European Parliament legislative resolution of 29 February 2024 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Kenya, Member of the East African Community, of the other part (15958/2023 – C9-0468/2023 – 2023/0338(NLE))

P9_TA(2024)0110 A9-0012/2024

(Consent)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the draft Council decision (15958/2023),

–  having regard to draft Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Kenya, Member of the East African Community, of the other part (13573/2023),

–  having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 207(4), first subparagraph, and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a) (v), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9‑0468/2023),

–  having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4) and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Development,

–  having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

–  having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0012/2024),

1.  Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;

2.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Republic of Kenya.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 29 February 2024 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Seychelles on access for Seychelles fishing vessels to the waters of Mayotte (15048/2022 – C9-0051/2023 – 2022/0362(NLE))

P9_TA(2024)0111 A9-0043/2024

(Consent)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the draft Council decision (15048/2022),

–  having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Seychelles on access for Seychelles fishing vessels to the waters of Mayotte (15088/2022),

–  having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Articles 43 and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v), and Article 218(7), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9-0051/2023),

–  having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4), and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Fisheries (A9-0043/2024),

1.  Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;

2.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Republic of Seychelles.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 29 February 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on data collection and sharing relating to short-term accommodation rental services and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 (COM(2022)0571 – C9-0371/2022 – 2022/0358(COD))

P9_TA(2024)0112 A9-0270/2023

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0571),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9‑0371/2022),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 22 February 2023(1),

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 15 March 2023(2),

—  having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 6 December 2023 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A9-0270/2023),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 29 February 2024 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2024/… of the European Parliament and of the Council on data collection and sharing relating to short-term accommodation rental services and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1028.)

(1) OJ C 146, 27.4.2023, p. 29. (2) OJ C 188, 30.5.2023, p. 19.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 29 February 2024 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Interim Agreement on Trade between the European Union and the Republic of Chile (11667/2023 – C9‑0466/2023 – 2023/0259(NLE))

P9_TA(2024)0113 A9-0011/2024

(Consent)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the draft Council decision (11667/2023),

–  having regard to the draft Interim Agreement on Trade between the European Union and the Republic of Chile (11668/2023),

–  having regard to the Joint Statement on the Provisions on Trade and Sustainable Development contained in the Interim Agreement on Trade between the European Union and the Republic of Chile, which is attached to the Agreement,

–  having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 91(1), Article 100(2), Article 207(4), first subparagraph, Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v) and Article 218(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9‑0466/2023),

–  having regard to its interim resolution of 29 February 2024(1) on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of the Advanced Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part,

–  having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4) and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on International Trade (A9‑0011/2024),

1.  Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;

2.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Republic of Chile.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0115.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 29 February 2024 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Advanced Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part (11669/2023 – C9‑0467/2023 – 2023/0260(NLE))

P9_TA(2024)0114 A9-0010/2024

(Consent)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the draft Council decision (11669/2023),

–  having regard to draft Advanced Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part (11670/2023),

–  having regard to the Joint Statement on the Provisions on Trade and Sustainable Development contained in the Advanced Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part, which is attached to the Advanced Framework Agreement (11670/2023),

–  having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 91(1), Article 100(2), Article 207(4), first subparagraph, and Article 212, and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), Article 218(7) and Article 218(8), first subparagraph, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9‑0467/2023),

–  having regard to its interim resolution of 29 February 2024(1) on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Advanced Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part,

–  having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4), and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on International Trade under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

–  having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on International Trade (A9‑0010/2024),

1.  Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;

2.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Republic of Chile.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0115.

European Parliament resolution of 29 February 2024 on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Advanced Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part (COM(2023)0432 – C9-0467/2023 – 2023/0260R(NLE))

P9_TA(2024)0115 A9-0017/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the proposal for a Council decision (COM(2023)0432),

–  having regard to the draft Advanced Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part,

–  having regard to the Joint Statement on the Provisions on Trade and Sustainable Development contained in the Advanced Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part, which is attached to the Advanced Framework Agreement,

–  having regard to the Interim Agreement on Trade between the European Union and the Republic of Chile,

–  having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and Chile, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 March 2005, and which will be replaced by the Advanced Framework Agreement,

–  having regard to the Agreement on Trade in Wines and to the Agreement on Trade in Spirits and Aromatised Drinks, which were previously annexed to the Association Agreement and will be incorporated into the Advanced Framework Agreement,

–   having regard to the negotiating directives of 13 November 2017 for the negotiations on a modernised Association Agreement with Chile issued by the Council and published on 22 January 2018,

–  having regard to its recommendation of 13 June 2018 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the negotiations on the modernisation of the EU-Chile Association Agreement(2),

–  having regard to its recommendation of 14 September 2017 to the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Service on the negotiations of the modernisation of the trade pillar of the EU-Chile Association Agreement(3),

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 entitled ‘European Economic Security Strategy’ (JOIN(2023)2020),

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 7 June 2023 entitled ‘A New Agenda for Relations between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean’ (JOIN(2023)0017),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 22 June 2022 entitled ‘The power of trade partnerships: together for green and just economic growth’ (COM(2022)0409),

–  having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640),

–  having regard to its resolution of 6 October 2022 on the outcome of the Commission’s review of the 15-point action plan on trade and sustainable development(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the future of EU international investment policy(5),

–  having regard to the Impact Assessment of 24 May 2017 accompanying the Joint Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to open negotiations and negotiate a modernised Association Agreement with the Republic of Chile (SWD(2017)0173),

–  having regard to the Sustainability Impact Assessment of 7 May 2019 in Support of the Negotiations for the Modernisation of the Trade Part of the Association Agreement with Chile,

–  having regard to the Declaration of the EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit 2023 held in Brussels on 17-18 July 2023,

–  having regard to the statement by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen with Chilean President Gabriel Boric of 14 June 2023,

–  having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 of 2 March 2022 entitled ‘Aggression against Ukraine’,

–  having regard to the UN Convention on Biological diversity and its Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework of 2022,

–  having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and to the Paris Agreement, adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC on 12 December 2015,

–  having regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),

–  having regard to the conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO), in particular ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples,

–  having regard to the conclusions of the visits to Chile of two ad hoc delegations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on 19 and 20 June 2023, and of the Committee on International Trade on 23-25 May 2022,

–  having regard to the Memorandum of Understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Chile on a Strategic Partnership on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains, signed in Brussels on 18 July 2023,

–  having regard to the Joint Declaration of the Ministers for home affairs of the Member States of the European Union and the Ministers with responsibility for security matters of the Member States of the Latin American Committee on Internal Security (EU-CLASI Joint Declaration) of 28 September 2023,

–  having regard to the national lithium strategy presented by the Chilean Government on 20 April 2023,

–  having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Title V thereof on the Union’s external action,

–  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 91, 100(2), 207 and 212 thereof, in conjunction with Article 218,

–  having regard to Rule 105(5) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

–  having regard to the interim report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on International Trade (A9-0017/2024),

A.  whereas the current international instability highlights the need for the EU to reinvigorate its partnerships with democratic and like-minded countries that share its values in order to strengthen its open strategic autonomy, diversify its supply chains, secure access to critical raw materials and cooperate in all multilateral forums to protect the rules-based international order based on peace, the rule of law and sustainable development;

B.  whereas Chile and the EU are close partners in tackling regional and global challenges and are united by shared universal values such as democracy and human rights, and close cultural, human, economic and political ties; whereas Chile is a highly important and reliable partner of the EU;

C.  whereas the modernised EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement (‘the Agreement’) promotes common values and principles, has the potential to considerably strengthen cooperation between Chile and the EU, extend it to new areas and offer mutual support for tackling new global challenges;

D.  whereas two major projects with Chile are being implemented as part of the EU’s Global Gateway strategy: the Team Europe initiative for the development of renewable hydrogen in Chile, with an initial budget of EUR 225 million; and the initiative for the development of critical raw material value chains for lithium and copper;

E.  whereas a ministerial meeting between the EU and the Latin American Committee for Internal Security (CLASI), of which Chile is a member, was held in Brussels on 28 September 2023, culminating in the adoption of a joint declaration on the need to step up cooperation on security and combating drug trafficking;

F.  whereas the EU is Chile’s third largest trading partner and its largest source of foreign direct investment; whereas the EU-Chile Association Agreement, in force since 2003, has significantly expanded bilateral trade and now needs to be modernised in order to bring it into line with international standards; whereas the EU and Chile share a commitment to promoting an open, sustainable, rules- and values-based multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its core;

G.  whereas Chile is one of the world’s most open economies and depends strongly on international trade; whereas Chile has one of Latin America’s most prosperous economies, while socio-economic inequality remains high;

H.  whereas the latest UN reports indicate(6) that Latin America and the Caribbean’s share in global manufacturing exports has not surpassed 5 % in the last 20 years, which shows that the region has a persistent, growing trade deficit in manufacturing exports;

I.  whereas Chile has some of the best natural conditions worldwide for the production of green hydrogen; whereas the Chilean Government has adopted an ambitious green hydrogen strategy that aims to make Chile one of the world’s top green hydrogen producers;

J.  whereas lithium is a strategic raw material; whereas Chile is the world’s second-largest producer of lithium and has the largest lithium reserves worldwide; whereas Chile is already the largest supplier of lithium to the EU by far; whereas Chile is also the world’s top producer of copper; whereas the Chilean Government has adopted an ambitious lithium strategy aimed at increasing Chile’s lithium production; whereas it is in the interests of both Chile and the EU to foster Chile’s ability to build up its own domestic industrial capacity in this sector, in particular by generating added value through the domestic processing and transformation of raw materials;

K.  whereas agriculture and mining are key sectors for the Chilean economy; whereas the sustainability impact assessment pointed out that lithium mining in Chile is concentrated in water scarce regions, areas that are mostly populated by rural and indigenous communities; whereas an uncontrolled and unsustainable increase in mining and agricultural production could have negative impacts; whereas these risks must be carefully addressed and closely monitored;

L.  whereas trade and investment policies should contribute to raising social, environmental and animal welfare standards and ensure full respect for fundamental rights, including local communities’ and indigenous peoples’ rights, the right to adequate food and water and the rights of peasants and other people working in rural areas; whereas the EU’s approach to trade and sustainable development aims to contribute to the effective implementation of ILO core labour rights and of the Paris Agreement;

M.  whereas the EU has reformed investment protection provisions, replaced the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism with the investment court system (ICS) and launched multilateral negotiations for an investment court, which are significant steps in the right direction for a modernised and sustainable investment policy; whereas the ICS will replace the old bilateral investment protection treaties that Chile has concluded with 16 EU Member States;

N.  whereas the Council has made public the entire set of negotiating directives for the Agreement, the first time it has done so for such an agreement covering political and trade matters, thereby responding to calls for greater transparency and better communication of the content and objectives of the negotiations;

Bi-regional cooperation

1.  Highlights the geopolitical significance of strong bi-regional relations between the EU and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, and the political importance of robust bilateral relations between the EU and Chile based on the modernisation of the association agreement, among others; emphasises the geopolitical value of the Agreement in view of the presence of other actors, such as China;

2.  Welcomes the EU-CELAC Summit of July 2023 and the commitment to further deepening this strategic partnership based on shared values and principles as well as on historical, linguistic, cultural and social ties; stresses the significance of regular bi-regional dialogue and appreciates Chile’s constructive role in this bi-regional dialogue, as well as at multilateral level;

3.  Emphasises that the EU’s strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean needs to be implemented swiftly based on joint priorities; highlights the importance of joining forces with CELAC countries to promote and guarantee peace and security, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and development, as well as to tackle global challenges such as climate change, the biodiversity crisis, migration, gender-based violence and corruption;

4.  Welcomes the announcement of a EUR 45 billion financial package to support a fair green transition, an inclusive digital transformation, human development and health resilience in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in particular welcomes the fact that the project for the development of the Green Hydrogen Fund in Chile has made significant progress; calls for the swift implementation of the EU Global Gateway investment agenda in Latin America and the Caribbean based on the Team Europe approach;

5.  Notes that the support of partners in Latin America and the Caribbean has been and remains very valuable with regard to voting in the UN General Assembly on Russia’s unjustified, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the fact that Chile voted in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; appreciates the humanitarian aid provided by Chile to Ukraine as well as the readiness of Chilean specialists to participate in demining Ukraine’s territories; encourages Chile to join the restrictive measures adopted by Western countries against Russia;

Political dialogue and sectoral cooperation

6.  Highlights the fact that Chile is a key partner for the EU in Latin America and the Caribbean and shares democratic values and many common interests with the EU;

7.  Notes that the 2002 EU-Chile Association Agreement has been a success story, as it provides a clear legal framework for regular dialogues and allows discussion on many areas of common interest;

8.  Notes with satisfaction that the Agreement reflects many of Parliament’s recommendations issued prior to the negotiation of the Agreement;

9.  Welcomes the fact that parliamentary diplomacy is recognised as a pillar of the political dialogue with Chile; praises Chile’s key role in the Andean Parliament as well as in the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly;

10.  Underlines the importance, in the context of the Agreement, of fighting against all kinds of human rights violations and of effectively eradicating any discrimination against indigenous people, migrant workers, people with disabilities and LGBTI people, among others, and any other vulnerable people; welcomes the fact that the Agreement contains robust provisions on democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law; underlines the importance of enforceability of the human rights commitments;

11.  Reiterates the importance of the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples in line with the international agreements such as UNDRIP and ILO Convention 169, including the respect of the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) of local communities and indigenous peoples;

12.  Underlines the importance of respecting and upholding social and environmental standards; stresses, in this regard, that the role of human rights defenders and whistleblowers, among others, is crucial and needs to be protected;

13.  Underlines that the Agreement has the potential to considerably strengthen cooperation between Chile and the EU and further it to new areas ranging from cybercrime and the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism to cooperation on polar matters;

14.  Welcomes the fact that the Agreement provides for strengthened political cooperation on foreign and security matters amid geopolitical challenges, in particular as regards countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

15.  Underlines that cooperation with international partners is a key pillar of the EU security and defence agenda; welcomes the launch of the EU-Chile bilateral Security and Defence dialogue; calls for the deepening of cooperation on defence and security with Chile, including in the framework of the Strategic Compass; appreciates Chile’s participation since 2004 in the military crisis management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation Althea);

16.  Points out that the Parties agreed to cooperate and exchange views in the areas of regular and irregular migration; considers that the exchange of best practices is a very helpful tool; notes that Chile is a major destination for migrants from other Latin American countries, particularly Venezuela; acknowledges the Chilean Government’s efforts to successfully integrate the migrant population; recognises Chile’s important role as President Pro Tempore of the Quito Process in coordinating a regional response to the Venezuelan migration crisis;

17.  Is concerned about the increase in organised crime and drug trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean, the increasingly prominent drug trafficking in Chile as well as the unprecedented quantities of illicit drugs trafficked to the EU from the region; calls for a substantial increase in bi-regional cooperation in the fight against these threats; considers it important that the Agreement contains provisions on cooperation in the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking in order to ensure an integrated, evidence-based and effective approach;

18.  Highlights that both the EU and Chile have committed to become climate-neutral by 2050; welcomes the commitment to strengthen cooperation in the fight against the climate crisis under the UNFCCC and to effectively implement the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, as well as the protection of the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources, including in the framework of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity; stresses that this commitment must be mirrored by concrete measures as part of the implementation of the Agreement;

19.  Recognises the importance of cooperation on civil satellite navigation, Earth observation and other space activities; supports the work of the regional Galileo Information Centre in Chile in monitoring local and regional satellite navigation initiatives, identifying potential markets and stakeholders, and providing support to users in developing new applications through cooperation between Latin American and European industry; welcomes the recent announcement concerning the rolling out of a regional Copernicus strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean, including a regional Copernicus data centre in Chile;

20.  Appreciates the potential for further deepening cooperation in the areas of scientific research, technological development and innovation, youth and culture;

21.  Recognises the commitment to respect ILO conventions and to exchange information on methods to measure poverty in order to support evidence-based policies; encourages the exchange of best practices considering Chile’s high level of income inequality;

22.  Welcomes the much-needed joint commitment to achieving the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals, as they are crucial in addressing today’s challenges while leaving no one behind;

Trade and investment pillar

23.  Welcomes the Agreement as an important signal in support of open, fair and rules- and values-based trade, at a time of increasing economic fragmentation and protectionism; believes that the Agreement will be mutually beneficial and contribute to enhancing long-term economic development, job creation, diversification and value added production processes;

24.  Commends the ambitious and comprehensive nature of the trade and investment pillar of the Agreement, which delivers on the priorities set out in Parliament’s recommendation of 14 September 2017(7); notes that 99 % of tariff lines will be fully liberalised and over 95 % of trade between the EU and Chile will be duty-free under the Agreement; welcomes the fact that the agreement has been modernised on the basis of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement; stresses, in this respect, that it is crucial to avoid unnecessary administrative burdens and to simplify export procedures throughout the implementation of the Agreement;

25.  Welcomes the fact that the chapter on trade and sustainable development (TSD) contains ambitious and binding commitments on environmental and labour standards; regrets, however, that the agreement does not yet fully reflect the EU’s new TSD approach;

26.  Notes that in their joint statement on trade and sustainable development attached to the Agreement, the EU and Chile commit to reviewing the Agreement’s TSD provisions upon the entry into force of the Interim Trade Agreement; underlines the importance of an ambitious review to bring the agreements into line with the objectives of the EU Green Deal and the EU’s TSD reform proposals as introduced in the 2022 Commission communication entitled ‘The power of trade partnerships: together for green and just economic growth’, which would add provisions to enhance the enforcement mechanism of the TSD chapter, including the possibility to apply a compliance phase, and trade sanctions as a measure of last resort in cases of failure to comply with the Paris Agreement or the ILO’s fundamental principles and rights at work;

