among communities; AJ. whereas supporting culture and clearly targeted resources for international cultural relations would greatly enhance the EU’s ability to fully develop and support its intercultural relations with partners as a valuable component of the preventive diplomacy toolbox; AK. whereas the EU’s cultural diplomacy and the protection of cultural and historical heritage are important for coexistence, peace, democracy and sustainable development by promoting solidarity, tolerance and reconciliation through its delegations and actors on the ground; AL. whereas the return of the US to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is important for global cooperation on transnational challenges, including preventive diplomacy efforts; AM. whereas the growing Russia-China-Iran axis is instrumentalising international organisations, particularly the UN bodies, to erode international law and subjugate them to their interests, which increasingly contradicts the UN Charter and the rules-based global order; AN. whereas climate diplomacy frames climate change as an element of external action policy and highlights the need to integrate climate objectives and address climate risks at the highest diplomatic level and across all policy areas; AO. whereas cooperation with Member States, institutions, transatlantic and international partners, EU candidate countries and other countries through the exchange of tools, information and practices can play a key role in upgrading and improving the preventive diplomatic tools of the EU; AP. whereas the recent surge in tensions between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo region is an opportunity for the international community, including the EU, to take urgent preventive diplomatic action before the matter escalates further; 1. Recommends that the Council, the Commission and the VP / HR:
2. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
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| Activities of the European Ombudsman – annual report 2022 |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to the annual report on the activities of the European Ombudsman in 2022, – having regard to Article 10(3) of the Treaty on European Union, – having regard to Articles 15, 24(3), 228 and 298(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), – having regard to Articles 11, 41, 42 and 43 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), – having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN CRPD), – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2021/1163 of the European Parliament of 24 June 2021 laying down the regulations and general conditions governing the performance of the Ombudsman’s duties (Statute of the European Ombudsman) and repealing Decision 94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom(1), – having regard to the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, as adopted by Parliament on 6 September 2001, – having regard to the Framework Agreement on Cooperation concluded between Parliament and the European Ombudsman on 15 March 2006, which entered into force on 1 April 2006, – having regard to its previous resolutions on the European Ombudsman’s activities, – having regard to Rules 54 and 142(2) of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the report of the Committee on Petitions (A9-0414/2023), A. whereas the annual report on the activities of the European Ombudsman in 2022 was formally submitted to the President of Parliament on 28 April 2023 and the Ombudsman, Ms Emily O’Reilly, presented the report to the Committee on Petitions in Brussels on 27 June 2023; B. whereas Articles 20, 24 and 228 TFEU empower the European Ombudsman to receive complaints concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, with the exception of the Court of Justice of the European Union acting in its judicial role; C. whereas Article 15 TFEU states that ‘in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible’ and that ‘any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies’; whereas ensuring that high-quality services are provided to EU citizens and that the EU administration is responsive to their needs and concerns is crucial in protecting citizens’ rights and fundamental freedoms; D. whereas Article 41 of the Charter on the right to good administration states that ‘every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union’; E. whereas Article 43 of the Charter states that ‘Any citizen of the Union and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State has the right to refer to the European Ombudsman cases of maladministration in the activities of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union, with the exception of the Court of Justice of the European Union acting in its judicial role’; F. whereas Article 298(1) TFEU establishes that ‘in carrying out their missions, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union shall have the support of an open, efficient and independent European administration’; G. whereas in 2022, the Ombudsman opened 348 inquiries, of which 344 were complaint-based and 4 own-initiative, while closing 330 inquiries (325 complaint-based and 5 own-initiative); H. whereas in 2022, the vast majority of the inquiries concerned the Commission (197 inquiries or 57,1 %), while the next largest numbers concerned the European Personnel Selection Office (22 inquiries or 6,3 %), the European Parliament (19 inquiries or 5,5 %), and the European External Action Service (16 inquiries or 4,6 %); whereas the remaining inquiries were distributed as follows: the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) (14 inquiries or 4,3 %), the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (7 inquiries or 2 %), other EU institutions or bodies (46 inquiries or 13,5 %), and other EU agencies (23 inquiries or 6,7 %); I. whereas in 2022, the largest percentage of the Ombudsman’s inquiries concerned the Commission, whose administrative activities receive considerable public attention, given that it is the EU executive; J. whereas in the inquiries closed by the Ombudsman in 2022, no maladministration was found in 37 % of cases, a solution was settled by the institution in 46,1 % of cases, no further inquiries were justified in 12,7 % of cases and maladministration was found in 4,5 % of cases; K. whereas the top three concerns in the inquiries closed by the Ombudsman in 2022 were transparency and accountability (e.g. access to information and documents) (32 %), culture of service (20 %) and respect for fundamental rights (15 %); whereas other concerns included proper use of discretion (including in infringement procedures), recruitment, good management of personnel issues, respect for procedural rights, proper management of infringement procedures, sound financial management, ethics and public participation in EU decision-making; L. whereas in 2022, the Ombudsman asked the Council to grant faster access to legislative documents so that the public can effectively participate in discussions on draft EU laws(2); M. whereas the Ombudsman found maladministration(3), (4) in how the Commission handled a public access request for text messages between its President and the CEO of a pharmaceutical company (Pfizer); N. whereas in 2022, the Ombudsman opened an inquiry into how the European Central Bank (ECB) handles ‘revolving doors’(5); O. whereas the Ombudsman opened a strategic inquiry into the systemic and significant delays in how the Commission handles requests for public access to documents; whereas the Ombudsman found maladministration in the Commission's way of handling such requests, notably in dealing with requests to review initial decisions (‘confirmatory applications’)(6); P. whereas in 2022, the Ombudsman also conducted wider strategic inquiries and initiatives into systemic issues in the EU institutions, covering ethical issues, ‘revolving doors’ moves, accountability in decision-making, access to documents and fundamental rights; Q. whereas in 2022, the Ombudsman issued a recommendation to the Council to grant full public access to the requested legislative documents, following an inquiry into the Council’s refusal to do so in the context of negotiations on the draft ‘Digital Markets Act’, following which the Ombudsman concluded that there was maladministration; R. whereas in 2022, the Ombudsman’s Office further raised public awareness of the Ombudsman’s role in maintaining high accountability and transparency standards in EU administration; S. whereas the Ombudsman decided to launch a public consultation on transparency and participation in EU decision-making related to the environment, in the light of the climate emergency and environmental and ecosystem degradation, with a view to assessing the EU's approach, as a party to the Aarhus Convention, in ensuring a high level of public access to environmental information and public participation in decision-making relating to the environment; T. whereas in 2022, the Ombudsman urged the Commission to treat access to document requests concerning EU recovery funds with greater consistency and to better explain its reasoning when deciding not to release the asked-for information(7); U. whereas in 2022, the Ombudsman opened an inquiry into the Commission’s refusal to give public access to documents related to its proposal for a regulation on the European Health Data Space(8); V. whereas in 2022, the Ombudsman opened an inquiry into how the Commission dealt with a request for public access to declarations of interests from the members of its Regulatory Scrutiny Board(9); W. whereas the Ombudsman has underlined that the EU rules on public procurement are not robust or clear enough to prevent conflicts of interest and has criticised the Commission for its insufficient critical scrutiny before awarding a contract to carry out a study on integrating environmental, social and governance objectives into EU banking rules to BlackRock Investment Management, a company that manages investments in the fossil fuel and banking sectors, which are areas that fall under the new environmental, social and governance rules; 1. Approves the annual report for 2022 presented by the European Ombudsman; 2. Congratulates Emily O’Reilly on her good work and her continuous efforts to improve administrative practices and to promote accountability and full transparency of the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, as well as to ensure accessibility of EU documents for EU citizens; 3. Expresses its appreciation for the continued constructive cooperation of the European Ombudsman with the European Parliament, and notably with the Committee on Petitions, as well as with other EU institutions; reiterates its commitment to support the Ombudsman in the performance of her duties; 4. Congratulates the Ombudsman’s Office for the significant improvement in its efficiency rate for the length of inquiry for closed cases, which improved from 13 months on average in 2013 to less than 6 months on average in 2022; underlines that the achieved results cover several areas of EU administration with limited resources; 5. Calls on the Council to fully comply with the transparency standards of a parliamentary and participatory democracy, as required under the Treaties and requested by the Ombudsman; recalls that the Court of Justice of the EU stipulated that the principles of publicity and transparency are inherent to the EU legislative process and that the lack of transparency and information weakens citizens’ trust in the legitimacy of the EU legislative process as a whole; 6. Calls on the Council to grant citizens timely access to its legislative documents during ongoing legislative procedures in order to fully uphold citizens’ Treaty-based right to participate in the democratic life of the Union, which would in turn enhance citizens' trust in the overall EU decision-making process; 7. Welcomes the opening of the own-initiative inquiry to assess how the Commission ensures that its interactions with tobacco industry representatives are transparent; underlines that the failure of the Commission as a whole to proactively publish details of its meetings with tobacco lobbyists amounted to maladministration, as indicated by the Ombudsman in her preliminary findings; recalls that the EU signed and formally confirmed the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and is obliged to comply with its provisions establishing that interactions with the tobacco industry should take place only when strictly necessary from a regulatory point of view, as well as to make those interactions transparent, in order to prevent the tobacco industry from having a negative impact on public health policies; 8. Considers it paramount that the Ombudsman launch an investigation to assess the level of independence of the EU Energy Platform Industry Advisory Group set up by the Commission; 9. Endorses the result of the Ombudsman’s examination of how the Commission ensures that external experts involved in evaluating project proposals under the European Defence Fund do not have conflicts of interest; underlines the paramount importance of carrying out a thorough assessment of conflicts of interest before appointing experts and of making sure that transparency and ethics obligations are robustly implemented; 10. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal, in response to the Ombudsman’s findings following her inquiry into the BlackRock case, to amend the Financial Regulation to include the option to reject tenderers if they have a conflict of interest; calls on the Commission to comply fully with the Ombudsman’s suggestions by adopting strengthened and clearer rules aimed at preventing any conflicts of interest in all procedures related to public procurement, including for its internal guidelines; 11. Highlights the fact that, following an inquiry by the Ombudsman into the phenomenon of ‘revolving doors’, the Commission is improving its handling of the issue and requests information from former staff on how they are complying with relevant restrictions; notes the faster publishing by the Commission of an annual overview of senior staff members requesting permission to move to new employment, and its assessment of these requests; underlines that the Commission should not grant any authorisation where the concerned employment cannot be made subject to restrictions that adequately mitigate the risks of conflicts of interest or where those restrictions cannot be credibly monitored and enforced, including the obligation for the new employer to make the restrictions public; believes that the Commission should publish information in a timely manner on all post-service activities of senior former staff members that it assesses, thus improving public scrutiny of these decisions, which is essential for monitoring purposes; welcomes the fact that staff on unpaid leave are forbidden from taking employment in areas where there is a risk of conflict of interest; encourages the Ombudsman to monitor the Commission’s handling of these issues; 12. Welcomes the own-initiative inquiry opened by the Ombudsman to assess how the ECB manages the issue of ‘revolving doors’ and endorses the call of the Ombudsman to the ECB to apply stricter rules governing staff moves to the private sector; supports the recommendation that ECB staff should be subject to strict cooling-off requirements and that the period during which former ECB staff are banned from lobbying their former colleagues should be increased; 13. Underlines that Qatargate shed a new light on lobbying and policymaking in the EU; acknowledges the Ombudsman’s critical assessment of the scandal and welcomes the development of new measures designed at improving the integrity standards within the European Parliament to safeguard EU democracy; considers these actions as an important first step to enhance the EU regulatory framework, as they aim to foster higher ethics and anti-corruption standards and thereby make the EU institutions examples of integrity and accountability; 14. Welcomes the continuous efforts of the Ombudsman to improve lobbying transparency and ethics, in particular by requiring the Commission to strengthen the Code of Conduct for Commissioners, create a public record of meetings between Commissioners and