27.  Expects the review to be carried out within the timeline set out by the joint statement and following meaningful consultations with all relevant stakeholders; calls on the Commission to keep Parliament closely involved throughout the review process, in line with its obligations pursuant to Article 218(10) TFEU, and to take utmost account of possible comments by the European Parliament;

28.  Notes that in the joint statement, both sides commit to considering the possibility of including the Paris Agreement on Climate Change as an essential element of the Agreement in the context of the review of the TSD provisions;

29.  Stresses that an implementation roadmap with concrete targets and milestones for their delivery, set up with the involvement of civil society, would be a useful tool to address TSD challenges;

30.  Welcomes the Parties’ commitment to promote the development of international trade in a way that is conducive to decent work for all, in particular women, young people and people with disabilities, in line with their respective obligations under the ILO;

31.  Welcomes the recognition of indigenous peoples’ knowledge and practices under the TSD chapter; regrets, however, that ILO Convention 169 and the UN principle of free prior and informed consent enshrined in UNDRIP, which uphold the rights of indigenous peoples in trade relations, are not explicitly mentioned;

32.  Welcomes the inclusion of a stand-alone dedicated chapter on trade and gender, the first of its kind in an EU trade agreement, which recognises the importance of incorporating a gender perspective into the promotion of inclusive economic growth, and the key role that gender-responsive policies can play in this regard; strongly supports the inclusion of a number of binding commitments to eliminate barriers and discrimination against women, promote gender equality and women’s empowerment and ensure that international trade benefits all; strongly supports the commitment to mainstream gender considerations across policies and instruments and the joint commitment to effectively implement the obligations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women as well as to fulfil Sustainable Development Goal 5 on gender equality; expects the Commission to build on this precedent in all future trade negotiations;

33.  Acknowledges the elimination of tariffs on EU exports, leaving 99,9 % of exports tariff-free, which could be favourable for Union producers of high-quality agri-food products; welcomes the fact that the tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for beef and sheep meat, both sensitive products, no longer include an automatic annual increase, as this is replaced by a fixed amount that will ensure more stable market access for Chilean meat products in the future; calls on the Commission to update its cumulative impact assessment on the impact of all trade deals on the EU agricultural sector and, specifically, to evaluate the agricultural components of the Agreement together with concessions under other existing and planned trade arrangements, in order to prevent their excessive accumulation;

34.  Recognises the efforts made on protecting sensitive EU agricultural products such as meat (beef, poultry, pig and sheep meat), certain fruits and vegetables (e.g. garlic, apple juice, grape juice) and olive oil by imposing limited and controlled access for highly sensitive products using TRQs, and excluding sugar and bananas from any trade liberalisation, with the aim of protecting EU production;

35.  Recognises that the Agreement protects a further 216 EU agricultural geographical indications (GIs) and 18 Chilean GIs, in addition to the existing agreements on wines and spirits, which protect 1745 EU GIs for wines and 257 EU GIs for spirits and aromatised wines; highlights that the extension of geographical indications agreed by the EU and Chile is an important step forward in the protection of EU geographical indications at the global level; calls on the Commission to ensure effective enforcement of GI protection rules for EU products in Chile and to consider expanding the list of protected GI products;

36.  Welcomes the inclusion of a dedicated chapter on sustainable food systems (SFS) that promotes bilateral and international cooperation on a sustainable food system, including provisions on animal welfare, the fight against food waste, the phasing out of the use of antimicrobials, the sustainability of the food chain, and pesticides; notes in particular the mutual commitments to maintain the phase-out of the use of antibiotics as growth promoters, in place in Chile since 2018; urges the Commission to make full use of the cooperation provisions contained in that chapter and to facilitate the exchange of information on innovative farming practices so that its ambition does not fall short of the EU’s sustainability efforts in climate change mitigation, biodiversity and environmental protection legislation; stresses that this cooperation should also strive to achieve the objectives of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, adopted under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, which includes among the global targets for 2030 the objective of ‘reducing the overall risk from pesticides and highly hazardous chemicals by at least half’;

37.  Believes that EU trade policy should contribute to achieving and implementing together the highest food safety, social, environmental, animal welfare and human rights standards; calls on the EU-Chile SFS sub-committee to develop an ambitious cooperation plan to achieve this;

38.  Welcomes the fact that the Agreement includes the single entity mechanism, as it avoids each Member State having to sign a protocol to export agri-food products to Chile, thus improving the overall potential of the Agreement and reducing unnecessary burdens and costs; calls for this measure to be included in future trade agreements;

39.  Encourages the EU and Chile to consider bilateral or multilateral cooperation in the development of sustainable and environmentally responsible production practices and the exchange of best practices in research, innovation and technological development; welcomes the intention of both parties to exchange expertise on the development and implementation of animal welfare standards;

40.  Calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure a level playing field for all agricultural, fishery and aquaculture products marketed in the Union regardless of their origin, including those originating in Chile; stresses the importance of improving the policy coherence of Union initiatives, with particular regard to trade, sustainable development, environmental protection, industrial policy, fisheries and agriculture;

41.  Welcomes the fact the Agreement contains a series of actions for both the EU and Chile in support of efforts to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing practices and to help deter trade in products from species harvested from those practices; further welcomes the fact that both the EU and Chile recently joined the IUU Fishing Action Alliance Pledge, aiming to stimulate ambition and action in the fight against IUU fishing;

42.  Welcomes the fact that the outermost regions have been taken into account in the Agreement’s bilateral safeguard measures;

43.  Expects that the provisions on investment liberalisation and investment protection will further boost sustainable investments in both directions by guaranteeing that investors from both sides will be granted fair and non-discriminatory treatment; emphasises that investments require legal security, trust and predictability; stresses that the investment protection provisions are aligned with the EU’s reformed approach on investment protection, which should aim to ensure a proper balance between the protection of investments and governments’ right to regulate in the public interest; recalls that a joint interpretative statement confirms the parties’ understanding that the investment protection provisions are to be interpreted and applied taking due consideration of their commitments under the Paris Agreement and clarifies that investors should expect that the EU and Chile will adopt measures to combat climate change; notes that the dispute settlement procedures established by the agreement follow the EU’s ICS model, with a permanent, independent and impartial tribunal and an appeal tribunal; highlights the need to implement and further improve the investment protection provisions in accordance with Parliament’s recommendations in its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the future of EU international investment policy;

44.  Is convinced that the new market access commitments concerning trade in services will open up new business opportunities for EU and Chilean companies, including small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); notes that the Agreement contains a state-of-the-art chapter on digital trade that will facilitate electronic commerce and protect customers online;

45.  Highlights that the Agreement preserves the right of governments to regulate in the public interest, for example in order to protect public health, consumers or the environment; stresses that the right of governments to regulate is not limited to these areas; underlines that the agreement guarantees the right of public authorities to maintain public services such as education, healthcare and water, or to re-nationalise privately provided services;

46.  Emphasises that EU and Chilean companies will be able to benefit from improved access to public procurement markets for goods, services and work at (sub-)central level; highlights the enhanced transparency requirements; welcomes the fact that the agreement allows procuring entities to take into account environmental and social considerations throughout the procurement procedure;

47.  Welcomes the dedicated chapter on SMEs, which account for a large proportion of EU-Chile trade; calls on the Commission to assist SMEs in taking full advantage of the opportunities provided by the modernised agreement, including by providing guidance to exporting and importing businesses on the new market access opportunities, as well as by providing administrative and technical support, simplifying procedures and addressing technical barriers to trade that disproportionately affect SMEs;

48.  Stresses that global efforts to combat climate change will require a rapid transition to renewable energy and fast government action to phase out fossil fuels, including by reducing fossil fuel investments and carving out governments’ climate policies from investment protection; emphasises that the Agreement should support international efforts in the transition towards renewable energies; urges the Parties to ensure alignment of investment protection provisions with environmental policies, labour rights and human rights; notes, however, that the Agreement allows protection for investments in fossil fuels; highlights that Chile has the potential to play a major role in the global green and just transitions, which should equally benefit the development of its own industrial capacities; notes that the development and scaling up of the Chilean renewable energy sector and infrastructure will require massive sustainable and predictable investments, including from EU companies; in this regard, believes that the Global Gateway strategy should allow the creation of joint strategic projects and enhance capacity-building; welcomes in this context the creation of a European initiative for the development of renewable hydrogen in Chile, which will promote the development of this strategic industry in the country and the creation of jobs while promoting exports of renewable hydrogen to Europe as well as other parts of the world;

49.  Emphasises Chile’s leading role as a major supplier of critical raw materials, including those that are essential for the green and digital transitions, such as lithium and copper; commends our Chilean partners for their commitment to cooperate with the EU on critical raw material supplies, which help to increase the EU’s resilience in sectors such as energy, transport, digital infrastructure and defence; stresses that this mutually beneficial Agreement will ensure non-discriminatory access for EU companies to Chilean raw materials, while aiming to leave sufficient policy space for Chile to create local added value through the domestic processing and transformation of raw materials; takes note of the provisions on dual pricing and export monopoly restrictions; believes that the EU should actively support Chile in its efforts to move up the value chain; is convinced that the exploitation of raw materials should be carried out in an environmentally and socially sustainable manner, and that it should benefit and engage local communities, including indigenous communities, and be fully respectful of their rights, including the right to free, prior and informed consent; welcomes the Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and Chile on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials value chains and calls for its swift implementation;

Institutional provisions

50.  Considers it important that the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) should be informed of the decisions and recommendations of the Joint Council and that the JPC may make recommendations to the Joint Council about the implementation of the Agreement; supports the holding of two meetings of the JPC per year in order to continue deepening parliamentary relations between both parties;

51.  Welcomes an institutionalised mechanism for involving civil society organisations in the implementation of the Agreement and the strengthening of the Domestic Consultative Groups; calls on the Commission and on the Chilean authorities to ensure the active and meaningful involvement of civil society, including NGOs, indigenous representatives, business representatives and trade unions, in the monitoring of the Agreement’s implementation;

52.  Calls on both parties to allocate sufficient financial resources and technical assistance to the Domestic Consultative Groups to enable them to properly carry out their tasks; expects close cooperation between EU and Chilean Domestic Consultative Groups;

53.  Urges both parties to the roll out the Agreement quickly, for the benefit of all, including SMEs and women;

54.  Recalls that the Agreement will require ratification at both EU and Member State level, whereas the Interim Trade Agreement, which contains only the trade and investment elements falling within the EU’s exclusive competence, will enter into force upon its ratification by Parliament and the Council; takes the view that the splitting of the agreement to speed up the ratification process fully respects the distribution of competences between the EU and its Member States and allows for a swift ratification of the parts falling under the EU’s exclusive competence, while maintaining the comprehensive nature of the agreement;

o
o   o

55.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Chile.

(1) OJ L 352, 30.12.2002, p. 3. (2) OJ C 28, 27.1.2020, p. 121. (3) OJ C 337, 20.9.2018, p. 113. (4) OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 99. (5) OJ C 32, 27.1.2023, p. 96. (6) https://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/goods-exports-latin-america-and-caribbean-increase-20-2022-growth-down-previous-year; http://repositorio.cepal.org/handle/11362/48651. (7) European Parliament recommendation of 14 September 2017 to the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Service on the negotiations of the modernisation of the trade pillar of the EU-Chile Association Agreement (OJ C 337, 20.9.2018, p. 113).

European Parliament legislative resolution of 29 February 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011 and (EU) 2019/942 to improve the Union’s protection against market manipulation in the wholesale energy market (COM(2023)0147 – C9-0050/2023 – 2023/0076(COD))

P9_TA(2024)0116 A9-0261/2023

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2023)0147),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 194(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9‑0050/2023),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 14 June 2023(1),

–  after consulting the Committee of the Regions,

–  having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 20 December 2023 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee Economic and Monetary Affairs,

–  having regard to the letter from the Committee on Budgets,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A9-0261/2023),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 29 February 2024 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2024/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011 and (EU) 2019/942 as regards improving the Union’s protection against market manipulation on the wholesale energy market

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1106.)

(1) OJ C 293, 18.8.2023, p. 138.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 29 February 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing a framework for a European Digital Identity (COM(2021)0281 – C9-0200/2021 – 2021/0136(COD))

P9_TA(2024)0117 A9-0038/2023

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0281),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9‑0200/2021),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 20 October 2021(1),

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 13 October 2021(2),

—  having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the responsible committee under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 6 December 2023 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A9-0038/2023),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Takes note of the statements by the Commission annexed to this resolution;

3.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

4.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 29 February 2024 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2024/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1183.)

ANNEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

Statement by the Commission on Article 45 on the occasion of the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2024/1183(3)

The Commission welcomes the agreement reached, which, in its view, clarifies that web browsers are required to ensure support and interoperability for the qualified website authentication certificates (QWACs) for the sole purpose of displaying the identity data of the owner of the website in a user-friendly manner. The Commission understands this obligation as not prejudging the methods used to display such identity data.

The Commission welcomes the agreement reached, which, in its view, clarifies that the requirement for the web browsers to recognise QWACs does not restrict browsers own security policies and that Article 45, as proposed, leaves it up to the web browsers to preserve and apply their own procedures and criteria in order to maintain and preserve the privacy of online communications using encryption and other proven methods. The Commission understands draft Article 45 as not imposing obligations or restrictions on how web browsers establish encrypted connections with websites or authenticate the cryptographic keys used when establishing those connections.

The Commission recalls that, in line with point 28 of the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016, the Commission will make use of expert groups, consult targeted stakeholders and carry out public consultations, as appropriate.

Statement by the Commission on unobservability on the occasion of the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2024/1183(4)

The Commission welcomes the agreement reached, which in its view, confirms that this amending Regulation does not allow for the processing of personal data contained in or arising from the use of the European Digital Identity Wallet by the Wallet providers for other purposes than delivering wallet services.

The Commission also welcomes the inclusion of the concept of unobservability in Recital (11c) of the draft amending Regulation, which should prevent wallet providers from collecting and seeing the details of user’s day-to-day transactions. The Commission is of the view that this concept means that there should not be correlation of data across different services for the purposes of user tracking or tracing or for determining, analysing and predicting personal behaviour, interests or habits.

At the same time, the Commission acknowledges that, in full compliance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679, the providers of European Digital Identity Wallets may access certain categories of personal data with the user’s explicit consent, such as in order to ensure continuity in the provision of wallet services or to protect users from disruptions in their provision. That data should be limited to what is necessary for each specific purpose.

(1) OJ C 105, 4.3.2022, p. 81. (2) OJ C 61, 4.2.2022, p. 42. (3) OJ L, 2024/1183, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1183/oj. (4) OJ L, 2024/1183, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1183/oj.

European Parliament resolution of 29 February 2024 on the murder of Alexei Navalny and the need for EU action in support of political prisoners and oppressed civil society in Russia (2024/2579(RSP))

P9_TA(2024)0118 RC-B9-0147/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia, in particular those concerning Alexei Navalny and the human rights situation in the country,

–  having regard to the statement of its Conference of Presidents of 21 February 2024,

–  having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the European Union of 19 February 2024 on the death of Alexei Navalny,

–  having regard to the joint statement by the Commission President and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 February 2024 on the death of Alexei Navalny,

–  having regard to the constitution of the Russian Federation and to the international human rights obligations to which Russia has committed itself,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

–  having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation, Mariana Katzarova, of 15 September 2023 entitled ‘Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation’,

–  having regard to the statement by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation of 22 February 2024,

–  having regard to the report by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights of 11 July 2023 entitled ‘Protecting Human Rights Defenders at Risk: EU entry, stay and support’,

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas Alexei Navalny, a prominent Russian political figure and the 2021 laureate of the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, perished in a Siberian penal colony north of the Arctic Circle while serving a unfounded, politically motivated prison sentence; whereas the killing of Alexei Navalny is yet another sign of the increasing and systematic repression in Russia; whereas the full responsibility for his death lies with the Russian state, in particular its president, Vladimir Putin, who should be held accountable;

B.  whereas the Russian authorities have not yet provided information about the exact causes and circumstances of his death, and his family was only allowed to recover his body for a medical investigation and funeral on 24 February 2024; whereas no independent autopsy or investigation into the cause of death has been conducted;

C.  whereas Alexei Navalny had been in detention since 17 January 2021, the date on which he returned to Russia following medical rehabilitation after an attempted state-sponsored assassination using the internationally banned nerve agent Novichok; whereas he had previously been detained and arrested many times and had been sentenced, on fabricated and politically motivated grounds, to long prison terms in evident attempts to stop his political activities and anti-corruption campaigns; whereas he had been subjected to psychological pressure, arbitrary punishment, severe ill treatment and torture during his imprisonment in several notorious prisons and penal colonies; whereas Alexei Navalny’s health had deteriorated due to mistreatment and a lack of proper medical care;

D.  whereas Alexei Navalny embodied the struggle for freedom and democracy, with his dream of a ‘beautiful Russia of the future’; whereas the continuous evolution of his views on Russian politics and Russia’s role in the world was noted with respect; whereas through his work, Navalny exposed the illegalities and corruption at the heart of the Russian government system; whereas Navalny tirelessly and courageously continued his fight from prison, illustrating his commitment to the principles of democracy and justice; whereas Navalny’s lawyers are being harassed and three of them have been in pre-trial custody since October 2023;

E.  whereas there are reports of Russian citizens paying tribute to Alexei Navalny in cities and towns across Russia, many of whom are being detained for these peaceful actions and some of whom are being subjected to targeted military draft notices; whereas the EU Ambassador to Russia, Roland Galharague, and many of his counterparts from the Member States, the UK and the US were among those who honoured Alexei Navalny’s memory at the Solovetsky Stone in Moscow;