lobbyists and proactively publish Commissioners’ travel expenses; 15. Underlines that the participation of citizens in EU decision-making is important for its legitimacy; appreciates the Ombudsman’s commitment to foster accountability in EU decision-making, especially in the area of environmental decisions; welcomes and supports the Ombudsman’s requests to the European Investment Bank (EIB) to take several transparency steps to enable the public to more easily see the potential environmental impact of the projects it finances, as well as the Ombudsman’s intention to step up her scrutiny of the EIB's activities, in the light of the EIB's insufficient follow-up to date, in particular regarding the timely publishing of information about projects related to the environment and EIB finances in order to give sufficient time to the public to raise concerns; 16. Commends the Ombudsman’s work in prioritising her assessment of the transparency of EU environmental decision-making, following, inter alia, her finding of maladministration in the Commission’s failure to consider properly the environmental impact of the EU-Mercosur trade agreement before concluding negotiation, the Commission’s severe shortcomings in handling requests on public access to environmental information and the lack of clear rules to ensure that experts the Commission consults, in the context of environmental policymaking, are not subject to conflicts of interest; 17. Underlines that the Ombudsman found regrettable the fact that proactive transparency mainly happened only after the national plans under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) had already been approved, thus preventing the public from adequately following the negotiations; is concerned about the lengthy delays that the Commission has been incurring in dealing with requests for public access to RRF-related documents, in some cases taking one year or more; urges the Commission to encourage the Member States to use a public portal to list all recipients of funding under the RRF, to continue publishing its preliminary assessments of Member States’ payment requests and to inform the public with concrete details about its supervisory and audit work in order to ensure meaningful accountability for all funds spent, welcomes the publication by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, in collaboration with the European Ombudsman’s Office, of the policy paper entitled ‘Towards good practice principles for government transparency in the use of recovery funds’, which provides guidance to governments on ensuring transparency and accountability in the use of COVID-19 recovery funds, welcomes, in this regard, the Ombudsman’s efforts to improve the transparency standards related to the RRF; 18. Highlights that in her strategic initiative concerning how the Commission ensured transparency and balanced interest representation under the common agricultural policy (CAP), the Ombudsman found that key elements of the CAP national strategic plans, including specific measures on budget items and milestones to be fulfilled, were missing, thus making it difficult for citizens and interested parties to understand the conditions under which Member States could use the assistance provided by the new CAP; supports the Ombudsman’s call on the Commission to proactively disclose more information concerning the approval of Member States’ strategic plans under the CAP; asks the Commissioner for Agriculture and his cabinet, as well as the Commission’s Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, to comply with the Ombudsman’s recommendations and seek a fair and balanced representation of the interests of both farmers and civil society in its meetings and exchanges with interest representatives, given that, as pointed out by the Ombudsman in her letter of February 2022, the Commissioner for Agriculture and his cabinet held more meetings with industry representatives than with environmental organisations and other organisations like research institutions; requests that the Commission assume an active role in securing compliance with the transparency obligations imposed on the Member States, including the obligation to disclose the broader entities that beneficiaries of funds belong to and the obligation to publish the total amount of payments received by a beneficiary, with a view to guaranteeing that the public has access to all necessary information about beneficiaries of CAP funding; 19. Regrets that the Commission’s approach to setting up civil dialogue groups for matters covered by the CAP did not comply with the Ombudsman’s recommendations and had several gaps, in particular a failure to transparently and clearly implement a balanced representation between economic and non-economic interests in the composition of the groups; 20. Emphasises the importance for all institutions of treating access to documents requests in a timely manner, so that the relevance of the information is preserved; supports the Ombudsman’s special report in her strategic inquiry concerning the time the Commission takes to deal with requests for public access to documents(10); is concerned about the Commission’s systemic and significant delays in processing such requests; underlines that public access to documents is a fundamental right under Regulation 1049/2001(11); urges the Commission to improve its administrative practices in order to respect the timelines set out by the legislator and to clearly and proactively demonstrate that transparency is the rule and a priority in its handling of requests for public access to documents; stresses the need for the EU institutions to dedicate sufficient human resources to improving efficiency in the handling of access to documents requests; recalls that the Ombudsman recommended a fundamental restructuring of the Commission’s approach to processing access to document requests; 21. Acknowledges the Ombudsman’s inquiry into the Commission’s failure to identify and therefore to assess the potential disclosure of the text messages exchanged between the Commission President and the CEO of a pharmaceutical company on the purchase of a COVID-19 vaccine; is worried that the Commission’s approach constituted maladministration; underlines that work-related text and instant messages are ‘documents’ under Regulation 1049/2001 and stresses that respecting this principle is of particular importance; welcomes the Ombudsman’s recommendations for the EU administration on the recording of work-related text and instant messages; stresses the importance for the EU institutions of fully complying with these recommendations in order to bring the practices of the EU administration into line with modern communication methods; takes note of the Commission’s response that it will issue further guidance on modern communication tools such as text messages; 22. Calls on the Council to learn a lesson from the Ombudsman’s inquiry into its refusal to give full public access to documents related to negotiations on the draft ‘Digital Markets Act’, which, in 2022, resulted in the Ombudsman’s conclusion that there was maladministration; calls on the Council to apply the highest standards of transparency in these cases, especially when the Ombudsman has already identified problems in previous strategic inquiries concerning the transparency of its legislative process and its decision-making during the COVID-19 crisis; recalls that transparency is one of the key principles set out in the EU Treaties and that a lack of transparency risks diminishing citizens’ trust in the European institutions and the EU as a whole; 23. Stresses the importance of the Ombudsman’s investigations into human rights compliance by the EU administration; supports the Ombudsman’s call for the Commission to set up a new and separate complaint handling portal for alleged human rights abuses, and to make it accessible for human rights-related complaints by civil society organisations and other stakeholders in countries with which the EU has trade deals; 24. Points out that the Ombudsman conducted a strategic inquiry into how Frontex complies with its fundamental rights and transparency