F.  whereas Russia’s political system is controlled by a consolidated authoritarian regime that engages in rampant corruption; whereas it uses rigged elections to provide a semblance of democracy and concentrates all power in the hands of Vladimir Putin; whereas the government suppresses any dissent with the support of loyalist security forces, a subservient judiciary, a controlled media environment and a legislature consisting of a ruling party and pliable opposition parties;

G.  whereas the death of Alexei Navalny is not an isolated incident, but the culmination of the Kremlin regime’s pattern of violence, suppression of dissent and intimidation against political opponents and civil society activists; whereas many democratic rights and civic freedoms guaranteed by the Russian constitution are non-existent in practice; whereas the Russian Federation continuously breaches international law and commitments;

H.  whereas the crackdown on independent civil society in Russia, targeting non-governmental organisations, human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, historians, women’s rights, LGBTIQ+ persons’ rights, environmental activists and activists for ethnic and cultural minorities, has had a devastating effect on the lives and freedoms of people belonging to minorities, LGBTIQ+ persons, women, and all people who do not adhere to the prevailing norms or who criticise the Russian regime and its policies; whereas an active civil society and a free media are crucial for ensuring democratic and open societies and safeguarding human rights;

I.  whereas Putin’s regime has decimated a generation of Russian human rights organisations, including Memorial and the Moscow Helsinki Group; whereas the EU hosts a variety of Russian dissidents and representatives of the media and civil society who were forced to leave Russia as their criticism of the government put them at great risk of retaliation from the authorities;

J.  whereas many opposition actors remain in Russia and continue to fight for democracy, the rule of law and human rights from within Russia, at great personal risk; whereas representatives of the opposition are systematically subjected to verbal attacks, ad hominem campaigns and dehumanisation by the government or by pro-government media; whereas the human rights group Memorial has designated over 600 people as political prisoners in Russia;

K.  whereas since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian authorities have increased their repression of political opposition, the media and civil society, curtailing rights and individual liberties even further to stifle domestic dissent, including by criminalising any expression of anti-war sentiment; whereas anti-war candidates have been prevented from standing in the forthcoming 2024 presidential elections in Russia;

L.  whereas there is no longer any safe space for civic action or political opposition within Russia, according to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation;

M.  whereas the Russian regime’s severe curtailment of human rights is in clear contravention of the nation’s own constitution and legal framework, as well as a violation of Russia’s international obligations;

N.  whereas a transparent, democratic, free and fair political competition process is not compatible with the political repressions that have been carried out in the Russian Federation for many years, culminating in the murder of a major leader of the Russian opposition, Alexei Navalny;

1.  Strongly condemns the murder of Alexei Navalny; expresses its wholehearted condolences to his family, associates and colleagues, and to his countless supporters across Russia; expresses its full support to Yulia Navalnaya in her determination to continue the work started by Alexei Navalny with her support, and to the Anti-Corruption Foundation founded by Navalny, which is continuing its work under the new circumstances;

2.  Pays its respects to Alexei Navalny as a political leader and prominent anti-corruption politician who, thanks to his bravery, charisma and capacity to mobilise people, achieved what others had tried but few had managed, namely to empower people by making them believe in their ability to improve their lives, change society and influence politics;

3.  Recalls his contributions to developing civic consciousness through genuine public debates, political campaigns, street protests and innovative communication, which led to him being viewed by many as representing a vision of another Russia where power would not be held captive by a kleptocratic regime protected by subservient law enforcement agents, but would be held by and serve the people;

4.  Calls on the Russian authorities to allow Alexei Navalny’s body to be buried according to his family’s wishes and not to obstruct his family’s efforts to organise a dignified funeral ceremony; demands an independent and transparent international investigation into the exact circumstances of Alexei Navalny’s death and into those responsible, in order to uncover the truth, ensure accountability and deliver justice; calls for the EU and its Member States to assume a leading role in calling for and supporting this investigation;

5.  Deplores and condemns the disinformation campaigns orchestrated by the Kremlin-controlled media that have sought to smear Alexei Navalny’s legacy and dignity both prior to and following his death, as well as that of his wife, family and close collaborators;

6.  Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to hold the Russian political leadership and authorities to account, in close coordination with EU partners; calls on the Council to effectively use the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime and implement targeted measures against those involved in and responsible for the politically motivated trials against Alexei Navalny, his sentencing, his imprisonment and his detention conditions, including the prosecutors and judges, prison staff and those responsible for his premature death; welcomes the recent adoption of sanctions by the US following Navalny’s death and invites the EU to coordinate its sanctions with international partners;

7.  Underlines that the Russian Government and Vladimir Putin personally bear criminal and political responsibility for the death of their most prominent opponent, Alexei Navalny, and that under such circumstances it is justifiable to raise the question of Vladimir Putin’s legitimacy in public and international discourse;

8.  Expresses its solidarity with all those in Russia and beyond who, despite the purposefully brutal repression and the severe personal consequences they face, still find the courage to speak the truth, uphold human values and fight for a democratic and peaceful future for Russia; considers that the people of Russia cannot be confused with the warmongering, autocratic and kleptocratic Kremlin regime;

9.  Denounces the escalation of human rights violations by the Russian regime and condemns the ongoing crackdown on government critics, human rights defenders, anti-war and environmental activists, leaders of national minorities, indigenous activists, independent journalists and historians, as well as the increased repression of LGBTIQ+ communities; calls on the UN Human Rights Council to conduct an immediate investigation into the acts of inhuman imprisonment, torture and murder of political opponents; underlines that the killing of Alexei Navalny serves as a stark reminder of the urgent need to address the Russian regime’s repressive policies and to take a decisive stand against such actions;

10.  Calls on the Russian authorities to drop all arbitrary charges and to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons, including but not limited to Vladimir Kara-Murza, Yuri Dmitriev, Ilya Yashin, Alexei Gorinov, Lilia Chanysheva, Ksenia Fadeeva, Vadim Ostanin, Daniel Kholodny, Vadim Kobzev, Igor Sergunin, Alexei Lipster, Viktoria Petrova, Maria Ponomarenko, Alexandra Skochilenko, Svetlana Petriychuk, Evgenia Berkovich, Dmitry Ivanov, Ioann Kurmoyarov, Igor Baryshnikov, Dmitry Talantov, Alexei Moskalev, Oleg Orlov, Boris Kagarlitsky and Ivan Safronov;

11.  Urges the Russian authorities to immediately end the use of torture, other ill treatment and arbitrary disciplinary measures against all detainees and to urgently reform prisoners’ detention conditions so that these comply with Russia’s obligations under international human rights law, in particular regarding prisoners’ access to doctors of their choice, appropriate medical treatment, lawyers, and communication with their families;

12.  Calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to find feasible ways of freeing the worst-affected prisoners, in particular political prisoners who are ill or have been tortured, including the option of possible exchanges of imprisoned individuals; calls on the Council to create a special role of envoy for political prisoners and hostages in Russia in order to coordinate such efforts, in cooperation with international partners, and to serve as a point of contact for affected families and associates;

13.  Calls on the Russian authorities to immediately release the hundreds of people who have been detained in recent weeks for peacefully paying tribute to the memory of Alexei Navalny; condemns the Russian authorities’ cruel practice of targeting political protesters by drafting them to serve in the war;

14.  Calls on the Russian authorities to repeal their oppressive legislation that contravenes the Russian constitution and the country’s international commitments, such as the laws on censoring truthful information about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and on so-called ‘foreign agents’ and ‘undesirable organisations’;

15.  Calls on the Member States to introduce extensive EU restrictive measures against individuals involved in the political persecution and fabrication of cases against Russian civil society representatives and activists, and to consider adding further persons identified by Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation to the sanctions list as regime enablers who contribute to waging and financing the war of aggression against Ukraine and to perpetrating domestic repression in support of the regime’s survival; insists on greater transparency in the process of applying and lifting EU restrictive measures;

16.  Calls on the EU Delegation and Member States’ missions in Russia to continue monitoring and attending the trials of individuals facing politically motivated prosecution;

17.  Calls for the EU and the Member States to continue to show their unfailing solidarity with and to actively support independent Russian civil society and the democratic opposition, who are working to transform Russia into an open society where political rights, fundamental freedoms and human rights are respected, thereby honouring the enduring legacy of Alexei Navalny; calls for the EU to support the establishment of a network of human rights defenders to monitor and report on human rights violations;

18.  Urges the Member States to expand and further facilitate the programme for humanitarian visas for Russian human rights defenders, pro-democracy activists and independent journalists at risk of political persecution;

19.  Reiterates its call for an EU-wide multi-entry visa scheme for human rights defenders, civil society activists and politically persecuted individuals, for the existing legal flexibility to be used and for gaps in legislation to be addressed, as proposed by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in its 2023 report entitled ‘Protecting Human Rights Defenders at Risk: EU entry, stay and support’; invites the EU institutions to prepare measures to cover the eventuality of Russia ceasing to issue passports at its consulates, including the recognition of de facto statelessness, and to issue travel documents in order to allow the democratic opposition, civil society activists and otherwise politically persecuted persons to relocate to EU Member States, and, where relevant, continue their work while in exile;

20.  Calls on the Member States to avoid the unjustified and disproportionate application of restrictive measures on individuals seeking refuge from and fighting against the current Russian Government;

21.  Calls for the simplification of processes for Russian dissidents in the EU to register organisations and entities, open bank accounts and carry out other administrative tasks in order to allow them to continue their work in exile;

22.  Deplores the Russian regime’s imperialist policies and condemns, in the strongest possible terms, Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine; reiterates that the EU, its Member States and like-minded partners around the world must continue their political, economic, financial and military support for Ukraine, including support to civil society and long-term support for the reconstruction of Ukraine, as this is the best response to the oppressive and aggressive practices currently perpetrated by the Kremlin regime; is convinced that Ukraine’s decisive victory may lead to genuine changes in the system in the Russian Federation, in particular deimperialisation, decolonialisation and refederalisation, all of which are necessary conditions for the establishment of democracy in Russia;

23.  Calls on the Commission to use the multilateral platforms of which Russia is a member to continue condemning human rights violations in Russia and Russia’s crime of aggression against Ukraine, to further support the documentation of human rights violations in Russia, and to support turning the examination by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of the human rights situation in the Russian Federation into a fully independent investigative mechanism;

24.  Expresses support for the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation, Mariana Katzarova, and calls on the Member States to ensure that the UN Human Rights Council extends her mandate again in 2024;

25.  Calls on the Commission, and in particular the European External Action Service, to develop a proactive, long-term strategic policy towards Russia that effectively responds to the reality of EU-Russia relations today, the human rights situation in Russia and the need to support Russian civil society and opposition representatives in exile;

26.  Commits to continuously addressing the Russian regime’s violations of its constitution and of international law, including the elections of 17 March 2024, given that these elections are expected to be held in the occupied territories of Ukraine, in a context of increased suppression of political pluralism and the media;

27.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Russian authorities, and to ensure that it is made available in the Russian language.

European Parliament resolution of 29 February 2024 on the need for unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after two years of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2526(RSP))

P9_TA(2024)0119 RC-B9-0143/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and on Russia, in particular those adopted since the escalation of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022 and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula on 19 February 2014,

–  having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part(1), and to the accompanying Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the European Union and Ukraine, signed in 2014,

–  having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

–  having regard to the Commission proposal of 20 June 2023 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Ukraine Facility (COM(2023)0338),

–  having regard to the European Council’s decision of 14 December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, following the Commission’s positive recommendation of 8 November 2023 in this regard,

–  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 December 2023 and 1 February 2024,

–  having regard to the report of 14 February 2024 by the World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, the Commission and the UN entitled ‘Ukraine: Third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3) February 2022-December 2023’,

–  having regard to the report of 9 February 2024 of the High-Level Working Group on the Environmental Consequences of the War entitled ‘An environmental compact for Ukraine – A Green Future꞉ Recommendations for Accountability and Recovery’,

–  having regard to Rules 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas Russia has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022; whereas Russia’s war against Ukraine started in 2014 with the illegal occupation and annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the subsequent occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; whereas this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of the fundamental principles of international law; whereas Russia’s actions in Ukraine over the past two years continue to threaten peace and security in Europe and worldwide;

B.  whereas the UN General Assembly, in its resolution of 2 March 2022, immediately qualified the Russian war against Ukraine as an act of aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and, in its resolution of 14 November 2022, recognised the need to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its war of aggression and legally and financially responsible for its internationally wrongful acts, including by making reparation for the injury and damage caused;

C.  whereas the Russian war of aggression is the largest military conflict on the European continent since the end of the Second World War and reflects the growing conflict between authoritarianism and democracy;

D.  whereas Ukraine and its citizens have shown unwavering determination in resisting Russia’s war of aggression, successfully defending their country, despite the high cost in civilian and military casualties, along with the destruction and weaponisation of civilian and public infrastructure, the natural environment and cultural heritage; whereas the brave people of Ukraine were awarded the 2022 Sakharov Prize as a tribute to their courage and resilience;

E.  whereas millions of Ukrainians continue to be displaced inside and outside Ukraine, having fled from Russia’s aggression; whereas more than 3.3 million people, including 800 000 children, are living along the front line; whereas homes, schools and hospitals continue to be bombed every day; whereas, according to the International Organization for Migration, Russia’s campaign of destruction in 2023 left nearly 720 000 people in the worst-affected parts of Ukraine with no access to adequate and safe housing; whereas the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that indiscriminate attacks on Ukrainian populated areas spiked in December 2023, highlighting the persistent pattern of civilian death, destruction and humanitarian needs throughout 2023;

F.  whereas Russia’s war crimes will leave an entire population traumatised, as 10 million people are estimated to be at risk of or living with a mental health condition, and 3.9 million people are estimated to be suffering from moderate to severe symptoms requiring treatment for mental distress, depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder; whereas in 2023, 227 incidents affecting humanitarian operations in the country were reported, with 50 humanitarian workers killed or injured, including 11 killed in the line of duty;

G.  whereas, according to the conservative estimates of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, almost two years into Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, more than 10 000 civilians have been killed and nearly 20 000 injured, with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) believing that the actual figures are considerably higher;

H.  whereas Ukrainian children are paying the ultimate price in the war, as over 520 Ukrainian children have been killed and over 1 226 wounded, 1,8 million have had to cross into neighbouring countries as refugees and another 2,5 million are internally displaced within Ukraine;

I.  whereas since the beginning of the full-scale war of aggression, approximately 20 000 Ukrainian children have been forcibly deported to Russia and Belarus or detained in the occupied territories; whereas the ICC has issued international arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova in view of their responsibility for committing the war crime of unlawful deportation and for the unlawful transfer of children from occupied territories of Ukraine to the Russian Federation; whereas fewer than 400 deported children have been returned to Ukraine and reunited with their families;

J.  whereas the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment has been alarmed by reports and testimonies pointing to inhumane detention conditions of the Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war held by Russia, including torture and the lack of medical care, resulting in permanent damage to their health; whereas there are known cases of the Russian military killing Ukrainian soldiers instead of taking them prisoner, including those most recently reported on 24 February 2024 in the Bakhmut area; whereas in 2022, more than 50 Ukrainian prisoners of war, mostly members of the Azov Battalion, were deliberately killed in a premeditated explosion at the prison in Olenivka;

K.  whereas women and girls are particularly at risk during humanitarian and displacement crises, as they continue disproportionately to be the victims of gender-based violence; whereas many women have stayed in Ukraine and have been mobilised to serve in the armed forces; whereas there are indications that female Ukrainian soldiers in captivity have been tortured and subjected to sexual violence; whereas the OHCHR has reported that, as men represent the majority of victims of summary executions by Russian forces in occupied territories, surviving family members – many of them women – are left behind to cope, often on their own, with limited family income, increased caregiver burdens and intense mental trauma and distress;

L.  whereas the Armed Forces of Ukraine managed to withstand the Russian invasion, liberated more than 50 % of the territories temporarily occupied after 24 February 2022 and regained control of Ukraine’s western access to the Black Sea, effectively pushing out the Russian Black Sea Fleet;

M.  whereas the EU has provided substantial support in all areas, including military support, since the start of the full-scale invasion; whereas the overall assistance pledged to Ukraine by the EU, its Member States and European financial institutions since February 2022 amounts to at least EUR 85 billion, including humanitarian and emergency assistance, budget support, macro-financial assistance and military aid; whereas EUR 17 billion was provided to Member States to host some 4 million Ukrainian refugees, who have been offered extended protection under the Temporary Protection Directive(2) until March 2025;

N.  whereas the EU and its Member States have so far provided military aid amounting to EUR 28 billion, and have committed a preliminary amount of approximately EUR 21,2 billion for 2024; whereas the European Peace Facility was used to provide EUR 5,6 billion for the transfer of military equipment to Ukraine by Member States; whereas the ammunition initiative, which was initially supposed to provide 1 million rounds of 155 mm shells to Ukraine by March 2024, now aims to deliver approximately half of that amount by that date, and the other half by the end of 2024; whereas the EU Military Assistance Mission in Support of Ukraine has so far trained 40 000 Ukrainian soldiers in Germany and Poland and the number is only increasing;

O.  whereas the Western countries’ combined GDP is 25 times greater than that of Russia, yet in 2023 Western military assistance to Ukraine amounted to less than 0,1 % of this combined GDP; whereas in 2023, Russia spent approximately 6 % of its GDP on its war of aggression and Ukraine spent the equivalent of 25 % of its GDP on its defence;

P.  whereas the US Congress has so far failed to adopt a new USD 60 billion package of support to Ukraine for 2024, which has essentially led to a halt in US aid commitments and military deliveries to Ukraine; whereas to fully replace the US military support in 2024, the EU and its Member States would have to double their current level and pace of military support;

Q.  whereas NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that NATO members must prepare themselves for a possible confrontation with Russia that could last decades; whereas Russia’s war of aggression has had the direct consequence of Finland and Sweden joining NATO, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia being granted EU candidate country status, robust security assistance packages being delivered to Ukraine by over 50 countries and strong political support for Ukraine being expressed at the UN;

R.  whereas the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine following the positive recommendation of the Commission, and further invited the Council to adopt the negotiating framework once the relevant Commission recommendations are met;

S.  whereas Ukraine has signed security agreements with the UK, Germany, France, Denmark and Italy in line with the G7 joint declaration of support for Ukraine, which was agreed on 12 July 2023 on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Vilnius; whereas the G7’s commitment opened the door to negotiations to formalise long-term bilateral security commitments and arrangements in support of Ukraine;

T.  whereas, according to reports, Russia has dramatically reoriented its economy towards a ‘war economy’, combined with plans for very high defence spending estimated at well over EUR 100 billion; whereas Russia reportedly produces more than 2 million artillery shells per year domestically, which is significantly more than the quantity EU governments had promised to Ukraine;

U.  whereas the EU has adopted 13 packages of sanctions since the onset of the war and has created a new role of International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions, specifically tasked with tackling the evasion and circumvention of sanctions targeting Russia and Belarus as its proxy;

V.  whereas it is estimated that the EU and other partners have frozen EUR 300 billion of Russia’s central bank reserves and EUR 21,5 billion in Russian oligarchs’ money, while the US and other Western allies have blocked or seized more than USD 58 billion in assets owned or controlled by sanctioned Russians;

W.  whereas the EU institutions recently reached an agreement to establish a Ukraine Facility that will offer EUR 50 billion in predictable medium-term support, in the form of grants and loans, for the repair, recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of Ukraine from 2024 to 2027;

X.  whereas Russia’s war of aggression shows its imperialistic attitude towards its neighbours; whereas as long as Russia remains a state pursuing revisionist policies, it will continue its efforts to maintain the ever-looming threat of aggression on the European continent; whereas numerous international actors have recognised Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and a state that uses means of terrorism;

Y.  whereas Russia is responsible for the global food security crisis, as a result of its war of aggression against Ukraine and its blockade of Ukrainian seaports; whereas Russia has been weaponising food and hunger since the beginning of the war;

Z.  whereas the ICC, following two ad hoc declarations by Ukraine, has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide when committed on the territory of Ukraine since November 2013, but does not have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression defined in Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute in this situation, as neither Ukraine nor the Russian Federation have ratified the Rome Statute and the amendments related to the crime of aggression; whereas the EU supports the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression;

AA.  whereas Ukraine’s natural environment has been a specific target in the war, as Russia has been blatantly using massive environmental damage, such as burning fields and forests, illegally logging Ukrainian lumber and contaminating water and soil with chemical waste, resulting in the destruction of the country’s land and habitability, and limiting future generations’ ability to thrive and prosper; whereas the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam on 6 June 2023 is a clear example of actions by Russia that will continue to cause ecological devastation in the years to come;

AB.  whereas on 13 February 2024, Maksim Kuzminov, a former Russian helicopter pilot who defected to Ukraine in 2023, was found dead in Spain, murdered by gunmen reportedly sent by the Russian Government; whereas over the last few decades, the Russian intelligence services have carried out a number of brazen covert operations, including assassinations, on EU territory;

1.  Reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the people and leadership of Ukraine and its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders;

2.  Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as of the involvement of the regime in Belarus; demands that Russia and its proxy forces cease all military actions and that Russia withdraw all military forces, proxies and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine; demands that the settlement of Russian citizens in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine cease and be reversed;

3.  Recalls that the Russian war of aggression started with the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula in February 2014, followed by the occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts; recalls that the peninsula was turned into a military base and served as a springboard for the full-scale invasion in 2022;

4.  Condemns the torture and killing of Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians by the Russian side; calls for an independent investigation into and the prosecution of such crimes, and calls for increased efforts to exchange prisoners between Ukraine and Russia;

5.  Condemns Russia’s attempts to deny Ukraine and its people their ethnic, linguistic and historical identity by erasing signs of Ukrainian identity in the occupied and annexed territories, banning the use of the Ukrainian language and symbols, as well as the intensive policy of ‘passportisation’ and the repeated attempts by the Russian President and other officials to rewrite history;

6.  Believes that the outcome of the war and the stance taken by the international community will play a crucial role in influencing future action by other authoritarian regimes, which are closely observing the course of the war and assessing how much space there is for them to exert aggressive foreign policies, including by military means;

7.  Underlines that the main objective is for Ukraine to win the war against Russia, which entails driving all the forces of Russia and its proxies and allies out of the internationally recognised territory of Ukraine; considers that this objective can be met only through the continued, sustained and steadily increasing supply of all types of conventional weapons to Ukraine, without exception;

8.  Acknowledges the resilience and determination demonstrated by the Ukrainian people in their pursuit of democratic values, reform efforts and aspirations for integration into the Euro-Atlantic community of nations;

9.  Recalls the importance of liberating and de-occupying the Crimean peninsula, which has been occupied by Russia for a decade now; recalls that citizens of the peninsula who are loyal to Ukraine, in particular the indigenous Tatars, face repression, arrest and torture; recalls that the Russian occupying forces have made every effort to erase Tatar heritage and the memory of Ukraine’s presence in the peninsula, and that they continue their attempts to forcibly change the demographic composition of the population, which may amount to acts of genocide as described in the Genocide Convention; supports Ukraine’s efforts to reintegrate Crimea, in particular the Crimea Platform;

10.  Reaffirms its support for consistently providing military aid to Ukraine for as long as necessary and in whatever form necessary for Ukraine to win; recognises the efforts made by the Member States in providing and by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) in coordinating military support to Ukraine to date; reiterates its call on the Member States to substantially increase and accelerate their military support, in particular the provision of weapons and ammunition in response to clearly identified needs, with a view to not only allowing Ukraine to defend itself against Russian attacks, but also to enabling it to regain full control over its entire internationally recognised territory; underlines that the insufficient and delayed delivery of weapons and ammunition risks undermining the efforts made so far; expresses concern that the target of 1 million rounds of ammunition will not be met as promised; calls on the Member States and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to present to Parliament information about past deliveries of military aid to Ukraine, including the audit conducted by the EEAS, and the amount of aid Member States are willing to commit during 2024;

11.  Believes that there should be no self-imposed restriction on military assistance to Ukraine; points to the huge divergence of military support provided by EU Member States as a percentage of their GDP; calls for the necessary investment in the European defence industrial base so as to substantially increase output in order to meet Ukrainian needs and replenish EU Member States’ depleted stocks; underlines that Ukraine is in particular need of sophisticated air-defence systems, long-range missiles such as TAURUS, Storm Shadow/SCALP and others, modern combat aircraft, various types of artillery and ammunition (155 mm in particular), drones and weapons to counter them; supports the proposal that all EU Member States and NATO allies should support Ukraine militarily with no less than 0,25 % of their GDP annually; calls for an overall increase in the financial ceiling of the European Peace Facility and insists that this should be used, among other things, for the single source procurement of available ammunition on the world market to meet Ukraine’s needs; urges the governments of the Member States to immediately enter into dialogue with defence companies in order to guarantee that the production and delivery of, in particular, ammunition, shells and missiles for Ukraine are prioritised over orders from other third countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to explore the possibilities for joint ventures and close cooperation with defence industries from like-minded third countries for the purposes of providing the necessary ammunition to Ukraine; urges in particular the largest Member States with substantial defence industrial capacities to significantly and urgently increase military assistance to Ukraine; calls on the US House of Representatives to adopt the military assistance package for Ukraine without any further delay;

12.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to fulfil the commitments of the 2022 Versailles Declaration and to accelerate the full implementation of the Strategic Compass by enhancing European military cooperation at industrial and armed-forces level, in order to make the EU a stronger and more capable security provider that is interoperable and complementary with NATO; welcomes the Member States’ and EU institutions’ increased budgets and investments in defence, and calls for an increase in targeted spending, joint procurement and joint investment in defence research and development; stresses that concrete steps should be taken towards Ukraine’s integration into EU defence and cybersecurity policies and programmes during the EU membership process;

13.  Welcomes the signing of security agreements between Ukraine and the UK, Germany, France, Denmark and Italy, in line with the G7 joint declaration of support for Ukraine, and calls on other like-minded partners to follow suit; underlines that these security agreements cannot be considered a substitute for future NATO membership; welcomes the progress made on the practical details and financial ceiling for a new Ukraine Assistance Fund, under the European Peace Facility, which would support the provision of military equipment to Ukraine through joint European procurement initiatives;

14.  Reiterates its support for the peace formula presented by Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy; believes that it is a comprehensive plan to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity; recalls that the plan’s 10 points were reflected in UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/6 of 23 February 2023 on principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine;

15.  Reiterates its call on the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States to work together with Ukraine and the international community on setting up a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by Russia’s leaders and their allies, such as the regime in Belarus; welcomes the establishment of the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine in The Hague;

16.  Expresses its full support for the ongoing investigation by the Prosecutor of the ICC into the situation in Ukraine based on alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide; urges Ukraine to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC and its amendments and formally become a member of the ICC in order to support international efforts to establish accountability for serious international crimes; calls for the EU to make further diplomatic efforts to encourage the ratification of the Rome Statute and all its amendments globally;

17.  Expresses horror at the fact that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has resulted in one of the fastest growing large-scale displacements of children since the Second World War; recalls that, as a result of the massive targeting of civilian infrastructure, Ukrainian children are severely deprived of access to basic services, such as education and healthcare, in particular mental health support;

18.  Reiterates that the continued forced relocation and deportation of Ukrainian children, including those from institutions, to Russia and Belarus and their forced adoption by Russian families is in breach of Ukrainian and international law; underlines that forcibly transferring children of a group to another group constitutes the crime of genocide, according to Article II of the Genocide Convention; demands that the Russian and Belarusian authorities ensure the immediate return of all Ukrainian children; praises the efforts of local Ukrainian organisations that, on a case-by-case basis, support parents and families in searching for their children and fighting for their safe return;

19.  Reiterates its condemnation of the forcible deportation of Ukrainian civilians to Russia, territories of Ukraine temporarily occupied by Russia, and Belarus; calls on all states and international organisations to press Russia to return all forcibly deported and illegally imprisoned Ukrainian civilians, especially children, including the remains of all those who died in captivity; urges the EU and its Member States to intensify the search for mechanisms to facilitate the release of Ukrainian civilians illegally detained by Russia, including through UN mechanisms;

20.  Regrets the fact that the Temporary Protection Directive is interpreted so narrowly that many women who have fled Russia’s war of aggression cannot access abortion care or other sexual and reproductive health treatments, including treatments following sexual abuse; is appalled by the fact that, as a consequence, many women have been forced to return to war-torn Ukraine to access sexual and reproductive health and rights services and reproductive care; calls on the Commission to review the directive in order to ensure that all Member States are obliged to offer the same care that women could otherwise receive in Ukraine;

21.  Condemns Russia’s intention to conduct presidential elections in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine on 15-17 March 2024 and underlines that it will not recognise the results of these illegal elections;

22.  Reiterates its call for innovative, complementary and flexible interaction between the ongoing work on the implementation of the Association Agreement currently in force and the accession negotiation process, thus allowing for Ukraine’s gradual integration into the EU single market and sectoral programmes, including access to EU funds in the respective areas, so that Ukrainians can reap the benefits of accession throughout the process and not only upon its completion; welcomes Ukraine’s successful actions that re-opened the Black Sea route for Ukrainian grain to reach its traditional markets; calls on the relevant international stakeholders to permanently secure these achievements and the freedom of navigation in the Black Sea for commercial purposes; supports the Commission proposal to renew the suspension of import duties and quotas on Ukrainian exports to the EU; urges the Commission to address any reports of market disruption caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the trade benefits conceded to Ukraine; calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the reasons for any unilateral actions, such as border blockades, that would limit Ukraine’s access to the EU single market, to establish effective measures to monitor the transit of Ukrainian agricultural products and to introduce measures to mitigate the effects on European farmers, whose reasonable protests and demands are also being exploited and targeted by Russian disinformation; calls for the EU. its Member States, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Trade Organization, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and other players to show greater solidarity and stabilise the grain market; calls for the EU and its Member States to halt the import and transit through EU territory of Russian grain and of grain stolen from Ukraine;

23.  Underlines that the Russian war of aggression has fundamentally changed the geopolitical situation in Europe and beyond, and threatens its security architecture, and that the response to this necessitates bold, brave and comprehensive political, security and financial decisions by the EU;

24.  Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine once the Commission’s recommendations are met; believes that Ukraine’s membership of the EU represents a geostrategic investment in a united and strong Europe and that it equates to showing leadership, resolve and vision;

25.  Calls on the Council and the Commission to set out a clear pathway for the accession negotiations, focusing on providing tangible benefits for Ukrainian society and citizens from the start of the process; invites the Council to task the Commission with immediately submitting proposals for the relevant negotiating framework and to adopt it once the relevant steps set out in the respective Commission recommendations of 8 November 2023 have been taken;

26.  Recalls that the EU accession process will be merit-based and that the enlargement methodology puts an emphasis on the crucial areas of respect for the rule of law, fundamental values, human rights, democracy and the fight against corruption; believes that a firmly merit-based accession process is in the best interest of both Ukraine and the EU; encourages the EU and its Member States to provide increased support and assistance to Ukraine on its path to EU accession, including technical expertise, capacity building and the institutional reforms necessary to meet the membership criteria;

27.  Calls on the Ukrainian Government to continue to strengthen local self-government, a reform that has received significant national and international acclaim, and to embed the success of the decentralisation reform in the overall architecture of Ukraine’s repair, recovery and reconstruction processes; reiterates its position that representatives of local self-government and civil society in Ukraine must be actively involved in the recovery and reconstruction process and that this process must meet the highest standards of transparency and accountability;

28.  Welcomes the EU institutions’ agreement in principle on the establishment of the Ukraine Facility, which will provide predictable financial assistance to Ukraine, and calls for its rapid deployment; underlines the strengthened role of the Verkhovna Rada, sub-national entities and civil society as relevant partners for the executive authority in identifying the priorities that will be financed via the Ukraine Plan, stressing that this also increases the oversight and monitoring of the Facility; points to the estimate of the World Bank’s latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment of at least EUR 452,8 billion over the next decade for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction; stresses, therefore, that the funds provided for under the Ukraine Facility will not be sufficient and calls for the EU and its Member States to commit to additional long-term financing for Ukraine, in particular given that the latest US aid package for Ukraine remains blocked in Congress;

29.  Calls for the EU, the Member States and like-minded partners to provide comprehensive and coordinated political, economic, technical and humanitarian assistance to support the sustainable and inclusive post-war reconstruction and recovery of Ukraine, with a particular emphasis on the restoration of essential infrastructure, healthcare, education and social services; considers that the reconstruction of Ukraine must prioritise the well-being of the Ukrainian people over favouring oligarchs and corporate profits; calls for the EU and the Member States to continue to provide medical treatment and rehabilitation, including psychological support, to injured and bereaved Ukrainian soldiers and civilians; calls for continuous attention and increased support for demining activities in Ukraine and for a long-term demining programme;

30.  Emphasises the need to support Ukraine in re-establishing the conditions that will allow its people to resume a safe and prosperous economic and social life and to recover from the profound consequences of the war on mental health, for internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes, and, in particular for the country’s younger generations, to develop personal, educational and entrepreneurial projects; underlines, in addition, the need to take into account the concerns, needs and expertise of internally displaced persons and refugees in the recovery and reconstruction process, as their reintegration into local communities will be crucial for strengthening Ukraine’s societal and institutional resilience and its unity;

31.  Calls on the Council to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing its effectiveness and impact; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the swift implementation and strict enforcement of all 13 packages of sanctions; asks the Commission for an impact assessment on the sanctions’ effectiveness in hindering the Russian war effort and on the circumvention of sanctions; recalls that the EU is working on legislation to designate the violation of restrictive measures a criminal offence; reiterates its call on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to develop a sanction circumvention prevention mechanism;

32.  Insists on the need to ban Russian uranium and metallurgical imports into the EU, as well as cooperation with the Russian nuclear sector and Rosatom in particular; calls for an immediate and full embargo on Russian imports into the EU of agricultural and fishery products, as well as fossil fuels and liquefied natural gas transported by sea through pipelines, and to further decrease the price-cap on Russian petroleum products in coordination with G7 partners in order to stop financing Russia’s war with EU money; calls, in addition, for punitive measures to be imposed against Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’, which transports oil without insurance on precarious vessels through EU and international waters, and for sanctions against companies from China and other countries helping Russia to circumvent sanctions; calls for the current military and dual-use licensing regime to be expanded to include a much larger group of war-relevant goods, including digital components; calls for the sanctions against Belarus to be fully aligned with those against Russia; calls for further persons identified by Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation to be included on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime and other sanctions lists;

33.  Condemns all those countries that are supplying military equipment to Russia and assisting it in circumventing and avoiding the effects of the sanctions imposed on it, and calls for the EU to rigorously prosecute companies, associations and individuals participating in the circumvention of sanctions; calls for the EU, the Member States and their allies to strengthen the effectiveness of the sanctions already imposed, to take urgent steps to block any attempt to circumvent these sanctions and to work on a secondary sanctions mechanism that would close any loopholes;

34.  Reminds businesses, individuals, financial institutions and others that operate in or have value chains linked to the Russian Federation or the areas it occupies in Ukraine, including investors, consultants, non-governmental organisations and due diligence service providers, that they will face significant operational, legal, economic and reputational risks associated with their Russian business operations and relationships; calls on the Member States to take particular measures to prevent advanced technological products that are being exported to third countries from ending up in Russia;