obligations under its expanded mandate under Regulation 2019/1896(12), stresses the importance of applying high transparency standards to allow for public scrutiny and of ensuring full respect for fundamental rights in all of Frontex’s operations to improve its accountability; calls on Frontex to ensure an adequate follow-up to the recommendations issued by the Ombudsman; 25. Notes the Ombudsman’s inquiry into the Commission’s system monitoring the Croatian authorities’ respect for fundamental rights in the context of border management operations supported by EU funds, in the conclusion of which the Ombudsman criticised the Commission for its delay in setting up an appropriate monitoring mechanism for border management by the Croatian authorities; urges the Commission to always react promptly to the Ombudsman’s suggestions for improvement, in particular in cases like this one, when significant shortcomings are identified; 26. Welcomes the fact that, on the basis of the Ombudsman’s practical recommendations on the use of official languages when communicating with the public, the network of EU agencies agreed on the guidelines on multilingual policies; 27. Takes note that in 2022, the Statute of the European Ombudsman was updated with implementing provisions detailing the working procedures of the Ombudsman’s Office; believes that the new provisions will contribute to improving the Ombudsman’s work; 28. Welcomes the Ombudsman’s commitment to monitor the EU administration’s implementation of the UN CRPD; appreciates the Ombudsman’s work as a member of the EU Framework for the UN CRPD; 29. Underlines the results of the Ombudsman’s own-initiative inquiry into how the Commission monitors EU Structural and Investment Funds to ensure that funds are used to strengthen the rights of persons with disabilities to independent living and inclusion; welcomes the suggestion of clearer guidance about the need to promote deinstitutionalisation in the context of the use of EU Structural and Investment Funds; 30. Encourages the Ombudsman to continue the exchanges on experiences and best practices with national ombudsmen through the European Network of Ombudsmen (ENO); appreciates that the 2022 ENO annual conference focused on best practices for helping refugees and addressed the effects of the digitalisation of public services on citizens’ rights; commends the addition of the Ukrainian and Moldovan ombudsman’s offices to the ENO; 31. Welcomes the Ombudsman’s continuous efforts to further improve the visibility of its activities, including via online tools and the multilingual website offering assistance in all 24 official languages of the EU; 32. Welcomes the fruitful, long-standing dialogue between the Ombudsman and the European Parliament’s Committee on Petitions; underlines that the intensive collaboration between these two bodies helps to increase the democratic accountability of the EU institutions and bring them closer to citizens; 33. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the report of the Committee on Petitions to the Council, the Commission, the European Ombudsman, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and their ombudsmen or similar competent bodies.
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| Transparency and accountability of non-governmental organisations funded from the EU budget |
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The European Parliament, – having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Articles 2, 3, 5, 11(2) and Protocol (No 2) thereof, – having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 322(1a) and 325(4) thereof, – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(1) (the Financial Regulation), – having regard to the Commission proposal of 16 May 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (COM(2022)0223), – having regard to the report of its Committees on Budgets and on Budgetary Control of 4 May 2023 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013(2), – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy(3), – having regard to the Commission communication of 3 December 2020 on the European democracy action plan (COM(2020)0790), – having regard to Special Report 35/2018 of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) of 18 December 2018 entitled ‘Transparency of EU funds implemented by NGOs: more effort needed’, – having regard to the study entitled ‘Financing of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from the EU Budget’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union on 25 November 2010(4), – having regard to the study entitled ‘Democratic accountability and Budgetary Control of non-governmental organisations funded by the EU Budget’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union on 24 January 2017(5), and to its subsequent update of 21 January 2019, – having regard to the study entitled ‘Transparency and accountability of EU funding for NGOs active in EU policy areas within EU territory’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union on 28 September 2023(6) (‘transparency and accountability study’), – having regard to the Commission’s operational guidelines for recipients of EU funding on the use of the EU emblem in the context of EU programmes 2021-2027, published in March 2021, – having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 with recommendations to the Commission on a statute for European cross-border associations and non-profit organisations(7), – having regard to its resolution of 10 May 2023 with observations forming an integral part of the decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2021, Section III – Commission and executive agencies(8), – having regard to its resolution of 10 May 2023 with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2021, Section I – European Parliament(9), – having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption(10), – having regard to the Discharge from 2021 on the EU general budget – Commission and executive agencies(11), – having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, – having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0446/2023), A. whereas the EU has designed transparency and accountability mechanisms to ensure that EU funds awarded to beneficiaries, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are used effectively, efficiently and in line with the EU’s values, policies and financial rules enshrined in, among other places, the Financial Regulation, which lays down transparency as one of its guiding budgetary principles, requiring the Commission to make available, in an appropriate and timely manner, information on EU funds; B. whereas the EU is one of the largest financial backers of civil society organisations(12); C. whereas civil society ranges from low-key community activities to NGOs; whereas the spectrum of NGOs receiving EU funding covers a wide range of structures, ways of functioning, sources of financing and focus areas, which translates into a variety of projects that are financed with EU funds; whereas the Treaties require the EU institutions and Member States to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society; whereas the EU and its Member States should provide adequate funding to programmes aimed at protecting and promoting the rights and values enshrined in the EU Treaties; whereas NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs) play an important role in implementing these programmes; whereas, in some cases, public authorities are outsourcing tasks to NGOs and CSOs; whereas the Commission manages EU funds directly, indirectly or in a shared way; whereas in line with the principle of subsidiarity, the funds directly awarded to beneficiaries, including NGOs, are subject to monitoring and reporting by the Commission; D. whereas the Commission’s Financial Transparency System (FTS) is the main source of publicly available data for large-scale analysis of grants and contracts managed directly by the Commission; whereas a clear distinction should be made between public transparency and transparency for the purpose of legitimate budgetary control, given the sensitive