35.  Insists that circumventing a Union restrictive measure, including by transferring goods to a destination where their import, export, sale, purchase, transfer, transit or transport are restricted, should be criminalised at EU level; stresses that it is critical for enforcement that the EU quickly criminalise direct sanctions violations, including when committed with serious negligence, as well as indirect sanctions violations through the circumvention of Union restrictive measures; welcomes the recently reached agreement in principle between EU institutions on new rules criminalising the violation of EU sanctions;

36.  Condemns Russia’s practice of blocking any action at UN level aimed at holding it accountable for its war of aggression against Ukraine; calls for the EU and its Member States to take further action to continue Russia’s international isolation, including with regard to Russia’s membership of international organisations and bodies, such as the UN Security Council;

37.  Underlines the urgency of establishing a sound legal regime allowing for the confiscation of Russian state-owned assets frozen by the EU, and for their use to address the various consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, including the reconstruction of the country and compensation for the victims of Russia’s aggression, thereby strengthening the resilience of Ukraine; underlines its conviction that once the war ends, Russia must be obliged to pay the reparations imposed on it to ensure that it makes a substantial contribution to the reconstruction of Ukraine; welcomes the creation of the Register of Damage caused by the Russian aggression, which is the first step in the establishment of an international compensation mechanism; welcomes, therefore, the Council’s decision to set aside, as a first step, extraordinary revenues generated by assets and reserves of the Central Bank of Russia immobilised under EU sanctions, which will allow them to be used to make a financial contribution to the EU’s support for the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine through the Ukraine Facility;

38.  Reiterates its concern about the situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which is illegally controlled by Russia; supports efforts to maintain a continued International Atomic Energy Agency presence at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant; recalls and condemns Russia’s actions that have inflicted severe damage on the environment in Ukraine, including the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, the logging of Ukrainian forests, extensive mining and the contamination of air and water resources; reiterates its deep concern about the broader long-term environmental impact of the war; underlines the need to create a system for recording and assessing the environmental damage caused by Russia and to prepare legal grounds for Russia’s accountability for those crimes;

39.  Strongly condemns Russia’s eradication, destruction and looting of Ukraine’s cultural artefacts, such as churches, artworks, museums and universities; takes note of the damage, as verified by UNESCO, that has been caused to 341 sites since the start of the full-scale invasion, including 126 religious sites, 150 buildings of historical and/or artistic interest, 31 museums, 19 monuments, 14 libraries and 1 archive; reiterates that the deliberate destruction and looting of Ukrainian cultural heritage sites may amount to war crimes;

40.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to work strategically and proactively to counter hybrid threats, to strengthen EU strategic communication and to prevent Russia’s interference in political, electoral and other democratic processes in Ukraine and in the EU, in particular malicious acts aimed at manipulating public opinion and undermining European integration, particularly in the light of the upcoming European elections; calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to provide relevant information on the mutual benefits and opportunities of enlargement both in Ukraine and in the Member States in order to further increase support and improve understanding of the accession process;

41.  Condemns the assassination of Maksim Kuzminov in Spain; calls on the Member States to respond promptly and with resolve against disruptive actions by the Russian intelligence services within the EU’s territory; recommends that the Member States enhance counterintelligence cooperation and information-sharing;

42.  Expresses concern about the restriction of foreign travel of members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; believes that this could be considered indiscriminate restriction of the political activity of elected members of parliament, in particular of those representing the opposition; strongly believes that in times of war, any political resource that can represent Ukraine’s cause in any international forum should not be disregarded;

43.  Expresses its utmost appreciation for the continued and tireless work of the local staff of the Delegation of the EU to Ukraine in circumstances that remain very difficult for them and their relatives; urges the EEAS and the Commission to adopt contingency plans and interim solutions for the local staff of the EU Delegation, including teleworking and flexible working arrangements and temporary relocation solutions, which are tailored to meeting the actual needs and challenges of the staff; stresses, in addition, the importance of taking adequate care of the mental health of the EU Delegation’s staff;

44.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the United Nations and the Russian and Belarusian authorities.

(1) OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3. (2) Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (OJ L 212, 7.8.2001, p. 12).

European Parliament resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement (2023/2114(INI))

P9_TA(2024)0120 A9-0015/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular its Articles 5(3), 48 and 49,

–  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard the Council conclusions of December 2006, March 2020 and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,

–  having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on 30 years of Copenhagen criteria – giving further impetus to EU enlargement policy(1),

–  having regard to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

–  having regard to the Manifesto of Ventotene,

–  having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement(2),

–  having regard to the Committee of the Regions’ opinion of 5-6 July 2022 on the Commission’s Enlargement Package 2022, as well as the President of the Committee of the Region’s statement of 8 November 2023 on the Commission’s 2023 Enlargement package,

–  having regard to the Commission’s report of 9 February 2022 on cohesion in Europe towards 2050,

–  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 23-24 June 2022, and 29-30 June 2023, 26-27 October 2023, and 14-15 December 2023,

–  having regard to the Commission’s Analytical reports of 2 February 2023 on Ukraine’s (SWD(2023)0030), Moldova’s (SWD(2023)0032) and Georgia’s (SWD(2023)0031) alignment with the EU acquis,

–  having regard to the Commission’s Joint-Communication to the European Council of 29 November 2023 on the State of Play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations (JOIN(2023)0050),

–  having regard to the conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 29-30 April 1997 on the application of conditionality with a view to developing a coherent EU strategy for relations with the countries in the Western Balkan region,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on the matter, in particular that of 24 October 2019 on opening accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania(3), and its resolutions on the 2022 Commission reports on Kosovo(4), Serbia(5), Albania(6), Bosnia and Herzegovina(7), North Macedonia(8) and Montenegro(9),

–  having regard to its recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Western Balkans, following the 2020 summit(10),

–  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 19 and 20 June 2003 and the Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans,

–  having regard to EU Association Agreements with Albania(11), Bosnia and Herzegovina(12), Georgia(13), Kosovo, the Republic of Moldova(14), Montenegro, North Macedonia(15), Serbia, Türkiye(16) and Ukraine(17),

–  having regard to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans (COM(2023)0692),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057), and to the Commission strategy for ‘A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans’ of February 2018,

–  having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the candidate status of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia,

–  having regard to its resolution of 5 October 2023 on taking stock of Moldova’s path to the EU(18),

–  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 01/2022 of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

–  having regard to the Commission’s 2022 Enlargement package of 12 October 2022,

–  having regard to the 2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy to the Enlargement Package adopted by the European Commission on 8 November 2023 (COM(2023)0690),

–  having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)(19),

–  having regard to the European Economic and Social Committee’s opinion of 10 July 2014 on enhancing the transparency and inclusiveness of the EU accession process(20),

–  having regard to its resolutions of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty(21), and of 11 July 2023 on the implementation of the passerelle clauses in the EU Treaties(22),

–  having regard to the report of 9 May 2022 on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe of 9 May 2022 and to its resolution of 4 May 2022 on the follow-up to the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe(23),

–  having regard to its resolutions of 9 June 2022 on the call for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties(24), and of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties(25), and activation of Article 48 TEU asking the European Council to agree on calling a Convention to reform the Treaties,

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A9-0015/2024),

A.  whereas nine of the 10 countries currently aspiring to join the EU have candidate status, some of them for many years; whereas those candidate countries find themselves at various stages of the accession process and negotiations;

B.  whereas following the Commission’s recommendations in the 2023 enlargement package, on 14 December 2023 the European Council decided to grant candidate status to Georgia and to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, and the Republic of Moldova as well as with Bosnia and Herzegovina, once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria has been achieved;

C.  whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and other ongoing geopolitical challenges have given new geostrategic meaning to the enlargement of the European Union; whereas the stability, security and democratic resilience of the Western Balkans and the Eastern Neighbourhood are inextricably linked to those of the EU;

D.  whereas enlargement is a moral and historic commitment, and a strategic geopolitical priority representing a geostrategic investment in the future, which will contribute to peace, stability, security, democracy, unity, the fight against climate change, as well as, ensuring prosperity and well-being on the European continent; whereas the EU’s security also rests on its ability to defend, advance and sustain peace, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental values; whereas enlargement can be mutually beneficial for both existing and future Member States, and their citizens as long as the proper conditions and requirements are met;

E.  whereas enlargement has become one of the strongest EU policy and geopolitical tools; whereas according to the Eurobarometer of June 2023, the majority of the EU’s population is in favour of the future enlargement of the EU; whereas a new impetus, commitments and vision are urgently needed to re-energise the enlargement process, ensuring its continuity, consistency and impact; whereas the lack of engagement in previous years has created a vacuum, thus opening the space for Russia and China and other external actors; whereas the principle of mutual and sincere cooperation must always be respected;

F.  whereas accession to the EU must always be a merit-based procedure whereby each applicant is assessed on its own merits in terms of its fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria in their entirety, including those of ensuring a continuous full respect for human rights, including the rights of minorities, democracy, and the rule of law, as well as for the other fundamental values of the EU; whereas positive outcomes should be sought as quickly as possible, while avoiding fast-tracking or pre-defined deadlines;

G.  whereas stagnation or backtracking must have consequences, as the entire accession process needs to be based on fair and rigorous conditionality;

H.  whereas accession to the EU requires ambitious integration agenda capacity from both the EU and the candidate countries; whereas fundamental reforms in the areas of the judiciary, the fight against corruption, media freedom and pluralism are necessary for candidate countries to progress along their path towards the EU;

I.  whereas it would be advantageous to complete the pending membership of the existing Member States in the Euro and Schengen area along with the next enlargement;

J.  whereas the countries of the Western Balkans must also focus on conflict resolution, regional cooperation and reconciliation; whereas there is no place in the EU or in the countries aspiring to become Member States for inflammatory rhetoric, genocide denial or glorification of war criminals from any side; whereas coming to terms with the past is the only way to achieve genuine reconciliation, which is crucial for prosperous societies and successful integration;

K.  whereas the processes of widening and deepening the EU must go in parallel as they have the capacity to mutually reinforce each other, multiplying their impact and significantly contributing to the overarching objectives for which the EU was created;

L.  whereas the challenge of a bigger European Union demands an enhanced enlargement policy, based on gradual integration into common policies and with clear benefits for citizens throughout the process;

M.  whereas, in the context of enlargement, there is a need to look in a holistic way at the review of current and future European policies, structural reforms, institutional changes and the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2028-2034;

N.  whereas the countries of the Western Balkans have for decades stated their determination to join the EU; whereas on 23-24 June 2022 EU leaders reconfirmed a full and unequivocal commitment to the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans;

O.  whereas candidate countries must demonstrate their adherence to the fundamental values of the EU, and also alignment with the EU’s policies and positions, including its common foreign and security policy (CFSP);

P.   whereas some Western Balkan countries have reached a high degree of alignment with the EU’s CFSP in recent years, including sanctions against Russia in response to its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas in March 2023 Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro, and North Macedonia launched the ‘Western Balkans QUAD – 100 % alignment with EU Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP)’ platform;

Q.  whereas the EU must demonstrate a clear political will to support the candidate countries and should step up considerably its conditional technical and financial support for fundamental reforms, the resolution of bilateral disputes, economic convergence and regional economic integration in accession countries; whereas the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans aims to accelerate fundamental reforms, enhance the countries’ integration into the EU’s single market as well as boost economic integration of the region;

R.  whereas malign foreign actors are using hybrid interference methods to impact and derail EU integration;

S.  whereas Parliament is undoubtedly the most supportive EU institution when it comes to enlargement; whereas Parliament’s role remains extremely limited throughout the entire enlargement process and should be strengthened in order to increase democratic legitimacy and accountability, including in evaluating the intermediate steps of the accession, inter alia through regular committee meetings and parliamentary scrutiny of pre-accession funding, while making use of its existing tools and instruments, including democracy support programmes; whereas regional and local administrations and civil society organisations should be structurally involved in the enlargement process and its scrutiny;

T.  whereas major initiatives such as the European Political Community, which has already held three official meetings, enable political cooperation and contribute to regional dialogues in different domains between the EU and other countries, but are not alternatives to EU membership;

U.  whereas significant pre-enlargement reforms are needed to guarantee the efficient functioning of the enlarged EU and its capacity to absorb new members and to promote their successful integration as well as to respond properly to the many challenges it currently faces; whereas this could imply significant changes in the EU’s institutional framework, and the possible advancement of differentiated integration solutions whenever the Treaties allow; whereas some of those solutions have been discussed for some time already; whereas in order to achieve this, the EU should also take full advantage of the flexibility afforded by the Treaty of Lisbon ahead of a more in-depth reform in the context of a possible revision of the treaties;

V.  whereas the EU faces considerable challenges to delivering effective crisis management and, in particular, in decision-making procedures, whereas the EU’s credibility and ability to act in a timely and effective manner depends on democratic and efficient decision-making, and even more so in an enlarged EU of 30 or more Member States; whereas it is clear that the EU institutions and decision-making mechanisms, especially in the Council, are unfit for a Union with an increased number of Member States; whereas political will and efficient decision-making leading to timely and coordinated internal and external action is vital to safeguard the EU’s interests and its global geopolitical leadership and credibility; whereas recent difficulties with EU decisions on sanctions confirm the need to move away from unanimity; whereas a profound reform of the EU’s institutional framework and governance structures, with simplified, more effective and democratic decision-making procedures, must be implemented where necessary in parallel with the ongoing accession negotiations;

W.  whereas passerelle clauses could be used immediately to switch from the requirement for unanimity to qualified majority voting in specific policy areas; whereas Parliament has activated the Treaty revision procedure and has submitted proposals for the amendment of the Treaties to the Council in accordance with Article 48(2) TEU; whereas the President of the Commission announced during her speech at the European Parliament on 17 January 2024 the forthcoming presentation of a Communication on Treaty Reform paving the way for a discussion in the European Council, in the near future;

X.  whereas the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission have committed to following up effectively on the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe; whereas the Conference on the Future of Europe called on the EU to agree on a strong vision and a common strategy to consolidate its unity and improve the decision-making capacity of the EU in view of future enlargement; whereas many of these proposals can only be implemented if there are changes to the Treaties;

Y.  whereas democratic backsliding is among the greatest threats facing the European Union, both internally and externally;

Z.  whereas the mechanism to ensure compliance with the EU’s fundamental principles and values and the acquis communautaire must also be strengthened in parallel with the next enlargement; whereas the implementation of the acquis should be thoroughly and objectively monitored for each candidate state;

AA.  whereas enlargement is both a major financial challenge for the EU, in particular, cohesion and agriculture policies, as well as other EU programmes and policies and an opportunity to reform the EU; whereas the current and future MFFs should be reviewed, reprioritised, properly constructed and significantly strengthened and their governance overhauled to enable and underpin substantial EU enlargement without jeopardising the support needed in current Member States; whereas this financial groundwork must be in place prior to enlargement;

AB.  whereas the reconstruction and post-war recovery of Ukraine is an additional challenge to be addressed in the wider context of an international effort;

On the strategic dimension of enlargement

1.  Welcomes the aspiration of numerous European countries and their citizens to join the EU and acknowledges their political will and the serious efforts they have made to meet the requirements for membership;

2.  Believes that enlargement is of the utmost strategic importance for the EU; reaffirms that an enhanced enlargement policy has become one of the strongest EU policy and geopolitical tools representing a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability, security, climate protection and prosperity across the continent and all the more so in the face of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and other common geopolitical challenges, requiring a long-term political vision and bold decisions; emphasises the political urgency of demonstrating the EU’s commitment to the international rules-based order; insists that given the major security challenges facing Europe, the enlargement of the EU, and the inclusion of Ukraine in the Western collective security and defence systems, will strengthen European security;

3.  Welcomes the Commission’s recommendations in the 2023 enlargement package and further welcomes the European Council’s decisions to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, to grant Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 are taken and to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria has been achieved; invites the Council to task the Commission to immediately submit proposals for the relevant negotiating frameworks and to adopt them once the relevant steps set out in the respective Commission recommendations of 8 November 2023 are taken;

On accession procedures and the role of the European Parliament

4.  Acknowledges the historic opportunity and challenge facing the EU of meeting its commitments to the countries and the peoples of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia, and of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia; recognises the importance of the European integration of these crucial partners; also recognises the importance of regional cooperation within the respective regions of the Eastern Partnership, and the Western Balkans;

5.  Reiterates the view that Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances; urges the Turkish Government to break the current deadlock and move forward towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership by developing a realistic parallel framework of cooperation, such as a modernised association agreement and calls on the Commission to explore possible formats for such a framework; recalls that any improvement in EU-Türkiye relations must be based on tangible progress on human rights, democracy and respectful neighbourly relations;

6.  Underlines that accession to the EU must always be a merit-based procedure and that each applicant must be assessed on its own merit in terms of its meeting the Copenhagen criteria in their entirety; underscores that there can be no short-cuts on EU values and fundamental principles; highlights that the rule of law, democratic reform, media freedom and respect for human rights, including the rights of minorities, should be put at the forefront of the accession process, with judicial independence, the fight against corruption and the empowerment of civil society being crucial preconditions for progress along the path to EU membership;

7.  Requests that effective monitoring mechanisms to protect fundamental values and the sound financial interests of the Union in the context of accession procedures be enhanced; reiterates in this regard its calls to include candidate countries in the EU rule of law mechanism and its annual reporting exercise, automatically activating pre-accession cooperation and verification mechanisms; supports the Commission’s intention to include accession countries into the Rule of Law Reports, insists that they feed into the annual progress reports;

8.  Encourages enlargement countries to continue to resolutely implement the necessary reforms and make tangible and irreversible progress, starting with the fundamentals of the EU accession process;

9.  Insists on the need for continuous efforts to foster media pluralism, defend the rights of journalists and ensure freedom of expression in all candidate countries;

10.   Points out that alignment with the EU’s CFSP is also an essential indicator of full adherence to the EU’s fundamental principles and sustainable future membership; urges all candidate and potential candidate countries to prioritise a swift and full alignment with the CFSP and reiterates that accession of a given country can proceed only once it aligns with the EU’s restrictive measures, including sanctions put in place in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

11.  Calls for the EU’s enlargement strategy to be thoroughly evaluated and for the reasons for the limited progress made by some enlargement countries to be assessed, particularly in the areas of the rule of law, human rights and democracy;

12.  Considers the Commission’s revised methodology, which should be updated to include the accession processes of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, to be a long-term policy framework, guiding the enlargement process;

13.  Stresses that while the process should become more incremental and dynamic and the EU should set concrete individual reform targets, roadmaps and intermediate timelines for each accession country, there can be no fast-track or pre-defined deadlines for membership, as they could affect the integrity of the accession process; believes, however, that the next EU enlargement should take place as soon as all accession conditions are met in the candidate countries concerned and in parallel the necessary European reforms are agreed and implemented; expects that the first candidate countries will be ready to join the Union by the end of this decade;

14.  Insists that EU enlargement is a shared responsibility of the current and aspiring Member States; calls on the Member States to demonstrate a clear and unequivocal political commitment towards the enlargement process, based on objective criteria and not misused to settle bilateral disputes, which should be resolved separately from the accession process; stresses that excessive delays on the way towards full EU membership can negatively impact both public opinion and the political commitment of candidate countries;

15.  Underlines that accession processes can take place in a reversible manner, and that the merit-based approach can also lead to freezing of the accession negotiations in the event of backsliding on fundamental values, and can only be resumed after significant progress on reforms; calls for robust and enhanced monitoring, reporting and assessment of the reforms and progress made by the candidate countries in all the negotiating chapters with a strategically applied targeted conditionality based on clear progress benchmarks, sanctioning regression on fundamentals or persistent stagnation in reforms and rewarding reforms and fulfilment of benchmarks through clear negotiation timelines;

16.  Calls on the Commission to improve the consistency, efficiency and transparency of pre-accession assistance, clearly reflecting the priorities in the fundamental areas in the allocation of IPA III funding; calls, in particular, for the introduction of stricter and more enforceable accountability with regard to spending and for improvement of the overall cycle of disbursement, implementation and scrutiny of pre-accession funding, applying strict conditionality, including in the implementation of the Economic and Investment Plan and the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans; invites the Commission to carry out a mid-term review of the IPA III Regulation and to propose the listing of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia as its beneficiaries, invites the Commission to swiftly implement the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors Special Report 01/2022;

17.  Calls for options to further strengthen protection of the rule of law and the EU’s democratic values against backsliding for both existing and future Member States to be explored in the context of Treaty reform, ensuring that enlargement strengthens the EU and its single market;

18.   Highlights the need to ensure that EU funding provided to enlargement countries is in line with the EU’s own strategic goals and interests; calls on the Commission to financially support those accession countries that work towards good neighbourly relations, inclusive regional cooperation and sustainable reconciliation, including but not limited to the prosecution of war criminals and ensuring access to truth, justice and effective reparations to victims of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide;

19.  Calls on the accession countries to enhance judicial cooperation with the EU in criminal matters under the working arrangements with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in order to facilitate effective investigation and prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO, and stepping up the administrative capacity of local administrations;

20.  Reiterates its position on the need for strengthened, formal, structured and systematic cooperation between the EU and the Council of Europe in supporting accession countries on reforms, ensuring their compliance with all the recommendations of the Venice Commission on their path towards EU membership;

21.  Believes that the challenge of an expanded EU requires an enhanced enlargement policy putting in place a clear incremental pathway towards EU membership, including gradual integration into common policies, such as the single market, for those countries that complete negotiations in a given policy chapter or that make substantial progress on EU-related reforms; notes that such progress should enable access to EU funds in the respective areas so as to bring clear benefits for citizens throughout the process; notes that this pathway should be accompanied by increased technical and conditional financial assistance with a special focus on the implementation and enforcement of laws under negotiating clusters on fundamentals and external relations, notably chapters 23, 24, 30 and 31; invites the Commission to present detailed proposals on the incremental accession methodology, including clear ‘graduation’ and reversibility clauses; underlines that the phasing-in of candidate countries into selected policy areas with limited rights and obligations is by no means a substitute for or an alternative to fully fledged membership;

22.  Acknowledges the importance of initiatives such as the European Political Community, which enable political cooperation and contribute to regional dialogues and which could facilitate the gradual integration of candidate countries into the Union and to its policies, but are not alternatives to EU membership;

23.  Stresses that it could be useful to have a separate post of Commissioner for Enlargement;

24.  Suggests considering granting candidate countries observer status in relevant bodies and institutions, including Parliament, initially on the basis of temporary arrangements if negotiations are sufficiently advanced, in particular on clusters on fundamentals and external relations, and all conditions are met and agreed, until the accession treaties have been signed; welcomes in this regard the decision of the European Economic and Social Committee to include observers from candidate countries as of 2024;

25.  Considers there to be a need for stronger, more effective and meaningful European Parliament decision-making and oversight of the EU’s enlargement policy and its funding, so as to increase democratic legitimacy and accountability; insists on strengthening the role of Parliament throughout the entire accession process, including the intermediate steps, covering a full scrutiny of the progress made by the candidate countries across policy fields; commits to enhance regular and transparent dialogue and cooperation with the national parliaments of candidate countries as a model for parliamentary scrutiny of EU integration;

26.  Underlines the need to strengthen democracy support through the existing channels and instruments, such as the Jean Monnet Dialogue, the Inter-party Dialogue (IPD) and the Parliamentary Dialogue Process (PDP);

27.  Calls on the EU institutions and Member States to fully engage in further strengthening the reform processes in the candidate countries, in particular their administrative capacities;

28.  Highlights the need to step up transparency, empower citizens’ participation and close involvement of the civil society in the enlargement process and its scrutiny, ensuring its sustainable funding;

29.  Underlines that the enlargement process must not inadvertently perpetuate or exacerbate disparities based on sexual orientation and gender identity; urges the Commission and candidate countries to integrate measures within the enlargement process that actively promote and ensure the rights of LGBTIQ individuals, such as developing policies that eliminate discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, enhancing LGBTIQ participation in decision-making processes, and fostering inclusivity in the political, economic, and social spheres through education and awareness-raising activities; calls on the Commission and candidate countries to duly monitor and evaluate the status of LGBTIQ rights in candidate countries;

30.  Considers that the accession process must ensure that candidate countries increase their efforts related to equal rights for persons with disabilities; emphasises the need to increase pressure on candidate countries to implement reforms to improve the situation of persons with disabilities and to increase their efforts in terms of deinstitutionalisation including the transition from institutional to family and community-based care;

On European institutional and financial reforms

31.  Considers that the processes of preparing for enlargement should proceed in parallel in the EU and accession countries; stresses that European institutional and financial reforms are needed to face current challenges and to ensure the EU’s capacity to absorb new members and to promote their successful integration; calls on the EU Institutions and Member States to undertake the necessary reforms to ensure that their absence does not delay the accession of new Member States; notes that these reforms are needed to strengthen the EU and its institutions so as to promote democratic legitimacy, good governance, functionality, accountability, transparency and sustainability; stresses, in particular, the importance of bolstering the democratic legitimacy of EU policies by reinforcing Parliament’s decision-making and scrutiny rights; reiterates, therefore, its calls to grant Parliament a general and direct right of legislative initiative;

32.  Firmly believes that European institutional reforms should increase the EU’s ability to act, and include simplified and more effective decision-making procedures, moving away from unanimity; reiterates that qualified majority voting should be implemented in areas such as the protection of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the MFF, sanctions and other relevant foreign policy decisions, such as the start of EU accession negotiations, the opening and closing of individual negotiation clusters and sanctioning of backtracking, but with the exception of decisions authorising military missions or operations with an executive mandate;

33.  Calls for the mechanism to protect the rule of law and the EU’s fundamental principles and values, and the monitoring capacity to ensure compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, to be strengthened ahead of the next round of enlargement; proposes that the procedure in Article 7 TEU be reformed by ending unanimity in Council decisions, by introducing a clear timeframe, and by making the Court of Justice the arbiter of violations; points out that the introduction of qualified majority voting (QMV) in this respect would facilitate the enlargement process; stresses the need for further reform of the rule of law conditionality mechanism to cover and guarantee all of the Union’s fundamental values as defined in Article 2 TEU;

34.  Believes that in the context of full membership, differentiated integration is part of the solution for an efficient and deepened enlarged EU; underlines, however, that respect for the Union’s values as set out in Article 2 TEU is non-negotiable, should not be subject to any derogations or opt-outs and that membership of the Union has to require a strong commitment to respect all EU law; considers also that a broad area of European common ground must always be ensured, covering areas such as the customs union, the single market and its four freedoms, the core social acquis, and agricultural, competition and trade policies; notes that beyond this common ground, Member States willing to move European integration forward in a wider array of policy areas should be allowed to do so; underlines that under such a system of differentiated integration, while all Member States would take part in decisions about issues in the area of common ground, only Member States willing to participate in areas of deepened integration would take part in the decisions concerned; notes that differentiated integration also implies differentiated financial arrangements;

35.  Calls for the full use of the flexibility provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon ahead of a more in-depth reform in the context of a possible revision of the treaties; recalls that a number of flexibility instruments, such as passerelle clauses, enhanced cooperation, constructive abstentions, permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and opt-out mechanisms are already possible under the current EU legal framework, as the experience of the Schengen area, one of the greatest achievements of the Union, and the euro area clearly show; recalls that phasing-in solutions, temporary derogations and transition periods can be negotiated in the context of accession procedures; points out that the use of these flexibility mechanisms should not prevent constructive discussions on treaty revision, as endorsed by Parliament in its resolution of 22 November 2023;

36.  Notes that institutional pre-enlargement reforms must also address the implications of enlargement for the composition of Parliament; recalls that the European Parliament is the only directly elected institution representing EU citizens; underlines that, while ensuring appropriate democratic representativeness, Parliament should remain at a workable size; points out, however, that a reasonable increase in the size of Parliament cannot be ruled out in order to ensure sufficient democratic representativeness in an enlarged EU; insists on a new system for seat allocation based on a permanent mathematical formula, which is objective, fair, transparent and durable; recalls its position that seat allocation in the European Parliament should be considered together with the voting system in the Council;

37.  Stresses the need for a swift revision of the Council’s functioning and decision-making process in view of enlargement; proposes to review the system of rotating presidencies of the Council; notes that the calculation of qualified majority voting thresholds should also be reconsidered to improve the balance between larger and smaller states and to set higher thresholds for the most important decisions; calls for the utmost transparency and integrity of the Council’s decision-making process in the context of enlargement;

38.  Notes that the composition of the Commission must take enlargement into account and recalls in this regard the flexibility provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon; highlights that any reassessment of the practice of appointing one Commissioner per Member State must ensure a geographically balanced composition of the Commission;

39.  Reiterates its call for the strengthening of the instruments for citizens’ participation in the EU decision-making process;

40.  Stresses that enlargement is both a major financial challenge for the EU, in particular regarding cohesion and agriculture policies, and an opportunity to reform the EU; points out that this challenge requires a properly designed, prioritised and funded MFF and a more effective EU budget that enables the Union to take on new commitments while continuing to deliver on existing programmes and political priorities; further stresses that sufficient additional and genuine own resources are also needed to meet the enlargement challenge; notes that enlargement adds to other growing demands on EU funding in the fields of financial stability, strategic autonomy, health, energy, decarbonisation, the clean energy transition, environmental protection, digitalisation, research, defence and security; underlines that such financial reforms must be considered in parallel with the ongoing accession negotiations and adopted ahead of enlargement; defends its position that the current and future MFF architecture should be restructured and significantly strengthened to increase resilience; underlines the need to take the accession of new members into account during preparation of the 2028-2034 MFF;

41.  Calls on the Commission and candidate countries to guarantee the special role of SMEs as a main pillar in strengthening industrial policies and enhance the countries’ ability to achieve a just transition and adapt to technological challenges on the way to an inclusive digital transition;

42.  Reiterates its calls on the Council, the Commission and the EEAS to improve strategic communication and visibility of both the mutual socio-economic benefits and challenges of enlargement in the accession countries and the Member States alike via an effective information campaign strategy throughout the enlargement process, demonstrating tangible results of the ongoing accession process and of each round of negotiations;

43.  Reiterates its calls for the recommendations of the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE) to be implemented, in particular by stepping up efforts to counter disinformation and prevent foreign malign interference and attempts to undermine democracy and to derail EU integration by sabotaging political, economic and social stability in the candidate countries;

44.  Points out that the reconstruction and post-war recovery of Ukraine is a multidimensional challenge to be addressed in the wider context of an international effort; stresses that funding for Ukraine must stem from multiple international sources, including frozen Russian assets; underlines that these investments will come with associated financial risks and insists that this process must be closely monitored and embedded in a well-designed, tailor-made legislative framework, that is corruption and fraud proof; calls, in this regard, for swift adoption of the Regulation establishing the Ukraine Facility;

45.  Welcomes the Commission’s work on pre-enlargement policy and the funding review, and calls for a thorough impact assessment of the implications of enlargement; supports the creation of an effective EU-supported conflict resolution and mediation mechanism outside the enlargement framework, dedicated to fostering reconciliation and resolving bilateral issues in accession countries, helping to find and implement definitive binding solutions to regional and bilateral disputes and the legacies of the past;

46.  Calls for the European elections 2024 to be taken as an opportunity to debate and present the need for and the benefits of the process of deepening and enlarging the European Union; and the necessary European political, institutional and financial reforms;

o
o   o

47.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the governments and parliaments of the accession countries.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0471. (2) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105. (3) OJ C 202, 28.5.2021, p. 86. (4) OJ C, C/2023/1066, 15.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1066/oj. (5) OJ C, C/2023/1065, 15.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1065/oj. (6) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0285. (7) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0284. (8) OJ C 479, 16.12.2022, p. 33. (9) OJ C 32, 27.1.2023, p. 63. (10) OJ C 362, 8.9.2021, p. 129. (11) OJ L 107, 28.4.2009, p. 166. (12) OJ L 164, 30.6.2015, p. 2. (13) OJ L 261, 30.8.2014, p. 4. (14) OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4. (15) OJ L 84, 20.3.2004, p. 13. (16) OJ L 361, 31.12.1977, p. 29. (17) OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3. (18) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0357. (19) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1. (20) REX/401-EESC-2014- 1609. (21) OJ C 252, 18.7.2018, p. 215. (22) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0269. (23) OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 109. (24) OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 130. (25) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0427.

European Parliament resolution of 29 February 2024 on the implementation of the EU-Southern African Development Community (SADC) Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) (2023/2065(INI))

P9_TA(2024)0121 A9-0024/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the SADC EPA States, of the other part(1),

–  having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2016 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the SADC EPA States, of the other part(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 6 October 2022 on the outcome of the Commission’s review of the 15-point action plan on trade and sustainable development(3),

–  having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the future of EU-Africa trade relations(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on a new EU-Africa Strategy – a partnership for sustainable and inclusive development(5),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0152),

–  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 11 October 2022 entitled ‘Individual information sheets on implementation of EU Trade Agreements’ (SWD(2022)0730),

–  having regard to the Commission position paper on the Sustainability Impact Assessment in support of trade negotiations with Angola for EU-SADC EPA accession,

–  having regard to the Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Angola (EU-Angola SIFA),

–  having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, including the Paris Agreement of 2015,

–  having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,

–  having regard to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) publication of 19 October 2021 entitled ‘Transforming Southern Africa: Harnessing Regional Value Chains and Industrial Policy for Development’,

–  having regard to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area,

–  having regard to the Joint Statement of the 26th EU-South Africa Inter-Parliamentary Meeting, which took place on 31 October and 1 November 2018,

–  having regard to the SADC Vision 2050,

–  having regard to the SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap (2015-2063),

–  having regard to the European Economic and Social Committee’s own-initiative opinion entitled ‘Next Generation Trade and Sustainable Development – Reviewing the 15-point action plan’(6),

–  having regard to the Ex-post evaluation of the EU-SADC Economic Partnership Agreement – Inception Report of 21 June 2023,

–  having regard to the meetings of the EU-SADC EPA Trade and Development Committee, in particular its sixth to ninth meetings,

–  having regard to the 2021 Global Report on Food Crises,

–  having regard to the study of the European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services of 22 November 2023 entitled ‘EU-Southern African Development Community Economic Partnership Agreement: AA geo-economic perspective’(7),

–  having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Development,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0024/2024),

A.  whereas geopolitical changes, including the coronavirus pandemic, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the economic consequences thereof, have led to Africa’s repositioning and the countries of the Global South having a more self-determined role on the world stage, advancing their own interests and contributions;

B.  whereas the association of important countries of the Global South in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) alliance, which is to be expanded by six more countries from 2024 following the decision of the BRICS summit in August 2023, underscores the importance of maintaining cooperation with Global South nations on equal and equitable terms;

C.  whereas South Africa plays a prominent role as a bridge-builder between the European Union and the African continent and as a partner in addressing global challenges;

D.  whereas the post-Cotonou Agreement will become the new overarching framework for all EPAs, including the EPA with the SADC, as well as a key reference for future reviews of these agreements;

E.  whereas the full participation of all stakeholders, namely civil society, business representatives and trade unions, in implementing and monitoring the EU-SADC EPA is essential for the timely identification of challenges, opportunities and priorities and for monitoring the respective agreed actions;

F.  whereas Angola is in the process of joining the EU-SADC EPA; whereas the EU and Angola have concluded negotiations on an EU-Angola SIFA;

G.  whereas special and differentiated treatment is a founding principle of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Policy Coherence for Development principle should guide EU trade relations with developing countries;