contexts and issues NGOs work with; E. whereas an analysis of FTS data shows that EU financial commitments to NGOs, excluding EU programmes in the field of education and research, amounted to at least EUR 2.6 billion in 2022, under direct management, across all EU programmes and funds; F. whereas EU transparency and accountability requirements and controls should apply to all interest representatives benefiting from EU funds; whereas 3 377 entities(13) are registered in the EU Transparency Register under the category ‘NGOs, platforms and networks and similar’; whereas the nature of requirements and controls has to conform with the categorisation established in the Transparency Register, with a view to taking into account all judicial forms of entities and not only NGOs; whereas EU requirements and controls do not solely have to be linked to the Transparency Register as some entities granted with EU funds might prefer to stay out of this register to avoid putting their existence at risk; G. whereas EU transparency and accountability requirements and controls should apply to all beneficiaries of EU funds, including NGOs, that are required to maintain accurate and transparent financial records on the use of EU funds and the origin of financial sources used for their functioning, as they are accountable to their members, donors, partners and beneficiaries regarding the actions they take, the sources of their financing, including EU funds, and the decisions they take on behalf of their stakeholders; whereas the Member States lay the legal basis for NGOs, which have their status registered at national level; H. whereas the exploitation of EU funds against EU rules, principles and values is on the rise; whereas individuals and front organisations, most often under foreign influence, seek to obtain EU financial support and the respectability that results from it, whatever the amount, but in reality use EU funds for activities that undermine fundamental EU principles and values and our attachment to democracy; I. whereas the Commission has the responsibility to ensure the implementation of the EU budget and to respect EU regulations and values; whereas, in this regard, all ex ante and ex post controls have to ensure that only NGOs and entities working in respect of EU rules, principles and values will be granted EU funds; J. whereas the 2021 Discharge on the general budget of the EU and the Commission underlines the deep concern regarding the funding of projects carried out by or involving NGOs with links to radical religious and political organisations; calls on the Commission to guarantee that EU funds only finance organisations that strictly respect all Union values and urges the Commission to set up ex ante mechanisms that clearly identify NGOs operating on Union territory and abroad that have acknowledged ties to religious fundamentalist networks and that push forward an agenda that undermines Union values(14); K. whereas the same high standards for accountability and the same transparency rules should apply to all NGOs that receive EU funding, regardless of whether the place they operate is within or outside the European Union; L. whereas some considerations set out hereafter are based on some of the findings of the transparency and accountability study that address further transparency weaknesses concerning the information on the use of EU funds by the Commission, the Member States and beneficiaries, including NGOs; General remarks 1. Welcomes the vital role played by NGOs in representing civil society and in promoting and defending the rights and values enshrined in the Treaties and the fundamental rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter); stresses that only NGOs whose actions respect these rights and values should be entitled to EU funding; urges all stakeholders to increasingly place EU principles and values at the heart of EU funding and acknowledges the diversity of NGOs as regards their size, resources and staff; 2. Highlights, in particular, the role of beneficiaries, including NGOs, in implementing the EU budget and the obligation to carry out this role in full respect of the EU financial rules and principles for the protection of the EU’s financial interests; recalls that NGOs operating within EU territory are required to comply with the national law applicable in each Member State concerned by their activity, as well as with Union law and international law; reiterates that EU transparency and accountability are essential to strengthen a favourable and fair European system based on democracy, fundamental freedoms, inclusion and diversity; 3. Underlines that NGOs rely both on public financial support and on private donations, in a non-mutually exclusive way; recalls that the ability to seek, secure and use resources other than EU funds or public funds at national or local level is essential for the existence and operation of NGOs; 4. Highlights that CSOs deserve the utmost respect and gratitude for the daily work they do; recognises the work done by CSOs across Europe and the world on a daily basis and affirms that these NGOs deserve the highest praise and support; emphasises the importance of meeting the financial and other needs of these organisations; 5. Commends the crucial role of NGOs in EU and non-EU countries in defending the rule of law and democratic values, fighting corruption and promoting human rights and democracy; reiterates that in countries with authoritarian or non-democratic regimes, NGOs often represent the last line of defence of democracy that authoritarian regimes worldwide try to silence, including through adopted legislation and discriminatory obligations, and are thus in need of support and protection; calls on the Commission to consider safeguard clauses and mechanisms in this respect; stresses the importance of securing adequate and transparent EU funding for NGOs and entities active in these fields; 6. Applauds the activity of NGOs in areas of conflict in ensuring that humanitarian aid reaches the civilian population and those in need in a rapid and effective manner; recognises the importance of NGOs in ensuring that the EU, as the largest donor of development aid in the world, continues to contribute to promoting stability, overcoming poverty and advancing global development; 7. Points out that, in practice, the legislative processes could neglect the voices of local, regional and national NGOs; considers that small NGOs often face difficulties in accessing EU funding because of cumbersome administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to further simplify and streamline the procedures, so as to enable smaller NGOs, including at the local level, to apply and benefit from EU funding; highlights that the priorities and needs of smaller NGOs are often ignored or receive less attention, despite the fact that they often know the situation best and accomplish a huge amount of work; emphasises that the work of small organisations should be paid the highest respect and that EU funding should be made more accessible to them, as they represent an important element that reinforces diversity and variety across Europe and beyond; recognises that NGOs in Europe play a crucial supportive role in complementing public services; 8. Remains deeply concerned by threats to and unjustified attacks on NGOs in some Member States, including by proposing and adopting legislation that imposes discriminatory obligations on NGOs that restrict or ban their activities, and through online and offline intimidation and harassment against their staff, negative public statements and smear campaigns, verbal threats and legal and physical attacks; stresses that some NGOs also face excessive administrative controls or audits, politically motivated funding cuts and overly strict legal requirements for their formation and registration; insists that NGOs must be protected and should receive adequate funding and support; 9. Is convinced that transparency and accountability are also vital for NGOs and other for-profit or non-profit entities to showcase their valuable work, be recognised and build their credibility; considers that special provisions should apply to NGOs acting in full compliance with EU values and financial rules and in full respect of the EU Charter, while operating in democratically challenged environments; believes that European citizens must be assured that the EU knows exactly how all EU funds are used; is therefore concerned that there is a lack of information, data and control on who or what receives EU funds, despite existing transparency requirements; recalls that transparency and accountability requirements should always comply with international and human rights law, in particular regarding the exercise of civic freedoms, remaining strictly necessary and proportionate to the specific aims pursued; 10. Recalls that transparency and accountability should not be used to curtail the space for independent civil society or to silence critical voices; 11. Underlines that it is of utmost importance to ensure that EU transparency and accountability obligations do not put the final beneficiaries of EU funds at risk; believes that, in duly justified cases, in particular for NGOs operating in countries ruled by authoritarian regimes or with recognised rule of law issues negatively impacting NGOs and with reduced civic space, where the public dissemination of information on the identity or the work of those NGOs could lead to reprisals, putting the existence of those NGOs and the security and safety of their staff at risk, public transparency requirements should exceptionally be applied in an appropriate manner; 12. Is of the opinion that certain alleged corruption cases, which generated public discontent, such as Qatargate, could have been prevented through the consistent enforcement of existing transparency requirements and an obligation for involved entities, including NGOs, to disclose their sources of funding and their internal structures; notes that, in some cases, the involved entities profited from EU funding; 13. Condemns the increase in the exploitation of EU funds against EU principles and values, especially when the use of funds and transfers to other organisations are not entirely traceable; warns of the danger of EU funds ultimately being used within corrupt circles and being subject to fraud and irregularities, foreign interference or entryism; emphasises the importance of ‘final beneficiary transparency’ for EU funds; NGOs and entities in the context of budgetary control 14. Reiterates the fundamental significance of public trust in and support for NGOs; acknowledges that the terms used to describe these organisations are subject to different legal and public interpretations, which vary among Member States; 15. Emphasises that the term NGO is a broad umbrella term encompassing many different kinds of entities: from large international organisations to small regional or local ones, from organisations run mostly by employees to those consisting mostly of volunteers; highlights that the subject matter covered by NGOs and the method of implementation can also vary substantially; understands that this diversity makes it difficult to have a common definition of NGOs within the EU; highlights, nevertheless, the advantages of establishing a harmonised EU-wide approach, including through a harmonised definition, whose added value lies in increased transparency, accountability, predictability and public trust; encourages the co-legislators, therefore, to reach an agreement on such a harmonised approach to NGOs and relevant entities at EU level, which would considerably help European budgetary control procedures, especially in the case of cross-border associations; reiterates the utmost importance of ensuring transparency and accountability for all entities that are granted EU funds; acknowledges the advantage of establishing a harmonised approach to what these entities are in relation to the EU and its bodies in different contexts; 16. Takes note of the Commission proposal to include a common definition of NGOs in the 2022 proposal for a recast of the Financial Regulation; recalls that Parliament, in its mandate, requested further clarity on the definition of an NGO, in particular on the degree of formal existence, transparency and accountability from its members or founders; encourages the Commission to conduct an in-depth consultation on the definition of an NGO, involving Member State officials and NGO representatives, also taking into account the methodology that was followed when defining the term ‘small and medium-size enterprise’ (SME); 17. Considers that an NGO should not be financed 100 % by the state and the Commission in order to be considered an NGO; 18. Notes that the Commission uses the terms NGOs and not-for-profit organisations (NFPOs) without a clear distinction in the FTS; regrets that this results in an uncertainty in the allocation and monitoring of EU funds and might lead to a misperception regarding the volume of funding for NGOs and entities; notes that the FTS FAQs provide a definition for NGOs whose non-profit status is an essential element and is subject to validation; regrets that this unclear distinction is possible as up to now, there has been no harmonised EU approach to NGOs and only self-classification of entities has been used for the FTS, which is based solely on rules that may vary among Member States; calls further for the FTS to ensure a proper categorisation of the various types of NGOs or NFPOs in order to avoid situations in which there is little or no differentiation between certain types of organisations and whereby universities, research institutes, voluntary organisations and other NGOs are considered identical in the FTS database; Towards better EU transparency and accountability of EU funds 19. Considers that fraud, conflict of interests, double funding, corruption and money laundering or embezzlement must be prevented and tackled in all situations and for all beneficiaries irrespective of their nature and legal status; is concerned about the insufficient available data to the discharge authority on such cases; recalls that all applicants and beneficiaries of EU funding, including NGOs, are subject to EU financial rules; 20. Underlines that the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) is an important instrument to protect the Union’s financial interests, ensuring multilevel protection through the early detection of persons or entities representing risks that threaten the Union’s financial interests; welcomes the Commission proposal for a recast of the Financial Regulation, which includes the extension of EDES to shared management and adds new grounds of exclusion(15); calls on the Commission to make EDES fully operational to allow for an effective exclusion of beneficiaries, including NGOs, based on the Financial Regulation, from further access to EU funds; 21. Is concerned that transparency requirements can be insufficient, especially when funds are passed along a chain and used to co-fund joint projects with other donors; considers it problematic that the FTS only provides information about grants awarded directly by the Commission under direct management, but no details on funds received indirectly from beneficiaries and partners that have a legal relationship with the Commission; 22. Emphasises that not all Member States provide the same level of information on grants and that the existing EU database is not sufficiently consistent and coherent; calls on the Commission to strengthen transparency and accountability in cases of shared and indirect management by verifying the re-allocation of funds and their use up to the final recipients, in line with the proposal for a recast of the Financial Regulation; 23. Calls on the Commission to reinforce ex ante control mechanisms proportionately, including adequate random checks; is of the opinion that severe weaknesses exist in the ex post control on the use of EU funds and urges the Commission, in cooperation with Member States, to produce an in-depth analysis with clear proposals to reinforce their quality, amount and regularity, supported by a well-established and centralised budgetary control task force within the Commission for all interest representatives, disposing