H.  whereas gender inequality costs sub-Saharan Africa on average 6 % of the region’s yearly GDP, jeopardising the continent’s efforts for inclusive human development and economic growth; whereas a one percent increase in gender inequality reduces a country’s human development index by 0,75 %;

I.  whereas the SADC EPA States are facing challenges such as deep inequalities and a heavy dependence on exports of unprocessed raw materials and agricultural products;

J.  whereas these inequalities have proven to be an obstacle to broad-based industrialisation efforts and sometimes lead to corruption, and require the development of differentiated policies to address economic inequalities within and between countries in the SADC region;

K.  whereas the SADC Vision 2050 is based on three pillars: industrial development and market integration, infrastructure development in support of regional integration, and social and human capital development;

L.  whereas the SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap 2015-2063 identifies three preferred growth paths for resource-based industrialisation in the region: agricultural commodity processing, mineral processing, and industrial and service-based value chains;

M.  whereas developing countries face a gap of USD 2,5 trillion in annual financing to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030; whereas foreign direct investment (FDI) is an instrument for financing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the corresponding SDGs; whereas such capital can support job creation and social and environmental improvements, as set out in the SDGs; whereas the aim of attracting investment should go hand in hand with the acknowledgement, in the context of international investment agreements (IIAs), that the parties to these agreements should seek to improve their levels of environmental or labour protection, and not weaken or reduce them;

N.  whereas the objective of the SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap 2015–2063 is to develop and participate in regional and global value chains;

O.  whereas transport and digital infrastructure is needed to develop regional value chains and increasingly integrate SADC States into global value chains;

P.  whereas the crucial elements for successful participation in the value chain are financing, skills, technology, infrastructure and logistics;

Q.  whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly widened the investment gaps in the SADC EPA States and limited their fiscal space;

R.  whereas the consequences of the measures taken to prevent the spread of COVID-19 have significantly affected the livelihoods of populations, particularly in the states of Eswatini and Lesotho, which depend on the South African Labour and Border Crossing;

S.  whereas commodity price volatility during the COVID-19 pandemic caused economic damage to SADC EPA States dependent on the tax revenues from extractive industries;

T.  whereas the low level of local production of health products keeps the region dependent on international production for the procurement of vital health products, including essential vaccines against COVID-19;

EPA monitoring and review process

1.  Welcomes the first review process launched in November 2021 after the EPA had been provisionally applied since 2016 and expects it to be able to demonstrate the link between the EPA and sustainable development; calls on the Commission to work with the SADC partners to advance fair, inclusive and sustainable trade so that the EPA, when implemented effectively, can ensure and contribute to sustainable development in the region; urges the Commission in the ex post evaluation of the EU-SADC EPA to analyse thoroughly the impact of the EPA on SDGs, informal and local economies, regional and pan-African integration, economic diversification, the fight against climate change, including the contribution of domestic industries to this effort, and the effective support of Global Gateway and the EU Aid for Trade programme in the context of the EU-SADC EPA; recalls that the present agreement primarily focuses on trade in goods and does not address trade in services, investment, or other issues such as intellectual property rights, competition, and public procurement; invites the parties to consider these issues in the future reviews, since a provision exists for negotiating on these matters in the future;

2.  Reiterates its position on the importance of the involvement of civil society in the implementation and monitoring of the EPA; regrets the fact that limited civil society involvement during EPA implementation has been observed; emphasises, in this regard, the imperative of actively promoting civil society participation; notes that the active participation of civil society organisations and stakeholders, including women’s groups and students’ organisations, in the monitoring and evaluation process can provide valuable insights and feedback on the agreement’s impact on women and young people;

3.  Acknowledges that the preparation of the joint monitoring report on the EPA is advancing at a pace slower than anticipated; acknowledges the capacity constraints faced by SADC EPA States in this regard; recalls that, pursuant to the new trade and sustainable development (TSD) approach, all relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations, business representatives and trade unions, should be involved in this stocktaking exercise and encouraged to make proposals to maximise the effectiveness of the EPA and that the EPA should be modernised to establish a Domestic Advisory Group, which has become a common practice in other EPAs; advocates more structured participation of stakeholders with regard to the concrete implementation of all sustainability aspects in the EU-SADC EPA; urges SADC EPA States countries to comply with the commitments agreed under the EPA to engage civil society actors;

4.  Recognises that flexible transitional arrangements are needed for SADC EPA States to comply with the TSD requirements in the EPA and with other international commitments;

5.  Expects that, depending on the outcome of the review, the EPA will be adapted or possibly expanded in complementary agreements in order to consolidate and deepen the partnership between the EU and Southern African countries in response to geopolitical changes and to the challenges of climate change;

6.  Welcomes the decarbonisation aspirations of Angola, a country that has been heavily reliant on its extractive industries;

7.  Welcomes the fact that within the framework of the EU-Angola SIFA, fiscal capacity building measures are being envisaged;

Trade balances

8.  Welcomes the fact that trade relations between the EU and the SADC EPA States have expanded significantly, both at regional and bilateral levels, with the SADC EPA States being able to achieve a trade surplus; considers that this demonstrates the EPA’s positive contribution to economic development, while the desired positive effects on employment, regional economic cooperation and the diversification and modernisation of the economy have not yet reached their potential and should be pursued as a priority; notes that SADC EPA States mainly export precious stones, articles of wood, transports(8), mineral products and agricultural products, such as fruits and vegetables, to the EU; notes, however, that South Africa’s exports to the EU are more diverse and include higher added-value goods;

9.  Emphasises that with the exception of South Africa, SADC EPA States primarily trade within the region; notes that trade with South Africa continues to account for 80 % of the EU’s trade with the SADC EPA States and that South Africa’s trade in goods with other African countries accounts for only 17 % of its total foreign trade; notes that intra-SADC trade accounts for 23 % of SADC States’ total trade; acknowledges that intra-SADC trade patterns differ from EU-SADC bilateral trade; points out that overall, there has been no improvement in diversification and the share of manufacturing in GDP remains weak; stresses that diversified economies would make the SADC EPA States more resilient to external shocks; stresses the importance of strengthening regional value chains;

10.  Stresses that the EPA should support a new trade dynamic between the Parties by means of the progressive asymmetrical liberalisation of trade between them; stresses also that it can reinforce, broaden and deepen cooperation in all areas relevant to trade and therefore also enhance the partnership between the SADC countries and the EU; stresses the importance of the principle of asymmetric trade liberalisation as a tool to foster the economic growth and sustainable development of SADC EPA countries;

11.  Underlines that while EPAs can provide significant advantages for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, they also come with their own set of challenges and drawbacks; insists, therefore, that policymakers carefully consider these factors and work to ensure that EPAs are implemented in a way that maximises benefits for all parties involved;

12.  Recalls that all the Parties should always act on the basis of the principles of solidarity and mutual interest in order to enhance their fruitful collaboration, fulfil their commitments and obligations, and facilitate the capacity of the SADC EPA countries to continue to implement the agreement;

Technical barriers to trade

13.  Recalls that the SADC EPA aims to promote regional integration and that the agreement should be a building block for the African Continental Free Trade Area launched in 2021; notes that regional integration is challenged by long waiting times at border crossings, high border costs and inadequate cross-border connectivity; calls on the Commission and the SADC EPA States to increase cooperation in infrastructure, digital trade and certification, including under the Global Gateway Initiative; stresses the importance of prioritising regional transport and infrastructure projects in the region to deepen regional integration and increase intra-trade flows; recalls the need to promote efficient cross-border infrastructure development, harmonising regulations and strengthening cooperation between SADC EPA States in order to create an interconnected SADC region; calls on the SADC EPA States to harmonise the regulations and procedures related to customs and transportation in order to simplify cross-border processes, reduce delays and promote a conducive environment for trade and investment;

14.  Stresses the necessity of formalising cross-border work arrangements to promote decent work, protect workers’ rights and ensure social and economic development in the region; recognises the specific challenges faced by women, particularly in the context of cross-border work, including gender-based violence and corruption;

15.  Urges the Commission and the SADC EPA States to extend their commitment to creating an enabling environment that supports legal and transparent labour mobility, while safeguarding the rights and dignity of workers;

Rules of origin

16.  Welcomes the Commission’s announcement on the activation of regional cumulation with Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries; recalls that the introduction of flexible rules of origin is essential for achieving regional integration objectives; stresses that rules of origin must promote the objectives of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA); recalls that the EPA should support the further development of the AfCFTA;

Trade disputes and market access issues

17.  Notes that trade irritants have occurred in relation to sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, in particular for poultry and citrus fruits; calls on the Commission and the SADC EPA States to use the forums and cooperation mechanisms agreed under the EPA to address changes in SPS regulations at an early stage and in a cooperative atmosphere so that appropriate action can be taken in a timely manner; recalls that the European Parliament should be fully informed in the framework of the review ensuring that the SPS measures applied by South Africa are in line with Union requirements and the provisions of the EPA and do not harm the plant health of Union and SADC production; acknowledges that the Commission has given technical and financial support to EU-SADC EPA States to comply with the requirements of the SPS measures and calls for a thorough monitoring of the work to reduce health risks; recommends that solutions to trade irritants caused by SPS requirements be sought through high-level political discussions;

Capacity building

18.  Notes that governance and fiscal and institutional capacity remain the greatest challenges for the EPA’s effective implementation;

19.  Highlights the importance of development cooperation and technical and financial assistance as essential factors for achieving the objectives under the EPA and for beneficial cooperation between the Parties;

20.  Recalls that it can be challenging for smaller ACP countries lacking in resources and infrastructure to implement EPAs; calls for the EU and its Member States to assist their developing partner countries so that they can fully take advantage of the opportunities presented by EPAs;

21.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to step up their efforts in technical assistance; calls on the Commission to significantly expand its communication and cooperation with SADC EPA States and to provide them and, when appropriate, their companies and civil society organisations, with timely support in implementing upcoming EU projects and fulfilling other international commitments such as the Multilateral Environmental Agreements, the International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights;

Economic, social and environmental development

22.  Concludes that the EPA has not succeeded in deepening regional value chains and those in and between SADC EPA States to any significant extent, but should strengthen the diversification of exports and regional value-added chains, as well as create more resilient supply chains that can adapt to future disruptions of the socio-economic development of the SADC; underlines the importance of developing regional value chains for the economic resilience of the region; expects the EPA to better contribute to combating the lasting problems of food sovereignty and poverty reduction in the SADC EPA States; recalls that the objective of EPAs is to create positive effects on economic development and regional integration; stresses that the EPA still has a lot of potential to advance sustainable development and that this should be pursued as a priority;

23.  Underlines the wish to leave sufficient policy space for SADC EPA States to create local added value; believes that the EU should actively support the SADC EPA States in their efforts to move up the value chain; stresses that the effective management of regional specialisation is essential to maximise the potential of regional value chains and requires cooperative governance structures and policies; calls for the EU and SADC EPA States to work towards the development of high-quality digital infrastructure, including broadband networks and digital platforms, to enhance connectivity, promote e-commerce and facilitate the exchange of information and services across borders;

24.  Underscores the critical importance of the service value chain in driving economic growth, fostering innovation and enhancing regional cooperation within the SADC region; highlights the potential in the service sectors in the SADC region, which include financial services, tourism and telecommunications;

25.  Underlines the importance of the EU’s commitment to multilateral cooperation and to securing Europe’s own trade interests, while at the same time addressing some of the key interests of ACP countries, particularly with regard to regional integration;

26.  Recalls the two-pillar solution for addressing the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation and globalisation of the economy, as agreed by the members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting;

27.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure that the agreed global minimum corporate tax rate of 15 % for multinational enterprises is applied effectively; underlines that this minimum tax rate is estimated to generate around USD 150 billion in additional global tax revenues annually;

28.  Calls on the Commission to ensure that developing countries can fully exercise their rights under the WTO special and differential treatment provisions, most notably in order to ensure their food security; calls on the Commission to update its 2009 communication on fair trade(9);

29.  Stresses that there is an urgent need to undertake far-reaching joint efforts towards decarbonisation and to support this with substantial funding, as well as to carry out far-reaching technology transfers; emphasises the significance of joint collaboration in promoting sustainable development and combating climate change, while fostering economic growth; stresses that the establishment of energy partnerships with the countries of the SADC region must focus not only on the implementation of the Green Deal in Europe, but must at the same time aim to supply the region;

30.  Reiterates that the green transition offers the potential to be a generator of quality and green jobs that can contribute significantly to poverty eradication and social inclusion, both in EU Member States and in the SADC EPA States;

31.  Underscores the importance of investing in education and skills development tailored to decarbonisation efforts, while addressing the challenges of the just transition;

32.  Considers that projects to improve local infrastructure in the SADC EPA countries in connection with city partnerships are useful in order to underpin climate partnerships between the EU and individual SADC EPA States in a decentralised manner, and to deepen exchanges between municipalities in Southern Africa and the EU; is convinced that municipal exchanges make it possible for African and European experts to develop problem-appropriate solutions for the development of local infrastructure; welcomes the fact that such partnership projects are supported by the programme ‘Local Authorities: Partnerships for sustainable cities 2020’; calls on the Commission to continue to assist the SADC EPA countries in meeting EU environmental policy requirements and maintain this funding programme; urges the Commission, the European External Action Service and the EU delegations to facilitate dialogue with the aim of promoting mutual understanding on the impact of EU climate initiatives, such as the introduction of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) Regulation and the Deforestation Regulation, and upcoming Union due diligence legislation;

33.  Stresses that the SADC EPA States are particularly affected by the impacts of climate change; recalls that agriculture in Southern Africa is affected by both floods and droughts; urges the Commission and the SADC EPA States to intensify their cooperation in developing appropriate early warning systems and coordination between the relevant ministries of the SADC EPA States in order to achieve the objectives of the Nationally Determined Contributions;

34.  Welcomes the efforts of the SADC EPA States and the Commission to establish closer cooperation on resilient food systems and food sovereignty within the review process; considers that this cooperation is an opportunity to push forward the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas and agriculture-oriented ILO Conventions such as No. 129 on labour inspection in agriculture, No. 10 on minimum age in agriculture and No. 11 on the right of association in agriculture; recalls the fact that agro-ecology’s capacity to reconcile the economic, environmental and social dimensions of sustainability has been recognised in landmark reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, as well as the World Bank and FAO-led global agricultural assessment (IAASTD);

35.  Stresses the need for efforts in building climate-resilient value chains within the agro-industry and the development of drought-resistant crop varieties and climate-adapted processing techniques;

36.  Emphasises that access to clean water and sanitation facilities is fundamental to agricultural sustainability; stresses the need for comprehensive water management strategies; emphasises that the lack of access to clean water and sanitation in the SADC region is an obstacle to sustainable development;

37.  Calls for regional agro-processing initiatives to be carried out and shared among SADC EPA States in order to promote knowledge exchange and the sharing of best practices; calls for the progress made in regional value chains in agricultural processing to be monitored;

Gender

38.  Acknowledges the vital role of women in the economic development of the SADC region and the importance of creating an enabling environment that safeguards their rights; calls on the Commission to prioritise gender issues in the context of the implementation of the EPA, for example by organising workshops on gender equality between, inter alia, women’s rights organisations in the EU and in SADC countries, by raising the awareness of domestic authorities and companies as to the untapped economic potential stemming from discrimination against women and by helping them identify the political, economic and social drivers that hamper African women’s advancement and calls for policies and concrete actions to close the gender gap; stresses the importance of empowering women and young people in the SADC region by enhancing their access to finance, resources and economic participation; calls for the EU and the SADC EPA States to ensure equal and unhindered access to financial services and resources for women and young people, and the promotion of financial inclusion;

Investment

39.  Points out that green finance and investments need to be significantly scaled up in order to achieve the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement and to advance the transition to a low-carbon and climate-resilient economy in the SADC EPA States;

40.  Calls for the EU and SADC EPA States to actively explore innovative mechanisms for green finance, including green bonds, climate-focused investment funds and public-private partnerships, leveraging international platforms to attract investments in sustainable and climate-resilient projects; calls for the EU to leverage its influence in obtaining improved financing practices from institutions such as the World Bank and enhancing the International Monetary Fund’s role in reducing the debt of heavily indebted countries and therefore calls for the EU and its Member States to use their influence to explore new approaches that unlock finance for climate adaptation; emphasises the need for proactive measures to continue to attract increased investments, notably in strategic and innovative sectors, which can lead to higher-quality outcomes and foster more sustainable development, which could result in long-term benefits both for the SADC EPA States and the EU; further urges the EU and SADC EPA States to jointly explore innovative financing possibilities such as securing loans and subsequently allocating them under appropriate conditions to finance public infrastructure in crucial areas such as energy, water supply, waste disposal and recycling;

41.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to intensify their efforts at international forums, including the WTO, to advocate increased international climate financing;

42.  Notes that the investment stock of EU Member States in the SADC EPA States remains significantly higher than that of the United States or China;

43.  Further considers that there is an urgent need to increase sustainable investment in the SADC region and expects investment areas to be identified that appear particularly suitable for investment partnerships between the EU and the SADC EPA States; calls for a better coordinated Team Europe approach in identifying and implementing suitable measures to increase investment; stresses that the achievement of the SDGs requires massive investments in supporting infrastructure and diversification away from dependence on primary commodities towards high-value industrial products; stresses that the EU’s investment policy should help developing countries, notably African countries, to attract FDI and to reduce the funding gap to achieve the SDGs; emphasises that creating decent jobs must be a key factor for supporting investment in the SADC region, enabling robust domestic frameworks for human rights and environmental due diligence; underlines the importance of involving local companies wherever possible in the implementation process to keep invested funds in the region, boost employment and facilitate the transfer of skills; believes that Global Gateway funds should be increased and that the share of grants for equally necessary public investments must be increased;

44.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that when selecting and supporting Global Gateway projects, social dialogue needs to be an integral part of the institutional framework for policy-making and implementation at all levels;