of a clear mandate, investigation capabilities and resources; 24. Recognises the importance of transparency in all aspects of EU-funded activities to ensure the responsible and accountable use of funds; acknowledges the concerns regarding potential foreign interference in EU policymaking and that the system in place cannot fully prevent actors from establishing fund and/or co-opt beneficiaries, including NGOs, to promote false narratives including through disinformation, as allegedly happened in Qatargate; believes that existing concerns should not lead to a stigmatisation of all NGOs since most NGOs respect and promote EU democratic principles and values; underlines that the EU budget must not be used to lobby against the EU’s democratic principles and values; 25. Calls on the Commission to require beneficiaries, including NGOs, in receipt of EU funds to publish details of any funding received from other sources in relation to projects co-financed by the EU over a five-year period, while maintaining the principle of confidentiality, in particular, in duly justified cases of beneficiaries, including NGOs, facing serious threats of reprisal; underlines that funding for NGOs from outside the EU can be a legitimate source of financing, but stresses that without clear transparency rules in respect of the principle of confidentiality, such funding possibilities are open to abuse and undue influence from third state actors; calls on the EU institutions to improve the implementation of their transparency standards, including the obligatory reporting of lobbying activities; 26. Encourages the Member States to establish national lobby and transparency registry laws, which should also require the disclosure of donors, including international ones, and sources of funding, with equal transparency requirements for all interest representatives regardless of their nature and legal status; 27. Recalls that Member States are responsible for the registration, control and reporting of cases of detection of fraud, misuse of funds or money laundering, convictions or ongoing investigations; believes that national administrations, which are closer to the ground, represent the first effective layer for the control and monitoring of organisations that are acting against EU rules and values, in order to strengthen efforts to prevent, detect and tackle fraud and the misuse of funds; 28. Calls on national authorities to strengthen their transparency and accountability systems in order to identify all organisations or entities that are acting against EU rules and values and to take legal and administrative measures that facilitate action at EU level and make it easier and quicker for the Commission to include the entities concerned in its systems; urges the Commission to include all interest representatives in violation of EU rules and values in the EDES and to exclude them from EU funding accordingly, in line with the Financial Regulation applicable to the EU budget; 29. Is of the opinion that no margins of appreciation should be left for Member States to subject NGOs to fatally restrictive requirements and obligations; recalls that the Commission started an infringement procedure against Hungary when it introduced a foreign interference law in 2017 and that, in its judgment of 18 June 2020(16) (European Commission v Hungary), the Court of Justice of the EU stated that the right to freedom of association and thus EU law is violated if systematic obligations on CSOs are rendering significantly more difficult the action and the operation of the organisations subject to them; 30. Regrets the publication of data in the FTS with a delay of between 6 and 18 months and its impact on transparency; calls on the Commission to publish information about EU grants awarded to NGOs and entities no later than six months after the date on which the grant was awarded, including funding received from other sources, while taking into account the principle of confidentiality in duly justified case of beneficiaries, including NGOs, facing serious threats; calls on the Commission to develop and integrate data validation tools so that the FTS data validation process is automatic, continuous and quicker, and consumes fewer resources; 31. Regrets the fact that the Commission’s IT systems are not user-friendly and use different conventions to identify beneficiaries of projects and grants, resulting in differing data, making it difficult to reconcile information from different publicly accessible Commission portals and databases; recommends that the Commission establish harmonised rules and standardise the layout and functionalities of programme-specific databases, taking into consideration the diverse environments and areas of action in which NGOs operate, and without putting additional unnecessary burdens on them; 32. Calls on the Commission to use a common unique entity, such as a unique participant identification code, and project identification keys across all portals and databases, including on beneficiaries’ websites, while maintaining the principle of confidentiality, in particular, in duly justified cases of beneficiaries, including NGOs, facing serious threats of reprisal, in order to facilitate the reconciliation of publicly available information provided by different systems and websites; calls on the Commission to provide all beneficiaries, including NGOs, with code that extracts five years of funding data directly from the FTS and includes links to the corresponding project entries in the Commission’s programme databases; 33. Observes significant inconsistencies in the content and extent of the information displayed on project websites including on the distribution of funds received among partners and on the connection to pertinent Commission databases; calls for a more proactive approach to public transparency and increased cooperation with EU budgetary authorities that goes beyond the current minimal requirements for EU grant funding; calls for the Commission to reinforce a system for a commitment from all applicants, including NGOs, to the EU Charter when applying for EU funds; calls for a clearer and more systematic presentation of information on EU-funded project websites on the grant funding received from the EU and from other sources; 34. Calls for the ultimate owners of companies to be listed in central registers in EU countries, accessible to people with a ‘legitimate interest’, such as investigative journalists, concerned citizens and NGOs; 35. Notes that, although the mainstreaming of the eGrants system as a common grants management tool and applicant registration system across Commission services has improved the quality and completeness of FTS data, more effort needs to be made to improve the reliability of such data; is concerned that there are still continuing shortcomings in terms of consistency in existing Commission transparency portals and systems; calls further on the Commission to step up its work on streamlining databases for a more user-friendly FTS that is linked to the Transparency Register and compatible with specific programme databases; highlights that it should include final payments, making it possible to identify beneficiaries, including NGOs, by category, including through the definition of an NGO and relevant entities in line with the Financial Regulation; requests that the Commission prepares a proposal for further administrative action by the end of 2024; 36. Notes that in some situations the home office of the non-profit organisation is in one country and the beneficiary operations take place in another; calls for the non-profit organisations to take appropriate measures to account for funds and services delivered in locations other than their home jurisdiction; 37. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal to set up, based on Article 36 of the Financial Regulation, a centralised, interoperable IT system for data mining and risk scoring to improve the efficiency of the internal control of budget implementation; underlines that this system must not only include recipients’ data, but also the data of beneficial owners in accordance with Directive (EU) 2015/849(17); calls for this system to include risk indicators based on data from the EDES under all management modes; 38. Regrets that the coexistence of reporting obligations and accounting practices at national and EU levels may lead to a disproportionate administrative burden for beneficiaries, including NGOs; calls on the Commission to ensure that reporting obligations at EU and national levels are consistent in order to guarantee easier monitoring of the fulfilment of obligations; 39. Emphasises the importance of transparency and of identifying the final recipient of EU funds; calls on the Commission to develop a harmonised monitoring system aimed at reducing the red tape, improving efficiency and identifying final beneficiaries; recommends that the Commission track EU funds up to the final beneficiaries in a systematic, standardised and harmonised manner across information and transparency platforms at EU level; calls, furthermore, for an enhanced dialogue between the Commission and the beneficiaries of EU funding, including NGOs, on how to reduce excessive burdens; 40. Is concerned when the visibility provisions of EU programmes are not entirely respected; calls on the Commission to instruct its services to terminate agreements or reduce payments to beneficiaries not respecting their contractual visibility obligations; 41. Invites the Commission to ensure that it provides training for all of its programme officers and EU agencies on the Financial Regulation and on the EU budget; calls on the Commission to provide all beneficiaries of EU funding, including NGOs, training on reporting and financial rules, and requests that the discharge authority is duly informed about these trainings, including their content, their participants and the related costs; calls on the Commission to simplify the grant application and selection procedures, and to ensure uniformity of approach and transparency of the process, a reduction in administrative burden and regular adaptation of these rules to changing circumstances and lessons learned; 42. Notes the 2018 finding of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) that the provision of sub-granting does not allow the Commission to properly monitor how EU funds are used; calls for the amounts provided to NGOs as third parties in the form of cascading grants to be clearly identifiable in the FTS and in the Commission annual financial and accountability reporting; 43. Calls on all EU institutions to ensure far stricter implementation, enforcement and supervision of adherence to the current provisions on the EU Transparency Register; calls for more resources to be allocated to the Transparency Register Secretariat so that it is able to offer support to all applicants and registrants, especially small entities and NGOs, throughout the registration process and to verify the information they provide more thoroughly; calls, in particular, for a transparency officer to be placed in all committee secretariats and relevant administrative units; recalls that, according to the Transparency Register guidelines, changes in the data provided should be communicated as soon as they occur and, in any case, within three months; insists that any changes in the board or leadership of entities registered should also be recorded in the Transparency Register; requests to have the transparency database only accessible to specific authorised persons, and upon request to the budgetary authority, in order to avoid the dissemination of information that could endanger an individual’s life or personal safety or the existence of an NGO; 44. Regrets the coexistence of different disclosure requirements for different types of organisations in the Transparency Register; calls on the Commission to impose the same disclosure requirements on all types of organisations registered in the Transparency Register; notes that, in particular, they must all be required to disclose their income and all amounts spent on lobbying(18); 45. Recalls the recommendations from the 2021 Parliament discharge resolution(19) calling for a revision of the EU Transparency Register and its guidelines to require the disclosure of details on all funding sources from registered organisations, including the shares held in other companies, and to allow EU funds to be traced from the direct recipient to the final beneficiary when funds are passed along a chain, including when funds from one beneficiary, including an NGO, are transferred to another, while taking into account the principle of confidentiality in the case of NGOs facing serious threats; 46. Calls on all NGOs and entities committed to full transparency and accountability, the EU Charter and promoting democratic and EU values, to request to be included in the Transparency Register when applying for EU funds; 47. Calls for strict enforcement of the rules for access to Parliament and for invitations to parliamentary committees, which are conditional on the registration of each organisation in the Transparency Register by the new transparency officer who will be placed in each committee secretariat; 48. Calls for all EU-funded beneficiaries, including NGOs, to publish online all meetings with MEPs, MEPs’ assistants or representatives of other EU institutions, bodies or agencies whenever such meetings relate to ongoing EU legislative files or to the EU financing that such beneficiaries receive or apply for, in line with similar obligations for MEPs; calls for the relevant EU institutions and bodies to provide the tools necessary for the publication of such meetings, while permitting justified exceptions; 49. Considers the adoption of an NGO regulation to be a discriminatory measure that targets NGOs but not any other EU funding recipients; is of the opinion that issues such as revolving doors, transparency in financing and donations, the fight against money laundering, limiting foreign interference, independence from political and economic influence, and whistleblowing are of importance for all entities receiving EU funds and should not be used to limit the space of action of NGOs; 50. Reiterates its call in the 2021 Commission discharge resolution(20) to ensure that all EU funding beneficiaries, including NGOs, that have misused or misappropriated EU funds, or engaged in activities contrary to the EU values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and the EU Charter, including inciting terrorism, hate speech, supporting or glorifying violence, political and religious extremism as well as spreading disinformation under the disguise of intentionally falsified scientific data, are listed in the EDES and are blocked from access to EU institutions and EU funding programmes in direct and shared management; calls on the Commission and the Member States to enforce the implementation and publication of an improved exclusion list as recommended by Parliament and in line with the agreement on the Financial Regulation; expects the Commission to report on the implementation of this recommendation at the beginning of 2025; 51. Calls on the Commission and the ECA to systematically submit the findings and the audit conclusions related to the risk-based on-site checks of beneficiaries, including NGOs, and their results to Parliament as the discharge authority; encourages increased cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the ECA; calls on the Commission to enhance, in particular, the access status for OLAF in order to obtain information on the financial misconduct of individual beneficiaries, investigate them and impose appropriate sanctions (i.e. suspension of payment via the EDES system), in the event of fraud, corruption and other irregularities related to EU funds, in compliance with the applicable regulations; 52. Recalls that NGOs are subjected to the same level of controls and investigations as any other recipient of EU funds covering all expenditure sides, within the respective mandates of both OLAF and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office; o 53. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the European Court of Auditors.
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