45.  Calls on the Commission to better coordinate the individual national export credit agencies of EU Member States in order to align with the priorities of the European Green Deal;

46.  Underlines the significance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the economic development of SADC States, recognising their potential and role; reiterates the need to raise awareness on the benefits and opportunities of the agreement, in particular for SMEs;

47.  Emphasises the importance of proactive involvement by private sector enterprises in the implementation and monitoring of the EU-SADC EPA;

48.  Calls on the Commission to actively promote and encourage participation in capacity-building programmes and regional initiatives aimed at strengthening investment and export capacity, while fostering a more SME-friendly market environment;

49.  Welcomes the introduction of EU programmes such as the Support to Improving the Investment and the Business Environment Programme aimed at improving the business and investment climate in SADC States; calls, in this context, for more funding to be envisaged in the next financial period in order to give a greater boost to the growth and development of private sector, as well as to create job opportunities for the local population, thereby reducing poverty;

50.  Stresses that a transparent and predictable legal and fiscal framework will help promote regional integration and attract foreign direct investment;

Angola’s accession

51.  Recognises the importance of the EU-Angola SIFA to this Agreement as a new approach to build the necessary transparent and predictable legal and fiscal framework fostering the due diligence of investors to attract sustainable and responsible investment, and highlights the agreed provisions on commitments on gender, climate change and sustainable development; encourages other countries in the region to consider similar SIFAs with the EU, which include nationally determined contributions in their design; underlines that the EU-Angola SIFA should contribute to the attraction and expansion of sustainable investment in Angola, as well as to the promotion of economic diversification, while at the same time integrating environmental and labour rights commitments, and should not have the opposite effect; highlights sustainable investment opportunities in the climate-sensitive agricultural sector, investments in renewable energy and climate-resilient infrastructure, as well as skills development; calls on the Commission to prioritise cooperation projects that promote the sustainability commitments set out in the EU-Angola SIFA within the Multiannual Indicative Programme for Angola; believes that agreements such as the EU-Angola SIFA can provide a legal and organisational framework for sustainable investment that reduces Angola’s dependency on oil and gas; welcomes the fact that the EU-Angola SIFA includes important aspects of the practical implementation of investments such as the transparency and predictability of investments, the streamlining of approval procedures, the establishment of focal points of interested investors, procedures for dispute avoidance and resolution and for the due diligence of investors; calls for the EU and the SADC EPA States to consider whether a Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreement should complement the EPA; calls on the SADC EPA States to enter into negotiations on this issue, if necessary;

52.  Welcomes the request of Angola to join the EU-SADC EPA; hopes, in this context, that the negotiation process will commence without further delay; considers that if Angola joins the EU-SADC EPA or any other separate binding and enforceable international instrument between the EU and SADC States, the EU-Angola SIFA should be adapted accordingly;

53.  Recalls that according to the Commission’s impact assessment, Angola faces capacity issues in implementing the EPA effectively; calls on the Commission to assist Angola in capacity building;

Raw materials

54.  Calls on the Commission and the SADC EPA States to strengthen cooperation through formal forums, as well as critical raw materials strategic partnerships and implementation roadmaps, in order to ensure a diversified and sustainable supply of key raw materials for the green, digital and just transitions, improve recycling of natural resources and waste management, support domestic industries to move up the value chain from the extraction to the processing of raw materials and promote responsible mining practices, notably by recognising and applying the free prior and informed consent of the local population affected by mining projects and by bringing benefits along the entire supply and production chain; is convinced that raw materials extraction needs to occur with respect for environmental standards, labour and human rights, including the rights of indigenous peoples; calls for the continuous and broad participation of all relevant stakeholders, including local and indigenous communities; advocates policy reforms addressing land and mine ownership, labour rights and social justice in order to mitigate conflicts and encourage sustainable investment; is concerned about cases of violations of human rights and the high level of environmental damage caused by some mining companies;

55.  Welcomes the Strategic Partnership with Namibia, which aims to build renewable hydrogen development and critical raw material value chains; recalls the need for developing necessary infrastructure, such as renewable energy facilities, transportation networks and research centres, to facilitate the production and distribution of renewable hydrogen;

56.  Calls, in this context, for the establishment of knowledge-sharing platforms and research networks in order to facilitate the exchange of best practices, experience and innovative solutions between Member States; considers it useful to extend technological cooperation to other fields;

57.  Stresses that the EU’s request to ban export taxes on raw materials has been a long-standing stumbling block in the negotiation process on EPAs, given that export taxes and duties are not prohibited under the WTO regime; recalls the right of African countries to regulate raw materials in their public interest; calls, accordingly, for the EU to refrain from adopting a trade policy that prohibits, as a general rule, developing countries from levying export taxes on raw materials, insofar as this is WTO-compatible;

TRIPS waiver

58.  Notes that the original proposal of, inter alia, India and South Africa for a Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) waiver for COVID vaccines was met with different reactions in the beginning and was later supported by the EU; stresses that in the future, equal partnership should involve more dialogue; calls for the EU and its Member States and on the WTO Members to take forward the long overdue discussions in the WTO on the extension of the 12th Ministerial Conference TRIPS decision to extend the agreed flexibilities at WTO level to therapeutics and diagnostics; in this context, invites the Commission to put in place a clear policy framework to ensure that the future EU compulsory licencing system is in line with the agreed TRIPS flexibilities; calls for stronger equal cooperation with the SADC EPA States in this context;

59.  Welcomes the efforts made within the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership to build a vaccine production infrastructure; stresses that this infrastructure must include the production of COVID-19 vaccines;

o
o   o

60.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Southern African Development Community Economic Partnership Agreement States.

(1) OJ L 250, 16.9.2016, p. 3. (2) OJ C 204, 13.6.2018, p. 222. (3) OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 99. (4) OJ C 32, 27.1.2023, p. 74. (5) OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 80. (6) OJ C 105, 4.3.2022, p. 40. (7) Study – ‘EU-Southern African Development Community Economic Partnership Agreement: A geo-economic perspective’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services, 22 November 2023. (8) Cipollina, M., ‘The Trade Growth under the EU–SADC Economic Partnership Agreement: An Empirical Assessment’. Economies Vol. 10, No12, 2022. (9) Commission communication of 5 May 2009 entitled ‘Contributing to Sustainable Development: The role of Fair Trade and non-governmental trade-related sustainability assurance schemes (COM(2009)0215).

European Parliament resolution of 29 February 2024 on the critical situation in Cuba (2024/2584(RSP))

P9_TA(2024)0122 RC-B9-0144/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Cuba, in particular its resolution of 12 July 2023 on the state of the EU-Cuba PDCA in the light of the recent visit of the High Representative to the island(1),

–  having regard to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part(2) (PDCA), signed in December 2016 and provisionally applied since 1 November 2017,

–  having regard to Articles 4, 5 and 229 of the Cuban Constitution and to the Cuban Penal Code,

–  having regard to the definition of ‘civil society organisation’ in the Official Journal of the European Union,

–  having regard to document ARES (2021) 2474104 by the European External Action Service (EEAS) Deputy Managing Director for the Americas,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966 and other international human rights treaties and instruments,

–  having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1984, to which Cuba is a State Party,

–  having regard to reports by human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch, the Human Rights Foundation and Prisoners Defenders, to Chapter IV.B on Cuba of the 2020, 2021 and 2022 annual reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), to the communication of 6 November 2019 to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights from the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, and the UN Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, on Cuban medical brigades, to the communication of 2 November 2023 to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights from the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, on Cuban medical brigades, and to the conclusions of the UN Human Rights Council’s 2018 Universal Periodic Review of Cuba with regard to Cuban medical brigades,

–  having regard to the communication of 16 November 2023 issued to Cuba by the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues,

–  having regard to Rules 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas Parliament gave its consent to the PDCA on 5 July 2017, with clear conditions linked to the improvement of human rights and democracy in Cuba, including a suspension clause in the event of a violation of the human rights provisions; whereas the accompanying resolution asked the Cuban authorities to allow European Parliament delegations to enter the country and have access to their interlocutors;

B.  whereas several articles of the EU-Cuba PDCA, namely Articles 1, 2 and 3, establish clear principles on equality, reciprocity, mutual respect, strengthening of contacts, dialogue and cooperation between both societies; whereas Parliament has requested that the EEAS do everything possible to closely monitor the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba when applying the PDCA; whereas respect for human, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights is essential for the EU;

C.  whereas the number of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience in Cuba has risen dramatically, reaching 1 066 on 31 January 2024, including 33 who were minors at the time of detention, an eightfold increase since 2018, rising by 170 in the last 12 months, equivalent to a monthly average of more than 14 politically motivated detentions; whereas human rights organisations have also documented more than 11 000 cases of ‘pre criminal’ convictions with average sentences of 2 years and 10 months without any crime having been committed or attempted , a number reported by the Speaker of the UN Committee Against Torture (CAT) in April 2022 in the Concluding verbal observations at the 73rd Session of the CAT Periodic Review on Cuba; whereas in the past decades, Article 72 of the Cuban Civil Code has permitted an average of 3 850 new ‘pre-criminal’ detentions every year; whereas Articles 434.1 and 189.3 of Cuba’s new Penal Code build on the ‘pre-criminal’ measures contained in the Civil Code;

D.  whereas the UN previously expressed its concern to Cuba about the detention and imprisonment of religious leaders in the country; whereas on 16 November 2023, five mandate-holders and rapporteurs of the UN Special Procedures sent Cuba a communication in which they described and condemned Cuba’s systematic pattern of persecution, imprisonment and torture of evangelical pastors and Catholic priests, Muslim imams and Yoruba/Santería religious leaders;

E.  whereas the Institute for Crime and Justice Policy Research updated in January 2024 the World Prison Brief reporting an increase in the number of prisoners on the island, placing Cuba second in the world in terms of its incarceration rate; whereas the Cuban Government continues to use arbitrary detention to harass and intimidate critics, independent activists, political opponents and others;

F.  whereas human rights organisations continue to document the ongoing crackdown on the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association in the country and the Cuban authorities’ stifling of dissenting voices and targeting of human rights defenders; whereas in 2023 more than 200 incidents of internet restrictions were documented, including hacking into the accounts of journalists in order to silence them and curb free speech;

G.  whereas the human rights situation in Cuba is deeply concerning, particularly with regard to vulnerable populations, such as women, ethnic minorities and the LGBTIQ+ community; whereas non-governmental organisations and independent observatories report an increase in femicides in Cuba, with the number of femicides rising to 89 in 2023 and eight new cases being reported so far in 2024; whereas despite this, the regime has not implemented a system for registering femicides in Cuba using up-to-date public data, and a comprehensive law against gender-based violence, guaranteeing the involvement of civil society representatives, has not yet been adopted;

H.  whereas Parliament has repeatedly reminded the EEAS that the participation of representatives of independent civil society in political dialogues and the agreement’s cooperation projects is an essential part of the PDCA, as stressed in its Article 36, and that excluding representatives of independent civil society from cooperation funds and/or participation in the agreement while, on the contrary, allowing participation and access to cooperation funds exclusively for companies in which the state participates or which it controls, as has been the case since the signing of the agreement, should be remedied immediately;

I.  whereas on 2 January 2024, the UN publicly disclosed the letter of indictment sent to the Cuban regime accusing it of forced labour, one of the forms of modern slavery denounced by the Special Rapporteurs on Human Trafficking and Slavery; whereas several international organisations have denounced the fact that Cuban civilian workers serving abroad, including doctors, teachers, sailors, engineers, artists or athletes, are subjected to human trafficking by inherently coercive laws and regulations affecting very explicit basic freedoms, including Article 176 of the Penal Code, Mincex Resolution 368 of 2020, the Migration Law and Decree 306 of 2012;

J.  whereas the regime gradually imposed on Cuba rules out any prospect of democratic change, as Article 5 of the Cuban Constitution states that the ‘unique, Martí, Fidelista and Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Cuba’ is the highest political force and ruler of society and the state, and as Articles 4 and 229 establish the current political system as irrevocable;

K.  whereas despite years of insisting on the need to visit the island, the Cuban authorities systematically refuse to allow official committees, delegations and some political groups from the European Parliament, international human rights organisations and other independent observers of the human rights situation, including UN special rapporteurs, to enter Cuba or to visit prisons;

L.  whereas on 23 November 2023, the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament authorised the sending of an ad hoc delegation to Cuba following a letter of invitation from the Ambassador of Cuba to Belgium and the European Union dated 20 September 2023; whereas on 19 December 2023, the Vice President of the Cuban Parliament informed the EU ambassador in Cuba of its refusal to receive Parliament’s delegation with the justification that it did ‘not wish to receive the visit of Members of the European Parliament who work against Cuba’s interests and are completely aligned with the United States’; whereas the Ambassador of the Republic of Cuba, in a letter dated 25 January 2024, addressed to the President of the European Parliament, referred to the President of the ad hoc delegation of the European Parliament to Cuba and two other members, as ‘maintaining links and supporting citizens and organisations included in the National List of persons and entities ... based on acts of terrorism’; whereas in November 2023, a delegation of the Cuban Parliament was received at the European Parliament’s premises;

M.  whereas Parliament has awarded its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to Cuban activists on three occasions: Oswaldo Payá in 2002, the Ladies in White in 2005 and Guillermo Fariñas in 2010; whereas Sakharov laureates and their relatives are still being regularly harassed, intimidated and prevented from leaving the country and participating in international events; whereas on June 2023, the IACHR concluded that state agents were directly involved in the deaths of democracy activists Oswaldo Payá and Harold Cepero in a 2012 car accident; whereas there should be a fully transparent investigation to bring to justice those responsible for the killing of Oswaldo Payá and Harold Cepero;

N.  whereas the PDCA has failed in its core aim of improving fundamental freedoms in Cuba;

1.  Regrets that despite the time that has elapsed since the entry into force of the PDCA, the situation of a lack of democracy and freedoms in Cuba has not improved, and that on the contrary, there has been a further deterioration and aggravation of the human rights situation on the island, in clear and systematic violation of the basic provisions of the PDCA;

2.  Stresses the obligation for all parties to fulfil the binding provisions of the PDCA and to uphold the principle of the universality of human rights;

3.  Condemns in the strongest terms the systematic human rights violations and abuses perpetrated by the Cuban regime against protesters, political dissidents, religious leaders, human rights activists and independent artists, among others; urges the Cuban authorities to immediately put an end to the policy of repression; condemns the lack of religious freedom in Cuba;

4.  Is concerned at the alarming increase in the number of political prisoners, which has risen more than eightfold since 2018, making Cuba the biggest prison for political activists and dissidents in Latin America; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of individuals detained solely for exercising their human rights, including the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; further calls for the dismissal of unjust criminal charges and supports the facilitation of the return of those in exile;

5.  Declares it unacceptable that the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Havana agreed to exclude the Cuban democratic opposition and independent and legitimate civil society organisations, both European and Cuban, from political dialogues because of the lack of endorsement by the Cuban authorities; recalls its resolution of July 2023 in which it deeply regretted the fact that the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) squandered the chance to support democracy through Cuban civil society and the political prisoners and to send a clear message about the EU’s concerns regarding human rights violations in Cuba;

6.  Reiterates its firm and unconditional support for the Cuban people, for all human rights defenders in Cuba and for their commendable dedication to freedoms and all rights which the Cuban regime has denied for decades;

7.  Expresses its deep concern over the existence of forced labour in Cuba and condemns Cuban state-driven forced labour, in particular in medical brigades, but also involving teachers, sailors, engineers, artists, athletes and others, whose salary is mostly appropriated by the Cuban Government; denounces the fact that most of the ‘volunteers’ in international missions stated that they were deployed against their will or had to participate under coercive structural conditions;

8.  Notes that in November 2023, members of the Cuban Parliament, including the Secretary of the Cuban National Parliament, Homero Acosta, were accorded respectful treatment and warmly received at the European Parliament; declares the continued exclusion of the European Parliament, which is the sole European institution denied access to Cuban territory, to be unacceptable and in violation of the PDCA; rejects Cuba’s decision to refuse a visit by an ad hoc delegation from Parliament and urges the Cuban authorities to adhere to the principles of the PDCA and grant Parliament access to the country; requests that, in accordance with the PDCA’s principles of equality, reciprocity and mutual respect, similar measures be adopted, denying access to Parliament’s premises to any representative of the National Assembly of People’s Power or of the Cuban regime;

9.  Demands that, in accordance with the PDCA, the Cuban authorities grant access to a European Parliament, EU and Member State delegation, as well as to independent human rights organisations, in order to monitor trials and visit the hundreds of activists and ordinary Cubans who remain imprisoned for exercising their right to freedom of expression and assembly; calls on the HR/VP, in any contact with the Cuban authorities, to raise the fact that Parliament has yet again been denied access and to urge them to reverse this decision immediately;

10.  Reiterates its call on the Council to apply the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (the EU Magnitsky Act) and adopt sanctions against those responsible for the persistent human rights violations in Cuba, starting by sanctioning Miguel Díaz-Canel, as the most senior figure in the chain of command of the Cuban security forces, along with other high-ranking officials within the Cuban Government and all those responsible for the imprisonment of political prisoners;

11.  Reiterates its call for the EU to trigger Article 85(3)(b) of the PDCA to request an immediate meeting of the joint committee owing to the Cuban Government’s breaches of the agreement, which constitute a ‘case of special urgency’, underlines that these breaches involve persistent and substantial violations of democratic principles, as well as a disregard for the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and emphasised in Article 1(5) of the PDCA, and stresses that the Cuban regime’s failure to address such transgressions despite repeated calls from Parliament to do so should lead to the suspension of the agreement;

12.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government and National Assembly of People’s Power of Cuba, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the governments of the members of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0280. (2) OJ L 337 I, 13.12.2016, p. 3.